DOCSLIB.ORG

THE WAR in SYRIA: an ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE Maya Hadar

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
THE WAR in SYRIA: an ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE Maya Hadar Austrian National Defence Academy Vienna IFK MONITOR Interna�onal THE WAR IN SYRIA: AN ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE Maya Hadar While Israel and Syria have technically been in a state of war since the esta- blishment of Israel in 1948, Israel’s official position in the Syrian civil war is of non-interference. Yet, adherence to its national interests and the safety of its citizens indicates taking action, whenever needed, both militarily and di- plomatically during the course of the war as well as once the dust settles. The world is undoubtedly united by its other potential threat, to date, the former concerns regarding the ramifications of are engaged in Inner Arab world disputes. the Syrian civil war on the well being of As such, Iran’s growing influence in close the Syrian people. We share our hope for a proximity to Israel’s’ northern border swift cessation of violence in the form of forms a much greater threat to Israel’s se- an agreement, which would enable the safe curity. return of displaced refugees. However, different countries have different interests Israeli-Syrian historic relations in the landscape of a post-war Syria: the main concern of the US and many Eu- Not only that Israel and Syria have never ropean countries being the threat arising established diplomatic relations, they were from the destabilizing influence of Sunni engaged in battle in four major wars (1948, extremists such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda. As 1967, 1973 & 1982). A further worsening demonstrated by several attacks carried out of the relations between the two occurred on European territory in recent years (Bar- following the Six-Day War in 1967, fought celona, London, Manchester, Paris, Stock- between Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. holm etc.), this is not merely a potential During the war, Israel has obtained control threat. over the Gaza strip and the Sinai Peninsula (from Egypt), the West Bank and east Jeru- Though Israel certainly shares the humani- salem (from Jordan) and the Golan Heights tarian concerns in this regard (and have (from Syria). Whereas the Sinai Peninsula long provided humanitarian assistance to was returned to Egypt following the Camp Syrian refugees), its’ main concern is Iran David accords of 1978 and whereas Israel and its proxy militant organization, most signed a peace treaty with Jordan in 1994, notably- Hezbollah. While anti-Israeli at- the formerly Syrian Golan Heights were tacks by Sunni extremists constitute an- annexed in 1981 and remained an “open Support forInstitute Peace Management and Conflict IFK Monitor International October 2017 wound” for Syria. The Golan Heights were gime and is allowing its Iranian partner and still are a perpetuation of Syrian defeat to maintain a strong military presence in the war and its’ meaning is both psycho- in Syria. Moreover, there is an immi- logical and strategic. Despite the Syrian nent danger that sophisticated weapons vindication achieved following the 1973 “made in Russia” would find their way war’s early success, hostilities between the from the Syrian army to the hands of two countries never ceased to exist. At Hezbollah. Lastly, Russian boots present present time, a ceasefire line originating in on Syrian ground may limit Israel’s free- the aftermath of the 1973 war is largely re- dom of action in Syria when it wishes to spected. tackle potential threats. This also holds the potential for Russian-Israel clashes, A few Israeli attempts to engage Syria in even unintentionally. peace negotiation (by former prime min- ister Sharon in 2004 and as part of a land - Though Sunni militant groups operating trade by former prime minister Olmert in Syria do not pose an immediate threat in 2007) were made under the Israeli pre- to Israel’s national security, cementing requisite that Syria will halt support for themselves in the region and exporting “terrorist agents”, “guerrilla groups” and extremist ideologies may potentially de- Iran. Indirect peace talks held in 2008 with stabilize Egypt and Jordan and thus, en- Turkish mediation did not yield any result. danger previously signed peace treaties. Furthermore, similarly to many other Threats to Israel’s national security western high-profile destinations, Israel may be a target of future attacks by ISIS - Iranian military presence in Syria and its and their likes. critical support