elections, in which Allende’s opponents, Showdown in bolstered by cia support, would presum- ably defeat Allende at the polls. Santiago In this view, the military coup and the bloody Pinochet dictatorship, which lasted nearly 17 years, were unfortunate What Really Happened but unintended consequences. But that in Chile? is not what really happened in Chile. BLOOD ON THE TRACKS As Devine acknowledges, in the fall Made in the U.S.A. of 1970, U.S. President Richard Nixon ordered the cia to orchestrate a military Peter Kornbluh putsch that would prevent the recently ore than 40 years after the elected Allende from assuming office. 1973 military coup that cost This top-secret plan was referred to as MChilean President Salvador Track II, to distinguish it from Track I, Allende his life and brought General a covert political campaign supported Augusto Pinochet to power, the historical by the State Department to convince the record on the U.S. role in Chile continues Chilean Congress not to ratify Allende’s to stir debate. Far from being a “cold election and thus to keep him from office. case” of the Cold War, as Foreign Affairs Devine benignly characterizes Track II implied in its July/August issue, it as a misguided covert action. In fact, remains a hot and controversial topic. Track II centered on a violent criminal Jack Devine’s audaciously titled article, scheme. The plan was to kidnap Chile’s “What Really Happened in Chile,” relates commander in chief, General René his version of the story of infamous U.S. Schneider, who firmly opposed the idea covert actions in which Devine himself of a military coup. “The cia was aware played a key role as a young cia officer of the plan,” Devine notes, as if the agency based in Santiago. were an innocent bystander, simply Devine’s central argument is that gathering intelligence on the operation. between 1970 and 1973, the cia sought The truth is far more sinister. The to protect Chile’s democratic institutions Schneider operation was a cia-sponsored from Allende’s Popular Unity government, plot: cia officials pressed the agency’s which Washington believed would push station in Santiago to come up with a Chile toward Cuban-style socialism way to “remove” Schneider because he and into the Soviet orbit. According to was standing in the way of a military Devine, the cia was merely “supporting coup. Cia representatives met repeatedly Allende’s domestic political opponents with the conspirators, led by a retired and making sure Allende did not disman- Chilean army general, Roberto Viaux, tle the institutions of democracy,” such and an active-duty brigadier general, as opposition parties and media outlets. Camilo Valenzuela. On October 19, cia The cia’s goal, Devine suggests, was to headquarters sent the station six untrace- preserve those institutions until the 1976 able submachine guns and ammunition 168 foreign affairs Showdown in Santiago in a diplomatic pouch, to be provided to small group of covert operatives to quickly the plotters. The agency also provided catalyze a coup, Washington developed $50,000 to Valenzuela to bankroll the a longer-term effort to destabilize the operation and thousands more to Viaux to Chilean government economically, keep the operation “financially lubricated,” politically, and militarily and to create as one cia cable stated. Given the risks a climate conducive to Allende’s demise. involved, the cia issued the plotters life For the cia, “Track II never really ended,” insurance policies. Thomas Karamessines, Devine’s superior But on October 22, the thugs hired officer in the agency’s Directorate of with cia funds shot Schneider during Operations, testified during a special their attempt to abduct him as he drove Senate investigation in 1975. “What we to work. U.S. operatives then provided were told to do was to continue our $35,000 to help some of the assassins efforts. Stay alert, and to do what we flee Chile—and to purchase their silence could to contribute to the eventual about the cia’s involvement. achievement of the objectives and The very next day, as Schneider lay purposes of Track II.” dying from multiple gunshot wounds, Devine appears unaware that Henry high-level cia officials sent a cable of Kissinger, Nixon’s national security commendation to the station in Santiago: adviser, convinced Nixon to reject the “The station has done [an] excellent job State Department’s position that the of guiding [the] Chileans to [the] point United States should accept Allende’s today where a military solution”—that election and work toward his electoral is, an anti-Allende coup—“is at least an defeat in 1976. At a pivotal National option for them,” the cable read. The Security Council meeting on November 6, agency lauded its operatives in Chile 1970, three days after Allende’s inaugura- “for accomplishing