US Foreign Policy During the Nixon and Ford Administrations
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DePaul University Via Sapientiae College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences 3-2012 US Foreign Policy During the Nixon and Ford Administrations Rachael S. Murdock DePaul University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd Recommended Citation Murdock, Rachael S., "US Foreign Policy During the Nixon and Ford Administrations" (2012). College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations. 115. https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/115 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact [email protected]. US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CHILE DURING THE NIXON AND FORD ADMINISTRATIONS A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts March 2012 BY Rachael Murdock Department of International Studies College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences DePaul University Chicago, IL i DEDICATION To my family, whose encouragement and support were essential to the completion of this project. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A very hearty thanks to my thesis advisor, Dr. Rose Spalding, Professor of Political Science at DePaul University. Her patience, guidance, encouragement, insight as she mentored me through the thesis process were indispensible. Great thanks also to Dr. Patrick Callahan, Professor of Political Science at DePaul. He provided vital insight and guidance in developing Chapter Two of this thesis and offered excellent input on later drafts of both Chapters One and Two. I would also like to thank Fr. Thomas Croak, Associate Professor Emeritus in the Department of History at DePaul. Drs. Spalding, Callahan, and Croak all served on my thesis committee. Their suggestions at my proposal defenses were invaluable in shaping the project as I began my research, and their suggestions at my final defense were invaluable in shaping the final document. Many, many thanks to you all! Thanks must also be given to the libraries at DePaul University, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and the University of North Carolina at Charlotte from whom I borrowed more books than I can count. Thank you, as well, to MEPCO Insurance Premium Financing, AXA Assistance, USA, the Cheatham Lab at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Nutrition Research Institute, and the School of Architecture at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte for employing me throughout my career as a graduate student. Finally, thank you to my parents, Douglas and Ann Murdock, for scouring the pages of this document for typing errors. I deeply appreciate your assistance! iii PREFACE I first became interested in the topic of CIA involvement in Chile as an undergraduate in a core humanities course on ethics at Queens University of Charlotte. I had to write a paper and the topic intrigued me. Like many who have written on the subject, what I first wanted to know was whether the US could be held responsible for the 1973 coup. What I discovered was that in a strictly technical sense, though the CIA manipulated the political situation in Chile, the Agency was not directly involved in the kidnapping attempt on General Schneider or the successful coup three years later, and so I concluded in my paper. As I began to think about my graduate thesis project, I discovered that my initial question was neither very interesting nor very useful. First, it’s an unresolveable question. The CIA was not directly involved in the major events of 1970 and 1973 in Chile, but the US Government certainly did what policy makers perceived was necessary to encourage both actions. It is impossible to determine, however, what would have happened had the US refrained from using its covert powers of influence. Second, there can be little practical application derived from determining whether the US can be held responsible for the events of 1970 and 1973 in Chile. What could be gained by simply passing judgment? Not much. There is a more interesting question, a question with more possibilities for future practical application: how did the United States find itself acting in a matter fundamentally discordant with core American political values? That is the subject of this thesis. