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8413211

Campany, Richard C., Jr.

U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE ARMS EMBARGO PERIOD 1874-1900

Th» Am»rtc»n Unlvenlty Ph.D. 1864

University Microfiims internstionsi

U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE ARMS EMBARGO PERIOD 1974-1980 by RICHARD C. CAMPANY, JR. submitted to the Faculty of the College of Public and International Affairs of The American University in partial fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations Signatures of Committee: Chairman /Z'

Dçfin o^ the College 'TO.

1984 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016 (f3^^

The alliance relationship between the United States and Turkey has been beset with difficulties on both sides. This has been especially true since the United States imposed an arms embargo against its NATO ally following the Turkish occupation of northern Cyrpus in 1974. This study examines the effectiveness of the arms embargo (and by extention, other sanctions and embargos) as a tool of influence in affecting changes in the foreign policy of alliance partners. The literature on alliance theory and use of sanctions is reviewed to develop theoretical tools with which to exeutiine the Turkish arms embargo. Additionally, the study proposes that certain historical factors, notably the Eastern Question and the Capitulations play a major role in Turkish foreign policy attitudes, and that the United States, in the embargo period did not take these factors into account. The evolution of the relationship between the United States and Turkey from the Treaty of 1830 to the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1980 is discussed, with particular attention to the factors involved in the Turkish decision to intervene in Cyprus, and the factors that led the United states to impose the embargo. The Turkish decision to intervene in Cyprus is analyzed in terms of the bureaucratic politics paradigm as applied to a weak parliamentary system. Details are based on the author's experiences in Turkey, and on the Turkish press. The Turkish decision was based on domestic factors, primarily the desire on the part of the Ecevit government to strengthen its position, and the U.S. decision was primarily an outcome of the "Watergate" crisis, with a strong legislature dominating a weakened executive. The conclusion is that a tool of influence, the arms embargo, is widely used by the United States, without regard to the fact that it is ineffective in modifying foreign policy behavior of other states. The embargo does, however, serve some domestic political goals and is therefore likely to continue to be used as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. In the case of the Turkish embargo, the experiences of Turkey with foreign intervention made the embargo not only ineffective, but counterproductive. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface...... * ...... ill Chapter 1. INFLUENCE AND E M B A R G O S...... 1 The United States and Turkey Nature of Alliances Influence, Interference, and Embargos II. TURKISH FOREIGN RELATIONS ...... 21 Origins of Turkish Foreign Policy Early U.S.-Turkish Relations The Eastern Question Nationalist Foreign Policy The U.S. Comes to Turkey Turkey, Greece and Cyprus III. DOMESTIC COMPONENTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY ...... 83 The Formal Decision-making Process Political Maneuvering, 1974-1980 Political Violence Domestic Views of Cyprus IV. CONFRONTATION; THE U.S. AND TURKEY FACE THE EMBARGO...... 115 Dec is ion-making Capitulations Revisited Cyprus Negotiations Aid Restored Effectiveness of the Embargo V. THE ARMS EMBARGO AS A TOOL OF INFLUENCE . . . 139 Issues in the U.S. and Turkey Thoughts on Alliances Embargos as Tools of Influence Greece, NATO, and Cyprus; the Southern Flank Conclusions

i APPENDICES...... 168 1. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the Ottoman Empire and the United States (1830) 2. Aid to Turlcey Agreement (1947) 3. NATO Statue of Forces Agreement (1954) 4. U.S. Turkey Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (1980) BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 205

ii PREFACE

The impact of the arms embargo imposed against Turkey in 1974 was matter of direct concern to me, as I was then living in Ankara* I was a U.S. Air Force officer, who as a linguist and area specialist, was responsible for liaison and coordination with elements of the Turkish National Police, Ministry of Customs, Ministry of the Interior, and the Turkish General Staff. During the two years I had this responsibility, the ques tion of the arms embargo arose in discussions daily, in meetings with high-ranking officials (including one who later was a member of the military junta in 1980) and with Turks of every level of society in every part of Turkey. These conversations took place in numerous fora. In late 1974, for example, my car broke down in the mountains north of Kastamonu, well off the normal routes of travel. Villagers helped me bring the car to a village of perhaps eight hundred, where a Turk who had worked in Germany attempted to repair the car. Late in the evening, then, I found myself, in an open area with a dozen or so village notables questioning me on why the arms embargo had been imposed. The presence of the entire population of the village just beyond the iii notables (and the 20" weather) affected the intimacy, but not the intensity of the conversation. From this and many other similar experiences, it was apparent that the embargo was not affecting Turlcish foreign policy behavior as desired, and was most counterproduc tive domestically in Turkey. On my return to the U.S., I was in a position to monitor reporting on events in Turkey, and to make frequent trips to that country and continue ray contacts with Turkish and U.S. officials. A tool of influence, the arms embargo, was not achieving the desired results. Why was this so? In considering this question, there appeared to be two aspects to the answer. Firstly, the arms embargo, while widely used by the United States, almost never had the intended effect on the policies of the targeted state. Secondly, Turkish concerns about the nature of their relationship with the United States were exacerbated by the stress of the embargo. U.S. insensitivities to Turkish history and society, and Turkish lack of under standing of U.S. policies contributed greatly to the difficulties faced by the U.S. and Turkey in maintaining an alliance relationship during the Embargo period. Understanding the problems of the Embargo period is important. Turkey has great strategic value to the U.S. As the southern anchor of NATO, it contributes the second largest land force to the alliance, and it is

iv one of the two NATO states directly bordering the U.S.S.R. Turkish control of the entrance to the Black Sea prevents the large Soviet Black Sea Fleet from sortieing in time of war; a combination of the Black Sea Fleet and the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron would give the Soviets naval superiority in the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey also controls the ideal Soviet land route to the Persian Gulf, a long time goal of the Soviets and the Russian Czars. Further, should the Soviets invade Iran, airbases in Turkey are ideally positioned to interdict invasion routes and supply lines. In addition to these military issues, Turkey provides a link between the Islamic world and the West, being a member of both NATO and the Islamic Conference. Study of the Embargo period provides evidence of the value of arms embargoes as tools of influence, as well as the nature of alliance relationships. Together with understanding of specific U.S./Turkish issues, such knowledge ought to be of value in dealing with further tensions in the U.S./Turkish relationship. Would, for instance, an arms embargo be an appropriate response to the declaration of independence by the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus? The historical record indicates that such a response would not be likely to alter the actions of either Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots, although it might satisfy U.S. domestic political concerns — at the expense of U.S. national interests. In considering the Embargo period, my personal experiences with Turkish views has been most beneficial, as has a collection of unpublished Turkish and Greek material on the subject accumulated over the last decade. A review of the Turkish press also was of use in providing views of disparate elements of Turkish society, as well as a record of domestic events not well reported in the West. Reports of numerous Congressional hearings on the Embargo and its effects proved helpful in clarifying U.S. expectations. Lengthy discussions with members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee staff supplemented the written record. In considering this material, I have used the historical analytical approach, which I consider was most appropriate for examination of this specific episode in U.S./Turkish relations. To the extent that theory has been developed in this area, I have also examined the embargo in terms of alliance theory and in terms of how one state influences the foreign policy actions of another state. This effort would not have been possible without the assistance of my dissertation committee. Dr. Alan Taylor, Dr. Theodore Couloumbis, and Dr. Kerim Key. The members of the committee provided me with unique insights, and clarified my thinking on the issues

vi Involved. I would especially note my debts in this work to the writings of George Harris and Roger Trask, whose seminal works on U.S./Turkish relations were invaluable. Ray Pollari, my supervisor from 1976 to 1980, granted me time to pursue my studies and encouraged my efforts. Finally, my wife June and my daughter Jennifer have often been without husband and father so that I could complete this dissertation.

vii CHAPTER I

INFLUENCE AND EMBARGOS

The United States and Turkey The relationship between Turkey and the United States in the post-World War II period has undergone numerous changes. The two states have at times been very close with Turkey undertaking actions at the request of the United States that were of only indirect benefit to Turkey. These included, for example, the basing of U-2 reconnaisance aircraft at Incirlik Air Base, and the collection of intelligence data from several listening posts in northern Turkey. While these efforts did, very indirectly, assist the NATO alliance, Turkey, which had limited access to any of the information collected from her territory, received almost no meaningful benefit from these facilities. The United States came to depend upon Turkey acting in this way, i.e., in the best interests of the United States. This was, however, an inherently unstable situation, as the real national interests of the two countries, while having certain elements in common, also involved aspects that were of no concern, or even opposed to the goals of the other country. The management of the alliance relationship

1 was therefore built on certain false perceptions of national interests by both parties. These false perceptions and their consequences in the use of the arms embargo to influence Turkish actions are the major theme of this work. This theme reflects the words of Washington's Farewell address : So, likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement of justification. It leads also to concessions to the favorite nation of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the concession by parting with what ought to have been retained, and by exciting jealously, ill will, and a disposi tion to retaliate in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld; and it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nation) facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country without odium, sometimes even with popularity gilding with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion or a laudable zeal for public good the base or foolish . compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation. Partly as a consequence of the world view embraced in this passage, and partly as a result of the nature of the world political system, the U.S. for many years eschewed the development of "entangling alliances." Even during the U.S. intervention in Europe in World War X,

Quoted in Burton and Kaufman, Washington * s Farewell Address: The View from the 20th Century Tchicago, QuandrangTe Books, 1969), p. 27. the U.S. was an "Associated Power," not an "Allied Power." Only after World War II, did the U.S. undertake to enter into long-term foreign alliances as a major element of its foreign policy. The development of such alliances has been widely studied, but with little regard to the intrinsic nature of alliances. Disregarding Washington's advice, the creation of artificial congruencies of policy in order to foster the development or continuation of an alliance relationship has become common practice in the foreign policy of the United States. Soviet expansionism following World War IX and the inability of the British to maintain an independent economic and military deterrent to this expansionism led the U.S. to become permanently involved in European affairs. The Greek civil war and the Soviet demand for bases on the Dardanelles brought the U.S., Greece and Turkey to conclude that they had a mutual security interest in containing the Soviets. The Truman Doctrine, which formalized the containment policy, was triggered by the problems of Greece and Turkey. For Turkey as well as for the U.S., entering into such an alliance relation ship was a dramatic break with past foreign policies, a break driven by the immediacy of the Soviet threat. Some aspects of this shift in policy will be dealt with in chapter XI. The movement from dispassionate observer of the world to active participant in the new bi-polar world came both the U.S. and Turkey without time for full consideration of alliances and the consequences of alliance relationships.

Nature of Alliances The management of an alliance is an art rather than a science. Alliance theory as presently constituted does not even agree upon the definition of alliance. Before proceeding further, then, a review of the meaning of alliance, and what an alliance is, is in order. Alliance as a word has been used in numerous ways, many of which are contradictory. The term Alliance for Progress has a meaning clearly distinct, and in many ways opposite to, the use of alliance in such terms as the Triple Alliance prior to World War 1. The word is defined by Holsti as An alliance is a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues.2 by Haas as An alliance is a relationship in which a formal agreement specifies the rights and obligations of the members of the alliance.^ 2 Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and John Sulivan, ed. Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances; Comparative Studies, (New York, Wiley, 1973)., p. 4. 3Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1^64), p. 13. and by Morgenthau ae An alliance adds precision, especially in the form of limitation to the existing community of interests, and to the general policies and concrete measures serving them.4 Morgenthau implies alliance to mean any formal agreement among states, as do Holsti and Haas, but there is no agreement as to the purpose of such an agreement. Holsti limits the use of the term to those agreements which deal with national security issues. These defini tions do not limit the specificity of the term. That is, it may or may not include more than two states, it may deal with national security, or with other rights and obligations, and it may or may not be formal* It is clear that all these are structural definitions, presupposing a nation-state world order, presumably at least bi-polar and more likely multi-polar in nature. Alliances then are structural level aspects for the purpose of international relations analysis. The creation of an alliance relationship appears to be directly related to the level of perception of a common threat by those states engaged in establishing such a relationship. Holsti suggests that this perception is the determinant in the relationship. He notes that:

4 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York, Alfred Knopf, 1949), p. 142. Alliance partners, moreover, are said to be chosen on the basis of common need, not for reasons of shared values, institutions, or a sense of community.5 An alliance is formed according to Jackson, when two groups characterized by a fundamental cleavage of interest develop into opposing groups.^ The result is, then, the bipolar world. This view of formation of alliances creates a reflexive argument; is, do alliances occur in bipolar worlds because of differences, or do differences between groups create bipolar worlds? Beres proposes that structure determines the nature of the alliance pattern. He argues that in a bipolar world strong allinaces are found because there are no alterna tives, whereas a multi-polar world weakens the reliability of alliance commitments.^ Yi and Thompson, however, suggest that there was a fundamental change in the nature g of alliance formation after World War II. They suggest

^Holsti, Unity, p. 27. ^W. D. Jackson, "Popularity in International Systems; a Conceptual Note," (International Interaction. Vol 4 1977), p. 88. ^L. R. Beres, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Reliability of Alliance Commitments,"(Western Political Quarterly, Vol 24, .December 1972), p. 703. ®W. R. Thomson and R. P. Yi, "Systematic Interaction Opportunities and War Behavior," (International Interact ions, Vol 7,.1980), p. 58. a stochastic model of alliance formation predicated on balance of power considerations prevailed until 1945. In the bi-polar world of two nuclear superpowers, however, alliance formation is not predicated upon balance of power, but simply on immediate fears and historical ties. Dinner stein supports the position taken by Yi and Thompson, noting that post-World War II alliances are definitely status-quo accepted, and lead to a partial g accomodation between the superpowers (detente). It is clear, however, that perception of threat is the major factor in leading to alliance formation. Thucydides noted that mutual fear was the only solid basis of an alliance, and Fedder stated that: The occasion for the formation of NATO was the . _ perception of a Soviet threat to Western Europe. Liska in a discussion of the formation of alliances said that small power members of such alliances are not drawn to them, rather, they are driven by the threat of another great power.

^H. Dinner stein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems, " (American Political Science Review, Vol 59 1965), p. 598. ^®Edwin Fedder, "The Concept of Alliances," (International Studies Quarterly, V. 12, 1968), p. 76. 11 George Liska, Nations in ' Alliance, (Baltimore, Johns, Hopkins, 1968), pi 117. Holsti, in reviewing conceptions of national roles in alliances gave several sources for alliance formation as perceived by the member states. These include the common perception of a strategic threat, the location of the member state in relation to each other and to the perceived threat, the structure of the alliance system, and the perception by individual members that they have insufficient capabilities standing alone to respond to the threat. 12 While these attributes of alliance formation certainly are factors to be considered, it is apparent that none would lead to the creation of any alliance relationship without the overriding percep tion of a threat. Expanding on the above concepts, Rothstein suggested that small powers join alliances for different reasons than great powers, because their world-view and goals in the international system are different. Nonetheless, security and survival of the state are the primary goal of the small power (as indeed, they are of the great power) and when a threat that cannot be countered with their own resources is perceived, they enter an alliance relationship, albeit reluctantly.

^^Holsti, Unity, p. 33, 13Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, (NewYork, Columbia, 1966), p. 11. Rothstein further notes that neutrality always appeals to a small power, but the international system will not permit such a policy unless (1) the state cannot affect the balance of power by adhering to a great power, (2) the citizens are willing to reduce their expectations of affecting world affairs, and (3) no great power threatens their role. 14 Alliance management has been the subject of much study, again primarily at the systemic level of analysis. Brody suggests that the most important factor in continued cohesion of an alliance is the continuation of the perception of a common threat. Liska suggests that cohesion must be rationalized.This expands upon the point made above that states in alliance relationship emphasize commonalities rather than dissemilarities in their goals, and in their internal system. Liska further notes that consultation and compromise or at least the appearance of such, are major factors in a successful relationship.^^ Schelling and others have suggested that the success of the alliance can be measured by its effectiveness in international negotiations and bargaining

^^Ibid., p. 29. ^^Richard A. Brody, "Nuclear Weapons and Alliance Cohesion," (Journal of Conflict Resolution, V. 7), p. 669. Liska, Nations, p. 88. ^^Ibid., p. 92. 10 situations. IB Others have posited that alliance cohesion can be viewed in economic terms. 19 Neither cohesion or influence can be easily measured nor can levels of perceived threat. Further consideration of the early Holsti work on measurement of threat perception would be of value here. 20 Another major factor in cohesion to an alliance is the level of commitment it entails, in the Correlates of War Study of Singer and Small it was explicitly assumed that adherence to an alliance imposed certain requirements upon members that would not have been a factor had that state not adhered to the pact. 21 Moreover, the Singer and Small study tested these commitments by determining whether or not the members jointly participated in conflict more often than non-members, and whether or not they fought each other less frequently than they fought non-alliance states. While this is a relatively straightforward method of operationalizing data, it appears to be based

IflThomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, tLonScn, Oxford University, 1973J , p. 5. 19Mansur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliance," (Review of Economics, V. 28),p. 267. ^®0p Cit, p. 13. 21J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of Whr," in Quantitative Interna tional Politics, (New York, Free Press, 1968),p. 250. 11 on a weak premise. If it is accepted that states join alliances because of a common threat, it is expected that they will join in conflict against that threat. States not wishing to fight in such cases are not likely to adhere to the pact in the first place. This procedure then appears to test not the level of commitment nor the strength of cohesion, but only whether the state joined the alliance or not. As far as the determination that alliance members are less likely to fight each other, Liska pointed out that a great power can rarely have as allies both parties 22 to a local conflict. This is because of the difficulties involved in the rationalization of the cohesion process, and the probability that vital national interests of those states will overcome their alliance status. This, of course, is one of the difficulties with the U.S. retaining a relationship with both Grece and Turkey--not to mention Israel and the Arab States. Palmerston suggested a similar concept in his statement that nations have neither permanent friends nor allies, only permanent interests. 23 Holsti furthers this by discussion of factors that weaken alliance cohesion. He notes that

^^Liska, Nations, p. 262. 23Address to the House of Commons, 1848, quoted in Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, (Annapolis, Naval Institute, 19^6), p. 6. 12 small powers will possess influence disporportionate to their size because they have less to lose, and because they can commit the great power. 2 A Further, since nations with different attributes are unlikely to be compatible partners, only an immediate threat can ensure such partners remain allied. Holsti also argues that change in goals, the state of international tensions, size and distance of allies, and instability of regimes can also negatively influence alliance cohesion. He postulates that alliance cohesion is a direct function of the level of conflict between alliances, and the relationship of this conflict to national interests. 25 Thus France in 1956 shared the perception of its NATO allies of the Soviet threat, but found them indifferent to its concerns in Algeria.

Influence, Interference and Embargos The question of influence and how that influence is to be exercised is one of the two major factors in determining the cohesion of an alliance. The second factor is perception of the external threat and the extent to which this perception is shared by the members of the alliance. Both factors interrelate; when the threat is apparent and imminent, then the stronger power can be

' ^^Holsti, unity, p. 119.

25 . R. Kam, "Alliances versus Ententes," (World Politics, Vol28.onJuly 1976), p. 611-621. 13 more active in influencing its partners; when the threat is perceived as lessened, the great power ought to be delicate and discreet in its attempts to influence alliance partners. A more comprehensive look at the nature of influence in alliances depends upon a precise definition of that term, which is used in the literature in many ways, some of which are not narrow enough to be of value in understanding the term. A most useful definition of influence, penetration. Interference, and intervention— terms which are often used interchangably— has been 2 g provided by Couloumbis, Petropulos, and Psomades. They suggest that influence be used generically to describe penetration, interference, intervention, and other forms of pressure. Interference then is some deliberate, systematic, and organized activity intended to affect the performance, policies, or structure of the target state. Intervention in this context is defined as the use, or threat thereof, of military force, while penetration refers to direct participation in the affairs of the target state by officials of the patron state. Within this general framework of influence, it should be noted that influence does not necessarily flow

26T. A. Couloumbis, J. A. Petropolus, and H. J. Psomades, Foreign Interference in Greek Politics, (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976), p. 9-10. ~ 14

from the greater to the smaller power. Frequently, the lesser power, having limited objectives as opposed to the greater power, can exert its efforts in that limited arena so as to manipulate the actions of the greater power in that particular area. U.S. policy in the Middle East and the efforts of the Israelis are perhaps the best case in point. Another example, although in this instance, influence by a non-state actor, is the ability of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to collect funds openly within the U.S. despite its intended uses in actions contrary to U.S. foreign policy objectives. The case of the IRA demonstrates a second consid eration: that no alliance relationship is needed for states or other actors to attempt to influence the actions of other states. Nevertheless, alliance partners, because they are tied in so many ways, are most likely to wish to influence the actions of their partners. Such attempts at influence are likely to be limited to interference and lesser forms of influence such as diplomatic or economic pressures. Actual intervention or penetration would change the nature of the relation ship, from alliance to client. Of course, there are many who argue that the U.S. routinely uses such measures in its dealings with its alliance partners. 27

2?lbid., p. 144. 15

The bulk of the literature on intervention, such as Fanon, deals with the concepts of colonialism and imperialism rather than with alliance concepts as considered here. 28 Such literature impacts on alliance relationships by casting influence and other actions in these emotionally volitile terms. The success of Khomeinei's rejection of the "Great Satan" and the Western concepts such as equal rights for women and secular education at least partially was due to the ability to portray U.S. influence in Iran as "colonialism" and "imperialism." 29 The view of cultural influence as imperialism is very difficult to quantify. While the size of the USIS reading room may be known, the impact of reruns of Bonanza and star Trek is more widespread and unplanned. Planned interference can take many forms. It could be the appearance of the U.S. ambassador with the favored candidate in an election, or it could be the covert funneling of U.S. funds to the campaign of such a candidate. The value of interference that is too overt is questionable. To be effective, it requires the complete understanding of the targeted political

^®Franz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, (New York: Ballântine, 19791, p. 102. ^®Amin Baikal, TheT h Rise______and Fall of the Shah, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 198G), p. 193. 16 environment and the calculation of the consequences of the planned action. The Germans sent Lenin to the Eastern Front in 1917 in order to weaken the Allied Powers. They were successful in the short term. In the longer run, however, it is apparent that they were not sufficiently sensitive to the possible consequences of their actions. The difficulty of measuring the impact of overt interference is reduced by its very overtness. The impact of the action can be isolated and measured after the fact, at least in some instances. Here too a detailed understanding of the muddy waters one is about to stir is essential. The overt attempt to influence the actions and policies of Nasser in the 1950s by refusing arms aid and by not funding the Aswan High Dam were counterproductive to U.S. policies in the Middle East. It is transparently clear that attempts to influence the actions of other states should be made cautiously, and by a tool appropriate to the desired outcome. Sanctions as a tool of influence include arms embargos as well as other actions, ranging from restric tions on the movement of goods, people or funds, to total blockades, perhaps including the use of armed might as enforcement. Economic sanctions have been widely used in the post-World War II environment. As Doxey has pointed out, to be effective the sanction's 17 deprivation*! effect must be of greater consequence than the status of the policy that the sanction is intended to modify.Only if the state is totally dependent upon the state or states imposing the sanction is the policy likely to be altered in response to the sanction. As a means of influence, Doxey suggests that sanctions are destructive of the values they are intended to conserve.Similarly, George argues that coercive diplomacy (i.e., sanctions) focuses on the opposition's will--that is, they are intended to produce a precise and measured amount sufficient to achieve the desired policy change. 32 George considers this to be difficult to implement successfully. 33 Renwick notes that sanctions are liable to have perverse effects, and that their main effect has been invariably punitive rather than remedial. 34 Of the many tools available to influence the policies of other states, the U.S. has frequently

Margaret Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement,(New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 125. S^Ibid., p. 132. Alexander George, David Hall, and William Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,(Boston; Little, Brown and Co., 1971), p 18. S^ibid. ^^Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 91. 18

resorted to the use of an arms embargo. Curing the Carter Administration for example, it was generally invoked in the name of human rights. In a similar vein, there has long been an arms embargo against South Africa in an attempt to modify that country's apartheid policies. An arms embargo was imposed on Pakistan in 1965 in order to prevent further fighting between that country and India. Selective arms embargos such as the prohibition on the shipment of offensive weapons to some countries, or the absolute prohibition on certain classes of weapons, such as nuclear weapons, are also used by the U.S. as a means of influencing other states' behavior. Embargos and sanctions are a traditional tool of U.S. foreign policy, going back to the various neutrality acts of the Napoleonic period. The desired outcome of these acts, non-involvement in the wars of Europe was not achieved by these laws. The naval campaign against the French in the 1790s and the War of 1812 were directly related to the European conflicts and occurred despite the neutrality acts. The value of similar legislation in 1914 and again in the late 1930s are historically apparent. It has been suggested that one of these measures, preventing the export of war materials to Japan was the immediate cause of the Japanese attack 19 on the U.S. 35 Why, then, Is this tool of influence so widely used despite its obvious faults? To many in the U.S., such sanctions have great moral value, that is the supply of weapons to a state whose policies are not in the American tradition is wrong, and no further justification is needed for the embargo, whatever its actual results are. Beyond this, while the utility of moral judgements in international relations is open to question, their value in domestic politics is well established. For domestic reasons, it may appear prudent to punish a foreign state for some act or behavior. While this may be cloaked in moral terms, it is not likely to affect foreign actions. Thus, even a policy ineffective in modifying foreign behavior may have beneficial results for those espousing it in the U.S. The maintenance of U.S. self-image as well as these domestic political benefits play a large role in the continued use of a tool whose international effects are so lacking in success. There are occasions where the embargo not only fails to modify foreign behavior as the U.S. desires, it actually damages U.S. national interests. The endless debate on air defence missiles for Jordan, and the continuing embargo on provision of practical quantities

^^David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, (New York : Morrow, 1971) , p. 10 20 of appropriate weapons has in no way contributed to peace in the Middle East or the security of Israel— the ostensible purpose of the embargo. Another example was aluded to earlier; an arms embargo may well have been the trigger to cause Japan to attack Pearl Harbor— certainly not its intended purpose, despite the revisionist historians. So then, we have a paradigm of sanctions/arms embargos as a tool of influence in U.S. foreign policy, a paradigm with historical roots in the founding of our country. This paradigm has, however, little to recommend it if its real purpose is its ostensible purpose. That is, if embargos are to modify other states' behavior, they are inappropriate and ineffective. If they are to serve U.S. domestical political purposes, if the main concern is with U.S. self-image, and there is little adverse effect on national interests, then they may have some limited domestic value, but they are not then tools of foreign policy. In the instance of the arms embargo against Turkey, the tool of influence was not suited to achieve the desired goal, both from the historical record of U.S.-Turkish relations, and from the paradigm of the emgargo.

