Race, Space, and Nation: The Moral Geography of White Public Opinion on Restrictive Immigration Policy

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Yalidy Mercedes Matos, M.A.

Graduate Program in Political Science

The Ohio State University

2015

Dissertation Committee:

Kathleen McGraw, Advisor

Ismail K. White

Reanne Frank

Copyright by

Yalidy Mercedes Matos

2015 Abstract

This dissertation examines the determinants, both internal- and external factors, of attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies. I frame my examination and discussion of this research within a larger argument about immigration as a series of racial projects that have and continue to contribute to the imaginaries of American-ness. Essential to these racial projects are both internal and external factors, of which I focus on individual- level predispositions as internal factors, and the media and geographic context as the external factors. First, at the individual level, I explore the ways in which five predispositions— racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, anti- egalitarianism, and social dominance orientation—affect individuals’ attitudes towards immigration policies, and I argue that underlying these predispositions are conceptions of

American national identity. Second, the media works as an external factor to frame the issue of immigration in ways that are not only predominately negative and conflate illegality with Latinos and immigrants alike, but also in ways that engage the aforementioned predispositions further emphasizing the link between immigration and the definition of what it means to be “American.” Finally, geographic context is key to understanding attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies. Geographic context is associated with both varying levels of individual’s predispositions and the framing of immigration in the media. Moreover, territory and borders (as part of geographic

ii contexts) are intricate concepts vis-à-vis the birth of American nationalism. Borders delineate us from them. Accordingly, geographic contexts are interlaced with sociopolitical historical legacies. Environments—whether a neighborhood, state or a region—have a specific history that is embedded within the psyche of that environment in ways that affect contemporary immigration rhetoric and discourse. I put forward a novel theoretical framework that furthers our understanding of immigration politics, and that has wide applicability beyond the immigration context.

iii

Para mi mamá y papá, por ser lo suficiente valiente de soñar más grande para sus hijos

To all immigrant families, who dare to dream big

iv Acknowledgments

I would not have been able to successfully complete graduate school or this dissertation without the help of many along the way.

First and foremost, God.

My family, thank you for the constant love and support. My parents' believe in the importance of education and their willingness to let me venture out of Washington

Heights, NYC for college. Gracias a mi mamá, Lidia, por ser el ser humano más valiente y compasiva que conozco, y por su apoyo incondicional. Mi papá, Julio, por enseñarme a trabajar duro, dedicación, puntualidad, y por su apoyo incondicional. To my sisters,

Julissa and Vianna, for your love and believing in me. To my nieces and nephews, who provided me with so much joy and laughter throughout the years. To my brother,

Alexander, I do what I do for you.

My friends, support system, and cheerleading team, I could not have made it through in one piece if it was not for the love and support you all provided me. Delia

Fernandez, Tiffany Lewis, Danielle Olden, Eva Pietri, Mei-ling Rivera-Cerezo, Taneisha

Means, Kenneth Blacks, Leila Ben-Nasr, and Cassie Patterson you have been the best support team I could have asked for; thank you for always being there. Delia and Tiffany, these past two years you have been my rock, you kept me going and cheered me on, and for that I will be eternally grateful.

v My advisor and dissertation chair, Kathleen McGraw, thank you for believing in me, for your support, your time, and investment. Words cannot express how indebted I feel for the time and effort you have provided me and my work.

Thank you to my dissertation committee members Reanne Frank and Ismail

White, for your invaluable comments.

Theresa Delgadillo, Yolanda Zepeda, and Inés Valdez, thank you for supporting me during my time in graduate school. Thank you for always believing in me and providing your time to help me succeed. Thank you to Maurice Stevens, J. Marcela

Hernandez, and Cyndi Freeman for their generosity through my years at Ohio State.

Thank you to Mab Segrest, MaryAnne Borrelli, Bill Klann, and Kim Edwards.

Henry Adams once said, “A teacher affects eternity; he can never tell where his influence stops.” Thank you for being inspiring teachers, you have not only positively affected me, but everyone I come across as well. I took in your footsteps to inspire students and teach them that one’s environment does not define who they can become.

Thank you to the Graduate Association of Latin@/Latin American (GALA)

Students, for being my home away from home.

This work was made possible by The National Science Foundation Graduate

Research Fellowship (DGE-1343012), the Mershon Center for International Security

Studies, the Department of Political Science at Ohio State, Ohio State’s Office of

Diversity and Inclusion, the American Political Science Association, and the Council of

Graduate Students at Ohio State.

vi Vita

January 28, 1987 ...... Born in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic

2005 ...... High School Diploma, Vanguard High School, New York, NY

2009 ...... B.A. Gender & Women’s Studies and Government, Connecticut College, New London, CT

2009-2010 ...... Graduate Fellow, Ohio State University

2010-2011 ...... Research Assistant, Ohio State University

2011-2014 ...... National Science Foundation (NSF) Graduate Fellow

2011 ...... M.A. Political Science, Ohio State University

2014 ...... Graduate Teaching Associate, Ohio State University

2015 ...... Graduate Fellow, Ohio State University

July 2015-2017 ...... Presidential Postdoctoral Fellow, Brown University, Providence, RI

Fields of Study

Major Field: Political Science

vii Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii Acknowledgments ...... v Vita ...... vii List of Tables ...... xi List of Figures ...... xii Introduction ...... 1 Looking Ahead ...... 6 Chapter 1: Geographies of Exclusion: ...... 10 Introduction ...... 10 Predispositions, Immigration, and the Boundaries of American-ness ...... 14 The Media, Immigration, and Boundary-Setting ...... 21 Geographies of Exclusion: Immigration and Racialized Nationalism ...... 27 Immigration and Nationalism ...... 28 Nationalism and Geography ...... 30 Immigration and Geography ...... 31 Predispositions and Geographic Context ...... 36 The Media and Geographic Context ...... 41 Conclusion ...... 43 Chapter 2: Contemporary Immigration in the News ...... 45 Introduction ...... 45 The Importance of Framing ...... 48 Common Immigration Frames ...... 49 Framing and Context ...... 54 Research Design ...... 56 Methodology ...... 56 Coding ...... 60 Results: The Boundaries of American Identity through Media Frames ...... 64 Immigrants as Culturally Different ...... 66 Immigrants as Lawbreakers ...... 74 Securing America/ns ...... 80 Discussion: Predispositions in the Media ...... 87 Immigrants as Different ...... 87 Immigrants as Lawbreakers ...... 88 Immigrants as a Threat to America and Americans ...... 89

viii Limitations ...... 90 Conclusion ...... 90 Chapter 3: The Geopolitics Of Immigration ...... 92 Introduction ...... 92 Individual Predispositions and Political Outcomes ...... 94 Explaining the Links Between Predispositions & Immigration Attitudes ...... 95 The Geopolitics of Predispositions ...... 99 A Topography of Immigration ...... 101 Hypotheses ...... 104 Empirical Approach & Data ...... 105 Dependent Variables ...... 106 Key Independent Variables/Alternative Predictors ...... 107 Results ...... 109 Predispositions Influence Restrictive Immigration Policies ...... 110 Preliminary Evidence: Mapping Predispositions and State Level Correlations ...... 115 MultiLevel Analysis ...... 118 Discussion ...... 136 Racial Resentment ...... 136 Authoritarianism ...... 140 Moral Traditionalism ...... 141 Anti-Egalitarianism ...... 143 Ideology/Partisanship ...... 146 Limitations ...... 147 Conclusion ...... 147 Chapter 4: Mapping Moralities ...... 149 Introduction ...... 149 Moral Geographies ...... 150 Predispositions, Moral Geographies, and Immigration ...... 152 Methodology ...... 153 Sample ...... 154 Design ...... 156 Hypotheses: ...... 157 Dependent Variables ...... 159 Independent variables ...... 160 Results ...... 161 Predispositions in the Media ...... 170 Discussion ...... 181 Predispositions, Immigrations Policy, and Geographic Context ...... 181 Predispositions in the Media: Immigration Framing ...... 183 Limitations ...... 185 Conclusion ...... 186 Chapter 5: The Moral Geography of Whiteness ...... 188 Introduction: Geography, Race, and Immigration ...... 188 Data ...... 191 Results ...... 192 Psychological Predisposition, Geography, and Identity ...... 193 Geography and Intergroup and Intragroup Identity ...... 194 ix Regional Differences ...... 196 Are White Americans Differentiating Between Groups? ...... 198 Predicting Feeling Towards Groups? ...... 201 Regional Variation in Whiteness ...... 208 Discussion ...... 212 The Moral Geography of Psychological Predispositions ...... 212 A Possessive Investment in Whiteness ...... 217 Conclusion ...... 223 Conclusion: The Moral Geography of Immigration ...... 224 Major Findings ...... 227 Media Frames Highlight the Boundaries of American-ness ...... 228 Racial Resentment is the Strongest Predictor of Restrictive Immigration Policies ...... 229 Individual Predispositions Vary as a Function of Geographic Context ...... 230 Preferences for Restrictive Immigration Policies Vary as a Function of Geographic Context ...... 231 Immigration and The Possessive Investment in Whiteness ...... 231 Looking Ahead ...... 232 The Moral Geography of Immigration ...... 234 References ...... 236 Appendix A: Chapter 3 Question Wording ...... 255 Dependent Variable ...... 255 Independent Variables ...... 256 Appendix B: Chapter 3 Summary Statistics Table ...... 260 Appendix C: Chapter 4 & 5 Summary Statistics ...... 261 Appendix D: Experimental Manipulations ...... 263 Appendix E: Chapter 4 & 5 Question Wording ...... 267 Chapter 4 Dependent Variables ...... 267 Chapter 5 Dependent Variables ...... 268 Independent Variables ...... 268

x List of Tables

Table 2.1. Coding Scheme ...... 62 Table 2.2. Frequencies of Coding Scheme Terms ...... 65 Table 2.3. Frequency (#) of Terms Used to Describe Immigrants, 2008-2013 ...... 78 Table 2.4. “Security” Frequency Between Arizona Republic and Birmingham News ..... 82 Table 3.1. Correlations Between Individual Predispositions ...... 110 Table 3.2. What Predicts Immigration Attitudes? ...... 114 Table 3.3. Average State Predisposition and State-Level Indicators ...... 118 Table 3.4. Multilevel Models Predicting How Racial Resentment Affects Support for Police Checks and Immigration Levels, by Region ...... 122 Table 3.5. Multilevel Models Predicting Key Predispositions Affects Support for the Dream Act, by Region ...... 126 Table 3.6. Multilevel Models Predicting How Key Predispositions Affects Agreement that Immigration Takes Away Jobs, by Region ...... 131 Table 4.1 Contextual Variables ...... 156 Table 4.2. Description of Experiment Conditions ...... 159 Table 4.3. Correlations Between Individual Predispositions ...... 161 Table 4.4. Ordered Logit Analysis Predicting Restrictive Immigration Policy Preferences ...... 163 Table 4.5. Does Region Influence Immigration Policy Preferences? ...... 169 Table 4.6. The Role of Predispositional Frames on Immigration Policy Preferences .... 172 Table 4.7. The Role of Frames on Restrictive Immigration Policies, by Region Subsample ...... 179 Table 5.1. What Predicts Core Predispositions ...... 194 Table 5.2. Correlations Between Group Feeling Thermometers ...... 196 Table 5.3. Predicting Cold/Warm Feelings Towards Out-Groups ...... 204 Table 5.4. Predicting Cold/Warm Feelings Towards In-Groups ...... 206 Table 5.5. Predicting Warm Feelings Towards Whites, by Region ...... 209 Table 5.6. Predicting Warm Feelings Towards Americans, by Region ...... 210

xi List of Figures

Figure 2.1. Number of Immigration Articles from National Newspapers, 2000-2013 ..... 59 Figure 2.2. Number of Immigration Articles from State Newspapers, 2000-2013 ...... 60 Figure 2.3. Frequency of Ethnic Terms in all Newspapers, 2008-2013 ...... 67 Figure 2.4. Frequency of “Latino” and “Hispanic,” by Year ...... 69 Figure 2.5. Frequency of “Race” and “Racial,” by Year ...... 71 Figure 2.6. Frequency of “Civil Rights,” by Year ...... 72 Figure 2.7. Frequency of “Crime,” by Year ...... 76 Figure 2.8. Frequency of “Illegal” and “Illegal Immigrant,” by Year ...... 79 Figure 2.9. Frequency of “Security,” by Year ...... 81 Figure 2.10. Frequency of “Border,” by Year ...... 83 Figure 2.11. Frequency of “American” and “Citizen,” by Year ...... 84 Figure 2.12. Frequency of “Job/s,” by Year ...... 86 Figure 3.1. Maps of the average predispositions for each state...... 116 Figure 3.2. Predicted Regional Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies ...... 120 Figure 3.3. Effect of Racial Resentment on Police Checks ...... 124 Figure 3.4. Effect of Racial Resentment on Levels of Legal Immigration ...... 125 Figure 3.5. The Effect of Racial Resentment on Opposition to the Dream Act ...... 128 Figure 3.6. The Effect of Moral Traditionalism on Opposition to the Dream Act ...... 129 Figure 3.7. The Effect of Anti-Egalitarianism on Opposition to the Dream Act ...... 130 Figure 3.8. The Effect of Racial Resentment on Immigration Takes American Jobs ..... 133 Figure 3.9. The Effect of Authoritarianism on Immigration Takes American Jobs ...... 134 Figure 3.10. The Effect of Moral Traditionalism on Immigration Takes American Jobs ...... 135 Figure 4.1. Predispositions, by Region...... 166 Figure 4.2. Means Restrictive Immigration Policy Preferences, by Region ...... 167 Figure 4. 3. Regional Differences in Police Checks, by Frame ...... 175 Figure 4.4. Regional Differences in Immigration Levels, by Frames ...... 176 Figure 4.5. Regional Differences in Immigration Policy, by Frames ...... 177 Figure 4.6. Regional Difference in Job Threat, by Frames ...... 178 Figure 5.2. Out-Group Feeling Thermometer, by Region ...... 197 Figure 5.3. In-Group Feeling Thermometer, by Region ...... 198 Figure 5.4. Mean Difference of “Illegal Immigrant” ...... 199 Figure 5.5. Mean Difference of “Hispanics/Latinos” ...... 200 Figure 5.6. Mean Difference of “Immigrants” ...... 200 Figure 5.7. Mean Difference of “Americans” ...... 201 Figure 5.8. Gallup Ideology by State, 2014...... 213

xii Figure 5.9. Population Over 25 Without HS Diploma, by Percent ...... 214 Figure 5.10. Black and Hispanic Concentration, Census 2010 ...... 217 Figure 6.1. Illegal Immigration Costing US Billions, Protest Sign in Georgia ...... 235

xiii Introduction

While some of this endless antagonism seems based upon a realistic conflict of interests, most of it, we suspect, is a product of the fears of the imagination. Yet imaginary fears can cause real suffering ~ Gordon W. Allport (1954/1979).

On the night of September 28, 2011, frightened and panicked Latino families packed up their belongings leaving behind their homes, pets, jobs, and self-owned shops.

These families fled and left it all behind to migrate elsewhere; anywhere but Alabama.

On February 5, 1916, a Black family packed up their belongings and headed North, as chronicled by the Chicago Defender who declared that the “treatment doesn’t warrant staying” (Wilkerson 2010: 36). This family fled the place they called home to go elsewhere; anywhere but Alabama.1

On September 30, 2011, 1,988 Latino students were absent from school in the state of Alabama, about five percent of the entire Latino population in the school system.

For example, Laura kept her children from school for fear of harassment (Southern

Poverty Law Center 2012). On September 4, 1957, the Arkansas National Guard blocked nine Black students in their attempt to enter Little Rock High School. Elizabeth Eckford,

1 Literature on the cause of the “Great Migration,” especially in the years of 1910-1920, in particular from the South (Deep South) to the North (Midwest) is extensive. It is commonplace to assign primacy to economic forces on both ends of the migration movement. Northern industrial demand for labor pulled migrants from the South, but there were also push factors associated with the repressive and oppressive policies in the South. The primacy of economic factors is unquestionable; however, in light of the sociohistorical reality of many Black in the South, the links between racial violence and the Great Migration cannot be overlooked (see Tolnay and Beck 1991; Cohen 1991 both in Black Exodus: The Great migration from the American South, Harrison A (ed). University Press of Mississippi: Jackson, MS). This introduction uses such sociohistorical realities in comparison to present-day immigrant realities, but does not intend to question the massive economic factors leading Blacks outside of the South. 1 one of the students attempting to get an education, was harassed and spat on by one of the white women surrounding her as she tried to enter the school (History.com Staff 2010).

On June 9, 2011, Governor Robert J. Bentley signed into law Alabama House Bill

56 (HB 56), entitled the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act.

One of its provisions prohibited transporting and harboring undocumented immigrants.

On September 18, 1850, the United States Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act of

1850, which prohibited any person from harboring or concealing fugitives.

The similarities are striking. Contemporary immigration laws, such as Alabama’s

HB 56, bear an eerie resemblance to the exclusionary racist projects during slavery and

Jim Crow. In fact, the similarities between the two have led some to call the contemporary manifestations of Jim Crow, Juan Crow (Lovato 2008). In the first story,

Latino families are fleeing their mobile homes in Alabama on the same day Judge Sharon

Lovelace Blackburn ruled constitutional key parts of HB 56 (Robertson 2011).

Consequently, Latinos, regardless of status, fled Alabama because they feared racial profiling due to the mandate allowing police to stop anyone they deem “reasonably suspicious” of being in the country unauthorized. In fact, native-born Latinos, like

Carmen Gonzalez, a Texas native, are often profiled and harassed with taunting words like “Go Back to Mexico” (Southern Poverty Law Center 2012: 7). The conditions of HB

56 made it such that a large number of Latino families fled.

HB 56 was modeled after Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070), the Support Our

Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, which was signed into law by Governor

Janice Brewer on April 30, 2010. After Arizona’s far reaching immigration law made it constitutional for police to stop anyone they deem “reasonably suspicious” of being in the

2 country illegally, five other states (including Alabama) passed copycat laws. Alabama, however, went above and beyond Arizona by passing even harsher restrictions, making

HB 56 the harshest immigration law to date. In addition to granting the police power to stop and detain anyone they have suspicion of being undocumented, the law prohibits undocumented immigrants from receiving public services. It bars undocumented students to attend public colleges and universities. The law requires that the immigration status of all children in elementary, middle and high school be recorded. It prohibits the transporting and harboring of undocumented immigrants. The law prohibits landlords from renting property to undocumented immigrants. It forbids employers from hiring undocumented immigrants, and requires small businesses to use the E-Verify system.

Finally, the law states that any contract made where one party is an undocumented immigrant is considered null and void. Alabama was not alone in passing a SB 1070 copycat law; the other four states were Georgia (HB 87), South Carolina (SB 20), Utah

(HB 497), and Indiana (SB 590).

Alabama’s HB 56 and Arizona’s SB 1070 were designed to make life difficult enough that immigrants would flee voluntarily. In fact, Kris Kobach, Kansas’ Secretary of State and the architect behind HB 56, candidly admits his “attrition through enforcement” or “self-deportation” strategy, that drives Latinos out of the state of

Alabama, is an efficient way to enforce the law: “People are self-deporting...People are picking up and leaving...You’re encouraging people to comply with the law on their own.

Nobody gets arrested. Nobody spends time in detention. We don’t expend resources in removal proceedings...I’d say that’s a good thing” (Waslin February 2012). Similarly, many Black families between 1915-1970 fled Northward, and for many of them the goals

3 was to escape Jim Crow. Emphasizing the welfare of “the race”2 is a letter dated May 12,

1917, to the Chicago Defender from a man looking to escape Augusta, GA:

Dear Sir: Just for a little infermation from you i would like to know wheather or not i could get in tuch with some good people to work for with a firm because things is afful hear in the South… i think peple as a race oguht to look out for one another as Christians friends i am a schuffur and i cant make a living for my family with small pay and the people is getting so bad with us black peple down South hear. now if you ever help your race now is the time to help me to get my family away (Scott 1919: 335).

Blacks in the South during this time period wanted to escape the racist and discriminatory practices in the South. It is such practices that have also led Latino families to flee places like Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina.

As part of HB 56, school officials at the high, middle, and elementary level are required to determine whether students are undocumented and to submit annual tallies of

“suspected” undocumented immigrants. This provision made it so that Latino families, regardless of status, were afraid to send their children to school. In fact, Latino children, those born in the US and those born outside of the US, were equally discriminated against due to HB 56. Although during Jim Crow, the conditions were different, black children were equally discriminated against solely due to their race. Both Jim Crow and HB 56 made it so that the education system was involved in institutionalizing discriminatory practices. Furthermore, HB 56 made it illegal to harbor or aid undocumented immigrants3, strikingly similar to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850!

The South’s sociohistorical racial exclusionary projects have resurfaced under a new name and target (Lovato 2008). My intention is not to conflate slavery and Jim Crow

2 “The race” meant the African American race. 3 These provisions were eventually permanently blocked on October 29, 2013, 2 years and 4 months after the signing of the original bill. 4 to contemporary immigration laws or to equate the struggle of two distinct racial/ethnic groups in the US. It is, however, to be explicit about the continuation of racial/racist exclusionary projects in America. I use Alabama as an example of these projects in order to draw lines between the exclusionary and discriminatory roots of the history of slavery and Jim Crow laws and contemporary immigration laws, such as HB 56. Underlying all of these projects is a racialized conception of nationhood. In regards to immigration, this conception is masked by a discourse of “protection,” “safety” and “security” geographically rooted beyond the Southwestern border.

At the root of attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies are concerns about American-ness. Contemporary state-based laws (i.e. SB 1070) perform a similar task to that of past immigration laws, in that they delineate a definition of American-ness that is historically and contextually situated. In practice, immigration laws define who belongs and who does not belong, and the border is the site on which these definitions are contested. Borders mark “a space that American power proceeds from” (Dudziak and

Volpp 2005). Borders exist in various manifestations; there are the physical borders, and the one’s in our heads, the perceived borders, the imagined borders. Additionally, there are the “figurative” borders that mark particular bodies (Chang 1997). Contemporary migration of immigrants to different parts of the US, such as Alabama, parallels the simultaneous migration of the imagined border. Hence, present day immigration rhetoric and discourse has less to do with “real” borders and much more to do with the perceived borders, the ones that are learned, whether through predispositions from socialization or the media. This dissertation project argues that attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies among whites are embedded in ideas about American-ness and nationhood that

5 manifest itself in individual-level predispositions, the media, and geographies of exclusion.

Looking Ahead

Chapter 1 theorizes these interrelations and connections by using an interdisciplinary approach to understand attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies in a more holistic manner. More specifically, it examines the ways in which immigration has been and continues to be about the delineation of boundaries, of American-ness. I first establish the ways in which individual psychological predispositions are tied to immigration and to the boundaries of American-ness. 4 Second, I argue that mass media frames immigration in ways that highlight differences between immigrants and

“Americans.” Furthermore, I argue that the media uses language that engages psychological predispositions. Finally, I make a theoretical argument about the ways in which immigration, nationalism, and geography are tied together in the very idea that is

America. I argue that the maintenance of American nationalism not only happens within

American borders or the US-Mexico border, but it also happens at local level borders and the imagined borders that are present in the consciousness or sub-consciousness that delineate different kinds of people, and deem some more “American” than others.

Chapter 2 serves as a framing chapter for the next two chapters by focusing on how the media engages and primes core predispositions and examines whether context plays a role in where we see different kinds of immigration framing. The chapter lays out the importance of framing to public opinion. It then goes through the most common

4 Psychological predispositions include racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, egalitarianism, and social dominance orientation. 6 immigration frames and the connection between framing and context. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis of newspaper articles, I find that elements of the predispositions can be found in how immigration is framed in contemporary media. The discussion explores the ways in which conceptions of American-ness are embedded in the key predispositions. The findings of this chapter support the argument that both external influences, like the media, and internal predispositions interact with each other in ways that engage and prime the predispositions resulting in real-life behavioral consequences.

Aspects of all of the predispositions mentioned in this chapter—racial resentment, egalitarianism, moral traditionalism, authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation

(SDO)—could be found in media portrayals of immigration and/or immigrants. Thus, the findings lend preliminary evidence that the media engages and primes these predispositions in a way that affects how salient they are vis-à-vis immigration attitudes.

Chapter 3 examines the ways in which geographic context affects individual predispositions, and thus restrictive immigration policy preferences. It explores whether there exists regional variation in the key predispositions and immigration policy attitudes across different regions of the United States. Furthermore, it examines whether the variation in predispositions helps explain the geographic distribution of restrictive immigration policies. The chapter aims to fill a void in our understanding of predispositions and whether we can conceive of a psychological topography that interacts with immigration policy attitudes. My analysis of the survey data demonstrates that individual predispositions vary by region, in turn affecting immigration policies attitudes.

I examine this by using the American National Election Studies Time Series Surveys.

The findings reflect how attitudinal and behavioral effects of predispositions go beyond

7 the individual; they also affect the socio-political geographic context in which one resides and vice versa.

In Chapter 4, I test the relationship between predispositions, immigration, and geographic context using a randomized experiment. The survey experiment manipulated four immigration stories using the language of four of the predispositions, racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and social dominance orientation. I test whether the predispositional frames influence the accompanying predisposition and consequently restrictive immigration policy preferences. The chapter found that only some frames were effective and some varied as a function of region, consequently influencing preferences for restrictive immigration policies. The major finding in Chapter

4 highlights the peculiarity of the American South as a region that is unique from both

Border and Northern states. In the discussion, I analyze the ways in which restrictive immigration policies are interlaced with where we see people, who are most susceptible to higher levels of predispositions, residing.

In Chapter 5, I use the experimental data to further investigate the effect of the predispositional frames on how whites feel towards out-groups and in-groups. I find that whites in various parts of the country, and most pronouncedly in the American South, are concerned about their own in-group vis-à-vis immigration, and more importantly borders.

Southern whites, in particular, show a peculiar obsession with the US-Mexico border, building a fence along the US-Mexico border, and securing the nation’s borders more generally. It is in these borders, the physical borders, and the borders/boundaries of whiteness, that concern white Americans.

8 The concluding chapter summarizes the major findings and situates my dissertation project within different fields. Additionally, it includes direction for future work. The conclusion highlights the importance of examining immigration in more holistic ways that include both internal and external factors. It also emphasizes the importance geographic context as an essential factor in understanding preferences for restrictive immigration policies.

9 Chapter 1: Geographies of Exclusion:5 Immigration and the Imaginaries of Race, Space, and Nation

“[T]he immigrant is at once a critical supplement and a threatening other through whom American identity is imagined and reproduced” ~ Ali Behdad (2005: 17).

Introduction

This dissertation examines the determinants, both internal- and external factors, of attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies. I frame my examination and discussion of this research within a larger argument about immigration as a series of racial projects that have and continue to contribute to the imaginaries of American-ness.6 Essential to these racial projects are both internal and external factors, of which I focus on individual- level predispositions as internal factors, and the media and geographic context as the external factors. First, at the individual level, I explore the ways in which five predispositions— racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, anti- egalitarianism, and social dominance orientation—affect individuals’ attitudes towards immigration policies, and I argue that underlying these predispositions are conceptions of

American national identity. Second, the media works as an external factor to frame the issue of immigration in ways that are not only predominately negative and conflate

5 Adapted from David Sibley’s 1995 book, Geographies of Exclusion: Society and Difference in the West. 6 I use the term imaginaries to emphasize that American nationalism is a cultural artifact and a construction imagined (See Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities). 10 illegality with Latinos and immigrants alike, but also in ways that engage the aforementioned predispositions by further emphasizing the link between immigration and the definition of what it means to be “American.” Finally, I argue that geographic context is key to understanding attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies. Geographic context is associated with both varying levels of individual’s predispositions and the framing of immigration in the media. Moreover, territory and borders (as part of geographic contexts) are intricate concepts vis-à-vis the birth of American nationalism.

Borders delineate us from them. Accordingly, geographic contexts are interlaced with sociopolitical historical legacies. Environments—whether a neighborhood, state or a region—have a specific history that is embedded within the psyche of that environment in ways that affect contemporary immigration rhetoric and discourse.

Immigration in the United States has been and continues to be about delineations of boundaries, of belonging. By definition, immigration delimits American national identity; however, it does so by defining it as a cultural notion. American-ness is a cultural identity, one that is explicitly descriptive about who belongs and who does not belong. The Naturalization Law of 1790, the first attempt to define American citizenship, proclaimed “That any alien, being a free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof…”7 Immigration not only defines the boundaries of

American citizenship racially, but it also defines it in relation to the boundaries of the

American nation-state. From its inception, the nation-state has been concerned with the politics of race and space, of borders. In fact, “the state is inherently racial. Far from

7 Sess. II, Chap. 3; 1 stat 103. 1st Congress; March 26, 1790. 11 intervening in racial conflicts, the state is itself increasingly the preeminent site of racial conflict” (Omi and Winant 1994). The border is a spatial site of the politics of exclusion.

It is where we see the contestation of American nationalism, of the politics of belonging.

The establishment of the Border Patrol in the 1920s institutionalized “an already pervasive racial logic: the collapsing of brown skin, impoverishment and nationality as racial difference” (Rosas 2006: 399). This policing of the border was established after the passage of the National Origins Act of 1924, which established a system of national quotas to protect “American racial stock from further degradation or change through mongrelization.”8 As Mae M. Ngai argues, the Immigration Act of 1924 “constructed a vision of the American nation that embodied certain hierarchies of race and nationality.

At its core, the law served…to maintain social and political dominance” by Northern

European white Protestant Americans, thus, constituting a racial project that furthered institutionalized racial lines and defined nation in racial terms (Ngai 2004: 23).

Furthermore, the Immigration Law of 1924 also institutionalized a conflation between race and nation, a conflation we continue to see in contemporary immigration laws (e.g.

Arizona’s SB 1070 and Alabama’s HB56). As Ngai states:

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, “race” and “nation” were loosely conflated in intellectual discourse and in the public imagination. Race indicated physical markers of difference (especially color) but also often simultaneously referred to culture-commonalties of language, customs, and experience. Race, people, and nation often referred to the same idea (2004: 23).

In practice, immigration laws have served to define who belongs and who does not belong, and borders have served as the site on which these definitions are contested.

8 Statement of U.S. Representative John C. Box (Texas), Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st session, 1928, 69, pt. 3: 2817-2818. 12 The historically specific flow of immigrants in the twentieth century, namely from

Mexico and Central America, gave rise to anxieties about unauthorized immigration that was contested along the US-Mexico border, resulting in further militarization of the border. The more contemporary flow of immigrants to different parts of the US, such as

Alabama, has simultaneously caused the migration of the imagined border. Hence, present day immigration rhetoric and discourse engages both “real” borders and perceived borders, the ones that are learned, whether through family socialization or the media.

Public opinion is vital in a democratic political system. In the Gettysburg

Address, President Lincoln defined democracy as being a “government of the people, by the people, for the people…” ("The Gettysburg Address" 1863). Public opinion is of paramount important because it allows “the people” to make their opinions and attitudes known to their own elected government representatives; thus, leading public opinion to influence politics and policymaking (Shapiro 2011). However, the extent to which public opinion is linked to policy outcomes varies depending on political institution, type of policy, politician rhetoric, saliency, ideological direction, and other factors (see Page and

Shapiro 1983). In order to understand mass opinion support on policies, understanding how people form political preferences is key. Public opinion on immigration policies, and attitudes towards immigration as whole, is influenced by both internal and external factors. In other words, individuals bring their own social and political values and predispositions when they evaluate information and construct their opinion on an issue.

In addition, mass media and elite rhetoric plays a crucial role in influencing not only

“what” the public pays attention, but also “how” they understand issues; the differing

13 ways in which issues are frames, or “packaged.” Thus, to understand white public opinion on restrictive immigration preferences, this dissertation project focuses on both internal-level variations, and external influences on public opinion.

The remainder of this chapter develops each element of the dissertation— predispositions, media framing, and geographic context—and examines the ways in which each relates to attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies. Each element is needed to understand, in a more holistic manner, the ways in which attitudes toward immigration policies are produced and reproduced given internal and external factors.

Additionally, this chapter explores how each piece aids in defining American-ness, which

I argue underlies attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies and provides an analytical framework from which to understand the proliferation of restrictive immigration policies in particular geographic contexts

Predispositions, Immigration, and the Boundaries of American-ness

According to Zaller, “[P]redispositions are at least in part a distillation of a person’s lifetime experiences, including childhood socialization and direct involvement with the raw ingredients of policy issues, such as earning a living, paying taxes, racial discrimination, and so forth” (1992: 23). Zaller argues that political predispositions (e.g. partisanship and ideology) regulate the acceptance or non-acceptance of the political communications the person receives. Zaller argues that people tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with their political predispositions, but they do so only to the extent that they possess the contextual information necessary to perceive a relationship between the message and their predispositions (45). Aside from political predispositions, there are psychological predispositions as well. Predispositions include personality traits that 14 predispose individuals to have a particular attitude or behavior (e.g. authoritarianism).

Predispositions can also be broader attitudinal and behavioral dispositions, such as racial resentment. In this dissertation, I focus on five predispositions: racial resentment, egalitarianism, moral traditionalism, authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation.

All of these predispositions have been widely studies in social and political psychology, and can be measured with well-validated and reliable scales. Each of these predispositions, I argue, affects attitudes towards immigration policies, and underlying each are conceptions of American-ness.

Individual differences in predispositions are associated with differences in political behavior and attitudes. The effects of predispositions on politics and prejudice are well documented. For example, those persons high in authoritarianism are found to be prejudiced against different types of minority groups (Adorno et al. 1950; Cohrs and

Stelzl 2010; Esses, Dovidio, and Hodson 2002; Esses et al. 2001; Esses, Jackson, and

Armstrong 1998; Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ 2007). Those persons high in moral traditionalism often oppose policies such as gay rights (Brewer 2003). Similarly, persons high in racial resentment are also prejudiced, specifically against African Americans. The literature on the links between racial attitudes and immigration is quite consistent in asserting that racial attitudes play a crucial role in affecting immigration attitudes (Brader,

Valentino, and Jardina 2009; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Kinder and

Sanders 1996; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013). As Kinder and Sanders (1996) illustrate, high racial resentment is associated with individuals’ to opposition to liberal racial policies, such as affirmative action. Finally, egalitarians have been found to engender positive feelings toward minorities, including immigrants, and to have more

15 pro-immigration attitudes (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Pantoja 2006). Below I outline the ways in which each predisposition engages in ideas about American-ness.

Racial resentment is the belief that a) Blacks no longer experience racial discrimination, but b) they still do not conform to traditional American values, and nevertheless c) they continue to demand special treatment, and d) receive such special treatment from the government (Sears, Henry, and Kosterman 2000). Conceptually, racial resentment measures “a new form of prejudice…[which] at its center are the contentions that Blacks do not try hard enough to overcome the difficulties they face and they take what they have not earned” (Kinder and Sanders 1996: 105-6). There are two predominant ways in which racial resentment creates boundaries around what it means to be American. First, it defines, to a certain extent, what it means to be an American. For example, being an American is a person who works hard to assimilate to mainstream society and to reach the American dream without any help from the government.

American values of individualism and the free market play a vital role in levels of racial resentment. Second, it specifies who is not following these particular norms, in particular

African Americans, but perhaps also other groups that are portrayed as also wanting unearned benefits from the government, such as undocumented immigrants. In essence, any out-group that does not “fit” the boundaries of what it means to be American and does not follow Americans values and norms can be defined under racial resentment.

At the root of anti-egalitarianism lies the belief that equality of opportunity exists for everyone, and those that do not work hard are to blame for their own misfortunes.

Hence, anti-egalitarianism is strongly correlated with racial resentment. Egalitarianism, the opposite of anti-egalitarianism, as defined by Feldman, “Americans have interpreted

16 equality as formal or political equality rather than equality of results” (1988: 661).

However, equality of opportunity is different from equality of results, which most

Americans do not endorse (Sears, Henry, and Kosterman 2000). In essence, I argue that egalitarianism is a racialized concept because some Americans, white Americans in particular, are predisposed to believe that African Americans along with other out-groups expect equality of results. Consistent with this argument, Sears and colleagues (2000) use egalitarianism as a determinant of racial resentment. Most Americans, including African

Americans, endorse the American values of individualism and equality, but in practice white and Black Americans’ policy views differ (e.g. affirmative action; Kinder and

Sanders 1996; Myrdal 1944/1962).

Moral traditionalism is also significantly correlated with racial resentment and egalitarianism. Moral traditionalism, as defined by Conover and Feldman (1986), refers to people’s underlying beliefs about traditional family and social organization (i.e. traditional cultural norms and values), in particular a reverence for tradition

(conservatism) rather than modernism (liberalism). Additionally, moral traditionalists prefer the status quo and do not agree with alternative lifestyles. Moral traditionalism is a reverence for conservatism, and conservatism is highly correlated with conceptions of

Americanism. Citrin and colleagues find that “Republicans and conservatives were more likely than Democrats and liberals to endorse the religious, "patriotic," linguistic, and individualistic conceptions of Americanism” (1990: 1131). For example, 79% of strong

Republicans emphasized the importance of speaking English in making one a “true”

American. Citrin and colleagues also find relationships between conceptions of

Americanism, ideology, and attitudes towards Hispanics (but not Asians). Furthermore,

17 the connection between identifying with the Republican Party and negative attitudes toward cultural minorities “can be attributed to the tendency for Republicans to be conservative and Democrats to be liberal” (1141). Although there is relatively little scholarship on the relationship between moral traditionalism (as defined by Conover and

Feldman) and immigration, some scholars have found a relationship between moral traditionalism (or a varied definition or term) and immigration attitudes, especially post-

9/11 (Branton et al. 2011; Schildkraut 2002, 2005).

Authoritarianism is a predisposition that reflects a belief in absolute obedience or submission to authority figures, as well as the administration of that belief through the oppression of individuals or groups considered subordinates (see Adorno et al. 1950).

Adorno and colleagues defined the authoritarian personality as constituting nine personality dimensions: conventionalism; authoritarian submission; authoritarian aggression; superstition and stereotyping; power and toughness; destructiveness and cynicism; anti-intraception; sexuality, and projectivity (Adorno 1950: 60).9 Adorno and colleagues were interested in identifying openly antidemocratic ideals as it “refers to active hatred, or to violence which has the direct aim of wiping out a minority group or of putting it in a permanently subordinate position.” Additionally, the scale was set to identify “[a] pseudo-democratic idea…one in which hostility toward a group is somewhat tempered and disguised by means of a compromise with democratic ideals” (1950: 60).

9 Authoritarian individuals rigidly adhere to conventional values (conventionalism), submit to and obey the proponents of these values (authoritarian submission), and advocate punishment for those who violate conventional values (authoritarian aggression), Furthermore, authoritarians are likely to exhibit an overly negative view of mankind (destructiveness and cynicism), oppose any reliance on subjective feelings (anti- intraception), and are readily accepting of supernatural determinants of behavior and categorical thinking (superstition and stereotypes). The authoritarian is preoccupied with power relationships and exaggerates assertion of strength and toughness (power and toughness). Finally, he or she is overly concerned with sexual issues (sexuality) and projects his or her own sexual and aggressive motives on those around him (projectivity). 18 More recently, there have been different definitions of authoritarianism, including Bob

Altemeyer’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism, which he defines as “persons [that] are (a) relatively submissive to those they consider the established authorities, (b) aggressive when they believe that authorities sanction the aggression, and (c) conventional”

(Altemeyer 2004: 426).

Authoritarianism, along with social dominance orientation (SDO), is a primary predictor of prejudice. Prejudice is often theorized as related to out-groups, and racial minorities in particular (Allport 1954/1979; Bobo 1988; Esses et al. 2001). Scholars have also examined the relationship between prejudice and immigration attitudes (Esses et al.

2001; Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1999; Stephan et al. 1998), thus, signaling a relationship between authoritarianism, prejudice, and immigration. More recently, conceptions of authoritarianism have shifted from personality-based to a more generalized motive for the maintenance of conformity, order, and social uniformity

(Feldman 2003; Jugert and Duckitt 2009; Stenner 2005). Authoritarians, in general, are intolerant of groups that are different in some way and those that deviate from the social norm (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996); contemporary (undocumented) immigrants, I would argue are considered by most white Americans to fit this description.

Authoritarians are interested in the maintenance of boundaries, as they clearly delineate between authority and non-authority, between us and them. According to Sibley, authoritarians are distrustful and suspicious, they have an intolerance of ambiguity, and thus, differentiate “clearly between those on the outside, the ‘other’, and the relevant in- group” (1995: xiii). Authoritarianism is part of one’s socialization, including both

19 individual value systems and external social influences, both of which interact to influence behavioral attitudes (Duckitt and Fisher 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997).

The final predisposition I consider is social dominance orientation (SDO), which as previously mentioned is a primary predictor (along with authoritarianism) of prejudice.

SDO measures one’s preference for hierarchy and approval of domination over lower- status groups (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). As opposed to egalitarianism,

SDO is a group-based predisposition rather individual-based. In other words, SDO measures group-based orientations, while egalitarianism measures individual-level orientations. Pratto and colleagues argue that, unlike authoritarianism, SDO is a normal human propensity. Those high on SDO prefer hierarchy and often self-select into hierarchy enhancing institutions (e.g. law enforcement). Those low on SDO tend to be more empathetic with lower-status groups and prefer more egalitarian social relationships and institutions (e.g. social work). Those high on SDO also express negative attitudes towards minorities (Altemeyer 1998; Sidanius, Levin, and Pratto 1996). Esses and colleagues find a correlation between SDO and immigration attitudes, such that those high in SDO support more restrictive immigration policies (Esses, Jackson, and

Armstrong 1998). In another study, Esses and colleagues (2001) examine both situational influences on immigration attitudes (i.e. media representations of immigration) and individual differences (i.e. SDO) as if they were mutually exclusive. SDO, however, is not a fixed personality trait or predisposition that is held by individuals at a constant. On the contrary, it is, along with the other predispositions, malleable depending on situations.

This project extends this literature by examining the impact of the five predispositions on immigration attitudes simultaneously. It also contributes to an

20 understanding of predispositions as malleable at the individual-level, as being engaged through media framing, and as being concentrated in particular geographic contexts

(Rentfrow 2010; Rentfrow et al. 2013; Rentfrow, Gosling, and Potter 2008), as a way to understand how the sociohistorical geographic context affects the proliferation of immigration policies in particular regions or states. The following section examines the ways in which the media engages and primes individual level predispositions.

The Media, Immigration, and Boundary-Setting

Framing refers to the way in which an issue is “packaged,” so that it emphasizes certain things while leaving out others; it encourages a particular interpretation of an issue. “Frames define the problem, diagnose its cause, offer and justify treatments for the problem, and predict their likely effects” (Entman 1993: 52). Exposure to a particular frame impacts both the attitudes people form and the ways in which people behave.

