elections, in which Allende’s opponents, Showdown in bolstered by cia support, would presum- ably defeat Allende at the polls. Santiago In this view, the military coup and the bloody Pinochet dictatorship, which lasted nearly 17 years, were unfortunate What Really Happened but unintended consequences. But that in Chile? is not what really happened in Chile.

BLOOD ON THE TRACKS As Devine acknowledges, in the fall Made in the U.S.A. of 1970, U.S. President Richard Nixon ordered the cia to orchestrate a military Peter Kornbluh putsch that would prevent the recently ore than 40 years after the elected Allende from assuming office. 1973 military coup that cost This top-secret plan was referred to as MChilean President Salvador Track II, to distinguish it from Track I, Allende his life and brought General a covert political campaign supported Augusto Pinochet to power, the historical by the State Department to convince the record on the U.S. role in Chile continues Chilean Congress not to ratify Allende’s to stir debate. Far from being a “cold election and thus to keep him from office. case” of the Cold War, as Foreign Affairs Devine benignly characterizes Track II implied in its July/August issue, it as a misguided covert action. In fact, remains a hot and controversial topic. Track II centered on a violent criminal Jack Devine’s audaciously titled article, scheme. The plan was to kidnap Chile’s “What Really Happened in Chile,” relates commander in chief, General René his version of the story of infamous U.S. Schneider, who firmly opposed the idea covert actions in which Devine himself of a military coup. “The cia was aware played a key role as a young cia officer of the plan,” Devine notes, as if the agency based in Santiago. were an innocent bystander, simply Devine’s central argument is that gathering intelligence on the operation. between 1970 and 1973, the cia sought The truth is far more sinister. The to protect Chile’s democratic institutions Schneider operation was a cia-sponsored from Allende’s Popular Unity government, plot: cia officials pressed the agency’s which Washington believed would push station in Santiago to come up with a Chile toward Cuban-style socialism way to “remove” Schneider because he and into the Soviet orbit. According to was standing in the way of a military Devine, the cia was merely “supporting coup. Cia representatives met repeatedly Allende’s domestic political opponents with the conspirators, led by a retired and making sure Allende did not disman- Chilean army general, Roberto Viaux, tle the institutions of democracy,” such and an active-duty brigadier general, as opposition parties and media outlets. Camilo Valenzuela. On October 19, cia The cia’s goal, Devine suggests, was to headquarters sent the station six untrace- preserve those institutions until the 1976 able submachine guns and ammunition

168 foreign affairs Showdown in Santiago in a diplomatic pouch, to be provided to small group of covert operatives to quickly the plotters. The agency also provided catalyze a coup, Washington developed $50,000 to Valenzuela to bankroll the a longer-term effort to destabilize the operation and thousands more to Viaux to Chilean government economically, keep the operation “financially lubricated,” politically, and militarily and to create as one cia cable stated. Given the risks a climate conducive to Allende’s demise. involved, the cia issued the plotters life For the cia, “Track II never really ended,” insurance policies. Thomas Karamessines, Devine’s superior But on October 22, the thugs hired officer in the agency’s Directorate of with cia funds shot Schneider during Operations, testified during a special their attempt to abduct him as he drove Senate investigation in 1975. “What we to work. U.S. operatives then provided were told to do was to continue our $35,000 to help some of the assassins efforts. Stay alert, and to do what we flee Chile—and to purchase their silence could to contribute to the eventual about the cia’s involvement. achievement of the objectives and The very next day, as Schneider lay purposes of Track II.” dying from multiple gunshot wounds, Devine appears unaware that Henry high-level cia officials sent a cable of Kissinger, Nixon’s national security commendation to the station in Santiago: adviser, convinced Nixon to reject the “The station has done [an] excellent job State Department’s position that the of guiding [the] Chileans to [the] point United States should accept Allende’s today where a military solution”—that election and work toward his electoral is, an anti-Allende coup—“is at least an defeat in 1976. At a pivotal National option for them,” the cable read. The Security Council meeting on November 6, agency lauded its operatives in Chile 1970, three days after Allende’s inaugura- “for accomplishing this under extremely tion, Kissinger’s talking points called difficult and delicate circumstances.” for a discussion of “actions we can take In the face of widespread public ourselves to intensify Allende’s prob- revulsion in Chile at Schneider’s murder, lems so that at a minimum he may fail the Chilean military officials whom the or be forced to limit his aims, and at a cia had paid and counted on failed to go maximum might create conditions in forward with the coup. “At that point, which a collapse or overthrow might be all coup plotting ended and Nixon drasti- feasible.” Both Secretary of Defense cally altered his policy,” Devine asserts. Melvin Laird and Secretary of State Washington’s “new goal,” he writes, William Rogers agreed that “we want “was to support the political opposition to do it right and bring [Allende] down.” and avoid giving Allende an excuse to Nixon instructed his top national secu- exploit anti-American sentiment to rity aides to pursue aggressive actions increase his domestic popularity and to subvert Allende’s government, masked international support.” by a “very cool and very correct” public The declassified record tells a very posture toward Chile, which would deny different story: U.S. policymakers Allende the chance to use the specter adjusted their strategy but not their of U.S. intervention to rally national- ultimate goal. Rather than rely on a ist support.

