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In all cases the best available copy has been filmed. kitemattonal aooN.z#ebmw A m Arbor, M)4B10e 8413211 Campany, Richard C., Jr. U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE ARMS EMBARGO PERIOD 1874-1900 Th» Am»rtc»n Unlvenlty Ph.D. 1864 University Microfiims internstionsi Copyright 1984 by Campany, Richard C., Jr. Aii Rights Reserved U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE ARMS EMBARGO PERIOD 1974-1980 by RICHARD C. CAMPANY, JR. submitted to the Faculty of the College of Public and International Affairs of The American University in partial fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations Signatures of Committee: Chairman /Z' Dçfin o^ the College 'TO. 1984 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016 (f3^^ 4W»ICAir UHIVBHSITY LTBPstfy (c) COPYRIGHT BY RICHARD C. CAMPANY, JR, 1984 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE ARMS EMBARGO PERIOD 1974-1980 by RICHARD C. CAMPANY, JR. ABSTRACT The alliance relationship between the United States and Turkey has been beset with difficulties on both sides. This has been especially true since the United States imposed an arms embargo against its NATO ally following the Turkish occupation of northern Cyrpus in 1974. This study examines the effectiveness of the arms embargo (and by extention, other sanctions and embargos) as a tool of influence in affecting changes in the foreign policy of alliance partners. The literature on alliance theory and use of sanctions is reviewed to develop theoretical tools with which to exeutiine the Turkish arms embargo. Additionally, the study proposes that certain historical factors, notably the Eastern Question and the Capitulations play a major role in Turkish foreign policy attitudes, and that the United States, in the embargo period did not take these factors into account. The evolution of the relationship between the United States and Turkey from the Treaty of 1830 to the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1980 is discussed, with particular attention to the factors involved in the Turkish decision to intervene in Cyprus, and the factors that led the United states to impose the embargo. The Turkish decision to intervene in Cyprus is analyzed in terms of the bureaucratic politics paradigm as applied to a weak parliamentary system. Details are based on the author's experiences in Turkey, and on the Turkish press. The Turkish decision was based on domestic factors, primarily the desire on the part of the Ecevit government to strengthen its position, and the U.S. decision was primarily an outcome of the "Watergate" crisis, with a strong legislature dominating a weakened executive. The conclusion is that a tool of influence, the arms embargo, is widely used by the United States, without regard to the fact that it is ineffective in modifying foreign policy behavior of other states. The embargo does, however, serve some domestic political goals and is therefore likely to continue to be used as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. In the case of the Turkish embargo, the experiences of Turkey with foreign intervention made the embargo not only ineffective, but counterproductive. TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface....................... * ............ ill Chapter 1. INFLUENCE AND E M B A R G O S.................. 1 The United States and Turkey Nature of Alliances Influence, Interference, and Embargos II. TURKISH FOREIGN RELATIONS .............. 21 Origins of Turkish Foreign Policy Early U.S.-Turkish Relations The Eastern Question Nationalist Foreign Policy The U.S. Comes to Turkey Turkey, Greece and Cyprus III. DOMESTIC COMPONENTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY ................................ 83 The Formal Decision-making Process Political Maneuvering, 1974-1980 Political Violence Domestic Views of Cyprus IV. CONFRONTATION; THE U.S. AND TURKEY FACE THE EMBARGO.............................. 115 Dec is ion-making Capitulations Revisited Cyprus Negotiations Aid Restored Effectiveness of the Embargo V. THE ARMS EMBARGO AS A TOOL OF INFLUENCE . 139 Issues in the U.S. and Turkey Thoughts on Alliances Embargos as Tools of Influence Greece, NATO, and Cyprus; the Southern Flank Conclusions i APPENDICES................................... 168 1. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the Ottoman Empire and the United States (1830) 2. Aid to Turlcey Agreement (1947) 3. NATO Statue of Forces Agreement (1954) 4. U.S. Turkey Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (1980) BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................ 205 ii PREFACE The impact of the arms embargo imposed against Turkey in 1974 was matter of direct concern to me, as I was then living in Ankara* I was a U.S. Air Force officer, who as a linguist and area specialist, was responsible for liaison and coordination with elements of the Turkish National Police, Ministry of Customs, Ministry of the Interior, and the Turkish General Staff. During the two years I had this responsibility, the ques­ tion of the arms embargo arose in discussions daily, in meetings with high-ranking officials (including one who later was a member of the military junta in 1980) and with Turks of every level of society in every part of Turkey. These conversations took place in numerous fora. In late 1974, for example, my car broke down in the mountains north of Kastamonu, well off the normal routes of travel. Villagers helped me bring the car to a village of perhaps eight hundred, where a Turk who had worked in Germany attempted to repair the car. Late in the evening, then, I found myself, in an open area with a dozen or so village notables questioning me on why the arms embargo had been imposed. The presence of the entire population of the village just beyond the iii notables (and the 20" weather) affected the intimacy, but not the intensity of the conversation. From this and many other similar experiences, it was apparent that the embargo was not affecting Turlcish foreign policy behavior as desired, and was most counterproduc­ tive domestically in Turkey. On my return to the U.S., I was in a position to monitor reporting on events in Turkey, and to make frequent trips to that country and continue ray contacts with Turkish and U.S. officials. A tool of influence, the arms embargo, was not achieving the desired results. Why was this so? In considering this question, there appeared to be two aspects to the answer. Firstly, the arms embargo, while widely used by the United States, almost never had the intended effect on the policies of the targeted state. Secondly, Turkish concerns about the nature of their relationship with the United States were exacerbated by the stress of the embargo. U.S. insensitivities to Turkish history and society, and Turkish lack of under­ standing of U.S. policies contributed greatly to the difficulties faced by the U.S. and Turkey in maintaining an alliance relationship during the Embargo period. Understanding the problems of the Embargo period is important. Turkey has great strategic value to the U.S. As the southern anchor of NATO, it contributes the second largest land force to the alliance, and it is iv one of the two NATO states directly bordering the U.S.S.R. Turkish control of the entrance to the Black Sea prevents the large Soviet Black Sea Fleet from sortieing in time of war; a combination of the Black Sea Fleet and the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron would give the Soviets naval superiority in the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey also controls the ideal Soviet land route to the Persian Gulf, a long time goal of the Soviets and the Russian Czars. Further, should the Soviets invade Iran, airbases in Turkey are ideally positioned to interdict invasion routes and supply lines. In addition to these military issues, Turkey provides a link between the Islamic world and the West, being a member of both NATO and the Islamic Conference. Study of the Embargo period provides evidence of the value of arms embargoes as tools of influence, as well as the nature of alliance relationships.

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