Austrian National Defence Academy Vienna IFK MONITOR Interna�onal

THE WAR IN SYRIA: AN ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE Maya Hadar

While Israel and Syria have technically been in a state of war since the esta- blishment of Israel in 1948, Israel’s official position in the Syrian civil war is of non-interference. Yet, adherence to its national interests and the safety of its citizens indicates taking action, whenever needed, both militarily and di- plomatically during the course of the war as well as once the dust settles.

The world is undoubtedly united by its other potential threat, to date, the former concerns regarding the ramifications of are engaged in Inner Arab world disputes. the Syrian civil war on the well being of As such, Iran’s growing influence in close the Syrian people. We share our hope for a proximity to Israel’s’ northern border swift cessation of violence in the form of forms a much greater threat to Israel’s se- an agreement, which would enable the safe curity. return of displaced refugees. However, different countries have different interests Israeli-Syrian historic relations in the landscape of a post-war Syria: the main concern of the US and many Eu- Not only that Israel and Syria have never ropean countries being the threat arising established diplomatic relations, they were from the destabilizing influence of Sunni engaged in battle in four major wars (1948, extremists such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda. As 1967, 1973 & 1982). A further worsening demonstrated by several attacks carried out of the relations between the two occurred on European territory in recent years (Bar- following the Six-Day War in 1967, fought celona, London, Manchester, Paris, Stock- between Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. holm etc.), this is not merely a potential During the war, Israel has obtained control threat. over the Gaza strip and the Sinai Peninsula (from Egypt), the West Bank and east Jeru- Though Israel certainly shares the humani- salem (from Jordan) and the Golan Heights tarian concerns in this regard (and have (from Syria). Whereas the Sinai Peninsula long provided humanitarian assistance to was returned to Egypt following the Camp Syrian refugees), its’ main concern is Iran David accords of 1978 and whereas Israel and its proxy militant organization, most signed a peace treaty with Jordan in 1994, notably- Hezbollah. While anti-Israeli at- the formerly Syrian Golan Heights were

tacks by Sunni extremists constitute an- annexed in 1981 and remained an “open Support forInstitute Peace Management and Conflict

IFK Monitor International October 2017 wound” for Syria. The Golan Heights were gime and is allowing its Iranian partner and still are a perpetuation of Syrian defeat to maintain a strong military presence in the war and its’ meaning is both psycho- in Syria. Moreover, there is an immi- logical and strategic. Despite the Syrian nent danger that sophisticated weapons vindication achieved following the 1973 “made in Russia” would find their way war’s early success, hostilities between the from the Syrian army to the hands of two countries never ceased to exist. At Hezbollah. Lastly, Russian boots present present time, a ceasefire line originating in on Syrian ground may limit Israel’s free- the aftermath of the 1973 war is largely re- dom of action in Syria when it wishes to spected. tackle potential threats. This also holds the potential for Russian-Israel clashes, A few Israeli attempts to engage Syria in even unintentionally. peace negotiation (by former prime min- ister Sharon in 2004 and as part of a land - Though Sunni militant groups operating trade by former prime minister Olmert in Syria do not pose an immediate threat in 2007) were made under the Israeli pre- to Israel’s national security, cementing requisite that Syria will halt support for themselves in the region and exporting “terrorist agents”, “guerrilla groups” and extremist ideologies may potentially de- Iran. Indirect peace talks held in 2008 with stabilize Egypt and Jordan and thus, en- Turkish mediation did not yield any result. danger previously signed peace treaties. Furthermore, similarly to many other Threats to Israel’s national security western high-profile destinations, Israel may be a target of future attacks by ISIS - Iranian military presence in Syria and its and their likes. critical support in developing comple- mentary infrastructure (e.g. missiles and - The on-going Syrian civil war, com- chemical weapon manufacturing facili- bined with Assad’s reliance on Iran and ties) as well as its cooperation with lo- Hezbollah which enabled him to regain cal Hezbollah forces threatens Israel’s control over most of the country’s ter- northern border and increases the risk ritory (and made him the anticipated of a combined military operations on winner of the war), precludes any at- Israeli territory. In addition, as the main tempt to negotiate peace between Israel supplier of arms to Hezbollah, Iran’s and Syria for the time being. Moreover, freedom of action in Syria means an Assad’s dependence on Iran and the lat- increased capability of Hezbollah to ter’s tightening grip in the region makes target Israel’s larger cities using sophis- any future agreement between Syria and ticated weapons and mid to long range Israel improbable. missiles fired from southern Lebanon. Israel’s Actions in Syria since the be- - Although Israeli-Russian relationship ginning of the uprising has improved since the 1960-1970s: “when the Soviet Union was the Arab world’s weapons supplier and the Arab-Israeli conflict Israel’s official position regarding the Syr- was seen as just another front in the Cold War” ian war is of non-interference. However, (Harel, foreignpolicy.com, Oct 6, 2015). it has repeatedly stated that crossing its’ As a key player, Russian influence in the “red lines”; the shipment of anti-aircraft Syrian war may pose a threat to Israel’s missiles, precision ground-to-ground mis- national security since Russia is militar- siles, and chemical weapons to Hezbollah ily backing up the anti-Israeli Assad re- will not go unanswered. Attacks against