September/October 2014 169 Devine and His Critic

By the time Devine arrived in Chile Panama Canal Zone. A declassified in August 1971, the cia had already intelligence report recorded Pinochet’s initiated a five-part “Covert Action belief that Allende “must be forced to Program for Chile.” The operations step down or be eliminated” and a clear included “enlarging contacts in the message from U.S. Army officers in Chilean military,” “political action to response: the “U.S. will support [a] divide and weaken the Allende coalition,” coup against Allende with ‘whatever “support to non-Marxist opposition means necessary’ when the time comes.” political groups and parties,” aiding media outlets that “can speak out against AN EXPENSIVE FREE PRESS the Allende government,” and running When the time came, the United States propaganda operations through media did not directly participate in the coup, outlets to “play up Allende’s subversion as Devine correctly points out. But that of the democratic process.” is not because Washington opposed a Devine minimizes the cia’s contact military takeover. Rather, according to with the Chilean military leadership, the minutes of an interagency meeting suggesting that the cia was simply gather- in October 1972, U.S. officials deter- ing intelligence. But at the first meeting mined that “if and when the Chilean after Allende’s inauguration of the high- military decided to undertake a coup, level interagency committee that over- they would not need U.S. government saw clandestine operations, Kissinger assistance or support to do so success- stated that the goal of maintaining fully.” Even so, just four days before covert contact with Chile’s military the coup, the cia was working on “a officers was “not just for intelligence capability for influencing the situation” but for potential future action.” Cia if, as one State Department report documents reveal that as political and noted, the predicted coup was “in economic instability increased in Chile, danger of failure.” the agency stepped up its communica- In that sense, the issue of whether tion with key officers. A May 1973 Washington played a direct role in the memorandum to cia Director James coup is a red herring. The questions Schlesinger noted that the agency had that matter more are whether the Nixon “accelerated efforts against the military administration attempted to “bring target” in order to “better monitor any down” Allende by creating conditions coup plotting and bring our influence “in which a collapse or overthrow may to bear on key military commanders so be feasible,” as Kissinger put it, and that they might play a decisive role on whether the cia contributed to that the side of the coup forces.” effort in a significant way. Moreover, the cia was not the only The answer to both questions is part of the U.S. government bringing yes—and by his own account, Devine its influence to bear. The U.S. Depart- was deeply involved in the covert opera- ment of Defense also maintained contact tions that, according to his cia superiors, with the generals. Indeed, a full year made the biggest contribution to the before the coup, U.S. military officials 1973 coup. “My most important respon- met with Pinochet and his aides in the sibility at the time was handling the

170 foreign affairs ‘media account,’” Devine writes, “espe- cially the cia’s relationship with El Mercurio,” Chile’s leading newspaper. Although Devine casts the $2 million that the cia clandestinely funneled to El Mercurio—the equivalent of more than $11 million in today’s dollars—as an effort to preserve “press freedom” in Chile, declassified White House andcia Franklin Williams records show that Nixon and Kissinger Internship authorized that funding so that the The Council on Foreign Relations is seeking newspaper could mobilize and bolster talented individuals for the Franklin Williams political opposition to Allende. Internship. Indeed, far from being the professional The Franklin Williams Internship, named after news outlet that Devine describes, El the late Ambassador Franklin H. Williams, was established for undergraduate and graduate Mercurio was a key player in the pro- students who have a serious interest in coup forces in Chile. Only ten days international relations. after Allende’s election, the paper’s Ambassador Williams had a long career of owner, Agustín Edwards, traveled to public service, including serving as the Washington to meet with Kissinger American Ambassador to Ghana, as well as the and cia Director Richard Helms and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Lincoln University, one of the country’s historically provide detailed intelligence on real black colleges. He was also a Director of the and potential coup plotters inside the Council on Foreign Relations, where he made Chilean military. With massive cia special efforts to encourage the nomination of financing,El Mercurio positioned itself black Americans to membership. as a bullhorn for organized agitation The Council will select one individual each against the government. In the summer term (fall, spring, and summer) to work in the Council’s New York City headquarters. of 1973, the cia station in Santiago The intern will work closely with a Program reported that El Mercurio and the mili- Director or Fellow in either the Studies or tant right-wing group Patria y Libertad the Meetings Program and will be involved (Fatherland and Liberty) “have set as with program coordination, substantive and business writing, research, and budget their objective [the] creation of conflict management. The selected intern will be and confrontation which will lead to required to make a commitment of at least 12 some sort of military intervention.” hours per week, and will be paid $10 an hour. After Allende was overthrown, the cia To apply for this internship, please send a gave special credit to the media project; résumé and cover letter including the se- according to one cia memo, it “played a mester, days, and times available to work to the Internship Coordinator in the Human significant role in setting the stage for Resources Office at the address listed below. the military coup of 11 September 1973.” The Council is an equal opportunity employer.

