Overt Peace, Covert War?: Covert Intervention and the Democratic Peace Alexander B
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The United States' Janus-Faced Approach to Operation Condor: Implications for the Southern Cone in 1976
University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Supervised Undergraduate Student Research Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects and Creative Work Spring 5-2008 The United States' Janus-Faced Approach to Operation Condor: Implications for the Southern Cone in 1976 Emily R. Steffan University of Tennessee - Knoxville Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj Recommended Citation Steffan, Emily R., "The United States' Janus-Faced Approach to Operation Condor: Implications for the Southern Cone in 1976" (2008). Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/1235 This is brought to you for free and open access by the Supervised Undergraduate Student Research and Creative Work at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Emily Steffan The United States' Janus-Faced Approach To Operation Condor: Implications For The Southern Cone in 1976 Emily Steffan Honors Senior Project 5 May 2008 1 Martin Almada, a prominent educator and outspoken critic of the repressive regime of President Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay, was arrested at his home in 1974 by the Paraguayan secret police and disappeared for the next three years. He was charged with being a "terrorist" and a communist sympathizer and was brutally tortured and imprisoned in a concentration camp.l During one of his most brutal torture sessions, his torturers telephoned his 33-year-old wife and made her listen to her husband's agonizing screams. -
Revolutions, Coups, and Regrets/ U.S. Intervention in Latin America
University of Hawai‘i at Hilo HOHONU 2019 Vol. 17 in general was complex and changed rapidly as events Revolutions, Coups, and unfolded. The revolution is perceived in the modern eye Regrets: as simplistic and the motivations obvious. However, that viewpoint reveals a lack of understanding of the Cuban U.S. Intervention in Latin Revolution and the subsequent political quagmire. What follows will display this Cuban quagmire in all of its America during the Cold War. complexities. Paul Edward Fontenot The government of Fulgencio Batista emerged From the Monroe Doctrine to the construction of in Cuba after a coup in 1952. Only seven years later the Panama Canal, the United States has been involved however, revolutionary forces under Fidel Castro in many of the most important events in Latin America, overthrew the authoritarian and oppressive Batista and the history of Latin America is closely tied to that of regime. The insurgency against Batista developed a the United States. With the relation that Latin America reputation inside and outside of Cuba as freedom currently shares with the U.S. in mind, one would not fighters resisted the repressive Batista regime. Batista’s find it shocking that the United States intervened all allies declined as the insurgency gained more ground over Latin America during the Cold War. The United and defeat loomed. Even the United States had all but States rigged the elections in numerous Latin American abandoned him by 1958. The Eisenhower administration countries, assassinated political figures in others, and did not want to openly support Castro nor openly even toppled governments all in the name of preventing condemn Batista, but they knew a losing horse when the spread of Communism or protecting their economic they saw one. -
Pinochet Loses Immunity LADB Staff
University of New Mexico UNM Digital Repository NotiSur Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) 6-18-2004 Pinochet Loses Immunity LADB Staff Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur Recommended Citation LADB Staff. "Pinochet Loses Immunity." (2004). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/13271 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in NotiSur by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LADB Article Id: 52365 ISSN: 1089-1560 Pinochet Loses Immunity by LADB Staff Category/Department: Chile Published: 2004-06-18 An appeals court in Chile opened the door on May 28 to clarifying the role former dictator Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990) played in the creation of Operation Condor, a coordinated effort by South American military dictatorships to eliminate opponents in the 1970s and 1980s. In a surprise decision, the full Santiago Appeals Court voted 14-9 to lift the 88-year-old retired general's immunity from prosecution, clearing the way for him to testify in a case heard by Judge Juan Guzman involving human rights lawsuits filed in 1998. Chilean President Ricardo Lagos praised the court's decision, while the head of the Army publicly lamented it. Operation Condor prosecution dogs ex-dictator The Appeals Court decision came in response to the accusation of kidnapping brought by the relatives of 13 disappeared prisoners from the era of the repressive alliance between intelligence services of South American dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s (see NotiSur, 2001-06-01). -