in developing comple- mentary infrastructure (e.g. missiles and - The on-going Syrian civil war, com- chemical weapon manufacturing facili- bined with Assad’s reliance on Iran and ties) as well as its cooperation with lo- Hezbollah which enabled him to regain cal Hezbollah forces threatens Israel’s control over most of the country’s ter- northern border and increases the risk ritory (and made him the anticipated of a combined military operations on winner of the war), precludes any at- Israeli territory. In addition, as the main tempt to negotiate peace between Israel supplier of arms to Hezbollah, Iran’s and Syria for the time being. Moreover, freedom of action in Syria means an Assad’s dependence on Iran and the lat- increased capability of Hezbollah to ter’s tightening grip in the region makes target Israel’s larger cities using sophis- any future agreement between Syria and ticated weapons and mid to long range Israel improbable. missiles fired from southern Lebanon. Israel’s Actions in Syria since the be- - Although Israeli-Russian relationship ginning of the uprising has improved since the 1960-1970s: “when the Soviet Union was the Arab world’s weapons supplier and the Arab-Israeli conflict Israel’s official position regarding the Syr- was seen as just another front in the Cold War” ian war is of non-interference. However, (Harel, foreignpolicy.com, Oct 6, 2015). it has repeatedly stated that crossing its’ As a key player, Russian influence in the “red lines”; the shipment of anti-aircraft Syrian war may pose a threat to Israel’s missiles, precision ground-to-ground mis- national security since Russia is militar- siles, and chemical weapons to Hezbollah ily backing up the anti-Israeli Assad re- will not go unanswered. Attacks against IFK Monitor International October 2017 specific targets on Syrian territories (as the steps in both the military and diplomatic recent attack on Syria’s chemical weapons levels: manufacturer in the Hama province) are often left unconfirmed by Jerusalem offi- On the military level cials. In addition to the military response, Israel tends to diplomatically engage the 1. The prevention of “Game Changing” US and Russia in such circumstances. weapons provided by Iran (or Russia, While specific and independent of the for that matter) from reaching Hezbol- conflict in Syria, these attacks are frequent lah. (in a recent interview, Israel’s former air force chief Amir Eshel stated that Israel 2. The prevention of the establishment of had hit arms convoys of the Syrian military an Iranian operation-base in southern and its Hezbollah allies nearly 100 times in Syria, from which Hezbollah can carry the past five years; Reuters, Sep 7, 2017). out attacks against Israel on the one hand, and reinforce Iranian-backed mili- Moreover, in the course of the war, Is- tary presence in the Golan Heights on rael has provided medical care to Nusra the other hand. Front fighters (the al-Qaida terrorist off- shoot) who are actively fighting the Ira- 3. Maintaining the “red lines” policy and nian backed axis of Assad and Hezbollah. providing a response when those are Although the Nusra Front is certainly no threatened. Such actions will send a ally of Israel, Amos Yadin, former mili- clear message to Syria, Iran and Hez- tary intelligence chief was quoted saying bollah, and demonstratively strengthen that Hezbollah and Iran “are the major Israel’s position in both the military and threat to Israel, much more than the radical the diplomatic fronts. Sunni Islamists” (Jerusalem Post, March 13, 2015). Evidently, non-official Israeli On the diplomatic level support of rebel groups extent beyond a mere humanitarian assistance. Non-Israeli 1. Attempting to obtain a Russian com- sources also point to an on-going supply mitment regarding the whereabouts of funds (used to pay for fighters’ salaries of Russian weapons transferred to the and ammunition) food, fuel and medical Syrian army and preventing those from provisions to Syrian rebels near the Israeli reaching Hezbollah. border and deeper on Syrian soil as early as 2013. The creation of a special army unit 2. Strengthening the diplomatic relations to oversee the aid operation was reported with Turkey and work towards future by the Wall Street Journal. This suggests cooperation, as both countries share a that unlike its’ official position, Israel is border with Syria and a common enemy very much involved in the Syrian war. (ISIS and Shia-domination). Possible Israeli actions in Syria 3. Seeking continuing cooperation with the international community regarding Israel’s territorial proximity to Syria, mili- the ISIS threat. tary capabilities