Anthony Cordesman, Jordanian Arms and the Middle East Balance,(Washington; Middle East Institute, 1983), p. 143. CHAPTER II

TURKISH FOREIGN RELATIONS

Origins of Turkish Foreign Policy One of the themes of this work is that the reaction of Turkey to the arms embargo was largely a consequence of her history of dealings with foreign powers. The Ottoman Empire, which had been supreme in its heyday, had slipped behind western Europe economically and militarily and had come under foreign influence in every sphere. Eventually the Empire was partitioned by foreign powers and only the War of Independence preserved the Anatolian homeland from foreign control. Symbolic of this domination by outsiders and the Eastern Question were the Capitulations, the grants of certain sovereign powers to foreigners resident in the Empire. The Capitulations were not originally a sign of Ottoman weakness, but merely the administrative procedure by which the Empire dealt with non-Turkish, non-Muslim minorities. Under the Ottoman system, relations with foreign states were a mixture of theocratic policy and pragmatism. The Sultan, as temporal ruler, was also the Caliph, the supreme religious authority. He ruled in these two

21 22 persona what the elite considered to be a Moslem state under Koranic law. ^ It should be noted that there were numerous variances from the ideal in the day-to-day environment, but there was no doubt that the mythos of 2 the people was that of the true state of Islam. The state was dar-ul-Islam. the remainder of the world was composed of unbelievers fdar-ul-harb), and one of the purposes of the state was to extend the benefits of Islam to the unbelievers.^ The political, economic, and overall structure of the early Empire was built on the continual expansion of the state, with new lands, more 4 states, and more opportunities for the elite. As the Empire reached the practical limits of expansion, the changes internally were dramatic, particularly in the economic sphere.^ Other states were therefore not equals, but merely unconquered lands whose rulers had no legitimacy. This meant that the Western concepts of diplomatic

^Seyyed Hassein Nasr, Ideals and Realities of Islam, (London, George Allen, 1975), p. lOTl 2 Marshall G. Hodgson, The Venture of Isleuaa, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 336. ^Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (London, Oxford University, 1976), p. 328. *Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire,(London, .Trinity Press, 1973), p. 48. ®Ibid., p. 51. 23 immunity, formal declarations of war, and other principles of the nation-state system had no value in the Ottoman system.^ Indeed, the Sultan on occasion ordered ambassadors imprisoned.^ The initial practical approach to dealing with foreign powers, as opposed to the theoreti cal or ideal concept described above, was to treat foreigners much as minorities inside the Empire were already treated. The millet system involved grants of certain administrative powers to the temporal or spiritual leader of such a minority— the ambassador then was treated as if he were responsible for all citizens of his country A and for their action in the Empire. This could sometimes have unpleasant consequences for the ambassador if his fellow statesmen were involved in criminal activities.^ In practice, as formal agreements were made as to the nature of the authority of the ambassador, all citizens of foreign states had effective diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal laws, as did Imperial subjects working

^Lewis, Emergence, p. 329. . R . Erdbrink, At the Threshold of Felicity, (Ankara, Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1975), p. 22. Q Herbert Gibbons, The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire,(London, Thomas Nelson, 1968), p. 78. Q Peter Sugar, Southern Europe under Ottoman Rule, (Seattle,.University of Washington Press, 19771 , p. 277. 24

for the foreigners.These agreements became known as the Capitulations.^^ Much of the public agitation in Turkey against U.S. military presence has recalled these Capitulations, and often parallels have been drawn between the various privileges granted to American military personnel and the concessions granted to foreigners under the Ottomans. 12 Much of this public discussion either deliberately or inadvertantly overlooks the origins of the Capitulations. The Capitulations question dates back to the first formal agreement between the Osmanlis and a foreign power. This occurred on 18 June 1387, when the agreement of 1352 between the Osmanlis and the Genoese was formalized, rather than in the 1535 Treaty between France and the Ottomans, as is often cited. In the Geneose Agreement, the merchants of Genoa were granted the right to enter and reside in the Empire, the right of safety from local authority, the right to have

^®Uriel Heyd, Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 223. James Scott, The Law Affecting Foreigners in Egypt as a Result of the Capitulations, (Edinborough, Green Press, 1908), p. 31. 12Ugur Kokden, Turkive'de Bati Bunaliro.(Ankara , Safak Hatbaasi, 1978), p. 105. ^^Nasim Sousa, The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey, (Baltimore, (Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), p. 128. 25 cases arising from disputes between Genoese to be tried by a Genoese Consul, and the right of immunity from special customs imports.These rights were primarily designed to encourage foreign trade, and to maintain contact on a limited level with the West. The Capitula tions were not imposed on the Ottomans by the Genoese in any sense, rather, the Capitulations reflected the Millet system of administration as described above. The French Capitulations of 1535 had this aspect but also included a number of new privileges, which reflected the political nature of the agreement. The French claimed the right to protect all foreign merchants, the right to protect Catholic religious institutions and personnel, and a special interest in Jerusalem.The Capitulations also allowed the French to maintain their own courts; Likewise, when the King shall send to Constantinople or Pera a bailiff . . . the said bailiff shall be received and maintained in proper authority . . . hear, judge and determine all cases, suits and differences, both criminal and civil which might arise between subjects of the (French) King. As foreign powers increased their trade and political relations with the Empire, and as the Ottomans

Scott, Foreigners, p. 31. ^^Gibbons, Foundation, p. 163. ^®J. C. Hurewitz, The Middle East in World Politics, (Yale, Yale University Press, 1975), p. 3. 26 declined, the Capitulations increased in number and grew in significance.^^

Early U.S.-Turkish Relations The United States entered into the Capitulatory System on 7 Kay 1830 with the signing of the first treaty between the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire. 18 This treaty contained the standard articles, although a disagreement about article 4, which related to the trial of U.S. citizens, was a problem in U.S.-Turkish relations until 1923, when the U.S. and Turkey signed an agreement at Lausanne. 19 The 1830 treaty contained a secret article which promised that the U.S. would build and sell warships to the Empire. 20 The Ottomans were in desperate need of such assistance after the destruction of their fleet at Navarino in 1827. The U.S. Senate rejected this secret codicil to the treaty, which resulted in considerable irritation of the Sultan, although he eventually ratified the treaty without the secret article.21

^^Lewis, Emergence, p. 455. 18James A. Field, America and the Mediterranean World 1776-1882, (Annapolis, Naval Institute), p. 151, ^^Hurewitz, p. 246. 20Hunter Miller, ed. Treaties and Other Interna tional Acts of the United States, (Washington, 'Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 543. ^^Field, America, p. ISO. 27

David Porter was appointed as the first American representative to the Sublime Porte. He assisted the Sultan in obtaining the services of a number of U.S. shipbuilders, who constructed modern shipyards and 22 modern warships in Istanbul. Indeed, Porter, a naval officer, even assisted in the rebuilding of the Ottoman Navy with counsel and advice. 23 American interests in the Ottoman Empire at this time were limited. The United States desired freedom of navigation, including the right to traverse the Straits and enter the Black Sea. This included the freedom of the seas for both commercial vessels and warships; although the U.S. respected the "ancient rule" of the Ottomans regarding warships in the Straits, official U.S. policy was always that this rule was without legal power. 24 The primary U.S. interest in relations with Turkey was to maintain good commercial relations by obtaining a most favored nation agreement and by maintaining the U.S. position on 25 freedom of navigation. 90 p. Dek Wheelock, "Henry Eckford," (American Neptune, V. 77), p. 212. ^^Field, America, p. 151. ^^Ferenc Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 65. 25Leland Gordon, American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930, (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932}, p. 49. 28

A major factor in U.S.-Turkish relations until the 1930s, the relationship between U.S. interests and the Armenians has been checkered. At firsts missionaries were resisted by the Armenian hierarchy, as the conversion to Protestant faiths weakened the temporal power of the Armenian millet leadership. There were even protests by the Armenieuis that American missionaries were forcing Armenian children to convert. 26 As the advantages of immunity from Ottoman law and the educational and economic benefits of conversion became obvious, the number and influence of American missionaries among the Armenians increased. Soon the Ottoman government felt constrained to protest over the number of Armenians claiming U.S. protection, and exemption from Ottoman taxes and laws. 27 Violence against American missionary schools and Armenian converts became a major issue between the U.S. and the Ottomans in the 1880s and later. 28 A lesser interest was to allow American missionary activity in the Empire, especially in the Levant and

26Letter, Sublime Porte to U.S. Envoy, 7 April 1863, in Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs,(Washington, D.C., (GPO, 1870) , p. 1094. 27Letter, O. S. Strauss to Hr. Bayard, 28 February 1868, in Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1870), p. 1565. 28Letter, Consul General To Secretary of State, 12 April 1893, in Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, (Washington, D.C.,.GPO, 1893), p. 628. 29 and Armenia. 29 As early as 1829, American missionaries penetrated to Erzurum, and Tabriz.The missionaries and traders were under the protection of the Capitulations, which, due to the "most favored nation" status, increased as the European powers forced additional Capitulations, including the right to own and alienate land, upon the Ottomans.The major capitulations included the right to land ownership, which entailed freedom from taxation, exclusion of Ottoman legal authority, and, for all practical purposes, extraterritorality. 32 Criminal and civil jurisdiction was extended to most cases involving foreigners, even when an Ottoman citizen was party to the case, and the jurisdiction came to include not only foreign nationals, but all Ottoman citizens .who claimed foreign protection. 33 Thus, areas developed where the Empire had no legal authority, even over its own citizens who were under foreign protection. Embassies maintained schools and their own postal systems which carried much

29Gordon, American Relations, p. 23. ^^Edward Head, "American Hissions in the Near East,"(Foreign Affairs. V. VII, April 1929) , p. 402. 31James B. Angell, "The Turkish Capitulations," (American Historical Review, Vol VI, January 1981),, p. 255. ^^Heyd, Law, p. 224. ^^Erdbrink, Threshold, p. 119. 30 of the domestic mail.Foreigners and their employees had become totally exempt from customs duties and other levies.

The Eastern Question Western Europe had once trembled before Lithe Ottoman Empire. Twice Ottoman armies beseiged Vienna, and Ottoman fleets controlled as much of the Mediterranean as they desired. In the 18th century, however, the relationship altered, as European military and diplomatic successes began to roll back the boundaries of the Empire. The causes of this shift are quite complex, and not fully understood. The failure of the Ottomans to modernize their military establishment while Europe developed rifled guns and new tactics was the most immediate problem for the Ottomans. Four European powers, the Kapsburgs, the Russians, the French, and the British were the major competitors for influence in the Ottoman Empire, and combinations of these powers for and against the Ottomans and each other fought military and diplomatic battles throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.

^^Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 63, ^^Lucius Thayer, "The Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire," (American Journal of International Law, V. XVII, April 1923) , p. 208. 31

The British were primarily concerned with protecting routes to India, and with preventing either the French or the Russians from obtaining control of invasion routes to the Persian Gulf, Iran and India. France desired the rich lands of the Levant, and used her ancient Capitulatory privileges to intervene on behalf of Catholic elements in the Empire. The Hapsburgs wanted to recover lands lost to the Empire and to expand southwards. Russia, also claiming Capitulatory privileges over Orthodox subjects of the Sultan, wanted access to the Mediterranean and to the land route to the Persian Gulf. England and France in the throes of the Industrial Revolution were interested in raw materials and markets for finished goods. The Hapsburgs also invoked their special role as protector of Catholics as part of the reason for their attacks on the Ottoman Empire, although this would appear to be more a device for obtaining public and international support than a serious goal of the Hapsburgs. 36 The Austrian expansion at the expense of the Ottomans was conducted to some extent, in conjunc tion with the Russians, and was primarily a phenomenon of the eighteenth century. Austrians were often in conflict with the Russians over who was to be predominant

^^Lewis, Emergence, p. 36 32

in the Balkan shatterbelt, and this led to centuries of instability and violence in that area. Continued Austrian expansion in the Eastern European sectors of the Ottoman Empire was later the trigger that resulted in World War One. 37 The Russian conflict with the Ottoman Empire began in the late 17th century and continues into the 20th century. Russian saw the weakening Ottoman Empire as a tremendous opportunity for expansion. With the limited modernization and westernization programs of Peter the Great and subsequent strong Russian rulers, warm water ports, first in the Black Sea and later in the Mediterranean thus entailing control of Straits, were seen as necessities for the trade and military sea power needed for a state of Russia's importance. 38 This perceived need for control of the Straits is still a significant factor in Russia's foreign policy. Like Austria, Russia found the Orthodox Christians and Slavic peoples under Ottoman rule as a convenient pretext for gaining popular support for wars against the Ottomans. Thus, an ideologi cal and racial component was added to what began primarily as a guest for territory. Between 1672 and 1914, there

37 Prank Weber, Eagles on the Crescent, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 12-13. 38 Lewis, Emergence, p. 313. 33 were twelve such wars. Many gains and losses occurred during these wars for both sides. The Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774 gave Russian merchant vessels the right to transit the Straits for the first time. In 1799, a treaty of alliance between Russia and the Ottomans, against the French, in effect placed the Ottoman Empire under Russian protection. The treaty was never invoked, and was abrogated in 1806. In 1833, the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi gave Russian warships the right to transit the Straits, but this was superceded by the London Declaration of 1 8 4 1 Again, in 1878, the Treaty of St. Stefano allowed Russian warships in the Straits, but this was retracted at the Berlin Conference A 9 under British pressure. Thus, while Russia was successful in occupying considerable territory on the Black Sea Coast, and in the Eastern area of the Empire, she had no success in establishing control over the Straits, or breaking through to the Mediterranean. Russia also desired to reach the Persian Gulf via Erzurum, Van

^®Ibid., p. 23. ^®R. W. Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy, (New York,Longmans, Green and Co., 1928)., p. 267. ^^Lewis, Emergence, p. 37. ^^G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question, (London; University of London Press, 1971), p. 84. 34 and Mosul, and was Interested in Central Asia and Afghanistan, and ultimately the pearl of the British Empire, India— the "Great Game" of the 19th century. Britain had had trade relations with the Ottoman Empire from the 16th century. This was not, however, the major cause of British interest in the Eastern Mediterra nean area, although the desire to sell manufactured goods and to obtain mining concessions was always an important consideration. The primary British interest was to protect the jugular vein of her Empire, the land and sea routes to India. This entailed preventing other Great Powers, such as France during the Napoleonic Wars, from achieving a dominant position in the Fertile Crescent, Egypt, Asia Minor, or from obtaining control of the Straits. The British interest in the Eastern Question was then, an outgrowth of her Imperial expansion, and was initially a reactive, and not a forward policy.Britain had little interest in obtaining hegemony in the Ottoman Empire herself, but for the sake of her Empire could not allow anyone to be in a position to threaten her routes to India. This goal became even more important in the late 18th and early 19th centuries as the Napoleanic invasion of Egypt reaffirmed the weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire which

^^Ibid., 49-50 and 69-72 35

had been demonstrated earlier by Austria and Russia. The British now perceived that they could no longer depend upon the stability of the Ottoman Empire to defend the routes to India. For that reason, Britain encouraged the growth of Egyptian separatism, so long as that separatism was in favor of increased ties with Britain. When other areas of the Ottoman Empire, such as Greece, displayed separatist tendencies, the British attempted to discourage them. However, with the involvement of Egyptian troops in Greece, and public support for the Greeks in England, Britain, acting in concert with other European powers, imposed a settlement of the Greek Revolution. 44 This was to set a pattern for other such imposed settlements throughout the 19th century. Whenever the peace or stability of the Ottoman state was seriously threatened, as in the case of the Egyptian invasion of Anatolia, the European Powers, led by Britain would impose a settlement on their terms. By the mid-19th century, Britain's interest in the Eastern Question, while remaining predominately concerned with the security of her routes to India, had become part of a larger problem. As the weakness of "The Sick Man of Europe" become more apparent to the

*4lbid., p. 51. 45 Mowat, History 299 and Lewis, Emergence, 36-38. 36

Europeans, who had now far outstripped the traditional world in military and economic power, European powers began increasingly to consider the Empire as ripe for exploitation and colonial expansion* This was the great age of colonial expansion and imperialism, and many areas once under Ottoman rule had already fallen to Western expansionism. These powers began looking to the homeland of the Empire as a place for their economic and political expansion. However, there was a reluctance to move quickly, as all the powers realized that any activities by them would result in counterreactions by other European states. The British provided a major counter-weight to such expansionism. Realizing, however, that some such activities were inevitable, the British consolidated their control over Egypt and the Suez Canal. As the question of the weakness of the Ottomans become more important to the Europeans, a series of formal and informal arrangements were made in order to reduce the possibility of competition in the Middle East leading to war in Europe. This was part of an attempt by the European powers to create a stable world order under European control. In the Middle East, the major problem for Britain continued to be Russia. The balancing of other European powers against Russia became a major aspect of British foreign policy in the 19th century. Most of the European political difficulties and conflicts 37 of the second half of the 19th century were tied directly or indirectly to the Eastern Question, and European competition for the spoils of the Ottoman Empire. The assignment of spheres of influence and the stability of the European system as established in such conferences as those at Vienna and Berlin, began to deteriorate in the early years of the 20th century. The competition between the Central Powers and the Entente Powers led to the collapse of the European system. The First World War exacerbated the Eastern Question when the Ottomans entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. To a large extent, however, the Eastern Question had been responsible for the war itself, with the Balkan Wars and the Xtalo-Turkish War being the preliminaries, and the Serbian-Austrian problem being the spark. With the entry of the Ottomans into the War, the Russians became increasingly insistent upon obtaining concessions from the Allies after the war. The Allies, in a series of five secret pacts, agreed to the dismember ment of the Ottoman Empire.Russia was to finally obtain control of the Straits, and Constantinople, and Britain, France, and Italy were all to receive parts of the Ottoman territory. The Sykes-Picot Agreement between

^®Clayton, Britain, 199-202 *^Lewis, Emergence, 246-247. 36

Britain and France was the most detailed of the agreements The Bolsheviks made the agreements public in 1917, and denounced them as imperialist in nature. At thë^Paris Peace Conference, the Ottoman Empire was partitioned among the victors, with independent states of Armenia and Kurdistan being proposed. The Arab provinces were to be severed irrevocably from the Turks. The Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations incorporated this division of the Empire. From the British point of view, they were now confirmed in control of Egypt and Iraq, and the Straits had been placed under an International Committee which included a British representative. These terms were imposed on the impotent government of the Ottomans. An Armenian state had been created, Greece had occupied Izmir, and Anatolia had been partitioned among the Italians, French and British. Western influence in the Empire was so overt and so destructive of the established social and economic order that large factions of the Empire turned to secret nationalist movements in the hope of expelling foreign influence from their homelands. European penetration and influence in the Ottoman Empire had a major effect on the development of nationalist movements throughout the Middle East and on the course of political and interna tional policies of the states that grew out of the Empire. European influence created a climate of anti-Western, 39

anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist feeling that remains a major aspect of political thought and activity in the Middle East and Turkey. In Anatolian Turkey, the Allied Powers moved quickly to divide up the country. The creation of zones for the British, the French, the Italians (later the Greek zone), and the further divisions promised by the Treaty of Sevres was seemingly acquiesed to by the Sultan, as he had accepted so many earlier European humiliations.*^ The only successful Turkish general of World War I and a fervant nationalist, Kemal Atatuk, rejected the division the Allies planned for Turkey.

Nationalist Foreign Policy Faced with the trauma of defeat and the potential that even Asia Minor might be partitioned or placed under foreign protection, Ataturk energized the Turkish people with a version of a Turkish state, renouncing any desire to retain vestiges of the Empire.** While initially opposed by all of the occupying powers, who used the Treaty of Sevres as the legalistic foundation for their role, early military victories by Ataturk led the French and Italians to quickly come to terms with

**Ibid. **A Speech by Mustapha Kemal,(Istanbul, Ministry of Education, 1963), p. 16. 40

the new movement.^* Relying on British support, however, the Greek army moved against Ataturk and his forces in Asia Minor, and also demonstrated before Istanbul. The Greeks were defeated and their forces driven out of Turkey. The British, who had not taken any overt steps to aid the Greeks also withdrew. 52 As the U.S. and Turkey were not in conflict during the First World War, the U.S. was not directly involved in the Treaty of Sevres. Under President Wilson, the U.S. had actively opposed many of the secret pacts agreed to by the Allied Powers concerning the partition of the Ottoman Empire. U.S. policy toward the breakup of the Empire was heavily influenced by the report of the King-Crane Commission, which reviewed the situation in Anatolia in 1919. The Commission recommended : (1) an Armenian state, (2) a separate mini^state of Constantinople, (3) a Turkish state occupying interior Anatolia, (4) autonomy for the Greeks in Izmir, and (5) the U.S. to be the mandatory power for all these new states. 53 There was never any real movement toward

**Speech, p. 498. ^^Michael Smith, Ionian Vision, (New York, St. Martin's, 1973), p. 198, S^ibid., p. 318. 53Roger Trask, The United States Response to Turk ish Nationalism and Reform, (Minneapolis, University of Minneapolis Press, 1971},p. 25-26. 41 carrying out the report of the Commission r the Europeans were opposed, the Turks were opposed, and there was little support in the U.S. for becoming so deeply involved in the Middle East. Much of the American public opinion did favor the creation of an Armenian state, an idea also much favored by Wilson. Outmaneuvered by the Allies and with little support in the legislature, Wilson returned to the U.S. without having had significant impact on Allied policies toward the Middle East. In the aftermath of the War of Independence, the U.S. and Turkey adopted a separate treaty (never formally ratified by the Senate) at Lausanne in 1923.^* The major U.S. concerns dealt with the continuation of the Capitulations, rejected outright by the Turks, concessions for U.S. corporations, also largely rejected, and repara tions for the Armenians, also rejected by the Turks. By 1927, the U.S. and Turkey had reestablished cordial ties, with modest economic relationships and a very modest missionary role. The principles of Ataturkist Turkey, or Kemalism, formed the foundation of the domestic and foreign policies of the Turkish state from the overthrow of the Sultan to the Third Republic of the 1980s. The first of these "Six Principles" was Republicanism, which entailed

S*Ibid., p. 34. 42 transfer of sovereignty from the sultans of the Ottoman state to the people of the new Republic of Turkey. Nationalism, the second principle, was the rallying cry of the war of independence. It stressed the uniqueness of the Turk and the purification of the state of foreign elements. The third principle. Populism, meant the equality of all Turks and the end to special privilege- such as the Capitulations. Revolutionism was the principle that called for zeal in effecting radical changes in the social and economic structure of the state, and the erradication of the remnants of the Empire. The fifth principle. Secularism, led to the end of the Caliphate and the purging of religious elements from the state structure. The sixth, and final principle of Etatism called for a mixed economy, with state control of basic resources and heavy industry. This state control was a reaction to the excesses of foreign exploitation during the Ottoman period,** Ataturk, a fervent nationalist, had been aided by only one foreign power— the U.S.S.R., and opposed by Western Europe and the U.S. His view on foreign influence was straightforward:

**C. H. Dodd, Democracy and Development in Turkey,(Hull: Eothen Press, 1979),p. 85. 43

The main point was that the Turkish nation should live in honor and dignity. Such a condition could only be obtained by complete independence. No matter how wealthy and propserous a nation is, if it is deprived of its independence, it no longer deserves to be regarded otherwise than as a slave in the eyes of the civilized world. . . . To accept the protectorate of a foreign power is to admit lack of all human qualities, weakness and incapacity. Indeed, it is impossible to envisage people who have not been humiliated willingly accept a foreign master. . . . But the Turk is both dignified and proud; he is also capable and talented. Such a nation would prefer to perish rather than subject itself to the life of a slave.56 Ataturk moved cautiously in dealing with foreign powers, however, as his first priority was to consolidate and modernize the Turkish people. His foreign policy goal was to establish the new Turkish state as a legitimate power, and to normalize relations with his neighbors. One of his earliest major steps was to negotiate an alliance with Greece, despite the conflict of earlier years. 57 The early friendship with the U.S.S.R. was ended as the Communist movement in Turkey became open. 58 In short, the goals of Ataturk's foreign policy were to end foreign political and economic penetration, to maintain correct

**Speech, p. 9. *^Roderic Davison, Turkey, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 141. e Q George Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey, (Stanford, The Hoover Institution, 1967), p. 137. 44 relations with Greece and other neighboring states through treaties with his neighbors to the East and West, and to maintain a sufficient armed force to deter foreign adventurism in Turkey. 59 He rejected attempts by some of his followers to intercede in problems involving Turkish tribes in Central Asia, and in Irag.*^ World War II saw Turkey neutral until the closing days of the war in Europe. While the Allies attempted in the early days of the war to draw Turkey in on their side, Turkish demands for military and economic aid were far too excessive for the Allies.*^ The Turks supplied chromium to the Allies, and interned aircrews who landed in Turkey following raids on Rumania. The conditions of internment were benign— the present day U.S. military aid mission to Turkey is housed in the same building used to hold the aircrews. 62

The U.S. Comes to Turkey Following the war, Turkey, which had cut its ties with the Middle East by abolishing the Caliphate, was

59Speech, p. 740. Stanford Shaw and Ezel Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey,(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 377. *^Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943- 1945, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973), p.T02< 62.This is the popular story among the U.S. and Turkish military communities in Ankara. 45 faced with a threat at once new and old. The U.S.S.R. wanted bases in Thrace to control the Straits, and cessation of eastern provinces which would give it control of invasion routes to Iraq and the Persian Gulf.** The Truman Doctrine and membership in NATO followed, as discussed earlier. This was a major change from Ataturkist foreign policy. Now Turkey accepted certain foreign influences in hopes of avoiding other, less benign, influences.** The Soviet Union and Turkey had signed a treaty of peace and friendship in 1921. This had been the first major international treaty signed by either revolutionary regime.** While some in the West viewed this as a sign that Turkey and the U.S.S.R. shared a common ideology, the difference between the nationalist revolution in Turkey and the internationalist movement of the U.S.S.R. was quite clear to the two states, and relations were never truly warm. Several major factors militated against close ties. These included the geography of the situation— one large state bordering a small state which

63 Henry Howard, Turkey, the Straits, and U.S. Policy,(Baltimore, .Johns Hopkins, 1974), p. 240. 64Bruce Kumholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, (Princeton, .Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 356. **Alvin Rubinstein, Soviet Policy toward Turkey Iran and Afghanistan, (New York, Praeger, 1982), p. 5. 46 cpntrolled a vital geopolitical feature— the Straits. Then the history of conflict between the two states, with constant Russian incursions into Turkish territory was a significant deterrent to Turkish trust of the Soviets. The fact that only the West had modernized and could provide a model for Turkish development kept Turkish eyes focused on Western, rather than Soviet ideals. Finally, there was a true distrust of communism and its expansionist goals on the part of Ataturk.** In the post-World War II period, Turkey moved from a one-party authoritarian regime to a period of multi-party democracy. The decade from 1950-1960, which also saw the rapid build-up of the U.S. presence in Turkey, coincided with the governments of the Democratic Party (DP) headed by Adnan Henderes. The Menderes* governments altered domestic and foreign policies estab lished by their predecessor, although the extent and nature of deviation from the principles of Ataturk ism of these governments was never really extreme. The DP did encourage relaxation of secularism, by allowing the traditional Arabic language call to prayer, by helping to establish divinity schools (imam hatip), and by using government funds to build new mosques. 67 The

**Ibid., p. 6. *^Ergun Ozbudun, The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics, (Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 16. 47

still unfinished New Mosque dominates much of Ankara's skyline, and recalls the actions of the Menderes government.^ 68 In the economic sphere, the DP encouraged free enterprise in its campaigns, but found it convenient to continue to build up the state enterprises after gaining power. The issue that led to the downfall of the DP was how to deal with legitimate political dissent. By closing newspapers, by arresting opposition leaders for insulting the government, and finally by attempting to restrict the movements of Ismet Inonu, the man considered to be Ataturk*8 successor, Menderes alienated the officer corps, as well as much of the public.** Student violence and riots, capped by a protest march of the officer cadets of the Ankara Military College resulted in a coup d'etat on May 27, 1960. 70 Following the trial and execution of Menderes a new constitution was drawn up and approved by the voters on July 9, 1961. Several members of the military junta, including Alparslan Turkes, opposed the quick return to civilian rule and sent

68When the mosque is completed by voluntary donations, it is said that it will be the largest mosque in the world, in terms of worshippers under a roof. **Ozbudun, Role,, p. 13. 7*Ibid. 48 abroad in various diplomatic posts.Abortive military coups against the new government in 1982 and 1963 were easily suppressed. 72 The foreign policy of the Henderes period was pro-Western and anti-Soviet. In addition to asking for U.S. military assistance, Turkey sent troops to Korea and joined NATO and CENTO. Turkey supplied a base for U.S. reconnaissance flights over the U.S.S.R. and for the U.S. Beirut operation in 1958. 73 U.S. military and economic assistance was crucial to the modernization of the Turkish armed forces, and it allowed the DP to maintain steady economic growth despite inefficient state enterprises. Relations with Greece were cordial with the independence of Cyprus in 1960 intended to remove that issue as an item of dispute between Greece and Turkey.^* The pro-Western credentials of the Menderes government were impeccable--and led to accusations that he was a U.S. puppet by both the left and the right.

’^Ibid., p. 33. 7*Ibid., p. 35. 73Roderic Davison, Turkey,(Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1968),p. 150. ^*Couloumbis, Triangle, p. 32.