According to Chong and Druckman, framing can work by creating new beliefs, making certain beliefs more accessible, or making beliefs more applicable or stronger in people’s evaluations (2007: 111). An individual’s “frame in thought” consists of a mix of considerations or a dominant consideration. Framing, then, changes attitudes by altering the considerations used in evaluating an issue. The given consideration, however, needs to be stored in memory in order to be available for retrieval and use. If the individual fails to understand the concept…then [the concept] is not an available consideration and the individual will not be affected by [the] frame” (Chong and Druckman 2007: 110). As

Callaghan and Schnell explain, “By promoting a particular frame, political elites, the media, and other players can alter how an issue is understood and thus shift public opinion” (2001: 186). These beliefs, in turn, have behavioral implications. I explore what 21 those “beliefs” are, and unpack the ways in each of the five predispositions—racial resentment, egalitarianism, moral traditionalism, authoritarianism, and SDO—are engaged and “primed” through framing (for priming literature see Mendelberg 2001,

2008a, 2008b).

Elites, including the mass media, have a long-standing history of using and priming race for political reasons (Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). One of the most well known contemporary examples is the Willie Horton ad campaign. In the 1988 presidential campaign, George H.W. Bush used Willie Horton’s face (an African

American male) as a way to attack his opponent Michael Dukakis. At the time, Dukakis supported a furlough program in Massachusetts as a way of criminal rehabilitation. Willie

Horton benefitted from this program when he was giving furlough for a weekend, during which he subsequently committed more criminal activity. Horton’s picture was used in a campaign ad by Bush along with a message that claimed Dukakis was “weak” on crime.

Whether or not Dukakis was, in fact, weak on crime was only part of the narrative. The narrative also involved the face of a black man as the face of crime. Crime, then, becomes a coded racialized word carrying particular meanings about black men and crime. The ad helped further justify some Americans’ stereotypes about black men and crime. Hence, the ad was an example of the implicit priming (Mendelberg 2001; White

2007) of race, because this particular race-gendered individual (i.e. Willie Horton) was used without mention of his race, but the media viewers were left to fill in the blanks

(Gilliam and Iyengar 2000). Additionally, not only do people fill in the blanks when they do not exist, but they also attach what they believe, their predispositions, about black

Americans, and black men in particular, to the narrative. Hence, the narrative becomes

22 the interplay between the intentional media framing of an issue and the individual’s pre- existing dispositions. The literature on racial priming is extensive, however, there has been less attention to how other predispositions, namely egalitarianism, moral traditionalism, authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation, are present in mass media.

In practice, egalitarianism is a concept that appears often in the news and is used as a way to frame or package a particular policy issue (Gamson and Modigliani 1987).

One common policy issue frame includes stories engaging equality of opportunity versus equality of results, for example in the context of affirmative action and welfare, both of which are racially coded words (Gamson and Lasch 1983; Hancock 2004; Kinder and

Kam 2009; Kinder and Sanders 1996). In the media, affirmative action is often framed as pushing equality of results “too far” and as being “reverse racism” towards whites.

Affirmative action is often framed as a story about African Americans getting preferential treatment (for current example see Abigail Fisher v. University of Texas 2014). Bobo and colleagues have shown that people are supportive of “opportunity-enhancing forms” of affirmative action rather than of “outcome-directed” forms (i.e. equality of opportunity v. equality of results). Sniderman and Carmines (1997) find that white Americans are more supportive of affirmative action if framed as efforts to achieve equal treatment of groups rather than giving preferential treatment to certain groups. Similarly, welfare is often conflated with American values of hard work and too much government help for un- deserving people and/or groups (Hancock 2004). More recently, we have seen immigration being framed as an issue about public services, including immigrants having

23 “anchor babies” in the United States and taking advantage of the welfare system (Dinan

2012; The Washington Times 2010).

The mass media often invoke narratives about tradition, conservatism, and

American identity and the demise of, and dangers, to American identity. For example, after the 9/11 terrorism attacks, narratives about Muslims as non- and/or un-American were rampant in the news (Ali et al. 2011; Nayak 2006; Schildkraut 2002). The Center for American Progress’ report, “The Roots of the Islamaphobia Network in America,” focuses on the source of over $42 million dollars that funds Islamophobic initiatives post

9/11. These initiatives did not only affect individuals at a personal level, but it also prompted Americans to take matters into their own hands (American Civil Liberties

Union 2012). Similarly, post 9/11 rhetoric about immigration implicates a particular group, namely Latinos and almost always of Mexican nationality, as non- or un-

American and perceived threats to the nation (Schildkraut 2002, 2011). For example, in an October 2001 Gallup poll, 58% of respondents said that immigration should be decreased, a sizable increase from the year before, where only 38% of respondents felt immigration should be decreased; that was the second lowest level on record since Gallup started asking the question in 1965 (Gallup 2014).

Authoritarianism is often explicitly and implicitly engaged in the media. First, the media often engages authoritarianism through their framing of crime news, which portrays authority figures (i.e. police) and perpetrators. It reminds the audience that authority figures should be respected. Second, the media often portrays boundaries and delineations, an individual or group on one side, and another individual or group on the other. The audience, then, must decide what side they are on, which engages the

24 authoritarian personality’s tendency to resist ambiguity and choose one side or the other.

Finally, media coverage on contemporary restrictive immigration policies, such as

Arizona’s SB 1070 and Alabama’s HB 56, underlies authoritarianism. These laws require police officers (i.e. authority figures) to use their judgment in deciding whether someone is in the US illegally. Police officers are authority figures to ordinary citizens, but they are also following orders from a higher authority, making them more susceptible to higher levels of authoritarianism (Gatto et al. 2010). Furthermore, media coverage of these laws trigger authoritarianism and implicate ordinary people. In essence, it allows ordinary citizens of these states to use their own individual judgments and follow state law, which they consider legitimate. Most people are likely to obey orders, especially when it comes from a figure—whether person or state—they consider a legitimate authority.

SDO is most often implicitly engaged in the media, especially as it relates to immigration. Underlying immigration rhetoric is the notion of who belongs and who does not belong (Behdad 2005; Schildkraut 2005, 2011), a binary that underlies social dominance orientation. It groups Americans and citizens in one category, and non-

Americans and non-citizens in another category, defining the terms as binary (Hegel and

Baillie 2003). The opposite of being American is being non-American and the opposite of being a citizen is being non-citizen. Previous work has found a link between citizenship and American identity; citizenship comes before becoming American (Schildkraut 2011).

Hence, there is an implicit message when engaging in binaries such as “us (Americans)” versus “them (un-American);” one is “better” than the other. For example, one of the debates that surround immigration is whether children born in the US to foreign-born

25 non-citizen parents should be American citizens. In a 2010 New York Times editorial, the editorial staff states that two members of the House of Representatives, Lamar Smith of

Texas and Steve King of Iowa “[b]oth want Congress to reinterpret the 14th Amendment to deprive children of illegal immigrants who are born on American soil of their citizenship” ("Immigration Hardball" 2010). It is clear that both of these members are pitting “American soil” against “illegal immigrants.” In other words, you cannot be both a child of undocumented immigrants and an American citizen; both of these identities exist in a binary. Lamar Smith of Texas, in a letter to the editor stated, “The American people have repeatedly demonstrated their strong opposition to amnesty for millions of illegal immigrants. Unfortunately the administration and the Democrats are choosing not to listen” (Smith 2010). This discourse again uses the “American people” and “illegal immigrants” as opposites; you cannot be both. In fact, one identity is dependent on the other. Being an “American” relies on the realization, criminalization, and dehumanization of Other identities. Media framing of immigration is exemplary of binaries, especially those between Americans and non-Americans.

The media is a critical external factor that influences public opinion; it creates, molds, and reflects public opinion. Pratto and Lemieux argue that immigration "is a social-psychologically ambiguous situation, the meaning of immigration can be manipulated through discourse.” (2001: 426). Moreover, "[n]ot only does this making of meaning disambiguate ambiguous social situations like immigration, it energizes the public’s values into political action" (416). One of the common ways in which socio- political issues, such as immigration, are given meaning is through framing (Brader,

Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Chavez 2001, 2008; Chavez and Hoewe 2012; Dunaway,

26 Branton, and Abrajano 2010; Knoll, Redlawsk, and Sanborn 2010; Lakoff and Ferguson

2006; Santa Ana 2002). The media, I argue, engages in ideas that underlie internal predispositions and at times makes them more salient vis-à-vis policy issues. Additionally,

I argue that the media not only engages in ideas about context and belonging (“American soil” in relation to nationalism), but it is also influenced by geographic context (Bohon and Parrot 2011; Fryberg et al. 2012; Kim et al. 2011; Sabia 2010). The following section explores the ways in which geographic context plays a role in influencing attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies.

Geographies of Exclusion: Immigration and Racialized Nationalism

“The sense of border between self and other is echoed in both social and spatial boundaries” ~ David Sibley (1995:32)

In this section, I explore the interconnected ways in which geography underlies attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies. Theoretically, there is a link between immigration, nationalism, and geography. Immigration has been and continues to be essential in the formation of American nationalism. In turn, nationalism is “the most territorial of political ideologies” (Sibley 1995: 223). Logically, immigration is also about geography, not only as it relates to nationalism, but also because immigration’s battlegrounds happen in spatial sites, which includes both physical- and imagined borders. The physical borders are interlaced with conceptions of nationalism, territory, and sovereignty, and the imagined borders are in part a function of the predispositions that create a “sense of border between self and the other…” (Sibley 1995: 32).

27 Immigration and Nationalism

Nationalism is the “desire among people who believe that they share a common ancestry and a common destiny to live under their own government on land sacred to their history” (Wiebe 2002: 5). Thus, nationalism is a construction, and as Benedict

Anderson argues a cultural artifact; an “imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign (Anderson 2006: 6). Anderson, however, does not see nationalism as inherently racist and/or racial. He argues that racism has its origins in ideologies of class, rather than nation (149). Anderson’s conception of nationalism, however, is insufficient, and evades the inherently racist formation of American nationalism. According to Omi and Winant (1994), the modern conception of race occurs with the rise of Europe and the arrival of Europeans in the Americas. The conquest, they argue, was the first, and perhaps the greatest, racial formation project (62). From 1607 to

1865, the authors called the US a racial dictatorship, because most non-whites were eliminated from the sphere of politics. Omi and Winant argue that the centuries of racial dictatorship have had very large consequences:

[F]irst, they defined ‘American’ identity as white, as the negation of racialized 'otherness'--at first largely African and indigenous, later Latin American and Asian as well. This negation took shape in both law and custom, in public institutions and in forms of cultural representation. It became the archetype of hegemonic rule in the U.S. It was the successor to the conquest as the 'master' racial project" (66).

Thus, the imagined American nation is inherently racial. Nationalism and race do not exist in a mutually exclusive space; on the contrary, nationalism was built on racist and racial notions of Otherness. The definition of the Other is historically specific and shifts according to the racial projects of the time. Immigration policies throughout the history of

28 the U.S. are a series of racial projects that have and continue to contribute to the

American imagined community.

Immigration is essential to the formation of national culture and identity. As

Behdad argues, “located at the interstices of national consciousness and state apparatuses, immigration's ambivalences make the concept of 'nation-state' imaginable in America”

(2005: 22). Behdad’s claim about “immigration’s ambivalences” spring up from

America’s ambivalent position in relation to immigration throughout history. She argues that the US strives for immigration control through its laws, but simultaneously remains ambivalent and open-ended about the economic necessity of immigration. This ambivalence makes the concept of nation-state imaginable, because immigration is needed to define the “American us” versus the “foreign them.” There would be no us if there is no them to compare to and define against. As Behdad makes very clear:

What we encounter in every anti-immigrant claim is a differential mode of national and cultural identification that posits a fundamental difference between the patriotic citizen and the menacing alien. The project of imagining a homogeneous nation is never complete. It requires the continual presence of the immigrant as other, through whom citizenship and cultural belonging are rearticulated (2005: 11-12).

Immigration elicits concerns about the identity of the Other, the immigrant. As

Schildkraut argues, white Americans perceive immigrants to lack core American values, and thus leading to their un-American label (Schildkraut 2011). Immigration, however, not only elicits these concerns, but it is an inherent component of an American racialized nationalism, which is a territorial political ideology.

29 Nationalism and Geography

Nationalism is inherently territorial. In fact, it is “the most territorial of political ideologies based on cultural beliefs about a shared space occupied by a kin-like, ethnic, or affinity group who face common dangers and bring to these a social bond forged through the trials and tribulations of a common history brought about by a common geography” (Agnew 2004: 223). An imagined sense of national identity is explicitly connected to a physical space marked by boundaries, those within the national space and those outside of it. As Sibley argues, “feelings of belonging and ownership attach to national territory” (Sibley 1995: 90). Nationalism, however, can be based on conceptions of civic or ethnic identity. Ethnic nationalism includes the exclusive identity of the people with the nation, whereas civic nationalism involves an inclusive identity of the nation with the people (Agnew 2004: 228). The United States is an example of civic nationalism, because the “exceptionality” of America lies in its shared American political principles of individualism and egalitarianism, in essence the American creed, lauded in the

Constitution and Declaration of Independence (Lipset 1996). However, America’s nationalist roots lie in ethnic nationalism. From its inception, the human landscape of

America was aesthetically white. Thus, I would argue, the US is exemplary of both civic and ethnic nationalism, and the two collide in spatial sites where American nationalism is contested.

In the US, the nation is tied to territory that often involves a “prototypical landscape as representative of the collective identity” (Agnew 2004: 233). This landscape is naturalized and produced by human processes, which “take place in context. They occur within historically produced landscapes; they have spatial extent and distribution. It

30 makes as much sense, therefore, to speak of ‘spatialization’ as it does racialization.

Indeed, the two occur simultaneously” (Kobayashi 2004: 241). Thus, one cannot separate notions of territory and the people that inhabit territorial spaces. Ideas are produced in context, “and in turn contribute to the production of that context” (Kobayashi 2004: 239).

Geographic context affects those that inhabit it, but those that inhabit a geographic space also affect that space. Nationalism, thus, becomes a practical politics; it is “the fusion of a piece of land with the symbolic and mythified history of the nation” (Agnew 2004: 227).

This fusion between lands and history “gives nationalism such symbolic power immediately related to the sites and circumstances of everyday life…” (Agnew 2004:

227). John Agnew asks, “how did nationalism reconfigure understandings of the ‘home’ such that the local became part of a nationalist ‘homeland?’” (2004: 227). The answer, I argue, lies in the local production of the nation through state-sponsored (whether the nation-state or individual American states) immigration policies policed at national, local, and imagined border sites, “where notions of national identity, citizenship, and belonging are articulated” (Behdad 2005: 165) and regulated by ordinary people invested in the maintenance of boundaries.

Immigration and Geography

Borders exists all around us. Borders serve as territorial markers that define geographical boundaries. Borders also serve as ideological conceptions that delineate belonging. Hence, borders are also both internal and external to an individual, and individuals, just like the media, are active participants in the making of borders. As

Agnew argues, “the nation’s territory is not a simple block of space but a complex set of relationships between local, regional, and national levels of social practice and 31 geographical imagination (Agnew 2004: 228). In fact, the regulation that occurs at a national and international level vis-à-vis immigration conditions the kind of local regulation and policing that happens locally. This section examines the ways in which the physical and imagined borders are (re)produced at the local state-level, which results in an enactment of a local production of nationalism that is interlaced with attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies.

One of the ways in which the border marks a territorial boundary is the delineation between the American North and South. Slavery marked one of the most prominent and significant delineations between the Agrarian South and the North. This is the case not because the North as an entire region was opposed to slavery or because

Northerners' views on slavery and black Americans varied drastically, but because

Southern regional identity was intimately and intricately bound with slavery and ideas about nationalism. As C. Vann Woodward makes clear, the American South "has sought a distinct regional identification and the label of the ‘most American' of regions” (Gerster and Cords 1989: 119). What makes the South the "most American?" Underlying the label of "most American," I argue, is a conflation between ideas about what it means to be

“American;” an identity that implicates both race and space. Southerners defined

Southern regional identity as both a territorial space marked by the Mason-Dixon border and as racial imaginaries of American-ness. In fact, Woodward argues, “The South was

American a long time before it was Southern in any self-conscious or distinctive way”

(Gerster and Cords 1989: 132).

One’s home and neighborhood are also exemplary of border territory. The home is part of the private sphere, whereas the neighborhood is part of the public sphere, hence

32 there is more explicit policing and regulation of neighborhoods. According to David

Sibley:

Individuals and groups also feel territorial about neighbourhoods, but whether they do or do not depends on the location and the social composition of the area. Difference…is less likely to be noticed, less likely to be a source of threat, in a weakly classified environment like…Manhattan than it is in a strongly classified, purified space (1995: 90).

Parts of the South continue to be classified as “purified spaces.” In fact, there are neighborhoods and towns in Alabama such as Arab and Albertville that continue to be predominately white spaces, and have a history of being sundown towns, as noted in the introduction. The transgression of immigrants into predominately white spaces leads to, what Sibley calls, liminal zones or spaces of ambiguity and discontinuity (1995: 33), resulting in the need to police these spaces; to enforce racial boundaries. The construction of “white” spaces or whites is itself a “dominant metaphorical map" that outlines those who belong and those who do not, at least as defined by the predominant group in these towns or neighborhoods (Kobayashi 2004: 244). According to John Hope Franklin, in the

South the enforcement of Jim Crow laws “and customs was the responsibility of all whites, who could resort to violence with impunity to prevent any breach whatsoever”

(Gerster and Cords 1989: 112). Similarly, post 9/11 rhetoric by President Bush signaled a parallel task for the “American” people: “Our citizens have new responsibilities. We must be vigilant” (Bush Nov 8, 2001). By the same token, contemporary immigration laws require citizen participation in enforcing the laws. Spatial racial boundaries provide security and comfort for some, which is why there is an investment in securing and

33 policing such boundaries; it is this particular type of investment in which immigration discourse and debate is exemplary.

State-sponsored immigration laws such as SB 1070 and HB 56 are cases of such investment—what George Lipsitz calls a “possessive investment in whiteness” (Lipsitz

1998). In fact, in a recent article entitled, “It is all still about race: Obama hatred, the

South, and the truth about GOP wins,” Paul Rosenberg explores the “cultural divide between the white South and the rest of the country,” and argues that race is still the answer as to why 42.4 percent of white Southerners blame Blacks exclusively for their disadvantage (Rosenberg 2014). The public support of enactment of restrictive immigration laws across various US states, particularly in the South, is a result of, what

Sibley calls, “moral panics.” According to Sibley “Moral panics articulate beliefs about belonging and not belonging, about the sanctity of territory and the fear of transgression.

Since panics cannot be sustained for long, however, new ones have to be invented (but they always refer to an old script)” (1995: 43). As a result of the moral panics from the aftermath of the Civil War and the Reconstruction Period, the South instituted Jim Crow laws. Most recently, HB 56 is exemplary of new moral panics that follow an old script.

Moral “panics concern contested spaces, liminal zones which hostile communities are intent on eliminating by appropriating such spaces for themselves and excluding the offending ‘other’” (Sibley 1995: 39). The intent of laws like SB 1070 and HB 56 are, in fact, to eliminate the transgressing Other; these laws depend on “attrition through enforcement” or “self-deportation” strategies.

34 Contemporary immigration laws such as HB 56 give ordinary people the right to regulate and police boundaries, boundaries that not only signify power, but are also interlaced with ideas about American national identity.

This reaction to certain kinds of difference is bound up with questions of power. A fear of mixing unlike things often signifies a reluctance to give up ground and relinquish power. In all kinds of political, social and socio- spatial relationships, boundaries then assume considerable significance because they are simultaneously zones of uncertainty and security. Policing boundaries is one way of reducing fear. Boundary crossing is discouraged by appeals to loyalty –to the state, to the community…(Sibley 1995: 183).

As a result, ordinary people’s predispositions play a role not only in their everyday regulation of boundaries, but also in their attitudes towards immigration policies. These predispositions play a part in the imagined borders of which people conceive. As mentioned earlier, the maintenance of boundaries is a critical component of the authoritarian personality. The fear of difference and of change defines, in part, moral traditionalism and social dominance orientation. Those individuals high on authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and social dominance orientation fear disruption to the status quo, to their own “purified spaces,” because “living with the other, with the foreigner, confronts us with the possibility, or not, of being an other (Sibley 1995: 112).

The result of these dynamics leads to a contestation of space, of boundaries, of belonging.

Belonging, then, is defined, practiced and reproduced in distinctive ways across time and space.

Context and the maintenance of borders is a crucial element to understanding the proliferation of contemporary state-based laws (e.g. HB 56) in particular places. These laws perform a similar task to that of past immigration laws, they delineate a definition of

35 American-ness that is historically and contextually situated. Present day immigration debate is contextually rooted in a post-9/11 world, and geographically rooted beyond the

Southwestern border. The proliferation of restrictive immigration policies have occurred in non-border states such as Alabama, South Carolina, Georgia, Indiana, and Utah.

Ironically, states like Alabama went beyond Arizona’s restriction and added harsher restrictions. However, it is not as ironic as it sounds, given Alabama’s and much of the

South’s sociohistorical racial exclusionary projects, projects that have resurfaced using a new name and target (Lovato 2008). Geo-sociohistorical context is essential to understanding contemporary immigration policy attitudes.

Predispositions and Geographic Context

“‘[A]uthoritarianism’ is as often a cultural style as an attribute of personality, and it is at the cultural and institutional level that we shall look for the explanation of continuing Southern peculiarity” ~ (Reed 1972: 84).

Psychological research has grappled with the question of why some people are more prejudiced and/or ethnocentric than others. This particular research emphasizes two major explanations, the personality versus the social-psychological explanations. The former argues that prejudice is a result of stable personality related characteristics Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1998; Duckitt et al. 2002). The latter argues that prejudice is caused by external factors, for example, social identity and position (Tajfel and Turner

1986; Brewer YEAR). However, current psychological research has questioned the rigidity of these explanations as mutually exclusive (Duckitt et al. 2002; Duckitt and

Sibley 2010; Huang & Liu 2005; Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar, & Levin 2004). In fact, scholars have also questioned the stability of personality traits (Winter 2003), and have

36 argued that personality is an array of dispositions that can be engaged or primed. This dissertation contributes to this literature by examining a) the malleability of predispositions within individuals and b) the situational nature of predispositions by geographic context. In this project, I argue that prejudice, ethnocentrism, and, in this case, restrictive immigration policy preferences are influenced by both individuals predispositions and factors linked to one’s outside world, which includes the sociopolitical geographic context, thus taking a the third approach to look at personality and social-psychological attributes as mutually inclusive.

To conceive of a relationship between predispositions and geographic context is nothing new; particularly as it relates to authoritarianism, given the concepts’ significance in the 1940s with the rise of fascism and anti-Semitism (Adorno et al. 1950).

Scholars such as John Shelton Reed and Alfred O. Hero both theorize around a cultural definition of authoritarianism vis-à-vis Southern geographic context. In fact, Reed states:

Like race, and like religion in its noncreedal aspects, region is a summary construct. It ‘often captures (imperfectly to be sure) a set of historical experiences, socialization patterns, life styles, and…culture differences.’ There is an intrinsic aspect of region, however, which sets it off from these other face-sheet data. As many ‘regionalist’ scholars have observed, there are good reasons to suppose that the simple fact of residence in a particular area, implying exposure to a peculiar climate, soil, and terrain, will produce distinctive effect. If regional differences in culture and demography exists, residence alone will also determine exposure to these no-less-important ‘climates’ (Reed 1972: 9).

Reed’s definition of region as a summary construct aligns quite well with Zaller’s definition of predispositions (1992). Region, according to Reed, encompasses historical experiences, socialization, and lifestyles. Similarly, Zaller defines predispositions as “a distillation of a person’s lifetime experiences, including childhood socialization”

37 (1992:23). In this dissertation, I argue that predispositions vary as a function of geographic context.10

There have been studies exploring the geographical distribution of personality traits, namely the “Big Five” (Krug and Kulhavy 1973; Rentfrow 2010; 2013; 2008).11 In their latest investigation, Rentfrow and colleagues examined the personality traits of more than 1.5 million Americans from 48 states and Washington DC by asking participants about their character traits and demographic factors, including their place of residence.

They find that the United States has three distinctive psychological clusters based on the

Big Five personality traits. The first cluster includes states in the North central Great

Plains and in the South, which make up a “Friendly and Conventional” psychological region. The second cluster includes states predominately in the West and some along the

Eastern Seaboard, which made up a “Relaxed and Creative” psychological region.

Finally, states in New England and the Middle Atlantic were prototypical of the last psychological region, “Temperamental and Uninhibited.”

Each cluster is derived from the Big Five personality traits. States within the first psychological cluster, Friendly and Conventional, are marked by high Extraversion,

Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness, and low Neuroticism and Openness. “This configuration of traits portrays a region of people who are, on average, conventional, friendly, sociable, compliant, and emotionally stable” (Rentfrow 2013: 9). The second cluster of states, Relaxed and Creative, are marked by low Extraversion, low

10 The causal arrow goes both ways: individuals who have high levels of particular predispositions may live in a particular region or locality, and thus making this region or locality also high on particular predispositions. However, and equally important, the geographic context’s “climate” and history also influence one’s levels of predispositions. 11 The Big Five personality traits are Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional stability (or its reverse Neuroticisn), and Openness. 38 Agreeableness, average Conscientiousness, very low Neuroticism, and very high

Openness, “representing a region of people who are, on average, creative and relaxed, reserved, and perhaps somewhat socially distant” (9). Finally, the third cluster of states,

Temperamental and Uninhibited, reveal slightly below-average Extraversion, low

Agreeableness, low Conscientiousness, very high Neuroticism, and slightly above- average Openness, which “represents a region of people who are, on average, irritable, impulsive, and quarrelsome” (9). Rentfrow and colleagues find evidence that like-minded people tend to be clustered together leading the them to divide the US into three psychological regions. The work by Rentfrow and colleagues serves as a platform from which I base my argument about the geographical distribution of the immigration-related predispositions.

In fact, there is scholarship that looks at the relationship between predispositions and the Big Five traits (Akrami and Ekehammar 2006; Altemeyer 1996). For example, those high on SDO are characterized by low Agreeableness (Ekehammar et al.2004;

Heaven and Bucci 2001) and weakly by low Openness to Experience (Duriez and

Soenens 2005; Sibley and Duckitt 2008). In relation to Rentfrow’s psychological regions, states within the Friendly and Conventional are also marked by low Openness, but high

Agreeableness. The psychological region consisting of states within the Temperamental and Uninhibited cluster are marked by low Agreeableness, and above-average Openness, making it possible that states in both of these psychological regions are also high in SDO.

Those persons high on authoritarianism are characterized primarily by low Openness to

Experience, sometimes combined with high Conscientiousness (Altemeyer 1996; Butler

2000; Hodson and Sorrentino 1999; Peterson et al. 1997), and at times high Extraversion

39 (Ekehammar et al. 2004’ Lippa and Arad 1999; Trapnell 1994; Sibley and Duckitt 2008).

Again, those in the psychological region of Friendly and Conventional fit all three personality levels, indicating that states North central Great Plains and in the South should also have a high level of authoritarianism.12 In essence, given Rentfrow’s geographical distribution of the Big Five personality traits, and the traits’ correlation with some of the predispositions this project examines, it is likely that individual predispositions also vary as a function of geographical context.

The sociopolitical context of geographies, I argue, plays a role in the varying levels of predispositions one holds. For example, there is relevant scholarship that delineates the differences between the American South and the non-South. As Hero argues, “many of the psychological, cultural, and social correlates of authoritarianism in

America, as determined by social research, have been among those felt to be particularly prominent in the South…” (1965: 355). Moreover, according to Reed, Southerners “are more likely than non-Southerners to be conventionally religious, to accept the private use of force (or the potential for it), and to be anchored in their homeplace” (1972: 83). These characteristics, Reed argues, “can, with some difficulty, be subsumed by the psychological concept of ‘authoritarianism’” (84). Additionally, Southerners are concerned about traditions of the past and family, both of which partly define moral traditionalism (Hero 1965: 342). Moral traditionalism and authoritarianism, although distinct concepts, are highly correlated, whereas authoritarianism and SDO are correlated, but to a lesser extent. For example, people high on RWA tend to be religious whereas people high on SDO do not. People high on RWA tend to need structure, value

12 For a meta-analysis examining personality, prejudice, and related constructs such as Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) see Sibley and Duckitt 2008. 40 conformity, and tradition, in contrast to those high on SDO (Ekehammar et al. 2004: 466).

Furthermore, the South appears be less egalitarian than the non-South. Hero argues that,

“[w]hereas Northern industrial life became more and more equalitarian, the antebellum social organization of concentrated privilege and power continued in much of the

South…” (Hero 1965: 343). The research by both Reed and Hero are contextually and situationally rooted in the 1960s and 70s during a time where racial turmoil spread across the American South. Are these differences between the South and non-South still applicable today? What are the contemporary political implications of such predispositional differences? This project examines these questions, and further expands the literature on predispositions, context, and political behavior.

The Media and Geographic Context

There is a vast literature on the role the mass media plays a crucial role in shaping public opinion (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar and

Simon 1993; McCombs 2004; Zaller 1992). There is also research on the role of context

(i.e. the racial composition of where you live) plays in relation to the mass media

(Gilliam, Valentino, and Beckmann 2002). There is a relatively smaller literature on whether mass media framing varies as a function geographic context (Fryberg et al. 2012;

Hopkins 2010; Kim et al. 2011).

According to Gamson and Modigliani (1987), certain frames have a natural advantage over others due to higher resonance with larger cultural themes. I would argue that certain parts of the US have distinct cultural “themes.” For example, in the South particular frames may resonate more than others. For example, a frame that emphasizes immigration’s role tearing apart neighborhoods may resonate more in the South than 41 other places given the South’s history of sundown towns. Additionally, a frame that implicates black Americans may also resonate more in the South, than in the West or

Southwest regions. Individuals, then, are predisposed to understand certain frames more than others; certain frames are more accessible to certain individuals than others.

Lee and colleagues (2008) also argue that frames interact with individual characteristics in a way in which framing effects are not uniform (2008: 700). Gamson and Modigliani explain that “individuals bring their own life histories, social interactions, and psychological predispositions to the process of constructing meaning; they approach an issue with some anticipatory schema, albeit sometimes with a very tentative one”

(Gamson and Modigliani 1989: 2). Thus, because geographic contexts have their own history, and individuals residing in particular contexts vary in levels of psychological predispositions, the practice of framing should follow this logic. However, do local level mass media framing differ by geographic context to suit their own constituents?

Daniel J. Hopkins (2010), in his article titled, Politicized Places: Explaining

Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition, examines how national and local conditions interact to construct immigrants as threatening. He argues that as national rhetoric and coverage of immigration increases, it interacts with local county changes in immigration to increase anti-immigration attitudes. Pearson-Merkowitz and

Yoder (2009) also find that in Arizona, Texas, Tennessee, and Georgia, restrictionist legislation was sponsored by legislators whose districts experienced a significant increase in Hispanic settlement. These studies suggest one way in which geographic context affects attitudes towards immigration, but do not necessarily argue that local news rhetoric differs depending on place.

42 Fryberg and colleagues (2012) find that location (and political ideology) influence the type of framing supporting or opposing Arizona’s anti-immigration bill SB 1070. The authors conducted a content analysis of three weeks’ worth of newspaper articles from two Arizona newspapers (one Conservative, one Liberal) and five national newspapers

(three Conservative, two Liberal). They find, contrary to their hypotheses, that national newspapers were more likely than Arizona newspapers to frame arguments supporting the bill in terms of threats (i.e., threats to economic and public safety) and to frame arguments against the bill in terms of civil rights issues (i.e., racial profiling). Similarly,

Kim et al. (2011) analyze the differing media portrayals of illegal immigration between border-states (California and Texas) and non-border states (Missouri and Pennsylvania) and find significant differences. They find a significant difference between border and non-border states. Border states mentioned negative consequences and social costs of immigration more often than non-border states. In this dissertation project, I further examine whether media frames in relation to immigration differ depending geographic context, and argue that certain frames resonate in some places more than others.

Conclusion

At the root of attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies are concerns about the imaginaries of race, space, and nation, all of which are embedded in the

American psyche. This dissertation examines three interrelated components to understanding attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies. First, people have predispositions they carry in and outside consciousness that influence immigration attitudes. These predispositions in turn influence attitudes towards immigration policies in two ways: a) at the individual level, such that varying levels of the predispositions 43 influence individual attitudes towards immigration policies; and b) at a regional aggregate level, where the concentration of people with varying levels of the predisposition also influence collective attitudes towards immigration policies. Second, media framing influences attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies. I advance the existing literature by arguing that the media frames immigration in ways that engage predispositions. Finally, geographic context affects both media framing of immigration and where we see a concentration of high levels of the predispositions. The proliferation of restrictive immigration policies in particular parts of the US is tied to the sociohistorical political legacies of different spaces, which are attached to the very idea that is America. The following chapter examines the ways in which immigration is framed in the media, in particular the extent to which the media frames immigration using language that engages psychological predispositions. Additionally, it examines, through a content analysis, whether media frames vary as a function of geographic context.

44 Chapter 2: Contemporary Immigration in the News The Activation of Individual Predispositions Through Framing

“The reality is that if you allow illegal immigration to continue in your area you will destroy yourself eventually…If you don't believe illegal immigration will destroy a community go and check out parts of Alabama around Arab and Albertville… [Republicans need to] empty the clip, and do what has to be done.”

– Alabama Senator Scott Beason, R-Gardendale (Rolley 2011).

Introduction

In the United States, the media play a crucial role in creating, molding, and reflecting public opinion. One way in which a nation-state defines its boundaries vis-à-vis national identity is through mass media. From the onset, freedom of speech and freedom of the press were vital to the democratic functioning of America. One of America’s founding fathers, Thomas Jefferson, made this clear when he said, “were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter” (Thomas

Jefferson to Edward Carrington 1952). The media play various roles, one of which is providing people with a narrative with which they can understand politics, by framing political and policy issues. Furthermore, the media not only provides the public with a narrative, but it also attaches this narrative to already existing predispositions that individuals hold, the overarching argument of this chapter. The opening epigraph is an example of such narrative framing as it relates to immigration.

45 The opening epigraph reveals important information about how immigration is framed in the media. First, it reveals to the audience explicit information about immigration (e.g. illegal immigration is bad, it will destroy you and your community,

Republicans are against illegal immigration, Republicans need to take strong measures to secure themselves and their communities). The epigraph also leaves out other information about immigration (e.g. a distinction between legal and illegal immigration, why is illegal immigration destroying these communities, what do Arab and Albertville actually look like, and what Democrats think of illegal immigration). Finally, the quote by Senator

Scott Beason also provides readers with context (e.g. the senator is from Alabama, which is a Southern Republican state, most Alabamians and probably others will know Scott

Beason is white by nature of his name, and Scott Beason is male). There is one more thing the opening epigraph does; it engages various individual predispositions.

The epigraph engages implicitly racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, anti-egalitarianism, and social dominance orientation. First, racial resentment is engaged by Senator Beason’s use of “illegal,” by engaging in the narrative of criminality, which is a racialized code word. It also conflates “illegality” with immigrants rather than the act of unauthorized migration into the US (Santa Ana 2002). Crime is also used in the racial priming literature to proxy an implicit measure of racial resentment (Domke 2001;

Entman 1992; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000). Second, ideas of authoritarianism underlie his quote because it is clear he considers “illegal” immigrants to be undercutting the rule of law. Furthermore, as an authority figure, Senator Beason is perceived to be knowledgeable about political issues, including immigration. Audience members or those paying attention to the news who are prone to respect authority will then perceive his

46 statements as true. Third, social dominance orientation (some groups are better than others) and moral traditionalism (reverence for the status quo) are engaged in his ideas about immigrants “destroying” his communities (i.e. “American” communities). In essence, he is saying without “these people” the communities would not have been destroyed. He juxtaposes those who belong in Arab and Albertville (i.e. white

Alabamians) and those who do not (i.e. “illegal” immigrants). “These” immigrants are

“destroying” communities like Arab and Albertville because they disrupt tradition; they disrupt the status quo. Finally, he is implicitly saying that “illegal” immigrants do not belong in communities like Arab and Albertville, denying them the basic right to live where they want to, engaging ideas about egalitarianism (all individuals are equal).

Hence, framing not only provides lens with which to understand a story, but it is also engaging and priming13 individuals’ existing dispositions and attaching them to immigration.

This chapter serves as a foundational chapter for the next three that follow— where I focus on individual predispositions and context using survey and experimental data—by focusing on how the core predispositions appear in American newspapers and whether context plays a role in where we see what kinds of immigration framing.

However, this chapter is limited in that I only look at frequencies of terms, rather than percentages, lending preliminary results only. The structure of the chapter first lays out the importance of framing to public opinion. I then go through the most common immigration frames found in the literature, and the connection between framing and context. This section is followed by the research design, including the methodology and

13 Priming is defined as cues in the information environment that activate or deactivate citizens’ predispositions. See Mendelberg 2001; 2001a; 2008b. 47 data used for this chapter. The results follow, using both quantitative and qualitative analysis of newspaper articles, where my preliminary results find that elements of the predispositions can be found in how immigration is framed in contemporary media. I also explore whether there are contextual elements to the connection between immigration framing and predispositions. In other words, is there statistical evidence that newspapers in one geographic context use a particular frame more than another, and why. I conclude the chapter with a larger discussion and analysis of the findings vis-à-vis activation of the aforementioned predispositions.

The Importance of Framing

Framing has various meanings in the social sciences. Given its root in an array of disciplines including sociology (Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Gamson and Modigliani

1989), psychology (Kahneman and Tversky 1984), and political science (Chong and

Druckman 2007), framing can differ conceptually between each discipline. Amos

Tversky and Daniel Kahneman defined framing as subtle differences in the definition of choice alternatives (1984). This perspective is dependent on the assumption of

“equivalence framing,” which refers to differential modes of presentation for the exact piece of information (i.e. risk-averse versus risk-seeker presentation of one situation).

The sociological tradition of framing, however, defines framing as a broader and more encompassing concept. According to Gamson and Modigliani (1987), frames are “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events…The frame suggest what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (143).

This definition is also labeled “emphasis framing,” since the observed effects can be attributed to differences in opinion rather than sole differences in framing presentation. 48 Scholar of political communication, Robert Entman suggests that frames “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text,” but

Bertram Scheufele argues that framing is not reliant on accessibility (52; Scheufele 2000,

2004). Empirical evidence by Thomas Nelson and colleagues seems to support this claim

(Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). According to these authors, “frames influence opinions by stressing specific values, facts, and other considerations, endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue than they might appear to have under an alternative frame” (569).

Framing research, thus, has focused on two types of frames: equivalency and emphasis frames. The latter is exemplary of the work by Thomas Nelson who exposed participants to a news story that presented the Ku Klux Klan’s plan to hold a rally

(Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). In one condition the story is framed as being a public safety issue, and in the other it is framed as freedom of speech, with the frames influencing attitudes about whether the KKK should be allowed to hold the rally. This dissertation project uses this approach to explore the ways in which immigration is framed in the news media.

Common Immigration Frames

The discourse around immigration is socially constructed. According to Bohon and Macpherson-Parrot (2011), “the ‘problem’ of unauthorized immigration has been socially constructed by various actors across the state” (101). There is a sizeable scholarship that examines how immigration and immigrants are framed (to name a few, see Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Chavez 2001; Chavez 2008; Chavez and Hoewe

2012; Dunaway, Branton, and Abrajano 2010; Knoll, Redlawsk, and Sanborn 2010; 49 Santa Ana 2002). Lakoff and Ferguson (2006) argue that framing is at the center of the immigration debate. The following section looks at some of the most commonly used frames.

The Illegal & Criminal Frames

According to Lakoff and Ferguson, the illegal frame is the most commonly used immigration frame (2006).14 The illegal frame also dehumanizes the subjects by using the term as a modifier to describe a person, literally calling them “illegal people” not worthy of basic human rights (Colorlines and Applied Research Center 2010; Downes

2007). Merolla and colleagues (2013) analyze the use of “illegal,” “undocumented,” and

“unauthorized” in four newspapers (Washington Post, Washington Times, New York Post, and New York Times), and three major cable news networks (CNN, FOX, MSNBC).

They find that 41 percent of all stories on immigration dealt with “illegal” immigrants, whereas only 1 percent dealt with “undocumented,” and .2 percent with “unauthorized” immigrants between 2007 and 2011. However, 96.4 percent of the immigration stories focusing on legal status dealt with “illegal” immigrants, in comparison to 3.2 and .4 percent dealing with “undocumented” and “unauthorized,” respectively. Moreover, when the authors focused only on the stories that focused primarily on legal status

(5,851/13,918), all of the newspapers and cable networks used the term “illegal” equally.

The illegal frame goes hand-in-hand with the criminal frame. It frames the issue as a legal one and stresses the criminality of the issue. It paints a picture of immigrants as inherently “bad people” that break laws. Linking immigration and crime results in

14 According to the data I present, “illegal” was the most common frame; the word appeared 8,518 times in all of the newspapers I analyze between 2008-2013. 50 attitudes towards immigrants and immigration that have political and behavior consequences. As a result, conflating immigration to drug cartels, violence, and crime, the media frames immigration as a threat to the safety and security of the American public (Igartua and Cheng 2009). If immigrants are portrayed as a threat, then Americans are more likely to have negative attitudes toward members of this group and to support policies that seek to restrict and exclude them from American society (Fryberg et al.

2012: 98). Kim and colleagues (2011) analyze the ways in which the media present illegal immigration through a content analysis of six regional and national newspapers, and three national television networks between 1997 and 2006. They find that references to crime as a negative consequence of immigration significantly outnumbered all other immigration frames. Igartua and Cheng (2009) found, through a randomized experiment, that students exposed to the news story linking immigration and crime reported immigration as a problem more frequently. In the aftermath of 9/11, the “securitization of migration” discourse strengthened the associations between immigrants, crime, threat, and security (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2000).

The Latino Frame

Finally, I examine another framing tactic used by the media, which is the conflation of immigration and Hispanics/Latinos. This conflation provides news viewers and readers to connect immigration with a group of people they can recognize. Although, this frame is less common in the literature as a “frame.” I argue that it is, in fact, a frame; it provides information, while simultaneously leaving pertinent information out.