IFK Monitor International October 2017 specific targets on Syrian territories (as the steps in both the military and diplomatic recent attack on Syria’s chemical weapons levels: manufacturer in the Hama province) are often left unconfirmed by Jerusalem offi- On the military level cials. In addition to the military response, Israel tends to diplomatically engage the 1. The prevention of “Game Changing” US and Russia in such circumstances. weapons provided by Iran (or Russia, While specific and independent of the for that matter) from reaching Hezbol- conflict in Syria, these attacks are frequent lah. (in a recent interview, Israel’s former air force chief Amir Eshel stated that Israel 2. The prevention of the establishment of had hit arms convoys of the Syrian military an Iranian operation-base in southern and its Hezbollah allies nearly 100 times in Syria, from which Hezbollah can carry the past five years; Reuters, Sep 7, 2017). out attacks against Israel on the one hand, and reinforce Iranian-backed mili- Moreover, in the course of the war, Is- tary presence in the Golan Heights on rael has provided medical care to Nusra the other hand. Front fighters (the al-Qaida terrorist off- shoot) who are actively fighting the Ira- 3. Maintaining the “red lines” policy and nian backed axis of Assad and Hezbollah. providing a response when those are Although the Nusra Front is certainly no threatened. Such actions will send a ally of Israel, Amos Yadin, former mili- clear message to Syria, Iran and Hez- tary intelligence chief was quoted saying bollah, and demonstratively strengthen that Hezbollah and Iran “are the major Israel’s position in both the military and threat to Israel, much more than the radical the diplomatic fronts. Sunni Islamists” (Jerusalem Post, March 13, 2015). Evidently, non-official Israeli On the diplomatic level support of rebel groups extent beyond a mere humanitarian assistance. Non-Israeli 1. Attempting to obtain a Russian com- sources also point to an on-going supply mitment regarding the whereabouts of funds (used to pay for fighters’ salaries of Russian weapons transferred to the and ammunition) food, fuel and medical Syrian army and preventing those from provisions to Syrian rebels near the Israeli reaching Hezbollah. border and deeper on Syrian soil as early as 2013. The creation of a special army unit 2. Strengthening the diplomatic relations to oversee the aid operation was reported with Turkey and work towards future by the Wall Street Journal. This suggests cooperation, as both countries share a that unlike its’ official position, Israel is border with Syria and a common enemy very much involved in the Syrian war. (ISIS and Shia-domination).