^*Davison, Turkey, p. 152-6 49

While U.S. military assistance to Turkey began with Lend Lease in moderate quantities during World War II, it was not until initiation of the Turman Doctrine on 15 Hay 1947, that U.S. personnel began to be stationed in Turkey, a move which quickly aroused memories of the Capitulations. 7S However, hot until Turkey entered NATO in 1951 were U.S. troops sent to Turkey in large numbers. On 10 August 1947, the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMHAT) was formed in Ankara, under the command of Major General Horace McBride. 77 The organization had elements of all four military services, JAHMAT was renamed JUSMMAT— the Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, in 1958.^* Major deficiencies in the Turkish Armed Forces at the time were outmoded equipment, lack of early warning radar and interceptor aircraft, and an inadequate transportation 70 network. Between 1947 and 1970, the U.S. was to grant more than three billion dollars in military aid to . an Turkey. JUSMMAT, which had 1,250 personnel in 1951,

76George Harris, Troubled^.:Alliance, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 28. JUSMMAT Information Office, nd, p. 2. 7*Ibid. 7*Ibid., p. 19. 80Defense Security Assistance Agency, Report, 1975, p. 92. 50 was the largest U.S. military advisory group abroad. fil During the saume period, the U.S. granted over one billion dollars in economic assistance. 82 In addition to the NATO Pact and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) accompanying it, there were numerous bilateral agreements of varying levels of formality and secrecy arranged between the two nations regarding the U.S. military presence in Turkey. S3 The most formal of these was the 1959 Mutual Defense Pact.** The various agreements gave U.S. military personnel freedom from customs duties, jurisdiction of U.S. military courts over most criminal activities, and allowed U.S. facilities, including clubs and exchanges DC to operate free from Turkish taxes, rules, or laws. The similarity between these privileges and the Capitula- lions is obvious, and it was not overlooked by the Turks, although the overriding concern over the U.S.S.R. kept criticism of the agreements muted throughout the

JUSMMAT, p. 4. 82Defense Security Assistance Agency, p. 98. 83An example would be the agreements under which TUSLOG (The United States Logistic Group) was formed. **U,S. State Department, Treaties and Other Inter national Acts Series, 1959, p. 4191. QC Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 45. 51

8fi 1950b . The Republican Peoples' Party, however, criticized the 1959 agreement, primarily because they believed it was a U.S. attempt to shore up the Henderes government against any domestic challenges. 87 Turkish foreign policy in the 1950s emphasized increased U.S. military and economic aid, and was concerned about any decline in U.S. interests in the area; in order to achieve these goals, Turkey cooperated closely with the U.S., even to offering bases for Jupiter IRBHS. 88 After the collapse of the Henderes government in 1960, the new military government attempted to regularize the various bilateral agreements and emphasize Turkish national interests. 89 Anti-American publicity based on comparison of the privileges of the SOFA with the Capitulations increased dramatically during the 1960s, and one was of the major issues of the 1969 election campaign.*®

gg Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, (Boulder, Westview, 1977), p. 395. 87Ulraan and R. H. Delcmejian, "Changing Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy," (Orbis, Vol 11, N. 3, 1967), p.772. **Ibid,, p. 398, **Kemal Karpat, "The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64."(American Historical Review, V. XXV, No. 6, 1970), p. 1667. 52

The issue of the Peace Corps and its purported role in U.S. espionage was also a major issue in this 91 campaign. The "garrison mentality" of the U.S. community, its isolation from the Turkish environment, and its ignorance of Turkish customs and mores contributed to this growth in anti-Americanism. 92 Large scale black marketing operations involving the American military postal system (APO) and exchanges also contributed to publicity about "Capitulatory" privileges. 93 Numerous anti-American books were published, and it became intellectually fashionable to blame all of Turkey's problems on American "Intervention." 94 A major incident that exacerbated relations was the 5 November 1958 incident in which a U.S. Army officer, returning from a cocktail party, ran into a formation of the elite Presidential Guard, killing one and injuring 20 others. U.S. officials invoked the SOFA, court-martialled the officer and fined him $1,200. Needless to say, the Turkish press and public did not consider this to be adequate punishment, and the issue of criminal jurisdiction

*^Ibid., p. 398. 92charlotte Wolf, Garrison Community, (West Port, Greenwood, 1969), p. 1. 93R. C. Lawson, "New Regime in Turkey," (Current History. V. LII, Feb 67), p. 105. **.Jacob Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1974), p. 28. 53 became a major public question. 95 A leading Turkish newspaper carried the following editorial: When you meet one of the Americans residing in our country, do you ask, even before learning his name, whether he is on duty or not? No? Then let us warn you at once that you are exposing yourself to great danger . . . Just as these (Americans) bring all their foodstuffs, even their salt, from their own country, they never use the local justice.95 Despite the adverse publicity the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) of 1969 essentially confirmed the status of Americans in Turkey. 97 The U.S. viewed the DCA as an attempt to assume control of U.S. operations, whereas the Turks viewed it as a regularization and consolidation of numerous agreements. 9fi The U.S. felt that the privileges accorded to U.S. forces in Turkey were only the usual privileges given to American forces throughout the world, and therefore should not be abridged. 99 While perfectly correct, the position did not take into consideration Turkish history, sensibilities, and political realities. The DCA was signed in July, 1969,

95Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 160. **Dunya, p. 2, 12 Nov. 59, as quoted in Harris, 161. *^U.S. State Department, Defense Cooperation Agree ment with Turkey, (Washington * Government Printing Office, 1976),. 98 Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 160. **Ibid, 54 but was kept secret and not submitted to the National Assembly, an action which led to considerable discontent in the press and assembly.^®® The question of the special rights given to Americans continued to be a major irritant, especially given the lack of understanding displayed by both sides. Despite foreign schools, even U.S. military schools, being illegal in Turkey, U.S. military school buses continued to travel in large nunbers directly in front of the National Assembly.^®^ U.S. mili tary guards, unarmed, but in uniform, continued to travel throughout the capital of Ankara checking various U.S. facilities in the city, and cases of large blackmarketing continued. 102 By the seune token, the Turkish government allowed public criticism of many of the U.S. privileges to stand, without serious attempts to place the privileges in proper perspective, and failing to communicate adequately those points where U.S. and Turkish interest were congruent. This mutual misunderstanding was exacerbated by the Embargo, and the results will be discussed in a later section of ; this paper. The reaction and actions of the Turkish government to the Embargo

^®®Berch Berberoglu, Turkey in Crisis,(London, ?ed, 1980), p. 89. 101 Personal observation, 1974-81. l®*Ibid. 55 cannot be fully understood with reference to the history of the Eastern Question and the Capitulations. In addition to the problems in U.S.-Turkish relations growing out of the Capitulations, there are several other defense related issues which have created problems in the relationships of the two powers. The first issue was the use of U.S. installations in Turkey for purposes not related to the defense of Turkey or NATO.This is a major instance where U.S. assumptions that the interests of the two powers were totally identical resulted in problems that could have been avoided or diluted. Incirlik Air Base was used by the U.S. in 1958 to support U.S. military operations in Lebanon.^®* While the government of the time authorized this action after the fact, there was considerable uproar in the press and among opposition leaders.^®* The Turkish press was especially upset by the fact that WQst European and U.S. newsmen were permitted to enter Incirlik to cover the operation, but Turkish newsmen were not allowed to enter the installation.^®* The use

^®*American Foreign Policy Institute, NATO, Turkey and U.S. Interests, (Washington, 1978) , p. 31. ^®*Harry Howard, "The Bicentennial in American- Turkish Relations,"(Middle East Journal. V. 30, No. 3, Sum 76) , p. 306. ^®*Ahmad, Experiment, p. 297.

^®*Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 166. 56 of Incirlik became such an issue that Prime Minister Deroirel saw fit to issue a statement that the U.S. would not be permitted to use Incirlik to intervene in the 6-Day War and later that it would not be used to intervene in the 1969 Lebanese crisis or the 1970 Jordanian crisis. 107 ' Another aspect of Incirlik was its use in supporting the U-2 flights, beginning in 1956. lOB The Turkish government was aware of the U-2 program, and provided extensive security for Incirlik operations. 109 When the installation's role was compromised in 1960, there was guarded criticism in the press, but the May 1960 Coup overrode the issue. After the 1965 crash of a reconnaissance plane in the Black Sea, however, the Turkish government ordered the U.S. to suspend such flights. The Jupiter missiles also resulted in a worsening of relations. Although Turkey had asked for the missiles, and was eager to support them, by July 1962, there were hints in the press that the U.S. was planning to close the

^®’lbid. lOflFrancis Power, Operation Overflight, (New York, Tower, 1970), p. 41, ^®*Ibid. ^^®M. Phillips Price, A History of Turkey, (London , George Allen, 1966), p. 259.

^^^Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 165. 57

sites unilaterally. 112 This reduced the Turkish view of the value of NATO, and of their role in the Alliance. 113 The United States had indeed raised the issue with the Turks after President Kennedy ordered the missiles removed in early 1961, but when the Turks adamantly opposed the question, the State Department dropped the matter.The missiles became an issue during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Soviets suggested that the Jupitera be withdrawn in exchange for their with drawing the Cuban missiles. While the U.S. did not officially agree to this. President Kennedy did order the missiles withdrawn without consulting the Turkish government, which actually owned the missiles, although not their warheads.The Turkish public was convinced that the U.S. had sacrificed the Turkish missiles and that the U.S. had treated Turkey as a client whose interests were negotiable. 116 Another aspect of the incident has also had continuing impact on U.S.-Turkish relationships; that is the realization that Turkey might

112George Guren, "Ambivalence in the Alliance," (Orbis, V. 24, Summer *80), p. 369. ^^*Ibid., p. 370. ^^*Graham Allison, Essence of Decision,(Boston Little, Brown, 1971), p. 141. ll*Ibid., p. 142.

^^*Ahmad, Experiment, p. 402. 58 become a target for Soviet nuclear attack because of the U.S. bases, and that having bases which would attract such an attack might.not be in the security interests of Turkey. A third defense related issue is that of nuclear weapons in Turkey. According to Harris, the U.S. had deployed nuclear weapons in Turkey since 1957. 118 In a major news conference in 1970, Prime Minister Demirel stated: At present there are in Turkey ground launching devices and nuclear arms with limited ranges directed at the target from the air and also the NIKE system against an air raid. All are to be used for tactical defense purposes . . . in accord ance with the established rules of NATO, tactical nuclear arms in Turkey are subject to the double key system and it is impossible to use them without Turkey's consent. The question of control over the weapons was a significant political issue in Turkey. In 1966, one major party had called for full Turkish command over nuclear weapons on Turkish soil, and leftist politicians demanded that direct Turkish control be established over the nuclear weapons. The presence of nuclear weapons on Turkish soil was also an issue for U.S. politicians. On 27 July 1975, Senator Hugh Scott said:

^^^Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 97. ^^*Ibid, p. 237. ^^*Ibid., p. 153. 59

If Turkey takes over the U.S. nuclear weapons sites it will become a major nuclear p o w e r . It appears clear that neither side was completely happy with the nuclear weapons issue. The United States first attempted to influence Turkey to halt the growing of opium poppies in 1923, when the American Consul in Istanbul suggested that the Turks substitute mulberry trees for opium poppies, and that the U.S. finance the conversion. 121 There was no response from either the Turkish or U.S. government to this request. As heroin addiction increased dramatically during the Vietnam War, the question of control of the international heroin trade became increasingly important to the U.S. 122 As early as 1966, the U.S. Ambassador began to insist that not only should poppy growing be controlled, but that the crop should be completely eradicated. 123 The poppy was a major cash crop in the Afyonkarahisar region, and there was considerable reluctance to comply with the U.S. request. After the fall of the Demirel government and the beginning of the Brim "technocrat" cabinet, U.S. pressure increased

^*®New York Times, 20 July 75, p. 1. 121 James Spain, "The U.S., Turkey, and the Poppy," (Middle East Journal. Vol 29, No. 3, Summer 75),p. 247. ^**Ibid., p. 249.

^^*Ibid., p. 250. 60 dramatically. Under the pressure the Erim government agreed in 1971 to ban all poppy growing.^** This agreement included $35 million to recompense Turkish farmers and to allow them to convert their fields to other crops. 125 The decision was very unpopular in Turkey and it became a major symbol of Turkish subservience to U.S. interests. 126 There was also considerable public feeling that the problem of drug addiction should be resolved in the U.S., not in Turkey where there was no problem. In the elections of 1973, every major party opposed the poppy ban. 127 After the elections, the new government made it clear to the U.S. that poppy cultivation would resume without regard to the 1971 agreement and the resumption of poppy cultivation was formally announced on 1 Jan 1974.^** U.S. reaction was forthright. On 13 March 1974, Representative Charles Rangel announced that he would propose cutting all aid to Turkey if the poppy ban was lifted.^** In a "backgrounder" U.S. officials warned on

4 m A Ahmad, Experiment, p. 340. 125Howard, Bicentennial, p. 307. 1.26Nuri Eren, Turkey, NATO and Europe, (Paris, Atlantic Institute, 1977),, p. 24. 127Ahmad, Experiment, p. 340. ^**New York Times, 8 Jan 74, p. 5. 1 2QNew York Times, 14 Mar. 74, p. 40. 61

6 May 1974 that U.S.-Turkish relations would worsen if the growing of poppies resumed.On 30 June 1974, the U.S. State Department ordered the U.S. Ambassador to "return for consultation, " a traditional means of displaying official displeasure. 131 On 9 July 1974, Representative Lester Wolf introduced a bill to cut off aid to Turkey unless Turkey reinstituted the opium poppy ban; this bill had 238 co-sponsors. 132 ■ On 2 August 1974, after the Cyprus problem had begun, the full House voted to cancel all aid to Turkèy. 133 Only considerable pressure by the Administration prevented this bill from becoming law.^^^ Turkey instituted strict controls over the opium fields, a control the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency considered satisfactory.The issue was overtaken by the Cyprus problem as the major problem between the U.S. and Turkey, but its effects remain in both countries, and it embittered many formerly pro-American Turks against the U.S. It also was a major factor in the Arms Embargo, as many U.S. legislators

^^^New York Times, 7 May 74, p. 16. ^^^New York Times, 30 June 74, p. 7. ^^^New York Times, 9 July 74, p. 19. ^^^New York Times, 3 Aug. 74, p. 1. 134ibid. ^^^Spain, "Poppy," p. 308, 62 were still struggling with the poppy issue when the Cyprus invasion began. Turkish interests in the alliance relationship were based initially on perception of a common threat— the U.S.S.R. Having fought numerous wars with Russia, the Turks were ready to accept U.S. assistance in containing the Soviet threat. Turkey was willing to extend this opposition to the Communist danger to the Middle Bast in adhering to the Baghdad Pact, even though the United States failed to participate fully in this security arrangement. 136 To Turkey, or at least to that element of popular belief which is sometimes referred to as the national psyche, the concept of Arkadas, friendship is of crucial importance. 137 Turkey viewed herself as an equal in an arrangement of friends aligned against a common foe. Naturally, it was expected that friends would also support each other on issues of Importance to themselves. 138 The disappointment with the United States then, arose in some considerable part out of a feeling of betrayal of this friendship. They consider the U.S. to

^^®Erem, p. 43, 137Esat Cam, "Foreign Policy Preferences of Turkey," Pis Politika, V. VII No, 344, Dec 78),p..81. 138 In frequent conversations with Turkish officials and citizens, 1974-80. 63 have betrayed them over what they view as their legitimate concern with Cyprus. A parallel is often drawn over the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the U.S. response to those incidents with the arms embargo following the occupation of Cyprus. 139 Further, Turkey, in the spirit of Ataturkism, viewed itself as a Western state with real cultural affini ties to the U.S.^^^ From this affinity, certain obliga tions are expected and when these are not fulfilled, there is a sense of betrayal. 141 To some extent the U.S. shared the perception of common interest, to the point that any action the U.S. viewed as furthering its interests such as use of Turkey for the 1958 occupation of Beirut, was viewed as requiring 1 d 9 no consultation with the Turks. The U.S. wanted Turkey as part of its containment policy, as a secure area for bases and installations to support U.S. activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, to maintain stability on NATO's southern front, and to maintain U.S. economic interests, limited though they were, in Turkey.

13*Ibid. 140lbid. 141lbid. ^*^Ihsan Gurkan, NATO, Turkey and the Southern Flank,(New York, National Strategy Center, 1980), p. 31. ^*^U.S. Congress. House. Turkey's Problems and Prospects: Implications for U.S. Interests,(Washington, GPO,, 1980), p. 48. 64

The common thread, then, was the Soviet threat. However, both had divergent views on what that entailed, and in other aspects of the relationship. Bulent Ecevit, writing in 1978, noted four major factors in the evolution of the U.S./Turkish relationship: 1. The diminished sense of the Soviet threat, by all parties. 2. The Turkish feeling of U.S./NATO neglect. 3. The perilous domestic political and economic situation. 4. The Turkish need for trade, credits and aid. In Ecevit's view, these factors had changed the nature of U.S./Turkish ties unalterably, and a new reality had to be defined.^** The lack of any effective Turkish mechanism to influence U.S. popular opinion limited severely any Turkish ability to expound its views of the meaning of the alliance.Indeed, neither side defined the nature of their implicit assumptions and expectations in a suitable forum.

Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus The relationship between these states has experienced severe tensions since the revolution which

^**Bulent Ecevit, "Choices in Turkish Foreign Policy," (Survival, Vol. 20, Oct 1978), p. 203. ^*^Engin Holmstrom, Editorial, (Bulletin of Turkish- American Associations, V. 1, No. 5 & 6, Oct 80) , p. 1. 65 brought independence from the Ottoman Empire to Greece. Differences in religion and the diametrically opposed concepts of Meqali and pan-Turkism contribute to these problems.The war fought in the 1920s in some ways contributed to improvements in relations, at least by forced population movements reducing the potential for further conflict.The Treaty of 1930 helped also to reduce tension in the inter-war period. Nevertheless, even if the Cyprus issue were resolved, Greece and Turkey would continue to have issues at contention. While primarily a dispute between Greece and Turkey, the issue of the Aegean shelf also directly affects U.S.-Turkish relations because of the U.S. attempts to mediate the problem.The off-shore islands, which belong to Greece, have been an issue between the two countries for many years, primarily because of the strategic positions of the islands and Greek militarization there in contravention of agreements between the two states. 149 When the possibility that the Aegean Sea might have oil deposits became apparent.

^^^Smith, Vision, p. 23. George Kousoulas, Modern Grece, (New York, .Charles.Scribner, 1974), p. 136. ^**Ellen Laipson, Turkey and U.S. Interests, (Washington, Congressional Research Service, 1980), p. 1. ^^^Cumhurrivet, 21 Apr 74, p. 1. 66

Greece suggested that the off-shore islands and their territorial waters were so situated that the economic rights to the entire North Aegean Sea were Greek. This position was rejected by Turkey, which laid claim to a substantial portion of the 10,000 square kilometers of the sea-bed.^^^ For a number of years, disputes over air traffic control in the Aegean meant that air traffic could not fly directly between Greece and Turkey. 152 Both countries issued oil exploration licenses and threatened to interfere militarily with each others explorations in the disputed areas. On 21 April 1974, the two countries were reported to be mobilizing and nearing a state of war as a result of the Aegean dispute.This did not materialize but there have been minor shooting incidents and seizures of fishing vessels by each side.^^* The dispute continues, although the issue of air traffic control has been resolved. 155 Disputes over NATO roles resulted in the realignment of command arrangements. LANDSOUTHEAST and ISOlbid. ^^^Ahmad, Experiment, p. 341. ^^^NOTAM, 22 Jul 74. 153Cummhurrivet. 22 Apr 74, p. 1. ^^^Curamhurrivet, 19 Dec 78, p. 1. ^^^Gurkan, NATO, p. 20. 67

6th ATAF, which once included units of both countries and provided for a unified defense of the region now include no Greek forces.Separate commands have been established in Greece, effectively halting combined planning and combined exercises in the region. Further, the re-entry of Greece into NATO military planning was obstructed by Turkey for some time. 157 These problems, however, are overshadowed by the Cyprus question. The proximate cause of the Arms embargo was, of course, the Turkish military operations in Cyprus follow ing the Greek junta-inspired coup de etat. The Cyprus question has been one of the major issues affecting Greek-Turkish relations, and both directly and indirectly, U.S. relations with both countries. Turkish domestic politics and Turkish relations with the U.S. have been in large part, pawn to the problems of Cyprus since independence was granted to that country by Great Britain in 1960. 198 The Trilateral Agreement through which independence was granted was violated in both spirit, and letter by Greece, Turkey, and the Greek-Cypriot-dominated government of Cyprus itself from the very

iS6^ e North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Facts and Figures, (Brussels, 1981), pp. 71, 105. ^^’ibid., p. 71. 158Kenneth Mackenzie, Cyprus: The Ideological Crucible,(London, Institute for Conflict Studies, 1972), p. 14. 68 beginning. 159 As is typical of such an important issue, it has become imbued with emotional1stic responses on the part of all countries involved, sometimes to the exclusion of their own national best interests. While the questions of international law and morality can and have been argued ad nauseum, and no view would satisfy all parties, there are certain aspects of the Cyprus Question which can be set forth in a manner which helps set the scene for an understanding of the events which led to the Arms Embargo and the continuing impasse. This review does not attempt to evaluate either legally or morally the positions of the actors in the Cyprus Question; rather, it is an effort to define the parameters and frameworks in which these actors operate. Cyprus is an island of 3,572 square miles, located about forty miles off-shore in the Mediterranean from Turkey, and about sixty miles from Syria. It is strategically located in that military forces operating from Cyprus could dominate southern Turkey, the Levant coast, and much of the Eastern Mediterranean. As of January 1970, the population was estimated at 628,000, 78% of Greek origin, 18% Turkish origin, and 4% consisting of various minorities.

Halil Salih, Cyprus; Impact of Diverse Nation alism on a State, (University, .University of Alabama Press, 19TeT, ^16: 69

While inhabited since ancient times (at least 5800 B.C.), Cyprus had almost always been under the control of extra-insular powers. This has contributed to the question of legitimacy of any rule of Cyprus, at least in the view of some observers. Greek influence and settlers appeared on the island about 1400 B.C., establishing a unique culture, which may have included substantial population representation from Anatolia. In 709 B.C., Cyprus became part of the Assyrian Empire and shortly thereafter, the Egyptian Empire. The Persians replaced the Egyptians in 540 B.C. to be replaced in turn by Alexander and his successors in 332 B.C. From 294-58 B.C., Cyprus was under Ptolemaic rule but became part of the Roman Empire in 58 B.C. It was under Roman rule that Christianity became estab lished on Cyprus, and the island became part of the Byzantine Empire after the division of 395. Religious control became paramount, and the Cypriot Church received independent status in 488 with the right to elect its own Archbishop.The Church became a political and economic, as well as religious, master of the island during the Byzantine period. During the Third Crusade, Cyprus was conquered by Richard I of

^®®Robert Stevens, Cyprus; A Place of Arms,(New York, Praeger, 1966), p. 7.

^®^Sugar, Rule, p. 45, 70

England, and for 400 years the Island was ruled by West Europeans* The Lugisgnan Dynasty, which ruled from 1192r*1489, attempted to suppress the Cypriot Church, and convert the populace to the Roman Catholic faith. The Cypriots were largely reduced to the level of serfs and while the island became prosperous because of its commercial activities and trade, the wealth remained in the hands of the rulers. Venice took control of Cyprus in 1489 but the position of the Cypriots was not substantially changed by this shift in the ruling elite. In 1571, the Ottoman Turks captured Cyprus, beginning 300 years of Turkish occupation. As part of the Ottoman Empire's administrative practices (the Millet system), the island was administered through the Cyrpiot Church and Archbishop. 162 Under the Millet system religions or ethnic groupings recognized by the Sublime Porte as constituting an organized community under his suiBinary were permitted a certain degree of autonomy. While there were differences in the freedoms permitted such groups, in general, they were permitted to have their own laws and system of justice for members of the group, they could collect taxes for operation of their internal administration system, and, frequently, they collected the Ottoman taxes for transferral to the

^®^Ibid, 71 provincial governor. Matters involving a Moslem and members of such groups were, however, invariably handled through the imperial system, and not by Millet courts. Turkish governors varied in their level of tolerance of church rule (sometimes executing Archbishops) but the concept of the Archbishop and church as having both temporal and religious power was firmly established by Turkish policy. During this period also, substantial numbers of ethnic Turks migrated to Cyprus; the number 20,000 has been given for migration of Turks in the early period. 163 Cyprus was not an important part of the Ottoman Empire; trade was stagnant, and the economy deteriorated. In the nineteenth century, an ancient and deep rooted aspect of the Greek cultural heritage came to the fore in areas dominated by the Ottomans. This was the "Great Idea" or meqali concept; the view that the Greek peoples of right should be independent in all areas that had been traditionally Greek.This was both an ethnic and religious issue, with considerable fervor added to the matter by the concept of a reestablish ment of a universal Christian Empire with Constantinople as its rightful capital. The same period also saw the

^®^Stevens, Arms, p. 37 ^®^Smith, Vision, p. 3, 72 weakening of the Ottoman Empire, and the rise of European interest in the politics led to the independence of Greece in 1821. The new Greece was truncated, however, in the view of many Greeks, it lacked Crete and Cyprus, not to mention Constantinople.Attempts to extend the meqali concept ot Cyprus were unsuccessful, although enosis with Crete was achieved late in the nineteenth century. The spirit of Greek nationalism continued, however, to grow in fervor, and to continue to seek redress from the Turks for real and imagined injustices. Britain had been drawn into the Greek War of Independence, and partly because of this, and because of fear of Russian influence over routes to India (the Eastern Question), Britain became deeply involved in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire in the mid-late nineteenth century.^®® In 1878, Britain leased the island of Cyprus for thirty years, primarily for use as an advanced naval base.^^^ Britain was at this period expanding her influence throughout the Eastern Mediterranean in quest of security for her trade routes to India. The fear of Russian, or French, control or access to areas

^®^Ibid. ^^^Mowat, - History, p. 14. ^®’lbid., p. 150. 73 which could threaten these routes drove British policy in the far region nearly a century. Other factors, as mentioned above, and debts owed to Britain by the Ottomans were also involved in the decision to occupy Cyprus* The British allowed the Cypriots to establish a legislature containing both Greek and Turkish representatives and having limited powers. IfiS The British, as in other colonial areas, used the policy of divide and rule in their administration of Cyprus. 169 They deliberately created division among the Greek and Turkish residents of the island in order to maintain their rule at minimal costs. This policy, which exacerbated the differences between the two groups already existing as a result of the Millet system and religious differences, in some considerable part resulted in the current problems between the two groups.170 When Turkey was drawn into World War I, Britain formally annexed Cyprus as a colony, and abrogated their lease arrangement with Turkey.This ended the period of Turkish sovereignty over the island. This

^®®Salih, Diverse, p. 5. l**Ibid. 170lbid. ^^^Shaw and Shaw, History, p. 321. 74

arrangement was concurred in by the new Turkish Republic in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. 172 Until the 1950s, the situation remained relatively static. There was increasing interest in enosis (union with Greece) and occasional demonstrations and violence, but no large-scale anti-British activity. 173 Especially during World War II there was seeming peace on Cyprus. In the late 1940s, a new constitution was promulgated by the British and agitation for enosis began to grow, in large part as a result of dissatisfaction over the terms of the constitu tion. The Turkish population also became increasingly aware of their own national identity during the early years of the twentieth century. The pan-Turk and pan- Turanism movements, and the victory of Ataturk over _ foreign invaders in Anatolia in the 1920s, resulted in a situation wherein some, at least, of the Turks on Cyprus viewed their future as lying with the mainland, rather than with any possible apparent nationalist movement. There was and is an incredible tension between pan-Turkism and the meqali concept, between Turkish and Greek nationalism. Both movements claim, a result of perceived historical right, many of the same areas.