Additionally, it provides figurative borders around particular bodies (i.e. Latinos). The tendency to link unauthorized immigration and Latinos is, as Chavez makes clear, not 51 uncommon or new (see Chavez 2001, 2008; Santa Ana 2002). Leo R. Chavez’s book

Covering Immigration: Popular Images and the Politics of the Nation looks at the discourse on Mexican immigration. He finds that of the magazine covers that reference

Mexican immigration the imagery has been overwhelmingly alarmist. “Alarm is conveyed through images and text that directly or metaphorically invoke crisis, time bomb, loss of control, invasion, danger, floods, and war” (2001: 216). The mass media have capitalized on portraying Latinos negatively, and emphasizing the negative consequences of immigration, hence conflating the two, which is a frame in and of itself.15

The illegal, criminal, and Latino frames are representative of imagined borders.

These frames emphasize the cultural boundaries that exist on the one side between civil law-abiding Americans, and on the other, law-breaking Latino “illegal” immigrants. The following two frames are examples of the physical borders.

The National Security and Border Frames

The national security frame and border frame are frames interlaced with the discourse of invasion, where “illegal aliens” are depicted as wanting to invade the US.

The national security frame emphasizes a post 9/11 threat intricately connected to the

US-Mexico border. Kim and colleagues (2011) find that the national security frame is the third most mentioned frame in their study. Similarly, Lakoff and Ferguson (2006) contend that conservatives use the security frame as a way to argue for increased border security. Similarly, a border frame is often paired with concerns about the war on terror.

15 Similarly to the conflation of terrorism and Muslims post 9/11 or the conflation between the Cold War and the Soviets. 52 Securing our borders implies a threat; there are people on the other side that are a threat to the US, and Americans need protection. It also distinguishes “Us” v. “Them,” and this distinction is usually made explicit by a physical borderline (i.e. the US-Mexico border).

Lahav and Courtemanche distinguish between the concepts of physical insecurity and cultural insecurity, and find that individuals exposed to the framing of immigration as a national security problem are more likely to say immigration is an issue of great importance (2012).

The Economic Frame

The media also frames immigration as a problem with “tangible” costs, such as economic threats. A set of studies argue that economic concerns are at the heart of anti- immigrant sentiment and anti-immigration policy preferences (Citrin et al. 1997; Facchini,

Mayda, and Puglisi 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Lee and Ottati 2002; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). However, another set of scholars suggest that immigrants and immigration help the economy rather than hurt it (Altonji and Card 1991). Framing immigration as having “real” negative costs to the country and to American taxpayers appears to be an effective way in which the news media talks about immigration (Brader,

Valentino, and Suhay 2008). Fryberg and colleagues (2012) define the framing of economic threats as having to do with threats to the economic and social welfare system, including frames about immigrants and/or immigration taking jobs away from native- born Americans. After analyzing three weeks (April 17- May7, 2010) worth of five national- and two Arizona newspapers that focused on the Arizona SB 1070 bill, they found economic threats to be among the top five immigration frames and was most common among national newspapers, regardless of ideological leanings. Lahav and 53 Courtmanche (2012) used a randomized experiment to frame immigration as a threat to the economy, and found that those subjects exposed to the economic frame were the second largest group to say immigration is of great importance. Igartua and Cheng (2009) used a similar experimental design, but framed immigration as having positive economic consequences. They found that this frame was the weakest between the two frames used

(other story used crime frame).

Imagined and Physical Borders Through Framing

This chapter examines immigration frames using a different conceptual framework. Although, the frames examined in previous research (e.g. illegal and security frames) certainly invoke predispositions, such as ideas about racial resentment, my goal is to explicitly investigate framing that invokes the core predispositions. As argued in

Chapter 1, the predispositions are inherently about ideas of American-ness. In this

Chapter, I extend this idea and argue that the mass media create rhetorical boundaries— both physical and imagined borders—by choosing frames that paint a one-sided picture, and often paint immigrants as the perpetrators. Americans can only conceive of immigration in a way that mimics the most commonly used frames. Consequently, the types of frames most common in the mass media undoubtedly affect public opinion on immigration.

Framing and Context

Although immigration has always been a national issue regulated by federal policies, the states have always had a stake in immigration. Immigrants move to certain states over others, and until recently these states included immigrant hubs, such as

54 California and New York. However, with an influx of immigrants moving to states that have seen very little in-migration, immigration became a hot topic. Due to the Supreme

Court ruling on Arizona’s SB 1070, states have the limited ability to pass immigration- related policies (see Arizona et al. v. United States 2012), making immigration a state- level issue, rather than a solely national one.

Various scholars have questioned whether the framing of immigration differs in a national versus local setting (Fryberg et al. 2012; Kim et al. 2011). For example, Bohon and MacPherson Parrot (2011) examine how the media has presented the phenomenon of unauthorized immigration in Georgia and consequently, how the public has responded.

They find that the Atlanta Journal-Constitution (1) does not necessarily inflate the number of unauthorized immigrants, but offers confusing and sometimes contradictory estimates, (2) disproportionately links unauthorized immigration with Latinos, (3) uses the term “illegal” to describe immigrants, and finally (4) quotes elites on the social and financial costs of unauthorized immigration without any evidence or basis. The authors conclude that claims-makers (media and elites) have legitimized unauthorized immigration as a social problem through the construction of the “illegal immigration problem” (111).

The framing of immigration, hence, is not a phenomenon that happens only in the national arena, but also in more localized settings. In addition, national and local framing of immigration may differ resulting in different political consequences. In particular, I look at The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal as examples of two highly circulated national newspapers. I also examine Alabama’s The Birmingham News,

55 Arizona’s The Arizona Republic, and Vermont’s The Rutland Herald as examples of three highly circulated state newspapers to examine the contextual aspect of immigration.

Research Design

Methodology

My methodology, a quantitative and qualitative semi-structured content analysis, is purely exploratory. The purpose of the content analysis is to explore and examine immigration frames, especially as they relate to the five aforementioned predispositions, and explore whether there are any differences across the different geographically located newspapers. More specifically, I examine whether there is a difference between the ways in which immigration is framed in the national versus local newspapers, and whether there are differences in the way it is framed across the three local statewide newspapers.

The decision over which statewide newspapers to examine arose from the underlying motivation of this project to understand why certain states, especially those in the South, pursued unauthorized immigration as a legislative agenda without having the numbers to warrant an actual threat. The statewide newspapers explored in this chapter compare and contrast three different types of states, demographics, and immigration context.

I sampled from three different regions of the United States. The first is Alabama, a state from the Southern Black Belt. Alabama is also one of three Southern states that passed an anti-immigration law, HB 56, in 2011, following Arizona’s SB 1070.

According to the US Census and as of 2012, Alabama is 66.6 percent white, 26.5 percent

Black/African American, and 4.1 percent Hispanic/Latino of any race.16 According to the

Pew Hispanic Center, in 2010 there were an estimated 120,000 unauthorized immigrants

16 http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/01000.html 56 in Alabama out of 11,200,000 unauthorized immigrants in the US, which is 1.07 percent of the unauthorized population residing in the state (Passel and Cohn 2011). Alabama’s demography depicts a state with a large percentage of Blacks, and a small percentage of unauthorized immigrants. Moreover, Alabama’s geographic location as a non-border state does not warrant costly immigration-related policies.

The second state, Arizona, comes from the second group/region, which is border states. Unlike Black Belt states, border states have a more explicit and direct relationship with immigration, given they share a border with another country. Additionally, states like California are well-known immigrant hubs. Arizona has a long trajectory with immigration-related legislation. The most recent law, SB 1070, passed in 2010 was quite controversial and led other states to follow suit. According to the US Census, and as of

2012, Arizona is 57.1 percent white, 4.5 percent black/African American, and 30.2 percent Hispanic/Latino of any race.17 Arizona’s demography depicts a state with a large percentage of Latinos, but only a 3.57 percent unauthorized immigrant US population

(Passel and Cohn 2011). Arizona’s geography, however, results in a perception of immigration a top issue of concern.

Finally, the third state, Vermont, comes from the third group/region, which are predominantly white Northern states. I chose Vermont as one of the Northern states to focus on because of its demographics, and difference from the other two states. Vermont is 94 percent white, 1.1 percent black, and 1.6 percent Hispanic.18 According to Pew

Hispanic Center, Vermont has an estimated less than 10,000 unauthorized immigrant population, which is .09 percent of the unauthorized immigrant population in the United

17 http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04000.html 18 http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/50000.html 57 States (Passel and Cohn 2011). Vermont is a comparison case for both Alabama and

Arizona, as Vermont does not have large non-white minority population, and is not as affected by Latino immigration. However, Vermont does share a border with Canada, so it will be interesting to see whether there is a different kind of border rhetoric.

The New York Times is a daily newspaper, founded in 1851. Its website is one of

America’s most popular news sites, and the most visited among all of the nation’s newspapers. As of March 2013, it has a daily circulation of 1,865,318 and 2,322,429 on

Sundays. The Wall Street Journal is an international daily newspaper, founded in 1889.

The Journal is the largest newspaper in the United States, by circulation. As of March

2013, it has a daily circulation of 2,378,827 (incl. 900,000 digital) and 2,406,332 on the weekends. I chose both of these newspapers for their broad and national perspectives, and as two of the three (USA Today is the other one) most widely circulated newspapers in the United States.

Figure 2.1 below is a graphical depiction of the number of immigration articles in

The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal, between 2000 and 2013. Both newspapers follow a similar pattern, depicting important immigrant events in the United

States (i.e. 2006 immigration legislation and marches, SB 1070 in 2010, HB 56 and others in 2011, and immigration reform in 2013). While the Times surpassed the Journal in number of articles pre-2010, both newspapers has similar numbers, especially in 2010 and afterwards.

58 Number of National Newspaper Articles with Headline Immigration/Immigrants, 2000-2013 400 300

200 NYTimes 100 Wall Street Number of Articles Articles of Number 0 Journal 2011 2011 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 Year Figure 2.1. Number of Immigration Articles from National Newspapers, 2000-2013

In terms of more local newspapers, I have chosen to focus on Alabama’s The

Birmingham News, Arizona’s The Arizona Republic, and Vermont’s The Rutland Herald, between 200 and 2013. The Birmingham News is the principal newspaper for

Birmingham Alabama, and the largest newspaper in Alabama. It was found in 1888, formerly The Evening News, and then The Daily News. As of 2012 (when it became a thrice-a-week newspaper), it has a circulation of 91,000 on Wednesdays/Fridays and

203,000 on Sundays. The Arizona Republic is a daily newspaper published in Phoenix, founded in 1890 (as The Arizona Republican). As of 2012, it has a daily circulation of

321,600 on weekdays, 347,134 on Saturdays, and 538,579 on Sundays. Finally, The

Rutland Herald is the second largest newspaper in Vermont (after the Burlington Free

Press). The Herald was founded in 1794, and it has a daily circulation 12-17,000. I have opted to use the Herald for two reasons: (1) I did not have access to read full articles from The Burlington Free Press, and (2) The Burlington Free Press and The Rutland

Herald were not that different in regards to the number of immigration. For example in

2013, according to The Burlington Free Press website it published 14 articles with the headline “immigration” or “immigrants” and The Rutland Herald published 26. Figure 59 2.2 below depicts a graphical representation of the number of immigration articles in the state newspapers. Similar to the national newspapers, the state newspapers also follow the same pattern. The Republic surpassed all other state newspapers in immigration articles.

Additionally, it surpassed both national newspapers as well. For the Birmingham News we can see a rise in the number of immigration articles in 2011, which is the year HB 56 was passed in Alabama. The Herald has quite a small number of immigration articles through the years, but we can see a rise in articles during the 2006 immigration legislations and marches across the country.

Number of State Newspaper Articles with Headline "Immigration" OR "immigrants", 2000-2013 500

400

300 Birmingman News 200 Arizona Republic

Number of Articles Articles of Number 100 Rutland Herald 0

Year Figure 2.2. Number of Immigration Articles from State Newspapers, 2000-2013

Coding

To identify relevant articles from all of the aforementioned newspapers, I used a series of online research databases (not all of the newspapers were available within one database). For The New York Times I used LexisNexis Academic, for The Wall Street

Journal and The Arizona Republic I used ProQuest, and finally for The Birmingham

News and The Rutland Herald I used NewsBank. I initially collected all articles, 60 including letters to the editor and opinion editorials, from the years 2000-2013 with a search on headline or document title (both of these are equivalent) search of

“immigration” or “immigrants.” Figures 2.1 and 2.2 depict the numerical data. As a way to narrow my search, I decided to analyze articles starting in 2008 through 2013. I decided to start at 2008 because I did not want any residual rhetoric from the highly publicized immigration marches in 2006. As the Figure 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate immigration articles started declining in 2008. I then follow the pattern of the data post-2008.

After having identified the articles, I created a list of immigration-related terms that appear in the previous literature (Fryberg et al. 2012; Igartua and Cheng 2009; Lahav and Courtemanche 2012). I then, created text documents of all of the articles by newspaper and year, and used a free-ware application, Word Counter, to investigate the frequencies of all unique words in the newspapers. Looking at frequency terms is common in the literature of framing (Entman 1993). I then added any new terms I found with high frequency to the list. I used all of the terms to develop a coding scheme that placed the term under one of the appropriate predispositions, as seen in Table 2.1.

Most of the data presented in this chapter used the entire population of newspaper articles within the five newspapers across six years. In order to quantitatively examine whether there are difference of means among of some the frames, I randomly sampled thirty articles per newspaper per year. In the cases were significant difference of means were found, I included ANOVA results.

61 Table 2.1. Coding Scheme Terms Racial Resentment • Hard work • Race/racial/racist • Worker/s • African American/ Blacks • Welfare • Hispanics • Unemployment • Latinos • Lazy/laziness • Mexican • Crime • American norms & values • Civil Rights • Individualism

Authoritarianism • Authority • Illegal/legal • Law/s • Unauthorized/undocumented • Rule of Law • Border • Police • Cultural attributes • Enforcement/law enforcement • Norm non-conforming • Security

Moral Traditionalism • Tradition • Welfare • American values • Alternative lifestyles • Hard work • Language/English-language • Traditional values • Conservatism • Family • Americanism • Way of life

Egalitarianism • Equality/equal rights • Welfare • Individual rights • Anchor babies • Equal opportunity • Equal treatment • Life chances

Social Dominance Orientation • Us • Equality • Them • American • Us v. them • Citizen/Citizenship • Superior • Border • Groups • Group competition

Due to the fact there are certain predispositions that are correlated in the mass public with each other, there are frames/terms that appear in more than one predisposition.

For example, the relationship between racial resentment and moral traditionalism (.45), egalitarianism (.51), and authoritarianism (.39) all have a moderate to strong correlation at p < .000.19 Hence, there are frames/terms that inhabit multiple predispositions.

19 Data based on the 2012 ANES. 62 First, Table 2.1, Row 1 illustrates the frames/terms associated with immigration and/or immigrants that I attribute to racial resentment, such as “crime,” “race” “African

Americans,” “Hispanics/Latinos,” and “hard work.” Second, is defining egalitarianism, which becomes difficult because it is so closely aligned with racial resentment. However, we can think of egalitarianism as “equality of opportunity” on one end and “equality of results” in the other end. Table 2.1, Row 4 depicts the way in which I have empirically defined egalitarianism for the content analysis. Empirically, egalitarianism is defined as any newspaper articles using an egalitarian narrative to frame immigration with words/terms such as “equality” and any variation of that term (e.g. equality of opportunity, equal treatment, equal rights), “welfare,” “anchor babies,” and “life chances.”

Third, moral traditionalism is defined by terms such as “tradition,” “American,” “values,”

“way of life,” “language/English/Spanish,” and “conservatism.” Fourth, as Table 2.1,

Row 2 indicates, the media can use explicit words that trigger authoritarianism such as

“authority,” “rule of law,” “law breakers,” and “unauthorized.” However, it can also trigger it more implicitly by emphasizing immigrants’ cultural differences and their deviation from the social norm (Fisher et al. 2011). Finally, the media can engage SDO, just like it can engage the other aforementioned predispositions, by using key words and phrases, especially as it relates to the immigration debate. As Table 2.1, Row 5 illustrates,

SDO is captured by words and phrases such as “superior,” “immigrant group,” “us v. them,” “equality,” and “citizen/ship.” SDO can also be captured by media stories about the ways in which immigrants are taking things away from native-born Americans, like jobs and public services. In essence, this type of rhetoric is one about group competition

(Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong 1998).

63 Results: The Boundaries of American Identity through Media Frames

The narrative about immigration in contemporary media is one of anti- immigration and anti-immigrant sentiment. An analysis of top newspaper articles reflects a negative story about immigration. It emphasizes the costly nature of immigration, both economical and otherwise. It frames immigration as a narrative about who belongs and who does not belong, and why. Ultimately, immigration is used as an issue to have implicit conversations about who is deemed American and who falls short of that title.

The following section illustrates this point by looking at the ways in which immigration is attached to the five aforementioned predispositions, which in many ways delineate the boundaries of American identity.

As illustrated in Table 2.2, through proxy terminology all of the predispositions are being engaged. Through the examination of Table 2.2, I found three overarching themes that include aspects of some, if not all, of the predispositions: immigrants as culturally different, immigrants as law-breakers, and securing America/ns. The first theme, immigrants as culturally different, engages mainly with racial resentment, but the theme also underlies the other predispositions. I use ethnic terms, race/racial, and civil rights to examine the ways in which the newspapers depict immigrants as culturally different between 2008-2013. The second theme, immigrants as lawbreakers, engages mainly with authoritarianism by focusing on crime and illegality. Finally, the third theme, securing America/Americans focuses on the frames of security, border,

Americans/citizens, and jobs, which engages all of predispositions.

64

Table 2.2. Frequencies of Coding Scheme Terms Terms # # Racial Resentment Hard work 50 Race/racial 514 Work* 7890 African American/ Blacks 101 Welfare 129 Hispanics 1902 Employment* 571 Latinos 1178 Lazy 9 Mexican 897 Crime 1267 American/Citizen 6048 Civil Rights 399 Individualism 2 Authoritarianism Authority/ies 865 Unauthorized/undocumented 1532 Law/s* 9560 Border* 3269 Rule of Law 101 Culture/al 247 Police 1929 Norm/s 9 Enforcement 2580 Federal 3307 Security 1975 Illegal* 8518 Moral Traditionalism Tradition* 195 Welfare 129 American/Citizen 6048 Lifestyle/s 15 Hard work 50 English 540 Family 1099 Conservative/s 839 Way of life 8 Culture/al 247 Egalitarianism Equality 49 Welfare 129 Individual rights 3 Anchor babies 16 Equal opportunity 5 Un/equal treatment 4 Opportunity 314 Job/s 2135 Equal* 181 Social Dominance Orientation Us 845 Equality 49 Them 2848 American/Citizen 6048 Superior 12 Border 3269 Group* 2850 Competition 70 Immigrant group 96 Note: * Term frequency based on any variation of the word.

65 Immigrants as Culturally Different

Within the larger umbrella of American-ness, all of the frames that invoke the predispositions allude to the fact that immigrants are different. Sometimes these differences are based on cultural attributes and other times they are based on perceptions of political, social, and physical differences. After examining the data, one of the most common referenced frames are related to immigrants as culturally different.20 The following subsections include the results based on implicit and explicit mentions of race and ethnicity.

Race and Ethnicity

The media makes it quite clear that contemporary immigration is different than earlier waves of immigration. Moreover, they are clear about what contemporary immigration looks like. In essence, the face of immigration is Hispanic/Latino (Chavez and Hoewe 2012). I found Hispanics/Latinos continuing to occupy this super-imposed identity as immigrants. In particular, “illegal” immigrants are the most often conflated with immigration. Figure 2.3 depicts the frequency of different ethnic terms in all of the newspapers aggregated for 2008 through 2013, and evident in Figure 2.3 is the conflation of immigration and Hispanics, Latinos, and Mexicans identities. The number of times the other ethnicities are mentioned is small compared to Latino identities, even though Indian immigration to the United States surpassed that of Chinese populations between 2007 and

2008, making them the third largest immigrant group behind Mexicans and Filipino

(Terrazas and Batog 2010). In general, all of the newspapers used Mexican, Latino, and

20 See Table 2.2 terms: race, racial, Hispanics, Latinos, Mexicans, English, lifestyle, culture/cultural. 66 Hispanic in relation to immigration and/or immigrants; this conflation has consequences on these groups of people, regardless of legal status.

Frequency of Ethnic Terms, 2008-2013

700 650 600 550 500 Arizona 450 Republic 400 Birmingham 350 News 300 Rutland Herald 250 Frequency (#) Frequency 200 NY Times 150 100 WSJ 50 0 Spanish Mexican Latino Hispanic Chinese India Asian

Ethnic Terms

Figure 2.3. Frequency of Ethnic Terms in all Newspapers, 2008-2013

I ran a one-way repeated measure ANOVA on a random sample of thirty articles from the five newspapers to determine if there are significant mean differences in the frequency of the combined terms Hispanic and Latino (mean frequency: NYT=203.67;

WSJ=158.83; AR=89.83; BN=54.5; RH=7.5). The results show that different newspapers elicited statistically significant differences in mean Hispanic_Latino use over the time between 2008-2013, F(4, 20) = 14.99, p = .000). I got similar results for Hispanic F(4,

20) = 12.35, p = .000, Latino on its own (F=12.84), and Mexican (F=8.92). The results lend preliminary evidence to contextual differences between the newspapers.

In Figure 2.4, we see that movement of Hispanics and Latinos by year and newspaper. The New York Times conflates immigration and Latinos most consistently

67 compared to all of the other newspapers. The Wall Street Journal’s mentions of Hispanics or Latinos rose incrementally between 2009 and 2011, after which it stayed at a steady number of around 200. Given the national scene vis-à-vis immigration, it is not surprising that there was an increase between these years. The WSJ increased its coverage of the immigration debate during those years, and reached similarities with the NYT in regards to the number of articles about immigration and/or immigrants (see Figure 2.1) and the conflation between immigration and Hispanics/Latinos as illustrated in Figure 2.4.

Similarly, both the Arizona Republic and the Birmingham News had higher mentions of these ethnic terms that coincided with their respective immigration laws. The

Birmingham News’ use of these terms declined after 2012, which may be due to the backlash Alabama received regarding claims of racial profiling. Not surprisingly, The

Rutland Herald had the least number of mentions, and the number of mentions did not rise in lieu of SB 1070 or HB 56, but rose in lieu of the immigration reform bill in 2013.

Moreover, the Rutland Herald has very few mentions of “Canada,” between 2008 and

2013, which implies that the US-Canada border does not elicit as much news and is not as threatening as the Southern border.

68 Frequency of "Latino" & "Hispanic", by Year

350 300 250 Arizona Republic 200 Birmingham News 150 Rutland Herald 100 NY Times Frequency (#) Frequency 50 WSJ 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year

Figure 2.4. Frequency of “Latino” and “Hispanic,” by Year

A prime example of the conflation between immigration and Hispanics is from a woman attending a rally in Alabama who said that she supports the law (HB56) because of her concerns about border security and proceeds to equate this concern with Mexicans.

The woman states, “I've liked every Mexican I've ever met,” which she uses as a preface or justification for the next statement: “It's not whether I like them or not. It's about keeping our borders secure” (Gray Sep. 21, 2011). She does not realize that in her mind the rhetoric of border security is conflated with all persons that “look” Mexican, regardless of whether they are Mexican-American. In addition, the US shares more than one border with another country, which she is clearly not concerned about. It is these types of conflation between immigrants, illegal immigrants, and Latinos that results in negative consequences for all Latinos—regardless of status—and all immigrants— regardless of race and/or ethnicity (Knoll, Redlawsk, and Sanborn 2010; Ramakrishnan,

Esterling, and Neblo 2010). In fact, immigration is often racialized in the media the analyses below reveal.

69 Figure 2.5 looks at the frequency of the use of the word race and racial in immigration-related articles. Although the frequency of the words are not as high as other terms, it is noteworthy to see where we see the highest frequencies and in what year. The

NYT’s highest frequency happens in 2010, the year Arizona’s SB 1070 was passed. The frequency of the word declines after that. The WSJ follows a very similar trend, but uses the word a lot less frequent than the NYT. The Arizona Republic has the highest frequency of any newspaper between 2008-2010. The Birmingham News follows a similar trend, in that the terms appeared most in 2011, the year of Alabama’s HB 56. Prior to 2011, The

Birmingham News hardly used the word vis-à-vis immigration. The Rutland Herald uses both terms very minimally, with a slight spike in 2010. The use of the terms may or may not have a negative connotation to it, but what is important for the purposes of this project is the fact that immigration became a much more racialized issue in 2010 and

2011, seemingly correlated with the immigration policies in Arizona and five other states across the country. A race discourse, whether it was about SB 1070’s likely consequence of racial profiling or Alabama’s racial past, was present during the time these policies were being passed and enacted.

70 Frequency of "Race" and "Racial," by Year

90 80 Arizona 70 Republic 60 Birmingham 50 News Rutland 40 Herald 30 NY Times 20 WSJ 10 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 2.5. Frequency of “Race” and “Racial,” by Year

One of the other, more implicit, ways in which immigration became a racialized issue was from the use of civil rights terminology, as seen in Figure 2.6. Similar to the use of race/racial, the use of civil rights depends on geographic context between 2010 and 2011. The NYT used the word infrequently, but rose in a curvilinear manner in the years between 2009 and 2012. The WSJ has the exact same trend as the NYT, but used the term at a much lower rate. The Arizona Republic used the term quite steadily between

2008 and 2010, then the use of the term dropped after 2010. The use of the term by The

Birmingham News, a Southern newspaper, stands out. Between 2008 and 2010, the use of civil rights vis-à-vis immigration was quite uncommon. Again, like race/racial the use of civil rights does not indicate a negative or positive connotation. It does, however, indicate a racialization of immigration and a conflation between Alabama’s HB 56 and civil rights; a conflation that is highly contextualized, given Alabama’s role in the civil rights movement.

71 Frequency of "Civil Rights," by Year

90 80 70 Arizona 60 Republic 50 Birmingham 40 News Rutland 30

Frequency (#) Frequency Herald 20 NY Times 10 WSJ 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year

Figure 2.6. Frequency of “Civil Rights,” by Year

Civil rights terminology was often invoked in two ways. First, the immigration laws, namely Arizona’s SB 1070 and Alabama’s HB 56, were invoked as being civil rights violations. The excerpt from a NYT article below illustrates this point.

Even though the Justice Department sued to block the Arizona law as an unwarranted intrusion into federal power, the Department of Homeland Security under Secretary Janet Napolitano has been doggedly expanding efforts to enlist local help in deportations, ignoring local communities' objections about racial-profiling and worries about civil rights violations ("A Setback for Arizona-Style Immigration Laws" April 13, 2011)

Second, the immigration laws were often being conflated with the civil rights movement.

The excerpt below from an article in the New York Times is exemplary of this third point.

Thousands of people gathered at the Capitol in Atlanta on Thursday to protest legislation aimed at illegal immigrants. The folk rock duo the Indigo Girls performed their song ''Shame on You'' with lyrics adapted for the rally. Representative John Lewis, a Georgia Democrat who was a leader in the civil rights movement of the 1960s, urged the crowd to fight. ''I was beaten, left bloody, but I didn't give up, and you must not give up,'' he said ("Georgia: Rally for Immigrants' Rights" March 24, 2011).

Similarly, an article about Arizona’s law, XXX wrote: 72

In Washington, Representative Luis V. Gutierrez, Democrat of Illinois, was arrested after staging a sit-in on the sidewalk in front of the White House with about three dozen other people, in front of a crowd of thousands. At a rally before he was arrested, Mr. Gutierrez, speaking in English and in Spanish, evoked memories of the civil rights movement of the 1960s. ''There are moments in which you say, 'We will escalate this struggle,' '' he said. ''Today they will put handcuffs on us. But one day we will be free at last in the country we love.'' In all, 35 people were arrested in the sit-in, the United States Park Police said (Preston May 1, 2010).

The Birmingham News conflated Alabama’s history of the civil rights struggle in

Alabama with the contemporary immigration law, HB 56. For example, in an article

Julieta Garibay, a board member of United We Dream, stated:

The state that witnessed the birth of the Civil Rights Movement is now seeing those results reversed by being among states drowned under the xenophobic tidal wave of Arizona copycat bills,'' the press release from United We Dream stated. ''The goal is to revive the solidarity among all of Alabama's residents that the great Martin Luther King Jr. left behind (Faulk August 19, 2011)

In another instance, Contreras, a 15 year old girl living in Alabama, compared the civil rights movement of the 1960s and said: “We can't let history repeat itself” (Faulk August

24, 2011). Immigration protesters also used this particular history to rally against HB 56, and to make about the similarities between civil rights violations and the violations caused by HB 56. The title of a November 13, 2011 article illustrates this point:

“Immigration protesters rally at civil rights site Cross-state tour targets ‘bad law’” (Dean

November 12, 2011). Immigrant protesters were strategic in choosing civil rights sites, including Birmingham's Kelly Ingram Park and the grave of Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth at

Oak Hill Cemetery, to protest the immigration law, given Alabama’s sociohistorical legacy surrounding civil rights.

73

Immigrants as Lawbreakers

Another reoccurring frame in relation to immigration is the “crime” frame, which encompasses a larger conversation surrounding American normative behavior in regards to the justice system. For example, the attorney general of Alabama, Luther Strange, wrote a piece in The Birmingham News, entitled “Immigration and the Rule of Law.” In the piece he states, “As this debate swirls and the political winds blow, I am, and will continue to be, focused on my job of enforcing the laws of Alabama through the proper legal channels” (Strange 2011). The attorney general is emphasizing the normative rhetoric of the “rule of law” in relation to immigration. In other words, for him immigration is about the rule of law, period. In October of the same year, there was a piece about a Mexican couple living in Birmingham, AL trying to aspire to the American

Dream. The husband, Miguel Morales, reiterates how difficult it is to enter the US the

“proper ways.” “When he hears people asking why undocumented Hispanics don't just go back to Mexico and go through the proper channels to immigrate here legally, Morales just shakes his head. ‘It's really almost impossible,’ he said. ‘I know the perception in

America is that it's easy, but it's not. You need to have a master's degree or a Ph.D.’”

(Leech 2011). Apparent in these quotes, the framing of the immigration debate as one about the rule of law or legality is prominent, and has consequences on public opinion.

The framing of immigrants as criminals and the frame surrounding conversations about

(il)legality are furthered examined below.

74 Crime

Crime is one of the most common immigration frames, resulting in negative consequences for all those deemed immigrants. Immigrants are often portrayed as criminals, not only because they are perceived to break the law by coming into the US illegally, but even once in the US they are perceived and stereotyped to be associated with drug cartels and high neighborhood crime. Consequently, it conflates immigration

(and immigrants) with crime, which results (and helps explains) the public’s perception of the Other.

Figure 2.7 displays the frequency of the word crime and the results evidently show the high frequency of the word, especially during times when policies are on the table, i.e. when politicians need constituent support. The conflation between crime and immigration for the NYT remained high between 2009 and 2010. After 2010, it started to decline and by 2013 it declined significantly. The WSJ used the word considerably less than the NYT, reaching its highest point in 2010. It did start to pick up again after 2012. I attribute the increase in the use of crime by the WSJ to the 2013 immigration reform bill in congress. However, I do think that the WSJ’s increase is correlated with an increase in newspaper articles on immigration, rather than a larger conflation of crime and immigration by the WSJ. The Arizona Republic used the term at a higher rate than any other newspaper. In 2010, the title of two articles in the Arizona Republic quite explicitly perpetuate the crime frame: “Most illegal immigrants bring drugs, Brewer says” (Rough

Jun. 26, 2010), and “Illegal Immigrants are Criminals” ("Illegal Immigrants are

Criminals" May 26, 2010). Again, it is not surprising given the context of Arizona in

2010. The Birmingham News has a similar trend line in regards to their high use of the

75 word in 2011, their policy equivalent year. Prior to 2011, the conflation of crime and immigration in The Birmingham News was quite low. The Rutland Herald in general did not have as many immigration related articles as the other two state-level newspapers, and its use of the word crime was almost non-existent between 2008 and 2013.

A one-way repeated measure ANOVA on the sample of five newspapers determined significant mean differences in the frequency of the term crime (mean frequencies: NYT=82.33; WSJ=29.5; AR=72.83; BN=24.33; RH=2.17). The results show that different newspapers elicited statistically significant differences in mean crime use over the time between 2008-2013, F(4, 20) = 6.17, p = .002. The results lend preliminary evidence to contextual differences within the newspapers.

Frequency of "Crime," by Year 160 140 120 Arizona 100 Republic 80 Birmingham 60 News Rutland Frequency (#) Frequency 40 Herald 20 NY Times 0 WSJ 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year

Figure 2.7. Frequency of “Crime,” by Year

Illegality

The “illegal frame” is the most reoccurring immigration frame. The use of the word “illegal” not only says something about the issue at hand but it also describes the people underlying the issue. It frames immigration as an (il)legal issue, and immigrants

76 as “illegals” also suggest criminality. Immigrants are in the country illegally, which means they broke the law and committed a crime (Lakoff and Ferguson 2006).

Immigrants go from being human beings, to being “illegals” and sometimes “illegal aliens.” It is an abstracted description and one that makes it easier for people to blame

“illegals” for the problems in the US The presence of the word illegal criminalizes the individual, just as much as the act.

Table 2.3 displays the frequency of different types of ways “illegal” is used, and other common terms used to describe immigrants without papers. The frequency of the word is quite astonishing, especially when compared to the low frequency of other terms.

The NYT uses the word at the highest rate of any other newspaper. In Table 2.3, Column

4, Row 1, we see that the NYT used a variation of the word “illegal” 3,264 times between

2008 and 2013. The WSJ is also high at 2,059 times it used the word between the same years. The Arizona Republic similarly uses the word just as much with 2,097 times. The

Birmingham News’ use of the word is much lower at 947, but still high enough to conflate immigration and “illegal.” Not surprisingly, The Rutland Herald used the word at a lesser rate than all of the other newspapers. However, in The Rutland Herald’s illegal appears the most in relation to immigration.

77 Table 2.3. Frequency (#) of Terms Used to Describe Immigrants, 2008-2013 Arizona Republic Birmingham News Rutland Herald NYT WSJ Illegal (Inclusive)21 2097 947 151 3264 2059 Illegals 82 11 1 26 79 Illegal Immigrant 801 479 8 1971 858 Unauthorized (Inclusive) 14 64 0 131 62 Undocumented (Inclusive) 458 151 32 313 421 Undocumented Immigrant 274 59 14 118 175

In Figure 2.8, we can see the frequency of “illegals” and “illegal immigrants” aggregated by year and newspaper. Not surprisingly, The New York Times has the highest frequency of the terms. This is not surprisingly because the NYT is one of the newspapers who have yet to ban the “I” word (Haughney April 23, 2013).22 In fact, none of the newspapers I analyzed have officially banned the term “illegal.” The WSJ use of the word is much lower than the NYT, but it does increase its use in 2010 and 2011, and again in 2013. The Arizona Republic increased their use of the word by 45% between

2009 and 2010. After 2010, however, the Republic dropped their use of the word quite significantly decreasing 65% between 2010 and 2011, and 77% by 2013. The

Birmingham News increased their use of the word 90.2% between 2010 and 2011, an increase that is heavily correlated with Alabama’s HB 56. Similarly to the Republic,

Birmingham dropped the term by 54% between 2011 and 2012, and by 88.6% by 2013.

21 Inclusive signifies that I use all instances of the term, while those terms that do not have (inclusive) are verbatim terms from the newspapers. For example, Illegal (inclusive) includes illegal, illegals, illegal immigrants, illegal aliens, illegal people, illegal person etc. 22 “The Drop the I-Word Campaign to eliminate use of the word "illegal" was launched in September 2010 as anti-immigrant sentiment and hate crimes against communities of color had increased. Powered by immigrants and diverse communities across the country, Drop the I-Word has worked steadily through advocacy and coverage at Colorlines.com to present the dehumanizing and inaccurate aspects of the i-word, give space for immigrants to tell their stories, and to highlight the history behind the term "illegal" and other dehumanizing language” (http://colorlines.com/droptheiword/). 78 The Rutland Herald barely uses these terms, which means that when they do use the term illegal it is not describing a person, per se, more so an act.

A one-way repeated measure ANOVA on the sample of six newspapers determined significant mean differences in the frequency of the term illegals/illegal immigrants (mean frequencies: NYT= 332.83’ WSJ=156.17; AR=147.17; BN=81.67;

RH=1.5). The results show that different newspapers elicited statistically significant differences in mean use of the term over the time between 2008-2013, F(4, 20) = 15.40, p

= .000. The results lend preliminary evidence to contextual differences within the newspapers.

Frequency of "Illegals" & "Illegal Immigrant(s)," by Year 500

400 Arizona 300 Republic Birmingham News 200 Rutland Herald Frequency (#) Frequency 100 NY Times WSJ 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year Figure 2.8. Frequency of “Illegal” and “Illegal Immigrant,” by Year

Immigration frames about criminality and the law often juxtapose immigration with notions of American norms and values. For example, in an editorial in the New

York Times, a ranking member of the House Judiciary argued that “enforcing the current laws against illegal immigration is consistent with the ultimate American value --the rule

79 of law” ("Re: 'Immigration Hardball'" Nov. 17, 2010). American norms and values are yet another way in which immigration discourse is framed in the media.

Securing America/ns

Underlying almost all, if not all, immigration frame is the idea that immigrants are norm non-conforming. In other words, they do not follow traditional American norms and values. Thus, immigration often invoked as a security issue. It is not only framed as a security issue in the physical sense of the word (e.g. securing Americans form criminals), but also securing America from norm non-conforming individuals that threaten the

American creed (Lipset 1996).

(Border) Security

Figure 2.9 depicts the frequency of the term “security,” with the exception of any mentions of “social security.”23 One of the first things that stand out from Figure 2.9 is the steadiness with which the word security is used by almost all of the newspapers with the exception of 2013. Ironically, the NYT used the word more frequently during SB 1070 year, while WSJ used the term more frequently during HB 56 year. At the state level, The

Arizona Republic had relatively low use of the word in general, increasing its use in 2013.

It makes sense that the Republic’s use of security maintained a steady line. Contextually,

Arizona is a border state that, I would argue, has always had rhetoric surrounding security.

The Birmingham News, on the contrary, is the opposite. Alabama is not a border state, and we can see the low use of the term security vis-à-vis immigration between 2009 and

2010. In 2011, however, it surpassed The Arizona Republic’s use of the term, after which

23 Even though this may still be relevant in the conversation surround immigration, I was interested in security in a more physical sense of threat. 80 it maintained a steady rate between 2011-2012 and decreasing slightly in 2013. Finally,

The Rutland Herald barely used the term, but increased in 2013.

Frequency of "Security," by Year

300 250 200 Arizona Republic 150 Birmingham News

100 Rutland Herald

Frequency (#) 50 NYTimes

0 WSJ 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year

Figure 2.9. Frequency of “Security,” by Year

What is most interesting about the security frame is how it differs between the three local state newspapers, in particular between The Arizona Republic and The

Birmingham News. Table 2.4 shows the difference of means test of security between the

Arizona Republic and the Birmingham News for the years between 2008-2013. It provides preliminary evidence that the use of the security frames is significantly different in the Arizona Republic and the Birmingham News; signaling contextual differences between these two newspapers.

81 Table 2.4. “Security” Frequency Between Arizona Republic and Birmingham News Obs Mean Std. Err Std. Dev AR 6 67 19.3428 47.38 BN 6 19.67 7.483191 18.33 Combined 12 43.335 12.1931 42.23813 Difference 47.33 20.73987 t= 2.28 Ha: Difference ≠ 0, p=.05

Border issues are also often conflated with security concerns; the rhetoric surrounding immigration is one of border security. As Figure 2.10 shows, “border,” is a highly used word when it comes to immigration and/or immigrant stories in the news.

The use of the word border by the NYT reached its peak in 2013. The WSJ’s use of the word declined significantly in 2012 and rose again in 2013. Similar patterns can be found at the state level. The Arizona Republic used the word the most of all the newspapers prior to 2013. Both the Birmingham News and the Rutland Herald used the word infrequently, only rising in 2010 and 2013 for the Herald and 2011 and 2013 for the

Birmingham News. Similarly to the term security, The Birmingham News’s use of both terms rose in the year that HB 56 was proposed and passed. All of the newspapers’ use of the term rose in 2013, seemingly due to the increased attention to immigration at the federal level.

82 Frequency of "Border," By Year 450

350 Arizona Republic 250 Birmingham News 150 Rutland Herald

Frequency (#) Frequency NYTimes 50 WSJ -50 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year

Figure 2.10. Frequency of “Border,” by Year

In the newspaper stories, there were plenty of advocates for states’ right to secure

“our” borders: In the Arizona Republic, for example, a contributor suggest, that “It is up to the states in combination with the federal government to provide for the security of

America's borders” ("Illegal Immigrants in the Census" Nov. 21, 2009). Moreover, even states that do not share a border with Mexico are concerned about their own borders.

Alabama House Majority Leader Micky Hammon, R-Decatur, commented on the ruling of HB 56: “We must remember that today's ruling is simply the first round in what promises to be a long judicial fight over Alabama's right to protect its borders” (Lawson and Faulk Aug. 30, 2011). In general, immigration is often and frequently framed as a threat to the American people. The construction of the border wall serves as a reminder that there exist those North of the border, which signals an us and that us is “Americans,” and those South of the border, which signals a them and that them is “Mexicans.”

83 Us (Americans) v. Them (Foreigners)

Outside of the term illegal, words like American and citizen are the most reoccurring in the set of newspapers and year I examine in this chapter, further emphasizing that immigration at its basis is about the contradiction between immigrants and Americans. Figure 2.11 depicts the use of the term American/s and citizen/s. The

NYT used these words the most out of all the newspapers averaging at 431.16 times. The

WSJ follows a similar trend, but used the terms at a much lower rate between 2008 and

2012, reaching its highest point in 2013. On average, the WSJ used the words 263 times between 2008 and 2013. The Arizona Republic’s highest point was in 2010 and on average, it used the words 189.17 times through the 2008-2013 timespan. The

Birmingham News averaging at 89.67 used the words a lot less frequent vis-à-vis immigration, reaching its highest point in 2011. The Rutland Herald, on average, used the words 35, which is mainly driven by 2013. Again, given the increased attention to immigration in 2013 by the Obama Administration, the increased use of the term in 2013 is not surprising.

Frequency of "American," & "Citizen," By Year 950 900 850 800 750 700 650 Arizona 600 550 Republic 500 Birmingham 450 News 400 350 Rutland 300 Herald

Frequency (#) Frequency 250 200 NYTimes 150 100 WSJ 50 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year Figure 2.11. Frequency of “American” and “Citizen,” by Year 84 As a way to get at the idea of Americans versus un-Americans, I explored the frequency of “us,” and “them,” in the Arizona Republic and the Birmingham News, in order to get at the contextual differences between these two newspapers. The Arizona

Republic used the terms more often, averaging at 42.2 in its use of “us,” and 98.4 in its use of “them,” with the exception of 2010. In 2010, it increased with 96 mentions of “us,” and 183 mentions of “them.” The Birmingham News had relatively fewer mentions through all of the years averaging at 11.5 for “us,” and at 30.4 for “them,” with the exception of 2011. In 2011, the Birmingham News has 63 mentions of “us,” and 131 mentions of “them.” Clearly creating a divide between “them,” those who are different from “us” when it is necessary for policy support. After framing immigration as a division between “us” and “them,” and after portraying immigration as a threat to the security of the American people, immigration is often framed as taking something from

“us,” or taking something they do not deserve. Immigration is framed as “taking

American jobs,” as “invading our country,” and as taking advantage of public services using Americans’ tax dollars.