and special relationship with the US keeps its interests relevant in 4. Although Russia has rejected Israel’s re- the discussion of post-war Syria. In order quest for a 60 km buffer zone between to protect its security interests and in light the Golan Heights and any Iranian of current military developments in Syria, backed militias, further Israeli-Russian Israel could consider taking the following cooperation would assist in ensuring Is- IFK Monitor International October 2017 raeli security interests in the framework appears as though Israel would have pre- of the de-escalation zones, specifically ferred the “devil it knows” over the un- on Syrian southwest. Moreover, since certainty following the emergence of a Russia serves as the only mediator be- new leader, possibly among Sunni Islamist tween Syria & Israel and Iran & Israel, groups.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Next Steps in Syria
    Next Steps in Syria BY JUDITH S. YAPHE early three years since the start of the Syrian civil war, no clear winner is in sight. Assassinations and defections of civilian and military loyalists close to President Bashar Nal-Assad, rebel success in parts of Aleppo and other key towns, and the spread of vio- lence to Damascus itself suggest that the regime is losing ground to its opposition. The tenacity of government forces in retaking territory lost to rebel factions, such as the key town of Qusayr, and attacks on Turkish and Lebanese military targets indicate, however, that the regime can win because of superior military equipment, especially airpower and missiles, and help from Iran and Hizballah. No one is prepared to confidently predict when the regime will collapse or if its oppo- nents can win. At this point several assessments seem clear: ■■ The Syrian opposition will continue to reject any compromise that keeps Assad in power and imposes a transitional government that includes loyalists of the current Baathist regime. While a compromise could ensure continuity of government and a degree of institutional sta- bility, it will almost certainly lead to protracted unrest and reprisals, especially if regime appoin- tees and loyalists remain in control of the police and internal security services. ■■ How Assad goes matters. He could be removed by coup, assassination, or an arranged exile. Whether by external or internal means, building a compromise transitional government after Assad will be complicated by three factors: disarray in the Syrian opposition, disagreement among United Nations (UN) Security Council members, and an intransigent sitting govern- ment.
    [Show full text]
  • Herding, Warfare, and a Culture of Honor: Global Evidence
    Herding,Warfare, and a Culture of Honor: Global Evidence* Yiming Cao† Benjamin Enke‡ Armin Falk§ Paola Giuliano¶ Nathan Nunn|| 7 September 2021 Abstract: According to the widely known ‘culture of honor’ hypothesis from social psychology, traditional herding practices have generated a value system conducive to revenge-taking and violence. We test the economic significance of this idea at a global scale using a combination of ethnographic and folklore data, global information on conflicts, and multinational surveys. We find that the descendants of herders have significantly more frequent and severe conflict today, and report being more willing to take revenge in global surveys. We conclude that herding practices generated a functional psychology that plays a role in shaping conflict across the globe. Keywords: Culture of honor, conflict, punishment, revenge. *We thank Anke Becker, Dov Cohen, Pauline Grosjean, Joseph Henrich, Stelios Michalopoulos and Thomas Talhelm for useful discussions and/or comments on the paper. †Boston University. (email: [email protected]) ‡Harvard University and NBER. (email: [email protected]) §briq and University of Bonn. (email: [email protected]) ¶University of California Los Angeles and NBER. (email: [email protected]) ||Harvard University and CIFAR. (email: [email protected]) 1. Introduction A culture of honor is a bundle of values, beliefs, and preferences that induce people to protect their reputation by answering threats and unkind behavior with revenge and violence. According to a widely known hypothesis, that was most fully developed by Nisbett( 1993) and Nisbett and Cohen( 1996), a culture of honor is believed to reflect an economically-functional cultural adaptation that arose in populations that depended heavily on animal herding (pastoralism).1 The argument is that, relative to farmers, herders are more vulnerable to exploitation and theft because their livestock is a valuable and mobile asset.