Possible Israeli actions in Syria 3. Seeking continuing cooperation with the international community regarding Israel’s territorial proximity to Syria, mili- the ISIS threat. tary capabilities and special relationship with the US keeps its interests relevant in 4. Although Russia has rejected Israel’s re- the discussion of post-war Syria. In order quest for a 60 km buffer zone between to protect its security interests and in light the Golan Heights and any Iranian of current military developments in Syria, backed militias, further Israeli-Russian Israel could consider taking the following cooperation would assist in ensuring Is-

IFK Monitor International October 2017 raeli security interests in the framework appears as though Israel would have pre- of the de-escalation zones, specifically ferred the “devil it knows” over the un- on Syrian southwest. Moreover, since certainty following the emergence of a Russia serves as the only mediator be- new leader, possibly among Sunni Islamist tween Syria & Israel and Iran & Israel, groups. A slightly better scenario for Israel, further cooperation with Russia (also though not very realistic at this point, is Imprint: concerning air and navel operations) is the survival of a weak Assad who lacks full Copyright, Production, in Israel’s best interest. control over Syria and most notably, on its Publisher: southern border. In such a situation, the Republic of Austria / Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports 5. Attempting to convince the US that the regime would be stable enough to sustain Roßauer Lände 1 Iranian threat is indeed immanent and itself without posing a threat to Israel. Is- 1090 Vienna collaborate a joint plan of action to ad- rael’s “best case” scenario, though not very dress it. likely at present time, is a secular Syrian Edited by: National Defence Academy government - strong enough to control its Vienna Conclusions country and tackle local resistance while Institute for Peace Support and opposing Iranian interventions on the one Conflict Management At this late stage of the war, as the Ira- hand, and weak enough to not threaten Is- Stiftgasse 2a 1070 Vienna nian backed Syrian army has regained ter- rael on the other. +43 (0) 50201 10 28701 ritorial control over most of Syria, there is [email protected] little doubt as for the way the war would The further continuance of the war may end. This is certainly not Israel’s preferred benefit Israel on the short run; Entrench- Copyright: © Republic of Austria / outcome. Such decisive victory of Assad ing all of the involving parties in violence Federal Ministry of Defence would enable Hezbollah and Iran to con- and hostility towards each other in a pro- and Sports / All rights reserved tinue to operate and further extend their longed battle for control over Syria would operation too close to the Israeli border: a reduce the likelihood of them initiating a Periodikum der most probable scenario. direct confrontation with Israel. To date, it Landesverteidigungsakademie is most probable that when the war drums October 2017 The disintegration of Syria into regions will cease to hoist, Assad would emerge controlled by different groups (ISIS, Ira- victorious. Thus, Israel should continue Printing: nian militias, Sunni extremists, Alawites, to simultaneously act on both the military ReproZ W 17- Stiftgasse 2a and possibly US, Russia and Turkey as part and the diplomatic level in order to ensure 1070 Wien of the newly established “de-escalation” its sustainability and the safety of its’ citi- zones), an outcome which is still likely, is zens. also not Israel’s “best scenario”. In such a case, Israel would have to potentially fight many fronts, as neither of the local players Personal Data: is friendly. In addition, sharing a common Maya Hadar (LL.M, M.A Peace Studies and enemy may unite Iran, Hezbollah and pos- Conflict Resolution) is a former legal officer sibly pro-Iranian factions and strengthen in the Israeli Defence Forces and is currently them on the short term, where the latter a guest researcher with the Institute for Peace might join forces in a coordinated attack Support and Conflict Management (IFK) of against Israel - in the long term. the Austrian National Defence Academy focu- sing on the MENA region. Her research further includes post-conflict societies, most notably, When both most likely outcomes are not in the psychological effects of political violence on Israel’s best interest, the dilemma between social and national identities, exploring national “the devil you know” and the “devil you attachment, social trust and social rifts. Her re- don’t know” rises. Judging by the history search focuses on, but is not limited to, the land of Israeli-Syria relations under the Assad Israel. mhadar@staff.haifa.ac.il. www.facebook.com/lvak.ifk regime before the outbreak of the war, it

IFK Monitor International Note: This article represents October 2017 exclusively the opinion of the author.