Figure 2.12 illustrated the number of times the term job/s appeared in the newspapers for all years between 2008 and 2013. Both the NYT and the WSJ used the term steadily, both increasing the use of the term in 2013. Not surprisingly, The Arizona

Republic’s highest point appeared in 2010. Similarly, The Birmingham News’s highest point came in 2011. Finally, The Rutland Herald barely used the term jobs in relation to immigration. A one-way repeated measure ANOVA on the sample of five newspapers determined significant mean differences in the frequency of the term job/s (NYT=114.33;

WSJ=120.17; AR=67.67; BN=45.67; RH=8). The results show that different newspapers

85 elicited statistically significant differences in mean use of the term over the time between

2008-2013, F(4, 20) = 6.47, p = .002.

Frequency of "Job/s," By Year 300 250 Arizona 200 Republic 150 Birmingham News 100 Rutland Frequency (#) 50 Herald NYTimes 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 WSJ Year

Figure 2.12. Frequency of “Job/s,” by Year

Illustrating the idea that immigrants, and in particular Mexicans, are norm non- conforming is a quote by a resident from Mesa, Arizona who wants to find more positive solutions to the immigration issue. However, she does express her concerns: “Sure we should monitor our borders more closely against this poverty-driven invasion from

Mexico. Sure we should find some way to prevent abuse and cost-hemorrhaging of our medical facilities. Sure we should stop illegal day laborers from undercutting the labor force of American workers and contributing to the unemployment crisis” (Katz De. 18,

2009). This quote brings three different types of concerns. First, the “invasion from

Mexico,” which then leads to the “invaders” to abuse American medical facilities and undercut the labor force of American workers. At a public hearing on the HB 56 in

Alabama, “supporters said they're tired of illegal immigrants taking jobs that could be held by Alabamians.” One man from Montgomery in particular said, “We have been invaded, and the invasion continues to this day,'' (White Mar. 3, 2011). Framing 86 immigration in such a way that makes explicit the negative costs associated with immigration, and more importantly, that native-born Americans are losing something simultaneously, is dangerous. It further creates a divide between those who consider themselves “American,” and those they consider “un-American.”

Discussion: Predispositions in the Media

The media frames that appear in the results section are all important frames that appeared in all of the newspapers across all years in large numbers. I found that each of these frames engages predispositional attributes, some change over time, while others have contextual differences.

Immigrants as Different

The conflation between Hispanics/Latinos and immigration clearly demarcate these particular brown bodies as not only immigrants, but as foreigners; as people who do not belong. Media frames emphasizing immigrants as different, whether culturally or racially, engages aspects of racial resentment. Though the use of ethnic terms, that clearly mark immigrants as non-white, and the use of words such as race/racial, the media frames engaged in racial resentment. The use of race/racial appears to be contextual, with both the Arizona Republic and the Birmingham News using the terms more frequently during the same year the state passed immigration-related legislation, which also creates a conflation between racialized ideas and immigration, an argument emphasized in Chapter

1. The use of these terms, however, started to declines after 2012, which I attribute to the fact the newspapers seemingly started to focus on the federal immigration reform bill, rather than Arizona’s SB 1070 and its copycat laws.

87 Similarly, the use of the civil rights terminology and the way in which it was invoked appears quite contextual. The term was most used by the Birmingham News in

2011, illustrating three main points. First, it depicts immigrants as a racially different group by comparing them to the struggles of African American during the civil rights era.

Second, it engages the audience in a particular history that is unique to the South and to

Alabama. Finally, it engages the predisposition of racial resentment, egalitarianism, social dominance, and moral traditionalism. It engages racial resentment because it explicitly relates Alabama’s HB 56 with the civil rights struggles of African Americans.

Racial resentment is explicit about asking whether conditions of slavery make it hard for

African Americans to obtain upward mobility. Egalitarianism is engaged implicitly though the use of civil rights and a history in unfair and unequal treatment of African

Americans, and now immigrants. Social dominance orientation defines group-based anti- egalitarianism, and the use of civil rights as a metaphor underlies group-based inequality between African Americans and whites, and now Latinos and whites. Finally, it engages moral traditionalism by delineating a line between those who are a part of the status quo and those who disrupt the status quo. The media frames emphasizing jobs is indicative of the kind of economic threat immigrants pose to Americans. This media frame is often invoked as immigrants taking what they do not deserve or have worked for, like jobs, from native-born Americans, again engaging in ideas of racial resentment.

Immigrants as Lawbreakers

The media frames of crime and illegality both engage attributes of authoritarianism. Overall, both media frames were used quite often by all of the newspapers. The Arizona Republic and the Birmingham News increased their use of both 88 terms during the year both of these states passed harsh immigration laws. After 2010 and

2011, the Arizona Republic’s and the Birmingham News’ use of both the terms decreased.

However, the WSJ’s use of both terms increased in 2013, so the terms are often used in relation to immigration-related legislation. Both of these media frames engage in aspects of authoritarianism, by emphasizing the rule of law in American and immigrants as people who break these rules. Additionally, the use of these media frames lends evidence to an understanding of these newspapers as authoritarian tendencies in their emphasis of the importance of following rules.

Immigrants as a Threat to America and Americans

Finally, and most encompassing, the media frames under the ‘Securing

America/Americans” theme engages all of the predispositional attributes, and all the frames follow a similar trend over time and by newspaper. The media frames of security and borders go hand-in-hand with authoritarianism. These frames emphasize the significance of authority by using terminology that engages in ideas about security, and in particular ideas about border security. The need for border security signals a need for authorities, in this case border patrol agents, to secure the American people from intruders; a kind of language that engages social dominance orientation, by depicting those outside of the American side of the border as un-Americans and different. The binary between American and un-American also engages in racial resentment, as African

Americans are often depicted as un-American due to the fact that they do not follow

American norms and values of hard work and individualism. On the one side, the land and its people are legitimately American, and thus in need of securing, and on the other side, the land and its people are un-American, and in need of being patrolled and policed. 89 Although the link between these frames and moral traditionalism is less clear, I would argue that, moral traditionalism because it is about maintaining the status quo, these frames are used to emphasize by the se of border rhetoric and delineating those who belong and those who don’t, us v. them, it engages in ideas about the threat immigration poses to the status quo, especially in the newer immigrant destinations like Alabama.

Limitations

In this chapter, I was limited in terms of the years I analyzed. In future work, looking at the ways in which immigration rhetoric has change pre- and post- 9/11 will help elucidate any changes in immigration rhetoric that happened as a result of 9/11. In addition, in this chapter I look specifically at raw numbers instead of percentages, and so does not control for differences in the volume of new coverage of immigration in the various newspapers. Future analysis will look at percentages rather raw data in order to get a better sense of the rate with which certain frames appeared more than others. Finally, a future revision to this chapter will also include a more structured qualitative analysis of the content of the articles, and will further separate the articles by section (e.g. news v. opinion section).

Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated through a content analysis of five newspapers over a time period of six years (2008-2013), that the most common immigration frames engage predispositional attributes that at their root implicate an understanding and a delineation of concepts of American-ness. The following chapter will take this preliminary analysis further by investigating, through survey data, the

90 impact of four out of the five predispositions on public opinion about restrictive immigration policies, and whether these predispositions vary depending on context.

91 Chapter 3: The Geopolitics Of Immigration Individual Predispositions and Immigration Policy In The United States

“[A] border that exists beyond maps, that is carved directly into the histories and imaginaries of a people” ~ Junot Diaz (2007).

Introduction

In 2006, Lance Frizzel—a spokesman for Republican Jim Bryson—who was running for governor of Tennessee, states “Regardless of the size of the local illegal immigrant population or a region's proximity to the US-Mexican border, in this election year ‘every state is a border state” (Kiely 2006). The South seems to provide a perfect example of Frizzel’s predictions. Southern history is multi-layered and complex. Its history with race, for example, is a difficult, but a significant part of Southern politics, both historical and current. The conflation of borders has led Southern communities to become “battleground[s] in the national debate over immigration” (Winders 2007: 924).

This chapter examines the ways in which geographic context affects individual predispositions, and thus support for restrictive immigration policy by examining associations, rather than causation. It explores whether there exists regional variation in predispositions—namely racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and anti-egalitarianism—and immigration policy attitudes across different regions of the

United States. Furthermore, it examines whether there is an association between

92 variations in the predispositions and the geographic distribution of restrictive immigration policies. The chapter aims to fill a void in our understanding of predispositions and whether we can conceive of a psychological topography that interacts with immigration policy attitudes. Is there a relationship between key individual predispositions and attitudes towards immigration policy? Finally, does this relationship correlate with where we have seen harsher anti-immigration legislation? I examine these questions by using the American National Election Studies Time Series Surveys. I argue that individual level predispositions are not stable, but are dispositions that are influenced by external environmental factors. The attitudinal and behavioral effects of predispositions go beyond the individual; they also affect the socio-political geographic context in which one resides and vice versa.

The first section looks at predispositions and political outcomes, namely immigration policy attitudes. In this section we find that predispositions do, in fact, affect immigration attitudes. The Geopolitics of Predispositions builds on Social Dominance

Theory’s (SDT) assertion that Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) levels are responsive to situational changes (Huang & Liu 2005; Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar, & Levin 2004).24 I extend this theory in thinking about the core predispositions and examine various scholars’ work on the geopolitics of personality, and argue that predispositions can also be conceived of as geopolitical. The next section, A Topography of Immigration, focuses on the case of Southern states and Southern regional identity to tie in all aspects of this chapter—predispositions, immigration attitudes, and context.

24 SDT is a theory of intergroup relation based on the maintenance and stability of group-based hierarchies. SDO is a measure of an individual's preference for hierarchy within any social system and the domination over lower-status groups. 93 Individual Predispositions and Political Outcomes

In this chapter, I focus on four predispositions—racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and anti-egalitarianism—that have been linked to prejudice and intergroup attitudes. In a previous chapter I examined the ways in which the five predispositions define Americanness, and thus influence views about immigration. In this chapter, I explore the ways in which these predispositions vary by geographic context and whether this variation affects attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies.

Where do individual-level predispositions come from? In regards to race, Omi and Winant (1994) argue that “Race becomes ‘common sense’—a way of comprehending, explaining, and acting in the world” (60). Race not only happens at the macro-level, but also at the micro-level, namely through socialization. Racial socialization and egalitarian values, for example, are taught at a very young age (Hughes et al. 2006; Rotherman and Phinney 1987). Outside of socialization, there are structural factors that influence individual’s predisposed attitudes and beliefs. Racial resentment, for example, is negatively correlated with education, income, and gender. Those with authoritarian personalities are generally less educated, and more likely to be poor. Hence, social background and environment all contribute to an individual’s predispositions.

Individual differences in predispositions is associated with differences in political behavior and policy outcomes. The effects of predispositions on politics and prejudice are well documented. For example, those persons high in authoritarianism are found to be prejudiced against different types of minority groups (Adorno et al. 1950). Those persons high in moral traditionalism often oppose policies such as gay rights (Brewer 2003).

94 Similarly, persons high in racial resentment are also prejudiced, specifically against

African Americans. As Kinder and Sanders (1996) illustrate, high racial resentment is associated with individuals’ to opposition to liberal racial policies, such as affirmative action. In fact, those higher on racial resentment often use the principle of individualism as a justification for opposing liberal racial policies, and deny any racial conscious or subconscious reasoning. Consequently, those high on racial resentment are not necessarily anti-egalitarians. Actually, some individuals who have high racial resentment and egalitarianism believe in equality of opportunity, but not equality of results; the latter goes beyond what the American government should provide. A key element American principle is meritocracy; if one works hard, they will get what they deserve because we all start off with a level playing field (i.e. equality of opportunity). This argument, however, ignores structural and systematic racism that continues to infiltrate American institutions.

These predispositions are not only interrelated, but as Chapter 2 examined, also define and engage meanings surrounding Americanism. Subsequently, at the root of immigration is a delineation of who belongs and who does not, who is American and who is consequently “un-American.” The following section explores the links between the predispositions and immigration attitudes.

Explaining the Links Between Predispositions & Immigration Attitudes

Underlying immigration discourse and policy issues are all four predispositions-- racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, anti-egalitarianism.25 This

25 Egalitarianism and Anti-egalitarianism are both extremes of one scale; anti-egalitarians are defined as those holding the opposite of egalitarian attitudes. 95 section explores these links by using previous literature, and concludes that there are both explicit and more implicit links between immigration and the four predispositions.

The link between authoritarianism and immigration has always existed, but it has also been reinforced in recent years. Immigration was exclusively under the authority of the federal government, it is now also under state and local authority. Post-2010 and

Arizona’s immigration policy SB 1070, the local and state police are able to stop any individual under the suspicion that s/he is in the United States illegally. There are now multiple ways in which an authority figure can implement an immigration law. Law and order is often emphasized in authoritarian personalities. Moreover, those persons high in authoritarianism view the world as inherently dangerous and threatening (Duckitt and

Sibley 2010: 1867). Jost and colleagues (2003) argue that people adopt an ideological system(s) that matches their psychological needs and motives. Such needs include, the need for order and structure, and avoidance of uncertainty and threat (341). Those who are concerned about avoiding threat are also those who have conservative tendencies, and conservatism is correlated with authoritarianism. As numerous studies have shown, those persons higher in authoritarianism, and related predispositions, also oppose immigration and have more punitive immigration policy attitudes (Cohrs and Stelzl 2010; Esses,

Dovidio, and Hodson 2002; Esses et al. 2001; Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong 1998;

Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ 2007).

Tradition is often invoked in debates about immigration, in particular, the status quo. Jost and colleagues (2003) argue that immigration is often portrayed as “frightening, confusing, and potentially threatening to the status quo” (351). The presence of immigrants and the arrival of new immigrants disrupt the status quo in any given locality,

96 whether at the macro or micro level. For example, Sabia (2010) states that Georgians have “a fear of cultural change and a fear of being displaced by brown-skinned people”

(64). Sabia’s statement makes clear the link between immigration and the fear of a shift in the status quo. There appears to be very little literature on the influence of moral traditionalism on immigration attitudes. However, I would argue that those high on moral traditionalism prefer more restrictive and punitive immigration policies. Moral traditionalists fear threat to the status quo, and consequently any group associated with changing the status quo would be perceived as threatening (Conover and Feldman 1986).

Hence, those with more conservative moral values feel less favorably about all out- groups, especially those that are perceived to threaten the status quo (i.e. undocumented immigrants).

The link between immigration and racial resentment is illustrated by Kinder and

Sanders (1996), who find that those higher in racial resentment towards black Americans are also more inclined to favor restrictions on the flow of immigrants into the U.S., to perceive immigrants as ineligible for government benefits, and finally to favor English as the official language (123-4). The literature on the links between racial attitudes and immigration is quite consistent in asserting that racial attitudes play a crucial role in affecting immigration attitudes (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Burns and Gimpel

2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013). It is less clear, however, whether whites feel resentment towards Latinos, or if the racial resentment they feel towards Blacks transfers over onto any out-group. According to Omi and Winant, the concept of race was developed gradually in order to justify ethnocentrism, a concept that is broader than racial resentment. Thus, it can be argued that racial resentment, even

97 though it focuses on Blacks as the main target, is a more generalized concept that can be applied to other out-groups, namely those closest to Blacks. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, for example, argues that dark-skinned Latinos are in the “collective Black” with other Black

Americans (Bonilla-Silva 2004). The transference of racial resentment onto other out- groups can be thought of as a continuum; where those deemed “un-American” are also those who white Americans feel most resentful towards. As a result, whites should feel the most resentful towards undocumented immigrants, even over Blacks and Asians, in that order because newer immigrants are said to not want to assimilate (Huntington

2004). If true, racial resentment will be one of the strongest predictors of restrictive immigration policies.

Equality of opportunity, or egalitarianism, is often linked to racial resentment.

Some white Americans use it, along with other principles, to justify their opposition to liberal racial policies. To be sure, an egalitarian individual is not necessarily a supporter of less restrictive immigration policy, such as increasing the number of legal immigrants or granting undocumented immigrants citizenship without any penalty. Thus, a link between egalitarianism and immigration policy attitudes is less clear. However, what is clear is a link between a discourse of equality and immigrant rights. For example, part of the immigrant rights discourse is whether undocumented immigrants deserve the same rights given to citizens, such as government benefits and social welfare, both of which are linked to policy. As opposed to Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), egalitarianism is an individual level predisposition, whereas SDO is a group-level predisposition.

Generally, egalitarians have been found to engender positive feelings toward minorities, including immigrants, and to have more pro-immigration attitudes (Espenshade and

98 Calhoun 1993; Pantoja 2006). It can be argued that anti-egalitarians rate out-groups from deserving to less deserving. Thus, anti-egalitarians are likely to prefer more restrictive immigration policy, but in particular, they would prefer immigration policies that do not grant amnesty or unwarranted governmental services and benefits to undocumented immigrants.

The Geopolitics of Predispositions

A geographic perspective is valuable to our understanding of how individual-level attitudes and behaviors affect macro level political outcomes. Kathleen McGraw (2006) states that “all political behavior occurs in a specific context, at a specific time and place by particular individuals characterized by different backgrounds, preferences, and personalities” (150). The “person X situation” approach McGraw describes was developed by Kurt Lewin (1936) and suggest that characteristics of the person (P) and characteristics of the environment (E) are contextual factors that influence political behavior (B) (for a review see McGraw 2006).26 Sibley et al. (2013), for example, find that individual differences interact with specific features of the environment to predict people’s levels of prejudice in distinct ways.

Individuals differ when it comes to values and orientations and these differences significantly affect public opinion (Gerber et al. 2011; Winter 2003). We often think of personality, however, as a set of stable predispositions. David Winter (2003) suggests that “while it is easy to think of personality as a static set of fixed ‘qualities,’ a more modern conception would view personality as an array of capacities or dispositions that may be engaged, primed, or brought forward depending on the demands of the situation

26 B= F(P, E), Political behavior (B) is a function (F) of the person (P) and his/her environment (E). 99 and a person's own 'executive apparatus’” (112). Likewise, social dominance theory

(SDT) argues that levels of SDO are responsive to situational change (Huang & Liu

2005; Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar, & Levin 2004). Zaller (1992) suggests that

“predispositions also partly depend on social and economic location…” (23). This chapter examines whether predispositions are responsive, not only to situational changes, but are, in fact, concentrated in parts of the United States where there exist inherent situations that contribute to a location being higher or lower in certain predispositions.

And if, in fact, individual differences in predispositions have politically significant consequences (see Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ 2007; Pratto and Lemieux 2001), then regional differences in predispositions should follow the same logic. A part of the political culture of any given state or region is its experience with factors that affect individual predispositions; hence states also have state personalities (Rentfrow 2010).

States have distinctive histories that affect state politics and policy. States’ personalities includes the state’s experience with race and racial minorities, new and old immigrants, and other factors such as the state economy, state demographics, and a state’s ideological identity.

To date, there have been four investigations exploring the geographical distribution of personality, namely the “Big Five” 27 personality traits, within the U.S.

(Krug and Kulhavy 1973; Rentfrow 2010; Rentfrow et al. 2013; Rentfrow, Gosling, and

Potter 2008). Peter J. Rentfrow and colleagues provide some evidence that there are, in fact, statewide and regional personality differences across the U.S. Rentfrow et al. (2008) argue that the psychological and behavioral tendencies associated with certain personality

27 The Big Five personality traits are Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional stability (or its reverse Neuroticisn), and Openness. 100 traits will tend to be more pervasive in a particular region as opposed to another region where the relevant personality traits are less common (341). The Big Five personality traits are useful in understanding a wide range of political attitudes and behaviors (Gerber et al. 2011; Mondak and Halperin 2008), and regional and state personalities (Rentfrow

2010; Rentfrow et al. 2013; Rentfrow, Gosling, and Potter 2008). However, the predispositions examined in this project have not been examined geographically.

Whether a psychological topography of racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and anti-egalitarianism exist, and whether this topographical configuration affects immigration policy attitudes at the individual level is the focus of my analysis, which contributes to existing literature, especially the work of Rentfrow and colleagues.

A Topography of Immigration

In recent years the South has seen an increase in new immigrants, and a reshaping of the demographics, often being called “the nuevo new South” (Mohl 2002; Winders

2007). Since the beginning of the 1990s, immigrants started to migrate in larger numbers and more rapidly to new destinations like Alabama, North and South Carolina,

Tennessee, Arkansas, and Georgia. Setting aside Texas, the Latino/a population in the

South went from 2.4 million in 1990 to 4.9 million in 2000 (Saenz et al. 2003). More specifically, the Latino population in North Carolina grew close to 400 percent, followed by Arkansas (337 percent), Georgia (300 percent), Tennessee (278 percent), South

Carolina (211.7 percent), and Alabama (208 percent) (Mohl 2002). Between 2000 and

2010, of the top ten immigrant-receiving states with the highest immigrant population

101 growth, seven are Southern states (Camarota 2012).28 Starting in the mid- to late 1990s, the South has seen a dramatic increase in its Latino/a population. In fact, Daniel J.

Hopkins (2010) finds that national immigration rhetoric and local county-level immigrant growth percent interact when particular states are considering passing an anti- immigration proposal. Similarly, Pearson-Merkowitz and Yoder (2009) find that in

Arizona, Texas, Tennessee, and Georgia, legislators whose districts experienced a significant increase in Hispanic/Latino settlement sponsored restrictive immigration legislation.

Southern states have, in fact, led the way in restrictive immigration policy, especially post 9/11 (see the National Conference of State Legislatures’ Immigration

Policy Project).29 In 2010, Arizona’s draconian immigration law, SB 1070, was the culmination of years of preparation. As noted in the introductory chapter, Arizona’s SB

1070 makes it a crime to be in the country illegally, and grants police power to stop and verify the immigration status of anyone they suspect of being an undocumented immigrant. SB 1070 goes further by making it illegal to shelter, hire, and/or transport undocumented immigrants. In June 2011, Alabama passed HB 56, a law similar to

Arizona’s SB 1070. HB 56 is regarded as the nation’s strictest and toughest anti- immigration law to date. In addition to granting the police power to stop and detain anyone they have suspicion of being undocumented, the Alabama law goes beyond this

28 Top ten states are (in order of highest to lowest growth; % growth in parentheses): Alabama (92.1); South Carolina (88.4); Tennessee (81.8); Arkansas (78.7); Kentucky (75.1); North Carolina (67.2); South Dakota (64.8); Georgia (63.3); Indiana (61.3); Nevada (60.6). Source: 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses and 2010 American Community Survey. 29 For a review by year (and state) of all different kinds of immigration bills look at the NCSL reports on state enactments at http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration.aspx. For example, for state omnibus bills in 2011, http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/omnibus-immigration-legislation.aspx; for bill in 2007, http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/2007-state-legislation-immigration.aspx; and for bills in 2006, http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/immigrant-policy-2006-state-legislation.aspx. 102 provision. The law prohibits undocumented immigrants from receiving public services. It bars undocumented students to attend public colleges and universities. The law requires that the immigration status of all children in elementary, middle and high school be recorded. It prohibits the transporting and harboring of undocumented immigrants. The law prohibits landlords from renting property to undocumented immigrants. It forbids employers from hiring undocumented immigrants, and requires small businesses to use the E-Verify system. Finally, the law states that any contract made where one party is an undocumented immigrant is considered null and void. It is these provisions, among others, that have made opponents of the law call it the new Jim Crow (see Southern

Poverty Law Center 2012).30

Immigration has become an issue that ceases to distinguish the US-Mexico border from US regional and state borders. In fact, immigration rhetoric and discourse engages the imagined borders, the borders being perceived by individuals that distinguishes native-born “Americans” with foreign-born immigrants (and immigrants in general).

According to Jamie Winders (2007), “The temporal overlap of growing immigration to the South since the late 1990s and growing nativist sentiment across the US since 9/11 has led Southern communities to fuse new regional racial demographics to new national border anxieties” (Winders 2007: abstract). For example, when an Alabama senator tells his rural constituency “controlling our borders is a priority” (Hollman 2006; as qtd in

Winders 2007: 926), he links national border control rhetoric with a more localized rhetoric of state borders. Arguably, then it seems clear that politicians use national border

30 There are other equally Draconian immigration laws in several other states including Georgia, South Carolina, Indiana, and Utah. 103 anxieties as a way to mask more controversial reasons behind anti-immigration policies, reasons that implicate the South’s equally controversial past.

According to Frazier and Reisinger (2006), the underlying worries about immigration, especially in the South, is something less visibly apparent; it is “the reshaping of Southern regional identity, power relations, and economic regimes” (281), powerfully illustrated by the various concepts employed in this dissertation. Frazier and

Reisinger’s assertion ties in all of the concepts of my dissertation in the ways in which the South’s regional identity links to worries that surround immigration policy and attitudes. “Southern regional identity,” is informed by the history of intergroup relations in the South, and this history—one of exclusionary projects around race and culture— informs predispositions, namely racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and anti-egalitarianism.

Hypotheses

Attitudes towards immigration policy has been shown to be influenced by predispositions (Esses, Dovidio, and Hodson 2002; Esses et al. 2001; Esses, Jackson, and

Armstrong 1998; Gallego and Pardos-Prado 2013; Kinder and Sanders 1996). In line with existing findings, individuals high on authoritarianism, racial resentment, moral traditionalism, and anti-egalitarianism will prefer more restrictive immigration policies.

The attitudinal and behavioral effects of predispositions go beyond the individual; it also affects how states and regions behave (Krug and Kulhavy 1973; Rentfrow 2010;

Rentfrow et al. 2013; Rentfrow, Gosling, and Potter 2008). I contend that higher levels of these predispositions will be concentrated in states with a history of hostile racial and intergroup relations, especially the South. Additionally, what happens locally also affects 104 attitudes towards immigration and political behavior (Hopkins 2010; Pearson-Merkowitz and Yoder 2009; Sabia 2010). Geographic context will inform levels of predispositions and consequently attitudes towards immigration. Thus, states with higher levels of these predispositions will not only prefer more restrictive immigration policies, but are more willing to enact harsher policies. Due to social desirability, I would argue that most

Americans do not admit to being anti-egalitarians, especially given that equality is one of the most coveted American principles. Hence, anti-egalitarianism will vary less than the other predispositions.

Predispositions and Policy Hypothesis

H1: Individuals high in authoritarianism, racial resentment, moral traditionalism, and anti-egalitarianism will prefer more restrictive immigration policies.

Geographic Context Hypotheses

H2: The impact of all four predispositions on support for restrictive immigration policies will vary by geographic context (regions).

H2a: All four predispositions will be strongest in the South, given the South’s history of race and intergroup relations.

H2b: All predispositions should be weakest in the Southwest, given the Southwest lacks much of the same history as the South.

Empirical Approach & Data

In order to test my expectations, I draw from existing American National Election

Surveys (ANES) Time Series Studies. I use primarily the ANES 2012, but also draw on the ANES 2008, 2004, and 2000. The ANES 2012 Time Series Study used both face-to- face and Internet modes to interview U.S. citizens age 18 and older. It was fielded in pre- 105 election Sept/Oct/Nov of 2008, and post-election in January of 2013. It includes a sample of 5,916 interviews. I will only utilize white non-Hispanic respondents. Additionally, I took extra measure to exclude white non-Hispanic respondents who had at least one foreign-born parent (for a total 3,101 respondents left to sample). The advantage of the

ANES 2012 is that it includes measures of all four predispositions, immigration policy measures, and respondents by state. However, the ANES 2012 alone does not provide enough power due to the small number of respondents by state. I use the ANES 2008,

2004, and 2000 to compensate by adding the respondents from these surveys. All four

ANES surveys were used to aggregate the data from the four predispositions in order to add to the sample size and map the results onto a US state map.

Dependent Variables

The ANES 2012 has five questions on immigration that can be used as dependent variables. I look white Americans’ attitudes towards police checking the documentation

“suspicious” individuals; federal immigration policy preferences; a version of the Dream

Act; immigration levels of immigrants allowed to immigrate to the US; and finally whether immigration threatens American jobs. (The wording of the dependent variables is available in Appendix A.) All of the dependent variables as well suited for testing my research question in this chapter. I am particularly interested in Police Checks because it illustrates one of the toughest measures taken against unauthorized immigration across the United States.

106 Key Independent Variables/Alternative Predictors

The primary independent variables are the four predisposition scales, authoritarianism, racial resentment, moral traditionalism, and egalitarianism (please see

Appendix A for question wording). Additionally, all of the scales were standardized to range from 0 to 1.

The ANES 2012 also contains numerous other independent variables for which I control. Ideology and Partisanship are both linked to immigration. Republicans and political conservatives are often found to carry more negative anti-immigration attitudes

(Chandler and Tsai 2001). One of the key distinctions this chapter aims to make is between the effects of statewide predispositions and ideology on immigration policy attitudes. I argue that predispositions have an independent influence on immigration policy attitudes, and that the variance in states is not just attributed to ideological differences across states. Education is associated with immigration attitudes (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010), stronger preferences for racial tolerance and cultural diversity (Campbell et al. 1960). Other political independent variables include gender, age, and income.

When it comes to the economy as a predictor of immigration attitudes there are mixed results. A few studies argue that economic concerns are at the heart of anti- immigrant sentiment and anti-immigration policy preferences. Some scholars argue that individual attitudes towards immigration come from a fear about labor market competition—fear that immigrants will take away jobs from natives, contribute to higher unemployment, and reduce wages and working conditions of certain occupations

(Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Scheve and Slaughter 2001) and/or the fiscal burden on

107 public services (Facchini, Mayda, and Puglisi 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Both of these are about personal self-interest. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) find that a more national sociotropic view of the economy plays a role. This view is less about personal concerns, and more a concern about the national outlook of the economy. Citrin et al.

(1997) and other scholars (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Lee and Ottati 2002), find that one’s national economic concerns and anxiety over taxes play a role in immigration preferences. However, Burns and Gimpel (2000), find that these effects disappear once prejudicial stereotypes about immigrants are taken into account. Evident in the findings is that there is no consistent answer as to whether economic concerns, whether personal or more sociotropic, play a definite role in individual attitudes towards immigration policy.

Additionally, whether these effects disappear once other factors are taken into account. I look at economic variables that account for both personal and national economies.

I also take into account intergroup attitudes. Scholars have argued that anti- immigrant, and in particular anti-Latino sentiments play a role in attitudes towards immigration (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013). I use feeling thermometers to get at feelings towards Asian-Americans, Blacks, Hispanics, and “illegal immigrants” (FeelingAsian, FeelingBlack, FeelingHisp, FeelingUndoc, respectively). Scholars have argued that immigration attitudes are rooted in group conflict, whether real or perceived (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Esses et al. 2001;

Hood and Morris 1997, 1998, 2000; Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ 2007; Sniderman,

Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; Watson and Riffe 2012). I use one of the dependent variables, JobThreat, to look at whether group threat plays a role in attitudes towards immigration.

108 Finally, I look at several variables on American identity and national pride. A set of scholars have looked at the importance of patriotism, nationalism, and identity as it pertains to immigration attitudes and restrictive policies (Schildkraut 2011; Theiss-Morse

2009). Some scholars argue that patriotism and nationalism are different and that nationalism is associated with more restrictive policies (Citrin, Reingold, and Green

1990; de Figueirefo and Elkins 2003; Huddy and Khatib 2007), however, the ANES 2012 did not have nationalism measures, thus, I will only a patriotism scale.31

Results

This chapter examines three main ideas: first, the ways in which authoritarianism, racial resentment, moral traditionalism, and anti-egalitarianism affect immigration policy attitudes; second, the geographic variation of the key predispositions mapped onto the US states; and third, the impact of the predispositions on restrictive immigration policy preferences by geographic context (US regions).

The primary independent variables are the four predisposition scales, authoritarianism, racial resentment, moral traditionalism, and anti-egalitarianism. All four predispositions are highly reliable, with the exception of authoritarianism. The cronbach’s alpha reliability of the 4-item measure of authoritarianism was .61,32 .83 for the 4-item racial resentment scale, .78 for the 4-item moral traditionalism scale, and .80 for the 6-item anti-egalitarianism scale. The correlations between all four predispositions are statistically significant and display a low to moderate positive relationship (with the

31 You can find a summary statistics table of all variables in Appendix B. 32 This reliability is acceptable because authoritarianism is such a short scale. 109 exception of anti-egalitarianism and authoritarianism; See Table 3.1). However, each

predisposition although correlated are independent and unique factors.

Table 3.1. Correlations Between Individual Predispositions 1 2 3 4 Racial Resentment (1) - Authoritarianism (2) 0.39 - Moral Traditionalism (3) 0.45 0.40 - Anti-Egalitarianism (4) 0.51 0.22 0.44 - Data: ANES 2012 Note: Bolded p < .05

Predispositions Influence Restrictive Immigration Policies

In order to examine whether racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral

traditionalism, and anti-egalitarianism influence immigration policy attitudes I ran an

ordered logistic model for each of the five dependent variables, shown in Table 3.2.

Additionally, I included variables known to influence immigration attitudes. Overall, all

four of the predispositions affect immigration policy attitudes. Almost all predispositions

influence the dependent variables positively, with the exception of anti-egalitarianism in

models 4 and 5. In other words, higher levels of each of the predispositions are correlated

with higher anti-immigration attitudes and more restrictive immigration attitudes.

The coefficient of an ordered logistic model are not interpretable, hence looking

at either factor changes or percent changes results in a better understanding of the effects

of each variable on immigration policies. Model 1 is of particular interest because it

showcases one of the toughest and harshest recent immigration policies. For example, a

one-unit increase in racial resentment increases the odds of favoring police checks by a

110 factor of 5.77 (476.9%).33 Similarly, a one-unit increase in moral traditionalism increases police checks by a factor 2.59 (157.7%), and by a factor of 2.64 (164.4%) for a one-unit increase in anti-egalitarianism. A one-unit change in racial resentment jumps from 0 to 1, which is a huge and implausible jump for most people. Instead, looking at standard deviation changes makes more sense. A standard deviation increase in racial resentment

(SD=.24) increases the likelihood of favoring police checks of “suspicious individuals” by 1.52 points. For a standard deviation increase in moral traditionalism (SD=.25) and anti-egalitarianism (SD=.21) increases preference for police checks by 1.27 and 1.23 points, respectively.

Models 2-5 have similar results, with a few exceptions. In general, an increase in all of the predispositions increases the likelihood of restrictive immigration policy preferences. The exception to this general finding is the results for anti-egalitarianism in

Models 4 and 5. Both of the coefficients are negative and statistically significant. In

Model 4, higher levels of anti-egalitarianism are associated with support for increasing immigration levels. A standard deviation increase in anti-egalitarianism (SD=.21), lowers preferences to decrease immigration levels by .90 points. In Model 5, anti-egalitarianism has an even stronger negative coefficient, indicating that higher levels of anti- egalitarianism lowers the likelihood that white Americans think immigration is taking jobs away. In other words, anti-egalitarians do not think immigration is taking jobs away.

A standard deviation increase in anti-egalitarianism decreasing the opinion that immigration takes jobs away by .81 points. Both of these findings run contrary to

33 These percentages indicate percent change in odds. Every unit increase in X has an exponential effect on the odds of success so an odds ratio can be >1. With this option, the interpretation would read: For a one- unit increase in racial resentment, the odds (not the probability) of favoring police checks increase by 476.9%, holding all other variables constant. 111 Hypothesis 1. A plausible reason for Model 4 lies in the dependent variable, which asks about decreasing/increasing legal immigrants, those permitted to enter the US. Hence, it may be that even those with higher levels of anti-egalitarianism are fine with allowing legal immigrants. Model 5 presents a harder case, however, if we conceive of anti- egalitarians as believing that as a society America has gone too far in pushing equality and that we should worry less about equality, it makes sense that they do not think of immigration as a threat. If anti-egalitarians believed that immigration poses a threat to

American jobs, then they would logically have to care about equality. They would want the US to decrease immigration because it is not “fair” or that immigrants take jobs away.

Included in the models are other independent variables or factors that have been known to influence immigration attitudes. Women are less likely than men to prefer a tougher immigration policy and more likely to favor the dream act. However, women are more likely to prefer decreased immigration levels and to say that immigrants pose a threat to American jobs. Ideology significantly affects whether respondents favor police checks in a positive direction. In other words, conservatives favor such policies more than liberals. Those leaning conservative, however, do not necessarily prefer decreasing legal levels of immigration. Not surprisingly, those with a higher educational background have more tolerant immigration views. In terms of the economy, only perceptions of the national economy influence immigration attitudes. Those who believe the national economy has gotten worse are also more anti-immigration and hold more restrictive immigration attitudes. Patriotism also influences immigration attitudes. Those who have higher levels of patriotism prefer police checks of “suspicious individuals.” However, higher levels of patriotism increases preferences to allow “dreamers” to obtain

112 citizenship. Finally, those who believe that immigration is taking jobs away have more restrictive immigration policy preferences.

In terms of white Americans’ feelings towards particular groups in America, there are inconsistent and mostly statistically insignificant findings. White Americans’ feelings towards Asians are only significant as it relates to the Dream Act. Those with warmer feelings towards Asians do not think that “dreamers” should be given citizenship. This is rather interesting given that Asians are also considered a largely immigrant group in

America. However, whites that have positive feelings towards Asians, may perceive competition between Asians and other immigrants, namely Latinos, hence would not want largely Latinos to benefit from citizenship. Feelings towards Latinos is only statistically significant in Model 5, indicating a decreased sense of job threat for whites who have warm feelings towards Latinos, which makes sense. Feelings towards Black

Americans is significant at p-value .10 in Model 5, indicating that warmer feelings towards Black Americans increases whites’ perceptions of job competition due to immigration. This finding also makes sense, given that Blacks and Latinos are often perceived as competitors for jobs. Finally, feelings towards “illegal” immigrants influences all models. Whites with warmer feelings towards “illegal” immigrants are less anti-immigration and hold less restrictive policy attitudes. Overall, the effects of the core predispositions are substantial even after controlling for all political factors such as, demographics, ideology, intergroup attitudes, and economic concerns.

113

Table 3.2. What Predicts Immigration Attitudes? Police Immigration Immigration Checks Policy Dream Act Levels Job Threat M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 Independent Variables Racial Resentment 1.752*** 0.824*** 0.820*** 1.464*** 1.803*** (0.274) (0.242) (0.248) (0.230) (0.244) Authoritarianism 0.032 0.597*** 0.451** 0.619*** 0.440*** (0.177) (0.153) (0.156) (0.146) (0.154) Moral Traditionalism 0.947*** 0.506* 0.583* 0.307 0.675*** (0.267) (0.234) (0.238) (0.221) (0.237) Anti-Egalitarianism 0.972** 0.300 1.025*** -0.511* -1.010*** (0.311) (0.249) (0.254) (0.243) (0.259) Gender -0.091 -0.321*** -0.255*** 0.247** 0.180* (0.097) (0.083) (0.084) (0.079) (0.084) Age 0.021 -0.011 -0.011 0.037** -0.008 (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) Income 0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) Ideology34 0.276*** 0.038 0.054 -0.080* -0.008 (0.047) (0.040) (0.041) (0.038) (0.041) Education -0.077 -0.015 -0.071+ -0.037 -0.173*** (0.050) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.043) EconomyNow 0.109 -0.064 -0.052 0.008 0.064 (0.089) (0.085) (0.089) (0.078) (0.082) NationalEconomy 0.213** 0.148* 0.357*** 0.163** 0.303*** (0.077) (0.069) (0.068) (0.065) (0.068) PersonalFinance 0.092+ 0.027 -0.011 -0.045 -0.020 (0.056) (0.048) (0.049) (0.046) (0.049) FeelingAsian 0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006* -0.002 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) FeelingHispanic -0.005 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.013*** (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) FeelingBlack 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.006+ (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) FeelingUndoc -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.025*** (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Table 3.2 Continued

34 I ran the model with party identification instead of ideology, and the results remain very similar. Party identification is statistically significant in M1 and slightly significant (p= .061) in M5. I did not run the model with both because of collinearity between party identification and ideology. 114 Table 3.2 Continued Patriotism 1.021*** -0.142 -0.708** -0.054 0.410+ (0.282) (0.250) (0.257) (0.240) (0.248) Job Threat 0.422*** 0.437*** 0.411*** 1.208*** - (0.078) (0.070) (0.071) (0.069) Cut Point 1 3.469*** -2.240*** 1.790*** -1.106** -1.786*** (0.441) (0.406) (0.408) (0.381) (0.369) Cut Point 2 4.914*** 1.773*** 3.270*** 0.417 0.950** (0.449) (0.405) (0.412) (0.373) (0.368) Cut Point 3 2.895*** 3.172*** (0.407) (0.381) Cut Point 4 4.471*** (0.385)

Pseudo R2 0.2783 0.1276 0.1305 0.1643 0.1693 N 2453 2454 2451 2446 2457 Log likelihood -1666.237 -2420.4192 -2181.2527 -2832.5011 -2075.9065 Data: ANES 2012 Times Series Study. Note: *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 + p < .10 Note: standard error in parentheses.

Preliminary Evidence: Mapping Predispositions and State Level Correlations

In order to investigate Hypothesis 2, I first started by creating variables that

signified state-level predisposition averages, and then map them onto the 48 contiguous

US states. Figure 3.1 illustrates the range of the four predispositions, where darker colors

illustrate higher levels of each of the predisposition. The maps themselves provide an

illustration of the variation of all predispositions by state. In Figures 3.1B, C, and D, we

can clearly see that darker colors are mostly in the South and Southwest.

Authoritarianism, Figure 3.1A, seems to be a bit more scattered than the other

predispositions. In other words, racial resentment, moral traditionalism, and anti-

egalitarianism are concentrated in Southern states—and to a lesser extent Southwestern

states—indicating a preliminary contextual element in the strength and level of

115 predispositions like racial resentment, moral traditionalism, and anti-egalitarianism, and consequently attitudes towards immigration policy.

Figure 3.1. Maps of the average predispositions for each state. Note: The legends for each predisposition are quintile splits (min, .25, median, .75, max). All predispositions are standardized from 0 to 1, and larger numbers always translate into higher levels of each predisposition. Data: ANES 2000-2012.