^^^Ibid., p. 365. 173 Polyvious Polyviou, Cyprus; The Tragedy and the Challenge,(Washington, American Hellenic Institute, 1975), p . 3 . 75

The spirit of these nationalist movements, and the perceptions of each that the other had been unjust, or evil in their dealings, is a spirit that forms the backdrop to the whole of the region; Cyprus being only one, albeit the largest area, where this tension has been a continual problem. There is, in effect, between Turks and Greeks on Cyprus, a situation which can be described appropriately as one of feud. The feud is an integral part of society in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It has been defined as : . . . a set of relationships between two tribal groups which are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These hostilities are of a sort that cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of hostilities which . . . know no beginning and are insoluble.174 As regards the statement above concerning termination, many groups which have a tradition of the feud do indeed have a mechanism to terminate a feud if it becomes dangerous to the larger society. In Moslem society, the village elders or the Cadi (religious judge) often have the authority to halt the feud.The feud

Jacob Black-Michand, Cohesive Force, (New York, St. Martin's, 1975), p. 22. P. Stirling, "A Death and a Youth Club," in Louise Sweet, ed., People's and Culture of the Middle East, (New York, Natural History Press, 1970), p. 192. 76 can be regarded as a mechanism of political action. If politics is determined to be the process of manipulation of the relationship between groups, then the feud consti tutes one type of political activity, as, indeed, does war. In the case of Cyprus, the two communities can be considered as feuding. They each take the view that the members of the other groups are collectively responsible for the actions of that group, and that they have a collective duty to avenge these perceived wrongs. Unfortunately there is in the absence of an outside power, no authority capable, in societal terms, of halting the feud. In 1950, Hakarios III became Archbishop of Cyprus, and a leader in the anti-British and enosis movements. Little attention was paid by either the Greek Cypriots or the British to the position of the Turkish Cypriots, who were markedly poorer and less educated than the Greek Cypriots. 177 The Turkish Cypriots only very slowly became even peripherally involved in political agitation. During this same period, Cyprus became extremely important to British grand strategy, as they withdrew from their bases in the Fertile Crescent and Egypt. 178 The situation in Cyprus became more violent

17fi Black-Michand, Feud., ' ' p. 27. 1 f-j Salih, Diverse, p. 6. ^^®Polyvious Polyviou, The Problem of Cyprus, (Nicosia, n.p. 1974), p. 16. 77 in 1955 with the formation of EOKA and subsequent bombings of British offices. Violence grew rapidly and the British responded with repressive measures. 178 At this time, also, the Turkish government began to suggest taxsim (partition) as a solution to the Cyprus problem. 180 Violence between Turkish and Greek Cypriots became a serious problem in 1957, and the attention of the Greek and Turkish governments, as well as that of the British government, became increasingly focused on Cyprus. In 1958, Hakarios began suggesting independence as the best solution. In 1958 also, the British changed their view of the strategic importance of Cyprus, deciding they needed to retain only small sovereign base areas for their defense purposes. 181 Violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and against the British continued to escalate. The British, Greeks and Turks began negotiations in Zurich, later continued in London, on the Cyprus problem. The final agreement between the three nations and representatives of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots was independence for Cyprus with a constitution guaranteeing

179Stevens, Arms, p. 38, ^^®Salih, Diverse, p. 7. IGllbid. 78 certain rights for the Turkish minority. 182 Treaties were signed between Cyprus, Britain, Greece and Turkey, guaranteeing the independence of Cyprus and that its constitution would not be abrogated. Article 4 of this Treaty was as follows : In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of these provisions. Insofar as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole sum of reestab lishing the state of affairs created by the present treaty.163 Two British Sovereign Base Areas were established, and an alliance between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey permitted small numbers of Greek and Turkish troops to be stationed on the island. Cyprus became an independent state in 1960, with Archbishop Hakarios as President. The guarantees of minority rights immediately caused difficulties, and friction between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots broke into violence in late 1963. Intercommunal warfare supported clandestinely by both Greece and Turkey became more and more violent, with U.N. peacekeeping troops having little immediate effect. In March 1964, heavy

182Polyvious Polyviou, Cyprus; Conflict and Negotiation,(New York, Holmes and Haier, 1980), p. 18. 183Charles Foley, The Struggle for Cyprus, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 118, 79 fighting between the two communities resulted in serious defeats for the Turks. The Turkish government prepared to land troops on Cyprus, but was stopped after the "Johnson Letter" threatened to withdraw U.S. support from Turkey.Turkish military aircraft nevertheless flew a number of missions in support of beseiged Turkish Cypriot positions. By the end of 1964, U.N. Troops had restored temporary order. The "Johnson Letter" was one of the major turning points in U.S.-Turkey relations. On 5 June 1964, the letter was dispatched; it warned that if Turkish action in Cyprus brought on a Soviet invasion of Turkey, the U.S. and NATO would not be obligated to protect Turkey. 185 It also warned that U.S. military equipment could not be used in a Cyprus intervention. The letter leaked immediately into the Turkish press, and became an inflammatory issue on an almost unprecedented scale, as U.S. intervention in Turkish affairs was universally condemned. The letter caused a réévaluation of Turkish foreign policy. In October 1964, the Foreign Minister of Turkey made a trip to the U.S.S.R., which was followed by the visit of President Podgorny to Ankara in January, 1965. Additionally the Turks joined the ROD with Iran

^®^Ahmad, Experiment, p. 406 IGSibid. 80 and Pakistan, and began to attempt to develop warmer relations with the Arab world. While the Johnson Letter did not cause a major break with the U.S., it did significantly affect public opinion, and did cause a réévaluation of Turkish foreign policy away from total dependence upon the U.S. The Johnson Letter continues to be an issue in the Turkish press. 186 The Turkish military was particularly upset by the Turkish government's "surrender" to the Americans. Intercommunal fighting on a large-scale broke out again in 1967, with Greek Cypriot forces armed with Czechoslovakian weapons overrunning Turkish Cypriot positions. Again, the Turkish government massed troops for use in Cyprus. 187 The Turkish government issued an ultimatum to the government of Greece, stating that

Turkish troops would intervene if peace was not restored, and Greek troops illegally present on Cyprus withdraw. IBS U.S. and U.N. efforts restored a semblance of peace, but for all practical purposes, there were two independent armed groups on Cyprus, with U.N. troops providing buffer zones. The situation was stable enough that Turkish intervention was considered by some

186Ahmad, Experiment, p. 406. ^Polyviou, Conflict, p. 49. ^®®Ibid. 81 observers to be unlikely unless the Greek government attempted to annex Cyprus, or unless there were massacres of Turkish Cypriots. 189 The Turkish view of the Cyprus problem changed significantly during the early 1970s. This was a result of the two aborted interventions which had produced a serious backlash and a hardening of public opinion towards Cyprus. Additionally, two new rightist parties both with Islamic and Pan-Turk elements arose. The two parties, the National Movement Party (Milli Harekat Partial) headed by Alparslan Turkes, who was born in Cyprus, and the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partial) took a hard line on the Cyprus question, both occasionally claiming that the entire island should be returned to Turkish control. 190 The National Salvation Party won less than 5% of the votes in the 1973 elections, but even this degree of popular support represented a swing to the nationalist position in Turkish politics. 191 In Cyprus, Archbishop Hakarios was becoming disenchanted with the Greek military government, and more interested in maintaining the status quo than in

189 Stevens, Arms, p. 211. ^®°Vali, Straits. p. 223. ^®^Ahmad, Experiment, p. 327. 82 continuing the drive towards enosis. 192 The Greek government had sent a number of military officers to take positions in the Cyrpiot National Guard. These officers were under the orders of the Athens government, rather than being responsive to Hakarios. Acting under the orders of the Athens government, the Greek officers participated in a coup against Hakarios on 15 July 1974, replacing him with Nicos Sampson, who had been an anti- 193 British and anti-Turk terrorist. The Turkish govern ment asked for British intervention under the terms of the I960 Treaty, and after this was refused, sent troops to Cyrpus on 20 July 1974.^®^ The intervention resulted in the fall of the Greek military junta, and the replacement of Seunpson by a much more moderate and respected Greek Cypriot. The question of cutting off aid because of the use of U.S. arms by the Turks arose almost immediately; on 24 July 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger threatened such a move. 195 On 25 July 1974, however, the Defense Department announced that aid would continue.^*®

192Polyviou, Conflict, p. 50. ^®^The Economist, 20 July 1974, p. 11. ^®^New York Times, 21 Jul 74, p. 1. ^*^New York Times, 25 Jul 74, p. 1. l**New York Times, 26 Jul 74, p. 1. CHAPTER III

DOMESTIC COMPONENTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

The Formal Decision-Making Process In order to discuss the Turkish policies that led to their occupation of Cyprus, the structure and processes by which foreign policies were formulated should be reviewed. Of course, since the 1980 coup, none of these formal structures continue to be active. Much of the informal structure and the relationships described here remain today, however. The state of Turkey, as of 1974, was a representative republic, founded on the principles of Ataturk. The Second Turkish Republic, instituted by the Constitution of 1961, had a parliamentary form of government, with a bi-cameral legislature, the Grand National Assembly (Buyuk Millet Meclisi), which was composed of the Senate of the Republic and the National Assembly.^ The Senate (Cumhuriyet Senatoau) consisted of less than two hundred members, who hold office through the means of three different processes. Every two years fifty members were elected through direct popular

This discussion is based on the constitutional issues in Turgul Ansay, Introduction to Turkish Law, (Ankara, Middle East University, 1966), pp. 26-46.

83 84 election, with each province or vilayet) consisting of one or more electoral districts, These popularly elected Senators served six year terms. The second major category of membership was that of the fifteen appointed Senators. These members were selected by the President, and were to be non-partisan ; they also served six year terms. The third category of membership consisted of the lifetime members. These were the former Presidents, and the members of the National Union Committee, the group responsible for the 1960 overthrow of the First Turkish Republic. In terms of impact on foreign policy-making, the Senate had little direct influence. It elected the President for a six year term from among its own membership, and could delay or postpone bills passed by the National Assembly. In times of crisis, it could exercise direct influence only through accepting or rejecting a declaration of war. The National Assembly (Millet Meclisi) had much more direct impact on the foreign policy decision-making process. There were 450 seats in the National Assembly, with each member elected based on proportional representa tion, with direct popular elections. The term was for four years. The National Assembly had direct control of the budget, of making laws, and of votes of confidence for formation of the government. The influence of the National Assembly on the foreign policy-making process 85

was thus direct and immediate. This was especially true in the 1970s in Turkey, during which time no single party had obtained a majority of seats in the National Assembly. The Governments were therefore coalitions, often including parties with radically different politics and ideologies. The Government formed by the National Assembly consisted of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers (Bakanlar Kuruinu). The Defense Minister and the Foreign Minister were included on the Council of Ministers. The Ministers of the Government were usually selected from among the National Assembly, but there was no constitutional requirement to do so and some govern ments have included non-elected technocrats, usually in lesser Ministries. The Prime Minister must be a member of the Grand National Assembly, never the Senate. The Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers were jointly responsible to the Grand National Assembly for the affairs of the nation and thus, especially during periods of coalition rule, individual Ministers might publicly and directly oppose the Prime Minister on some issues. However, if the Council of Ministers took a majority vote on an issue, all Ministers were obligated to support this position. Frequently, during periods of coalition government, issues were not voted on by the council, and members were free to oppose the Prime Minister. 86

The President of the Republic tCmnhurbaskani) had in theory a largely ceremonial position. He could not speak before the Grand National Assembly and could not veto legislation. He was, however, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and the military leaders were personally directly responsible to him, not to the Defense Minister. The President could call meetings of the Council of Ministers and take the chair, although this perogative was rarely taken. Of course, he appointed the Prime Minister, and if a government could not be formed, he appointed the caretaker government. Either the President or the Prime Minister could call meetings of the National Security Council. During martial law periods the President appointed the Martial Law Administrator. The third branch of government, the Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi) had no immediate role in foreign policy-making. They were responsible directly to the President, although their budget was decided upon by the National Assembly. The Armed Forces consisted of a unified General Staff, and an independent Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Minister of Defense was responsible for budget preparation, but had no voice in command and control of the Armed Forces and little voice in military policy-making. The role of the Armed Forces on decision making in the Turkish government was rarely overt. However, when issues that might effect Turkish military 87

security, of the reforms of Ataturk were considered, the Armed Forces' role as protector of Ataturk's policy had to be considered by the government. This was especially true in view of the military interventions of 1960 and 1971.^ On 12 March 1971, the Justice Party government of Prime Minister Demirel was the subject of a "coup by memorandum," when the Turkish General Staff directed the formation of a non-partisan government able to cope with the current economic and social problems faced by Turkey.^ This act was perceived in generally favorable terms by most elements of the political structure, but Ismet Inonu, associate of Ataturk, and former Prime Minister and President stated: If high-ranking military commanders are to decide when a Government is to be changed and what the short and long term tasks of newly formed governments are, and particularly if they put forward suggestions and insist on their implementation as unavoidable measures, then we cannot imagine Parliamentary life can be feasible . . . We believe in a democratic regime . . . If we have faith in democracy we must accept that a democratically formed government will ^ carry out these reforms in proportion to its powers. The depth of feeling indicated by the above, despite the fact that the coup succeeded, and that Turkey was ruled 2 George Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East,(New York, .Speller, 1965), p. 199; Ahmad, Experiment, p.~288; and Xurtul Altug, 27 Mayis'tan 12 Mart'a,Istanbul,.Koza Yayinlari, 1976), p. 373. ^Altug, p. 375.

*Hurrivet. 16 Mar 71, p. 1. 88

by "non-partisan" governments for over two years, indicates both an attachment to the Constitutional process and an implicit understanding of the military "veto" power. Turkish governments are not controlled by the Turkish Armed Forces, but must accept the possibility of military intervention of any policy or action which exceeds unwritten but commonly understood parameters. Understanding of the Turkish political process is tied to understanding of the "guardian" role of the military. This brief survey of the major foreign policy decision-making bodies of the Turkish Government illus trates several significant differences between the Turkish system and the U.S. system. While the Prime Minister also served as the power broker in the same sense as does the U.S. President, it is clear that the inherent strength of his position was considerably less. Having less power by virtue of his position, he must always devote much of his attention during any crisis to maintaining at least the core of his political strength. In parliamentary systems such as Turkey's, governments may fall during times of crisis; this suggests that the bureaucratic politics paradigm has greater validity in parliamentary systems than in strong Presidential systems. The basic analysis of governmental action as political resultant seems even more apropos in the parliamentary system than in the U.S. presidential 89

system. Parochial priorities and perceptions must more readily affect men who can fall from power literally on a day's notice, far more than men who do not face a reelection ceunpaign for several years. In foreign policy-making in Turkey, with its recent coalition governments, this parochial view must be even more dominant, especially during a crisis that might adversely affect the position of the Armed Forces. The strength of the bureaucratic politics paradigm then seems especially high for analyzing the foreign policy-making process of the Turkish Government. The persons occupying the positions of Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister(s) (in a coalition government). Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, Chief of the General Staff, and the President are the individuals most immediately concerned with foreign policy decision-making in a crisis situation. After a succession of various non-partisan technocratic governments, free elections were held again in October, 1973. They were indecisive. The Justice Party (JP), a moderate conservative party headed by Suleyman Demirel received 149 seats; the Republican Peoples' Party (RPP), a social democrat party headed by Bulent Ecevit, received 185 seats, 41 short of a majority; the National Salvation Party (NSP), a conservative religious party headed by Necmettin Erbakan 90

received 46 seats; and the Democratic Party (DP), also moderate conservative and lacking strong leadership, received 45 seats. Several smaller parties, including Alparslan Turkes* National Movement Party (NHP), described by some as fascistic, also obtained a few seats in the assembly.^ There were two major and two minor parties of significance in Turkey during the mid-1970s. They were the JP, the RPP, the NSP, and the NHP. The JP and the RPP were the two largest parties. During the period 1973-1980, no party received enough seats in any election to form a government, and parties therefore revalued around attempts by the JP and the RPP to entice the NSP, NHP, and other groups into forming coalitions. The NSP was part of coalitions with both major parties and a number of members of all significant parties switched alliance at least once. The four parties described above were also the parties that had strong personal leadership. Several other parties, the DP and the RRP, had sizable representation, but lacking strong leadership played little direct part in active politics. Party platforms were ideologically oriented, with many voters supporting their parties, however, more on their view of the leader and past allegiances.

^Cumhurrivet, 12 Nov 73, p. 11 91

The JP was founded in 1961, and claimed to be the inheritor of the Democrat Party, which had been outlawed following the military coup of 1960. The Democrat. Party was formed in 1946, as a reaction to the one party rule of the RPP. It was in many respects a liberal party in its earlier days, opposing the statism and populism of the RPP, and calling for increased freedom for private enterprise and the Islamic faith. Taking power in 1950, the Democrat Party at first was widely popular as it built up a transportation infrastruc ture (with significant U.S. economic aid), developed agriculture, and took on an extremely pro-Western slant in foreign politics. By 1955, as the economy faltered, and popular support began to wane, the party began to make greater claims on religious support (alienating the armed forces leadership), and even began to close newspapers and journals, opposing its views. Student demonstrations and attempts by the party to use military units to stifle opposition political leaders resulted in the coup of 1960, and the execution of party leaders. Popular support for many of the party's ideals remained, however, and with the return to democratic government, the JP took over much of the power base of the Democratic Party. Large landowners, businessmen, traders and a large segment of the peasantry formed the voting bloc of the JP, despite some obvious contradictions 92 that resulted. Tolerant of religion, although not as supportive of Islam as the Democrat Party had been, the JP attracted conservative peasants, which it then rewarded with state enterprises providing water, power, and agriculture research. Landowners were attracted by the status-quo social policies of the JP and by its benign neglect in implementing the land reform policies of the 1960 military government. Businessmen were attracted to the JP's support of free enterprise although the JP facility supported a mixed economy as well, and the hope that the JP could create a stable business climate. With this power base, the JP stayed in control of the government continually from 1964 to 1971, when it was overthrown by a military order following extensive political terrorism, and faltering economy. During the next two years of "technocratic" government, the JP continued to be active, awaiting the return to electoral politics which came in 1973. Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the JP, was born in Isparta province in 1916, the son of a small landowner. In 1949, he graduated from Istanbul Technical University, with a degree in civil engineering. For three years he worked as a design engineer in Ankara. In 1949 and 1950, he was an employee of the Bureau of Reclamation in the United States. During the Henderes regime, he held 93

a number of government posts, most in State Water Administration at the Middle East Technical University, as a construction contractor specializing in water supplies, emd asa.ccnsultant to several large U.S. engineering firms. Entering politics in 1962, he became leader of the JP in 1964, and Prime Minister in 1965. Not a charismatic speaker, he built his power base on his ability to understand and control party organizational politics, and on his ability to integrate the divergent desires of the JP constituency into a single whole. While personally speaking out for private enterprise, he continued the state enterprises and controls on foreign businesses established by his predecessors. Strongly pro-U.S. in orientation, he closed U.S. bases in 1975. Throughout the period 1974-1980, with its weak coalition governments, the major goal of Demirel appeared to be (as did that of other party leaders) to rebalance the coalitions in the assembly so that he would be able to take power. Many critics of Turkish political leadership during this period felt that Demirel, Ecevit and the others were so involved in political maneuvering that they lost touch with the real problems of Turkey. On September 12, 1980, the Turkish armed forces banned all political parties in Turkey, including the RPP, the party of Ataturk. The RPP was chaired by Ataturk from its inception in 1923 to his death in 1938. 94

He was followed by the Iklnci Adam, Ismet Inonu. Turkey was ruled as a single party state (with the exception of a few experimental periods) by the RPP until after World War II. The basic philosophy of the RPP was originally that of the "six arrows," nationalism, secularism, populism, republicanism, reformism and etatism. These issues were framed in reaction to the excesses of the Ottoman state, foreign domination, and Ataturk*s desire to move Turkey forward economically and socially. By the end of the First Turkish Republic in 1960, the RPP had become the protector of the reforms of Ataturk, emphasizing state enterprises, secularism, and less foreign involvement than the other major party, the DP. A dramatic change came when Bulent Ecevit replaced Inonu as party chairman in 1966, and established the RPP as a social democrat party. This was done both to deter the JP's drift toward capitalism and the challenge of the Turkish Labor Party on the left. This development of a formal ideological position led to the spin-off of rightist elements under Turhan Feyzioglyu in 1967. Working closely with the major labor federations, the RPP increased its share of the vote significantly in 1969. Following the 1971 coup by menorandum, Ecevit resigned as party chairman, and in a series of conferences and conventions returned to power, having decisively defeated Inonu*s more conservative faction and making 95 himself the unquestioned leader of the RPP. The RPP obtained a plurality of votes in 1973 elections, but found it necessary to form a coalition with a religious conservative party, the National Salvation Party, in order to form a government. Following the 1974 Cyprus operation, and the resignation of the RPP/NSP government, a stalemate ensued until a rightist coalition formed a government early in 1975. The RPP was never able in the 1973-1980 period to obtain sufficient popular support so as to be able to form a government without the support of an ideologically different coalition partner. Leader of the RPP, Bulent Ecevit was born in Istanbul in 1925, the son of a university professor and member of parliament. An urbanite and esthete, he received a degree in literature from the American run Roberts College in 1944. Following service as an interpreter and press attache in London, Ecevit became a columnist and art critic for the leftist newspaper Ulus in 1950. He published a number of poems relating to social conditions. In 1954, Ecevit was employed in the United States as a newspaper reporter in Carolina; he returned to the U.S. in 1957 as a Rockefeller scholar. He became Minister of Labor in 1961, under Inonu. He traveled widely in Western Europe, frequently attending social democratic party conferences. When political parties were banned in 1980, Ecevit returned to 96 journalism. His activities have led to his being sequestered. Born out of the banned National Order Party, the NSP headed by Necmettin Erbakan, was an Islamic fundamentalist partyr with pan-Turkism leanings. It was built on a base of landowners and small entrepreneurs While supporting free enterprise, it opposed foreign investment, as well as communism. It also supported strict moral (i.e., Islamic) values— Erbakan being known to smash saloons with an axe, ala Carrie Nation— and heavy industry. In foreign policy, the NSP encouraged increased ties with other Islamic states, especially Saudia Arabia and Libya. The NSP reacted ambivalently to the Iranian Revolution, however, publically supporting the concept of an Islamic State, while also decrying the Shia nature of that state. While the NSP was a member of coalition governments with both the JP and the RPP, it never achieved any meaningful part of its program, and its share of the public vote actually dropped in 1977. Necmettin Erbakan and other party leaders are to stand trial for their anti-secular activities. A neo-fascist party with strong Pan-Turanic views, the NHP was headed by a man with a violent political history— Alparslan Turkes. Suspected of supporting a coup in 1944 to attack Russia on the side of Germany, he later was one of the leaders of the 1960 coup. 97

When the junta would not go to the extremes he wanted, he was sent abroad as ambassador to India. He was implicated in the coup attempts of 1962 and 1963. Interned and later released, Turkes took over the Republican Peasant Nation Party and turned it into the NHP. The NHP appealed to small merchants, low ranking civil servants, and some rural leaders. It had nine principles, but was essentially in favor of a strong state, with state enterprises and corporate participation in the state. In foreign policy, it was expansionist wanting Cyprus, the Aegean Islands, Mosul, the Crimea, and other "Turkish" areas to be reunited. The NHP had a private militia, the Gray Wolves, which were involved extensively in the street violence of the late 1970s. Like the NSP, it achieved little, other than to act as a spoiler. The country was immediately faced with a crisis, there was no victor and no obvious coalition. Although there were many suggestions of a "Grand Coalition" of the RPP and JP, usually by military leaders, personal and political differences between the two made such an alliance improbable, and it never materialized. The struggle to organize a viable coalition continued until 25 January 1974, when a mesalliance of the RPP and NSP was formed. The two parties had radically different views on religion, on the economy, on foreign relations 98

(with the NSP calling for a break with the West and a turn toward the Arab world), and on the nature of the Turkish social structure.^ Despite these differences, common interests in sharing power, and the NSP desire to legitimize its position in Turkish politics (its predecessor having been outlawed in 1971 for injecting religion into politics) resulted in the coalition being formed after months of discussions and agreements over how such a government would function and what its policies would be. The program of the coalition included the following points: (1) End of the unjust treatment of the poppy growers, and (2) Remain within the mutual security system and existing alliances, but at the same time increase Turkey's ability to protect herself and to place under Turkish control joint Turkish-U.S, bases and facili ties.? The coalition continued, although with many irritations between the two partners, until the Cyprus Crisis of July 1974. The success of the "peace operation" led to increased independent activities by the NSP and attempts by Erbakan to downplay the role Ecevit played in the decision to intervene, and assume the full credit for D this very popular decision for himself. This, and the calculation by Ecevit that his public support had improved

^Millivet, Jan 74, p. 1. ’ibid. o Orta Doau. IS Aug 74, p. 1 99 to the point where new elections would give the IWP a clear majority, resulted in Ecevit dissolving the coalition and calling for new elections on 18 September 9 1974. The Turkish Constitution did not make new elections mandatory upon a government's resignation; a majority of the assembly must vote to hold such elections. All the opposition parties combined to vote down RPP moves to call elections. The various opposition parties were not able, however, to unite on any other issue. The period from 18 September 1974 to 31 March 1975 saw Turkey without a government. Caretaker govern ments lacking a vote of confidence attempted to continue the maintenance of the administration of the country. All parties opposed these caretakers governments and the caretakers were impotent and incapable of making any significant decision, especially any regarding foreign policy, specifically Cyprus. The RPP, NSP, and JP vied with each other to maintain the Turkish position on Cyprus and to reject any outside (i.e., U.S.) interference in Turkish affairs.On 31 March 1975, Demirel established a National Front coalition of the JP, NSP, NMP and the Republican Reliance Party (RPP) a small

^Cumhurrivet, 19 Sep 74, p. 1. ^^Various handbills and placards distributed Sep-Dee 1974. 100 moderate group which had split from the RPP in 1973.^^ A number of defectors from the DP gave the National Front a three vote majority in the Assembly, sufficient to form a new government. The coalition was fragile, composed of groups with radically different views, and held together only by the desire to keep the RPP out of the government. In order to maintain his slim majority, Demirel took positions on Cyprus more extreme than those of the RPP despite his historical friendship with thé U.S.^^ Elections were held in June 1977, several months before they became mandatory in October 1977. As the elections approached, the coalition developed wide splits with violent competition in many areas among coalition parties. The major issues were domestic, the economy and the rising level of political violence attracting the majority of attention. Foreign affairs were rarely discussed, except for continuing claims by the NSP and NMP to all of Cyprus. The campaign was violent— there were at least three attempts to murder Ecevit, and 34 were killed in a May Day rally in Istanbul.The Election results were again indecisive. The RPP received 213 seats, the JP 189, the NSP 24; the NMP 16; the RPP 3;

^^Hurrivet. 1 Apr 75, p. 1. ^^JP handbill. May 75. ^^Gunaydin, 2 May 77, p. 1. 101 the DP 1, leaving it powerless; and 4 independent seats. 14 The President asked Ecevit to form a government and he attempted to organize a one-party minority government with independent support. There were again calls for a "grand coalition," calls again ignored. The Ecevit minority government fell on 3 July 1977, after less than two weeks in office. In late July, a JP, NSP, and NHP coalition took office with a ten vote majority.This government was as paralyzed by internal dissention as the previous National Front government had been. The National Front government collapsed in late 1977, and was replaced by a coalition of the RPP and RRP, with the support of several JP defectors on 5 January 1978; this government too came to power with only a ten vote majority.^’ The government of Ecevit continued in power until 16 October 1979 when it was again replaced by a weak Demirel government. 18 During this period, there was intense political activity in the assembly; seven Ministers resigned or were censured, six Assembly members changed

^^Hurrivet, 28 Jun 77, p. 1. ^^Hurrivet, 4 Jul 77, p. 1. ^*Gunavdin, 28 Jul 77, p. 1. ^’Hurrivet, 6 Jan 78, p. 1. ^^Cumhurrivet. 17 Oct 79, p. 1. 102 parties. There also was a continued deterioration in the Turkish economy, still in shock from the increases in the price of petroleum, the worldwide recession, and the return of large numbers of workers from West Germany. These problems combined with inefficient state enterprises (the national airline had 19 aircraft and 17,000 employees), causing spiraling inflation and widespread unemployment. Domestic violence also was on the increase. The 12 Sept 80 military coup ended this six year period of weak and ineffective governments.