Moreover, as Pinochet’s forces began Council on Foreign Relations systematically murdering and torturing Human Resources Office thousands of civilians—some 1,200 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065 tel: 212.434 . 9400 fax: 212.434 . 9893 people were executed just in the three [email protected] http://www.cfr.org months following the coup, including

171 Devine and His Critic two U.S. citizens—the cia continued coup in Chile. “I mean we helped them. to pass funds to El Mercurio to generate [Word omitted] created the conditions popular support for the regime. The as great as possible.” media outlets “have supported the new “That is right,” Nixon agreed. military government,” the cia reported And that is what really happened three months after the coup, seeking in Chile. continued financing for the paper. “They have tried to present the Junta in the PETER KORNBLUH is Director of the National Security Archive’s Chile Documentation Project most positive light for the Chilean public.” and the author of The Pinochet File: A Declassified Given Devine’s covert role in supplying Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. funds to El Mercurio in the aftermath of the coup, his lament for the Pinochet regime’s atrocities during that period rings hollow. Devine Replies

PLENTY OF BLAME TO GO AROUND do not expect to change the minds Devine decries the “conventional of Peter Kornbluh and others who wisdom . . . that Washington played a I have spent decades insisting that the crucial role” in the coup. He asserts that cia was the architect of the 1973 Chilean “the cia should not be blamed for bad military coup against Salvador Allende. outcomes it did not produce.” But the I would, however, like to respond to some historical record confirms that thecia of Kornbluh’s points and once again stress did contribute to the tragic outcome of firmly that thecia did not plot with the a bloody regime change and the rise of Chilean military to oust Allende in 1973. authoritarianism in Chile. For its role Like many other critics of the cia’s in the overthrow of Allende and the actions in Chile during the 1970s, consolidation of the Pinochet regime, Kornbluh fails to properly distinguish the cia deserves all the blame it has between the U.S. role in the failed coup received—and more. attempt in Chile of 1970, which sought And so do the policymakers who to keep Allende from taking office, sent the cia on this disgraceful mission. and the U.S. role in the coup in 1973, A few days after the coup, Nixon and which resulted in Allende’s overthrow. Kissinger spoke and complained to each As I noted in my article, the 1970 coup other about criticisms of U.S. policy attempt, which President Richard Nixon that had appeared in press coverage of instructed the cia to support, easily the coup. “In the Eisenhower period meets my definition of bad covert action. we would be heroes,” Kissinger mused, The conditions on the ground in Chile referring to the cia-sponsored coup did not favor the kind of military coup that toppled the democratically elected that the White House envisioned. No leftist president of Guatemala in 1954. one at the cia really believed the coup “Our hand doesn’t show on this one would succeed; in fact, the cia station though,” Nixon suggested. chief in Santiago strongly recommended “We didn’t do it,” Kissinger replied, against supporting it. Even the White referring to a direct U.S. role in the House ultimately came around to the