In addition to mapping the key predispositions onto the 48 contiguous US states, I also wanted to examine whether there exists any correlations between these key predispositions and state-level factors, such as immigrant growth levels, poverty rates, and ideology. Correlations between state-level factors and the key predispositions is further suggestive evidence that 1) predispositions are influenced by external factors that are outside of the individual; and 2) context matters vis-à-vis the relationship between immigration and individual predispositions. In Table 3.3, we see the correlation between all of the aforementioned variables. First, we see the correlation between the state-level 116 mean averages of the predispositions. All of the predispositions are significantly and positively correlated, with the exception of anti-egalitarianism and authoritarianism.

Looking at the rest of the correlations, I find a correlation between the percentage immigrant growth between 2000-2014 and all four predispositions. A higher percentage of immigrant growth during that time is positively correlated with higher levels of racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and anti-egalitarianism. On the contrary, immigrant growth between 1990-2000 does not yield the same significant results. I also included a variable looking at immigrant growth between 1990-2010, where we can see similar results, with the exception of the decreased significance of anti- egalitarianism. We can also tell that immigrant growth between 2000-2010 is driving the results. I also looked at whether state poverty rates between 2008-2012 affect levels of predispositions. Table 3.3 indicates that a higher rate of poverty is positively correlated with higher levels of all predispositions. Finally, I examined the correlation between all of the predispositions and percentage of state ideology. More liberal states are negatively correlated with all of the predispositions, but only racial resentment and moral traditionalism are statistically significant. On the contrary, more conservative states are positively correlated with all of the predispositions, and they are statistically significant in racial resentment, moral traditionalism, and anti-egalitarianism.

117

Table 3.3. Average State Predisposition and State-Level Indicators Racial Moral Anti- Resentment Authoritarianism Traditionalism Egalitarianism

Racial Resentment - Authoritarianism 0.62 - Moral Traditionalism 0.68 0.71 - Anti-Egalitarianism 0.52 0.13 0.39 - Immigrant Growth 1990-2000 (%) 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.15 Immigrant Growth 2000-2010 (%) 0.45 0.53 0.54 0.34 Immigrant Growth 1990-2010 (%) 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.23 Poverty Avg. Rate 2008-2012 0.60 0.56 0.62 0.34 % Liberal -0.49 -0.20 -0.34 -0.25 % Moderate 0.11 -0.09 -0.11 -0.19 % Conservative 0.31 0.25 0.39 0.39 Sources: ANES 2000-2012; U.S. Census American Community Survey Note: Bolded p < .05

MultiLevel Analysis

This chapter considers the role that geography plays in influencing attitudes

towards immigration. The following analysis uses ANES 2012 respondents in order to

explore the multilevel nature of the data. The section prior explored in a preliminary and

descriptive manner the variation of the key predisposition vis-à-vis geographic context,

namely at the level of thestates. This next section treats respondents as being nested

within regions that have different propensities to support different immigration

reforms/policies. I used regions as second-level data because some states lack a large

enough sample. Additionally, in order to run a generalized linear model more smoothly, I

created binary variables for four of the dependent variables: police checks, dream act,

immigration levels, and job threat. I omitted immigration policy because it was harder to

recode as binary, given the four-point ordinal nature of the responses.

118 The hierarchical structure of the data requires appropriate statistical methods that account for the multiple data levels. According to the ANES data, overall support for police checks in the United States population in 2012 was around 75.5% (95% CI =

73.1%, 78.0%), for decreasing the levels of legal immigration the population support was around 80% (95% CI = 77.4%, 82.2%), and for opposition to a dream act policy support was around 28.6% (95% CI= 26.3%, 31%). Does the predicted level of support for each of these variables of interest vary by region? The usual means of gauging the amount of between-cluster variability for interval variables is to use the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), which is the ratio of the level-2 variance component to the total variance. However, the ICC is less reliable for generalized linear mixed models with a logit link function given that the level-1 variance becomes heteroskedastic (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, pg. 298). Instead, an empty model with a random intercept and no predictors was estimated, and random effects predictions were used in order to generate region-specific estimates of support. Figure 3.2 shows that the predicted probabilities for support of police checks vary considerably by region, ranging from a low of 69.5%

(West) to a high of 78.6% (South) (Intercept= 1.06; �= .19). The predicted probabilities for opposition to the Dream Act does not vary as much, ranging from 27.6% (Midwest) to 30% (South) (Intercept= -.913; �= .08). The predicted probabilities for decreasing the number of legal immigration varies the least changing only on the 6th decimal place, ranging from 79.8507% (Northeast) to 79.8508 (South) (Intercept= 1.37; �= .0002). In fact, the random effect for immigration levels is essentially zero, thus indicating region- to-region differences are negligible. Finally, the predicted probabilities for job threat ranges from 69.8% to 74.3% (Intercept= .975; �= .124).

119

Figure 3.2. Predicted Regional Support for Restrictive Immigration Policies

The next analytic step was to consider whether any characteristics of the individual or state could help explain this observed variability. In particular, I am interested whether the key predispositions’ effect size changes depending on the specific region in which the respondent resides; hence, all of the key predispositions were entered as a random effect in separate models. Table 3.4 – 3.6 illustrate the results of the analyses. For each outcome variable, I ran the same model and changed the random effect to each of the four predispositions. For outcome variables Police Checks and Immigration

Level, the only predisposition that yielded results is racial resentment, as showing in

120 Table 3.4 (the other predispositions did not yield random effects above zero). For both outcome variables Dream Act and Job Threat, three of the four predispositions yielded results, respectively in Tables 3.5 (authoritarianism did not yield random effects above zero results) and 3.6 (model including anti-egalitarianism did not converge).

Table 3.4 shows results of using racial resentment as a random effect for police checks and immigration levels. Model 1 shows that racial resentment tends to increase support for police checks quite dramatically (OR = 7.015). That is, increasing racial resentment from zero to one leads to a more than seven-fold increase in the odds of supporting police checks. Also increasing support for police checks are moral traditionalism (OR = 2.678), egalitarianism (OR = 3.959), greater conservative ideology

(OR = 1.409), whether one things the national economy is better than it was the previous year (OR = 1.454), feelings towards African Americans (OR = 1.016), patriotism (OR =

4.831), and whether one thinks immigration takes jobs away from Americans (OR =

1.650). In addition, an increase on the feeling thermometer for Hispanics leads to a decrease in support for police checks (OR = .982), as does an increase on the feeling thermometer for “illegals” (OR = .969). Table 3.4, Model 2 shows similar results, with a few exceptions. In the second model, authoritarianism is statistically significant, indicating that those with more of an authoritarian personality prefer to decrease legal levels of immigration (OR= 2.57). Anti-egalitarianism and patriotism fails to achieve statistical significance in this model. Finally, being female and being older increases support to decrease legal immigration levels (OR=1.55, OR=1.10, respectively).

121 Table 3.4. Multilevel Models Predicting How Racial Resentment Affects Support for Police Checks and Immigration Levels, by Region Model 1 Model 2 Police Checks Immigration Level Fixed Effects (Intercept) -5.528*** -3.532*** (0.823) (0.889) Racial Resentment 1.948*** 2.227*** (0.516) (0.560) Authoritarianism 0.32 0.944** (0.310) (0.339) Moral Traditionalism 0.985* -0.261 (0.454) (0.524) Egalitarianism 1.376** -0.355 (0.537) (0.574) Gender (Female) -0.087 0.438* (0.173) (0.191) Age (by group) 0.028 0.099*** (0.028) (0.031) Income (by group) 0.001 -0.017 (0.012) (0.013) Ideology 0.343*** -0.03 (0.080) (0.090) Education (by group) -0.076 -0.061 (0.086) (0.097) Economy 0.119 0.028 (0.150) (0.177) National Economy 0.374** 0.284* (0.134) (0.146) Personal Finance 0.093 -0.152 (0.098) (0.108) Feeling (Asian) 0.006 -0.016* (0.007) (0.008) Feeling (Hispanic) -0.018* 0.005 (0.008) (0.008) Feeling (Black) 0.016* 0.008 (0.007) (0.007) Feeling (Illegal) -0.031*** -0.021*** (0.004) (0.005) Patriotism 1.575*** 0.727 (0.486) (0.518) Table 3.4 Continued

122 Table 3.4 Continued Job Threat 0.501*** 1.353*** (0.136) (0.151)

Random Effects Intercept 0.241 0.219 Racial Resentment 0.381 0.315 Authoritarianism - - Moral Traditionalism - - Anti-Egalitarianism - - Note. Standard errors in parentheses. + p<.10 * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Figure 3.3 illustrates the predicted probabilities for each region, holding constant

all other control variables at the regional means with the exception of gender, which is

held constant at 1 given the results for women. As Figure 3.3 shows, the South starts off

at a much higher predicted probability (.66) of support of police checks, even at the

lowest racial resentment level. The West has the lowest probability (.44) of supporting

police checks when racial resentment is at zero, with the Northeast (.53) and Midwest

(.58), respectively, in between the South and the West. When racial resentments at .25,

the probability that the whites in the South support police checks rises to .75 percent, in

comparison to the West (58%), the Northeast (65%), and the Midwest (69%). When

racial resentment is at its highest level (1), the probability that whites in the South support

police checks is 92 percent, 87 percent in the West, 89 percent in the Northeast, and 90

percent in the Midwest. Interestingly, these results indicate that context matters a lot

more for those with low to mid- levels of racial resentment, but seems irrelevant for those

at the highest levels of racial resentment.

123

Figure 3.3. Effect of Racial Resentment on Police Checks

Figure 3.4 illustrates the predicted probabilities of Table 3.4, Model 2 for each region, holding constant all other control variables at the regional means with the exception of gender, which is held constant at 1 given the results for women. As Figure

3.4 shows, the South starts off at a much higher predicted probability, 60 percent support police checks, even at the lowest racial resentment level. The West has the lowest probability at 53 percent, with the Northeast (.59) and Midwest (.64), in between the

South and the West. When racial resentment is at .25, the probability that the whites in the South support police checks rises to 73 percent, in comparison to the West (67%), the

Northeast (71%), and the Midwest (75%). When racial resentment is at its highest level

(1), the probability that whites in the South support police checks is 94 percent, 91 percent in the West, and 93 percent in the Northeast and in the Midwest.

124

Figure 3.4. Effect of Racial Resentment on Levels of Legal Immigration

Table 3.5 shows results of using racial resentment, moral traditionalism, and anti- egalitarianism as a random effect for support for the dream act. Column 1, depicting racial resentment, shows that racial resentment increases opposition to the dream act

(OR= 4.26). That is, increasing racial resentment from zero to one leads to a more than four-fold increase in the odds of opposing the dream act. Also increasing opposition to the dream act are moral traditionalism (OR= 2.18), egalitarianism (OR= 3.03), authoritarianism (OR= 1.55, p-value= .06), whether one thinks the national economy is better than it was the previous year (OR= 1.66), whether one thinks immigration takes jobs away from Americans (OR= 1.64). In addition, an increase on the feeling thermometer for “Illegals” leads to a decrease opposing the dream act (OR= .98), being female (OR= .69), and higher levels of patriotism (OR= .2.04, p-value= .07). Column 2 and 3, showing moral traditionalism and anti-egalitarianism respectively, show similar 125 results. The important results from Table 3.5 is the fact that, similarly to racial

resentment, the effect size of both moral traditionalism and anti-egalitarianism change by

region, both random effects are significantly different from zero.

Table 3.5. Multilevel Models Predicting Key Predispositions Affects Support for the Dream Act, by Region Racial Moral Anti- Resentment Traditionalism Egalitarianism

(Intercept) -3.519*** -3.416*** -3.415*** (0.640) (0.651) (0.645) Racial Resentment 1.447*** 1.366**** 1.362*** (0.445) (0.374) (0.376) Authoritarianism 0.441+ 0.436+ 0.435+ (0.234) (0.234) (0.236) Moral Traditionalism 0.781* 0.752+ 0.787* (0.356) (0.400) (0.360) Egalitarianism 1.105** 1.078** 1.055** (0.366) (0.366) (0.393) Gender (Female) -0.371** -0.377** -0.379** (0.128) (0.128) (0.129) Age (by group) -0.037+ -0.036+ -0.036+ (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) Income (by group) -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) Ideology 0.085 0.086 0.087 (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) Education (by group) -0.025 -0.031 -0.03 (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) Economy -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 (0.143) (0.144) (0.145) National Economy 0.509*** 0.508* 0.509*** (0.104) (0.105) (0.105) Personal Finance -0.048 -0.048 -0.049 (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) Feeling (Asian) -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)

Table 3.5 Continued

126 Table 3.5 Continued Feeling (Hispanic) 0.001 0.001 0.001 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) Feeling (Black) 0.004 0.003 0.004 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) Feeling (Illegal) -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Patriotism -0.712+ -0.717+ -0.719+ (0.398) (0.399) (0.401) Job Threat 0.497*** 0.498*** 0.495*** (0.107) (0.107) (0.108)

Random Effects Intercept 0.228 .322 0.232 Racial Resentment 0.474 - - Authoritarianism - - - Moral Traditionalism - .360 - Anti-Egalitarianism - - .269 Note. Standard errors in parentheses. + p<.10 * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Figure 3.5 illustrates the predicted probabilities of Table 3.5, Column 1 for each

region, holding constant all other control variables at the regional means with the

exception of gender, which is held constant at 1 given the results for women. As Figure

3.5 shows, the South starts off at a much higher predicted probability, 11 percent oppose

the dream act, even at the lowest racial resentment level. The Northeast has the lowest

probability at 06 percent, with the West (.07) and Midwest (.10), in between the South

and the West. When racial resentment is at .25, the probability that the whites in the

South oppose the dream act rise to 14 percent, in comparison to the West (9%), the

Northeast (9%), and the Midwest (13%). When racial resentment is at its highest level

(1), the probability that whites oppose the dream act is 29 percent, 23 percent in the West,

127 and 33 percent in the Northeast, and 26 percent in the Midwest. The Northeast has the highest opposition to the dream act at the highest level of racial resentment.

Figure 3.5. The Effect of Racial Resentment on Opposition to the Dream Act

Figure 3.6 illustrates the predicted probabilities of Table 3.5, Column 2 for each region, holding constant all other control variables at the regional means with the exception of gender, which is held constant at 1 given the results for women. As Figure

3.6 shows, the South starts off at a much higher predicted probability, 16 percent oppose the dream act, even at the lowest level of moral traditionalism. The Midwest has the lowest probability at 10 percent, with the West (11%) and Northeast (15%), in between the South and the West. When moral traditionalism is at .25, the probability that the whites in the South oppose the dream act rise to 19 percent, in comparison to the West

(13%), the Northeast (17%), and the Midwest (13%). When moral traditionalism is at its

128 highest level (1), the probability that whites oppose the dream act in the South is 28 percent, 20 percent in the West, and 22 percent in the Northeast, and 26 percent in the

Midwest.

Figure 3.6. The Effect of Moral Traditionalism on Opposition to the Dream Act

Figure 3.7 illustrates the predicted probabilities of Table 3.5, Column 3 for each region, holding constant all other control variables at the regional means with the exception of gender, which is held constant at 1 given the results for women. As Figure

3.7 shows, the South starts off at a much higher predicted probability, 14.4 percent oppose the dream act, even at the lowest level of anti-egalitarianism (or conversely the highest level of egalitarianism). The West has the lowest probability at 10.5 percent, with the Midwest (11.6%) and Northeast (14.3%), in between the South and the West. When anti-egalitarianism is at .25, the probability that the whites in the South oppose the dream 129 act rise to 18 percent, in comparison to the West (13%), the Northeast (17%), and the

Midwest (15%). When anti-egalitarianism is at its highest level (1), the probability that whites oppose the dream act in the South is 35 percent, 24 percent in the West, and 27 percent in the Northeast, and 32 percent in the Midwest.

Figure 3.7. The Effect of Anti-Egalitarianism on Opposition to the Dream Act

Table 3.6 shows results of using racial resentment, moral traditionalism, and anti- egalitarianism as a random effect for support for the Dream Act. Column 1, depicting racial resentment, shows that racial resentment increases the belief that immigration takes jobs away (OR =12.31). That is, increasing racial resentment from zero to one leads to a more than seven-fold increase in the odds of supporting police checks. Also increasing the belief that immigration takes jobs away are authoritarianism (OR= 2.23), moral traditionalism (OR= 3.74), being female (OR= 1.42), whether one things the national

130 economy is better than it was the previous year (OR= 1.42), and patriotism (OR= 2.94).

In addition, an increase in egalitarianism leads to a decrease in believing that immigration

takes jobs away (OR= .26), so does an increase income (OR= .97), education (OR= .09),

feeling thermometer for Hispanics (OR= .98), and feeling thermometer for “illegals”

(OR= .96). Column 2 and 3, showing moral traditionalism and anti-egalitarianism

respectively, show similar results. The important results from Table 3.6 is the fact that

like racial resentment, the effect size of both authoritarianism and moral traditionalism

change by region, both random effects are significantly different from zero.

Table 3.6. Multilevel Models Predicting How Key Predispositions Affects Agreement that Immigration Takes Away Jobs, by Region Racial Resentment Authoritarianism Moral Traditionalism

(Intercept) 0.473 0.506 0.518 (0.721) (0.709) (0.713) Racial Resentment 2.507*** 2.488*** 2.46*** (0.539) (0.460) (0.464) Authoritarianism 0.803** 0.817* 0.779** (0.306) (0.349) (0.308) Moral Traditionalism 1.317** 1.316** 1.33** (0.464) (0.464) (0.477) Egalitarianism -1.357** -1.39** -1.341** (0.525) (0.526) (0.529) Gender (Female) 0.349* 0.336* 0.344* (0.174) (0.174) (0.176) Age (by group) -0.049 -0.049+ -0.049 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) Income (by group) -0.028* -0.028* -0.028* (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) Ideology -0.02 -0.012 -0.014 (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) Education (by group) -0.243** -0.244** -0.246** (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) Table 3.6 Continued

131 Table 3.6 Continued Economy 0.186 0.196 0.184 (0.160) (0.161) (0.162) National Economy 0.351** 0.347** 0.341** (0.138) (0.138) (0.139) Personal Finance 0.016 0.011 0.015 (0.102) (0.102) (0.103) Feeling (Asian) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) Feeling (Hispanic) -0.017* -0.018* -0.017* (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) Feeling (Black) 0.005 0.006 0.006 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) Feeling (Illegal) -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) Patriotism 1.082* 1.044* 1.042* (0.519) (0.519) (0.523) Job Threat - - -

Random Effects Intercept .256 .078 .037 Racial Resentment .546 - - Authoritarianism - .328 - Moral Traditionalism - - .175 Anti-Egalitarianism - - - Note. Standard errors in parentheses. + p<.10 * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Figure 3.8 illustrates the predicted probabilities of Table 3.6, Column 1 for each

region, holding constant all other control variables at the regional means with the

exception of gender, which is held constant at 1 given the results for women. As Figure

3.8 shows, the South starts off at a much higher predicted probability, 53 percent strongly

agree that immigration is taking jobs away in America, even at the lowest racial

resentment level. The West has the lowest probability at 30 percent, with the Midwest

(47%) and Northeast (44%), in between the South and the West. When racial resentment

132 is at .25, the probability that the whites in the South agree that immigration is a job threat rises to 66 percent, in comparison to the West (47%), the Northeast (59%), and the

Midwest (63%). When racial resentment is at its highest level (1), the probability that whites agree that immigration is taking jobs away is similar throughout all regions (89% in the Northeast, 90% in the South and West, and 92% in the Midwest).

Figure 3.8. The Effect of Racial Resentment on Immigration Takes American Jobs

Figure 3.9 illustrates the predicted probabilities of Table 3.6, Column 2 for each region, holding constant all other control variables at the regional means with the exception of gender, which is held constant at 1 given the results for women. As Figure

3.9 shows, the South starts off at a much higher predicted probability, 78 percent strongly agree that immigration is taking jobs away in America, even at the lowest level of

133 authoritarianism. The West has the lowest probability at 62 percent, with the Midwest

(74%) and Northeast (70%), in between the South and the West. When authoritarianism is at .25, the probability that the whites in the South agree that immigration is a job threat rises to 80 percent, in comparison to the West (68%), the Northeast (74%), and the

Midwest (78%). When authoritarianism is at its highest level (1), the probability that whites agree that immigration is taking jobs away is similar throughout all regions (81% in the West, 84% in the Northeast, 85% in the South, and 88% in the Northeast).

Figure 3.9. The Effect of Authoritarianism on Immigration Takes American Jobs

Figure 3.10 illustrates the predicted probabilities of Table 3.6, Column 3 for each region, holding constant all other control variables at the regional means with the exception of gender, which is held constant at 1 given the results for women. As Figure

3.10 shows, the South starts off at a much higher predicted probability, 70 percent

134 strongly agree that immigration is taking jobs away in America, even at the lowest level of moral traditionalism. The West has the lowest probability at 55 percent, with the

Midwest (68%) and Northeast (64%), in between the South and the West. When moral traditionalism is at .25, the probability that the whites in the South agree that immigration is a job threat rises to 76 percent, in comparison to the West (63%), the Northeast (71%), and the Midwest (75%). When moral traditionalism is at its highest level (1), the probability that whites agree that immigration is taking jobs away is similar throughout all regions (89% in the Midwest and the South, 87% in the Northeast, and 83% in the

West).

Figure 3.10. The Effect of Moral Traditionalism on Immigration Takes American Jobs

135 Discussion

In this chapter I set out to investigate the relationship between individual predispositions—namely racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and anti-egalitarianism—and immigration policy attitudes. Moreover, it examined whether we can begin to understand the proliferation of harsh immigration policies in the United

States, and ultimately where they end up becoming laws. I examined these questions by using the American National Election Studies Time Series Surveys, thus all results indicate associations rather than causal conclusions.

Racial Resentment

First, I looked at the effect of key predispositions on different immigration policy attitudes. As Table 3.2 illustrates, Hypothesis 1 was supported by the data. According to

Table 3.2, racial resentment is the strongest predictor of, or has the strongest association with, restrictive immigration policy attitudes. Kinder and Sanders (1996) find that those with high levels of racial resentment towards Blacks are also more likely to favor restrictions on the flow of immigration, and other immigration-related policies.

Additionally, previous scholars have found that racial attitudes play a role in affecting immigration attitudes (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Burns and Gimpel 2000;

Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013). This result is, at first, puzzling; what do attitudes about Blacks and attitudes about immigration have in common?

It may be the case that whites are transferring their racial resentment towards

Blacks onto other racial/ethnic out-groups. White Americans may not be distinguishing black Americans and Latinos as any different substantively. Descriptively, the two groups are different, and both have a different kind of history in the United States, 136 although maybe not so much if we can conceive of Blacks coming in slave boats to the

United States as a kind of forced “illegal immigration.” However, the more recent histories of both groups are different. African Americans are certainly not “immigrants” in the current sense of the word. So, why does racial resentment towards black Americans predict restrictive immigration policy allowing police officers to stop and check the immigration status of “suspicious” individuals, more restrictive federal immigration policy, opposition to the dream act, a decrease in immigration levels of documented individuals, and the believe that immigration threatens American jobs?

The resentment some white Americans feel towards black Americans is rooted in

American values and principles, such as individualism and equality of opportunity. All of which are easily transferable to other out-groups that white Americans deem as similar to

Blacks, but also a group that is not necessarily following the “American way of life”

(Schildkraut 2011). According to Schildkraut (2011), white Americans see immigrants as

“un-American,” and as wanting special favors from the government, a group that uses public services, but does not pay taxes, etc. Hence, racial resentment, even if the survey questions are aimed towards Blacks, can be thought of being transferred to other out- groups. As a result, racial resentment may within a continuum, especially as American becomes more racially and ethnically diversified, where whites rank the groups from least likely to follow American values and principles to most likely.

These findings imply that racial resentment influences immigration without the target group of the questions being changed to “immigrants,” or “Hispanics/Latinos,” as

Schildkraut (2011) suggests. There is a common racial element to both anti-black

(symbolic) racism and anti-immigrant resentment. Symbolic racism is a blend of

137 antiblack affect and traditional American values, like equality. Racial resentment, regardless of its target group, can be conceived of as being a broader concept with a common racial language that can be transferred to other out-groups, such as immigrants.

The aforementioned argument differs from Deborah Schildkraut’s “immigrant resentment” hypothesis, which states that immigrant resentment is about the violation of other types of norms, as opposed to the norms that plague black Americans (Schildkraut

2011). Racial resentment, I would argue, captures a broader racial sentiment, beyond any mention of particular groups.

As depicted in Figure 3.1 and in support of Hypothesis 2a and 2b, racial resentment is concentrated in the Southern region of the US, with the exception of

Nevada, New Hampshire, and Ohio. To further examine Hypothesis 2, I ran a multilevel analysis and used regions as the second level data, allowing respondents to be nested within regions. I also allowed racial resentment (and the other key predispositions) to vary by region. In all of three models in Tables 3.4-3.6, both the intercept and racial resentment were significantly different than zero indicating region-to-region variation of immigration policy preferences and racial resentment as illustrated in Figures 3.3, 3.4,

63.5 and 3.8 The results suggests that the impact of racial resentment on restrictive immigration policies varies across regions even after accounting for individual level characteristics, lending some evidence that symbolic predispositions vary depending on the individual and context. In other words, the relationship between an individual level predisposition and environmental factors is not unidirectional; the socio-political and historical environment one lives may also affect the level and strength of certain predispositions.

138 The multilevel analyses provide support for Hypothesis 2, 2a, and 2b. The South in most cases had the highest predicted probability of supporting police checks of

“suspicious individuals,” opposing the dream act, decreasing legal levels of immigration, and believing that immigration takes American jobs. On the contrary, the West in most cases has the lowest predicted probabilities of all four immigration policies. However, as racial resentment increased regional variation dampened. In other words, at the highest levels of racial resentment there is hardly any regional variation, making evident the power of racial resentment as an individual predisposition.

The South is also correlated with other statewide factors (factors as depicted in

Table 3.3) that are independently correlated with racial resentment. There is a significant correlation between the South and average poverty rates between 2008 and 2012 (.38, p- value=.01), and immigrant growth between 2000 and 2010 (.45, p-value=.001). The correlation between racial resentment and average poverty rates (.60), immigrant growth between 2000-2010 (.45), conservatism (.31, p-value=.03), and education levels (-.27, p- value=.06) are also statistically significant. In other words, higher levels of racial resentment are correlated with higher rates of poverty and immigrant growth (2000-2010) in a state, and with lower levels of education.

Interestingly enough, racial resentment is not significantly correlated with immigrant growth between 1990 and 2000, which was actually during the same time frame that most states experience a large surge in immigrant growth. In other words, the significant correlation that I find between percent immigrant growth between 2000 and

2010 may have less to do with actual numbers and more to do with other external factors.

According to Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2013), the political legacy of slavery

139 continues to affect contemporary attitudes. The authors find that white Americans who currently live in Southern counties that had high shares of slaves in 1860 are less likely to identify as Democrat, more likely to oppose affirmative action policies, and more likely to express racial resentment toward Blacks. They argue that the political legacy of slavery exists today because of intergenerational transference of public opinion and attitudes.

Consistent with my argument about the importance of the historical nature of intergroup relations, geographic context plays a role. In fact, Jim Crow has been said to reappear as either the “new Jim Crow” or his cousin “Juan Crow” (Lovato 2008; McWhorter 2012;

Southern Poverty Law Center 2012). In fact, Jim Crow tactics during the era and anti- immigration tactics used today have distinct similarities. Racial resentment, however, was not the only individual predisposition that varied by region in a significant manner.

Authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and Anti-egalitarianism also varied by region in some of the models.

Authoritarianism

Those persons high in authoritarian personality view the world as inherently dangerous and threatening (Duckitt and Sibley 2010); immigration only adds to this point of view. Authoritarians are more likely to support restrictive immigration policy; they are less likely to support the Dream Act, more likely to say immigration levels should be decreased, and finally more likely to feel that immigration threatens American jobs.

These results are in line with previous findings that show that persons higher in authoritarianism also oppose immigration and have more punitive immigration policy attitudes (Cohrs and Stelzl 2010; Esses, Dovidio, and Hodson 2002; Esses et al. 2001;

Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong 1998; Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ 2007). 140 In Table 3.6, Column 2, authoritarianism was used as a random effect allowing it to vary by region. As depicted in Figure 3.9, Authoritarianism was highest in the South and lowest in the West. According to Rentfrow (2013), “[T]he qualities of this region

(West) depict a place where open-mindedness, tolerance, individualism, and happiness are valued,” qualities contrary to authoritarianism (12). Authoritarianism is positively correlated with average poverty rates between 2008 and 2012 (.56, p-value=.000), conservatism (.24, p-value=.08), and immigrant growth between 2000 and 2010 (.53, p- value=.000). It is also negatively correlated with education levels (-.55, p-value=.000), indicating that those with the most education are less likely to exhibit an authoritarian personality. At higher levels of authoritarianism, however, there is little different between the regions in their preferences towards restrictive immigration policies. This is actually evident in both Figure 3.1A, where we see authoritarianism scattered throughout the regions) and the low region (Intercept) random effect in Table 3.6, Column 2.

Moral Traditionalism

Moral traditionalism is also strongly correlated with immigration policy attitudes.

Those higher in moral traditionalism support police checks, oppose the Dream Act, prefer to decrease legal immigration levels, and believe that immigration is a threat to American jobs. The results make sense because those higher in moral traditionalism are concerned with the maintenance of the status quo, and immigration has the power to change the status quo in multiple ways. First, newer immigrants, in particular, come to the United

States and threaten the American way of life. Second, older immigrants threaten the political and economic status quo. Older immigrants pose the threat of becoming citizens and obtaining the right to vote and run for local and state level government office. 141 Finally, the higher numbers of immigrants, especially Latino immigrants, threaten the political power of white in certain areas. Hence, the link between moral traditionalism and immigration policy attitudes exists clearly.

I also used moral traditionalism as a random effect allowing it to vary by region

(as seen in Table 3.5, Column 2 and Table 3.6, Column 3). Moral traditionalism, like the other predispositions also varied by region as depicted in Figure 3.6 and 3.10. The starkest difference can be seen in Figure 3.10 between the South and the West. The negative relationship in the West can be explained by the region’s “tolerance for cultural diversity and alternative lifestyles” (Rentfrow et al. 2013: 12). In both Figures 3.6 and

3.10, we can see the similarities between the Midwest and the South. In Figure 3.6, when moral traditionalism is at its highest the difference in percentage points between the

Midwest and the South is 2%, both regions have similar propensities to oppose the dream act. Similarly, both regions also have the exact same percentage agreeing that immigration takes jobs away from Americans (89%). Illustrated in Figure 3.1 as well, higher levels moral traditionalism are found predominantly in the South and Midwest.

Rentfrow (2013) and colleagues make similar observations about much of the Midwest and the South. In fact, Figure 3.1C is quite similar to Rentfrow’s map in Figure 2A.

This region comprises predominantly White residents with comparatively low levels of education, wealth, economic innovation, and social tolerance. Residents of this region also tend to be politically conservative, religious, and civically engaged in their communities. Taken together, the characteristics of this psychological region suggest a place where traditional values, family, and the status quo are important (Rentfrow et al. 2013: 11).

In fact, moral traditionalism is significantly correlated with higher conservatism (.39, p- value=.01) and higher rates of poverty (.62, p-value=.000), findings supported by

142 Rentfrow and colleagues. Finally, moral traditionalism is also positively correlated with immigrant growth between 2000 and 2010 (.54, p-value=.000). In other words, higher levels of moral traditionalism are associated with states with higher immigration growth between 2000 and 2010.

Anti-Egalitarianism

The link between anti-egalitarianism and immigration policy attitudes is not as clear as the other predispositions. The results indicate a more complicated story. Those higher in anti-egalitarianism are more likely to support police checks of “suspicious” individuals and oppose the Dream Act, results that are in line with my hypothesis.

However, according to Table 3.2, those persons higher in anti-egalitarianism are less likely to feel that immigration threatens American jobs, a result that is contrary to my hypothesis. One reason maybe because not many people admit to being anti-egalitarian or to harboring anti-egalitarian attitudes, hence they feel pressure to answer such questions the “socially desirable” way; hence, making the results complicated. In terms of the job threat question, it could be the case that individuals higher in anti-egalitarianism are not economically threatened by immigration precisely because they do not believe equality of opportunity actually exists.

To further explore the implications of egalitarianism, I divided egalitarianism into two different factors (see Sears, Henry, and Kosterman 2000). The first factor, Less

Equal Treatment, refers to a general egalitarianism; and the second factor, We’ve Gone

Too Far, refers to efforts by society or the government to go “too far” in dealing with equality. In other words, these factors tap into views about equality of opportunity and equality of results, respectively. I then re-ran Table 3.6 using both measures of 143 egalitarianism. The results indicate that equality of opportunity (or less equal treatment) is actually driving the results, while equality of results (or we’ve gone too far) does not reach statistical significant. In fact, in all models the coefficient for equality of opportunity is -.14 at a p-value of .001. In other words, those individuals who disagree with the following statements: 1) society should make sure that everyone has equal opportunity; 2) it is a big problem that we don’t give equal chance to everyone; and 3) we would have fewer problems if people were treated more fairly, do not think that immigration takes away jobs. It is precisely those who believe in equality of opportunity that think that immigration is taking away American jobs, because if indeed equality of opportunity exists, it is these individuals that perceive competition with immigrants.

Attitudes towards egalitarianism are also racialized. Americans, in particular white

Americans, use egalitarian values to suggest that racism is over and that black Americans are to blame for their current circumstances. This is evident in the strong positive relationship between egalitarianism and racial resentment (� = .52, � = .000). Hence, making egalitarianism a complicated and quite often contradictory individual predisposition.

I also used anti-egalitarianism as a random effect allowing it to vary by region.

The only model that converged is Table 3.5, Column 3, implying that egalitarianism varied by region. The variation, however, is not as prominent as it concerns opposition to the Dream Act, more so because there is little variation in the outcome variable and anti- egalitarianism. However, as Figure 3.7 illustrates, anti-egalitarians in the South and the

Midwest have the highest propensities to oppose the Dream Act (35% and 32%, respectively). Not surprisingly, state level anti-egalitarian means is not significantly

144 correlated with the South or the West. It is, however, significantly correlated with state conservatism (.39, p-value=.01), average poverty rates (.34, p-value=.02), and immigrant growth between 2000 and 2010 (.34, p-value=.02). In other words, there is positive relationship between higher levels of anti-egalitarianism, conservatism, poverty, and immigration.

Geographic context affects the strength and level of all predispositions, and thus immigration policy preferences. In the multilevel analyses, I allowed the impact of the predispositions to vary region to region.35 The relationship between an individual level predisposition and environmental factors is not unidirectional; the socio-political and historical environment one lives may also affect the level and strength of certain predispositions. In addition, context may also affect the importance of certain predispositions when it comes to influencing policy preferences. Research on attitude change suggests that individuals’ opinions and beliefs are affected by the attitudes and behaviors of the people in their environment (Rentfrow 2013; see Bourgeois & Bowen,

2001; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Rentfrow and his colleagues (Krug and Kulhavy 1973;

Rentfrow 2010; Rentfrow et al. 2013; Rentfrow, Gosling, and Potter 2008) have provided evidence that there are, in fact, statewide and regional personality differences across the

U.S. and they argue that the psychological and behavioral tendencies associated with certain personality traits will tend to be more pervasive in a particular region as opposed to another region where the relevant personality traits are less common (341).

Contemporary studies on the contextual effects of immigration also underscore the

35 Albeit, some models’ random effects were not significantly different from zero and some did not converge. 145 importance of looking at context and the different ways contextual effects are manifested political attitudes and behaviors.

As part of my models, I also looked at other individual level factors known to affect immigration attitudes. The following section discusses other important results.

Ideology/Partisanship

One of the most interesting results is the lack of influence of partisanship and ideology on immigration policy attitudes once we account for key predispositions. As the

Tables 3.4-3.6 show, ideology is only significant when it comes to preference for police checks. Partisanship fares the same way, and running the model with partisanship only does not change the results. In the study of American politics, ideology and partisanship typically explain a substantial amount of the variance in of citizens’ political behaviors and attitudes. However, the results presented in this chapter indicate that once personal predispositions are taken into account, ideology is relatively unimportant in predicting immigration-related attitudes. This result highlights the importance of understanding what shapes public opinion on immigration, and what types of information individuals really use to make their preferences on immigration policies. When I re-run the all of the models without the inclusion of the four predispositions, ideology doubles in Table 3.4,

Model 1, and reaches significance in some of the other models. Additionally, if ideology

(and partisanship) failed to play a large role in predicting immigration policy attitudes, then it could be the case that individuals regardless of party and ideological inclination could be moved from one policy preference to another. However, it could also be the case that the predispositions—with the exception of racial resentment—are proxies for conservatism. This study is obviously in making any conclusive remarks about when and 146 why ideology plays a major role in shaping immigration policy attitudes, and whether the predispositions can be detached from conservatism. Future work will explore this further.

Limitations

There are naturally limitations to this study. First, the sample size by state limited my ability to investigate contextual effects to region. Being able to replicate this study using state-level data as a random effect would capture a level of variation that region- level data obscures. Similar to regions, states are different and have their own unique histories. Relatedly, the sample size at both the state and regional level disallowed some of the models to converge, making it harder to compare within one outcome all predispositions. Second, this study’s findings are based on observational and correlational data. Third, the study focused exclusively on White Americans without a comparison group; future studies broadening the sample to include African Americans and Latinos will provide comparisons among a more representative US population.

Conclusion

Immigration continues to be an important topic in the United States. Support for immigration policy ebbs and flows and research on immigration attitudes should capture the dynamics of those changes, especially contextual differences. This task is an important one given that any sort of immigration reform policy has failed to pass both the

House and the Senate. Moreover, in recent years we have seen the advent of restrictive immigration policies in new locations, such as the South. This is a phenomenon that is understudied and under-examined: what is it about the South that makes it ripe for restrictive immigration policies in the absence of large numbers of undocumented and

147 even Hispanic/Latino immigrants. Addressing questions such as this will further our understanding of support for restrictive immigration policies, and its geographic component. The following chapter analyzes results from an experiment designed to establish a causal mechanism for why context matters as it relates to individual predispositions.

148 Chapter 4: Mapping Moralities Predispositions in the Media and their Effect on Restrictive Immigration Policy Preferences: An Experimental Analysis

“A moral geography, simply put, is the idea that certain people, things and practices belong in certain spaces, places and landscapes and not in others…The constitution of what counts as moral is infused with a geographical imagination and shot through with ideology. Moral geographies, as conventionally defined, are ideological geographies” ~ Tim Cresswell (2005: 128).

Introduction

This chapter has three main purposes. First, it examines whether individual psychological predispositions, and immigration policies vary as a function of region.

Second, it investigates the ways in which framing immigration using the language psychological predispositions affects a) individuals’ predispositions; and b) attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies. Finally, it examines whether the predispositional frames vary as a function of geographic context. I used a survey experiment designed to manipulate an immigration newspaper opinion article by using the different language from four of the five predispositions, namely social dominance orientation (SDO), authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and racial resentment. The previous chapter found that racial resentment was the strongest predictor of restrictive immigration policy preferences. This chapter furthers investigates the role of racial resentment and whether framing immigration using the language of racial resentment affects immigration policy preferences, and if so, where it has the strongest effect. Throughout the dissertation, I make an argument about the importance of not only understanding the sociopolitical

149 historical legacies of geographic contexts, but also examining the role they play vis-à-vis restrictive immigration policies. Furthermore, I argue that in order to understand the behavior of individuals, we must understand the psychological and moral geographies situated in time and space.

Moral Geographies

The term moral geographies refers to the social behavior of individuals who are spatially situated in particular areas. According to Tim Cresswell:

A moral geography, simply put, is the idea that certain people, things and practices belong in certain spaces, places and landscapes and not in others. This deceptively simple definition underlines the centrality of an understanding and theorisation of the interdependence of the geographical objects of space, place, landscape, territory, boundary and movement with the sociological/cultural objects of class, race, gender, sexuality, age, (dis)ability, etc. The word ‘moral’, therefore, indicates a fairly contingent set of rules and expectations dressed up as though it was common sense. Central to all these discussions is the role of power in constituting the relationship between geography on the ground and the practices of social groups and individuals. Central also is the role of the non-compliant in disturbing these taken-for-granted relationships and opening them up to question. The constitution of what counts as moral is infused with a geographical imagination and shot through with ideology. Moral geographies, as conventionally defined, are ideological geographies (2005: 128).

The idea that certain people, things, and/or practices belong in certain places/spaces rather than others is a strong concept, especially given the migratory nature of people, things, and ideas. In fact, we live in an era of globalization, which is defined as the interchange of worldviews, products, and ideas. Thus, to argue that certain people and practices belong in certain places versus another does not quite fit the contemporary world in which we live. However, as Cresswell continues to point out, this definition is

“deceptively simple.” In fact, at the heart of moral geographies is the interdependence of

150 the geographical place/space/boundary with the sociological objects of class, race, gender, and other identity-based considerations. Thus, these sociological and political objects of race and class are embedded within the geographies people inhabit; these moral geographies, however, also inhabit the people in these particular spaces. People affect the geographic and social context in which they live, but the morality of geographic contexts also affects its inhabitants. Central to the morality of a place is its history and consequently the common sense social/political/racial scripts (see Clair 2008; Clair,

Thomé-Williams, and Su 2005).

The sociopolitical historical legacies of geographic contexts play a significant role in the morality of particular places. The history that a place has with social issues surrounding class, race, gender, and sexuality inevitably plays a role in the socialization that happens in these particular places. “Moralities are, in short, constructed through geographically articulated social interaction” (Lee and Smith 2008: 7). Consequently, the sociopolitical history of places affects social interactions. And central to these social interactions is power, who has power and who does not, and who is deemed as belonging to this physical space and who does not. Power, thus, is expressed in the monopolization of space, leading those in power to constitute the relationship between geography and normative practices. Thus, those in power decide who belongs and who does not, and what is normative and what is not. And where there are normative practices and people, there are also non-normative practices and people. These “norms” become the ideological foundation of geographies. Hence, the non-normative practices, peoples, and ideas are not only non-normative, but are ideologically incongruent and geographically misplaced.

Circling back, then, the concept that certain people, things, and practices belong in

151 particular places and not others does not seem a strong statement after all. In fact, the history of the United States has been a history of forced settlement and ideologies.

Normative practices are, then, the common sense set of rules and expectations.

They become an almost inherent or “natural” part of a geographic context, and its people are socialized to not only maintain such normative practices, but to adhere to- and police such practices. These practices become the status quo, and those who benefit from the status quo defend it. The status quo is embedded in geographies, and is maintained by individuals within that geographic context. Geographies, then, become replete with the dominant views and values of the group in power. Historically, those in power in the

United States have been white Americans. Whiteness itself, thus, is constructed as the dominant racialized ideology, leading white Americans to partake in the defense of whiteness, thus, a defense of space. Those who do not conform to whiteness are “out of place.” According to Martin, “different identity types are constructed in specific social contexts and…” (2005: 98). Through socialization, these normative ideas about race, space, place, and identity are learned and become part of a person’s psychological predispositions. These psychological tendencies are, thus, geographically and historically situated.

