Breaking the Mold: Lessons from Sixteen Years of Innovative UN Political Engagement in Nepal
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FEBRUARY 2021 Breaking the Mold: Lessons from Sixteen Years of Innovative UN Political Engagement in Nepal REBECCA BRUBAKER with contributions from AKHILESH UPADHYAY Cover Photo: Members of the Madheshi ABOUT THE AUTHOR community of Biratnagar attend a political rally to demand autonomous DR. REBECCA BRUBAKER is Senior Policy Adviser at the federal regions and greater representa- United Nations University Centre for Policy Research. tion in parliament, 2008. UN Photo/Agnieszka Mikulska. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent those of the author The report would not have been possible without the time, and not necessarily those of the insights, and contributions of a number of individuals. The International Peace Institute. IPI author owes a debt of gratitude to the many individuals who welcomes consideration of a wide so generously gave their time to be interviewed for this range of perspectives in the pursuit of work. a well-informed debate on critical policies and issues in international affairs. Furthermore, Akhilesh Upadhyay, former Editor-in-Chief of The Kathmandu Post, conducted a series of key interviews IPI Publications with interlocuters in Nepal and the larger region. The Albert Trithart, Editor and transcripts from these interviews provided valuable insights Research Fellow on a range of perspectives. In addition, Mr. Upadhyay Emma Fox, Editorial Intern assisted with the organization of the author’s visit and interviews in Kathmandu and Delhi in summer 2019. The Suggested Citation: author remains grateful for the many conversations and Rebecca Brubaker, with contributions debates they had on the topic and Mr. Upadhyay’s editorial from Akhilesh Upadhyay, “Breaking the input on earlier drafts. Mold: Lessons from Sixteen Years of Innovative UN Political Engagement in In addition, sincere thanks are owed to Mari Yamashita, Nepal,” International Peace Institute, Catherine Sung, Aditya Adikari, Prabin Bahadur Khadka, February 2021. Teresa Whitfield, Karina Hangaru, Tamrat Samuel, Dirk Druet, Dr. David Malone, Alma Saliu, Sebastian von Einsiedel, Ian © by International Peace Institute, 2021 Martin, Cale Salih, Karin Landgren, and a final anonymous All Rights Reserved reviewer for their incisive feedback during the drafting process. www.ipinst.org Finally, the author would like to thank Adam Day and Anthony Dursi for their editorial feedback and Jessica Caus, in particular, for her stellar research support. CONTENTS Abbreviations . iii Executive Summary . v Introduction. 1 Brief Overview of the Conflict. 1 Novel Approaches to UN Political Engagement (2002–2018) . 2 Fostering Relationships with the Conflict Parties while Keeping the Region Engaged (2002–2005) . 2 Leveraging Human Rights to Increase Accountability and Socialize the Parties to a Negotiated Solution (2005–2006) . 5 UNMIN: A Rapidly Deployed and Focused Mission of Somewhat Limited Duration (2007–2011) . 9 DPA’s Embedded Political Liaison Office (2011–2018) . 14 Highlighting Best Practices: Breaking the Mold . 17 Engaging Early and Discretely . 17 Using Human Rights Monitoring to Lay the Groundwork for Conflict Resolution . 17 The Innovative Practices of UNMIN . 18 Providing for Continuity through a Mission Transition . 20 Highlighting Challenges . 20 Changes in Elite Perceptions of UN Political Engagement . 20 National Political Turnover . 22 Regional Players’ Comfort Level with an Enhanced UN Role . 22 Managing Expectations . 22 Maintaining Impartiality amid Difference . 24 Summarizing Lessons Learned . 25 ABBREVIATIONS AMMAA Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CPN-M Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) DPA/DPPA Department of Political Affairs/Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs LO Liaison Office NHRC National Human Rights Commission NC Nepal Congress Party OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights RNA Royal Nepal Army UNCT UN country team UNDP UN Development Programme UNMIN UN Mission in Nepal UML Unified Marxist-Leninist Executive Summary UN political engagement in Nepal between 2002 Over time, UNMIN lost support among an influen- and 2018 has long been considered a successful tial portion of Nepal’s traditional political elite. example of sustained and innovative support to a Rapid turnover made it difficult for the UN to critical peace process. Many governments in the engage with the Nepali government. Both India broader region, however, have largely eschewed and China opposed efforts to enhance the role of international assistance in resolving conflicts, the mission. There was a mismatch between perceiving it as an unnecessary infringement on Nepalis’ expectations about what the