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Dedication i Acknowledgements ii Preface iii Tables and Figures vi Commonly Used vii Acronyms 1. Introduction, Methodology, and Sources 1 Introduction 1 The Why and The How 5 Methodology 8 Data Analysis 10 Literature Review 14 Limitations and Delimitations 30 Chapter Outline 32 2. Foreign Policy Making During the Nixon and Ford Administrations: Theories of 34 US Intervention Introduction 34 "A Philosophical Deepening" 35 Two Different Foreign Policy Constructs 40 The Fundamental Inferiority of Latin Americans 43 Concern for Public Image 50 Centralization of the Policy Making Process 53 56 Domestic Factors Affecting Policy Toward Chile Foreign Policy Making During the Ford Administration 61 Alternative Interpretations 62 Conclusion 67 3. Build-Up to a Coup 72 Introduction 72 The United States and Chile, 1958 to 1970 74 Election Day and Its Aftermath 86 Perpetrator Testimony 100 4. Dealing with the Allende Government 117 Introduction 117 US Response to Allende's Election 119 Internal Factors: Failure of Allende's Economic Plan 134 and Political Upheaval September 11, 1973 141 Perpetrator Testimony 145 Conclusion 160 5. Fall-Out in Washington and Human Rights Abuses in Chile 164 Introduction 164 Brief Post-Coup Narrative 165 Official Investigations: The Church Committee and the 170 Hinchey Report v The Department of State and the Horman and Teruggi 182 Cases The Rise of Human Rights on the International Stage 186 The Pinochet Regime's Human Rights Record and US 189 Response Operation Condor 193 Perpetrator Testimony 205 6. Conclusions 212 Introduction 212 The Nixon and Ford Administrations' Foreign Policy 212 Making Process in Action Theories of Intervention 218 Interpreting the Chilean Case 219 Conclusion 226 Bibliography 235 vi TABLES AND FIGURES TABLES 1.1 Strategic Calculations Affecting Policy toward Chile, 1970-1973 6 1.2 Strategic Calculations Affecting US Policy toward the Pinochet Regime 7 6.1 Theories of Intervention 219 FIGURES 2.1 Kissinger’s Pentagonal Balance of Power 39 2.2 Kissinger’s Tri-lateral Power Relationship 39 2.3 US Economic Indicators, 1965-1976 57 2.4 US Unemployment Rate, August 1969 to December 1971 58 4.1 US Economic Aid to Chile 133 vii COMMONLY USED ACRONYMS This list is not meant to be exhaustive but should be a helpful guide to acronyms commonly cited in this thesis. CIA Central Intelligence Agency CODE Confederación Democrática, the Democratic Confederation - the Unidad Popular's main opposition front CONDORTEL Operation Condor's main communication system COS CIA Chief of Station DCI Director of Central Intelligence DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DINA Directorate of National Intelligence, Pinochet's secret police DOD Department of Defense DOJ Department of Justice DOS Department of State EXIM Export-Import Bank FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FOIA Freedom of Information Act (United States Congress) GOC Government of Chile IC Intelligence Community (United States Government) MAPU Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario, Chile's Movement for Unified Popular Action MIR Movimiento de Izquierdo Revolucionario, Chile's Revolutionary Movement of the Left NARA National Archive and Record Administration NSC National Security Council PCCH Partido Comunista de Chile, Chile's Communist Party of Chile PDC Partido Democrata Cristiano, Chile's Christian Democratic Party PN Partido Nacional, Chile's National Party PS Partido Socialista, Chile's Socialist Party UP Unidad Popular, the coalition of the left in the 1970 election and during Allende's presidency USG United States Government viii VOP Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo, Chile's Organized Vanguard of the People WH Western Hemisphere Division (of CIA) 1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY, AND SOURCES “I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its people.” 1 ~ Henry Kissinger, June 27, 1970 I. INTRODUCTION For decades, the Cold War brought the threat of nuclear conflict. The two dominant world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were ideologically opposed and saw each other’s nuclear capabilities as a threat to their respective national security. Though the United States and Soviet Union never met in open war, their conflict spilled over into the third world. As several leftist political movements developed in Latin America, US policy makers feared the domino effect, in which one country after another would fall to socialism or communism and thus fall under potential Soviet influence. Policy makers perceived a socialist/communist Latin America as a threat and devised various strategies to reverse the Latin American leftward trend and “contain” the spread of socialism/communism – ideas which became blended in the collective American consciousness - to as few countries as possible. Chile was one of the countries where the political Left was best established in Latin America. For decades it demonstrated a substantial following. A coalition of the 1 Henry Kissinger, quoted in Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 349. Kissinger’s comment was made during a 40 Committee meeting on June 27, 1970: “The Chairman’s comment was, I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.” NARA, “Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee 27 June 170 [sic],” June 29, 1970, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act, State Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pnara3/00009A43.pdf.