Predispositions, Moral Geographies, and Immigration

The psychological predispositions individuals hold, thus, form part of what defines moral geographies. Consequently, because moral geographies differ, so do the concentration of psychological predispositions individual hold in these particular contexts.

Due to the fact that predispositions vary as a function of geographic context and predispositions influence preferences for restrictive immigration policies, logically, 152 preferences for restrictive immigration policies should also vary as a function of geographic context given the different moral geographies of particular spaces/places.

This, then, becomes the theoretical foundation I use to argue that the effect of immigration stories framed using the language of psychological predispositions should vary as a function of geographic context, and should affect restrictive immigration policy preferences.

According to Pratto and Lemieux, immigration is an ambiguous social psychological situation, which allows immigration to be framed in multiple ways (2001).

Prattto and Lemieux disambiguate the meaning of immigration policy by framing it so that it appeals to those with high or low social dominance orientation (SDO). They find that framing the immigration policy as a way of maintaining dominance over immigrants appealed to those high in SDO, whereas framing the policy as a way of increasing equality between immigrants and members of the receiving society appealed to those low in SDO. The literature examining the effects of disambiguating or framing immigration by appealing to individuals’ predispositions is not extensive. This dissertation further this scholarly work by framing immigration using language related to SDO, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and racial resentment, all of which disambiguate immigration for the public. It gives immigration social meanings that relate to their own perceptions and predispositions. The following section lays out the methodology used in this chapter, including the experimental design, sample, and hypotheses.

Methodology

In order to test my expectations about individual predispositions, immigration policy preferences, and geographic context, I designed an experimental survey that 153 manipulated different immigration stories. The experiment was fielded April 1-11, 2016 through Qualtrics, an online survey software.36 Each respondent was paid $3.75 per completed survey.

Sample

The sample consists of 2,428 non-Hispanic white Americans born in the United

States, with both parents born in the United States. There was an overrepresentation of women in the sample (67.96%) and the average age was 35.25. The average education was 4.73, which is between the 4 (some college) and 5 (an associate’s degree) categories. 17 percent of the sample were high school graduates, 26 percent of the sample has some college, while 21 percent had a bachelor’s degree. 34 percent of the sample was employed full-time, 12 part-time, and 21 percent were retired. The mean income for the sample was 4.33, somewhere between $25-39,999 and $40-99,999, 43 percent of the sample chose the $40-99,999 income bracket. When it comes to partisanship, 35 percent of the sample self-identified as Republican, 26 percent as

Democrat, and 34 percent as Independent. Finally, ideologically speaking, 44 percent of the sample considered themselves moderates, while 22 percent thought of themselves as either strong or weak liberals, and 34 percent considered themselves strong or weak conservatives.

The geographic sample includes states from three different groups/regions of the United States (see Table 4.1 below). The first is the Southern Black Belt. These are the states that had the highest shares of slave populations pre-civil war. I am expecting

36 You can find more information about Qualtrics at www.qualtrics.com. 154 these states to be the highest in racial resentment, and I am expecting racial resentment to have the strongest predictive power in the South on immigration policy attitudes.

The second are border, Southwestern states. Due to the history of these states as border states with Mexico, and states that have a high Latino population, I am expecting that racial resentment towards Blacks will not affect immigration policy attitudes as much as Southern states. On the contrary, I am expecting that these states are more susceptible to an immigration rhetoric that highlights more general nativist conversations, and a rhetoric that focuses on immigrants.

Finally, the third group/region are three states from the Northern part of country:

Montana, Maine, and Vermont. I chose these particular states for three reasons. First, these states inhabit the lowest number of Black Americans. Second, they inhabit the lowest number of immigrants. Finally, these states had the lowest percentage of immigration growth in 2010. The immigrant share of the population in 2010 in Montana is 2.0 percent, 4.4 percent in Vermont, and 3.4 percent in Maine. The immigration growth between 2000 and 2010 is 22.2 percent in Montana, 18.6 percent in Vermont, and

24.5 percent in Maine. These three reasons justify the use of these three particular states as states that are the least alike to the other two groups. I expect these states to be the most malleable. In other words, the immigration frames will be able to activate the desired frame and strengthen restrictive immigration policy attitudes. For example, if an individual from Maine/Vermont/Montana were to receive the racial resentment frame, the racial resentment frame will activate the relationship between racial resentment and immigration policy attitudes.

155 Table 4.1 Contextual Variables Sample Size South 1,000 Border 821 North 607

Design

The survey experiment includes four manipulations and one control condition. In the control condition, subjects read a non-related article on the most recent iPhone by

Apple. The four experimental conditions involved an anti-immigration opinion piece, where the headline and parts of the text were varied by invoking key elements of the four predispositions. In the racial resentment condition, subjects read an opinion piece with the headline, “Immigrants foster crime and consume public resources.” This condition frames the immigration story as one based on racial resentment measures. At the root of racial resentment is the idea that Blacks take what they do not deserve (i.e. public resources). Additionally, I added the crime aspect because crime is a racialized word common in the media to imply black perpetrators (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000). In the authoritarianism condition, subjects read an opinion piece headlined, “Immigrants pose security threat to the ‘rule of law.’” This condition framed immigration using authoritarian tendencies to obey the rule of law and authority. In the moral traditionalism condition, subjects read an opinion piece with the headline, “Immigrants’ values contradict traditional way of life.” This condition is meant to frame immigration as contradicting traditional American way of life, to which moral traditionalists hold onto.

Finally, subjects read an opinion piece with the headline, “Us v. them, the immigration

156 debate.” This condition framed immigration as a group-based issue using social dominance orientation language.37

The experimental design is empirically beneficial because it allows me to say examine various questions. First, are individual predispositions affected by the accompanying predispositional frame? In other words, does the racial resentment immigration frame increase or decrease racial resentment among white Americans?

Second, are some of the frames stronger in certain geographic regions than others? Third, and more generally, what role is geographic context playing in relation to attitudes to immigration policy preferences?

Hypotheses:

H1: Individuals high in the core predispositions will prefer more restrictive immigration policies.

H1a: The impact of the core predispositions on support for restrictive immigration policies will vary by geographic region.

H2: Support for restrictive immigration policies will vary by context.

H3: The predispositional frames will activate and strengthen individual predispositions and lead to an increase in the association between the accompanying predisposition compared to the control group.

Research has suggested that the impact of race on whites’ policy preferences is most likely to occur in situations where priming or framing raises the salience of racial perceptions and attitudes (Hopkins 2010; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and

White 2002). Weber and colleagues focus on racially diverse residential areas as a

37 Experimental manipulations can be found in Appendix D. 157 context which heightens the salience of race (Weber et al. 2014). Additionally, they state that racial diversity in one’s environment “should function much like manipulations of stereotype activation in experimental studies” (64-5). They also argue that the heightened political effect of race in racially diverse contexts is complicated by the existence of egalitarian norms (social desirability to not express explicit overt racism or prejudice).

“More importantly, though, these pressures may be stronger among individuals living in the same racially diverse settings that increase the cognitive accessibility and policy influence of racial stereotypes” (65). Thus, individuals living in racially diverse environment should feel the most social desirability if the diversity is closely related to the policy issue. Hence, Hypotheses H4a and H4b, I argue that because the policy areas is immigration, in the South there would less social pressure because there is a larger black population as opposed to a Latino population, whereas in the Southwest, there would be more pressure to conform to egalitarian norms. Additionally, in the North because this racial diversity does not exists, I argue that the manipulations do the same work as racial diversity by raising the salience of race, thus lending to higher support of restrictive immigration policies in the North. These hypotheses are exploratory and preliminary in trying to extract the underlying mechanisms, given the limitations of the experimental design in testing causation.

H4: The influence of the frames on support for restrictive immigration policies should vary as a function of geographic context.

H4a) In the South, all of the frames should be associated with higher restrictive immigration policy preferences, given that the frames mimic the predispositions that also increase support for restrictive immigration policies.

158 H4b) In the border states, all of the frames should be associated with lower immigration policy preferences due to the explicit nature of the frames leading to social desirability effects.

H4c) In the Northern states, all of the frames should be associated with higher restrictive immigration policy preferences. The malleability of Northern states comes from the fact that they are the least diverse of states, limiting white Americans interaction with people of color, leading white Northerners to be more susceptible to priming/framing effects.

Table 4.2 offers a general description of the experimental conditions and specific hypotheses.

Table 4.2. Description of Experiment Conditions

Control (n= 518) • Article Headline: “iPhone 6 review”

Racial Resentment Condition (n= 485) • Opinions Article Headline: “Immigrants foster crime and consume public resources” Authoritarianism (n= 482) • Opinions Article Headline: “Immigrants pose security threat to the ‘rule of law’” Moral Traditionalism (n= 475) • Opinions Article Headline: “Immigrants’ values contradict traditional American way of life” Social Dominance Orientation (n= 468) • Opinions Article Headline: “Us v. them, the immigration debate”

Dependent Variables

There are five outcome variables that ask about different immigration policy preferences. First, Police Checks, is an ordered variable that asks respondents whether

159 they favor, neither favor or opposed, or opposed police being able to check the documentation of “suspicious” individuals. Second, Immigration Levels, using a 5-point likert scale, asks whether legal immigration levels should be increased or decreased.

Third, Immigration Policy, asks respondents to choose between four policies they see fit when it comes to immigration. Fourth, Dream Act, asks whether respondents favor, neither favor or oppose, or oppose young people who came to the US as children being able to obtain citizenship. Finally, Job Threat, although not a policy question per se, asks how likely it is that immigration takes away jobs from those already in the US.38

Independent variables

The primary independents variables are racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, social dominance orientation (SDO), and anti-egalitarianism. In addition to these main variables, I also include scales for patriotism, individualism, and nativism.39

All of the scales in this chapter have been standardized to range from 0 to 1, higher numbers indicating higher levels of the measure.

Secondary independent variables include three additional versions of the racial resentment scale: resentment towards Hispanics, resentment towards immigrants, and resentment towards undocumented40 immigrants. These scales ask the same questions as the racial resentment scale, but substitute the target group. In addition, I ask respondents to rank how they feel towards certain known groups in America, such as Blacks,

38 See Appendix E for survey wording. 39 See Appendix C and E for summary statistics and question wording, respectively. 40 In the survey, I used the word “illegal” is used in order to be able to compare across different surveys, since “illegal immigrants,” is how most surveys address undocumented or unauthorized immigrants. Note that I will use the word “illegal,” when addressing the experimental survey, and does not represent my own opinions about the usage of them term. Elsewhere, I refer to this population as either “undocumented,” or “unauthorized” interchangeably. 160 Hispanics/Latinos, Democrats, women, etc. Respondents rank each group from 0-100, 0 indicates feeling very cold towards that group and 100 indicating they feel very warm towards that group, whereas 50 is neutral. Finally, I control for traditional demographics variables, such as age, gender, income, and ideology, etc.

Results

Table 4.3 depicts the correlations between the main predispositions. All of the predispositions are significantly correlated with each other. Each of the predispositions are scaled to range from zero to one (0-1), and the higher the number, the higher the level of each predisposition. The results are similar to the previous chapter. All five predispositions are highly reliable, with the exception of authoritarianism, which is acceptable due to its short scale. The cronbach’s alpha reliability of the 4-item measure of racial resentment is .83, .64 for the 4-item authoritarianism scale, .80 for the 4-item moral traditionalism scale, .90 for the 8-item SDO-D scale,41 and .83 for the 6-item egalitarianism scale (Ho et al. 2012).

Table 4.3. Correlations Between Individual Predispositions 1 2 3 4 5

Racial Resentment_Blacks (1)

Authoritarianism (2) 0.3325

Moral Traditionalism (3) 0.4707 0.3788

Social Dominance Orientation (4) 0.2423 0.2898 0.2254

Anti-Egalitarianism (5) 0.5476 0.2763 0.5133 0.3934 Data: Original Experimental Survey, 2015 Note: Bolded p < .000

41 According to Ho and colleagues, although SDO works as a unitary construct, some analyses suggest that there are two complimentary dimensions, SDO-E and SDO-D. SDO-Egalitarianism is a preference for nonegalitarian intergroup relations, whereas SDO-Dominance is the preference for some groups to dominate others. I only use the SDO-D scale in order to get a cleaner measure of group-based hierarchy, and because I also measure egalitarianism separately. 161 Table 4.4 replicates Table 3.2 in Chapter 3. Many of the results are similar, but there are important differences. First, Table 4.4 includes SDO as one of the predispositions, which the ANES survey data reported in Chapter 3 could not include.

SDO affects three of the five outcome variables. A standard deviation increase in SDO

(SD=.22) decreases the likelihood of favoring police checks by .84 points. Additionally, a standard deviation increase in SDO increases the likelihood of supporting a decrease in legal immigration levels by 1.06 points, an increase in thinking that immigration is taking jobs away by 1.20 points. Racial resentment continues to be a predominant predictor of immigration-related policy attitudes, however, it does not predict allowing “Dreamers” to obtain citizenship. In fact, anti-egalitarianism is the dominant predictor of attitudes towards a dream act. Additionally, once egalitarianism is broken into two, equality of opportunity and equality of results, we find that equality of opportunity is driving the results. A standard deviation increase in equality of opportunity (lessequaltreatment;

SD=.26) increases the likelihood of denying “Dreamers” a way to obtain citizenship by

2.85 points. In other words, considerations about the Dream Act are primarly associated with attitudes towards whether white Americans’ believe that equality of opportinuty has been achieved. Table 4.4 does not include questions about the economy, as we saw in

Chapter 3 only national economy concerns were significant. Table 4.4 does include two new variables, nativism and individualism. Restrictive immigration policy preferences are significantly influenced by nativism, or the idea that immigration threatens American values and way-of-life. Finally, those with higher levels of individualism (the belief that government should not interfere with individual and state rights) prefer police checks and are not keen about allowing “Dreamer” to obtain a pathway to citizenship.

162 Table 4.4. Ordered Logit Analysis Predicting Restrictive Immigration Policy Preferences Immigration Immigration Checks Levels Policy Dream Act42 Job Threat Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Racial Resentment 1.580*** .829*** .784*** 0.367 1.348*** (0.241) (0.201) (0.221) (0.223) (0.205) Authoritarianism .337* .536*** 0.147 0.173 .448** (0.163) (0.135) (0.148) (0.151) (0.138) Moral Traditionalism .653** 0.097 0.162 0.271 .971*** (0.253) (0.208) (0.231) (0.233) (0.213) Anti -Egalitarianism 0.4529038 -0.041 .612* 1.452*** -0.226 (0.309) (0.241) (0.267) (0.262) (0.246) Less Equal Treatment - - - 1.05*** - (0.213) Too Far - - - 0.374+ - (0.225) SDO -.791** 0.268 .524* -0.007 .809*** (0.272) (0.222) (0.238) (0.229) (0.222) Age -0.001 .015*** -.009** .009** -.014*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Gender 0.112 .351*** 0.046 -.160+ -0.027 (0.108) (0.088) (0.095) (0.095) (0.089) Education -0.032 -.097*** 0.010 -.069** -.081*** (0.027) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) Employ -0.015 -0.025 0.025 -.088*** -0.022 (0.025) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) Income 0.035 -.083* -0.047 -0.050 -.132*** (0.039) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033) Ideology .124* -.072+ 0.070 .159*** .080+ (0.052) (0.043) (0.048) (0.047) (0.044) Nativism .450*** .700*** .181+ .257* .828*** (0.119) (0.100) (0.106) (0.106) (0.099) Individualism .452*** 0.010 0.123 .261* 0.151 (0.134) (0.115) (0.128) (0.129) (0.118) Patriotism .612* -0.197 0.087 -1.364*** .671** (0.256) (0.221) (0.246) (0.248) (0.228) Jobs .412*** .392*** .394*** .361*** - (0.058) (0.048) (0.051) (0.052)

Table 4.4. Continued

42 I also ran this model and broke the egalitarianism scale into two (Sears, Henry, and Kosterman 2000), and only did this for Model 4. See Appendix E for question wording. 163 Table 4.4. Continued Feeling_Black .010** .009** .009** 0.005 .009*** (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Feeling_Hispanic -.009* -.010*** -.010** -.012*** -0.005 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Feeling_Immigrant .007* -.018*** -.005* 0.001 -.007*** (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Feeling_White -0.002 .016*** .013*** 0.002 .005+ (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Feeling_Citizen 0.006 0.001 -.007+ -0.004 .007+ (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) Feeling_Illegal -.020*** -.005** -.021*** -.012*** -.018*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Feeling_Americam 0.001 -.007* 0.002 0.002 -0.003 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)

Cut Point 1 Constant 1.712*** - 1.77*** -3.165*** 0.273 -.675* (0.375) (0.322) (0.378) (0.352) (0.317)

Cut Point 2 Constant 3.621*** -0.293 1.124** 1.708*** 1.545*** (0.383) (0.319) (0.354) (0.353) (0.319)

Cut Point 3 Constant - 1.944*** 2.241*** - 2.968*** (0.322) (0.357) (0.322)

Cut Point 4 - 2.807*** - - Constant (0.325)

Pseudo R2 0.25 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.21 N 2428 2428 2428 2428 2428 Log likelihood -1703.78 -3029.97 -2191.92 -2093.22 -2630.78 Note: + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Do the strength of the predispositions vary as a function of geographic context, as we saw in Chapter 3? Figure 4.1 depicts box plots for each of the main predispositions.

The box plot for each predisposition illustrates the 75th and 25th percentile, the median

164 (line across the boxes),43 and the whiskers indicate the minimum and maximum values.

Additionally, you can see the dots indicating outliers in the data. Box plots are a convenient way to display variation without assuming a normal distribution; however, they do not tell us whether or not the variation is significant. For significance, I conducted one-way ANOVAs. There are statistically significant differences between regions for each of the predispositions. Racial resentment differs significantly by region

(F(2,2425) = 60.72, p = .000), and a Tukey post-hoc test revealed that it differs between

Border and Southern states (-.08 ± .01244, p=.000), Northern and Southern states (-.14

± .013, p=000), and Northern and Border states (-.06 ± .014, p=.000). Authoritarianism levels differ by region (F(2,2425)=25.63, p=.000), and each region is different from the other. Border and Southern states (-.07 ± .015, p=.000), Northern and Southern states (-

.11 ± .017, p=.000), and Northern and Border states (-.04 ± .017, p=.05) differ. Moral traditionalism significantly varies by region (F(2,2425)= 17.57, p=.000), and Southern states are significantly different from Border states (-.05 ± .012, p=.000) and Northern states (-.08 ± .013, p=.000). Social dominance orientation differs by region

(F(2,2425)=10.63, p=.000), and Southern states differ from Border (-.04 ± .01, p=.001) and Northern (-.05 ± .011, p=.000) states. Finally, anti-egalitarianism significantly varies by region (F(2,2425)= 9.83, p=.000), and Northern states differ from Southern (-.05

± .012, p=.000) and Border (-.03 ± .013, p=.03) states.

43 For authoritarianism the line for the South is red for visibility. 44 ± indicates the standard error. For example, for racial resentment it indicates ± .012 unit movement in a 0-1 scale. 165

Figure 4.1. Predispositions, by Region.

Next, I looked at whether restrictive immigration policy preferences vary by geographic context. Figure 4.2 is a descriptive illustration of the means of all five immigration-related outcome variables by region. For four of the five outcome variables, the South has the highest mean (exception is Dream Act). Border states seem to have the lowest mean, with the exception of preferences over immigration levels. Northern states are somewhere in between Southern and Border states, again with the exception of preferences for immigration level, which has the starkest differences.

166 Mean Restrictive Immigration Policy Preferences, by Region 5

4

3 Police Checks Immigration 2 Levels Immigration Policy Dream Act 1 Job Threat

0 South Border North

Figure 4.2. Means Restrictive Immigration Policy Preferences, by Region

Table 4.5 showcases an ordered logistic analysis of three of the five immigration- related outcome variables45 replicating Table 4.4 with the inclusion of the regional dummy variables (1= South; 0= Non-South; 1= North, 0= Non-North), and the Border

States dummy is the control variable. As Table 4.5 illustrates, racial resentment continues to strongly predict restrictive immigration policy preferences, even when controlling for a host of other political, demographic, and contextual variables. Additionally, a preference towards decreasing legal immigration levels, harsher immigration policies, and not allowing “Dreamers” to have access to citizenship differs significantly as a function where respondents are currently living. Ordered Logit results cannot be easily analyzed, thus by looking at standard deviation increases, we get a clearer sense about the magnitude of influence each independent variable has on the outcome variable. Racial resentment continues to affect immigration policy preferences most dominantly in Table

45 I ran all five immigration-related outcome variables, however, I am showcasing the three where the regional variables are significant, especially because the other two would only be a replication of Table 4.3. 167 4.5. For example, a standard deviation increase in racial resentment (SD=.27) the likelihood of favoring decreasing legal immigration levels increases by 1.25 points.

Geographic context also plays a significant role. White Northerners are more likely to prefer more restrictive immigration policies than whites in Border states, although the percent odds are not as high as racial resentment. For example, for whites living in Northern states the odds of favoring decreasing legal immigration levels as compared to Border states increases by 42.4 percent. Similarly, the odds of white

Southerners preferring to decrease legal immigration levels compared to Border states increases by 33.1 percent. The result for the South makes sense, in fact, in Figure 4.2, immigration level has the starkest differences between the South and the Border and

Northern states. However, it is surprising that those in the North, with very little immigration growth will have more restrictive immigration policy preferences. It may be the case that Northern states have more variation among preferences for immigration levels, immigration policies, and the dream act. By looking at the standard deviation of all three aforementioned outcome variables by region, the variations amongst them are not radically different. In fact, the standard deviation for Border states is slightly higher than Northern states for all three aforementioned outcomes (immigration level, immigration policy, and dream act), indicating more variation in Border states. Higher restrictive immigration preferences in the North in comparison to Border states may be due, then, precisely because these states are predominately white as media framing on immigration are more effective.46

46 I also ran the model with an interaction between the regional groups and each of the main predispositions, which did not result in significant interactions. 168 Table 4.5. Does Region Influence Immigration Policy Preferences? Immigration Levels Immigration Policy Dream Act Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Racial Resentment .837*** .838*** .503* (0.205) (0.225) (0.228)

Authoritarianism .548*** 0.164 0.209 (0.135) (0.149) (0.151)

Moral 0.088 0.151 0.263 Traditionalism (0.208) (0.231) (0.234)

Egalitarianism -0.019 .608* 1.433*** (0.242) (0.268) (0.263)

SDO 0.270 .534* 0.020 (0.222) (0.238) (0.229)

Age .016*** -.009** .008** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)

Gender .346*** 0.042 -.158+ (0.088) (0.096) (0.095)

Education -.093*** 0.014 -.063* (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)

Employ -0.023 0.028 -.084*** (0.020) (0.022) (0.022)

Income -.081* -0.046 -0.051 (0.033) (0.036) (0.036)

Ideology -.076+ 0.072 .170*** (0.043) (0.048) (0.047)

Nativism .703*** .179+ .255* (0.100) (0.106) (0.107)

Individualism 0.007 0.119 .248+ (0.116) (0.128) (0.129)

Patriotism -0.212 0.095 -1.333*** (0.221) (0.246) (0.248)

Jobs .385*** .394*** .365*** (0.048) (0.051) (0.052)

Feeling_Black .009** .009** 0.005 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)

Feeling_Hispanic -.010*** -.010** -.013*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)

Feeling_Immigrant -.018*** -.005* 0.001 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)

Feeling_White .016*** .013*** 0.001 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)

Table 4.5 Continued 169 Table 4.5 Continued Feeling_Citizen 0.001 -0.007 -0.004 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)

Feeling_Illegal -.005** -.021*** -.012*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)

Feeling_Americam -.007* 0.002 0.003 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)

North .353*** .242* .297** (0.102) (0.113) (0.114)

South .285** 0.078 -0.063 (0.092) (0.101) (0.102)

Cut Point 1

Constant -1.551*** -2.998*** 0.520 (0.329) (0.386) (0.363)

Cut Point 2

Constant -0.065 1.298*** 1.960*** (0.326) (0.364) (0.366)

Cut Point 3

Constant 2.181*** 2.417*** - (0.330) (0.366)

Cut Point 4

Constant 3.048*** - - (0.333)

Pseudo R2 0.16 0.20 0.16 N 2428 2428 2428 Log likelihood -3022.56 -2189.59 -2087.62 Note: + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Predispositions in the Media

I now turn to the question of whether the manipulated predisposition frames are associated with attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies. First, I looked at whether the frames affected the accompanying predisposition (for example, did the racial resentment frame increase or decrease levels of the racial resentment predisposition).

Through a series of one-way ANOVA tests, only the moral traditionalism frame had a

170 slightly significant small effect on the moral traditionalism predisposition compared to the control group ((F(1, 991)= 3.61, p= .058). Second, I examined whether the predispositional frames affected the immigration-related outcomes differently. Again, I used a series of one-way ANOVAs (not shown), there are significant differences at the 90 percent significance level between the manipulations in relation to immigration taking away jobs from those already in the F=(4, 2423)=2.00, p=.09. Delving deeper, the significant result is led by Northern whites, F=(4, 602)= 2.73, p=.03). In addition, a post- hoc Fisher-Hayter pairwise comparison tests shows a significant difference between the control frame and the racial resentment frame, which can be seen by looking at Figure

4.6.47 The racial resentment frame decreased the likelihood that respondents thought immigration takes jobs away from people already in the US as compared to the control frame.

In the next set of analyses, I included the manipulations in an ordered logit model for each immigration-related outcome variables; Table 4.6 shows the results for significant models only. The moral traditionalism frame increased the likelihood that respondents favored police checks by 37.7 percent. The racial resentment frame increased the likelihood of favoring a decrease in legal immigration levels at the 90 percent significance level by 24.4 percent. Finally, the SDO-, authoritarianism-, and racial resentment frames (moral traditionalism at 90% level) decreased beliefs that immigration poses a job threat by 29.6, 28.2, and 36.7 percent, respectively. Thus, these frames actually decreased restrictive thinking related to jobs and immigration. I also ran an ordered logistic model that included interactions between the manipulations and the

47 It should be noted that neither a Tukey HSD nor Tukey-Krammer post-hoc tests issued significant pairwise comparisons. 171 accompanying predisposition (along with all other control variables), and no significant interaction effects emerged. Thus it was not the case the experimental frames served as primes for the predispositions, increasing their influence on immigration policy attitudes.

Table 4.6. The Role of Predispositional Frames on Immigration Policy Preferences Police Checks Immigration Levels Job Threat Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Racial Resentment 1.595*** .820*** 1.360*** (0.241) (0.201) (0.206)

Authoritarianism .321* .536*** .433** (0.163) (0.135) (0.138)

Moral Traditionalism .635* 0.118 .972*** (0.254) (0.208) (0.214)

Egalitarianism 0.458 -0.059 -0.231 (0.309) (0.242) (0.246)

SDO -.778** 0.288 .815*** (0.273) (0.222) (0.222)

Age -0.001 .015*** -.014*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)

Gender 0.110 .348*** -0.028 (0.108) (0.088) (0.089)

Education -0.031 -.098*** -.082*** (0.027) (0.023) (0.023)

Employ -0.018 -0.026 -0.022 (0.025) (0.020) (0.021)

Income 0.036 -.081* -.132*** (0.039) (0.033) (0.033)

Ideology .126* -.073+ .080+ (0.052) (0.043) (0.044)

Nativism .444*** .697*** .847*** (0.120) (0.100) (0.100)

Individualism .450*** 0.013 0.144 (0.134) (0.115) (0.118)

Patriotism .634* -0.198 .667** (0.256) (0.221) (0.228)

Jobs .418*** .397*** - (0.058) (0.048) -

Table 4.6 Continued 172 Table 4.6 Continued Feeling_Black .010** .009** .009*** (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)

Feeling_Hispanic -.010* -.010*** -0.004 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)

Feeling_Immigrant .007* -.018*** -.007** (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)

Feeling_White -0.003 .016*** .006+ (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)

Feeling_Citizen 0.006 0.001 .0072401+ (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)

Feeling_Illegal -.020*** -.005** -.019*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)

Feeling_Americam 0.001 -.007* -0.002 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)

SDO Frame 0.223 -0.006 -.351** (0.146) (0.122) (0.125)

Authoritarianism Frame 0.095 -0.015 -.331** (0.145) (0.121) (0.124)

Moral Traditionalism Frame .320* 0.078 -.203+ (0.147) (0.121) (0.123)

Racial Resentment Frame 0.174 .219+ -.457*** (0.145) (0.121) (0.123)

Cut Point 1

Constant 1.872*** -1.700*** -.911** (0.386) (0.331) (0.325)

Cut Point 2

Constant 3.784*** -0.218 1.319*** (0.394) (0.328) (0.327)

Cut Point 3

Constant 2.022*** 2.748***

(0.331) (0.330)

Cut Point 4

Constant 2.886***

(0.334)

Pseudo R2 0.25 0.16 0.21 N 2428 2428 2428 Log likelihood -1701.02 -3027.33 -2622.62 Note: + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

173 However, do the impact of the manipulations vary as a function of region and consequently affect immigration policy preferences through contextual mechanisms? In order to test this question, I tested whether the manipulations affect the immigration- related outcome variables as a function of region using a series of 3 (region) X 5 (frames) factorial ANOVAs, shown in Figure 4.3-4.6. The region X frame interaction effects were not significant in any of the models; however, all models, with the exception of the

Dream Act, had significant main- and region effects. As shown in Figure 4.3, when it comes to favoring police checks, there are significant differences between the predispositional frames as a function of region, F(2, 2425)=10.88, p=.000. I ran the same

ANOVA by predipositional frame to test for main effects by frame, and for post-hoc pairwise differences in mean. There were significant main effects for the racial resentment frame (F(2, 482)=4.93, p=.008) and the control frame (F(2, 515)=4.92, p=.008). A post-hoc Tukey HSD pairwise comparison test revealed significant regional pairwise comparisons. The racial resentment frame influenced Southern and Northern whites’ preferences for police checks differently, in which case the racial resentment frame decreased Northern whites’ restrictive immigration policy preferences, having the opposite effect on Southern whites. Finally, the baseline group, or control group, also differed by region. Southern whites and whites from the Border states differed, as well as

Southern- and Northern whites. In both instance, Southern whites had higher levels of restrictive immigration policy preferences. There are, however, no significant frame effects for any of the three regions. In other words, the frames did not significantly vary within each region.

174

Regional Differences in Police Checks, by Frame

2.55 South 2.5

North 2.45 2.4 Fitted values

Border 2.35 2.3

SDO Authoritarianism Moral Trad. Racial Resent. Control Manipulations Figure 4.3. Regional Differences in Police Checks, by Frame

Figure 4.4 reveals significant differences in frames as a function of region, F(2,

2425)=20.44, p=.000. Preferences over immigration levels were influenced by the SDO

(F(2, 465)=3.06, p=.05), authoritarianism (F(2, 479)=10.20, p=.000), moral traditionalism

(F(2, 472(=3.86, p=.02), and control (F(2, 515)=5.95, p=.003) frames as functions of region. A Tukey post-hoc test revealed differences between whites living in Border states compared to both Southern and Northern whites, in relation to the authoritarianism frame.

In this instance, the authoritarianism frame appears to have decreased restrictive immigration preferences for whites living in Border states compared to both Southern whites and Northern whites. Southern and Border whites also differed in the ways in which the moral traditionalism frame influenced their attitudes towards immigration levels. Finally, in the baseline condition, Southern whites differed from both whites in

Border states and Northern whites. There are no significant frame effects for any of the three regions. 175

Regional Differences in Immigration Levels, by Frames 3.6

South 3.4

North 3.2 Fitted values 3

Border 2.8 SDO Authoritarianism Moral Trad. Racial Resent. Control Manipulations Figure 4.4. Regional Differences in Immigration Levels, by Frames

Figure 4.5 illustrates preferences for harsher immigration policies by predispositional frame as a function of region, F(2, 2425)=11.68, p=.000). There were significant differences in policy preference among the SDO (F(2, 465)=3.05, p=.05), authoritarianism (F92,465)=3.37, p=.04), racial resentment (F(2, 482)=2.80, p=.06), and control (F(2, 515)=3.66, p=.03) frames as a function of region. A Tukey HSD pairwise comparison test revealed differences in two of the five conditions, the racial resentment frame (South v. North) and the control frame (South v. Border). However, a Tukey-

Krammer test revealed differences among the SDO frame and the authoritarianism frame between Southern whites and whites living in Border states. There are no significant frame effects for any of the three regions.

176 Regional Differences in Immigration Policy, by Frames 3.1 South 3 Border Fitted values 2.9

North 2.8 SDO Authoritarianism Moral Trad. Racial Resent. Control Manipulations Figure 4.5. Regional Differences in Immigration Policy, by Frames

Finally, Figure 4.6, illustrates predispositional frames influenced attitudes towards immigration posing a job threat, as a function of region, F(2, 2425)=19.87, p=.000. There were significant differences in policy preference among the SDO (F(2, 465)=3.88, p=.02), authoritarianism (F92,465)=8.83, p=.000), racial resentment (F(2, 482)=5.70, p=.004), and control (F(2, 515)=3.55, p=.03) frames as a function of region. A Tukey HSD pairwise comparison test revealed differenced in four of the five conditions. Among the

SDO, authoritarianism, and racial resentment frame, Southern whites differed from

Northern whites. Among the authoritarianism and control frame, Southern whites differed from whites living in Border states. There is only one significant frame effect among

Northern whites, the racial resentment frame is significantly different from Northern whites from the control base groups of Northern whites (p=.05). In other words, Northern whites’ attitudes towards job threat posed by immigration were decreased by the racial resentment frame in comparison to the control group.

177

Regional Differences in Job Threat, by Frames

2.9 South 2.8 2.7 2.6 Fitted values 2.5

Border 2.4 North

SDO Authoritarianism Moral Trad. Racial Resent. Control Manipulations Figure 4.6. Regional Difference in Job Threat, by Frames

Next, I tested the effects of the predispositional frames on immigration policy preferences by regional subsample with additional control variables. Table 4.7 summarizes the results where significant regional framing effects emerged. Table 4.7,

Column 1 examines whether there are regional differences among the effects of the predispositional frames on favoring police checks. The results indicate slightly significant results only. The SDO frame increases white Northerners preferences to favor police checks. In addition, the moral traditionalism frame has a positive effect on favoring police checks in the Border and Northern states. Table 4.7, Column 2 focuses on predicting preferences over a Dream Act. The SDO and authoritarianism frames were slightly significant in increasing preferences to allow Dreamers to be given a pathway to citizenship. In other words, they decreased restrictive immigration preferences in relation to the Dream Act in Border states. Finally, Table 4.7, Columns 4-5 illustrate the results predicting Job Threat. The SDO frames was slightly significant in decreasing the

178 likelihood that whites in Border and Northern (p < .000) states think that immigration is taking jobs away from those already in the US. The authoritarianism and racial resentment frame significantly decreased the likelihood that whites in Border and

Northern states think that immigration presents a threat to American jobs. As it relates to job threat, the frames affected the outcome variable in the opposite direction, leading respondents in both Border and Northern states to decrease their restrictive thinking. In the South, however, a significant decrease was not present.

Table 4.7. The Role of Frames on Restrictive Immigration Policies, by Region Subsample Police Checks Police Checks Dream Act Job Threat Job Threat Border North Border Border North Racial Resentment 1.879*** 2.233*** 0.402 .776* 2.218*** (0.428) (0.527) (0.398) (0.351) (0.457)

Authoritarianism 0.259 -0.087 0.079 0.232 .917** (0.276) (0.337) (0.261) (0.231) (0.295)

Moral Traditionalism .934* 0.657 0.150 .593+ 0.325 (0.413) (0.529) (0.390) (0.342) (0.454)

Anti-Egalitarianism 0.197 0.524 1.776*** 0.600 -.866+ (0.548) (0.633) (0.493) (0.436) (0.524)

SDO -0.505 -1.680** 0.229 .689+ 1.085* (0.473) (0.540) (0.408) (0.386) (0.469)

Age 0.001 -0.011 0.007 -.013** -.018** (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)

Gender 0.235 -0.360 -0.160 -0.146 0.008 (0.182) (0.222) (0.166) (0.149) (0.186)

Education 0.003 -0.067 -0.065 -0.027 -.100* (0.049) (0.054) (0.046) (0.041) (0.047)

Employment 0.012 0.023 -.087* -0.033 0.033 (0.043) (0.049) (0.041) (0.036) (0.042)

Income 0.047 0.006 -0.078 -.105+ -.171* (0.067) (0.080) (0.062) (0.057) (0.070)

Ideology 0.075 0.167 .181* .165* 0.006 (0.090) (0.109) (0.082) (0.074) (0.096) Individualism .633** .510+ 0.120 -0.028 .414+ (0.226) (0.268) (0.233) (0.200) (0.248)

Table 4.7 Continued 179 Table 4.7 Continued Nativism .487* 0.306 -0.027 .972*** .833*** (0.213) (0.244) (0.191) (0.175) (0.202)

Patriotism 0.284 1.351** -1.390** 0.285 1.806*** (0.446) (0.493) (0.438) (0.393) (0.455)

Job Threat .456*** .457*** .364*** - - (0.098) (0.125) (0.088)

Feeling_Black .013* 0.015 0.001 .010* 0.008 (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)

Feeling_Hispanic -.020** -0.011 -.014** 0.000 0.006 (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)

Feeling_Immigrant .010+ 0.003 0.004 -.012** -.010* (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)

Feeling_White -0.011 0.002 -0.002 -0.008 .012+ (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) Feeling_Citizen .024** -0.001 -0.004 .014* 0.003 (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)

Feeling_Illegal -.018*** -.016*** -.019*** -.018*** -.024*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)

Feeling_Americam -0.008 0.010 0.003 0.002 -0.009 (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) SDO Frame 0.287 .505+ -.414+ -.376+ -.881*** (0.253) (0.297) (0.235) (0.213) (0.261)

Authoritarianism 0.023 0.394 -.406+ -.655** -.682** Frame (0.253) (0.293) (0.238) (0.215) (0.259)

Moral Traditionalism .465+ .471+ -0.089 -0.107 -0.323 Frame (0.255) (0.285) (0.236) (0.214) (0.250)

Racial Resentment 0.285 0.128 -0.265 -.495* -.806** Frame (0.254) (0.282) (0.238) (0.211) (0.254)

Cut Point 1

Constant 2.391*** 2.124** -0.697 -0.910 -0.890 (0.693) (0.759) (0.662) (0.576) (0.656)

Cut Point 2

Constant 4.065*** 4.552*** 0.733 1.174* 1.797** (0.707) (0.781) (0.663) (0.576) (0.666)

Cut Point 3

Constant - - - 2.447*** 3.462*** (0.582) (0.673)

Table 4.7 Continued

180 Table 4.7 Continued Pseudo R2 0.271 0.276 0.191 0.194 0.262 N 821 607 821 821 607 Log Likelihood -576.716 -433.203 -662.469 -907.410 -610.316 Note: + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Discussion

The first examination of this chapter replicated some of the analysis of Chapter 3, including Tables 3.1 and 3.2 (Tables 4.3 and 4.4 in this chapter), in order to compare the data and results. Table 4.4 depicts the correlation among the predispositions, and the results are very similar to the ANES 2012 survey data. Table 4.4 illustrates the predictors of restrictive immigration policy preferences, and although the results are slightly different, racial resentment continues to play a dominant role in predicting immigration policy attitudes. The other predispositions remain significant predicting several of the outcome variables, but there is less of an association in Table 4.4 than using ANES survey data. As illustrated by Table 4.4, Hypotheses 1a and 1b are supported. The predispositions influence attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies, and they vary in significance and strength by immigration policy. In this chapter, I was interested in further examining the role of geographic context. The next two sections both undertake an examination of context as it relates to predispositions, immigration policies, and the predispositional frames of the experiment.

Predispositions, Immigrations Policy, and Geographic Context

First, I tested whether the individual predispositions varied as a function of region; Figure 4.1 displays these results. The Black Belt South differs from the Northern states in every predisposition, and with Border states in all but one (anti-egalitarianism), 181 supporting Hypothesis 1a. The South has the highest level of all predispositions, which is in line with my theory about the influence of Southern sociohistorical political legacies.

I also tested whether the immigration policy outcomes varied as a function of geographic context. Figure 4.2 shows the means for each immigration policy preferences by region, the higher the mean, the more restrictive immigration policy preferences. The

South has the highest mean for each of the immigration outcome variables, and the means for the Northern and Border states vary. For all policy outcomes, with the exception of police checks and immigration levels, the North surpasses the means of the Border region.

At its face, geographic context significantly influences both predispositions and immigration policy preferences. However, does geographic context influence immigration policy preferences with added control variables? Table 4.5 shows the results of an ordered logit analysis with the inclusion of regional dummy variables. According to

Table 4.5, the is a significant difference between Northern states and Border states in relation to immigration levels, immigration policies, and dream act preferences. It appears the North prefers more restrictive legal immigration levels, immigration policy-, and dream act preferences in comparison to Border states. Finally, the South differs significantly from Border states by preferring more restrictive levels of legal immigration.

The Southern results are not surprising. However, at first glance it does not make sense why Northern states prefer slightly more restrictive policies than the Border states. In reality, these results show preliminary support for Hypothesis 4c, stating that Northern states will prefer more restrictive immigration policies due to the fact that they are the most malleable states, given the lack of Black, Latino, and immigrant populations in these three states. It may be the case that the predispositional frames influence Northern

182 states more so than any other region, because the frames made race salient in a way that race is already salient for the other two regions (see Weber et al. 2014). However, Figures

4.3-4.6 illustrate that the racial resentment frame actually decreased Northern whites’ propensity to support restrictive immigration policies, at least in relation to the control baseline group. The following section examines whether the experimental manipulations influenced the individual predisposition, and immigration policy preferences.48

Predispositions in the Media: Immigration Framing

I first tested, using a one-way ANOVA, whether the predispositional frames affected their accompanying predisposition. In general, the frames did not have any highly significant effect on the predispositions. The moral traditionalism frame did positively affect the moral traditionalism predisposition at p-value .06. In other words, the frame is associated with higher levels of moral traditionalism, or re-emphasized the predisposition in some individuals. According to Chong and Druckman, frames that coincide with one’s existing predispositions are more likely to be successful than frames that contradict these predispositions (2007). The frames, in this case, influenced the policy position and not the predisposition. One explanation may be that the frames did not affect the predispositions because the framing of was too strong and explicit.

