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2019-12 DIVERSIONARY THREATS IN LATIN AMERICA: WHEN AND WHY DO GOVERNMENTS USE THE THREAT OF FOREIGN INVASION, INTERVENTION, OR TERRORIST ATTACK?
Searcy, Mason
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64063
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
THESIS
DIVERSIONARY THREATS IN LATIN AMERICA: WHEN AND WHY DO GOVERNMENTS USE THE THREAT OF FOREIGN INVASION, INTERVENTION, OR TERRORIST ATTACK?
by
Mason Searcy
December 2019
Thesis Advisor: Cristiana Matei Second Reader: Tristan J. Mabry Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form Approved OMB REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2019 Master's thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS DIVERSIONARY THREATS IN LATIN AMERICA: WHEN AND WHY DO GOVERNMENTS USE THE THREAT OF FOREIGN INVASION, INTERVENTION, OR TERRORIST ATTACK? 6. AUTHOR(S) Mason Searcy 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis explains when and how Latin American leaders use diversionary force and the rally around the flag phenomenon in order to help shore up domestic support. This better understanding will allow policy makers to better predict Latin American leaders’ actions and to construct more specifically tailored foreign policies toward the region. The use of diversionary force by Latin American leaders has a broad history, and this thesis focuses on two case studies: Alberto Fujimori and his use of diversionary tactics against domestic terrorism threats, especially Sendero Luminoso in Peru, and Nicolás Maduro’s inflation of the threat of a U.S. or Western-led invasion of Venezuela. The thesis concludes that both autocratic regimes used diversionary tactics frequently, and continued to employ them regardless of the viability of the threat and the independence of other political institutions. As the situation in Latin America deteriorates, there is a pressing need to comprehend the inflammatory rhetoric of autocrats like Maduro in order to further U.S. efforts to create and implement a more constructive foreign policy toward the region.
14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF Latin America, diversionary tactics, rhetoric, threat, invasion, rally around the flag, PAGES legitimacy, foreign politics, domestic security threat, Fujimori, Chavez, Maduro, 81 Montasinos, Shining Path, Venezuela, Peru, Organization of American States, domestic 16. PRICE CODE threat, populism, caudillismo, chavizmo, counterinsurgency, SIN, domestic support, intermestic, military coup, internal unrest, Vargas, diversionary force 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
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ii Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
DIVERSIONARY THREATS IN LATIN AMERICA: WHEN AND WHY DO GOVERNMENTS USE THE THREAT OF FOREIGN INVASION, INTERVENTION, OR TERRORIST ATTACK?
Mason Searcy Lieutenant, United States Navy BA, Old Dominion University, 2013
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (WESTERN HEMISPHERE)
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2019
Approved by: Cristiana Matei Advisor
Tristan J. Mabry Second Reader
Afshon P. Ostovar Associate Chair for Research Department of National Security Affairs
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iv ABSTRACT
This thesis explains when and how Latin American leaders use diversionary force and the rally around the flag phenomenon in order to help shore up domestic support. This better understanding will allow policy makers to better predict Latin American leaders’ actions and to construct more specifically tailored foreign policies toward the region. The use of diversionary force by Latin American leaders has a broad history, and this thesis focuses on two case studies: Alberto Fujimori and his use of diversionary tactics against domestic terrorism threats, especially Sendero Luminoso in Peru, and Nicolás Maduro’s inflation of the threat of a U.S. or Western-led invasion of Venezuela. The thesis concludes that both autocratic regimes used diversionary tactics frequently, and continued to employ them regardless of the viability of the threat and the independence of other political institutions. As the situation in Latin America deteriorates, there is a pressing need to comprehend the inflammatory rhetoric of autocrats like Maduro in order to further U.S. efforts to create and implement a more constructive foreign policy toward the region.