Political Violence According to an unpublished report of the Turkish General Staff (TGS), 4,040 persons were killed in political IQ violence from April 1978 to September 1980. Other sources indicate this figure may actually be higher by a factor of 250%. 20 The TGS also reported that 230 members of the security forces were killed in the violence. Some significant events included the killing of the mayor of Halatya on 17 April 1978, the deaths of 111 persons in religious sectarian violence in Karamamaras 19-23 December 1978 (violence halted by commitment of a brigade of commandos and a battalion of paratroops) , the

19Turkish General Staff, The Situation of Anarchy amd Terror in Turkey, (np, nd (1981), p. 3. 20Author's estimate from newspaper reports. 103 deaths of 37 persons in riots in Corum 28-29 May 1980, and the murder of five government officials in their offices in Ankara on 4 September 1980. Among those killed were a former Prime Minister, the retired Chief of Intelligence, the editor of the largest newspaper, the public prosecutor of Ankara, and the Chief of Police of Adana— murdered by his own men. Some police stations were closed because of violence between rival groups in the police force, and there were rumors of dissidence in some military units. 21 The political unrest reached the point where leftist inhabitants of several Istanbul districts declared themselves independent Marxist states. 22 Their "seccession" was short-lived, but indicated the strain the political structure was undergoing. The Black Sea coast city of Fatsa established a revolutionary government, barricading the city off from the rest of Turkey. People's courts ordered executions of revisionists and capitalists, and private property was expropriated. Over 3,000 troops were required to restore the authority of the central government. 23

2 1Ferdinand Herni, "Democracy, Extremism and Terror in Turkey, " (Swiss Review of World Affairs, June 1979), p. 17. ^^Cumhurrivet. 29 May 80, p. 1. ^^Wall Street Journals p. 1, 29 April 1982. 104

The economic picture in Turkey in the mid-to-late 1970s was bleak. The economic policy of etatism. of state development of industry failed to keep pace with rising consumer demands i. The inefficient state enterprises with their bloated staffs and paperwork successfully prevented private competition in several major economic areas. While not unique to Turkey, these inefficient enterprises stifled internal growth. A description Of paying one's electric bill in Ankara in 1975 suggests the scope of the problem.The bill itself was normally slipped under the apartment door every three to five months, and generally covered a two month period. Thus, by the time the bill was presented, it was for a five to seven month earlier period. The company had already lost the use of working capital for that period. The bill was taken to the central office; in a city of over a million population, there was only one place an electric bill could be paid. On arrival early in the morning (9:00 a.m.), there were already crowds of several thousand people at the office. One stood in line (or forced through a mass of people) at the counter where four clerks exeunined the bill and compared it with the master records. The master records were kept in folio notebooks, which were arranged chronologically, geographically and

2 AAuthor's experience. 105 alphabetically. There were several thousand such binders. Once the attention of a clerk was gained, the clerk would send a small boy for the correct folio. If the folio was in its proper place, the boy would return with it. Once the clerks finished with a bill, they would toss each folio in a pile behind them, so later arriving customers were unlikely to be able to pay their bill because the folio was lost in the pile behind the clerks. After the bill had been checked and signed by the clerk and by their supervisor, it was time to line up for a revenue stamp. After obtaining the stamp (exact change only) and the signatures of the stamp clerk and her supervisor, the customer now moved to a line where the bill could actually be paid. This process involved having a clerk, an auditor, and a supervisor check the bill, the signatures, and the stamps before receiving the money. The money was then paid, and a second group of two clerks counted the money, and took the bill for a manager's signature. Once the bill was properly counter-signed, theoretically one was finished. In reality, it was best to return to the original line with the paid bill to have it entered as paid in the master folio. On some days this entire process could be completed in as little as four hours. The normal procedure was to accomplish the process in increments over the period of a week. 106

Similar delays were encountered throughout the economy. It was not unusual for private companies to wait two years for an import license for equipment— and then see their equipment rust for six months in a customs yard. 25 The ponderous bureaucracy and the massive underemployment created by it internally could be sustained during a period of economic growth. 2fi Following the oil price increases of 1973-4, and the reduction in foreign employment of Turkish workers, however, the twenty year pattern of growth in Turkey ended. The major source of foreign exchange had been remittances from workers employed in Europe. As demand for foreign exchange increased (in order to pay for oil and industrial materials), there was a fall-off in foreign exchange earnings. Beginning in 1975, Turkey began negotiating short-term foreign loans to finance imports— and interest on earlier loans; a no-win situation, combined with the policy of maintenance of state enter prises, maintenance of over-valued, and maintenance of artificially low prices on staples such as bread, the economy quickly became strained. 27 The result was high inflation, over 100% per year; 50% unemployment; lack

25Author's observation. 26Kemal Davis, The Foreign Exchange Gap,(Washing ton, World Bank, 1978), p. 46. 2’lbid. 107

of imports, especially oil, rationing of bread, milk, cigarettes and gasoline; and massive devaluation. 2S All these problems were unpopular and controversial, especially to those standing in mile long lines for cigarettes, and occupied much of the attention of the public and politicians throughout the 1970s. Coincident with the economic problems was a major shift in the patterns of the society. In 1950, Turkey was predominately an agricultural rural society with a small urbanized elite. By 1975, there had been a dramatic and unplanned-for shift of population to the cities. The cities were unable to provide housing and services for this influx. Slums known as gecekondu grew up outside every large city. 29 The occupants of these slums provided the cheap work force for the cities while the economy grew; when growth stopped, the qecekondu were the first to be laid off. Thus, they were now not only torn from their village society with its norms and authority figures they were also ripe for exploitation. The qecekondu dwellers, isolated from their village life and exposed to the radically different society of the city, looked for some kind of stability

^®Ibid., p.73. 29 Lincoln Bloomfield, "Anarchy in Turkey," (Conflict, V. 2, No. 1, 1980), p. 43. 108 in their lives. For some, this was religion, and fundamentalist parties such as the National Salvation Party (MSP) gained many adherents in the geoekondu. Others became associated with leftist movements such as the Turkish Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Party (TRWPP). Many, of course, attempted to lead lives as normal as possible under these new stresses, but the numbers of the "silent majority" declined as the economy weakened and violence grew. The majority of the over three million qecekondu dwellers were not involved in the violence. The large number of minority elements, such as Kurds, Circassians, and various other religious minorities, tended to live together, and form some associations. As the economy weakened and violence grew, these groups formed local protection elements. Such actions by minorities often enflamed violence by other, groups, and it was not favor ably received by the government. This was especially so in the case of the Kurds, who formed a significant part of the radical leftist movement. Violence, of course, was not foreign to Turkish society, which had a warrior tradition, and had institu tionalized the feud. However, the breakdown of societal norms took away much of the authority figures which could limit or control violence, but did nothing to eliminate the concept of violence as a means of resolving problems. 109

Combined with the widespread abailability of weapons, these feelings and frustrations led to armed conflict in the streets of the cities. Weapons of all kinds, including handguns and AK-47s although illegal, could be easily found for sale, even by foreigners, throughout Turkey. Smuggling of weapons were also on a large scale, seizures of thousands of weapons were not uncommon.Following the collapse in 1975 of the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq, AK-47s could be bought in Gaziantep for forty dollars. There was also the reluctance of Ecevit to take action against leftist activism and of Demirel to act against rightist agitators. This despite such speeches as: Our government's policy is to be against all kinds of terrorism, both right and left-wing. The result is, all terrorist are against the present government. The right-wing terrorists, who had practically got hold of the state mechanism are very frustrated. The left-wing terrorist, who had the:.illusion they would be tolerated by our government have been disillusioned. Our main deficiency has been the condition of the p o l i c e . 32 Associated with the above factors were resurgences of nationalism among the Kurds and a sense of power of the Shiite Alevi's. These movements, also often

^°Gunavdin. 29 Jun 77, p. 1. 31Author's observation. ^^Hurriyet. 22 Dec 78, p. 1. 110

associated with leftist elements, also turned to violence and agitation. Rioting in Diyaxbakir in 1975 by Kurds opposed to the visit of Alparslan Turks, the violently Turkish nationalist, had to be put down by armored units, with mock attacks against the mobs by jet fighters. 33 It was Alevi Sunni conflict that led to the 1978 riots in Karamanmaras previously noted. During the late 1970s then, Turkey was ruled by a series of very weak governments, unable to make diffi cult or unpopular decisions, and faced with an economic collapse and violence of near civil war proportions* The occupation of Cyprus had, in some ways, played a role in these problems. It was Ecevit*s attempt to use the popularity gained by the occupation that led to the lack of government from September 1974 to March 1975. From October 1973 to September 1980 Turkey had a succession of weak, fragmented coalition governments, caretaker governments, or no government at all. Whoever held power had to be sensitive to any action that might result in loss of support in the Assembly, or loss of any significant public support. The Demirel governments were especially hampered by being opposed by Ecevit, the hero of Cyprus. No concession on Cyprus or to the U.S. could be made by the National Front without fear of Ecevit ' s

^^Cumhurriyet, 19 Jul 75, p. 1 Ill opposition. Demirel also was sensitive to military intervention, as he remembered only too well 12 March 1971. He had also to be concerned about the military over the Cyprus issue. It was Demirel who had bowed to U.S. pressure in 1967 and cancelled Turkish military operations on Cyprus, a decision reminiscent of the 1964 Johnson Letter incident. Demirel could not afford to appear to soften or bend to U.S. pressure on the Cyprus issue. Bcevit's governments were also too weak and vulnerable to MSP propaganda to make significant concessions.

Domestic Views of Cyprus Not only were the leaders of the major parties unwilling to react to the embargo as Intended by the U.S., there was no real domestic pressure on them to resolve the Cyprus issue in a way responsive to U.S. desires. All major parties, including the four that participated in the governments of the embargo period supported the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus. The domestic press, well known for its sensationalism and general irresponsibility also supported the Cyrpus operation without notable exception. There were no editorials in any major newspaper or magazine calling for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus. No important or well known religious or business leader ever made a public statement opposing the continued 112 occupation of Cyprus. Even among the intellectuals, only a tiny minority of Marxist professors ever spoke out against the Cyprus operation--and in their case there is no doubt they were not speaking out in response to U.S. influence. Further, during the embargo period, a time of demonstrations, riots and strikes, there was not one public gathering whose main theme was to protest the Turkish occupation of Cyprus. There was no other issue, domestic or foreign, on which there was such 3 A unanimity in Turkey. Thus, in a period of violence and gradual disintegration of the political and economic infrastructure, there was no domestic incentive to yield to American influence, and every incentive to maintain the status quo on Cyprus. Even the Armed Forces, the element in the Turkish power structure most affected by the embargo, there was no movement to withdraw or compromise. The Armed Forces had upheld Turkish honor in their actions on Cyprus, and pressures to weaken their commitment to this honor were only to intensify it. They felt betrayed by the U.S. response and the embargo, and blamed U.S. actions on Greek perfidity. Of course, the constant statements by the U.S. executive branch that the embargo should be lifted encouraged the Armed Forces in the

34Author's observations. 113 early days of the embargo to believe it would be a short term affair with limited impact. In hundreds of conversa tions with Turkish officers during that period, they continually expressed amazement that the U.S. could act in a manner so counter to its vital interests (as they perceived them), and through the embargo so damage the military forces of one of its most dependable allies. While many admitted the damage done to Turkish readiness by the embargo, not once was the idea of acceding to U.S. influence on this issue raised. Too, officers were less interested in the Soviet threat and more worried about their ability to maintain law and order, and to deter Greek aggression in the Aegean. Rightists and most military officers rejected the embargo as a tool of influence because they had achieved a long desired goal in Cyprus, and felt that withdrawal would betray their honor. Leftists, most of whom shared the desire to protect their brothers in Cyprus, rejected the embargo as a tool of influence because of long standing concern with foreign influence, dating back to the Capitulations and the Eastern Question. Only a small group of intellectual Marxists without significant support opposed the Cyprus occupation, and that because they felt Turkey was acting as an imperialist. Even Kurdish groups who had no reason to support the Cyprus occupation rarely spoke against it because of its 114 popularity, and its remoteness from their own concerns. The embargo failed to influence Turkish foreign policy behavior and was counterproductive in its alienating of groups in Turkish society traditionally friendly to the U.S. CHAPTER IV

CONFRONTATION: THE U.S. AMD TURKEY FACE THE EMBARGO

Decision-Making On 15 July 1974, President Makarios was overthrown by a coup sponsored by the Greek military government.^ The Turkish Defense Minister announced that Turkey would invoke Article 4 of the Cypriot Treaty immediately 2 after the coup. After attempts to settle the issue with Britain and Greece, Turkey invaded Cyprus 20 July 1974, and then enlarged her zone of occupation in August to include about 40% of Cyprus. While the issue of cutting aid to Turkey was already before the House because of the poppy question, the invasion and Turkish use of U.S. armaments in violation of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, the Mutual Defense Pact of 1959, and the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act quickly became an issue for both Congress and the Executive. Kissinger first threatened an aid cutoff on 24 July 1974.* This was followed by a vote in the House to cut aid over the poppy issue on

^Washington Post. 16 Jul 74, p. 1 *New York Times, 16 Jul 74, p. 1. *New York Times, 2 Aug 74, p. 1. 115 116

4 1 August 1974. The Turks responded to U.S. objections by Invoking Article 4 of the Cypriot Treaty of Guarantee, the right of self-defense, and the need to maintain a strong Turkey in NATO after Greece had withdrawn from military participation.* The U.S. Congress rejected these arguments, but the Executive took delaying action, the State Department announcing it was "studying" the issue on 10 September 1974.* On 24 September 1974, the House passed an amendment to the Continuing Resolution on Foreign Aid (307-90), banning military aid and sales to Turkey unless the President certified that Turkey had made substantial progress towards an agreement on Cyprus.^ On 7 October 1974, the House rejected an administration proposal to modify the language to allow the President to certify g Turkish "good faith" in negotations vice "progress." This was followed by a Presidential veto of the Foreign Aid Act because of the amendment on Turkish aid, a veto 9 which was sustained on 15 October 1974. After repeated

^New York Times, 2 Sug 74, p. 1. *Cumhurriyet, 23 Aug 74, p. 1. *New York Times, 11 Sep 74, p. 1. 7 ...... Congressional Record, 24 Sep 74. ^Congressional Record, 7 Oct 74. a Congressional Record. 14-15 Oct 74 117 efforts to prevent any aid cutoff from becoming law, on 18 December 1974, the President signed into law P.L. 93-559, which suspended all U.S. military aid to Turkey effective 5 February 1975 and thereafter until the President could certify "substantial progress" on a Cyprus agreement.^* On 5 February 1975 this embargo became effective. From the beginning, the Turks had rejected the concept of the aid embargo as relating to the Cyprus operation and threatened to seek "alternative sources" of arms.^^ Anti-American protests resumed in Istanbul on 9 November 1974 after a hiatus in such activity of nearly three years. 12 After the failure of Kissinger to reach a modus vivendi in Brussels with the Turkish Foreign Minister on 12 December 1974, Turkish authorities became increasingly militant about the embargo question.^* On 20 January 1975, the Turkish Acting Defense Minister threatened "sanctions" against U.S. bases in Turkey if aid was cut off. 14 On 5 February 1975, after an emergency meeting of the Turkish National Security Council, the

^*New York Times, 19 Dec 74, p. 1. *^Cumhurrivet, 23 Aug 74, p. 1. ^*Gunavdin. 10 Dec 74, p. 1. ^*New York Times. 13 Dec, 74, p. 1 ^^Hurriyet, 5 Feb 75. 118

Acting Prime Minister warned that U.S. actions would result in a "reassessment" of Turkish ties with the U.S. and MATO.^* On 9 February 1975, the Defense Ministry again warned that U.S. bases would be closed if aid was cut.** On 10 March 1975, Kissinger flew to Ankara during a break in his Middle East shuttle flights, to discuss the embargo question. The talks were unproduc tive, but several anti-U.S. acts of violence including bombings accompanied his visit. 17 On 20 March 1975, Demirel called for cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey, and an end to the "unproductive and dangerous" arms embargo.** On 10 April 1975, President Ford in his State of the World message attacked Congress for cutting aid to Turkey. 19 Kissinger returned to Ankara on 21 May to meet with Demirel i at the conclusion of the meeting there were press reports Demirel had warned he would close U.S. bases if the embargo continued. 20 In a speech to the CENTO Foreign Ministers in Arkara on 21 May 1975, the

**Hurriyet, 5 Feb 75. **Gunavdin, 9 Feb 75, p. 1. *^Gunaydin, 12 Mar 75, p. 11. **Hurrivet, 21 Mar 75, p. 1, **New York Times. 11 Apr 75, p. 1. ?n Gunaydin, 22 May 75, p. 1. 119

Turkish Foreign Minister stated that U.S. bases would be closed. 21 On 14 June 1975, the Turkish National Security Council met and warned that the aid embargo violated U.S.-Turkish relations, and that U.S. bases in Turkey would be closed if the embargo was not lifted. 22 On 17 June 1975, the Turkish government issued a formal note to the U.S. government that unless aid was resumed in 30 days, the status of U.S. forces in Turkey would be changed. 23 Kissinger responded on 24 June 1975 that "no one can threaten the U.S."** On 24 July 1975, the House rejected Senate Resolution S.846 which would have lifted the arms embargo. 2 5 On 25 JUly 1975, the Turkish government suspended U.S. military activities in Turkey except those at purely NATO facilities, and placed U.S. personnel and bases under "provisional" status. 26 On 26 July 1975, a "high Turkish official" warned that Turkey could never again trust the United States. 27

21Gunaydin, 24May 75, p. 5. **Hurriyet, 15 Jun 75, p. 108. 23Resmi Gazete, 17 Jun 75, p. 108. **New York Times, 25 Jun 75, p. 1. 25Congressional Record, 24 Jul 75. **Hurriyet, 26Jul 75, p. 1.

*'^Gunaydin. 27 Jul 75, p. 1. 120

Capitulations Revisited As of the date of the Turkish decision to implement the "provisional" status of the U.S. forces in Turkey, the U.S. military establishment in Turkey included intelligence listening posts, airfields for tactical aircraft, defense communication stations, supply and ammunition depots, a LORAN navigation station and command and control facilities. 2B Sites were located throughout Turkey, with Sinop, Karamursel, Diyarbakir, Belbasi, Incirlik, and Izmir being among the largest and most important sites. 29 U.S. operations at the seven major and twenty-one secondary sites, manned by about 5,000 U.S. military personnel were inactivated, except for NATO operations at Incirlik.** The importance of the intelligence collection sites was described by the former NATO Supreme Commander, General Lyman Lemmnitzer. There is no area in the world comparable to Turkey as a vital base of intelligence gathering operations against the Warsaw Pact . . . This serious loss of vital U.S. intelligence for more than three years is extremely damaging to American and NATO interests because these bases when fully operational are capable of providing valuable and irreplacable

2BU.S. Congress. House, U.S. Military Installations and Objectives im the Mediterranean, " (Washington (GPO, 1977), p. 38. **Ibid., p. 40. **U,S. Congress. Senate, Military Aspects of Banning Arms Aid to Turkey,(Washington, GPO, 1978), p. 32. 121

Intelligence coverage for which no substitute is available.31 In addition to the direct impact on U.S. resources by the closing of the bases, the 5,000 U.S. servicemen and their dependents were affected in a number of ways. 32 The exchange in Ankara was closed, and items sold by other exchanges were restricted. Restrictions were placed on the movement of household goods in and out of Turkey, a problem which lasted several months before being rectified, and causing major problems for a number of families in a country where furnished apartments were rare. The mail service through the APO was restricted to letters only, with all package service cutoff, a special nuisance in view of exchange restrictions. Import and licensing of private autos was made much more difficult. Turkish commanders who assumed control of all U.S. facilities had full authority to enforce Turkish laws and regulations; with the "provisional status," there were no longer any provisions for U.S. personnel to be tried in U.S. military courts. U.S. personnel were restricted from traveling freely between sites, and U.S. military aircraft could no longer operate freely. The relationship of most, if not all, of these restrictions to the Capitulations question

**American Foreign Policy Institute, NATO, Turkey, and U.S. Interests (Washington, 1978), p. 32. 32 This section is based on the author's observations. 122 is obvious. The depth of Turkish resentment over U.S. military special privileges had obviously been underesti mated, as it was clear these restrictions were not directly related to the Arms Embargo and base closures, but were being placed in effect at the time to take advantage of the Embargo issue. These restrictions adversely affected much of the American military community in Turkey, which might otherwise have been of some use to the Turks in providing alternative views of the Embargo question to their representatives. The imposition of these restrictions, while understandable in the historical context, thus were counter-productive for Turkish foreign relations. They were, however, very popular domestically. Radical groups seized upon the opportunity to attempt to further restrict U.S. facilities in Turkey. On 6 August 1975, a group of about 50 Turkish youths occupied the U.S. exchange facility in Izmir, causing about $8,000 worth of damage, and receiving large-scale public attention and support. 33 This was one of the first incidents in a series of anti-U.S. terrorist attacks which continued to increase throughout the Embargo period, culminating in several assassinations in 1979-80. It is apparent that the Embargo was taken advantage of by

**Yeni Asir, 7 Aug 75, p. 1. 123 the terrorists in their attacks on Americans, attacks which had not been a problem since 1971. Violence outside Turkey also affected Turkish reaction to the Bitbargo. Armenian violence against Turkish interests became a serious problem in the 1970s, the first episode occurring with the Turkish consul in Los Angeles being murdered in 1973. Since then, nearly two dozen diplomats have been killed in 16 countries by Armenian terrorists. While the U.S. was not considered responsible by the Turks, the lack of strong U.S. condemnation of these acts, and effective cooperation against further acts was a negative factor. The potential that the U.S. Holocaust Museum would include a section on Armenians was also upsetting to the Turks. The Armenian community in the U.S. supported the Arms Embargo, which further exacerbated Turkish concern over the Armenian issue. Emotions continue strong between these groups. A German intelligence officer commented: In the East they never forget . . . the Armenians hated the Germans ever since Bismark's historical remark that the Armenian struggle in Turkey was not worth the life of a single Pomeranian Grenadier.34 Another longstanding problem in Turkish-American relationships also re-surfaced in the aftermath of the base closure. On 26 July 1975, Senator Hugh Scott said in a

**Schultze-Holthus, Daybreak in Iran,(London, Stapler Press, 1954), p. 51. 124

public statement that seizure of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey would result in Turkey becoming a major nuclear power.** This statement received widespread attention in Turkey, appearing in all major newspapers and magazines, and triggering a call by leftists for Turkey to take full control of the nuclear weapons. 36 Turkish magazines even published maps showing what purported to be the various U.S. nuclear weapons storage sites in Turkey. 37 The Turkish government took immediate steps to reassure the U.S. about the status of nuclear weapons, on 28 July 1975 reiterating the Turkish commitment to NATO protocols on nuclear weapons security and the "2-key" system. 38 This issue continued to recur throughout the Embargo period, with many references to the Jupiter Missile/Cuban crisis, and warnings of the danger that the U.S. would unilaterally change the status of these agreements without consulting the Turkish government, or considering Turkish national interests. Related to the nuclear weapons issue was the agitation against U.S. development and deployment of enhanced radiation weapons (neutron bombs). While this

**New York Times. 27 Jul 75, p. 1. **Avdinlik. 5 Aug 75, p. 1. *^Yanki, 11 Aug 75, p. 17. **New York Times. 29 Jul 75, p. 1. 125 campaign received much publicity in the U.S. and Western Europe, it was also a significant issue in Turkey. Demonstrations of up to 20,000 people took place against U.S. policies in Istanbul and Izmir. 39 The campaign included letter-writing to the U.S. Embassy.** The issue provided a vehicle for radical leftists groups to ally themselves with more moderate elements. The radical leftist Turkish Teachers Union (TOBtDER) was in the forefront of this movement, as it often was in anti-U.S. and anti-NATO campaigns.** Following the overthrow of the Shah's regime in Iran, a number of strains appeared in U.S.-Turkish rela-; tions. In a move compared by some to the use of Incirlik Air Base for the 1958 landings in Lebanon, U.S. helicopters were sent to that base. 42 Marine units originally accompanying the helicopters were not allowed to enter Turkey. The Turkish Communist Party clandestine radio broadcast the following: He flew away, he flew away, the Shah flew away. He took all his belongings and hurried to the U.S. The American bases and their equipment are now being transferred to Turkey. This is one of the main reas ons for the martial law that is imposed on our people.

**Yeni Asir, 28 Mar 78, p. 1. **Gunaydin, 7 Apr 78, p. 6. **Aydinlik, 28 Apr 78, p. 5. **New York Times, 12 Feb 79, p. 1. 126

The likes of Demirel are acting under the directives of the CIA. The slogan, "Yankee go home," must be shouted louder. The Shah flew away and the American agents and the likes of Demirel will also fly away from our homeland.43 Similar protests by Alevi Moslems and the fundamentalist National Salvation Party resulted in a policy enunciated in an official statement as followsi The U.S. government's request to station helicopters at the Incirlik airport for use in case it becames necessary to evacuate U.S. personnel and their dependents serving in Iran for humanitarian reasons has been accepted only on condition the Iranian authorities grant the necessary entrance permit, that no personnel other than the crew be permitted aboard the helicopters, that only U.S. personnel serving in Iran and their families be transported, and that no militarh equipment be transported from Turkey or Iran or vice v e r s a . 44 Later suggestions that with the collapse of the U.S. military position in Iran, that Turkey would now serve as a base for U.S. operations in Southwest Asia (SWA) were publicly rejected by Turkey.* * The strategic location of Turkey, however, inherently permits forces there to be available, if political constraints permit, for use in both NATO and SWA operations. A build-up at Turkish airfields in Eastern Turkey (Batman and Mus), while ostensibly for NATO purposes, inherently provides bases suitable for interdiction of any Soviet expansion

**Bizim RadVO, 18 Jan 79. **Gunavdin. 12 Feb 79, p. 1.

**Millivet. 15 Feb 79, p. 6. 127

Into Iran or the Persian Gulf.** The value of these bases was emphasized by the testimony of a high Pentagon official before the House. He noted that they provided an inherent deterrent to any Soviet adventurism in Southwest Asia, while reiterating that the agreement between the U.S. and Turkey on the use of these bases dealt solely with their use in a NATO scenario. . Urgent construction of these bases was called "our number one 4 7 priority in Turkey." The basic Turkish position, however, appears to continue to be as announced in March 1980: During a press conference yesterday, Deputy Prime Minister Faruk Sukan said the government is carefully apprising developments and changes in the Middle East, stating 'Turkey cannot insure its security and higher interests by remaining the satellite or sentry of any other state or organization. Alliances and pacts are based on the principle of mutual interests of coun tries, particularly on the preservation of their national security. One cannot permit or shut his eyes to unilateral applications of this principle.' Also related to the fall of Iran was the question of the use of Turkish bases for SALT II verification, especially by U-2 aircraft.*^ The memories of the Powers flight and

**U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Construction of the House Appropriations Committee, (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1983), p. 289. *^Ibid. **Cumhurrivet, 26 Mar 79, p. 1.

**New York Times, 15 May 79, p. 14. 128 the RB-57 crash in the Black Sea were renewed by these proposals. The Turkish government, which had taken a strong stand that U.S. facilities were for NATO use only was against such use of bases in Turkey, although at one paoint it was suggested that if the U.S.S.R. would approve such activities Turkey would permit them.** The U.S.S.R. firmly objected, however, and this concept never again surfaced. 51 In any event, there was some question on the U.S. side of the value of the whole idea: The ultimate value of the U-2 in the verification of SALT is a subject of some dispute. General Lew Allen, Chief of Staff of the Air Force and former head of the National Security Agency (NSA) testified in May 1980 that there are alternative means to verify SALT. He noted that use of the U-2 was a 'desirable alternative' to compensate for lost capabilities and one the United States 'would be very reluctant to be foreclosed from.'52 The Turkish government did officially state, however, that the U.S.S.R. had no veto over the use of Turkish sovereign territory: It is reported that the Soviet Union opposes recon naissance flights by American U-2 planes over Turkey. As is known, the Turkish Foreign Ministry statement on the issue said that the authorised Turkish bodies will examine the U.S. request in connection with U-2 overflights only if there is agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

**Gunaydin, 5 May 79, p. 1, **Gunaydln, 7 May 79, p. 1. **Senate, Military, p. 23. 129

Eastern bloc diplomatic observers.in Ankara have recalled that the Demirel government brought a halt to U-2 flights over Turkey in 1965 in response to Soviet reaction. These observers said: 'Turkey is. is an independent state and therefore it has to decide on the U-2 issue on its own. One cannot expect the Soviet Union to contact Turkey directly on this issue. However, the developing Turkish- Soviet economic relations in particular may be affected if Turkey grants permission for the U-2s. Also one must not forget that 8ALT-II is based on mutual trust.