    [Show full text]
  • Syria, April 2005
    Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Country Profile: Syria, April 2005 COUNTRY PROFILE: SYRIA April 2005 COUNTRY Formal Name: Syrian Arab Republic (Al Jumhuriyah al Arabiyah as Suriyah). Short Form: Syria. Term for Citizen(s): Syrian(s). Capital: Damascus (population estimated at 5 million in 2004). Other Major Cities: Aleppo (4.5 million), Homs (1.8 million), Hamah (1.6 million), Al Hasakah (1.3 million), Idlib (1.2 million), and Latakia (1 million). Independence: Syrians celebrate their independence on April 17, known as Evacuation Day, in commemoration of the departure of French forces in 1946. Public Holidays: Public holidays observed in Syria include New Year’s Day (January 1); Revolution Day (March 8); Evacuation Day (April 17); Egypt’s Revolution Day (July 23); Union of Syria, Egypt, and Libya (September 1); Martyrs’ Day, to commemorate the public hanging of 21 dissidents in 1916 (May 6); the beginning of the 1973 October War (October 6); National Day (November 16); and Christmas Day (December 25). Religious feasts with movable dates include Eid al Adha, the Feast of the Sacrifice; Muharram, the Islamic New Year; Greek Orthodox Easter; Mouloud/Yum an Nabi, celebration of the birth of Muhammad; Leilat al Meiraj, Ascension of Muhammad; and Eid al Fitr, the end of Ramadan. In 2005 movable holidays will be celebrated as follows: Eid al Adha, January 21; Muharram, February 10; Greek Orthodox Easter, April 29–May 2; Mouloud, April 21; Leilat al Meiraj, September 2; and Eid al Fitr, November 4. Flag: The Syrian flag consists of three equal horizontal stripes of red, white, and black with two small green, five-pointed stars in the middle of the white stripe.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise of Arabism in Syria Author(S): C
    The Rise of Arabism in Syria Author(s): C. Ernest Dawn Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring, 1962), pp. 145-168 Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4323468 Accessed: 27/08/2009 15:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mei. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Middle East Institute is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Middle East Journal. http://www.jstor.org THE RISE OF ARABISMIN SYRIA C. Ernest Dawn JN the earlyyears of the twentiethcentury, two ideologiescompeted for the loyalties of the Arab inhabitantsof the Ottomanterritories which lay to the east of Suez.
    [Show full text]
  • The Plight of Palestinian Refugees in Syria in the Camps South of Damascus by Metwaly Abo Naser, with the Support of Ryme Katkhouda and Devorah Hill
    Expert Analysis January 2017 Syrian voices on the Syrian conflict: The plight of Palestinian refugees in Syria in the camps south of Damascus By Metwaly Abo Naser, with the support of Ryme Katkhouda and Devorah Hill Introduction: the historical role of Palestinians the Oslo Accords in 1992 and the resulting loss by both the in Syria Palestinian diaspora in general and the inhabitants of the After they took refuge in Syria after the 1948 war, al-Yarmouk refugee camp in particular of their position as Palestinians refugees were treated in the same way as a key source of both material and ideological support for other Syrian citizens. Their numbers eventually reached the Palestinian armed revolution in the diaspora. This was 450,000, living mostly in 11 refugee camps throughout Syria due in part to the failure of the various Palestinian national (UNRWA, 2006). Permitted to fully participate in the liberation factions to identify new ways of engaging the economic and social life of Syrian society, they had the diaspora – including the half million Palestinians living in same civic and economic rights and duties as Syrians, Syria – in the Palestinian struggle for the liberation of the except that they could neither be nominated for political land occupied by Israel. office nor participate in elections. This helped them to feel that they were part of Syrian society, despite their refugee This process happened slowly. After the Israeli blockade of status and active role in the global Palestinian liberation Lebanon in 1982, the Palestinian militant struggle declined. struggle against the Israeli occupation of their homeland.