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vi TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION...... 1 A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...... 1 B. LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 3 1. The Realist Theory of War...... 4 2. The Constructivist Theory of War ...... 6 3. The Liberal Theory of War ...... 7 4. Conclusion of Literature Review ...... 11 C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES ...... 11 D. RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 13 E. THESIS OVERVIEW ...... 13
II. ALBERTO FUJIMORI: USE OF DIVERSIONARY TACTICS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM TO INCREASE DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR HIGH-RISK POLITICAL MANEUVERS ...... 15 A. FUJIMORI’S RISE TO POWER AND CONSOLIDATION AS A POPULIST LEADER ...... 16 B. FUJIMORI’S ROLE AS A POPULIST LEADER ...... 21 C. FUJIMORI’S FIGHT AGAINST SENDERO LUMINOSO ...... 23 D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ...... 28
III. VENEZUELAN CAUDILLISMO: USE OF DIVERSIONARY TACTICS AND DEPENDENCE ON POPULAR SUPPORT ...... 29 A. THE RISE OF CHAVISMO AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER ...... 30 B. FAILED COUP AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. RESPONSE ...... 36 C. DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES ...... 38 D. MADURO’S USE OF DIVERSIONARY TACTICS ...... 39 E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ...... 43
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION ...... 45 A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PERU AND VENEZUELA ...... 45 1. Analysis of Threat Credibility ...... 47 2. Analysis of Institutional Effects on the Use of Diversionary Tactics ...... 49 B. FINDINGS ...... 51 C. FURTHER RESEARCH ...... 53 vii LIST OF REFERENCES ...... 55
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...... 65
viii LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Comparative Analysis of the Autocratic Administrations of Alberto Fujimori and Nicolas Maduro ...... 47
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x LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
CCD Congreso Constituvente Democratic CT Counterterrorism MRTA Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement MVR Fifth Republic Movement OAS Organization of American States PDVSA Petroeos de Venezuela SIN Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional
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xii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many thanks to the multitude of professors in the National Security Affairs Department who helped me with this thesis, especially my advisor, Cris Matei, second reader, Tristan Mabry, and Christopher Darnton. I would also like to thank my friends and family who supported me throughout, as well as my leadership at U.S. Southern Command, especially Counter Threat Finance Branch Chief Erika Grumbach, for giving me plenty of guidance and support.
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xiv I. INTRODUCTION
Diversionary threats are part of the repertoire of foreign affairs. North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un called for a new round of ballistic missile tests to be conducted in 2017, despite no substantial improvement or innovation in either delivery or warheads. Every time North Korea conducts a missile test, the North Korean state media propagates the message that the missiles are to protect North Koreans against an American, South Korean, or Japanese invasion—despite the fact that such an invasion is entirely unlikely. Moreover, even though its moribund economy continuously struggles, North Korea “is spending about a third of its national income on its military.”1 This type of diversionary behavior is not unique to North Korea. Although Latin America is generally considered a pacific region, diversionary threats also exist there. The purpose of this thesis is to determine when and why governments choose to use the threat of foreign invasion, intervention, or domestic terrorism, with a particular emphasis on Latin American leaders. The use of diversionary force and the rally around the flag effect are covered in this thesis because of their direct connection to the inflation of threats, both foreign and domestic, to shore up legitimacy. Overall, in this thesis, I seek to understand when and how Latin American leaders use the threat of force, especially in the democratic era.
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION
A military invasion has historically been one of the most daunting and traumatic events a nation could experience and the very idea of it holds resonance. In the United States during the Cold War, portrayals of Communist troops parachuting into America played havoc on the American psyche, regardless of any actual attack ever taking place. It is important for state leaders to appear capable of defending their nations, or even being able to threaten others. This reasoning is useful when attempting to explain why North Korean leaders would aggressively test ballistic missiles, or why Venezuelan leaders would
1 Ju-min Park, “New Nuclear-capable Missile Test a Success, North Korea Says,” Reuters, February 13, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-nk-idUSKBN15R10O; “North Korea Spends about a Third of Income on Military: Group,” Reuters, January 18, 2011, http://ca.reuters.com/ article/topNews/idCATRE70H1BW20110118. 1 buy expensive fighter planes just to parade them down the streets of Caracas. The notion that a foreign state or domestic terrorist group could invade and harm its citizens has a powerful rallying effect on a population, and astute world leaders are well aware of this phenomenon.