Keeping the US Hand Well Hidden: the Role of the Church Committee in Rethinking US Covert Intervention in the 1970S
Keeping the US Hand Well Hidden: The Role of the Church Committee in Rethinking US Covert Intervention in the 1970s Julia Kropa A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of BACHELOR OF ARTS WITH HONORS DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN April 2, 2018 Advised by Professor Victoria Langland TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………………..ii Timeline……………………………………………………………………………………iii Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 1: US Covert Involvement and the Death of General Schneider…………………14 The Election of 1970 and Escalation of US Involvement…………………………16 Creating an Atmosphere of Overthrow……………………………………………26 The Aftermath of General Schneider’s Death……………………………………..37 Chapter 2: The Formation of the Church Committee……………………………………..42 The Origins of the Church Committee…………………………………………….45 White House Opposition to the Church Committee……………………………….59 The Committee’s Purpose for Investigating Assassination Plots………………….66 Chapter 3: The Church Committee Investigates Assassination Plots……………………..70 The Church Committee’s Investigation…………………………………………...73 The Investigation Reaches the White House………………………………………81 The Committee’s Interim Report and its Findings………………………………...91 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………96 Appendix 1……………………………………………………………………………….102 Appendix 2……………………………………………………………………………….107 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………...109 i Acknowledgments First and foremost, thank you to my advisor, Professor Victoria Langland, for her guidance and encouragement at every stage of this project from my initial thoughts to the end product. I would like to thank the LSA Honors Program and the History Department for generously providing funding for my research and writing. I am also thankful to my writing group, Maggie and Noah, for reading my many drafts and offering feedback at every step in the process. Many thanks to Emily for listening to me for a year and a half talking and brainstorming out loud, and for forcing me to always keep on working. -
Thesis US Cuba.Pdf
BEING SUCCESSFULLY NASTY: THE UNITED STATES, CUBA AND STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM, 1959-1976 by ROBERT G. DOUGLAS B.A., University of Victoria, 2005 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of History © Robert Grant Douglas, 2008 University of Victoria All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author. BEING SUCCESSFULLY NASTY: THE UNITED STATES, CUBA AND STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM, 1959-1976 by ROBERT G. DOUGLAS B.A., University of Victoria, 2005 Supervisory Committee Dr. Jason Colby (Department of History) Supervisor Dr. Perry Biddiscombe (Department of History) Departmental Member Dr. Jordan Stanger-Ross (Department of History) Departmental Member Dr. Michelle Bonner (Department of Political Science) Outside Member ii Supervisory Committee Dr. Jason Colby (Department of History) Supervisor Dr. Perry Biddiscombe (Department of History) Departmental Member Dr. Jordan Stanger-Ross (Department of History) Departmental Member Dr. Michelle Bonner (Department of Political Science) Outside Member Abstract Despite being the global leader in the “war on terror,” the United States has been accused of sponsoring terrorism against Cuba. The following study assesses these charges. After establishing a definition of terrorism, it examines U.S.-Cuban relations from 1808 to 1958, arguing that the United States has historically employed violence in its efforts to control Cuba. U.S. leaders maintained this approach even after the Cuban Revolution: months after Fidel Castro‟s guerrilla army took power, Washington began organizing Cuban exiles to carry out terrorist attacks against the island, and continued to support and tolerate such activities until the 1970s, culminating in what was the hemisphere‟s most lethal act of airline terrorism before 9/11. -
A Thesis Entitled a Socio-Historical Analysis of U.S. State Terrorism