Cyprus Negotiations The final major issue during the Embargo period, and one intimately related to the Embargo itself, was the progress of negotiations over the status of Cyprus. While books can and have been written on the progress of the talks, the basic position of the two primary negotiating parties, the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, is essentially unchanged. The Greek Cypriots want a return to the communal government as established by the 1960 constitution. ** They are willing to entertain additional safeguards for the rights of the Turkish minority, but insist that no partition of Cyprus, even under a weak central government can be permitted.** The Turkish Cypriots insist on a de jure partition of Cyprus, perhaps with a central government handling foreign affairs and

**Tercuman. 16 May 79, p. 4. **Polyviou, Conflict, p. 161 **Ibid,, p. 164. 130

some minor internal policies,** The Turks reject the concept that refugees return to their homes stating that separation of the two groups is the best way of reducing tensions and of safeguarding the minority's rights.*^ The United States, while not a party to the talks, has an interest in their progress, and has from time to time made proposals to both sides in the hopse of furthering the talks, The U.S. positions appear to have contributed little directly to the talks. However, they have been the subject of much public debate in Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. The Greek Cypriot view has been generally as follows: A careful study of the plan reveals that it aims at a partitionist solution. It provides for an inadequate central authority. It does not insure the return of the refugees. The most basic princi ples of the plan are unacceptable.3B Cypriot newspapers even suggested that the U.S. would force implementation of its plans through covert means: There are indications that the CIA has surfaced its moves in Cyprus. Selected operatives have arrived under cover, mostly through the occupied areas. This confirms old reports of CIA bases at Akrotiri. All this indicates that they are ready to intervene if the situation deteriates.59

**Cumhurrivet. 27 Aug 74, p. 5. *^Ibid. **Ta Nea. 19 Nov 78, in FBIS, 20 Nov 78, **Nicosia Alithia. 27 Nov 78, in FBIS, 27 Nov 78. 131

Some Greek opinions accepted the U.S. proposals as a foundation for discussions* The U.S. proposals offer a testimony of the U.S. desire for a settlement which will be as just as possible. Naturally the proposals do not meet the full extent of Greek Cypriot demands nor do they satisfy the broad principles of U.N. reso lutions. But they are presented as proposals for forming the basis for discussions. Rejection of these proposals would in no way serve the Cypriot cause.*9 Conservative Turkish opinion generally viewed the U.S. proposals in a rather neutral light: The Secret U.S. 'Cyrpus Peace Plan' prepared by the White House and State Department is expected to be accepted by both sides. The plan, under study for both sides, makes the following points: "1. The Republic of Cyprus will be a frderal republic consisting of a Turkish zone and a Greek Zone. Unification of either zone with a foreign power is forbidden. 2. The two regions will vote separately. 3. Full basic rights will be guaranteed. 4. The federal government will be responsible for defense, foreign affairs, customs, and the budget. 5. Full and balanced representation of both regions is required in all organis of government. 6. Cyprus will be de-militarized." This plan seems to serve acceptably as a basis for further negotiations.61

**To Vima. 10 Dec 78, in FBIS, 12 Dec 78 **Hurrivet, 16 Nov 78, p. 7. 132

The head of the miniscule Marxist Turkish Labor Party, however, opposed the U.S. initiative* Behice Boran, head of the Tbrkish Labor Party, said that Cyprus must be cleaned of all military bases and personnel to change the island from tension to peace. She charged that Turkey had violated the sovereignty of Cyprus by its 1974 peace operation, and said that Cyprus was not a toy for Greece or Turkey. 'Attempts to integrate Cypriots with Greece and Turkish Cypriots with Turkey must be given up. A democratic state Integrating the communities must be formed. This will serve world peace' she said.62 Her position found no popular support in Turkey. The U.S. initiatives did not materially further the Cyprus negotiations. They did serve a domestic purpose, in that they formed the basis for Administration findings that progress was being made and that aid to Turkey should therefore continue. Warren Christopher noted in May 1978: We place a high priority on the achievement of a just settlement of the Cyprus problem; it is a problem which grows more difficult with the passage of time . . . It has been suggested that lifting the embargo, or even proposing further military or economic assistance for Turkey, should be delayed until such time as a final Cyprus solution is achieved. As I have outlined, the Administration does not share the view, and we do not believe U.S. national interests would be served by such a course. We believe usch a policy would bring at best only a continued impasse . . *

*^Tercuman, 20 Nov 78, p. 1. 133

It must be recognized that embargoes are blunt tools for special situations of crisis proportions and usually of limited duration.63

Aid Restored While commercial sales to Turkey were resumed by PL 94-104 on 6 October 1975, aid and FHS credit and cash sales continued to be prohibited throughout 1975.** Although MAP funds were included in foreign aid authoriza tions for FY 76/7T and FY 77, the Foreign Assistance Act continued to preclude obligation of these funds.** Negotiations between the U.S. and Turkey over a new Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) were concluded in March 1976.** The agreement included $800 million in FHS and $200 million in grant aid over a four year period— the agreement also confirmed Turkish control of U.S. bases, but lifted most restrictions that had affected the activities of U.S. personnel.*^ A DCA for U.S. facilities in Greece was presented to Congress along with the Turkish DCA in January 1977.** While neither

**U.S. State Department ("Current Policy," May 1978). 64New York Times, 7 Oct 75, p. 1, 65.Ibid. 66New York Times, 26 Mar 76, p. 1. 67Ibid. 68New York Times, 11 Jan 77, p. 1. 134

DCA was accepted, PL 95-92, approved on 4 August 1977 allowed $175 million of FHS sales to Turkey during FY 78, gq although it continued the prohibition on MAP funds. The International Security Assistance Act of 1978, forwarded to the Congress on 21 March 1978, repealed the prohibitions on MAP aid to Turkey and allocated additional FMS and MAP assistance to Turkey.^* On 3 October 1978, Turkey agreed to end the "provisional status" despite the failure of the U.S. to formally approve the DCA.^* Turkey denied, however, that this approval was the result of any secret agreement. Foreign Minister Okun denied allegations today that his government had signed a secret agree ment with the U.S. on joint defense installations. Ohun said: 'There is no secret agreement between the U.S. and us on the joint defense installations. The government has established the provisional nature of these installations which will be applied until a final agreement has been reached and pro vided this to the public.' He added that relations had to be considered in a broader framework not limited to military concerns, but including economic issues as well. In 1960, a new PECA was negotiated which forms the basis for continuing U.S. aid to Turkey, and the continued functioning of U.S. facilities there. In his

**New York Times, 5 Aug 77, p. 1. ^*New York Times, 25 Apr 78, p. 11. ^*New York Times, 4 Oct 78, p. 1. ^^Anatolia, 17 Nov 78, p. 1. 135 prepared statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hr. Matthew Nimitz, Under Secretary of State said the following* Purpose and Characteristic of the DECA The Preamble of the DECA makes clear its important purpose. Both nations state their desire to enhance economic, defense, and related scientific and technological cooperation both bilaterally and as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This cooperation is in recognition of obligations arising from Articles II and III of the North Atlantic Treaty. The preamble also stresses that the bilateral relationship between the United States and Turkey rests on their shared dedication to the principles of democracy, human rights, justice and social progress. The DECA is markëd by the following general characteristicsi

-- It is a five-year agreement renewable annually thereafter. — It is a bilateral implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty. — It is an executive agreement containing no pledge of specific economic or military assistance. — It has a broad focus covering cooperation in the interrelated economic, military and defense production areas. — It provides for the continuation of United States military activities in Turkey, in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The 1980 DECA differed from earlier agreements in several ways. The 1976 agreement obligated the U.S. to

73 U.S. Congress, House ("Hearings," Washington, GPO, 1980), p. 5. 136 provide one billion dollars. The 19BO agreement had no specific amount of aid guaranteed. The 1976 DBCA was simply a basic agreement without detailed arrangements for operation of U.S. facilities. The 1980 agreement is a comprehensive agreement that covers the entire relation ship. Appendix three contains the text of the 1980 DECA. Despite the signing of this DECA, Turkey took pains to reemphasize the Turkish nature of these facilities. Foreign Minister Hayrettin Erkmen said the joint installations involved in a new defense cooperation agreement being negotiated with the United States were not foreign bases but installations of the Turkish Republic. He made the statement on the floor of the Senate Tuesday while briefing that legislative chamber on the draft defense coopera tion accord. The joint installations involved would not be used for purposes of U.S. defense, Erkmen said, but for NATO defense.'*

Effectiveness of the Embargo From 1974 to 1980 the U.S. had sanctions against Turkey, including an arms embargo, and restrictions on other forms of economic and military assistance. The declared purpose of these sanctions was to influence Turkey to settle the Cyprus issue on grounds favorable to the central Cypriot government. The sanctions failed completely to achieve that goal. As punishment for Turkish actions in occupying Cyprus there was some effect. The modernization of the Turkish armed forces lost six

Anatolia, 9 Jan 80, p. 1. 137 years. During that time, only a limited amount of new material was obtained, and the bulk of the Turkish inventory of aircraft and armor entered block obsolescence. This drastically reduced the combat effectiveness of NATO's Southern Region, especially in combination with the withdrawal of Greece from the military side of NATO. Diversion of limited Turkish economic resources to procure limited amounts of spares and supplies also hurt the Turkish economy. If viewed as punishment for Turkish behavior, then the embargo had significant effect. But at what cost to U.S. interests? The military integrity of NATO has been severely and seemingly permanently degraded. Integrated planning and exercises are a thing of the past in the Southern Region. The U.S. lost the trust of much of the Turkish population (without any corresponding increase in U.S. popularity in Greece or Cyprus), and provided an opening for Soviet propaganda exploitation of the value of friendship with the U.S. As a domestic issue, the embargo was one of a series of Legislative initiatives in foreign policy at a time of a weakened Executive Branch. The Turkish embargo, the halting of aid to Vietnam, and the cut-off of assistance to Angolan rebels all represented the victory of the Congress over a weak President. It further demonstrated the continued viability of the 138

Legalist position in U.S. foreign policy-making and in U.S. domestic politics, a matter which will be further reviewed in the next chapter. Attempts to provide aid to Turkey through NATO channels and the continued opposition to the embargo by the President added to the confusion about the real purpose of the embargo, especially in a region of the world used to conspiracies, plots, and hidden agendas. CHAPTER V

THE ARMS EMBARGO AS A TOOL OF INFLUENCE

Issues in the U.S. and Turkey Did the Arms Embargo against Turkey have any beneficial effects; was it useful in tilling the field of alliance unity? Or did it serve only to drive part ners apart, perhaps irrevocably? Again, the purported goal, to achieve a settlement on Cyprus was not achieved and in that sense this Embargo like previous embargos failed. An examination of the factors involved in this attempt at influencing an alliance partner's policies discloses that many factors were in play in this situation. The issue can be viewed in the U.S. as part of the Legislative-Executive struggle during a period of a greatly weakened Executive authority, i.e., immediately post-Watergate. Consideration of other threads of U.S. tradition, especially the Legalist-Realist tension appear useful. In Turkey, the bureaucratic politics of a fragmented parliamentary system, and the deterioration of a weak polity and economy are valuable tools for explaining Turkish actions. In U.S. politics, the argument over the decision to impose the Arms Embargo (often referred to as the

139 140

"Rule of Law" Embargo) represents a classic case of the dichotomy between those who view foreign policy from a national interest viewpoint (Realists) and those who view it from a moral viewpoint (Idealists) . From the viewpoint of a student of the nature of the foreign policy process, this is one of the most interesting aspects of the Embargo debate. The position of the Idealists can be summarized as follows i (1) Turkey used U.S. arms in its Cyprus invasion in violation of U.S. law, especially section 2314(d) of the 1962 Foreign Assistance Act. (2) Turkish invocation of Article 4 of the Treaty of Guaranty is not applicable as legal justification for its invasion because of the U.N. charter prohibition on the use of armed force. (3) The U.S. government is obligated to enforce its own laws, otherwise there is no meaning to the Constitutional process. (4) The Turkish invasion was not only illegal, in terms of U.S. law and.thé U N. Charter but it was immoral. Excessive force, particularly in the "second" invasion, was used to achieve purposes beyond the protection of ethnic Turkish Cypriots. (5) To permit or resume arms aid to Turkey without concession on Cyprus would justify the use of force by the Turks, and encourage other U.S. allies to use U.S. weapons without regard to U.S. law. (6) The U.S. cannot morally accept the use of force in settling international disputes; the U.N. Charter and basic U.S. percepts are diametrically opposed to such action. (7) If President Carter's statements on Human Rights were to have meaning, he could not support the TXurkish 141

violation of U.S. law, and of the rights of innumerable Cypriots.! The Idealist position is subscribed to by many Americans, either explicitly or implicitly. The Peace through Law association in Congress is an example of how the Idealist position explicitly affects the U.S. foreign policy process. This Idealist alignment unquestionably played a significant role in the Congressional actions towards Cyprus and Turkey. A number of congressmen subscribed to the following statement about the 1978 Security Assistance Act: As supporters of the rule of law in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, we recognize that Turkey's second invasion of Cyprus in August 1974, was a clear violation (of U.S. law). . . As supporters of human rights, we are not convinced that lifting the Embargo constitutes a course likely to lead to just settlement of the Cyprus tragedy . . . The Realist view of international relations rejects interjection of moral interests, and emphasizes consideration of national interest. As Thucydides said: . • . for we both know that into the discussion of human affairs the question of justice only enters where the pressure of necessity is equal, and that

A. A. Fatourous, "Some Legal Aspects of Recent U.S. Policy Toward Greece and Cyprus," in U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Greece and Cyprus,(Washington, Center for Mediterranean Studies, 1974), p. 29. 2 U.S. Congress. House, International Security Assistance Act of 1978, (Washington, GPO, 1978) , p. 60. 142

the powerful extract what they can, and the weak grant what they may . , .3 Horgenthau gave the Realist view of morality in foreign policy: Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states . . . realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.* The Realist defines national interest in terms of power. A Realist interpretation of the Embargo question is as follows: (1) Both Turkey and Greece have important strategic locations with respect to the U.S.S.R. and the Middle East. The Embargo prevents U.S. activities in Turkey. (2) Turkish NATO forces are large, but are weakened by the Embargo. (3) U.S. facilities in Turkey provide intelligence information vital to the U.S. (4) Turkey (and Greece) have legitimate and under standable interests in the security of their peoples on Cyprus. The overthrow of the Makarios government by the Greek junta removed the legiti macy of the government of Cyprus and endangered the Turkish minority's rights. (5) While Turkish use of U.S. weapons might have violated U.S.'. law, other use of such weapons, as by Israel in Lebanon has occurred without meaning ful U.S. action, and there is no reason to single out Turkey.

^Quoted in Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest, Chicago (University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 1. *Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York, Borzoni, 1967), p. 10. 143

(6) The Embargo failed to cause Turkey to make concessions on Cyprus, admittedly perhaps because of Executive opposition to the Embargo. (8) While no solution can satisfy both Greece and Turkey fully, the Embargo alienates Turkey without actually satisfying Greek concerns over Cyprus. Secretary of State Vance said: Turkey's continuing strategic importance is clear. The protection of our interests and those of our allieg requires that our relationship be revitalized

The contrast of Vance's statement with the earlier Congressional Idealist statement presents the conflict between these two traditions in U.S. foreign policy formulation in clear perspective. The debate between the two positions will continue with or without the Embargo crisis, but a major aspect ofthe development of the crisis arose from this debate. A second perspective from which the Embargo can be examined is the domestic politics, or "Greek Lobby" perspective. Many, including most Turks, ascribed the Embargo decision to the activities ofthe Greek Lobby, which had the active assistance of the Armenian-American Lobby in attacking Turkish interests. There is consider able value to examining the Embargo decision from this point of view, but it is not as powerful as many have suggested. The position of such men as Brademas and Sarbanes was undoubtedly strongly influenced by ethnic

^Senate, Military Aspects, p. 4, 144 ties and the Greek Lobby, but the number of Americans of Greek descent is not large enough or concentrated enough to form a lobby of sufficient power to influence a significant number of Representatives or Senators over the long term, especially where serious questions of U.S. national interest are concerned. A detailed study of voting patterns on Embargo issues and ethnic relationships has shown that there was no meaningful correlation between ethnic blocs and votes on the embargo.* Benjamin Rosenthal noted; It really does not have anything to do with whether anyone has some Greek friends . . . the question is, what is right for the United States of America.' The input of the Lobby on the decision was significant, but not decisive. Even direct appeals to the Greek- American voter did not, for example, change the Executive position, or that of the Legislative majority, in 1979; In view of President Carter's campaign to convince Congress of marginal progress on Cyprus so aid to Turkey can be approved, all Greek-Americans should struggle against this aid. The Greek-Americans must make it clear they will vote against Carter and his party if he continues to favor Turkey.=

Sallie Hicks and Theodore Couloumbis, "The Greek Lobby, Illusion or Reality?" in Abdul Aziz Said, ed., Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Relations, p. 90. ^Benjamin Rosenthal, Congressional Digest,(Vol. 54, April 1975), p. 124.

*To Vima, 12 Sep 79, p. 1. 145

In the above discussion, there is an implicit assumption that Congress played the determining role in the Embargo issue. This appears valid, and consideration of the factors that brought this situation about should provide an understanding of the primary reasons for the dominance of Congress, and of certain motives for the Embargo decision. In the aftermath of Vietnam, Congress attempted to reassert its role in the foreign policy process through such measures as the 1973 War Powers Act. These and other steps were taken after over a decade of Execution dominance and Congressional subordination in foreign policy (the Vietnam War). Congress was attempting to restore its role, and the role of public law, in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy to the extent that any infringement of the Executive on Congressional authority was the target of strong reaction. The attempt by Kissinger to downplay the legal aspects of the Turkish situation, and his attempts to convince Congress that the Administration was in the best position to evaluate U.S. national interests in the Turkish situation backfired. To an unguantifiable but certainly significant extent, this rejection of Administration dominance played a role in the Congressional decision. Kissinger was also coming under increasing criticism for detente, trade with 146 the U.S.S.R., and the Soviet dissident issue, all of which reduced his influence upon Congress. More importantly, the summer of 1974 was the height of the Watergate Crisis, with the spectacle of a President of the United States resigning under the threat of impeachment after a year long battle with Congress and the Courts which had left the country bitterly divided. The Congress naturally moved into this power vacuum created by the Watergate Crisis, and especially into foreign affairs because of the issues discussed above. The unwillingness of Congress to accept any Executive direction in the summer of 1974 obviated the value of Kissinger's position on the Turkish crisis. Indeed, virtually any act of the Administration was viewed with suspicion by the Congress, with the many recent discoveries of lies and misstatements made by the Administration to Congress to justify various foreign and domestic issues fresh in Congressional memory. The reassertion of Congressional power in foreign affairs after Vietnam and the chaos of the Watergate period are the two factors probably most explicative of the Embargo decision. The Turkish response of implementing a "provisional status" for U.S. forces in Turkey is less complex. It was the result of weak and fragmented governments which could not afford to take any action that could be viewed as 147 being subservient to U.S. control. Irritation over the Poppy Question, prior U.S. interference over Cyprus, and longstanding friction over U.S. military privileges in Turkey also contributed substantially to the Turkish decision, with the specifics of the decision being easily understood in terms of the Capitulations.

Thoughts on Alliances In viewing the Embargo period, a number of conclusions about the conduct of foreign affairs are suggested. One of the most significant of these involves the U.S. propensity to make treaties and enter alliances without consideration of the partners' concerns and motivations in participating in such pacts. U.S. policy during the past-World War II era seemed to be interested primarily in making alliances without much concern for possible eventual problems that might ensue for both . partners. In this regard, such problems as the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, the "Protocol States" of SEATO, and the 1978 difficulties over the Phillipines Defense Pact could be usefully recalled. Many of the U.S.-Turkish bilateral problems also arose from U.S. misunderstanding of the nature of the alliance relationship. The implicit assumption of the U.S. that allies have congruent interests in all issues and at all times was disastrously wrong. This is especially true in cases when alliances 148

have been made between the U.S. and two nations such as Greece and Turkey, that have had longstanding conflicts. There is a certain element of wishful thinking in such situations; that by creating such alliances, these conflicts will be obviated. The lack of planning for the eventuality that such assumptions might be in error has been demonstrated all too.jnany times, and guintessentially in the Embargo question, when U.S. policy alienated both Greece and Turkey, and failed in any meaningful way to contribute towards a resolution of the Cyprus dispute. Much has been said about the 'arrogance of power.' Perhaps the U.S. has another lesson to learn, are about the * ignorance of power.'9 Turkey also made essentially the same erroneous assumption about the nature of alliances as did the U.S. In the view of the Turks, the relationship was between equals, and it was assumed that as Turkey had taken steps far beyond the terms of the alliance in order to further U.S. national interests, the U.S. was therefore obligated to reciprocate by supporting Turkish national interests even when these interests fell outside the formal requirements of the alliance. In addition to the expectation of support from the U.S., the Turks expected to be consulted on matters of mutual interest. As the Jupiter missile issue, the U-2 situation, and the issue O Steven Oren, "Turkey Moves Right and East, (Contemporary Review, Vol 227f July 75), p. 13. 149

of the use of Inclrllk to send Marines to Iran, have demonstrated, mutual discussions have rarely occurred. Beginning in 1964, Turkey began reexamining the nature of its relationship with the U.S., and the possible need to diversify foreign ties. This change in the foundation of Turkish foreign policy was confirmed by the Embargo decision. Of course, such Turkish problems as the declining economy, relations with the Arab World, and changed perceptions of West Europe contributed to this reassessment. The utility of an alliance relationship certainly effects the usefulness of any form of intervention such as the embargo. The perception of the value of the U.S.-Turkish alliance had undergone significant change since the declaration of the Truman Doctrine. Certainly the two states did share a common perception of the threat of Soviet expansionism in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The U.S.S.R. was anxious to secure access to the Mediterranean, and Stalin stated to the U.S. ambassador that the U.S.S.R. must have a military base in the Dardanelles. Although he also assured Smith that he contemplated no use of force to achieve his goals, he had made the same assurances only four months earlier, immediately before movement of heavy Soviet 150 units into northern Iran.Turkey responded to this situation with full mobilization of its army, over a half million troops. This was an unbearable burden on the Turkish economy and, in any event, the equipment of the army was markedly inferior to that of the U.S.S.R.At the same time the U.S. military analysis of the situation came to the conclusion that Turkey was "the most important military factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East," and that Soviet expansion would have "serious impact" on the vital interests of the United States. 12 Interestingly enough, the Joint Chief of Staff also advised that the U.S. should avoid a military commitment other than through the United Nations because of the distances involved and the impracticality of assured lines of communications. However, the perception of the Soviet threat receded in Europe in the 1960s. By changing a long standing policy of grant aid to a policy of foreign military sales programs in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. enhanced a Turkish perception that

^*^Kuniholm, Origins, p. 334. ^^Vali, Straits, p. 90. ^^Kuniholra, Origins, p. 336. l^Ibid. 151 the U.S. felt that the threat had receded. Turkey itself, by seeking and accepting Soviet economic aid, demonstrated that it no longer felt so directly threatened as in the early 1950s. During the period 1974-1979 Soviet economic aid to Turkey totaled over 650 million dollars, one third of all Soviet economic assistance for that period. Ecevit stated in 1978 that The Embargo certainly affects our thinking in many ways and encourages us to be more imaginative regarding solutions to our economic problems and to our defense problems.!* Nevertheless, despite the visit to Turkey of high Soviet military officials, no Soviet military equipment has been procured by Turkey. But while the decreased perception of threat, and increase in economic relations has been compared to Hast Germany's 'tOstpolitik, " the Turks still have no desire to become dependent upon the U.S.S.R.^*

Another aspect of the Embargo issue was the demonstration of U.S. insensitivity to Turkish traditions, an insesnitivity already noted in such problems as the Capitulations question and the 1964 Johnson Letter. Turks have a perception of themselves as independent, proud.

^^Cumhurriyet, 28 Nov 78, p. 1. !5„Turkey after Iran and Camp David," (Dis Politika, V. VIII, No, 3 & 4, Jul 1980), p. 101. 152 self-reliant, having a long history as an important people, and unwilling to accept foreign domination. The Turkish Revolution of 1919-23 is a major expression of this price and freedom from foreign interference. The history of foreign interference during the Ottoman Empire, and the attempted division of Turkey by the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Treaty of Sevres are recalled with frequency by Turks when discussing foreign policy. When this general objection to foreign inter ference is combined with such specific issues as the poppy question and the Capitulations, there resulted Turkish intransigence to any settlement of Cyprus that could be associated with the Embargo. The issue of foreign interference and imposed settlements was and is an overriding concern of Turkish politics. Even Oemirel, the pro-Western moderate, attacked Ecevit for ending the provisional status of U.S. facilities: Demirel said at a meeting of the JP that the Ecevit government had failed. He said 'Mo one should attempt to betray the state to the other side; this is the important issue. Turkey is great and has always secured its rights. One must secure Turkey's rights, but not by operating with them.'15 The Embargo had negative effects on the settlement of the Cyprus question because of this Turkish attitude.

l*Millivet. 26 Nov 78, p. 1. 153

Further, the efforts by the Executive to end the Embargo encouraged the Turks to remain steadfast. Nor could Turkey afford to make concessions while under U.S. Congressional embargo. No doubt Ankara's time would have been different had the Embargo really hurt. But the main check was to Turkish pride. 17 At the same time, Turkey demonstrated an insensitivity toward U.S. relations with Greece and other nations. Turkey expected, if not open approval of its role in Cyprus following the Greek junta coup d'etat, at least that there would be no serious negative reaction from the U.S. This represented a continuation of Turkish misunderstanding of the meaning of the alliance between the U.S. and Turkey. Further, many of the issues such as the Capitulations and U.S. military special privileges could have been reduced in significance if Turkey had understood the basis for such requests, and attempted to defuse comparisions between the privileges and the Capitulations in domestic politics. Turkey, too, viewed the U.S. actions in terms primarily of her own interests, ignoring the needs of the U.S. to maintain (or at least attempt to maintain) relations with Greece because of U.S. national interests in the

^^Oren, "Turkey Moves," p. 11. 154

Greece relationship. The weak, divided Turkish governments of the period were unable to take new initiatives to overcome some of these failures to appreciate U.S. interests. Following the 1980 coup the military government devoted its attentions to ending political violence and restoring the economy. Foreign affairs, including Cyprus were secondary concerns at best. The attitude of the Papandreou government in Greece did not encourage concessions by the Turks, who in any event continued to have no domestic pressures to make such concessions. The military government in preparing the 1982 constitution did take note of some of the problems commented on in this paper. The President now has the authority to dissolve the Assembly and to call new elections. Power within the Assembly is severely limited in the case of small parties, and election laws make it difficult for members of small parties to stand for office. During times of emergency, the President can issue decrees having the force of law, which should preclude the parliamentary paralysis of the late 1970s. The Embargo weakened the eastern region of NATO by alienating Turkey, and not providing a settlement

IBThe Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, (Ankara, Basan Hatbaacink Sanayi, 1962.) 155 acceptable to Greece or Cyprus. The Embargo failed completely to help resolve the Cyprus issue, and probably prolonged it. If this was the justification for the Embargo, the Embargo was a policy failure. If it was meant to express the Idealist position on the need to enforce U.S. laws, and maintain U.S. moral posture, it did so, but at the cost of damaging U.S. national interests. If it is viewed as a successful attempt by Congress to assert its position in the U.S. foreign policy process, it was successful, but again at consid erable costs in terms of U.S. interests. If, however, the U.S. and Turkey renew their relationship on a new basis of mutual understanding as a result of lessons learned from the Embargo both countries would benefit. It will be difficult to return U.S.-Turkish relations again to the level of the 1950s and 1960s, but a realistic relationship based on truely mutual concerns and interests is possible, and should be an objective of both states. As noted earlier, arms embargoes have been used by the U.S. on numerous occasions. The ban on sales of advanced jet fighters to Latin American countries by Kennedy; the cut-off of assistance to Pakistan in 1965; the various delays in transfers to Israel; the "human-rights" embargoes of the Carter Administration; and the ban on sales to Iran following the Embassy 156

takeover. It is clear that the U.S. government considers the Embargo a legitimate, and implicitly, an effective tool of foreign policy. There is no question that sovereign states have the legitimate right to control exports of arms for of any other commodity) despite the existance of alliance pacts or sales contracts. During the debates on the Turkish Arms Embargo, Richardson Preyer stated: The purpose of the foreign aid program is to influence the future of other lands. As such it is a. vital instrument of foreign policy. Its purpose is not to do good to all mankind, nor to establish democratic governments in every country . . . we must keep foremost in any debate our own national interest.19 The courts have long held that the constitutional authority given the Executive to conduct foreign relations is sufficiently broad and powerful as to permit such action. As a tool of moral posture, embargoes have been successful in demonstrating U.S. judgements and moral positions. As a practical tool of foreign policy, the value of the Arms Embargo is less clear. Among the cases cited above, Latin American states have advanced jets of French, Italian, British, Israeli, and Soviet manufacture. Pakistan turned to the PRC as its major arms supplier, and is now again receiving advanced U.S. weapons. Israel continues to act without particular

^^Richardson Preyer, Congressional Record, (Vol. 54, April 1875), p. 115. 157 regard to U.S. Interests In the Middle East. The "human-rights" embargoes are of limited effectiveness in preventing arms procurement or modifying government behavior in Latin America. Finally, Iran continues its forth year of war, operating U.S. weapons (with Israeli aid) and buying weapons from numerous other suppliers. So, the embargoes have not Icept weaponry out of the hands of the target state, although they have sometimes slowed the flow of weapons and increased their costs. Embargoes have rarely been successful in modifying foreign behavior and have most often been counter-productive. The most successful embargo was the halting of aircraft delivery to Israel in 1970 which had the result of stopping Israeli deep strikes into Egypt. Broader U.S. policy interests in furthering the Rogers initiatives were not, however, advanced by the eitdsargo. Arms embargoes, while a commonly used tool of U.S. foreign policy, would seem to serve domestic political interests far more than,they serve U.S. foreign interests. These domestic interests include the concerns of the Legalist/Moralist elements in the U.S. foreign policy establishment. These elements are generally against the provision of arms to any state which actually uses them, either internationally as by Turkey, or domestically, as in the numerous "human rights" arms 158

embargoes. This is quite popular among the electorate which numerous polls show has little interest in U.S. military involvement abroad (always excepting Israel and— sometimes— Western Europe). The isolationist sentiment and the remnants of the "Merchants of Death" syndrome are still about as evidence by the spate of boo)c8 and articles about foreign misuse of U.S. weapons. Another domestic purpose served by the embargo is the opportunity for interplay between the President and Congress. Arms embargoes against Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan, Iran (under the Shah for certain weapons), and once even Israel (when Kissinger promised long range Pershing missiles during Sinai I) have been imposed by Congress over the loud objections of the President. Future consideration of arms embargoes should consider the patterns of previous embargoes, and the probability of achieving a specific desired outcome. Can the process of change be controlled, manipulated, and forced to conform to predetermined lines and objectives? The answer must surely be that it is doubtful . . . how societies develop their values and priorities is a function of their own particular culture and tradition. Policymakers could do worse than reflect on these questions as they puruse what, after all, is a limited mandate— the protection and promotion of U.S. national interests.20

20Jack C. Miklos, The Iranian Revolution and Moderniaation,(Washington, D.C., Defense University Press, 1983), p. 64. 159

Perhaps the U.S. would be beet served by minimizing the relationships which obligated it to provide arms, and thus the U.S. would not be faced so often with the use of a tool of so little utility.