A better understanding and exploration of why and when a government would use external threat (e.g., foreign invasion) or internal threats (e.g., domestic terrorism) would assist foreign policy makers when dealing with a seemingly belligerent foreign leader, and allow them to more comprehensively view their actions and security policies within the context of another nation’s domestic situation. The U.S. Navy has historically conducted and continues to conduct missions on a routine basis for political purposes. As the Department of the Navy’s mission increases in Central and South America, it arguably must understand the impact of its actions on the region’s democratically elected governments. Having a more sensitive gauge of Latin American leaders’ response to foreign actions, despite the actions intended task, may help the U.S. Department of Defense and State Department, as well as other Latin American nations, produce more effective foreign policy.
Latin America has a history of populist leaders who have been susceptible to issues of legitimacy. Among the rash of dictators and generals who controlled many Latin American countries, both before and after the Cold War, each had to deal extensively with internal unrest. The sheer frequency of governmental turnover, especially successful military coups, made many administration’s hold on power seem tenuous.2 This sensitivity to domestic legitimacy makes leaders who may have achieved their positions by nontraditional means, including legacies of coups d’état, especially vulnerable to using diversionary force tactics. The preponderance of democracies in Latin America ensure that maintaining the semblance of domestic legitimacy is paramount to retaining power regionally and domestically.3 Using the threat of foreign invasion, intervention or domestic
2 R. H. Dix, “Military Coups and Military Rule in Latin America,” Armed Forces & Society 20, no 3, (1994): 439, doi:10.1177/0095327x9402000307. 3 Arturo Valenzuela, “Latin American Presidencies Interrupted,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4, (2004): 10, https://muse.jhu.edu/. 2 violence would be especially appealing to these leaders who only have a tenuous grasp on power and claim to legitimacy. This project will attempt to view as clearly as possible how diversionary force and the rally around the flag phenomenon can affect a leader’s legitimacy and, in turn, allow policy makers to better predict Latin American leaders’ actions, as well as construct more specifically tailored foreign policies toward the region.
B. LITERATURE REVIEW
National leaders and foreign policy makers frequently deal with numerous diverse and powerful factors when formulating policy, factors which can help explain how and when international conflict can occur. Leaders often take into account the exhaustive list of environmental variables that provide decision-making context.4 Morgan and Bickers argue that what is of “critical importance…is the realization that foreign policy decisions are primarily political decisions that are made in an expressly political context. Decisions regarding international conflict are, as with any policy decisions, affected by the pushing and pulling of competing domestic interest.”5
Diversionary war theory is one attempt to explain a state’s security policy, especially adventurous military policies including war, as a means of diverting public attention away from either executive consolidation efforts or domestic issues.6 According to the diversionary theory of war, the initiation of some military conflicts can be attributed to national leaders attempting to divert public attention away from domestic issues by engaging in militarized foreign policies in an attempt to consolidate and shore up domestic support. The leadership may attempt to divert domestic discontent by creating a rally around the flag effect in order to bolster their political position.7
4 Clifton T. Morgan and Kenneth N. Bickers, “Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 1 (March 1992): 26. 5 Morgan and Bickers, “Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force,” 26. 6 Morgan and Bickers, 26. 7 Bruce Russet, Controlling the Sword (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). 3 This literature review is organized by categories based on different theories of approaches to war, including realist, constructivist, and liberal. A major difference regarding diversionary theory between the realists and the other two is that realist theorists treat each nation as a whole, sidelining fundamental differences in domestic institutions and constituencies. Constructivist and liberal theorists place far more credence on how the leaders are elected as well as how quickly and directly they are accountable to their citizens.