this under extremely tion, Kissinger’s talking points called difficult and delicate circumstances.” for a discussion of “actions we can take In the face of widespread public ourselves to intensify Allende’s prob- revulsion in Chile at Schneider’s murder, lems so that at a minimum he may fail the Chilean military officials whom the or be forced to limit his aims, and at a cia had paid and counted on failed to go maximum might create conditions in forward with the coup. “At that point, which a collapse or overthrow might be all coup plotting ended and Nixon drasti- feasible.” Both Secretary of Defense cally altered his policy,” Devine asserts. Melvin Laird and Secretary of State Washington’s “new goal,” he writes, William Rogers agreed that “we want “was to support the political opposition to do it right and bring [Allende] down.” and avoid giving Allende an excuse to Nixon instructed his top national secu- exploit anti-American sentiment to rity aides to pursue aggressive actions increase his domestic popularity and to subvert Allende’s government, masked international support.” by a “very cool and very correct” public The declassified record tells a very posture toward Chile, which would deny different story: U.S. policymakers Allende the chance to use the specter adjusted their strategy but not their of U.S. intervention to rally national- ultimate goal. Rather than rely on a ist support. September/October 2014 169 Devine and His Critic By the time Devine arrived in Chile Panama Canal Zone. A declassified in August 1971, the cia had already intelligence report recorded Pinochet’s initiated a five-part “Covert Action belief that Allende “must be forced to Program for Chile.” The operations step down or be eliminated” and a clear included “enlarging contacts in the message from U.S. Army officers in Chilean military,” “political action to response: the “U.S. will support [a] divide and weaken the Allende coalition,” coup against Allende with ‘whatever “support to non-Marxist opposition means necessary’ when the time comes.” political groups and parties,” aiding media outlets that “can speak out against AN EXPENSIVE FREE PRESS the Allende government,” and running When the time came, the United States propaganda operations through media did not directly participate in the coup, outlets to “play up Allende’s subversion as Devine correctly points out. But that of the democratic process.” is not because Washington opposed a Devine minimizes the cia’s contact military takeover. Rather, according to with the Chilean military leadership, the minutes of an interagency meeting suggesting that the cia was simply gather- in October 1972, U.S. officials deter- ing intelligence. But at the first meeting mined that “if and when the Chilean after Allende’s inauguration of the high- military decided to undertake a coup, level interagency committee that over- they would not need U.S. government saw clandestine operations, Kissinger assistance or support to do so success- stated that the goal of maintaining fully.” Even so, just four days before covert contact with Chile’s military the coup, the cia was working on “a officers was “not just for intelligence capability for influencing the situation” but for potential future action.” Cia if, as one State Department report documents reveal that as political and noted, the predicted coup was “in economic instability increased in Chile, danger of failure.” the agency stepped up its communica- In that sense, the issue of whether tion with key officers. A May 1973 Washington played a direct role in the memorandum to cia Director James coup is a red herring. The questions Schlesinger noted that the agency had that matter more are whether the Nixon “accelerated efforts against the military administration attempted to “bring target” in order to “better monitor any down” Allende by creating conditions coup plotting and bring our influence “in which a collapse or overthrow may to bear on key military commanders so be feasible,” as Kissinger put it, and that they might play a decisive role on whether the cia contributed to that the side of the coup forces.” effort in a significant way. Moreover, the cia was not the only The answer to both questions is part of the U.S. government bringing yes—and by his own account, Devine its influence to bear. The U.S. Depart- was deeply involved in the covert opera- ment of Defense also maintained contact tions that, according to his cia superiors, with the generals. Indeed, a full year made the biggest contribution to the before the coup, U.S. military officials 1973 coup. “My most important respon- met with Pinochet and his aides in the sibility at the time was handling the 170 foreign affairs ‘media account,’” Devine writes, “espe- cially the cia’s relationship with El Mercurio,” Chile’s leading newspaper.