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4.9

India and

The UN Military Observer Group in and declared a unilateral cease-fire, later recipro- Pakistan (UNMOGIP) continued to oversee a cated by India. Political relations improved frequently tense situation between Indian and further in January 2004, when an agreement Pakistani forces in the Jammu and was reached to commence a bilateral “com- region. While violence was common in the dis- posite dialogue” on an agreed range of issues, puted region during the year (though not usually including those related to Jammu-Kashmir. along the that divides the forces), Numerous confidence-building measures were the 11 July 2006 terrorist attacks on India’s mass initiated, and a minisummit was held in April transit system that killed 180 in the financial 2005 to discuss the fate of Jammu-Kashmir. capital, Mumbai, temporarily dashed hopes that Following an overall decline in violent attacks the two parties would move closer to resolution through 2005, India reduced its troop levels in of their prolonged territorial dispute. Respon- Jammu and Kashmir by about 3,000. sibility for the attacks was not claimed, but sus- In a demonstration of solidarity and a pecting Pakistan’s involvement, Indian prime desire to resolve their long-standing dispute, minister Manmohan Singh postponed continua- during the September 2006 meeting of the tion of the bilateral talks aimed at normalizing Non-Aligned Movement, Pakistani president relations, which had begun in 2004. Pervez Musharraf and Indian prime minister UNMOGIP continues to observe the cease- Singh agreed to resume their bilateral talks at fire established by the Karachi Agreement, of an undisclosed date in the future. UNMOGIP 27 July 1949, despite India’s official position continues to provide on-the-ground observa- that UNMOGIP has had no operational role to tion, but its ability to contribute to a further play since the signing of the 1972 Simla easing of tension in the Kashmir region re- Agreement, which established a line of control mains limited. The mission’s status is likely to (LOC) separating the two armies and specified remain unchanged for the foreseeable future. that the parties should resolve their differences bilaterally. The mission monitors the 1972 LOC, which has only been slightly revised since the 1949 Karachi Agreement. Over the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) years, India has restricted somewhat the activ- ities and movement of UNMOGIP observers • Authorization date 21 April 1948 (UNSC Res. 47) on its side of the LOC by requiring them to • Start date 1 January 1949 travel in Indian army convoys, and has re- • Chief military observer Major General Dragutin Repinc (Croatia) jected proposals for the UN to play a mediat- • Budget $7.9 million (1 January– ing role in the conflict. Despite this resistance, 31 December 2006) • Strength as of Military observers: 44 both governments have continued to provide 30 September 2006 International civilian staff: 22 UNMOGIP with accommodation, transporta- Local civilian staff: 47 tion, and security. Following tensions in 2003 that raised the For detailed mission information see p. 342. prospect of nuclear confrontation, Pakistan

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120 • MISSION NOTES

Box 4.9.1 Nepal

The handover of authority from Nepal’s In response to the increased violence a mission to oversee the rebel canton- King Gyanendra to parliament during and restrictions placed on personal free- ment, management of arms, and the 2006 marked the end of both the Hindu doms, the UN Office of the High Com- overall peace process. The letter also re- monarchy’s grip on Nepal’s governing missioner for (OHCHR), quested that the UN continue its human structures, and ten years of conflict with the consent of the Nepalese govern- rights monitoring, as well as oversee the between the Royal Armed Forces of ment, established a monitoring office in twenty-five-point code of conduct agreed Nepal and the country’s Maoist rebel Nepal in April 2005. Ian Martin was to by the two sides in anticipation of movement. To help sort out continuing appointed Personal Representative of the June 2007 elections. differences over disarmament and reinte- High Commissioner in Nepal. Ian Martin was subsequently gration, in August 2006 the new interim After further violence and protests, appointed Personal Representative of the government and the rebels jointly seven political opposition parties formed Secretary-General, supported by a small requested the to provide an alliance that brought about the rein- team of administrators. His first task a wide-ranging assistance package. statement of parliament on 24 April was to determine how the UN could In February 2005, King Gyanendra 2006. The opposition alliance then called contribute most effectively to Nepal’s dissolved Nepal’s parliament in an effort off protests and established an interim postconflict evolution. On 21 November to stifle political opposition and crush government, headed by Prime Minister 2006, the Maoists and the government the Maoist insurgency. This move was Girija Prasad Koirala. On 16 June 2006, agreed to a peace deal in which the followed by a wave of guerrilla attacks the Maoist rebels agreed to a three- Maoists would join the parliament and and political protests, which were met month cease-fire and joined the interim their weapons would be locked up and with an upsurge in arrests by the king’s government in peace talks aimed at com- monitored by the UN. emergency-rule government as well as pletely ending the decade-long conflict. With the first group of mission per- widespread human rights violations. The In August 2006, Secretary-General sonnel starting to arrive in late Decem- king lifted emergency rule on 30 April Kofi Annan dispatched a week-long ber, a second assessment team was sent 2005, but the gesture did little to calm assessment mission to Nepal, led by to plan for a full-fledged UN mission to the situation, as Nepal’s parliament was Staffan de Mistura. Following the mis- support the peace process. not reinstated and questions regarding sion’s return, Annan received identical the constitutional power of the monar- letters from the interim government and chy went unanswered. Maoist rebels, inviting the UN to dispatch