According to the racial priming literature (Mendelberg 2001, 2008a, 2008b), racial priming works best when it is implicit, because there is less social desirability to answer

“politically correct.” In other words, if the frames would have been less explicit, the frames may have affected their accompanying predisposition. In this case, respondents

48 I also tested whether the interaction between the predispositions and region affected immigration policy preferences, and they did not. 183 reacted quite strongly in relation the immigration story. For example, one respondent sent an email after completing the survey stating that “The article you provided is an excellent example of reducing complicated issues to slogans…” This is exemplary of the explicitness of the predispositional frames used in the immigration story, and how strongly some of the respondents reacted. Ultimately, Hypothesis 3 was not supported by the data.

Next, I examined whether predispositional frames affected immigration policy preferences, through a series of one-way ANOVAs.49 The frames significantly influenced attitudes towards immigration posing a job threat in America, however this result was led by Northern whites. The racial resentment frame decreased the likelihood that respondents thought immigration takes jobs away from people already in the US as compared to the control frame, which can be seen in Figure 4.6. In fact in Figures 4.3-4.6, the racial resentment frame decreased Northern whites’ restrictive immigration attitudes, although not all of the policy differences were significant. It may be the case that the racial resentment frame was particularly strong for Northern whites, who felt the pressure of egalitarian norms.

Table 4.6 tells us whether the predispositional frames influenced immigration policy preferences with the addition of control variables. The moral traditionalism frame significantly increased the likelihood that white Americans favor police checks. The racial resentment frame increased the likelihood that white Americans decrease legal levels of immigration. Surprisingly, with the addition of control variables, all of the frames decreased the likelihood that white Americans think it is very likely that

49 I also tested whether there were significant interactions between the frames and the predipositions (as per H3a), but there were no significant interactions. 184 immigration stakes jobs from people already here, which is similar to the results of the

ANOVA. It seems that with the addition of other immigration-related variables, including the predispositions, that the frames loose their significance, and lower harsher immigration attitudes vis-à-vis immigration as posing a job threat in America.

Finally, in order to examine Hypotheses 4a-c, I analyzed whether the influence of the frames varied as a function of region, and consequently affected immigration policy preferences, as shown in Figures 4.3-4.6.50 The results partially support H4a-c. First, H4a hypothesized that the predispositional frames will be associated with Southern support for restrictive immigration policies. This was supported by the data, with the addition of control variables. The South did, in fact, have higher tendencies for restrictive immigration policies as a result of some of the frames depending on the immigration policy. However, preliminary results indicate the frames having a stronger influence on

Northern whites, than any other region. There were also not significant interaction between region and frame, only main effects and regional effects. Further analysis and data is needed to adequate disentangle how the predispositional frames may or may not have significant regional differences.

Limitations

One of the most important limitations to this study was the explicit nature of the predispositional frames within the immigration story manipulated. The frames appeared to be too strong and too explicit to have had real effects on respondents. Due to the explicit nature of the frames, respondents felt a social desirability to disagree with the

50 I also tested this with control variables using ordered logit analysis, but none of the interaction between the frame and regions were significant with the inclusion of control variables. 185 articles or to have a heightened awareness of their own predispositions. In fact, one of the reasons why there might have been social desirability as it relates to the frames is because respondents’ predispositions were not actually lower. Hence, it is not the case that this particular sample of white Americans had lower levels of racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and SDO, but that the frames were too explicit and it was not socially desirable to agree with the opinion of the immigration articles.

Further work on this project should make the frames more implicit and examine whether it makes a difference.

Conclusion

Although individual predispositions are strongly predictive of restrictive immigration attitudes, the predispositional frames did not have an influence on individual predispositions or restrictive immigration policy attitudes as strongly. Even though there were cases where the frames exhibited significance in relation to attitudes towards immigration policies, it was in fact not immigration policy attitudes that were most affected by the manipulations. Ultimately, this chapter re-iterated the findings of the previous chapter and emphasized that white Americans hold restrictive immigration policies, and that the South is significantly different than other regions of the United

States. However, the chapter leaves more questions unanswered than answered questions.

For example, what is the root of white Americans’ attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies? How does it relate to how white Americans feel about Other groups? And finally, what is the relationship between restrictive immigration policy attitudes and the different kinds of resentments towards out-groups to how white

Americans see themselves and their perceptions of what is to be “American?” The 186 following chapter examines these questions using the same experimental data the current chapter uses.

187 Chapter 5: The Moral Geography of Whiteness How Immigration Threatens to the ‘Possessive Investment in Whiteness’

“The language of geography is often indistinguishable from the language of race and ethnicity. ‘European’, ‘Asian’, ‘Caribbean’, ‘Irish’: such labels, like innumerable others, are both geographical and ethnic designations. This dual identity explains, in part, why geography is…intimately involved in debates on the causes and consequences of racism and ethnic discrimination” ~ Alastair Bonnett (2005: 109).

Introduction: Geography, Race, and Immigration

Identity is a significant part of moral geographies. America is exemplary of the idea that geography cannot be distinguished from the language of race and ethnicity.

From its onset, Anglo-European settlers forced Native Americans out of their own land and reclaimed it as their own, connecting the land to their identity. Similarly, the system of chattel slavery deemed Blacks as closer to “nature,” and thus better “fit” to tend to the fertile land. The concept that one race was a better “fit” to a life of involuntary servitude and another was fit to benefit economically is, of course, a racialized geographical conception. Race/ethnicity/identity, then, have always been, and continue to be, tied to geography, to land, in one way or another. In similar fashion, the American “urban crisis,” is another example of how race and space have become indistinguishable. The Great

Migration of over 6 million Black Americans—driven from their homes by Southern Jim

Crow laws and racism to newly Northern industrial opportunities Post-WWI—from the rural South to Northern cities led whites to flee the cities into suburban homes. The federal government by way of the Federal Housing Administration, along with a series of

188 New Deal and Urban Renewal programs, institutionalized the indistinguishableness of race and space.

Thus, when one mentions neighborhoods, such as Harlem, Spanish Harlem, and

Washington Heights, those familiar with New York City can quickly name Blacks,

Puerto Ricans, and Dominicans, as the respective communities residing in those neighborhoods, further emphasizing the interlaced relationships between race/ethnicity and geography. According to Martin,

Spatiality is widely recognised as a key dimension in the formation of social identities: identities are understood to be generated in relation to specific places, both territorial and social (Keith and Pile 1993; Carter et al. 1993). National or regional identity, for instance, involves subjects’ perception of the importance of territorial location and history in the formation of elements that make up their common identity (2005: 98).

Similarly, during the flux of different racial and ethnic communities, namely Black

Americans moving into cities and whites moving into the suburbs, cities became synonymous with communities of color, poverty, and crime, and suburbs became synonymous with the white middle-class and “safe” neighborhoods. Thus, not only are specific spaces related to specific social identities, these spaces are also relegated value and power, or lack thereof.

However, it is the “bad” neighborhoods and cities that are more often in the news and the object of federal policies, rather than the suburbs. This is the case because majority white suburbs are the normative geographies, the “natural” kind. Bonnett makes that argument that,

[I]t is precisely this ability to appear natural that establishes whiteness as a significant concept within cultural geography. More specifically, it is the

189 way that white identity has (a) been used to construct normative geographies and (b) acted to naturalise modernity, in different ways in different societies around the world, that demands our attention (Bonnett 2005: 109).

Whiteness, in America, has constructed normative geographies. And for a long time these normative spaces were free of non-normative people. According to Bonnett, “it is only when ‘white places’ and ‘non-white places’ come into contact that the former become visible, the reality of white space becoming legible against a darker background”

(Bonnett 2005: 111). Moreover, it is when these whites spaces become visible, when non- white Others move into predominantly and historically white neighborhoods, that we see a “possessive investment in whiteness” (Lipsitz 1998).

Immigration, more broadly, serves as a key example of when we have witnessed the visibility of white spaces. In fact, according to Lipsitz, “The long history of the possessive investment in whiteness stems in no small measure from the fact that all subsequent immigrants to North American have come to an already racialized society”

(Lipsitz 1998: 2). In other words, all ethnic immigrant groups immigrating to America have been examples of the visibility of whiteness. However, as ethnic whites became, well, just whites, these white spaces became invisible again. More recently, the growth of immigrant populations in many non-traditional states and cities, many of which are in the

South, gave rise to the visibility of many Southern neighborhoods, with almost exclusively white residents (e.g. Arab and Albertville, AL). Thus, leading whites to a

“moral panic,” the realization that their natural and normative white spaces where no longer invisible, which, I argue, led to a series of immigration laws across the South and other parts of the country with the sole purpose of driving non-white immigrants out of

190 their neighborhoods and their state; in hopes that “normality” will once again be reinstituted.

In previous chapters, we have seen the role geographic context plays in influencing support for restrictive immigration policies. This chapter examines how immigration threatens the possessive investment in whiteness, by way of examining the relationship between identity and geography. I use original experimental data to examine the ways in which the core predispositions are interrelated with geography, and white

Americans’ feelings towards out-groups and their own in-groups, and ultimately how it relates to immigration policy preferences. The findings of this chapter indicate that immigration stimulates in-group bias for white Americans, and leads white Americans to be concerned about the maintenance of whiteness.

Data

The experimental data used in the previous chapter are also used in this chapter.

As discussed briefly in Chapter 4, the experimental survey asked respondents how warm or cold they feel towards a number of different groups. In this chapter, these questions become the main dependent variables. In particular, I use how whites feel towards four out-groups, Black Americans, Hispanics/Latinos, immigrants, and undocumented immigrants, and three in-groups, whites, citizens, and Americans. The feeling thermometers asked respondents to choose a number from 0-100 that indicates how they feeling towards a particular group, where 0 is cold, 50 is neutral, and 100 is warm. The higher the number the warmer respondents feel about a particular group.

In addition to feeling thermometers, this chapter uses four types of resentment as the independent variables, whereas the previous chapter only used racial resentment. The 191 experimental survey asked respondents the racial resentment 4-item questionnaire, however, I changed the target group from “Blacks” to 1) “immigrants,” 2) “illegal immigrants,” and 3) “Hispanics/Latinos,” all of which can be found in Appendix E. In addition, the measurement order of the four scales was randomized.

Results

The following section examines the ways in which geography, group affect, and group identification are related to each other, and what it means vis-à-vis immigration attitudes. First, I examine the predictors of higher levels of the core predispositions among white Americans. I also investigate whether there are significant regional differences in what predicts high levels of the core predispositions. As previous chapters have made evident, predispositions play a prominent role in influencing support for restrictive immigration attitudes. Additionally, we know that these predispositions vary as a function of geographic context. Thus, this first analysis furthers this investigation by tying together not only who is most susceptible to higher levels of these predispositions, but also where they live within the United States. Second, as a way to examine the relationship between group affect and group identity and the predispositions, I first look at the correlations between the feeling thermometers, and then look at what predicts warmer feelings towards different political groups. I, then, examine the regional variation in the predictors of warmer feeling towards groups. Finally, I examine the predictors and regional variation of whites’ feelings towards other whites and Americans, both of which

I argue are proxy measures for group identity (Wilson Forthcoming). According to

Turner, group belongingness is more about “Who I am?” rather than “Do I like these individuals?” (1982) and given that white Americans are both white and Americans, 192 these group thermometers are a proxy for group identification. Moreover, some research shows the association between whiteness and American (Cheryan and Monin 2005;

Devos and Banaji 2005), lending some evidence that whites see themselves when they think of Americans.

Psychological Predisposition, Geography, and Identity

In the previous chapter, the psychological predispositions varied as a function of geographic context. In order to understand the relationship between the predispositions, geography, and race the question of who is most susceptible to higher levels of SDO, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, racial resentment, and anti-egalitarianism and where these individuals live sheds light on why geographic context matters. Furthermore, it sheds light on why the South maintains its distinctiveness as a region with the highest levels of these particular predispositions, and also the highest levels of restrictive immigration policy preferences.

Through a series of regression analyses, I examined the demographics that affect higher levels of the four aforementioned predispositions in these experimental data, as shown in Table 5.1 below. As a reminder, all of the predispositions are scaled 0-1, which explains the smaller coefficients. First, higher levels of SDO can be found generally in men, younger individuals, less educated individuals, conservatives and in the South (as compared to both Border and Northern states). Higher levels of authoritarianism can be found in older less educated individuals, conservatives, and in both Border and Southern states (as compared to Northern states). Moral traditionalism is more common amongst older, less educated, conservative, and Southern individuals. Finally, racial resentment

193 shares similar characteristics and is generally more susceptible in older, less educated, conservatives, and in both Border and Southern states.

Table 5.1. What Predicts Core Predispositions Racial Moral Less Equal SDO Authoritarianism Too Far Resentment Traditionalism Treatment Age .002*** -.002*** .001+ .003*** .001* 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

Gender 0.001 -.060*** 0.011 0.015 -.043*** -.024* (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)

Education -.022*** -.020*** -.031*** -.011*** -.013*** 0.002 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)

Income .011** 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 .010* .021*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)

Ideology .089*** .025*** .073*** .115*** .100*** .098*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)

Knowledge -0.001 -0.011 -0.018 -0.001 -0.013 -0.012 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)

Border .052*** 0.015 .041* 0.003 .027* 0.000 (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)

South .105*** .036** .083*** .025* .031* -0.004 (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)

Constant .291*** .341*** .409*** .109*** .133*** -.047+ (0.027) (0.025) (0.036) (0.024) (0.028) (0.027)

R-Squared 0.265 0.082 0.134 0.372 0.240 0.249 N 2428 2428 2428 2428 2428 2428 Note: + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Geography and Intergroup and Intragroup Identity

In order to first analyze the relationship between white Americans’ feelings towards different groups, Table 5.2 depicts these correlations. It is important to note the significant correlations between certain groups. First, feelings towards Blacks are significantly correlated with all of the other groups. There is a high and positive 194 correlation between those who feel warm towards Blacks also feel warm towards

Hispanics, which may imply that these two groups are not entirely distinct in the minds of white Americans. In fact, the correlation between feelings towards Blacks and feelings towards Hispanics is not only the highest correlation between feelings towards Blacks and any other group, but it is the highest correlation across all groups. Although feelings towards Blacks and the rest of the groups are all significant, the lowest correlations are with feelings towards unauthorized immigrants, citizens, and Americans.

Second, feelings towards Hispanics are also significantly correlated with all other groups. Most importantly in Column 2, is the high correlation between feeling towards

Hispanics and feelings towards immigrants and the low correlation between feeling towards Hispanics and feeling towards Americans. In the third column, feelings towards immigrants and feeling towards undocumented immigrants has the highest correlation, similar to how white Americans feel about Blacks and Hispanics, the correlation between feelings towards immigrants and feelings towards Americans has the lowest coefficient

(along with feelings towards citizens, followed by feelings towards whites). The lowest correlation coefficient amongst all groups is between feeling towards undocumented immigrants and feelings towards whites; there is not a strong relationship between the two. Finally, there are strong relationships between how white Americans feel about those in their own racial/ethnic group, citizens, and Americans. The second highest correlation exists between feelings towards citizens and feelings towards Americans.

There is also a high correlation between feelings towards citizens (mean= 84.82) and feelings towards Americans (mean= 85.28); in fact, a difference of means test indicates no significant difference between the two, t(4854.94) = .82, p = 0.41.

195

Table 5.2. Correlations Between Group Feeling Thermometers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Feeling_Blacks (1)

Feeling_Hispanics (2) 0.803

Feeling_Immigrants (3) 0.629 0.7103

Feeling_Illegal Immigrants (4) 0.3926 0.4484 0.5663

Feeling_Whites (5) 0.4409 0.3955 0.2443 0.1239

Feeling_Citizens (6) 0.3926 0.3401 0.204 0.0194 0.7546

Feeling_Americans (7) 0.3502 0.3046 0.1834 0.0277 0.6527 0.7922

Data: Original Experimental Survey, 2015 Note: Bolded p < .000

Regional Differences

In order to test whether there are significant regional variations among white

Americans’ feeling towards groups, Figure 5.2 and 5.3 first looks at the whether the feeling thermometers vary by region without controlling for demographics and other immigration-related variables. Figure 5.2 depicts how white Americans’ feel towards out- groups, including Blacks, Hispanics, Immigrants, and “Illegal” immigrants. I tested whether these differences were significant through a series of one-way ANOVAs. A

Tukey post-hoc test revealed that there is a significant difference between how white

Americans feel about Black Americans in the North in comparison to the South (5.45 ±

1.34, p=.000). There is also a difference between the Border and Southern regions at the

90 percent significance level (2.63 ± 1.23, p=.08). In both instances, Northern and Border states had higher means than the South, which means these regions feel more warmly towards Black Americans in comparison to the South. Similarly, whites in Border (4.91 ±

1.25, p=.000) and Northern (7.18 ± 1.37, p=.000) states differed from white Southerners in how warmly they feel towards Hispanics/Latinos. Northern (5.93 ± 1.55, p=.000) and

196 Border (5.21 ± 1.42, p=.001) states also feel significantly more warmly than Southern whites do towards immigrants. Finally, as it relates to out-groups, whites in Border states feel significantly more warmly towards “illegal” immigrants than whites in the South

(3.60 ± 1.47, p=.04). This is also the case for Northern states in comparison to Southern states at the 90 percent significance level (3.51 ± 1.61, p=.08).

Figure 5.2. Out-Group Feeling Thermometer, by Region

Figure 5.3 depicts regional differences in how white Americans’ feel towards in- groups, including other whites, citizens, and Americans. The only significant differences were among whites’ feeling towards Americans, however, given the ceiling effects it is virtually impossible to find any significant differences. Whites in both Border (-2.09

± .909, p=.06) and Northern states (-2.50 ± .994, p=.03) differed from Southern whites in terms of how warmly they feel towards Americans. In both instances, Border and

Northern whites actually felt more coldly towards Americans than whites in the South. In

197 other words, Southern whites had significantly higher means than both Northern and

Border whites, and felt significantly more warmly towards Americans.

Figure 5.3. In-Group Feeling Thermometer, by Region

Are White Americans Differentiating Between Groups?

In many cases, there is a correlation between how white Americans’ feel towards one group and how they feel towards another group. I was interested in examining to what extent are white Americans’ differentiating between different groups, both in- and out-groups. Figure 5.4-5.7 show the results of the mean difference between different groups, by region; the higher the absolute number, the higher the difference between the two groups. For the purposes of this chapter and section, I chose to look at the mean differences between undocumented immigrants, Latinos, immigrants, and Americans in comparison to all of the other groups. In Figure 5.4, we see that feelings towards most groups are being differentiated from “illegal” immigrants. The group that white

Americans differentiate the least is immigrants. As it relates to regional differences,

198 Southern whites differentiate “illegal” immigrants from whites, Americans, and citizens at a higher level than whites in the North and Border states.

Difference Between "Illegal Immigrant" and Other Groups, by Region 60

50

40 South 30 Border 20 North

10

0 Black Hispanic Immigrant White American Citizen Figure 5.4. Mean Difference of “Illegal Immigrant”

Figure 5.5 depicts the mean differences between Hispanics/Latinos from other groups. The starkest finding is the lack of differentiation between Latinos and Blacks in all of the regions, although the South has a slightly higher differentiation mean than both

Northern and Border states. Hispanics are being differentiated from “illegal” immigrants the most, with whites in the North surpassing whites in Southern and Border states.

Southern white are differentiating Latinos with whites, Americans, and citizens at a higher level than whites in living in Northern and Border states.

199 Difference Between "Hispanics/Latinos" and Other Groups, by Region

40 35 30 25 South 20 Border 15 10 North 5 0 Black Immigrant "Illegal" White American Citizen Immigrant

Figure 5.5. Mean Difference of “Hispanics/Latinos”

In Figure 5.6, Black Americans and Hispanics are not being differentiated from immigrants in comparison to the other groups. Immigrants are being differentiated from

“illegal” immigrants in all regions. In a similar fashion, Southern whites differentiate immigrants from whites, Americans, and citizens at higher levels than whites living in

Northern and Border states.

Difference Between "Immigrants" and Other Groups, by Region

40 35 30 25 South

20 Border 15 North 10 5 Black Hispanic "Illegal" White American Citizen Immigrant

Figure 5.6. Mean Difference of “Immigrants”

200

Finally, Figure 5.7 highlights the differentiation between Americans and other groups. The starkest differentiation white Americans are making is between Americans and “illegal” immigrant. Then, whites are differentiating between Americans and immigrants, Hispanics and Blacks, in that order. Southern whites are differentiating between Americans and the four aforementioned groups at the highest level. Americans, whites, and citizens are hardly being differentiated between each other.

Difference Between "Americans" and Other Groups, by Region

60

50

40 South 30 Border 20 North 10

0 Black Hispanic Immigrant "Illegal" White Citizen Immigrant

Figure 5.7. Mean Difference of “Americans”

Predicting Feeling Towards Groups?

In order to examine out what influences white Americans’ warmer feeling towards all out-groups and in-groups, I ran OLS regression models controlling for demographics and immigration-related factors. Table 5.3 shows the predictors of feelings towards out-groups, whereas Table 5.4 shows what predicts feeling towards in-groups.51

51 Because the resentment scales and feeling thermometers are correlated with each other, some more than others, I worried about collinearity issues. However, after performing the regression, I used the vif stata command to test whether collinearity was, indeed, an issue. A large Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 201 In both Tables, I also included regional dummy variables. Table 5.3, Column 1 shows what influences whites’ feelings towards Black Americans. Not surprisingly, racial resentment is the most dominant predictor of feeling cold towards Blacks. In other words, higher levels of racial resentment decreases whites’ warm feelings towards Blacks.

Higher levels of resentment towards Hispanics increase whites’ warm feelings towards

Blacks. Higher levels of SDO decrease whites’ warm feelings towards Blacks. Feeling that immigration is taking jobs from those already here increases warm feelings towards

Blacks. Finally, feeling warmly towards Hispanics, immigrants, other whites, and citizens increases the likelihood of feeling warmly towards Blacks.

Table 5.3, Column 2 highlights the factors that predict white Americans’ feelings towards Hispanics. First, there is a strong and positive correlation between racial resentment and feelings towards Hispanics. Higher levels of racial resentment among whites increase warm feelings towards Hispanics, indicating a distinction between the racial resentment they feel towards Black Americans and how cold or warm they feel towards Hispanics. However, resentment towards Hispanics decreases warm feeling towards Hispanics, in much the same way that racial resentment decreases warm feelings towards Blacks. Higher levels of SDO has the same effect as well, it decreases warm feelings towards Hispanics. Warmer feelings towards Blacks, immigrants, whites and

“illegal” immigrants also increase warmer feelings towards Hispanics. Finally, white

Southerners feel less warmly towards Hispanics than do whites living in Border states.

indicates collinearity, a individual vif greater than 10 should be inspected, and an average vif grater than 6 is problematic. Both Table 5.4 and 5.5 resulted in no individual vif’s greater than 10 are the mean vif for Model 1 is 2.27, 2.25 for Model 2, 2.32 for Model 3, and 2.35 for Model 4, 2.24 for Model 5, 2.28 for Model 6, and 2.31 for Model 7. 202 Table 5.3, Column 3 highlights the predictors of feelings towards immigrants.

Similarly to the previous model, resentment towards Hispanics increases warm feelings towards immigrants, but resentment towards immigrants decreases warm feelings towards immigrants. Higher levels of authoritarianism, SDO, and nativism decrease warm feelings towards immigrants. Higher levels of education and patriotism increase warmer feelings towards immigrants. Those who think that immigration takes away jobs from people already in the US feel less warmly towards immigrants. Finally, those who feel warmly towards Blacks, Hispanics, and “illegal” immigrants also feel warmer towards immigrants.

Finally, Table 5.3, Column 4 illustrates what influences feelings towards “illegal” immigrants. First, resentment towards Hispanics and towards immigrants decrease warmer feelings towards undocumented immigrants. Higher levels of SDO increase warmer feelings towards undocumented immigrants. Those self-identifying as strong to weak conservatives are less likely to feel warmly towards undocumented immigrants.

Higher levels of nativism and patriotism decrease warm feelings towards undocumented immigrants. Those who think that immigration takes away jobs from people already in the US feel less warmly towards undocumented immigrants. Those who feel warmly towards Hispanics, immigrants, and whites are also more likely to feel warmly towards undocumented immigrants. Those who feel warmly towards citizens are less likely to feel warmly towards undocumented immigrants. Finally, Northerners are less likely to feel warmly towards undocumented immigrants compared to Border states.

203

Table 5.3. Predicting Cold/Warm Feelings Towards Out-Groups Blacks Hispanics Immigrants Illegal Imm. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Racial Resentment -18.787*** 11.282*** -2.919 6.431+ (2.192) (2.138) (2.828) (3.321)

Resentment_Illegal 4.087+ -3.022 2.870 -4.541 (2.326) (2.248) (2.958) (3.476)

Resentment_Hisp 7.751** -12.430*** 11.060** -12.146** (2.756) (2.656) (3.503) (4.117)

Resentment_Immigrant 2.771 2.483 -8.321* -22.680*** (2.703) (2.611) (3.432) (4.011)

Authoritarianism 0.806 -0.693 -3.942** 2.616+ (1.049) (1.014) (1.332) (1.567)

Moral Traditionalism 0.840 1.788 -0.455 -3.554 (1.603) (1.548) (2.038) (2.393)

Egalitarianism -3.311+ -1.758 5.619* -3.596 (1.841) (1.779) (2.339) (2.751)

SDO -5.164** -5.394*** -11.010*** 7.565** (1.649) (1.593) (2.089) (2.464)

Age -0.026 0.014 -0.034 0.038 (0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.034)

Gender 3.568*** -1.398* -1.873* 1.361 (0.667) (0.647) (0.851) (1.001)

Education 0.002 -0.139 .585** -0.239 (0.174) (0.168) (0.221) (0.260)

Employ 0.158 -.270+ .350+ -0.357 (0.156) (0.151) (0.198) (0.233)

Income 0.229 -0.339 -0.003 -0.210 (0.251) (0.242) (0.319) (0.375)

Ideology -0.014 0.002 .800+ -1.829*** (0.327) (0.316) (0.416) (0.488)

Nativism 1.230 -0.369 -7.854*** -2.743* (0.771) (0.745) (0.967) (1.151)

Individualism -0.419 1.681+ 1.901+ -2.454+ (0.894) (0.863) (1.136) (1.334)

Patriotism 0.294 -0.541 4.526* -7.156** (1.704) (1.646) (2.164) (2.541)

Jobs 1.035** -0.430 -1.497** -5.237*** (0.365) (0.354) (0.464) (0.536)

Table 5.3 Continued

204 Table 5.3 Continued Feeling_Black - .567*** .171*** 0.034 (0.016) (0.026) (0.030)

Feeling_Hispanic .607*** - .458*** .063* (0.017) (0.025) (0.032)

Feeling_Immigrant .106*** .265*** - .343*** (0.016) (0.015) (0.023)

Feeling_White .122*** .095*** -0.018 .155*** (0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.035)

Feeling_Citizen .065* 0.010 0.047 -.211*** (0.030) (0.029) (0.038) (0.045)

Feeling_Illegal 0.015 .026* .248*** - (0.014) (0.013) (0.017)

Feeling_Americam 0.034 0.010 -0.016 0.048 (0.026) (0.025) (0.033) (0.039)

North 0.285 0.326 -0.157 -2.613* (0.790) (0.763) (1.004) (1.179)

South 0.996 -2.229** 0.261 1.990+ (0.705) (0.679) (0.896) (1.052)

Constant 1.618 9.999*** 6.218+ 60.056*** (2.573) (2.477) (3.268) (3.643)

Adj.R2 0.692 0.726 0.626 0.522 N 2428 2428 2428 2428 Note: + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 5.4, highlights the factors that influence how warmly whites feeling towards in-groups. In Column 1, Model 5, not surprisingly, feeling warmly towards undocumented immigrants decreases warm feelings towards citizens. Feeling warmly towards Black increases warm feelings towards citizens, but the coefficient is very small.

Finally, feeling warmly towards Americans and whites increases warm feelings towards citizens. Column 2, Model 6 highlights the predictors of whites’ feelings towards

Americans. First, higher levels of SDO decrease warm feelings towards Americans.

Higher levels of education also decrease warm feelings towards Americans. High levels

205 of patriotism and warm feelings towards citizens and whites increase warm feelings towards Americans. Finally, Column 3, Model 7 looks at the predictors of warm feelings towards other whites. First, high levels of authoritarianism and SDO increase white

Americans’ warm feelings towards whites. Higher levels of education also increase warm feelings towards whites. Higher levels of individualism decrease warm feelings towards whites. Warm feelings towards undocumented immigrants, Blacks, Hispanics, citizens, and Americans increase warm feelings towards whites. Finally, whites in the North feel more warmly towards whites in general, compared to whites living in the Border states.

Table 5.4. Predicting Cold/Warm Feelings Towards In-Groups Feeling_Citizen Feeling_American Feeling_White Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Racial Resentment -1.324 1.905 2.764 (1.515) (1.727) (1.938)

Resentment_Illegal 1.586 -2.138 -0.727 (1.585) (1.806) (2.028)

Resentment_Hisp 0.459 0.195 -0.089 (1.880) (2.143) (2.406)

Resentment_Immigrant -1.292 2.005 1.278 (1.841) (2.098) (2.355)

Authoritarianism -0.548 0.058 2.637** (0.715) (0.815) (0.913)

Moral Traditionalism 1.870+ -2.156+ -2.375+ (1.091) (1.244) (1.396)

Egalitarianism -1.329 -0.250 -2.009 (1.254) (1.430) (1.604)

SDO -0.492 -3.579** 11.191*** (1.125) (1.281) (1.422)

Age -.032* .037* -0.008 (0.015) (0.017) (0.020)

Gender -0.057 -0.214 0.832 (0.457) (0.520) (0.584)

Education -0.056 -.381** .317* (0.119) (0.135) (0.152)

Table 5.4 Continued 206 Table 5.4 Continued Employ -0.083 0.180 -0.132 (0.106) (0.121) (0.136)

Income 0.202 0.140 0.311 (0.171) (0.195) (0.218)

Ideology -0.124 0.096 0.032 (0.223) (0.254) (0.285)

Nativism -0.261 0.311 1.312+ (0.525) (0.599) (0.671)

Individualism 1.039+ -0.984 -1.538* (0.608) (0.694) (0.778)

Patriotism -0.220 13.970*** -0.258 (1.160) (1.292) (1.485)

Jobs 0.406 -0.213 .590+ (0.249) (0.284) (0.319)

Feeling_Illegal -.044*** 0.013 .053*** (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)

Feeling_Hispanic 0.005 0.006 .077*** (0.014) (0.016) (0.018)

Feeling_Black .030* 0.020 .093*** (0.014) (0.016) (0.018)

Feeling_Citizen - .655*** .608*** (0.019) (0.023)

Feeling_Immigrant 0.013 -0.006 -0.008 (0.011) (0.012) (0.014)

Feeling_Americam .504*** - .139*** (0.015) (0.023)

Feeling_White .372*** .111*** - (0.014) (0.018)

North -0.864 0.025 1.508* (0.538) (0.613) (0.688)

South -0.478 0.812 0.586 (0.480) (0.547) (0.614)

Constant 11.256*** 7.929*** -5.985** (1.737) (1.991) (2.238)

Adj.R2 0.731 0.661 0.623 N 2428 2428 2428 Note: + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

207 Regional Variation in Whiteness

Certain predispositions increase warmer feelings towards whites. In Table 5.5 and

5.6 below, I analyze whether there are regional differences in whites’ feelings towards other whites and Americans, respectively. In Table 5.5, in bold are the findings I find important to note. In the South, resentment towards “illegal” immigrants is only significant in the South, indicating that Southern whites with higher levels of resentment towards “illegal” immigrants are also more likely to feel warmer towards whites, but also indicating that Southern whites are differentiating between norm violations among Blacks and undocumented immigrants. Higher levels of authoritarianism increase warmer feelings towards whites in both Border and Northern states. In all regions, high levels of

SDO increase warm feelings towards whites. Higher levels of education increase warm feelings towards whites only in the South. Similarly, a higher income and nativist beliefs increase warm feelings towards whites only for whites in the Northern states. Higher levels of individualism actually decrease warm feelings towards whites in the South.

Finally, Southern whites, and to a lesser extent Northern whites, who think that immigration is taking away jobs form those already in America have warmer feelings towards whites.

208 Table 5.5. Predicting Warm Feelings Towards Whites, by Region South Border North

Racial Resentment 1.902 2.782 4.378 (3.077) (3.296) (3.959)

Resentment Illegal Immigrants 6.520* -5.340 -6.448 (3.188) (3.557) (3.981)

Resentment Hispanics -2.021 5.400 -3.669 (3.752) (4.277) (4.733)

Resentment Immigrants -2.569 2.036 6.189 (3.833) (3.981) (4.678)

Authoritarianism 1.514 2.788+ 3.823* (1.457) (1.531) (1.843)

Moral Traditionalism -0.867 -2.351 -4.605 (2.349) (2.275) (2.822)

Anti-Egalitarianism -0.437 -0.972 -5.599+ (2.478) (2.872) (3.219)

SDO 9.827*** 11.659*** 12.181*** (2.201) (2.489) (2.905)

Age 0.021 -0.026 -0.053 (0.031) (0.034) (0.040)

Gender 0.692 0.864 1.320 (0.932) (0.986) (1.195)

Education .716** 0.248 -0.095 (0.239) (0.270) (0.293)

Employment -.465 0.228 -0.073 (0.214) (0.237) (0.267)

Income -0.331 0.034 1.673*** (0.345) (0.373) (0.444)

Ideology 0.146 -0.030 -0.278 (0.453) (0.482) (0.601)

Nativism 0.848 0.700 3.114* (1.048) (1.189) (1.315)

Individualism -3.514** -0.798 0.306 (1.228) (1.334) (1.580)

Patriotism -1.752 0.787 -1.196 (2.446) (2.582) (2.852)

Job Threat 1.440** -0.655 1.194+ (0.505) (0.528) (0.679)

Feeling_Immigrant -0.005 -0.029 0.013 (0.022) (0.025) (0.027)

Table 5.5 Continued 209 Table 5.5. Continued Feeling_Black .085*** .095** .097* (0.026) (0.030) (0.045)

Feeling_American .124** .132*** .151** (0.038) (0.037) (0.046)

Feeling_Citizen .649*** .591*** .567*** (0.038) (0.039) (0.045)

Feeling_Hispanic .064* .116*** 0.056 (0.027) (0.032) (0.046)

Feeling_Illegal .056** .051* .048* (0.019) (0.020) (0.024)

Constant -5.844 -3.960 -3.378 (3.535) (3.884) (4.254)

R2 0.620 0.629 0.670 N 1000 821 607 Note: + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

The most important finding of Table 5.6 is Southern whites’ propensity to correlate feeling warmly towards Americans with feeling warmly towards whites, a correlation only existing in the South.

Table 5.6. Predicting Warm Feelings Towards Americans, by Region South Border North

Racial Resentment 3.891 1.715 5.145 (3.669) (4.763) (4.262)

Resentment Illegal Immigrants 2.801 7.224 -8.181799+ (3.693) (5.112) (4.562)

Resentment Hispanics -0.205 -4.470 -4.713 (4.434) (6.049) (4.895)

Resentment Immigrants -2.658 0.926 6.789 (4.506) (5.449) (4.930)

Authoritarianism 1.699 -2.772 0.781 (1.792) (2.165) (2.035)

Moral Traditionalism -1.182 -0.303 -1.156 (2.736) (3.145) (3.129)

Table 5.6 Continued

210 Table 5.6 Continued Anti-Egalitarianism 0.514 -1.301 -1.632 (2.839) (3.904) (3.388)

SDO -4.891+ -2.509 -8.993** (2.608) (3.495) (3.273)

Age .098* 0.007 -0.067 (0.038) (0.049) (0.046)

Gender 0.870 -0.231 -3.086* (1.068) (1.387) (1.282)

Education 0.023 -.694+ -0.354 (0.295) (0.382) (0.319)

Employment -0.045 -0.234 1.161 (0.725) (0.955) (0.943)

Income -0.640 0.001 0.258 (0.433) (0.559) (0.562)

Ideology 0.174 0.163 -0.021 (0.550) (0.673) (0.654)

Nativism -1.722 0.214 1.857 (1.209) (1.673) (1.464)

Individualism -1.315 0.820 -2.536 (1.433) (1.893) (1.718)

Patriotism 9.470*** 14.718*** 19.648*** (2.648) (3.391) (3.118)

Job Threat -0.018 0.200 -0.295 (0.613) (0.766) (0.741)

Feeling_Immigrant 0.019 0.012 -0.017 (0.026) (0.033) (0.030)

Feeling_Black .051+ 0.032 0.057 (0.030) (0.042) (0.050)

Feeling_White .135*** 0.058 0.064 (0.040) (0.050) (0.046)

Feeling_Citizen .636*** .674*** .758*** (0.043) (0.052) (0.050)

Feeling_Hispanic -0.034 -0.012 -0.040 (0.033) (0.045) (0.052)

Feeling_Illegal -0.017 .054+ 0.034 (0.021) (0.030) (0.025)

Constant 9.789* 8.337 5.218 (4.493) (5.833) (5.311)

R2 0.669 0.639 0.751 N 511 432 352 Note: + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 211 Discussion

“[T]h essential theme of continuity and unity in the Southern heritage…was a ‘common resolve indomitably maintained’ that the South ‘shall be and remain a white man’s country’” ~ C. Vann Woodward (1989: 123).

The results indicate two major findings. First, those most susceptible to higher levels of the core predispositions are also concentrated geographically. Second, Southern whites continue to hold on to a particular Southern regional identity, an identity that has barely grown and evolved since the inception of America. In fact, “[t]he South was

American a long time before it was Southern in any self-conscious or distinctive way”

(Woodward 1989: 132).

The Moral Geography of Psychological Predispositions

In Table 5.1, the findings indicate who is most susceptible to higher levels of predispositions and whether higher levels vary regionally. As a way to further understand the relation between these results form Table 5.1 (e.g. where, in fact, do most uneducated and conservatives live), I found visual maps that can relate this message. Figure 5.8 is a

Gallup map depicting ideology by state in 2014. Gallup found that Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana are the most right-leaning states (Newport 2015). Thus, it makes sense that

Southerners also have higher levels of SDO, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and racial resentment.

212

Figure 5.8. Gallup Ideology by State, 2014.

Education, along with ideology, plays a role in influencing higher levels of the aforementioned predispositions. Thus, Figure 5.9 illustrated the percentage of the population over 25 without a high school diploma using data from the American

Community Survey (Metcalf, Box, and Evans). As the figure shows, the highest percentages of individuals over 25 without a high school diploma live in the Southern part of the United States. Once we overlay the demographics of individuals most susceptible to higher levels of SDO, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and racial resentment, it is not surprising to find most of these characteristics in the South, especially in the Southern Black Belt. The divisions between the American South and

North are not a thing of the past, in fact, they remain politically important today.

213

Figure 5.9. Population Over 25 Without HS Diploma, by Percent

The division between the American South and the Southwest (or Border region), however, was also a dominant one within the experimental data. The South and Border regions differed not only in levels of predispositions, but also in their preferences for restrictive immigration policies. For example, the South preferred more restrictive policies in all five outcome variables compared to the Border region. What explains this difference? Why would Border states, those closest to a constant and physical reminder of immigration, have lower restrictive immigration policy preferences? And in some instances even lower than Northern states? The answer, I argue, lies in the sociopolitical historical legacies of both the American South and Southwest; a legacy that continues to play a part in the concentration of different populations in the United States, as depicted in Figure 5.10 (Renn 2011).

Prior to the arrival of white settlers, large populations of Native Americans inhabited the Southwest. In fact, due to the Mexican-American War (1846-48) and the subsequent Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), Mexico agreed to make the Rio Grande a boundary between Texas and Mexico, and gave up ownership of California, and a large 214 area comprising of New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and parts of Wyoming and

Colorado (Acuña 1972). Mexicans in these newly annexed areas had the choice to relocate or to stay and receive American citizenship. Although the treaty extended symbolic citizenship, and between 1850 and 1920 Mexicans were considered racially

“white,” Mexicans still experienced segregation and discrimination, and lacked full citizenship rights (Lopez 1997).52 Within the same time frame, different laws enabled white settlers to move Westward and gain property. The Homestead Act of 1862, for example, provided anyone who had not taken arms against the US government the opportunity to apply for 160 acres of land (with certain conditions and a filing fee) (Foner

2012). This, of course, excluded the South. Even after the Southern Homestead Act of

1866, which sought to address land ownership in the South, many whites in the South could not afford the fees that accompanied the Act. It also excluded Mexicans, who, in the late 1800's, started to work on railroads, industries, and big ranches instead of small farming and ranching (Alamillo 2006; Garcilazo 2013). Westward economic expansion relied on land and gold, whereas the economic survival of the American South relied on the forced enslavement of human beings.

The Southwest and the South both have legacies of forced settlement and exclusionary practices, however, in the South these exclusionary practices were written into everyday life; practices that were part of the South’s moral geography. In order for the South to survive (not expand or develop) economically as a region, racist and exclusionary practices were necessary, and once they no longer existed the American

52 Reflected in such laws as California’s Greaser Act of 1855, which was an anti-Mexican law disguised as an anti-vagrancy law. 215 South, the Black Belt region especially, become synonymous with poverty. According to

Boyd Childress, the Black Belt is

A geographical region spreading across much of the cotton-growing area of the Southern United States, the Black Belt was a stronghold of the South’s agricultural heartland and slavery...The presence of a large slave population to tend cotton planting and productive led sociologists and historians to use the term Black Belt…Even by 1880, cotton production was still the major occupation of Black Belt residents. Tenancy became a way of life in the region after cotton declined; this area became nearly synonymous with poverty (Childress 2007: 190).

The economic dependency on cotton and a system of slavery in the American South, especially in the Black Belt, led to different sets of values and norms. Additionally, it led to a distinct moral geography, one in which Blacks were at the center of the non- normative. The interdependency of Blacks and slavery with the economic growth and survival of the American South leads this region to be intricately tied to social objects of race, power, and belonging. In contrast to the Westward expansion, where white settlers forcibly removed Native Americans and Mexicans from their homes and claimed it as

“US territories,” Southerners enslaved the black population and used them to tend the land. Hence, once slavery was deemed illegal and the cotton industry declined, Southern whites were left with one thing: their space/home/neighborhood. Subsequent Jim Crow

Laws came about as a way for whites to hold on to power, precisely because they were outnumbered. “Feeling under threat, whites in power in the 1890s systematically denied

Blacks suffrage by means of discriminatory devices such as poll tax and literacy tests”

(Winlow 2006: 124). Jim Crow laws became enactments of power and belonging. Jim

Crow became embodied in geographies of exclusion of the American South. Immigration laws, such as HB 56 and HB 87, are contemporary enactments of such power. In fact, as

216 Hero makes clear“…most Southerners came to view with skepticism, if not disapproval, new people, new ideas, and new methods and to adapt themselves to an imperfect, apparently immutable, physical and social world as they found it” (1965: 343).