Greece, NATO, and Cyprus: the Southern Flank The Greek component of the relationship also continues to be in a state of flux. The Papandreau government, elected on a platform of expelling U.S. facilities, nonetheless continues to negotiate for a new base rights agreement. Relations between the U.S. and Greece will continue to reflect past U.S. attitudes toward the Greek junta and the acceptance of the Turkish occupation of Cyprus. It has been suggested that the good will in Greece today reflects the interest of the U.S. Congress in condemning the dictatorship and in instituting the arms embargo. While this may well reflect public attitude, it continues to be true that Greece has turned more to Europe via the EEC than perhaps it did in the past, but still needs U.S. military assistance. The renewal of the base rights agreement, despite the promises of Papandreou to close these bases demonstrates the extent of this need. The NATO position has been changed by the actions of Greece and Turkey. Greece's absence from military planning, and the present lack of a combined command including planning for both countries weakens 160 the southern flank. The maintenance of Greek forces on the Aegean Islands, and other units outside NATO planning further weakens the area. This is also true of the commitment of Turkish forces to Cyprus, and the creation of IVth Army (the Aegean Command), whose units are not available for NATO planning. There are no answers, no final solutions in human affairs. A settlement of the Cyprus Question that meets the demands of Greece and Turkey does not appear practical— to say nothing of the needs and desires of the inhabitants of Cyprus itself. This does not mean that a modus vivendi cannot be achieved, A solution that recognizes that tensions will continue, but that tries to remove impetus toward near-term conflict is certainly possible. This appears to be the most productive path, even though it will satisfy no one. The Eastern Mediterranean has been a zone of conflict since at least the Iliad and the Oddessy; it would not be realistic to anticipate that peace will suddenly break out today. To achieve even this will require more realism in understanding the nature of alliances and the limits of friendships of all concerned. Limits on U.S. commit ments need also be understood by the partners involved. The Turkish military government appears to recognize this, and has made tentative moves toward integration 161

with Europe, and more flexible ties with the U.S. The government of Greece also clearly recognizes the need to keep tensions from rising to the point of open conflict. The status quo ante cannot be restored, and it is unrealistic to attempt it. Change is the only permanent feature of human society. The embargo may have affected Turkey as Ecevit noted in 1978; The Embargo was a negative factor. The Turkish people, with their long background of statehood are aware of the responsibilities of Turkey's geopolitical location. As a result the reaction felt to the Amercian Embargo has not resulted in any rash moves in the way of radical changes in Turkey's posture. With this negative factor removed, the way is open for the revitalization of Turkish-American relations. The best way of insuring peace in the region is to build up an atmosphere of mutual confidence with neighboring countries.21 Greece may now be concentrating on the develop ment of a modern economy with the aid of a legitimate, democratic government operating with the aid of responsible political parties. Churchill's statement about Greek politics is hopefully less true today; However the Greek race might have altered in blood and quality, their characteristics were found unchanged since the days of Alcibiades. As of old, they preferred faction above all other inter ests, . . . .22

21Cumhurrivet. 26 Nov 78, p. 1. ^^Winston Churchill, Closing the Ring,(Boston, Houghton-Hifflin, 1951), p. 217. 162

The United States may realize that; . . » they are in an unending struggle. And that is a very tough thing, because Americans are not patient. It is a tough thing to realize that they are in an endless effort, and that the search for final solutions is simply an unwise and unrealistic search . . . if we are not going to have illusions about each other, we are going to have a more solid relationship in the future, or a more sophisticated one than we had in the past.23 But, while there may be no final solutions to problems of international relations (or to most problems, perhaps) , there is still a need to pursue such goals. Niebuhr suggested that: The task of building a world community is man's final necessity and possibility, but also his final impossibility. It is a necessity and possibility because history is a process which extends the freedom of man over natural process to the point where universality is reached. It is an imppssibillty because man is, despite his increasing freedom a finite creature, wedded to time and place and Incapable of building any structure of culture or civilization which does not have its foundations in a particular and dated locus.24 What might a modus vivendi involve? Borowiec has suggested a number of steps which might be appropriate. 25 The Turks might reduce the size of the Fourth (Aegean) Army, and formally renounce any claims against

23 "Turkey, after Iran," op cit., p. 112. ^^Reinhold Neibuhr, Children of Light and Children of Darkness,(New York, Charles Scribner's, 1960), p^ 187. 25Andrew Borowiec, The Mediterranean Feud, (New York, Praeger, 1983), p. 146-149. 163

the Greek Aegean Islands. Then differences over the Aegean, which economically are far more significant than differences over Cyprus, might be,discussed in a cooler atmosphere. Contributing to this would be a reduction in rhetoric, with a joint cultural commission revising the propaganda found in the books of both countries. The economic situation of both countries might be assured by foreign (read EEC) assistance. Finally, the bizonal nature of Cyprus should be recog nized, but joint enterprises and efforts such as joint universities should be encouraged. Couloumbis has suggested a similar set of principles. 26 He proposes both sides renounce irredentist territorial claims, that both renounce the use of force as an instrument of bargaining, and that both agree to arbitration for settlement of technical disputes. With respect to Cyprus, both Turkey and Greece should declare that Cyprus is an independent state, renouncing taxsim and enosis. A federal, demilitarized Cyprus state has excellent economic prospects. The proposals of both authors have merit. While "the East never forgets," Egypt and Israel did sign a peace treaty, France and Germany are allies, and Yugoslavia is a federated state. Difficulties can be

26Theodore Couloumbis, The United States, Greece, and Turkey, (New York, Praeger, 1983), p. 209-213. 164

overcome, if the leaders of Greece and Turkey have sufficient stature to challenge the problems, if the U.S., NATO, and the EEC will assist. The attention span of the Western powers tends to be short--as > de Tocqueville long ago pointed out. The southern flank is not afforded a steady level of attention, as is required, and such attention is not likely to be forthcoming so long as actual violence is not involved. The Turkish return to constitutional government, and the conclusion of the U.S.-Greek base rights negotiations should provide an opportunity for progress in resolving the relationship. U.S. efforts should be directed to the end in a low-key manner, avoiding actions that could be perceived as intervention in either state's internal affairs. There is no need for the U.S. to present a "peace plan," such efforts are all too often seen as attempts to impose U.S. will. Efforts can and should be made to facilitate long-term attention to the issue on the part of U.S. policy makers. Far too often, only immediate crises receive the attention of policy level officials. Of course, closer consultation between the Executive and Legislative branches might help avoid such major differences as occured over the Embargo— but there is a constitutional tension between the two branches over foreign policy which can be eased, but not resolved. 165

Conclusions What then can be learned from the experiences of the Turkish arms embargo? It is clear that the nature of alliance relationships and methods of influencing allies is not well defined nor well under stood, either in theoretical or in practical terms. The history of sanctions such as arms embargos suggest that the paradigm in use for so long is at best ineffective and often counterproductive in foreign policy behavior modification. The continued use of such tools is of doubtful utility, although for domestic reasons they are likely to continue to be widely used. In examining the U.S.-Turkish relationship, it is apparent that neither country was sensitive to the concerns of the other or to the historical considerations that affect the foreign policy decision-making in each country. In a broader context, sensitivity toward the anti-colonial, anti-Western, and anti-imperialist popular reactions to the experiences of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would be of great value in dealing with Turkey and the other Ottoman successor states. Far too often the U.S. has taken policy steps in the region for its own reasons that fail to consider these sensitivities. Even when the leadership of one of these states acguieses to such steps, as did Henderes, 166 the popular reaction against the leader and the U.S. may well be counterproductive. Perceptions are important, especially in the Middle East, and actions justifiable in U.S. terms often are ineffective or counterproductive. A U.S. action, such as the NATO SOFA, may be appropriate in West Germany, but not be the correct policy in Turkey. The experiences of the Ottoman Empire with foreign intervention are not, of course, unique. The "Unequal Treaties" of the same period in China were very similar in form, and in consequence, as were European activities in such countries as Iran and Morocco. The resulting public concern in these countries (as well as in those states which actually experienced colonialism), for actions which recall or could be interpreted to recall the colonial/imperialist history of relations between their countries and the Western powers continues to be a problem for Western diplomacy, and one often dealt with no better than in Turkey in the 1970s. The entire arms embargo period demonstrates the futility of the "punishment" approach to international relations. Despite these problems, and the Improbability of some final resolution of the Cyprus issue, modest steps toward modest goals can be helpful, certainly more helpful than sanctions or embargos. 167

In Turkey, as in most countries of the region, storiesand proverbs are used as teaching tools; in that spirit, the following story illustrates a reason for continued efforts in the area; While serving at the court of Tamerlane, Nasruddein one day was challenged by the tyrannical ruler to do something to show that his reputation as a wise man was truely deserved. After several tries at Impressing the Kha Khan, Tamerlane became furious, shouting that he had fed and paid Nasruddein for years and that he was a hoax. He then ordered his guards to take Nasruddein out and behead him. Nasruddein, terrified, said "O Khan, I will teach your stallion to sing." Tamerlane halted the guards. Nasruddein, relieved, said "it is a difficult task, possible to no other man. It will take me ten years, and I will need considerable funds." Tamerlane was impressed by the wisdom of Nasruddein and agreed. When Tamerlane left the throne room, the Grand Vizer approached Nasruddein and said, "O Nasruddein, you are truely a great and wise man, but can even you accomplish such a feat as teaching the Kha Khan's horse to sing?" Nasruddein replied "No, I cannot. But many things can happen in a decade* The Khan may die, the horse may die, or I may die . , . and, . . . perhaps, the horse may learn to sing." APPENDIX 1

OTTOMAN EMPIRE. (TURKEY.) 1830. TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION. Concluded May 1, 1830; ratification advised and time for exchange of ratifications extended by the Senate February l.'léTl; ratified by the PMsident FeSruary 2, 1831; ratifications exchanged October 5, 1831; proclaimed February 4. 1832. (Treaties and Conventions, isbt; p". 74àTr— ------(The text here printed is a translation from the original treaty, which was in the Turkish language. Differences of opinion as to the true meaning of certain portions have been the subject of diplomatic correspon dence without reaching an accord.) ARTICLES, I. Trade privileges. II. Consular officers. III. Treatment of United States merchants and vessels. IV. Judicial treatment of United States citizens. V. Use of United States flag. VI. War vessels. VII. Navigation of the Black Sea. VIII. Ships not to be impressed. IX. Shipwrecks. Ratifications. The object of this firm Instrument, and the motive of this writing well drawn up, is that: No Treaty or diplomatic and official convention, having heretofore, existed between the Sublime Porte of perpetual duration, and the United States of America; at this time.

Source: Compilation of Treaties in Force, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1899, p. 474.

168 169

in consideration of the desire formerly expressed, and of repeated propositions which have, lately, been renewed by that Power, and in consequence of the wish entertained by the Sublime Porte to testify to the United States of America, its sentiments of friendship. We, the undersigned Commissioner, invested with the high Office of Chief of the Chancery of State of the Sublime Porte existing forever, having been permitted by His very Noble Imperial Majesty to negotiate and conclude a Treaty, and having thereupon conferred with our friend, the Honorable Charles Rhind, who has come to this Imperial Residence, furnished with full powers, to negotiate settle and conclude, the Articles of a Treaty, separately and jointly, with the other two Commissioners, Commodore Biddle and David Offley, now at Smyrna, Have arranged, agreed upon and concluded, the following articles: ARTICLE I. Merchants of the Sublime Porte, whether Mussulmans or Rayahs, going and coming, in the countries, provinces and ports, of the United States of America, or proceeding from one port to another, or from the ports of the United States to those of other countries, shall pay the same duties and other imposts, that are paid by the most favored nations; and they shall not be vexed by the exaction of higher duties; and in traveling by sea and by land, all the privileges and distinctions observed towards the subjects of other Powers, shall serve as a rule, and shall be observed, towards the merchants and subjects of the Sublime Porte. In like manner, American merchants who shall come to the well defended countries and ports of the Sublime Porte, shall pay the same duties and other imposts, that are paid by merchants of the most favored friendly Powers, and they shall not, in any way, be vexed or molested. On both sides, travelling passports shall be granted. ARTICLE II. The Sublime Forte may establish Shahbenders (Consuls) in the United States of America; and the United States may appoint their citizens to be Consuls or Vice-Consuls, at the commercial places in the dominions of the Sublime Porte where it shall be found needful to superintend the affairs of commerce. These Consuls or Vice-Consuls shall be furnished with Berats or Firmans; they shall enjoy suitable distinction, and shall have necessary aid and protection. 170

ARTICLE III. American merchants established in the well-defended states of the Sublime Forte, for purposes of commerce, shall have liberty to employ Semsars (brokers) of any nation or religion, in like manner as merchants of other friendly Powers; and they shall not be disturbed in their affairs, nor shall they be treated, in any way, contrary to established usages. American vessels arriving, at or departing from the ports of the Ottoman Empire, shall not be subjected to greater visit by the Officers of the Custom-House and the Chancery of the Port than vessels of the most favored Nations. ARTICLE IV. If litigations and disputes should arise, between subjects of the Sublime Porte and citizens of the United States, the parties shall not be heard, nor shall judgment be pronounced unless the American Dragoman be present. Causes, in which the sum may exceed five hundred piastres, shall be submitted to the Sublime Porte, to be decided according to the laws of equity and justice. Citizens of the United States of America, quietly pursuing their commerce, and not being charged or convicted, of any crime or offence, shall not be molested; and even when they may have committed some offence, they shall not be arrested and put in prison, by the local authorities, but they shall be tried by their Minister or Consul, and punished according to their offence, following in this respect, the usage observed towards other Franks. ARTICLE V. American merchant vessels that trade to the dominions of the Sublime Forte, may go and come in perfect safety with their own flag; but they shall not take the flag of any other Power, nor shall they grant their flag to the vessels of other Nations and Powers, nor to vessels of Rayahs. The Minister, Consuls, and Vice-Consuls of the United States, shall not protect, secretly or publicly, the Rayahs of the Sublime Porte, and they shall never suffer a departure from the principles here laid down, and agreed to by mutual consent. ARTICLE VI. Vessels of war of the two contracting parties, shall observe towards each other, demonstrations of friendship and good intelligence, according to naval usage; and 171

towards merchant vessels they shall exhibit the same kind and courteous manner. ARTICLE VII. Merchant vessels of the United States, in like manner as vessels of the most favored nations, shall have liberty to pass the canal of the Imperial Residence, and go and come in the Black sea, either laden or in ballast; and they may be laden with the produce, manufactures and effects of the Ottoman Empire, excepting such as are prohibited, as well as of their own country. ARTICLE VIII. Merchant vessels of the two Contracting Parties shall not be forcibly taken, for the shipment of troops, munitions and other objects of war, if the Captains or Proprietors of the vessels, shall be unwilling to freight them. ARTICLE IX. If any merchant vessel of either of the contracting parties should be wrecked, assistance and protection shall be afforded to those of the crew that may be saved; and the merchandise and effects, which it may be possible to save and recover, shall be conveyed to the Consul nearest to the place of the wreck, to be, by him, delivered to the Proprietors. CONCLUSION. The foregoing articles, agreed upon and concluded, between the Riasset (Chancery of State) and the above- mentioned Commissioner of the United States, when signed by the other two Commissioners, shall be exchanged. In ten months, from the date of this temessuck, or instrument of Treaty, the exchange of the ratifications of the two Powers shall be made, and the articles of this Treaty shall have full force and be strictly observed, by the two Contracting Powers. Given the 14th day of the moon Zilcaade, and in the year of the Hegira, 1245, corresponding with the 7th day of May of the year 1830 of the Christian Era. (signed) MOHAMMED HAMED, Reis-ul-Kutab (Reis Effendi.) APPENDIX 2

AID TO TURKEY AGREEMENT Agreement between the United States of America and Turkey (signed at Ankara July 12, 1947; entered into force July 12. 1947) The Government of Turkey having requested the Government of the United States for assistance Which will enable Turkey to strengthen the security forces Which Turkey requires for the protection of her freedom and independence and at the same time to continue to maintain the stability of her economy; and The Congress of the United States, in the Act approved May 22, 1947, having authorised the President of the United States to furnish such assistance to Turkey, on terms consonant with the sovereign independence and security of the two countries; and The Government of the United States and the Government of Turkey believing that the furnishing of such assistance will help to achieve the basic objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and by inaugurating an auspicious chapter in their relations will further strengthen the ties of friendship between the American and Turkish peoples; The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective governments for that purpose, have agreed as follows t Article I

The Government of the United States will furnish the Government of Turkey such assistance as the President of the United States may authorize to be provided in accordance with the Act of Congress approved May 22, 1947, and any acts amendatory or supplementary thereto* The Government of Turkey will make effective use of any such assistance in accordance with the provisions of this agreement.

Source t United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, WasKington D.C., GPO, 1947, p. 1629.

172 173

Article II The Chief of Mission to Turkey designated by the President of the United States for the purpose will represent the Government of the United States on matters relating to the assistance furnished under this agreement. The Chief of Mission will determine, in consultation with representatives of the Government of Turkey, the terms and conditions upon which specified assistance shall from time to time be furnished under this agreement, except that the financial terms upon which specified assistance shall be furnished shall be determined from time to time in advance by agreement of the two governments. The Chief of Mission will furnish the Government of Turkey such information and technical assistance as may be appropriate to help in achieving the objectives of the assistance furnished under this agreement. The Government of Turkey will make use of the assistance furnished for the purposes for which it has been accorded. In order to permit the Chief of Mission to fulfill freely his functions in the exercise of his responsibilities, it will furnish him as well as his representatives every facility and every assistance which he may request in the way of reports, information and observation concerning the utilization and progress of assistance furnished. Article III The Government of Turkey and the Government of the United States will cooperate in assuring the peoples of the United States and Turkey full information concerning the assistance furnished pursuant to this agreement. To this end, in so far as may be consistent with the security of the two countries: 1. Representatives of the Press and Radio of the United States will be permitted to observe freely and to report fully regarding the utilization of such assistance; and 2. The Government of Turkey will give full and continuous publicity within Turkey as to the purpose, source, character, scope, amounts, and progress of such assistance. Article IV Determined and equally interested to assure the security of any article, service, or information received 174

by the Government of Turkey pursuant to this agreement, the Governments of the United States and Turkey will respectively take after consultation, such measures as the other government may judge necessary for this purpose. The Government of Turkey will not transfer, without the consent of the Government of the United States, title to or possession of any such article or information nor permit, without such consent, the use of any such article or the use or disclosure of any such information by or to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of Turkey or for any purpose other than that for which the article or information is furnished. Article V The Government of Turkey will not use any part of the proceeds of any loan, credit, grant, or other form of aid rendered pursuant to this agreement for the making of any payment on account of the principal or interest on any loan made to it by any other foreign government. Article VI Any or all assistance authorized to be provided pursuant to this agreement will be withdrawn: 1. If requested by the Government of Turkey; 2. If the Security Council of the United Nations finds {with respect to which finding the United States waives the exercise of any veto) or the General Assembly of the United Nations finds that action taken or assistance furnished by the United Nations makes the continuance of assistance by the Government of the United States pursuant to this agreement unnecessary or undesirable; and 3. Under any of the other circumstances specified in section 5 of the aforesaid Act of Congress or if the President of the United States determines that such withdrawal is in the interest of the United States. Article VII This agreement shall take effect as from this day's date. It shall continue in force until a date to be agreed upon by the two governments. 175

Article VIII This agreement shall be registered with the United Nations* Done in duplicate, in the English and Turkish languages, at Ankara, this 12th day of July, 1947. Edwin C. Wilson For the Government of the United States Hasan Saka For the Government of the Republic of Turkey APPENDIX 3 AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTING NATO STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT, JUNE 23, 1954 Agreement, with Minutes of Understanding, between the United States of America and Turkey Inplementing Status of Forces Agreement of June 19, 1951, between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (signed at Ankara June 23, 1954} entered into force June 23, 1954) For the inçlamentation of the "Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, Regarding the Status of their Forces, " dated June 19, 1951, the two Governments have agreed as follows: 1. All persons who are relatives of, and in accordance with United States laws or regulations, depending for support upon and actually residing with any member of a United States force or the civilian component, except those who are not United States citizens, shall also be considered dependents and will be treated in all respects as those persons defined in Article I, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph c, of the aforesaid NATO Agreement* 2. For the purpose of the application of the aforesaid NATO Agreement and of the provisions of this Agreement, persons "who are in the eng>loy o f the United States armed services, within the meaning of Article I-l (b) of the aforesaid NATO Agreement, and without prejudice to the other requirements of that Article, shall include employees of United States military organizations, employees of United States Government departments, Post Exchanges, and recreational organizations for military personnel. Red Cross and United Services Organization personnel, and technical representatives of contractors with the United States forces who are assigned to United States military organizations in Turkey. All of these persons are subject to United States military law. Should any other specific categories become involved, the United States Government would wish to discuss their inclusion in this paragraph with the authorities of the Turkish Government. 3. Residence documents to the members of the civilian component and the dependents described in paragraph 1 of this Agreement, as well as the dependents described in Article I, paragraqph 1, sub-paragraph c, of the Agreement regarding the Status of NATO Forces, will

Source t United S^tes Treaties and Other Internationa1-Agreements, Washington, D.C,,“”GP0, 1956, p. 1465.

176 177

be issued without fees, except for administrative expenses incurred in issuing the documents. 4. It is the agreed.understanding of the Parties that reasonable quantities of provisions, supplies and other goods imported for the exclusive use of United States personnel, directly by special military agencies of the United States, such as post exchanges, commissaries, and officers' clubs; shall be accorded duty-free entry under the terms of Article XI, paragraph 4, of the aforesaid NATO Agreement in accordance with arrangements to be agreed with the appropriate Turkish authorities. It is understood that such provisions, supplies and other goods will be subject to agreed certification by an authorized United States official, and to inspection by Turkish customs for conformance with the certificates which shall be drawn up in accordance with the agreed arrangements mentioned above. It is further agreed that such special military agencies as post exchanges, commissaries, and officers' clubs will be permitted to operate at agreed locations without licenses, inspections or taxes and other charges. Categories of articles to be agreed between appropriate United States and Turkish authorities may be sold by these official United States military agencies only to authorized United States personnel. Administrative measures shall be taken by United States military authorities, in cooperation with the appropriate Turkish authorities, to prevent the resale or transfer in any way of merchandise sold under the provisions of this paragraph to persons not entitled to purchase items from such agencies, and generally to prevent the abuse of the facilities provided for in this paragraph. 5. In the implementation of Article XI of the aforesaid NATO Agreement, with respect to the duty-free entry of personal and household effects, it is understood that the free importation of such effects will be permitted from two months prior to six months after the arrival of the individual concerned or any of his dependencies. 6. It is understood that sales of personal and household effects and automobiles, taking place between individuals entitled to customs-free entry, are not subject to Turkish taxes. 7. It is understood that in the case of any damages in Turkey, caused by persons referred to in paragraph 2 above who are not paid from appropriations made to the United States Department of Defense, which 178

require, under the provisions of Article VIII of the aforesaid NATO Agreement, the payment of an amount in order to satisfy the claimant with respect to such damages, the Turkish Government shall pay such amount. Procedures with respect to the reimbursement to the Turkish Government of such amounts shall be the subject of special arrangements agreed between the two Governments. In witness whereof the respective representatives, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement. Done at Ankara, Turkey, in duplicate, in the English and Turkish languages, each of which shall be of equal authenticity, this twenty-third day of June, 1954. For the Government of the United states ot America Avra. M. Warren For the Government of the Republic of Turkey F. KOprûlü

Minute of Understanding with Respect to Paragraph Four of the "Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey Relative to the implementation of the 'Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, Regarding the Status of Their Forces'" It is not the intention of the Turkish Government to prohibit the sale of articles normally sold through United States special military agencies. A. H. W. K.

Minute of Understanding Regarding Paragraph Seven of the Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the United States of America Relative to the Implementation of the "Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces" It is understood that the United States Government is able to accept responsibility for repayment only with respect to claims arising from the acts of employees paid from appropriated funds of the Department of Defense. With respect to claims arising from the acts of all other members of the civilian component it is understood that the United States will exercise its good offices to make 179

satisfactory arrangements with the responsible entities for reimbursing the Turkish Government. However, the United States Governmnt under existing laws can accept no financial liability with respect to the latter category of claims. A. M, W. K. APPENDIX 4

AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION ON DEFENSE AND ECONOMY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLES II AND III OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY The Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Turkey, Reaffirming their devotion to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter, Recognizing that the relationship and cooperation between them rest on the principles of democracy, human rights, justice and social progress. Expressing their desire to maintain the security and independence of their respective countries and to increase the standard of living of their peoples, Recognizing that cooperation in the fields of economy and defense, as in all other fields, is based on full respect for the sovereignty of the Parties, Expressing their willingness to continue their economic and related scientific and technological cooperation both bilaterally and as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to enhance their defense cooperation as partners within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, Reaffirming their determination to contribute to the strengthening of world peace. Taking into account the principle that the maintenance of an adequate defense posture is an important element for the preservation of world peace and stability.

Source: US Congress. House. Hearings before the subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives Ninety-Sixth Congress. May 7, 1980. Committee Print.

180 181

Expressing their faith in the acceleration of disarmament efforts and their mutual desire to contribute to this process. Acting on the basis of their continuing friendship and in recognition of their obligations to the security and defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area and pursuant to Articles II and III of the North Atlantic Treaty, Have entered into the following Agreement: ARTICLE I On the basis of sovereign equality and mutual interest, the Parties shall maintain cooperation so as to foster their economic and social development. For this purpose, the Parties shall maintain and develop close cooperation between the comprising economic, defense and related scientific and technical fields. The Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey shall continuously review their cooperation in all these fields and identify and implement appropriate measures for developing it. For these purposes consultations shall be held, the level and date of which shall be as mutually agreed between the two Governments. ARTICLE II Recognizing the interrelationship of economic and defense matters and the fact that a sound defense rests on a sound economy and in order to assist each other to fulfill their mutual responsibilities as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Parties, as envisaged in Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, will exert maximum efforts to develop economic cooperation, including commercial, economic, industrial, scientific and technologi cal relations, between the two Countries. For this purpose, the Government of the United States will exert its best efforts to provide mutually agreed financial and technical assistance to Turkey's development efforts. ARTICLE XII For the purpose of strengthening the mutual security cooperation between the two Governments within the framework 182

of Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Government of the United States shall use its best efforts to provide the Government of the Republic of Turkey with defense equipment, services and training In accordance with programs to be mutually agreed upon. The cooperation in this field shall be carried out in accordance with Supplementary Agreement Number 1 on Defense Support. ARTICLE IV In the furtherance of the spirit of Article II of this Agreement and in recognition of the mutual benefits to be achieved by both Parties, the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey shall seek opportunities to cooperate in the production and purchasing of appropriate defense material. Both Parties will undertake to encourage joint investment in the above areas of economic and defense cooperation. For this purpose, the Government of the United States shall assist the Government of the Republic of Turkey in mutually agreed efforts aimed at enhancing the production, maintenance, repair and modernization of defense material and equipment in Turkey and will encourage new defense production projects and two-way trade in defense material. This cooperation shall be carried out in accordance with Supplementary Agreement Number 2 on Defense Industrial Cooperation. ARTICLE V 1. The Government of the Republic of Turkey authorizes the Government of the United States to participate in joint defense measures at specified Turkish Armed Forces installations. 2. The activities and technical operations of the installations shall be conducted in accordance with mutually agreed purposes and programs. 3. The "Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces" dated June 19, 1951, shall apply to the force and civilian component of the United States of America and their dependents assigned or stationed in the territory of the Republic of Turkey for the purposes of this Agreement. 183

4. The extent of the defense cooperation envisaged in this Agreement shall be limited to obligations arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty. 5. This cooperation shall be carried out in accordance with Supplementary Agreement Number 3 on Installations. ARTICLE VI Taking into consideration the sovereign equality of the Parties and for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Agreement and its Supplementary Agreements on the basis of reciprocity, the Parties agree that: A. The Government of the Republic of Turkey may maintain a military liaison office within its Embassy in the United States to carry out liaison with appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States on questions regarding the exchange of information, cooperation and other defense matters of mutual concern, including security assistance and other related subjects. B. Likewise, the Government of the United States may maintain its organization in Turkey to carry out similar functions with appropriate authorities of the Government of the Republic of Turkey. ARTICLE VII 1. This Agreement and the Supplementary Agreements annexed to it shall be valid for a period of 5 years. Unless one of the Parties notifies the other Party of the termination of this Agreement three months in advance of the end of this initial 5-year period, it will continue to be in effect from year to year until terminated by agreement of the Parties or by either Party upon 3 months notice prior to the end of each subsequent year. 2. Should disagreement arise from the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement or of the Supplementary Agreements, the Parties shall begin consultations immediately in order to resolve the matter. 3. Either Party may propose, should it find necessary, in writing, the amendment or revision of this Agreement or any of the Supplementary Agreements. In this case, consultations shall begin Immediately. If no result is reached in three months, either Party may terminate the Agreement or the Supplementary Agreement in question upon notice in writing of 30 days. 184

4. In the event that one of the Parties concludes that the other Party is not complying or is unable to comply with the provisions of this Agreement or its Supplementary Agreements, it may propose, in writing, consultations, which will begin immediately. If no result is reached within 30 days, either Party may terminate upon notice in writing of 30 days this Agreement or any of the Supplementary Agreements without prejudicing the validity of this Agreement. ARTICLE VIII This Agreement and the Supplementary Agreements annexed to it shall come into effect on the date of exchange of notes in accordance with respective legal procedures. ARTICLE IX Done at Ankara in duplicate, in the English and Turkish languages, each of which shall be equally authentic, on this 29th day of March, 1980. FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF FOR THE GOVERNMENT OP THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY; (signed) (signed) James H. Spain Hayrettin Erkmen Ambassador of the Minister of Foreign Affairs United States of America