1. The Realist Theory of War
Realism has four main assumptions; the international system is anarchic, states are the primary actors, states within a given system are unitary and rational actors, and survival is the primary concern for all states.8 Realism downplays the importance of individuals and institutions and views the international system as comprising states which are constantly vying for power and influence in the world. Thomas Hobbes’ perception of humanity, that it is inherently egocentric and conflictual unless there are external conditions which create coexistence, is a basis for understanding realist theory.9 Realists argue the international system is a zero-sum game, where any single actor’s success is another actor’s loss. Morgenthau summarizes the ideals of realism when he states, “whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.”10
A realist interpretation supports the diversionary force theory, as it contends that someone in power acts to maintain their position; under this perspective a leader could see a rational benefit to using diversionary force or artificially inflating security threats to perpetuate a rally around the flag effect. For example, Mitchell and Prins conducted a study exploring the relationships between states, arguing that a history of rivalry would increase
8 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Luigi Ricci and E. R. P. Vincent (New York, NY: Modern Library, 1950); Edward Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1956); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Around Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1961). 9 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathon, ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1962), originally published in 1651. 10 Morgenthau, Politics Around Nations, 27. 4 a state’s likelihood of employing diversionary force.11 The idea of an enduring rivalrybetween two states assumes the states are naturally opposed in a zero-sum environment, and that the relationship between two states could help explain the realist theory for why a state would use diversionary threats. Their study concludes that while economic hardship, especially monetary inflation, increases the probability of militarized dispute initiated in settings of rivalry, it actually decreases the chances of a dispute in non- rivalry settings. They argue that enduring rivalry gives the leader more political opportunity to use military force.12 This idea is supported by Bennett and Nordstrom in their study on enduring rivalries in which they concluded that states in persistent, long-standing rivalries have two main options to address a worsening economy.13 The states can address this by “either (1) escalating conflict within the rivalry to gain the benefits of a diversionary conflict or (2) seeking to settle the rivalry to free up resources that can be directed toward dealing with economic problems.”14
Other studies attempt to measure the effects and performance of diversionary force.15 The studies agree that since war is costly and a state can bargain, the leader would attempt to peacefully appease a domestic situation by negotiating with elites and the electorate, rather than attempt to use diversionary force. Diversionary force is more useful when a leader is attempting to demonstrate competence rather than cause a short rally around the flag effect. Diversionary behavior typically involves short actions of war including economic sanctions or military force short of open armed conflict, and the shorter they are, the more effective they are. These studies demonstrate the limitations of diversionary force and how actions less than full war can still be considered diversionary
11 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Brandon C. Prins, “Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, (2004): 940. 12 Mitchell and Prins, “Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force,” 940. 13 D. Scott Bennett, and Timothy Nordstrom “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, (2000): 35. 14 Bennett, and Nordstrom “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries,” 35. 15 T. Clifton Morgan and Kenneth N. Bickers, “Domestic discontent and the external use of force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36, (1992): 32; Ahmer Tarar, “Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War,” International Studies Quarterly 50, (2006): 172. 5 actions, possibly even more effective than war. This definition of diversionary theory increases the scope of the theory allowing for shows of force, threats to use force, and the use of force short of war, to be meaningfully incorporated into the research.16
2. The Constructivist Theory of War
Constructivism focuses on better defining the character of the international structure and how that structure defines the identities of states. A core concept of constructivism is that ideas, values, and cultural identities shape the international system in more powerful and profound ways than realists acknowledge. As a result, constructivists perceive the international system itself as a complicated social construct, not comprised simply of consolidated, independent state actors. As Finnemore explains, “interests are not just ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered; they are constructed through social interaction.”17 Constructivist theory also gives credence to international institutions, in that they can change state identities and interests.18
The diversionary war theory’s theoretical origins lie in the sociological literature, which centered on the idea of the interactions between in-groups and out-groups.19 The in- group/out-group hypothesis, as stated by Simmel, contends that a group can become more cohesive by coming into conflict with an alternate external entity.20 Simmel argues that conflict unifies members and “subjects them to uniform impulse” that they are forced to embrace or repel.21 He argues that war could be a last chance for a state to maintain cohesion despite being “ridden with inner antagonisms.”22