A Thesis Entitled A Socio-Historical Analysis of U.S. State Terrorism from 1948 to 2008 By Chad A. Malone Submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for The Master of Arts in Sociology ___________________________________ Advisor: Dr. Elias Nigem ___________________________________ Committee Member: Dr. Dwight Haase ___________________________________ Committee Member: Dr. Marietta Morrissey ___________________________________ College of Graduate Studies The University of Toledo August 2008 An Abstract of A Socio-Historical Analysis of U.S. State Terrorism from 1948 to 2008 Chad A. Malone Submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for The Master of Arts in Sociology The University of Toledo August 2008 This thesis is a critical examination of U.S. foreign intervention from 1948 to 2008. Using a comparative/historical analysis of seven cases—Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, Chile, Nicaragua, Panama, and Iraq—this study finds patterns of U.S. state/state-sponsored terror and intervention. Using world-system theory and G. William Domhoff’s class-domination theory of power, this study explains how and why the U.S. government, the U.S. military, the CIA, and U.S. corporations participate in economically motivated terrorist acts to support the capitalist mode of production, U.S. investments, and access to markets and natural resources. Finally, this study reveals patterns (in addition to the use of terror) that the U.S. government follows while intervening in the affairs of foreign nations. ii Dedication This thesis is dedicated to my parents. While they may not always agree with what I say or write, they have always been supportive of my education and my goals. -
A Challenge to Democratic Peace Theory: U.S. Intervention in Chile, 1973
A Challenge to Democratic Peace Theory: U.S. Intervention in Chile, 1973 by Carissa Faye Margraf Washington and Lee University Class of 2021 [email protected] In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Bachelor of Arts in Politics with Honors Thesis Advisor: Dr. Zoila Ponce de Leon Second Reader: Dr. Brian Alexander Lexington, Virginia Spring 2021 Margraf 2 Acknowledgements I would like to thank those who have supported me throughout my academic journey. Without you, I would not be where I am today. To my family, I will forever be grateful for the hours that you allowed me to ramble about Chile and covert action as I refined my argument, and for the attentive nods and encouragement throughout this process. To my friends, thank you for the much-needed thesis breaks of badminton, movies, and check-ins after long nights. I would also like to thank my wonderful Thesis Advisor, Dr. Zoila Ponce de Leon, for her endless support and dedication, and my Second Reader, Dr. Brian Alexander, for his thorough feedback and enthusiasm. Finally, I would like to thank my mom, who we lost at the start of my sophomore year. While she is not here to experience these final moments of my time at Washington and Lee University, I am confident that she would be glowing with pride. Margraf 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS I: EVERY THEORETICAL CHALLENGE REQUIRES A CATALYST o Abstract o Introduction o Thesis II: METHODOLOGY III: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND o Democratic Peace Theory ▪ Origin ▪ Contents of the Theory ▪ Normative vs Structural Logic ▪ Debates of -
Participación Uruguaya En La Coordinación Represiva Regional: “Operación Cóndor”
Equipo de Investigación Histórica Participación Uruguaya en la coordinación represiva regional: “Operación Cóndor”. Esta sección pertenece al Tomo I del libro "Investigación Histórica sobre detenidos desaparecidos" publicado por Presidencia de la República en el año 2007. Presentación La sola mención de la coordinación represiva regional evoca inmediatamente a la Operación Cóndor, aunque ésta fue sólo una, seguramente la más importante, de las instancias de colaboración entre las fuerzas represivas del Cono Sur (Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Paraguay y Uruguay) que se incluyen en esta Sección. Es claro que hubo coordinación y acciones conjuntas antes y después de los períodos autoritarios de los años sesenta, setenta y ochenta en esos países, pero las páginas que siguen refieren a los mecanismos de colaboración que predominaron entre 1973 y 1984, los años de la dictadura en Uruguay. La gran novedad de esta época fue la flagrante ilegalidad de los mecanismos empleados, con estructuras paralelas a las cadenas conocidas de mando militares y policiales, y el consecuente secreto que aún rodea todas estas actividades. Hoy se tiene acceso a varios archivos nacionales y extranjeros que ofrecen evidencia de esta colaboración ilegal, permitiendo contrastar con los numerosos testimonios de quienes fueron sus víctimas. El análisis y las conclusiones que aquí se presentan están fundados en una atenta lectura de documentos provenientes de archivos y documentación oficial de varios países. Aunque una porción de esta evidencia fue pública en su momento, la mayor parte fue abierta a la consulta sólo después del fin de los gobiernos autoritarios en la región. Los procesos de apertura de los repositorios documentales enfrentaron varios escollos y aún queda mucho por lograr. -
Covert Action: a Useful Tool for United States Foreign Policy?