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT NUMBER 1 BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE REPUBLIC" OF TURKEY ON DEFENSE SUPPORT ARTICLE I Pursuant to Article III of the Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy Between the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Turkey, the Government of the United States recognizes the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces for a modernization and maintenance program. With a view towards enhancing the confidence and cooperation between the two Governments, the Government of the United States is committed to use its best efforts to provide defense support (defense materials, services and training) for the Government of the Republic of Turkey and to provide on the best terms as may be possible, military assistance to the Government 185

o£ the Republic of Turkey in order to achieve the objectives of its modernization and maintenance program, which includes a Five-Year Procurement Program. ARTICLE II The Parties, bearing in mind that long-term defense planning is an indispensable element of military force planning and modernization, shall establish a Joint Turkish-United States Defense Support Commission in Ankara, hereinafter called the Joint Commission, in order to facilitate the most effective application of such resources as may be available to the Government of the Republic of Turkey for meeting its defense support requirements from United States sources. ARTICLE III The Joint Commission will be composed of senior Turkish and United States representatives and be headed by two co-directors, one from each country, having General/ Flag rank. The working procedures and administrative arrangements of the Joint Commission shall be further detailed by mutual agreement. Such procedures and arrangements will indicate that the Joint Commission will supplement existing lines of communication and coordination between the military organizations of both countries. ARTICLE IV Based on the list of defense articles prepared by the Turkish authorities in consideration of the assigned NATO missions of the Turkish Armed Forces, the Joint Commission will: A. Develop recommendations for the orderly implementation of a Rolling Five-Year Procurement Program taking into consideration the price and availability of alternative defense articles, especially the prospects for obtaining them through grant assistance, from excess stocks, by loan or lease, through military assistance recipient third country transfers, and by all other possible means. B. Prepare an annual acquisition program based on the Rolling Five-Year Procurement Program and consistent with the fiscal planning data provided by the Government of the Republic of Turkey with due regard for the levels 186

of military assistance it concludes might be available from United States sources. C. Recommend and support the implementation of the Annual Acquisition Program based upon the Rolling Five-Year Procurement Program, including annual amounts of military assistance from the United States, with the appropriate authorities of both Governments. ARTICLE V To implement the Rolling Five-Year Procurement Program as recommended by the Joint Commission, the Government of the United States will seek to provide excess defense articles and to loan and lease defense equipment. The Government of the United States shall provide military assistance to the Government of the Republic of Turkey subject to the annual authorizations and appropriations contained in the United States Security Assistance Legislation. In addition, both Governments will cooperate in efforts to encourage other NATO allies to contribute to the fulfillment of this Rolling Five-Year Defense Plan. ARTICLE VI The cost of defense articles and services, whether acquired by cash payment or through Foreign Military Sales Credits, shall be at the lowest possible price permitted by applicable United States legislation. ARTICLE VII The Government of the United States shall give high priority to the delivery of defense articles to the Government of the Republic of Turkey. ARTICLE VIII This Supplementary Agreement shall be valid for a period of five years from the date of its entry into force, unless one of the Parties notifies the other Party of the termination of this Agreement three months in advance of the end of this initial five-year period, it will continue to be in effect from year-to-year until terminated by agreement of the Parties or by either Party upon three months* notice prior to the end of each subsequent year. 187

ARTICLE IX Done at Ankara in duplicate, in the English and Turkish languages, each of which shall be equally authentic, on this 29th day of March, 1980. FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAi THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY: (signed) (signed) James W. Spain Hayrettin Erkmen Ambassador of the Minister of Foreign Affairs United States of America

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT NUMBER 2 BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY ON DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIÔN The Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Turkey, Desiring to strengthen their respective defense capabilities as well as those of the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole through efficient cooperation in the fields of research, development, production, procurement and logistic support, Recognizing that increased defense production capability is an integral part of a strong defense effort. Having regard to the fact that an essential security relationship is supported by harmonious economic relations. Bearing in mind the increasing impact of the economy and the application of new technologies on defense matters. Taking into consideration the efforts of the NATO countries to develop and maintain an advanced industrial and technological capability and to achieve a more rational use of available resources, the standardization and interoperability of equipment and services, increased exchange of information, and better coordinated procurement policies, have agreed as follows; 188

ARTICLE I 1. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Turkey will cooperate in order to increase their defense equipment production and maintenance capabilities and to enable their armed forces to acquire more economically and efficiently modern armaments and equipment needed for self and common defense. 2. To this end, both Governments will seek to facilitate the mutual flow of defense procurement and technological know-how in the field of defense. They will also seek to provide opportunities to compete for procurement of defense equipment and services and to promote and facilitate the co-production of defense equipment and cooperation in defense research and development and to expand progreuns of data exchange in defense technologies. 3. This Supplementary Agreement covers areas of possible bilateral cooperation in research, development, production, procurement and logistic support of conventional defense equipment. Measures taken under this Supplementary Agreement shall complement or be consistent with the work of the Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD), the Independent European Program Group (lEPG), and the Senior NATO Logisticians Conference (SNLC). They therefore agree that, in the event of a possible conflict between the lEPG and the Government of the United States, and this Supplementary Agreement, the Parties hereto will consult with a view to amending this Agreement. 4. The two Governments will, consistent with their relevant laws and regulations, give the fullest consideration to all requests for cooperative research and development, and to all requests for production and procurement intended to enhance the standardization and/or interoperability of equipment and services within the Alliance. 5. Each Government shall normally use competitive contracting procedures in acquiring items of defense equipment developed or produced in the other's country. 6. The two Governments shall agree upon detailed procedures to implement this Agreement. These procedures will incorporate the following: A. Offers or proposals will be evaluated without applying price differentials under "Buy National" 189

laws and regulations and without applying the cost of import duties; B. Full consideration will be given to all qualified industrial and governmental resources in each country; C. Offers or proposals will be required to satisfy the applicable requirements of the purchasing Government for performance quality, delivery and coats. 7. Any item to be excluded from consideration of reciprocal defense procurement under this Supplementary Agreement for reasons of protecting national defense requirements should be identified as soon as possible in lists drawn up by the Turkish Ministry of National Defense and the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense for their respective countries. These lists will be kept under review and may be modified only at this level. 8. Each Government will ensure that Technical Data Packages (TDP's) made available under this Supplementary Agreement are not used for any purpose other than for bidding on and performing a prospective defense contract, without the prior agreement of those owning or controlling proprietary rights and that full protection shall be given to such proprietary rights, or to any privileged, protected, or classified data and information contained in the TDP's. In no event shall the TDP's be transferred to a third country or any other transferee without the prior written consent of the originating Government. 9. Third party transfer of defense articles or technical data made available under this Supplementary Agreement and of defense articles produced with such data will be subject to the agreement of the Government that made available the defense articles or technical data, except as otherwise agreed. 10. At the request of the purchasing Government, arrangements and procedures will be established concerning follow-on logistic support for items of defense equipment purchased pursuant to this Supplementary Agreement. Both Governments will make their defense logistic systems and resources available for this purpose as required and mutually agreed. 190

ARTICLE II 1. The Government of the United States will furnish the Government of the Republic of Turkey such assistance as may be mutually agreed upon in light of the latter*s priorities for the production, maintenance, repair and overhaul of defense equipment and materials, including arms and ammunition. 2. Mutually agreed defense production projects will be designed to constitute an increment to the production capabilities of Turkish industry. Such projects may be carried out solely by Turkey, as joint United States-Turkish projects of coordinated production, or as multilateral projects with the participation of other NATO and friendly countries. ARTICLE III Each Government will permit the importation and exportation, free from customs duties and taxes or similar charges, of equipment and materials sent to its country for maintenance, repair or overhaul pursuant to this Agreement. ARTICLE IV 1. The Government of the United States will provide to the Government of the Republic of Turkey, or assist the Government of the Republic of Turkey in obtaining wherever possible at no cost, or, on terms no less favorable than those extended by the Government fof the United States to any other NATO country, industrial property rights for the purpose of promoting the defense equipment production and enhancing the rationalization, standardization and interoperability of equipment and services of the NATO Alliance. 2. The Government of the United States will waive its reimbursement claims from the Government of the Republic of Turkey, to the extent possible and on a reciprocal basis, with respect to research and development costs and non recurring production costs. ARTICLE V 1. Each Government will call this Supplementary Agreement to the attention of relevant industries within its territory and will provide appropriate implementing guidance. Both Governments will take all necessary steps 191

to ensure that industries comply with regulations pertaining to security and to the safeguarding of classified information. 2. Implementation of this Supplementary Agreement will involve full industrial participation. Accordingly, the Governments will inform their respective procurement and requirements offices of the principles and objectives of this Supplementary Agreement. ARTICLE VI 1. To the extent that any items, plans, specifications, or information furnished in connection with the implementation of this Supplementary Agreement are classified by the furnishing Government for security purposes, the other Government shall maintain a similar classification and employ security measures equivalent to those employed classifying Government. 2. Information provided by either Government to the other on condition that it remain confidential shall either remain in its original classification, or be assigned a classification that ensures protection against disclosure equivalent to that required by the other Government. To assist in providing the desired protection, each Government will mark such information furnished with a legend indicating the origin of the information, that the information relates to this Supplementary Agreement, and that the information is furnished in confidence. ARTICLE VII This Agreement shall be implemented in accordance with mutually agreed,programs. To this end, the two Governments, acting through their competent authorities will enter into implementing agreements. The two Governments will seek ways to implement these programs and projects, identified in an Annex to this Agreement, at the lowest possible cost to Turkey.

ARTICLE VIII 1. This Supplementary Agreement shall have an initial term of five years, and shall remain in force from year to year thereafter unless terminated. The Agreement shall be terminated at the end of its initial term or of an annual extension if either Party gives the other Party written notice of its intent to terminate it at least 90 days prior to the end of the term. 192

2. Should disagreement arise from the interpretation or Implementation of this Agreement, the Parties shall consult in order to resolve the matter promptly. 3. Either Party may propose in writing the revision or amendment of this Agreement* In such a case, consultations shall begin immediately. If no result is reached in three months, either Party may terminate the Agreement upon 30 days notice in writing. ARTICLE IX Should the implementation of the contracts signed within the framework of this Supplementary Agreement not be completed at the time the present Agreement is terminated, provisions of this Agreement shall continue to cover said contracts until they are completed. Should this Agreement be terminated. Article I, Paragraphs 8 and 9, and Article VI will continue in force for those materials and data which were provided during the life of the Agreement. ARTICLE X Done at Ankara in duplicate, in the English and Turkish languages, each of which shall be equally authentic, on this 29th day of March, 1980. FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY: (signed) \signed) James W. Spain Hayrettin Erkmen Ambassador of the Minister of Foreign Affairs United States of America

ANNEX TO SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT NUMBER 2 BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES' OF AMERICA AND OF THE REPUBLIC OF TUWtEY ON DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION Projects presently under consideration; A. Production of Anti-Armor Ammunition: A separate production line is required to manufacture armor piercing ammunition. The objective of this project is to gain the capability of producing hollow-charge and hard-core ammunition for existing 193

weapons in the Turkish Armed Forces and for more modern types of weapons. B. Production of- Fuaesi New facilities are required to produce various types of fuses. The objective of this project is to increase existing production capability by obtaining new technology and equipment to produce fuses for artillery ammunition, rocket and missle warheads, and various bombs and mines. C. Production of Propellant Powders and Explosivesi An increase in production capacity of propellant powders is required. The objective of this project is to produce various kinds of propellant powders and high explosives to support artillery ammunition and rocket warhead production programs. D. Production of Various Kinds of Rockets; The existing manufacturing facilities are required to be supplemented by equipment and production know-how in order to produce various kinds of rockets. The objective of this project is to manufacture and supply rocket-type ammunition and rocket-assisted equipment for the requirements of the Turkish Army. E. Improvement of Aircraft Rebuild Capabilities and Improvement of Facilities; In order to improve the rebuild capacity of existing aircraft in the Turkish Air Force, the development of plans and programs is required. The objective of this project is to be a complete and self- sufficient rebuild capability of engine, body, avionics and other electronic equipment for the existing aircraft, including F-4 Phantoms, F. Building a Modern Frigate and Improvement of Overhauling Capacity; The program of building a modern frigate suitable for Turkish Navy requirements is to be pursued. In parallel with the construction activity the overhauling capability of Golcuk shipyard is to be improved. 194

G, Tank Upgrading Frogrami The objective of this project is to convert existing M48 tanks into M48A3 and/or H48A5 versions, including Turkish production of various primary components.

IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT ON PIRINCLIK INSTALLATION, ANNEX NUMBER 2 TO SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT NUMBER 3 ON INSTALLATIONS I. Introduction. This Annex is in implementation of Supplementary Agreement Number Three on Installations, hereinafter called the Agreement, to the Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy which was concluded this date between the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Turkey. II. Description. For the purposes of this Annex, Pirinclik Installation consists of a complex which includes: 1. Pirinclik Station 2. Tropo Scatter Site 106 III. Purpose. The purpose of this Annex is to arrange the principles and procedures for the activities at Pirinclik Installation. IV. Mission. The Government of the United States is authorized to participate in activities at Pirinclik Installation In order to detect, identify, track, collect data on space vehicles and carry out associated support activities, including operation of a satellite communications terminal. V. Installation Plan. Current master plans for the Pirinclik Installation complex described in Article II of this Annex shall be maintained along with this Annex and shall contain geographical coordinates, elevation, area, legend and facility listing. 195

VI. Arms and Ammunition Authorization. A current list of arms and ammunition authorized to be maintained at the Installation shall be kept along with this Annex. VII. Major Items of Equipment. A current list of authorized major items of equipment shall be maintained along with this Annex. VIII. United States Forces and Civilian Component Personnel Authorization. A current list of authorized personnel levels for the United States Forces and civilian component shall be maintained along with this Annex. IX. United States Contractor and Turkish Civilian Employees. The number of United States national employees of United States contractors and the number of Turkish civilian employees shall be included in the quarterly personnel status reports submitted by the United States authorities. X. Joint Technical Operations. 1. Primary mission operations and related maintenance services shall be carried out jointly and data resulting from such operations shall be shared by the parties in accordance with the provisions of the Technical Arrangement on Joint Technical Operations at Pirinclik which shall be maintained along with this Annex. 2. Authorized duty positions for Turkish personnel participating in joint technical operations shall be attached to the Technical Arrangement on Joint Technical Operations at Pirinclik. 3. On-the-job training for Turkish personnel assigned to participate in joint technical operations shall be carried out in accordance with a program mutually agreed between the respective military authorities at Pirinclik Installation. 4. When requested, officers of one party shall provide letters of evaluation on the performance of personnel of the other party. 196

XI. Functional Organizational Chart. A current functional organizational chart of United States Forces within the Pirinclik Installation complex described in Article II of this Annex shall be maintained along with this Annex and shall include the numbers, titles and missions of the detachments depicted. XII. Responsibilities and Relationships. 1. The respective military authorities of the parties, as identified in Article III, Paragraph 1 of the Agreement, at Pirinclik are responsible to their higher authorities for compliance with and implementation of the appropriate provisions of the Agreement, this Annex and its appendices and those agreements, technical arrangements, and letters of understanding which have been or may in the future be concluded in accordance with the foregoing. 2. The relationship between the respective military authorities shall be maintained in a spirit of cooperation, goodwill and friendship. They will take those actions necessary to insure that their subordinates observe this same policy. 3. Upon request, the Installation Commander shall provide appropriate assistance in matters arising between United States personnel and Turkish personnel or local Turkish civilian agencies. 4. Consistent with their own regulations, the respective military authorities shall cooperatively develop appropriate plans to assist the local public under conditions of emergencies and natural disasters. The Installation Commander shall also develop plans with Turkish military and civilian agencies to insure their assistance when such conditions so require. 5. The respective military authorities will keep each other informed of official visits by their higher authorities and inspection teams, and as appropriate, will cooperate in the preparation and execution of necessary briefings in accordance with mutually agreed administrative arrangements. 6. The parties to this Agreement recognize the inviolability of each other's cryptographic rooms and shall take all measures necessary to prevent entrance by unautho rized personnel. In other areas determined to be restricted, entry by Turkish and United States personnel shall be mutually agreed. 197

7. Turkish or United States personnel observed in violation of laws, regulations, or orders shall be reported to their respective military authorities for appropriate action. 8. The respective military authorities shall jointly make arrangements for fire fighting and prevention as well as for the proper sanitation of the Installation. 9. Signs outside the installation shall be in Turkish. Signs within the installation shall be in Turkish or English or both as may be mutually agreed. 10. The respective military authorities shall jointly develop measures to prevent the unauthorized sale or disposition of equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods imported into Turkey in accordance with Article V of the Agreement for the exclusive use of the United States Forces, its members, civilian component, and dependents. 11. The respective military authorities shall cooperate to prevent the transfer of equipment, material and supplies being disposed of in accordance with Article VII, Paragraph 3 of the Agreement to unauthorized parties. XIII. Installation Security 1. The respective military authorities at Pirinclik each shall develop a security plan covering the premises exclusively used by its own national element. 2. The Installation Commander, consistent with Article III, Paragraph 3 of this Agreement shall prepare an overall installation security plan to counter security threats. 3. Qualified United States personnel shall be made available upon request to assist the Installation Commander in the discharge of his responsibility for the control of access to the installation. When search of personnel or vehicles entering or exiting the Installation is deemed necessary, search of Turkish personnel or vehicles shall be carried out by Turkish security personnel and search of United States personnel or vehicles shall be carried out by United States security personnel. 4. Entry and exit of official Turkish and United States vehicles shall be on the basis of the vehicle operation authorization (trip ticket) issued by competent 198

Turkish or United States officials. A log of such entries and exits shall be maintained at the gate. XIV. Joint Use Arrangements. 1. Ground transportation systems operated by one party may be utilized by personnel of the other party when adequate space is available. 2. Athletic and social facilities of one party may be utilized by personnel of the other party on a reciprocal basis in accordance with mutually agreed arrangements. Done at Ankara in duplicate, in the English and Turkish languages, each of which shall be equally authentic, on this 29th day of March, 1980. FOR THE GOVERNMENT OP THE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: REPUBLIC OF TURKEY: (signed) (signed)

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT NUMBER 3 BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY ON INSTALLATIONS ARTICLE I 1. Pursuant to Article V of the Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy between the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Turkey, the Government of the Republic of Turkey authorizes the Government of the United States to participate in joint defense measures at the following Turkish Armed Forces Installations: - Sinop (electromagnetic monitoring) - Pirinclik (radar warning space monitoring) - Incirlik (air operations and support) - Yamanlar (Izmir), Sahintepe (Gemlik) , Elmadag (Ankara), Karatas (Adana), Mahmurdag (Samsun) , Alemdag (Istanbul), and Kurecik (Malatya) . (nodal communications sites) - Belbasi (seismic data collection) - Kargaburun (radio navigation) 199

2. The Government of the Republic of Turkey also authorizes United States administrative and support organizations and activities outside the installations. Such organizations and activities shall be subject to the relevant provisions of this Agreement. 3. Where necessary, requirements specified in this Supplementary Agreement shall be elaborated in appropriate implementing agreements. ARTICLE II 1. Technical operations and maintenance services at the installations where the primary purpose is intelligence collection, nodal communications or radio navigation shall be carried out jointly by Turkish and United States personnel. The modalities of this cooperation, including the distribution of manpower spaces for assignment by each Party and training requirements for Turkish personnel shall be determined jointly by appropriate authorities of the, two Governments. For the purposes of this cooperation, the Government of the United States shall provide access to appropriate training for Turkish personnel. 2. All intelligence information, including raw data, produced at intelligence collection installations in the Republic of Turkey shall be shared by the two Governments in accordance with arrangements determined jointly by the competent technical authorities of the two Governments. 3. Mutually agreed arrangements shall be established to enhance Turkish Armed Forces' utilization of the capacity of the Defense Communications System in Turkey to the extent feasible. 4. U.S. and Turkish authorities shall consult to avoid interference between activities of the installations authorized by this Agreement and the activities of other military and civilian installations and to avoid damage to life and property. 5. Modernization, addition or importation of the equipment related to the technical operations at the installations which would increase mission capabilities shall be subject to advance approval by the Government of the Republic of Turkey. ARTICLE III 1. The Government of the United States of America will assign an officer as Commander of the United States 200

Forces at each Installation, who also will function as the single point of contact with the Turkish Installation Commander. The Turkish Installation Commander and the officer 8 0 assigned by the United States shall* -exercise command and control over their respective forces, including equipment and material and the premises exclusivly used by them, as well as providing security therefor; maintain close contact and coordination to insure that activities are conducted in a manner consistent with the spirit and provisions of this Agreement; and be responsible to insure that activities and technical operations at the installation shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. 2. Turkish civilian personnel employed by the United States Forces or contractors of the United States Forces shall be under the control, responsibility and direction of their employer. 3. The Turkish Installation Commander shall be responsible for relations with the local Turkish authorities, order and security of the installation as a whole, including perimeter security, consistent with Paragraph 1 of this Article and modalities mutually agreed in accordance with Paragraph 1, Article II of this Agreement. 4. Access to installations shall be under the control of the Installation Commander. Members and vehicles of the United States Forces and civilian component, as well as contractors, contractor employees and Turkish civilian employees of the United States Forces, shall have access to the installations on the basis of a standard identification card issued by appropriate Turkish authorities upon request of appropriate United States authorities. Such identification cards shall be valid for all Installations covered by this Agreement. Personnel awaiting receipt of a standard identification card and temporary duty personnel shall have access on the basis of official orders and United States or Turkish identification. Detailed implementing arrangements for admittance to the installations will be contained in a directive for procedures regarding admittance to the installations. 5. The United States flag may be flown at the headquarters of the United States Forces at the installation. 6. The Installation Commander may issue directives applicable to the installation as a whole consistent with the provisions of this Article. 201

ARTICIÆ IV The purpose, mission, location, installation plan, authorized quantities of arms and ammunition, authorized major items of equipment and authorized personnel strengths of the United States Forces and civilian component shall be detailed by mutual agreement. Increases in such authorized quantities and strengths shall be subject to prior approval of the appropriate Turkish authorities. The appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States shall provide to the appropriate authorities of the Government of the Republic of Turkey a quarterly report of assigned personnel strengths including Turkish civilian personnel, as well as organization charts for United States units at each installation. The Parties acknowledge that the number of personnel assigned may at times temporarily exceed authorized levels because of the personnel assignment processes. ARTICLE V 1. In accordance with the provisions of the "Agreement Between the Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces" dated June 19, 1951, the Government of the United States may import into and export from Turkey the equipment for its forces and reasonable quantities of provisions, supplies and other goods exclusively for the use of the United States Forces, its members, civilian component, and dependents. United States authorities shall notify Turkish authorities of such imports and exports by manifest. 2. The importation into and permanent transfer within Turkey of major items of equipment, arms and ammunition shall be subject to the prior approval of appropriate Turkish authorities and transfer within Turkey of arms and ammunition shall be accomplished with safeguards and protections as mutually agreed. Special procedures shall be established for the customs control of arms and ammunition as well as equipment and material of a classified nature. 3. Arms and ammunition and major items of equipment needed or the operation of an installation, including such equipment as may be earmarked for replacement as a result of modernization, will not be removed from Turkey without prior notification. 4. The competent authorities of both Parties shall consult before either Party terminates its activities or reduces its capabilities significantly at the installations. 202

ARTICIÆ VI ■ For the purposes of this Agreement, material, equipment, provisions, supplies, services, and civilian labor required by the Government of the United States shall be procured in Turkey to the extent feasible. ARTICLE VII 1. State-owned land areas including improvements, utilities, basements and rights of way already allocated by the Government of the Republic of Turkey for the purposes of this agreement will continue to be made available without costs to or claims against the Government of the United States. This Article shall not be interpreted as giving the right of ownership to such land areas, improvements, utilities, basements and rights of way to the United States and is without prejudice to the terms of existing non in t ergovernmen ta 1 base contracts under which certain property is provided to the Government of the United States for the purposes of this Agreement. 2. All non-removable property. Including property incorporated in the soil, constructed or installed by or on behalf of the United States on the land areas allocated by the Government of the Republic of Turkey for the purposes of this Agreement, shall, from the date of its construction or installation, become the property of the Government of the Republic of Turkey, and shall be so registered without prejudice to the authorization by the Turkish authorities to the Government of the United States and its personnel to use such property for the purposes of this Agreement. Upon final termination of the use by the Government of the United States of any such non-removable property, the right of such use will be transferred to the Government of the Republic of Turkey which will compensate the Government of the United States for the residual value, if any, of the property as determined by mutual agreement, taking into account past practices. Such property shall include those basic utility systems and other fixtures which have been permanently installed in or affixed to the property. 3. The Government of the Republic of Turkey shall have the right of priority to acquire, in accordance with mutually agreed terms, any equipment, materials, and supplies imported into or procured in Turkey by or on behalf of the Government of the United States for the purposes of this Agreement, in the event such equipment, materials and supplies are to be disposed of by the Government of the united States. 203

4. Construction of new buildings and other property incorporated into the soil at the Installations and demolition, removal, alteration and modernization which change the basic structure of existing buildings shall be subject to prior approval by the appropriate Turkish authorities, ^ ARTICLE VIII 1. The costs of operations and maintenance of the installations, except for the premises exclusively utilized for Turkish operations or by Turkish personnel, and the costs of mutually agreed construction, modernization, alterations and repairs at the installations shall be met by the Government of the United States. 2. Each party shall pay its own personnel costs. 3. The costs of extension of local utilities requested by the United States and provided by the Government of the Republic of Turkey to the perimeter of the installa tions shall be met by the Government of the United States. ARTICLE IX 1. The deployment into or from Turkey and operations, of rotational squadron aircraft of the United States authorized to be stationed at Incirlik installation in support of NATO defense plans, their related support units, and aircraft which support activities authorized by Article I, Paragraphs 1 and 2, of this Agreement, shall be carried out in accordance with implementing agreements. These agreements shall also include; A. Procedures for the joint use of Incirlik installation and for the provision of air traffic control services; and B. Procedures for training of rotational squadron aircraft at Incirlik. 2. Procedures for additional training in support of NATO defense plans will be established. Implementation of this training will be accomplished through separate protocols. 3. Aircraft operating in support of these activities shall have access to designated military and civilian airfields serving such activities. Supply vessels operating in connection with these activities shall have access to Turkish seaports to be authorized by the Government of the Republic of Turkey. 204

4. Provisions, consistent with this Agreement, will be established to facilitate movement of United States aircraft between installations and to and from Turkey. ARTICLE X The provisions of the Montreux Convention are reserved. ARTICLE XI The installations specified in Article I, Paragraph 1 above are subject to inspection by the appropriate Turkish authorities. The inspections in question shall be on the basis of mutually satisfactory administrative arrangements between the competent authorities of the Parties. ARTICLE XII Nothing in this agreement shall be in derogation of the inherent right of the Government of the Republic of Turkey under international law to take all appropriate restrictive measures required to safeguard its national existence in case of emergency situations. ARTICLE XIII 1. This Supplementary Agreement shall be valid for a period of five years from the date of its entry into force. Unless one of the Parties notifies the other Party of the termination of this Agreement three months in advance of the end of this initial five year period, it will continue to be in effect from year to year until terminated by agreement of the Parties or by either Party upon 3 months' notice prior to the end of each subsequent year. 2. In the event of termination of this Agreement, the Government of the United States shall complete the process of its withdrawal and liquidation within one year after the effective date of termination. This Agreement shall be considered to remain in force for the purpose of such withdrawal and liquidation. ARTICLE IX Done at Ankara in duplicate, in the English and Turkish languages, each of which shall be equally authentic, on this 29th day of March, 1980. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources Newspapers: The Turkish press for the period 1974-1980 was invaluable because of its coverage of Turkish actions not reported in the West, and because of its editorial content reflecting the disparate views of the Turkish public. The most important newspapers for this study were; Gunaydin, a large-circulation newspaper, reflecting popular opinion and attitudes, sometimes in a sensationalist manner, used extensively because it reflected the opinions of such a large audience. Cumhurriyet, reflecting the moderate leftist viewpoint of the Republican People's Party, was also a major source, as was the conservative Tercuman, which often reflected the views of the Justice Party. Two right-wing newspapers, Ortadoqu and Milli Gazete were of use, as was the left-wing Baris, and the Marxist Avdinlik. The weekly newsmagazine Yanki, independent to moderate conservative, was also valuable for its editorials and "insight" pieces.

Other Primary Material Bodurgil, Abraham, Turkey; Politics and Government: A Bibliography, Washington; Library of Congress, 1978. Ecevit, Eulent, Demokratik sol ve hukumet bunalimi, Ankara: Gunes Matbaasi, 1974. Erbakan, Necmettin, Milli Gorus. Istanbul; Dergah Yayinlari, 1975. Evren, Kenan, Statement, Head of State, Chief of General Staff and President of the National Security Council of the Republic of Turkey (Outlining the reasons for the coup and that nation's plans for the future). Congressional Record 126:H9934-H9936 Sep 29'80. Pell, Claiborne, Greece and Cyprus. 1975: a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975,

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