    [Show full text]
  • Aramaeans Outside of Syria 1. Assyria Martti Nissinen 1. Aramaeans
    CHAPTER NINE OUTLOOK: ARAMAEANS OUTSIDE OF SYRIA 1. Assyria Martti Nissinen 1. Aramaeans and the Neo-Assyrian Empire (934–609 B.C.)1 Encounters between the Aramaeans and the Assyrians are as old as is the occupation of these two ethnic entities in the area between the Tigris and the Khabur rivers and in northern Mesopotamia. The first occurrence of the word ar(a)māyu in the Assyrian records is to be found in the inscriptions of Tiglath-Pileser I (1114–1076 B.C.), who gives an account of his confronta- tion with the “Aramaean Aḫlamaeans” (aḫlamû armāya) along the Middle Euphrates;2 however, the presence of the Aramaean tribes in this area is considerably older.3 The Assyrians had governed the Khabur Valley in the 13th century already, but the movement of the Aramaean tribes from the west presented a constant threat to the Assyrian supremacy in the area. Tiglath-Pileser I and his follower, Aššur-bēl-kala (1073–1056 B.C.), fought successfully against the Aramaeans, but in the long run, the Assyrians were not able to maintain control over the Lower Khabur–Middle Euphrates region. Assur-dān (934–912 B.C.) and Adad-nirari II (911–891 B.C.) man- aged to regain the area between the Tigris and the Khabur occupied by the Aramaeans, but the Khabur Valley was never under one ruler, and even the campaigns of Assurnasirpal II (883–859 B.C.) did not consolidate the Assyrian dominion. Under Shalmaneser III (858–824 B.C.) the area east of the Euphrates came under Assyrian control, but it was not until the 1 I would like to thank the Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton, NJ, USA) for the opportunity of writing this article during a research visit in May–June, 2011.
    [Show full text]
  • Syria Situation
    SYRIA SITUATION The Syria situation entered its tenth year in 2020 with more than 5.5 million Syrian refugees hosted by neighbouring countries, of whom 45% are children and 21% are women. Living conditions are precarious, with more than UNHCR’s overall requirements for the Syria 60% of Syrian refugees living in poverty. UNHCR situation in 2020 stand at $1.991 billion. As of 25 and UNDP continue to co-lead the Regional August 2020, $684.9 million have been received. Refugee and Resilience Plan in response to the Flexible and country-level funds received by Syria crisis (3RP), coordinating the work of more UNHCR have allowed the organization to allocate than 270 partners in the five main hosting an additional $66.4 million to the Syria situation, countries. Inside the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria), raising the current funding level to 38%. These SYRIA UNHCR continues to support IDPs through low funding levels have forced UNHCR’s protection activities, core relief items and shelter operations in neighbouring countries to cut or SITUATION activities, while also mobilizing emergency reduce some programmes. Further cuts are responses to new displacement. expected in the second half of 2020 if more funding is not received. Three siblings walk with their father through the rubble of their neighbourhood in Homs. UNHCR/VIVIAN TOU’MEH © AFFECTED COUNTRIES KEY POPULATION DATA $1.991 BILLION (AS OF 30 JUNE 2020) UNHCR's financial requirements 2020, as of 25 August 2020 5.5 million Funding shortfall Syrian refugees and asylum- $1.240 BILLION TURKEY
    [Show full text]
  • A NOTE on SYRIA and the UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC by Alan W.Horton
    NORTHEAST AFRICA SERIES Vol. M No. 1 (United Arab Republic) A NOTE ON SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC by Alan W.Horton Reports This Report is one of a continuing series on current developments in world affairs written by Associates of the American Universities Field Staff. It is distributed to subscribers to the AUFS Reports Service as a useful addition to the American fund of information on for- eign affairs. ALAN W. HORTON has The writer is associated with the AUFS on a full-time since 1947 rcsidcd in the hlid- basis, spending long periods abroad and returning to dle East as a student. teacher, the United States periodically to lecture on the cam- relief workcr, and college ad- puses of AUFS sponsoring educational institutions. ministrator. He began the study of Arabic at the Ameri- Chosen for skill in collecting, reporting, and eval- can University at Cairo's uating data, each AUFS Associate combines long per- School of Oriental St~~diesin sonal observation with scholarly studies relating to October 1947. While continu- ing as a student he also taught political scicnce tllerc his area. the following year. For a time hc engaged in relicf Founded in 1951 as a nonprofit educational organi- \\-ork among the Arah refugees in connection with the zation, the AUFS at first limited distribution of the 1)rograrn of thc American Friends Service Committet, Reports to its corporate member colleges and univer- and later that of the UN Rclief and Works Agency. Before his appointment as Dean of the School of Ori- sities. Later, subscription categories were established ental Studies at AUC in 195.5, hlr.