Figure 5.10. Black and Hispanic Concentration, Census 2010

A Possessive Investment in Whiteness

Whiteness is at the center of preferences for restrictive immigration policies, and in particular, at the center of restrictive immigration policies in the American South.

Southern whites have a possessive investment in whiteness (Lipsitz 1998). Possessive, I use, in terms of both a possession in the maintenance of the dominance of the in-group and a possession in the maintenance of white-only physical spaces. First, Southern whites’ resentment towards undocumented immigrants actually increases how warm they feel towards their own in-group. There is a strong correlation between Southern whites that feel resentful towards undocumented immigrants and in-group attachment. Second,

Southern whites that believe that immigration is posing a job threat for Americans are

217 also more susceptible to having warmer feelings towards whites. In both instances, an immigration-related factor increases warmer feelings towards whites; they increase in- group attachment. These results are in line with the literature on intergroup relations that states that in-group favoritism is indirectly influenced by making salient in-group/out- group distinctions (Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1981). These results are also in line with the theoretical foundation I lay in Chapter 1 about the necessity of the immigrant “Other” to help main the imagined nation. In fact, whites’ lack of differentiation between Americans, citizens, and their own group emphasizes the fact that white Americans imagine the

American nation as white and place high importance on citizenship.

Southern whites, in particular, have a possessive investment in space. As a way to uncover the relationship I set out in Chapter 1 between race and space, I asked respondents a series of questions that dealt with space, in the imagined and psychical forms. First, I asked respondents if they own or rent a home. According to Reed,

“attachment to a place should also result in a reluctance to leave it” (1972: 36). And, in fact, Southern whites have a statistically higher mean of owning a home rather than renting, which is a proxy for attachment to a place. In another question, I asked about the likeliness of moving, and Southern whites are also the least likely to want to move. Even among those who said they are likely to move 68 percent said they would move to another neighborhood within their state.

In an attempt to get at the more physical and imagined kinds of borders, I asked respondents which one they think is the priority, securing the nation’s border or dealing with the immigration status of undocumented immigrants. Of the entire sample,

Southerners were the most concerned with the securing of border (23.8%), compared to

218 Border states (19.2%), and Northern states (12.6%). Even though the Southern Black Belt does not share a border with another country, it is the most concerned with borders, with boundaries. In fact, for those Southern whites who are thinking about moving, there is a statistically significant correlation between being concerned with securing the nation’s border and moving to another neighborhood within their current state. Preliminary results reveal that Southern whites are even willing to move neighborhoods to feel more secure.

Moreover, when asked whether they agreed or disagreed with building a fence along the

US-Mexico border, Southern whites have a statistically higher mean than both Border and Northern states. How is building a fence along the US-Mexico border securing

Southern whites? What borders, if not the physical kind, are Southern whites concerned about?

The answer, I argue, lies in the relationship between the physical and the imagined borders. Southern whites who agree to building a fence along the US-Mexico border, a border that no Black Belt state touches, are also more likely to have higher racial resentment, resentment towards Hispanics, immigrants, and “illegal” immigrants.

There is also significant correlations between the likelihood of Southern whites moving within the same state into another neighborhood and racial resentment, resentment towards Hispanics, and resentment towards “illegal” immigrants. In other words, higher levels of racial resentment, resentment towards Hispanics, and towards undocumented immigrants increases the likelihood that Southern whites consider moving to another neighborhood within their state. In fact, there is also a correlation between being concerned with securing the nation’s borders and all of the different types of resentments.

Higher levels of resentments leads whites to be concerned about America’s borders.

219 Additionally, owning a house rather than renting is also positively correlated with higher resentments towards all out-groups.

It seems, then, that the physical borders (US-Mexico border, the nation’s borders) for Southern whites exist in the imaginary more so than in the physical state or regional boundaries of the Southern Black Belt, as Allport calls it: “fears of the imagination”

(1954/1979). Southern whites are the most concerned about boundaries, about the maintenance of whiteness. In fact, there is statistically significant and positive correlation between Southern whites wanting to build a fence along the US-Mexico border and feeling warm towards whites, a relationship that does not exist in Border states. In other words, Southern whites’ in-group attachment is significantly related to their propensity to build a fence along the US-Mexico border. Southern whites’ possessive investment in whiteness is at the center their resentment towards out-groups, their attachment to their region, and consequently their tendency to prefer more restrictive immigration policies.

The investment in whiteness, has been a quest of the American South to distinguish itself as the “most American” (Gerster and Cords 1989). What does it mean to be most

American in the South? Table 5.7 highlights the fact that the South is the only region where feeling towards whites is a significant predictor of feelings towards Americans.

Thus, Southern regional identity is most American because the investment in whiteness continues to be a dominant role in contemporary politics.

In fact, the idea of “our America,” was pervasive among the majority of survey respondents. When asked what they thought about the article they read and what they thought about immigration in general, many of the respondents used the rhetoric of “our

America” or the threat to American values, to talk about immigration. For example, a

220 resident of New Mexico (NM) stated that immigrants “are a threat to our way of life in america.” This respondent conflates the “American way of life,” with “our,” in which she is including herself. The NM resident went on to say that “foreigners [are] coming into our country and undermining our way of life.” This conflation of identity (white female) with the “American way life” reiterates the findings of this chapter. In similar fashion, a resident of Arizona (AZ), when asked about what comes to mind when she thinks about immigration stated: “The unprotected border and how years ago our ancestors had to come here legally, fight for our country and understand our language.” Again, the rhetoric of “our country” continues, and this time the respondent added layers of border rhetoric, legal status, and language. Immigrating to the United States legally, “fighting” for the country, and speaking English are all being conflated with what it means to be

American.

Southern whites’ conflation between their own identity and their understanding of to whom America belongs was also pervasive. As equally pervasive was also the rhetoric of space among Southern whites. An Alabama (AL) resident is concerned about what is happening to her country, and is very concerned about being displaced from her own country:

The open border is frightening and the rumors/news/events/medical crises that are coming from this situation are leaving a pit of dread in the pit of the stomachs of many people I know; I heard yesterday Muslims do not want to assimilate into the general US pop, they want their own laws/courts/neighborhoods, what are we to think? Do we leave our country now?

This AL resident is “frightened” about the “open border,” but lives approximately 978 miles away from the nearest US-Mexico border in Texas. Furthermore, the border issue

221 for her is also about Muslims not want to “assimilate” and wanting their own neighborhoods. As a result, she asks, “what are we to think? Do we leave our country now?” This AL resident is clearly feeling like that the “open border” and those not assimilating to her country leaves her no option but to flee her country. The conflation in her statement between border, race, identity, and possession is exemplary of what she believes is hers. Similarly, a Georgia resident conflates immigration and space when asked what immigration makes him think, his answer: “freeloaders, rise in crime, [and] neighborhoods in decline.”

In line with concerns about space, is concern about the loss of “American” identity. A woman residing in South Carolina (SC) stated that “Too many of one nationality forcing their way into our country. Upsetting the balance of to one extreme inside of slowly accepting many nationalities to be "absorb" into our way of life.” This

South Carolinian is concerned that the US’ identity will no longer be white. Even though she does not explicitly say it, she is equating herself with “our country,” and is specifically saying that those who do not look like her are “forcing their way into our country.” She’s concerned that different nationalities are not longer assimilating, or as she puts it “absorbing into our way of life;” thus leading her to believe that the racial

“balance” is being upset. However, has there ever been a racial balance in the United

States, both in terms of raw numbers or socioeconomic status? Similarly, a resident of

Louisiana said that she “generally agree[s] that immigrants do not help our country identity.” Again, she is including herself in her “country[’s] identity.” Finally, a woman from SC says she just needs “someone to help us get our country back on track.” The

222 comments are exemplary that “The language of geography is often indistinguishable from the language of race and ethnicity” (Bonnett 2005: 109).

Conclusion

According to Lipsitz, “the possessive investment in whiteness is not simply the residue of conquest and colonialism, of slavery and segregation, of immigrant exclusion and the ‘Indian’ extermination. Contemporary whiteness and its rewards have been created and recreated by policies adopted long after the emancipation of slaves…” (1998:

4). Arizona’s SB 1070 and Alabama’s HB 56 are examples of policies that create and recreate ideas about whiteness; ideas about race and space and belonging. At the heart of the possessive investment in whiteness is the maintenance if the status quo, and the fear of losing the power that comes with being part of the dominant group. As this chapter illustrates, whites in various part of the country, and most pronouncedly in the American

South, are concerned about their own in-group vis-à-vis immigration, and more importantly borders. Southern whites, in particular, show a peculiar obsession with the

US-Mexico border, building a fence along the US-Mexico border, and securing the nation’s borders more generally. It is in these borders, the physical borders, and the borders of whiteness, that concern white Americans. The correlation found in this chapter between immigration, race, and space supports the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation project.

223 Conclusion: The Moral Geography of Immigration

It is people flows rather than weapons that threaten the territory with which he identifies ~ Shapiro (1999: 1).

The immigration of newcomers is not a new concept in the United States. The US has had various phases of immigration and newcomers, and in each phase the immigrant

Other has felt backlash. However, post- 9/11 changed the way Americans talk about immigration. After 9/11, immigration became tied with “national security,” or “security,” in general. Immigration was seen as one of the reasons why the terrorist attacks occurred in the first place. If the US has just had stronger border security, the attacks may have been deflected. 9/11 changed the ways in which immigration was viewed, and instead of weapons threatening America, “people flows” became the threat. And although those culpable of the 9/11 attacks entered the US “legally,” with “proper” documentation, the

US-Mexico border became the site most militarized post- 9/11.53 Even though, according to the 9/11 and Terrorist Travel Staff Report, “They [hijackers] successfully entered the

United States 33 times over 21 months, through nine airports of entry, most of which were on the East Coast” (Eldridge et al. 2004), the rhetoric of security was felt throughout the country, but most prominently it was conflated with the United States’

53 By using the words “legally” and “proper” I do not mean that the means through which documentation was acquired were legal or that the documents themselves were not fraudulent.

224 “porous borders.” Furthermore, the rhetoric of security became synonymous with cultural security; with securing the boundaries of American-ness (Huntington 1996, 2004).

This dissertation project set out to understand public opinion on contemporary restrictive immigration policies, and argued for the importance of both internal and external factors. Internally, predispositions such as, racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, anti-egalitarianism, and social dominance orientation, play a major role in influencing preferences for restrictive immigration policies. Externally, the media plays an important role in the framing of immigration rhetoric, in particular the kinds of frames that prime said predispositions. In addition, and the most unique and innovative area of my project, geographic context is important in understanding the relationship between the history of exclusionary practices in particular places with different levels of predispositions and with the proliferation of draconian immigration policies in particular states throughout the US. To date, there has not been any examination of the role of geographic context on the five predispositions I study or on attitudes towards immigration policy. One of this project’s aims is to push the current scholarship on immigration to consider the role of geographic context vis-à-vis immigration. Moreover, to further examine the role of the sociohistorical political legacies of particular places on contemporary exclusionary policies, such as immigration policies.

In addition to the geographic aspect of this dissertation, I set out to examine the internal and external factors of public opinion on restrictive immigration policies by using an innovative multi-method approach. First, through a quantitative content analysis of five newspapers, two national and three state-level newspapers, between 2008 and

225 2013, I examined the most common frames in relation to immigration and/or immigrants.

Second, through a national representative survey, I examined the effect of individual predispositions on restrictive immigration policies, and found preliminary evidence of the importance of geographic context in influencing predispositions, and in turn, immigration policy preferences. Finally, I designed an original randomized survey experiment that manipulated immigration stories using the language of four of the five predispositions and fielded the experiment in twelve states and three distinct regions of the country.

Through a multi-method approach, I was able to examine both internal and external factors that influence immigration policy preferences.

Overall, this dissertation project contributes to various fields, but most importantly it takes an interdisciplinary approach in understanding public opinion on immigration policy preferences. As a whole, my project speaks to the fields of political science, political and social psychology, ethnic studies, American studies, and political and cultural geography. This project examined important theories and concepts belonging to each of these fields, and created a space for the triangulation of theories and methodologies vis-à-vis immigration. In the social sciences, triangulation is defined as using two or more methods to confirm results. This project does just that by using a multi-method approach. In politics, triangulation is defined as a political candidate’s ideology being above and between left and right ideologies. In this case, this dissertation project exists above and between different fields in order to understand the complexities of the formation public opinion, and the nuances and ambiguity that come with immigration. Immigration itself is a complex and complicated issue, thus examining it by way of multiple perspectives and points of reference becomes crucial. Ultimately,

226 examining just political predispositions or just media effects or just context will not result in a holistic examination of restrictive immigration policy preferences, it is precisely a willingness to move above and between spaces that creates a more holistic understanding of contemporary support for restrictive immigration policies.

Major Findings

This section is a summary of the major findings of this dissertation project. The major findings indicate that the media highlights the boundaries of American-ness by emphasizing differences between immigrants and “Americans. Additionally, the findings indicate that support for restrictive immigration policies is influenced by individual predispositions, and racial resentment throughout the examination remained the strongest predictor of restrictive immigration policy preferences. Furthermore, this project found that individual predispositions and immigration policies vary as a function of geographic context. More generally, this project found that the sociohistorical political legacies of certain places and spaces affects not only predispositions, but attitudes towards immigration as well. Finally, this project found that preferences for restrictive immigration policies has as much to do with the delineation between us versus them, and the fear that “living with the [O]ther, with the foreigner, confronts us with the possibility, or not, of being an [O]ther” (Sibley 1995: 112; italics my own). This possibility leads white Americans to feel a greater in-group attachment and to a possessive investment in whiteness; an investment in the maintenance of the status quo.

227 Media Frames Highlight the Boundaries of American-ness

Media framing of immigration emphasizes the differences between immigrants and “Americans.” The top three overarching frames I found through content analysis of two major national newspapers and three widely circulated state-level newspapers across five years (2008-2013) are 1) immigrants as culturally different, 2) immigrants as lawbreakers, and 3) securing America/ns rhetoric. First, immigrants are often portrayed as different than “Americans,” by constant conflation of immigrants and

Hispanics/Latinos, which happened among all newspapers, especially during policy years

(i.e. AZ’s SB 1070 in 2010 and AL’s HB 56 in 2011). And although words like “race” and “racial” were not as highly used, they were used in both in the Arizona Republic and the Birmingham News the most in their respective policy years. Second, immigrants as lawbreakers and consequently as un-American was emphasized by highlighting that crossing the US-Mexico border illegality is a crime, and that once here immigrants are more susceptible to commit crimes. The language of illegality was one of the most prominent frames in relation to immigration, further emphasizing the criminality aspect of immigration and immigrants. Finally, the rhetoric of securing America and Americans was ever-present in media frames across all newspapers. The use of “border security,” and “border” and “security” separately, further emphasizes differences by highlighting a tangible division between us and them, which were two words highly used in the framing of immigration. Finally, highlighting the negative impact immigration has on jobs further indicates that immigrants are “taking” American jobs. Overall, there were some contextual differences among the newspaper, but further analysis should focus on

228 whether media frames vary as a function of geographic context and to what extent does it have political consequences.

Racial Resentment is the Strongest Predictor of Restrictive Immigration Policies

Psychological predispositions, namely racial resentment, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, anti-egalitarianism, and social dominance orientation, affect preferences for restrictive immigration policies. Each predisposition varied in significance and strength depending on the immigration policy at hand. Higher levels of authoritarianism resulted in preference for police checks, lower levels of legal immigration, and the perception that immigration takes jobs from those already here. Higher levels of moral traditionalism increased the likelihood of preferring police checks and the perception of immigration as a job threat. SDO influences higher preference for police checks, more restrictive immigration policy, and perceiving immigration as a job threat. Anti- egalitarians had more restrictive preferences to disallow “dreamers” to obtain a pathway to citizenship. In fact, egalitarianism was the strongest predictor of the Dream Act, indicating that this policy issue is inherently about the debate between equality of opportunity and equality of results. In fact, in Table 4.3, we can see that for white

Americans not allowing dreamers to obtain a pathway to citizenship is about equality of opportunity (or less equal treatment). In other words, those who believe that we all have equality of opportunity, that we all start at the same level playing field, do not agree that dreamers should be looked at any differently because they arrived in the US as children without the proper documentation. Finally, throughout the dissertation project racial resentment remained the strongest predictor of restrictive immigration policies. Those

229 with higher the levels of racial resentment, had the most restrictive immigration policy preferences.

These findings are in line with my theoretical argument about the importance of predispositions, but also the importance of race vis-à-vis immigration. Although racial resentment does not deal explicitly with immigration or any immigrant group it still affects white Americans’ immigration policy preferences. There are two main reasons for this result. First, immigration has been and continues to be a racialized issue. As Chapter

1 makes evident, the conception of the imagined nation is one that has and continues to be defined by racial categories. Hence, there is a common racial language or element in both racial resentment towards Black Americans and immigration. Second, racial resentment is about Blacks’ perceived American norm violation, which Americans’ equate with immigrants’ lack of American values. Ultimately, the strong correlation between racial resentment and immigration is not surprising, as immigration remains a highly racialized political issue.

Individual Predispositions Vary as a Function of Geographic Context

As shown in Chapter 3-5, individual predispositions also varied as a function of geographic context. In Chapter 3, Figure 3.1, we see the concentration of each of the predispositions in the American South, with the exception of authoritarianism, which is a bit more scattered throughout the US. Additionally, through multilevel analysis, I found that racial resentment varies as a function of region and consequently affects preferences for police checks, immigration levels, dream act, and job threat. Additionally, moral traditionalism and anti-egalitarianism vary as a function of region and consequently influences attitudes towards the Dream Act. Finally, authoritarianism and moral 230 traditionalism both vary as a function of region and influence attitudes towards immigration as a job threat. In Chapter 4, Figure 4.1, we see that generally, the South has the highest level of all predispositions in comparison to both Border and Northern states.

Ultimately, these findings support my hypotheses about the malleability of predispositions. Psychological predispositions are not a static set of dispositions, but are able to be engaged and primed depending on different situations. Moreover, predispositions are concentrated in certain parts of the US that correlate with particular past exclusionary racial projects.

Preferences for Restrictive Immigration Policies Vary as a Function of Geographic

Context

Similarly, preferences for restrictive immigration policies vary as a function of region. In Chapter 4, Figure 4.2 we can tell that the South has the highest mean in relation to restrictive immigration policy preferences, with the exception of the Dream Act.

Border states had the lowest mean for each of the immigration policies, with the exception of levels if legal immigration. The Northern states sat somewhere between the

South and Border states, again with the exception of immigration levels. Table 4.4 indicates statistically significant differences among the regions in relation to immigration policies, indicating that there some regions that are more susceptible to have more restrictive immigration policy preferences than others.

Immigration and The Possessive Investment in Whiteness

Finally, in Chapter 5, I found that immigration is as much about resentment towards out-groups as it is about the maintenance of the in-group. Whiteness is at the

231 center of preferences for restrictive immigration policies, and in particular, at the center of restrictive immigration policies in the American South. White Americans, and in particular Southern whites, define American-ness by using concepts of citizenship and whiteness. In fact, the immigration manipulations using the language of predispositions increase white Americans’ warm feelings towards their own in-group. The SDO frame, in particular, was the strongest among the predispositinal frames. In this case, the story framed immigration using the language of us versus them, and stated that immigrants pose a threat to American identity. SDO measures one’s preference for hierarchy and approval of domination over lower-status groups. Thus, respondents who read the SDO frame were not necessarily influenced to feel more resentment or prejudice for immigrants, but were influenced to have higher in-group attachment. The frame led to a conflation of their own identity with the “American identity” the article states is being threatened. Through qualitative data, some of the respondents furthered emphasized that that they felt “their” country was being threatened and that they needed to get “their” country back on track.

Looking Ahead

I am interested in taking my work in three main future directions. First, I am interested in further analyzing the ways in which white Americans differentiate between out-groups. I plan to investigate this question further by using the experimental data at hand. More specifically, I am interested in complicating the idea that white Americnas’ resentment towards immigrants and Latinos is significantly different than the resentment towards Black Americans. In her book, Schildkraut (2005) argues that immigrant resentment is about a different set of American norm violations that distinguishes it from 232 racial resentment. However, Schildkraut was not able to compare racial resentment in its traditional from (with target group Blacks) and racial resentment with different target groups. In the current experimental data, I asked respondents the 4-item racial resentment question and change the target group to “immigrants,” “Hispanics/Latinos,” and “illegal immigrants,” and will be interested in testing whether these are different from each other, and if so in what ways. Furthermore, whether they have political consequences vis-à-vis immigration policy preferences.

Second, future work and projects will focus on comparing different racial/ethnic groups in America and examining whether there are differences among the groups in relation to immigration attitudes. For example, are other racial and ethnic groups in

America similarly influence by immigration stories, and does immigration prime higher levels of in-group attachment? Are white Americans equally threatened by Asian immigration as they are about immigration form Central and South America? How do

Asian Americans, Latino Americans, and Black Americans differ from white Americans in relation to preferences for restrictive immigration policies? Are these other groups equally threatened by immigration or undocumented immigration? Ultimately, an equally holistic understanding of preferences for restrictive immigration policies needs to involve other racial/ethnic groups.

Finally, I would like to further expand my analysis on the importance of geographic context through another survey experiment fielded using a larger sample of states, and a larger respondent sample within each state. Additionally, I would like to obtain geo-code data (i.e. respondent addresses) in order to lower the level of analysis to census track to examine any inter- and intrastate differences. Census track data will also

233 allow me to investigate other contextual variables such neighborhood racial composition and its affects on attitudes towards restrictive immigration policies. Additionally, track level data will provide me with more leverage examine the spatial issues I begin to explore in this dissertation project.

The Moral Geography of Immigration

Research in contemporary immigration should be situated within a historical context that recognizes the centrality of racialized spaces, and the connections between race and space, vis-à-vis immigration in the formation of the imagined American nation.

“America” is defined by boundaries; those who belong, us, and those who do not, them.

Some of these boundaries are visible: the national borders and the US-Mexico border. In recent times, these boundaries have become quite fluid not only in their physical manifestations (state, city, and neighborhood boundaries), but also in the imagined kind.

The imagined borders are in one’s mind delineating between those who belong and those who do not. Gloria Anzaldúa’s understanding of borders as a psychic, social, and cultural terrain that we all inhabit, and that inhabits us all, is essential in understanding the fluidity of borders and the use of border rhetoric vis-à-vis immigration (Anzaldúa 1987).

These borders, whether the physical or imagined kinds, are the sites in which immigration battles are fought and American-ness is contested.

In 1912, local whites of Forsyth County in Gainesville, Georgia, lynched an

African American man who allegedly raped a white woman (Jaspin 2007). Black churches and farmhouses were burned and black families were told to leave (Firestone

April 8, 1999). “For almost a month, gangs of night riders harassed and intimidated the black population into moving out of the county” (Huff 2006). At 6:00am on September 234 14, 2006, the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement division (ICE) raided a Forsyth

County construction company where they arrested 30 Latino, of whom 20 faced legal charges of forgery and identity theft (Gurr September 15, 2006). Although Forsyth

County remains predominately white (86.4%), it has experienced strong population growth since the 1980s. Most dramatically, between 1990 and 2006, the total population increased by 243 percent. According to the 2010 Census, Hispanics/Latinos make up 9.6 percent of the population in Forsyth. Similar to Arizona and Alabama, Georgia passed

HB 87, the “Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011,” provoking a climate of fear among its Latino population (Jaksic 2012). It appears that Forsyth County, a historically labeled “sundown town,” (Loewen 2005) has continued its legacy of a possessive investment in whiteness (Lipsitz 1998) through its use of raids and intimidation to push out racial/ethnic minorities. Thus, it is not just about population increases, but at the root of what drives these raids and antagonism is an investment in the maintenance of whiteness, in the maintenance of the status quo—as depicted by the red, white, and blue US in Figure 6.1 held by a white male supporter of HB 87 in

Georgia—that has historically been equated to the very idea that is America.

Figure 6.1. Illegal Immigration Costing US Billions, Protest Sign in Georgia 235

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254 Appendix A: Chapter 3 Question Wording

Dependent Variable

Police Checks

“Some states have passed a law that will require state and local police to determine the immigration status of a person if they find that there is a reasonable suspicion he or she is an undocumented immigrant. Those found to be in the U.S. without permission will have broken state law. From what you have heard, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose these immigration laws?”

Immigration Levels

Should the number of new legal immigrants be increased a lot, increased a little, neither increased or decreased, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?

Immigration Policy

Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be toward unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States? 1) Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home country; 2) Have a guest worker program that allows unauthorized immigrants to remain; 3) Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States with certain requirements; or 4) Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States without penalties.

Dream Act

255 There is a proposal to allow people who were illegally brought into the U.S. as children to become permanent U.S. residents under some circumstances. Specifically, citizens of other countries who illegally entered the U.S. before age 16, who have lived in the U.S. 5 years or longer, and who graduated high school would be allowed to stay in the U.S. as permanent residents if they attend college or serve in the military.

From what you have heard, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose this proposal?

Job Threat

Now I'd like to ask you about immigration in recent years. How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here? Is it 1) extremely likely; 2) very likely; 3) somewhat likely; or 4) not at all likely?

Independent Variables

Racial Resentment

Racial resentment scale asks respondents to agree or disagree with four statements:

“Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors;” (2) “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class;” (3)“Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve; ” (4) “It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if

Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.”

Authoritarianism

256 The scale asks four questions that state “Which one you think is more important for a child to have:” 1) Independence or Respect for elders; 2) Curiosity or Good manners; 3)

Obedience or Self-reliance; and “Being considerate or Well-behaved.”

Moral Traditionalism

The scale asks four questions: “Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement? 1) The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes; 2)

The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society; 3) We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own; 4) This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.

Egalitarianism

The egalitarianism scale is based on respondents’ agreement with six statements: 1) “Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed;” 2) “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country;” 3) “One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance;” 4) “This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are;” 5) “It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others;” and finally 6) “If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.” This scale is coded so that higher values indicate less egalitarianism. The reliability of this scale is .80.

Less Equal Treatment

257 1) “Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed;” 2) “One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance;” and 3) “If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.” (Alpha’s Cronbach= .70)

Too Far

1) “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country;” 2) “This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are;” and 3) “It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.”

(Alpha’s Cronbach = .74)

Economic Variables

EconomyNow: “What do you think about the state of the economy these days in the

United States? Would you say the state of the economy is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad?

NationalEconomy: Now thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that over the past year the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?

PersonalFinance: “Would you say that [you/you and your family living here] are better off or worse off than you were a year ago?

Patriotism Scale

The Patriotism scale is based on responses to four questions: (1) “How important is being an American to you personally?;” (2)“How do you feel about this country. Do you hate it, dislike it, neither like nor dislike it, like it, or love it?;” (3) “When you see the American

258 flag flying does it make you feel extremely good, very good, moderately good, slightly good, or not good at all?;” (4) “How important is being American to your identity?”

Feeling Thermometers

Using the feeling thermometer below, where 0 is the coldest, 50 is neutral, and 100 is warmest, how do you feel toward: African Americans; Hispanics/Latinos; Immigrants;

Democrats; Republicans; Women; Men; White Americans; US citizens; Illegal immigrants; Americans.

259 Appendix B: Chapter 3 Summary Statistics Table

Table B1: Summary Statistics Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Dependent Variables Police Checks 2506 0.7478053 0.4343591 0 1 Immigration Level 2848 3.60007 1.085311 1 5 Dream Act 3086 2.548931 0.8820397 1 4 Immigration Policy 3090 1.687379 0.7977809 1 3 Job Threat 2876 2.257997 0.7034242 1 3 Independent Variables Racial Resentment 2875 0.6605652 0.2368194 0 1 Egalitarianism 2877 0.4428514 0.2076946 0 1 Authoritarianism 2728 0.5646994 0.3144868 0 1 Moral Traditionalism 2880 0.5862413 0.2464097 0 1 Gender (Female) 3101 0.5049984 0.5000557 0 1 Age (by group) 3081 7.81889 3.270735 1 13 Income (by group) 3016 14.92507 8.027008 1 28 Ideology 2933 4.376747 1.464996 1 7 Partisanship Education (by group) 3074 3.135654 1.132951 1 5 Economy 3088 2.66807 0.5789672 1 3 National Economy 3088 2.121762 0.806159 1 3 Personal Finance 3076 2.079974 0.964125 1 3 Feeling (Asian) 2871 65.46116 19.75861 0 100 Feeling (Hispanic) 2868 61.40481 21.34881 0 100 Feeling (Black) 2868 62.59902 20.89849 0 100 Feeling (Illegal) 2876 33.25487 24.30542 0 100 Patriotism 2878 0.8476662 0.1830908 0.083 1

260 Appendix C: Chapter 4 & 5 Summary Statistics

Table C1. Summary Statistics Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Demographics

Age 2428 35.25412 16.36864 1 75 Gender 2428 0.6795717 0.4667373 0 1 Education 2428 4.733526 1.947878 1 8 Employment 2428 3.352554 2.171302 1 7 Income 2428 4.326606 1.312675 1 7 Knowledge 2428 1.021005 0.5840656 0 2 Party ID 2170 2.105991 0.7946403 1 3 Ideology 2428 3.218699 1.239521 1 5 Vote 2420 2.340909 1.44082 1 6 Own/Rent 2428 1.400741 0.5921749 1 3 Mover 2428 2.339374 1.258569 1 5 Move Where? 917 1.332606 0.4984201 1 3 TV 2428 3.977759 2.786955 1 9 Radio 2428 2.30313 2.217369 1 9 Internet 2428 4.09061 2.838466 1 9 Cable 2428 3.323723 2.730707 1 9 Immigration Variables

Help/Hurt 2428 0.6692751 0.4705711 0 1 Police Checks 2428 1.556425 0.7511205 1 3 Immigration Levels 2428 3.275124 1.253297 1 5 Fence 2428 5.175041 2.08953 1 7 Immigration Policy 2428 2.972405 0.9339875 1 4 Dream Act 2428 1.721993 0.8233674 1 3 Jobs 2428 2.654448 1.084992 1 4 Secure Border 2428 1.443575 0.4969084 1 2 Nativism 2428 0.5288303 0.4992709 0 1 Feeling Thermometer

Blacks 2428 70.28871 26.14667 0 100 Hispanics/Latinos 2428 68.1598 26.7952 0 100 Immigrants 2428 59.11985 30.18468 0 100 Democrats 2428 53.8682 31.74803 0 100 Table C1 Continued

261 Table C1 Continued Republicans 2428 55.17628 30.67957 0 100 Women 2428 84.25783 20.00777 0 100 Men 2428 78.35708 21.74544 0 100 Whites 2428 79.24259 20.5957 0 100 Citizens 2428 84.8229 19.05339 0 100

Illegal Immigrants 2428 34.90733 31.34125 0 100 Americans 2428 85.27512 19.33631 0 100 Scales

Racial Resentment 2428 0.6389776 0.2659274 0 1

Racial Resentment_Illegal 2428 0.6497889 0.1627995 0.25 1 Raical Resentment_Hispanics 2428 0.6403418 0.2439316 0 1 Racial Resentment_Immigrants 2428 0.6386429 0.2493951 0 1

Moral Traditionalism 2428 0.545382 0.2619248 0 1 Authoritarianism 2428 0.5376853 0.3282012 0 1 Social Dominance Orientation 2428 0.2390985 0.2239512 0 1

Anti-Egalitarianism 2428 0.4001579 0.2392609 0 1 Less Equal Treatment 2428 0.3579764 0.2625096 0 1 Too far 2428 0.4423394 0.2767194 0 1

Patriotism 2428 0.8295236 0.210092 0 1 Individualism 2428 0.608045 0.4107863 0 1

Data: Original Experimental Survey, 2015

262 Appendix D: Experimental Manipulations

Social Dominance Frame:

Us v. them, the immigration debate

By Paul D. Mohaney

THIS NATION was built on the idea that it is better than other foreign countries that do not follow democratic ideals. Immigrants, however, pose a threat to this principle.

Supporters of more restrictive immigration policies argue that immigrants hurt American identity. During a recent press conference in Washington, DC, Senator Clark stated that, “America is an increasingly dangerous and disagreeable place because of foreigners, who do not follow American principles and norms.” He continued by saying that, “immigrant groups disturb the social order of America.”

Opponents of restrictive immigration policies claim that foreign immigrants contribute to American identity instead of changing its definition. For example, Senator Thompson, during the same press conference, argued that, “different groups should be able to hold the same kind of status,” and that more restrictive immigration policies “will make it difficult to share resources equally.”

Throughout the history of the United States, immigrants have been able to assimilate to American society. It seems that today’s immigrants are different. A study conducted by an independent non-partisan group found that immigrants are more attached to their home country more than America. Failure to reform our immigration system will be detrimental to the future of our country.

Authoritarianism Frame:

Immigrants pose security threat to the “Rule of law”

By Paul D. Mohaney

263 THIS NATION was built on the idea of “rule of law.” Immigrants, however, pose a threat to this principle.

Supporters of more restrictive immigration policies argue that unauthorized immigrants have no respect for the law. During a recent press conference in Washington, DC, Senator Clark stated that, “America is an increasingly dangerous and disagreeable place because of immigrants, who do not follow the rule of law.” He continued by saying that, “immigrants pose security threats and undermine the safety of the American people.”

Opponents of restrictive immigration policies claim that immigrants do not pose a threat and are not committing criminal acts at a higher rate than others. For example, Senator Thompson, during the same press conference, argued that, “immigrants are obedient and appreciate the laws in America,” and more restrictive immigration policies “will make life more difficult for immigrants.”

Throughout the history of the United States, immigrants have come to America for refuge from their own country, and embrace the American rule of law. It seems that today’s immigrants are different. A study conducted by an independent non-partisan group found that immigrants rarely think “obedience and respect for elders,” are characteristics that their children should have. Failure to reform our immigration system will be detrimental to the future of our country.

Moral Traditionalism Frame:

Immigrants’ values contradict traditional American way of life

By Paul D. Mohaney

THIS NATION was built on the idea of traditional American values, such as traditional family values and lifestyles. Immigrants, however, pose a threat to this principle.

Supporters of more restrictive immigration policies argue that immigrants have no respect for American traditions. During a recent press conference in Washington, DC, Senator Clark stated that, “America is an increasingly dangerous and disagreeable place because of immigrants, who bring with them their own beliefs and traditions.” He continued by saying that, “immigrants disturb the American way of life by speaking their own language and following un-American principles.”

264 Opponents of restrictive immigration policies claim that immigrants do want to assimilate to the American way of life. For example, Senator Thompson, during the same press conference, argued that, “immigrants often go to English as a Second Language classes after work, and they work hard to fit in,” and more restrictive immigration policies “will make it difficult for immigrants to do so.”

Throughout the history of the United States, immigrants have come to America for a better life, and adopt the traditional values that characterize the American way of life. It seems that today’s immigrants are different. A study conducted by an independent non-partisan group found that although immigrants are family oriented, they lack many of the traditional values of America. Failure to reform our immigration system will be detrimental to the future of our country.

Racial Resentment Frame:

Immigrants foster crime and consume public resources

By Paul D. Mohaney

THIS NATION was built on the idea that every person can work hard and be able to achieve the American Dream. Immigrants, however, do not follow this principle.

Supporters of more restrictive immigration policies argue that immigrants put a drain on public resources and foster crime. During a recent press conference in Washington, DC, Senator Clark stated that, “America is an increasingly dangerous and disagreeable place because of immigrants, who do not follow American principles and norms.” He continued by saying that, “immigrants expect government assistance when they do not deserve it.”

Opponents of restrictive immigration policies claim that it is already difficult for immigrants to work their way up from the lower classes. For example, Senator Thompson, during the same press conference, argued that, “it is hard for immigrants to work their way up,” and that more restrictive immigration policies “will make it even more difficult to do so.”

Throughout the history of the United States, immigrants have been able to help themselves and move their way up in society. It seems that today’s immigrants are different. A study conducted by an independent non-partisan group found that immigrants are involved in crime and

265 are putting a burden on public resources in some states. Failure to reform our immigration system will be detrimental to the future of our country.

Control Frame (iPhone): iPhone 6 Review

By Paul D. Mohaney

IT DOESN’T come with 1080p resolution or Optical Image Stabilization, like the iPhone 6 Plus, but Apple’s new 4.7-inch iPhone 6 is the best iPhone for most people. Our iPhone 6 review takes a look at how the smaller iPhone compares to the iPhone 5 and some of the Android smartphones it will battle over the course of the year.

For years, Apple’s iPhone toiled at 3.5-inches. Then, two years ago, Apple made the jump up to a 4-inch Retina Display to appease consumers that had campaigned for a larger display for gaming, multitasking, reading and browsing the web. This year’s iPhone 6 is the biggest iPhone yet. Instead of a 4-inch display, the iPhone 6 delivers a larger 4.7-inch Retina HD display.

It’s not as big as the iPhone 6 Plus or the Galaxy Note 4, but that’s a good thing. The added real estate comes without a massive jump in size making the iPhone 6 ideal for those that want a larger display but don’t want to be toting around a smartphone that feels like a small tablet. For those coming from an iPhone 5s or iPhone 5, it will take some adjustment. When that adjustment period ends, though, you’ll find that the iPhone 6’s size opens doors that weren’t open on the earlier models.

266 Appendix E: Chapter 4 & 5 Question Wording

Chapter 4 Dependent Variables

Police Checks

Some states have passed a law that will require state and local police to determine the immigration status of a person if they find that there is a reasonable suspicion he or she is an undocumented immigrant. Those found to be in the U.S. without permission will have broken state law.

From what you have heard, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose these immigration laws?

Immigration Levels

Should the number of new legal immigrants be increased a lot, increased a little, neither increased or decreased, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?

Immigration Policy

Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be toward unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States? 1) Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home country; 2) Have a guest worker program that allows unauthorized immigrants to remain; 3) Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States with certain requirements; or 4) Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States without penalties.

267 Dream Act

There is a proposal to allow people who were illegally brought into the U.S. as children to become permanent U.S. residents under some circumstances. Specifically, citizens of other countries who illegally entered the U.S. before age 16, who have lived in the U.S. 5 years or longer, and who graduated high school would be allowed to stay in the U.S. as permanent residents if they attend college or serve in the military.

From what you have heard, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose this proposal?

Job Threat

Now I'd like to ask you about immigration in recent years. How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here? Is it 1) extremely likely; 2) very likely; 3) somewhat likely; or 4) not at all likely?

Chapter 5 Dependent Variables

Feeling Thermometers

Using the feeling thermometer below, where 0 is the coldest, 50 is neutral, and 100 is warmest, how do you feel toward:

African Americans; Hispanics/Latinos; Immigrants; Democrats; Republicans; Women;

Men; White Americans; US citizens; Illegal immigrants; Americans.

Independent Variables

Racial Resentment

Racial resentment scale asks respondents to agree or disagree with four statements: “Irish,

Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up.

268 Blacks should do the same without any special favors;” (2) “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class;” (3)“Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve; ” (4) “It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.”

Resentment Towards Hispanics/Latinos

This scale asks respondents to agree or disagree with four statements: “Irish, Italians,

Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up.

Hispanics/Latinos should do the same without any special favors;” (2) “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for

Hispanics/Latinos to work their way out of the lower class;” (3)“Over the past few years,

Hispanics/Latinos have gotten less than they deserve; ” (4) “It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Hispanics/Latinos would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.”

Resentment Towards Immigrants

This scale asks respondents to agree or disagree with four statements: “Irish, Italians,

Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. immigrants should do the same without any special favors;” (2) “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for immigrants to work their way out of the lower class;” (3)“Over the past few years, immigrants have gotten less than they deserve; ” (4) “It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if immigrants would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.”

Resentment Towards “Illegal” Immigrants

269 This scale asks respondents to agree or disagree with four statements: “Irish, Italians,

Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Illegal immigrants should do the same without any special favors;” (2) “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for illegal immigrants to work their way out of the lower class;” (3)“Over the past few years, illegal immigrants have gotten less than they deserve; ” (4) “It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if illegal immigrants would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.”

Authoritarianism

The scale asks four questions that state “Which one you think is more important for a child to have:” 1) Independence or Respect for elders; 2) Curiosity or Good manners; 3)

Obedience or Self-reliance; and “Being considerate or Well-behaved.”

Moral Traditionalism

The scale asks four questions: “Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement? 1) The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes; 2)

The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society; 3) We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own; 4) This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.

Anti-Egalitarianism

The scale asks six questions: “Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement? 1) Our society

270 should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed; 2) We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country; 3) One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance; 4) This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are; 5) It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others; 6) If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.

Less Equal Treatment

1) “Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed;” 2) “One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance;” and 3) “If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.” (Alpha’s Cronbach= .70)

Too Far

1) “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country;” 2) “This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are;” and 3) “It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.”

(Alpha’s Cronbach = .74)

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO-D)

The scale asks eight questions: “Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement? 1) Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups; 2) In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups; 3) It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others; 4) To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups; 5) If certain groups stayed in their place, we would

271 have fewer problems; 6) It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom; 7) Inferior groups should stay in their place; 8) Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.

Secure Border

If you had to choose one, which should be the higher priority now: securing the nation's border, or addressing the status of illegal immigrants currently in the U.S.?

Fence

Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, agree a little, neither agree nor disagree, disagree a little, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the building of a fence along the U.S.-Mexico border?

Individualism

This scale asks three questions: Which comes closer to your views 1) One, the main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves; OR, Two, government has become bigger because the problems we face have become bigger; 2) One, we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems; OR, Two, the free market can handle these problems without government being involved; 3) One, the less government, the better; OR, Two, there are more things that government should be doing.

Nativism

This questions asks: Which comes closer to you view: One, The growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values; OR ,

Two, the growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society.

272 Patriotism

The Patriotism scale is based on responses to four questions: (1) “How important is being an American to you personally?;” (2)“How do you feel about this country. Do you hate it, dislike it, neither like nor dislike it, like it, or love it?;” (3) “When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel extremely good, very good, moderately good, slightly good, or not good at all?;” (4) “How important is being American to your identity?”

Own/Rent

This questions asks: Do you own or rent? Answer include 1) Own home; 2) Rent home; or 3) Not applicable.

Move

This question asks: How likely is it that you will move out of your neighborhood in the near future? Answers include 1) Definitely not move; 2) Probably not move; 3) Fifty- fifty chance; 4) Probably move; 5) Definitely move.

Move Where?

This questions was displayed to those who chose 3, 4, or 5 above, and asks: If you are going to move, where would you move? Answers include 1) To another neighborhood in your current state; 2) To another US state; 4) Outside of the US.

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