UN, and state sovereignty or a threat to regional balances of UNMIN in particular, could and could not do. power. Thus, examining how the UN established a Finally, the UN was faced with the constant political presence in Nepal, and how that presence challenge of maintaining impartiality, both real and eventually concluded, has important lessons for the perceived. UN more broadly. Taking the story of the UN’s sixteen years of The UN’s political engagement in Nepal can be political engagement in Nepal, its innovative divided into four phases. First, from 2002 to 2005, practices, and the challenging environment into the UN began fostering relationships with the consideration, this paper offers eight lessons: parties to the conflict and other actors in the region. Second, from 2005 to 2006, the UN • Foster relationships with key conflict parties leveraged human rights to increase accountability before there is a need for an active UN political and begin moving the parties toward a negotiated role; solution. Third, the UN Mission in Nepal • Use indirect means to keep the regional players (UNMIN) was deployed in 2007 and remained in positively engaged, when direct means fail; the country until 2011 to support the implementa- tion of the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. • Draw on or generate high-quality, fast, action- Finally, a UN political liaison office remained able and representative conflict information; engaged in Nepal following the mission’s departure through 2018. • Design UN missions according to context; UN actors have been heralded for a range of best • Manage a mission’s (perceived or real) practices during these sixteen years of political footprint in order to maximize leverage; engagement. The UN effectively used its good offices to engage early in the conflict and used a • Build a dedicated communications strategy to human rights mission to lay and then maintain the help set and manage expectations regarding groundwork for peace talks. UNMIN used innova- what a mission can and cannot do; tive approaches to monitor arms and armies while • Consider using human rights monitoring as deploying rapidly. It also reached out to Nepalis the groundwork for conflict resolution; and across the country and collaborated with the wider UN system to ensure the sustainability of its efforts. • Be willing to make unpopular decisions, if they At the same time, the UN’s ability to contribute to are the right decisions for sustaining the peace. peace in Nepal was limited by several challenges. Breaking the Mold: Lessons from Sixteen Years of Innovative UN Political Engagement in Nepal 1 Introduction officials) and the international community of experts on Nepal. Transcripts of the interviews are UN political engagement in Nepal between 2002 on file with the author. In addition, the author was and 2018 has long been considered a successful granted access to personal archives on UN political example of sustained and innovative support to a involvement in Nepal between 2002 and 2009. The critical peace process. Many governments in the report draws heavily from both interviews and the broader region, however, have largely eschewed archives given the sensitive nature of the topics international assistance in resolving conflicts, explored. perceiving it as an unnecessary infringement on state sovereignty or a threat to regional balances of Brief Overview of the power. Thus, examining how the UN established a political presence in Nepal, and how that presence Conflict eventually concluded, can highlight important lessons for the UN more broadly. In 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launched a violent insurgency against the state, This report is divided into five parts. First, it protesting inequality and exclusion within Nepali provides an overview of the conflict situation at the society and seeking to replace the capitalist system time of the UN’s initial political engagement. with one based on the tenets of Maoism. The Second, it briefly summarizes insurgents began by attacking the four periods of the UN’s UN political engagement in Nepal police stations in the remote involvement, beginning in between 2002 and 2018 has long (and generally disenfran- 2002 with the quiet diplomacy been considered a successful chised) mountain districts of of one UN official and ending example of sustained and innovative Rolpa and Rukum in the west in 2018 with the closing of an support to a critical peace process. and Sindhuli in the east. The embedded political liaison conflict escalated as police office. Third, it highlights best retaliated and the Maoists practices from the sixteen years of UN political counterattacked. Successive civilian governments engagement. Fourth, it reviews the particular attempted to counter the Maoists’ advances, using challenges faced and looks at