    [Show full text]
  • British Reports on Ottoman Syria in 1821-1823
    University of North Florida UNF Digital Commons History Faculty Publications Department of History 2-16-2019 Rebellion, Unrest, Calamity: British Reports on Ottoman Syria in 1821-1823 Theophilus C. Prousis University of North Florida, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/ahis_facpub Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Prousis, Theophilus C., "Rebellion, Unrest, Calamity: British Reports on Ottoman Syria in 1821-1823" (2019). History Faculty Publications. 29. https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/ahis_facpub/29 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at UNF Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UNF Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Digital Projects. © 2-16-2019 All Rights Reserved Chronos- Revue d’Histoire de l’Université de Balamand, is a bi-annual Journal published in three languages (Arabic, English and French). It deals particularly with the History of the ethnic and religious groups of the Arab world. Journal Name: Chronos ISSN: 1608-7526 Title: Rebellion, Unrest, Calamity: British Reports on Ottoman Syria in 1821-1823 Author(s): Theophilus C Prousis To cite this document: Prousis, T. (2019). Rebellion, Unrest, Calamity: British Reports on Ottoman Syria in 1821-1823. Chronos, 29, 185-210. https://doi.org/10.31377/chr.v29i0.357 Permanent link to this document: DOI: https://doi.org/10.31377/chr.v29i0.357 Chronos uses the Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-SA that lets you remix, transform, and build upon the material for non-commercial purposes.
    [Show full text]
  • United Arab Republic 1 United Arab Republic
    United Arab Republic 1 United Arab Republic ةدحتملا ةيبرعلا ةيروهمجلا Al-Gumhuriyah al-Arabiyah al-Muttahidah Al-Jumhuriyah al-Arabiyah al-MuttahidahUnited Arab Republic ← → 1958–1961 ← (1971) → ← → Flag Coat of arms Anthem Oh My Weapon[1] Capital Cairo Language(s) Arabic [2] Religion Secular (1958–1962) Islam (1962–1971) Government Confederation President - 1958–1970 Gamal Abdel Nasser United Arab Republic 2 Historical era Cold War - Established February 22, 1958 - Secession of Syria September 28, 1961 - Renamed to Egypt 1971 Area - 1961 1166049 km2 (450214 sq mi) Population - 1961 est. 32203000 Density 27.6 /km2 (71.5 /sq mi) Currency United Arab Republic pound Calling code +20 Al-Gumhuriyah al-Arabiyahةدحتملا ةيبرعلا ةيروهمجلا :The United Arab Republic (Arabic al-Muttahidah/Al-Jumhuriyah al-Arabiyah al-Muttahidah), often abbreviated as the U.A.R., was a sovereign union between Egypt and Syria. The union began in 1958 and existed until 1961, when Syria seceded from the union. Egypt continued to be known officially as the "United Arab Republic" until 1971. The President was Gamal Abdel Nasser. During most of its existence (1958–1961) it was a member of the United Arab States, a confederation with North Yemen. The UAR adopted a flag based on the Arab Liberation Flag of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, but with two stars to represent the two parts. This continues to be the flag of Syria. In 1963, Iraq adopted a flag that was similar but with three stars, representing the hope that Iraq would join the UAR. The current flags of Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen are also based on Arab Liberation Flag of horizontal red, white, and black bands.