172 foreign affairs Showdown in Santiago same position: declassified documents role compared to the domestic political show that on October 15, Henry Kissinger and economic factors that led the military directed the cia to tell Roberto Viaux to act against Allende. to call off the planned kidnapping of Kornbluh and others critics tend to General René Schneider. But Viaux ignore the truth about the conditions ignored that instruction and went ahead in Chile under Allende. They overlook with the ill-fated plot. the economic and political incompe- More important, there is no evi- tence of Allende’s government and his dence to support the view that the cia very serious flirtation with President engaged with the plotters who managed Fidel Castro of Cuba and the extreme to overthrow Allende three years later. leftists of Chile’s Revolutionary Left Even Kornbluh seems to recognize this. Movement, who revealed their true So the disagreement comes down to the nature when they violently attacked extent to which the cia’s activities influ- the peaceful “March of the Empty Pots enced the political environment and and Pans,” led by women’s groups in contributed to Allende’s downfall. Based December 1971. Kornbluh also ignores on my experience inside the cia station the major role that the Communist in Santiago during the events in question, Party of Chile played in Allende’s I clearly have a different perspective on government, as well as the aid and that matter than Kornbluh does. support Allende received from Cuba and the Soviet Union, which included A RELATIVELY MINOR ROLE the training of Chilean intelligence During my time in Chile, between operators and of Allende’s personal 1971 and 1973, the cia pursued a policy security detail. designed to support the political oppo- As Allende enacted radical, destabi- sition, including certain media outlets lizing land reforms and nationalized and protest groups, but did not collude industries, including Chile’s vitally or conspire with the Chilean military to important copper industry, U.S. officials overthrow Allende. The goal was to keep began to fear that Allende’s government the opposition alive and help position would also take direct control of the it to defeat Allende’s party in the next media. The cia’s support for El Mercurio national elections. Washington also hoped aimed to prevent such a strike against to thwart Allende’s efforts to draw Chile Chilean democracy. As I noted in my into the Soviet sphere. In the context of article, the paper’s editors in Chile took the Cold War, the importance of that no guidance from the cia. The funding objective cannot be overstated. the agency provided was designed to I’m not arguing that the agency’s keep the newspaper in business at a activities didn’t contribute to Allende’s time when the Allende government fall; they did. But that outcome was not was blocking its access to newsprint. the intention of the cia’s support to the Agustín Edwards, the paper’s owner, opposition—and the agency’s activities feared that the government would soon clearly weren’t the only factor that con- shut down the paper. Edwards had a tributed to the final result. Indeed, the good, but not particularly deep, rela- cia’s support played a relatively minor tionship with Nixon; he lived abroad

September/October 2014 173 Devine and His Critic and had no contact with the cia in became known as “the tank putsch,” Chile. And there was no indication junior military officers started plotting in the field that Edwards had any real on their own. The generals decided to sway over U.S. policymakers, especially take charge of the coup plotting to after the failed 1970 coup. maintain discipline in Chile’s military Just as Kornbluh misconstrues institutions and to preserve stability. support for a free press as evidence that the cia took part in coup plotting, he CREDIT WHERE CREDIT’S NOT DUE also draws inaccurate conclusions about It is true that Washington welcomed the cia’s ties to the Chilean military. the 1973 coup, since it appeared to be a Kornbluh asserts that those ties were Cold War victory for the United States. deeper than I described in my article. Kornbluh cites a transcript of a conver- He bases that conclusion on a declassi- sation between Nixon and Kissinger in fied document describing a meeting which the men seem to take credit for between U.S. military personnel and Allende’s removal. But the fact that Augusto Pinochet in the Panama Canal Nixon said something doesn’t make it Zone and another declassified docu- true. It is hardly uncommon for political ment stating that the cia would be figures to take excessive credit for devel- increasing its surveillance of the opments they see as positive—just as Chilean armed forces. they distance themselves from outcomes First of all, assuming that the first they deem unfavorable. document’s account of the meeting in Despite our differences, Kornbluh and Panama is accurate, the discussion it I agree on one point: U.S. involvement describes does not reflect U.S. policy. in Chile in the 1970s remains a hot-button And there is no evidence to suggest that issue. I take some modest comfort from this discussion was related to the cia’s the fact that as a former cia field opera- covert-action program. As for the second tive who served in Santiago during the document, there is a world of difference Allende era, I have been able to offer between conducting surveillance on my firsthand account of what really another country’s armed forces and happened in the Chilean coup in 1973. collaborating with them. Kornbluh I hope that it proves useful to historians suggests that the U.S. relationship with and that its lessons might inform future the Chilean military was robust, but I policymakers and cia leaders.∂ know the exact number and quality of the United States’ military sources at the time, and they were indeed meager. Ultimately, the Chilean military moved against Allende not because the United States wanted it to do so but because the country was in disarray. By the spring of 1973, the Chilean economy had spiraled out of control and street demonstrations had become routine. Coup rumors were rampant, and in what

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