Covert Action: A Useful Tool for United States Foreign Policy? Derek Andrew Uram M.Ed., University of Toronto, 2002 B.Ed.,University of Toronto, 2000 B.U.R.Pl., Ryerson Polytechnical Institute, 1989 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION in the School of Public Administration 0 Derek Andrew Uram, 2005 University of Victoria All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or by other means, without the permission of the author. Supervisor: Dr. Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly ABSTRACT Covert action is a policy tool used by the United States government. It is secretive and highly controversial in that it attempts to actively change the course of events in other nations. Much covert action undertaken by the US government has taken place within the developing world - governments have been overthrown, elections influenced, media distorted, and the lives of millions of individuals affected by covert activities secretly organized and executed by US officials in Washington, DC and Langley, Virginia - headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency. The question must be asked: Is covert action a useful tool for US foreign policy? Evidence from two important case studies - Iran and Chile - reveals that covert action has very limited genuine value as a policy tool. It does not always produce desired results. Even "successful" covert undertakings can create additional problems, the type of which may not appear until many years after the fact. Supervisor: Dr. E. Brunet-Jailly (School of Public Administration) Table of Contents Title Page . -
Music for a Shadow Play)
Gamelan (Music for a Shadow Play) By Lawrence R. Tirino ©2013 To the good people who have been led astray by madmen, and especially to those who have suffered as a result. 1.Death in the Afternoon Chucha de tu madre! Que bestia!¨ Louis grumbled under his breath as he listened to the men on red scooters visiting all the small shopkeepers. ¨Chulqueros! ¨ He spat into the gutter. ¨Todo el pueblo anda chiro; ¨ - meaning of course that everyone‟s pockets held lint, or dust, or assorted garbage, but none of them held any money. They can‟t get credit cards, and banks won‟t lend them the small amounts that they needed to keep their business running, so they look for one of the countless street shysters that sit drinking coffee at beachfront restaurants in the afternoons when the sun has mellowed. These merchant bankers are the survivors who fled the brutality of their own countries; and although they now wear fine leather shoes and silk shits, the scent of decadence still clings to their pores. Last year they were charging twenty per cent of the principle on the first of the month. Nervous shopkeepers were easily confused into believing that they were paying the same rates as banks. Now it was even easier; a few dollars every day. But all the borrower ever pays is interest. One day the victim wakes up and realizes their mistake; and then they fold and disappear into the nighttime air. Or perhaps the back page of the morning paper. Sunday, the saddest day. -
2013 Annual Report
The National Security Archive The George Washington University Phone: 202/994-7000 Gelman Library, Suite 701 Fax: 202/994-7005 2130 H Street, N.W. www. nsarchive.org Washington, D.C. 20037 [email protected] Annual Report for 2013 The following statistics provide a performance index of the Archive’s work in 2013: Freedom of Information and declassification requests filed – 1,167 Freedom of Information and declassification appeals filed – 219 Pages of U.S. government documents released as the result of Archive requests – 82,537 including such news-making revelations as the first official acknowledgement of the legendary “Area 51” secret base in Nevada; U.S. intelligence’s detection in December 1995 of activities at the Indian nuclear test site that suggested underground test preparations; U.S. and British records relating to Canadian intelligence’s discovery in 1964 that Israel had contracted with Argentina to purchase over 80 tons of “yellow cake,” with virtually nonexistent safeguards; CIA materials officially acknowledging the agency’s direct role in the 1953 Iran coup; and documentary evidence of the collusion of Mexican officials with the Zeta drug cartel in the 2010 San Fernando massacre of 72 migrants attempting to reach the United States. Pages of declassified documents delivered to publisher – 23,819 in one reference collection: Mexico-United States Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013. Evidence delivered to truth commissions and human rights investigators – 2,000 documents to United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights -
Killers of IWW Member Frank Teruggi Sentenced in Chile
Killers of IWW member Frank Teruggi sentenced in Chile In February 2015, two former Chilean military intelligence officers were convicted of the murder of IWW member Teruggi and another American, Charles Horman. Teruggi and Horman were kidnapped, tortured and murdered during the military coup in Chile in 1973. Frank Teruggi, an IWW member from Chicago and a native of Des Plaines, Ill., was kidnapped, tortured and murdered during the military coup in Chile in 1973. On Feb. 4, 2015 two Chilean military intelligence officers were convicted of the murder of Fellow Worker (FW) Teruggi and another American, Charles Horman. Brigadier General Pedro Espinoza was sentenced to seven years in the killings of both men. Rafael González, who worked for Chilean Air Force Intelligence as a “civilian counterintelligence agent,” was sentenced to two years in the Horman murder only. Espinoza is currently serving multiple sentences for other human rights crimes as well. A third indicted man, U.S. Naval Captain Ray Davis, head of the U.S. Military Group at the U.S. Embassy in Santiago at the time of the coup, has since died. Teruggi, 24, and Horman, 31, had gone to Chile to see and experience the new socialist government of President Salvador Allende. FW Terrugi participated in protest marches in Santiago following the unsuccessful June 1973 military attempt referred to as the “Tanquetazo” or “Tancazo.” FBI documents show that the agency monitored him, labeling him a “subversive” due to his anti-Vietnam war activities, and participation in assisting draft evaders. FBI files also list his street address in Santiago.