    [Show full text]
  • Mapping Peace Between Syria and Israel
    UNiteD StateS iNStitUte of peaCe www.usip.org SpeCial REPORT 1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPO R T Frederic C. Hof Commissioned in mid-2008 by the United States Institute of Peace’s Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution, this report builds upon two previous groundbreaking works by the author that deal with the obstacles to Syrian- Israeli peace and propose potential ways around them: a 1999 Middle East Insight monograph that defined the Mapping peace between phrase “line of June 4, 1967” in its Israeli-Syrian context, and a 2002 Israel-Syria “Treaty of Peace” drafted for the International Crisis Group. Both works are published Syria and israel online at www.usip.org as companion pieces to this report and expand upon a concept first broached by the author in his 1999 monograph: a Jordan Valley–Golan Heights Environmental Preserve under Syrian sovereignty that Summary would protect key water resources and facilitate Syrian- • Syrian-Israeli “proximity” peace talks orchestrated by Turkey in 2008 revived a Israeli people-to-people contacts. long-dormant track of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Although the talks were sus- Frederic C. Hof is the CEO of AALC, Ltd., an Arlington, pended because of Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, Israeli-Syrian peace Virginia, international business consulting firm. He directed might well facilitate a Palestinian state at peace with Israel. the field operations of the Sharm El-Sheikh (Mitchell) Fact- Finding Committee in 2001. • Syria’s “bottom line” for peace with Israel is the return of all the land seized from it by Israel in June 1967.
    [Show full text]
  • Interaction of Aramaeans and Assyrians on the Lower Khabur
    Syria Archéologie, art et histoire 86 | 2009 Dossier : Interaction entre Assyriens et Araméens Interaction of Aramaeans and Assyrians on the Lower Khabur Hartmut Kühne Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/syria/509 DOI: 10.4000/syria.509 ISSN: 2076-8435 Publisher IFPO - Institut français du Proche-Orient Printed version Date of publication: 1 November 2009 Number of pages: 43-54 ISBN: 9782351591512 ISSN: 0039-7946 Electronic reference Hartmut Kühne, « Interaction of Aramaeans and Assyrians on the Lower Khabur », Syria [Online], 86 | 2009, Online since 01 July 2016, connection on 22 May 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ syria/509 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/syria.509 © Presses IFPO INTERACTION OF ARAMAEANS AND ASSYRIANS ON THE LOWER KHABUR Hartmut KÜHNE Freie Universität Berlin Résumé – Le modèle centre/périphérie a souvent été utilisé pour expliquer les relations entre Assyriens et Araméens. Il est de plus en plus clair que ce modèle n’est pas apte à rendre compte de l’interaction entre ces deux groupes ethniques. Il convient de se défaire de l’idée de l’influence sur la périphérie et de chercher plutôt les signes des processus d’émulation qui ont lieu entre deux groupes équivalents culturellement et qui s’affrontent dans un territoire sans suprématie politique. Au cours du temps — environ 500 ans, entre 1100 et 600 av. J.-C. —, la situation politique change et avec elle les formes de l’interaction perceptibles au travers des différents traits culturels, illustrés par les objets découverts en fouille. De fait, on doit s’attendre à ce que ces objets reflètent différentes étapes d’émulation et deviennent potentiellement des hybrides, plus ou moins élaborés, ou des transferts plus ou moins profondément modifiés.
    [Show full text]