16 Morgan and Bickers, “Domestic Discontent,” 32. 17 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, (Cornell University Press, 1996). 18Alexander Wendt, “Anarch is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organizations 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 394. 19 Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955); Louis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956). 20 Simmel, “Conflict and the Web,”93. 21 Simmel, 93. 22 Simmel, 93. 6 There is substantial literature devoted to the study of diversionary theory in the United States that applies in-group/out-group theory. Studies conducted by Mueller, Brody and Page, and McKuen found that the diversionary theory holds true in cases of U.S. politics, showing that elements of the in-group/out-group theory can be applied successfully at the national level.23 Their reports indicated increases in popular support for governments as a result of foreign policy activities. These works present evidence that the existence or the perception of the existence, of an external national threat promotes group unity. Mueller’s introduction of the “rally-round-the-flag” was, as he defined it, the rush of nationalism that occurs when the nation’s leader attempts to focus the public’s attention “beyond the water’s edge” as the primary basis of the rally phenomenon.24
3. The Liberal Theory of War
Liberalism places more emphasis on state preferences, as opposed to state capabilities, as the primary determinant of state behavior. In this school of thought, the state is no longer viewed as a unitary actor; instead state institutions, governmental structure, economics and culture are powerful factors when considering state decision making.25 The three core assumptions of liberalism, as posed by Moravcsik, includes the primacy of societal actors, that states represent a subset of domestic society, and the interdependent nature of the international system.26 The second point is particularly important to this research because it contends that policy is “constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals or groups (inside and outside the state apparatus) who constantly pressure the central decision makers to pursue policies
23 John Mueller, “Presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson,” American Political Science and Review 64 (1970): 20; John Mueller, “War, Presidents, and Public Opinion,” (New York: Wiley, 1993); Richard Brody and Benjamin Page, “The Impact of Events on the Presidential Popularity; The Johnson and Nixon Administration,” in Perspectives on the Presidency, ed. Aaron Wildavsky (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1975), 137; M. MacKuen, “Political drama, economic conditions, and the dynamic of presidential popularity,” America Journal of Political Science 27, (1983): 166. 24 Mueller, “Presidential Popularity,” 25. 25 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513. 26 Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 520. 7 consistent with their preferences.”27 This idea of representation, or the lack of representation, can help explain why and when a government makes foreign policy, because whichever subset of society is most represented in the government will likely make foreign policy choices that will increase its administration’s authority.
Liberalism is prevalent in literature about diversionary force theory as it helps explain the differences in the choices different states make. Many authors focus on how democracies and autocracies behave regarding domestic unrest or other challenges to their legitimacy.28 By allowing insight into the intrastate workings of a particular government, liberalism helps increase the literature’s understanding of when and why a government would use diversionary force or artificially inflate threats.
The institutional approach, as described by Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Silvers, and Smith posits that the primary desire of leaders is to remain in their respective political positions.29 The power and privileges that accompany a governmental administrative role appeal to the leader and they will not surrender their political leadership easily. They are constantly attempting to appease their domestic constituents in order to remain in their positions. The institutional approach argues that the leaders must appeal to two different levels of support to remain in power; the electorate who have an institutional say in choosing leaders, and the minimal grouping of people necessary to retain enough support to remain in office.30 Diversionary force is one way in which leaders can appeal to both levels of support because it uses the rally around the flag effect to unify both support groups
27 Moravcsik, 518. 28 Christopher Gelpi, “Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, (1997): 257; Jeffery Pickering and Emizet F. Kisangani, “Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention,” International Studies Quarterly 49, (2005): 25; Ross A. Miller, “Domestic structures and the diversionary use of force,” American Journal of Political Science 39, (1995):765; David Sobek, “Rallying Around the Podesta: Testing Diversionary Theory Across Time,” Journal of Peace Research 44, (2007): 30. 29 Bueno de Mesquita et al., “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,” American Political Science Review 93, (1999): 794. 30Jeffery Pickering and Emizet F. Kisangani, “Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention,” International Studies Quarterly 49, (2005): 27. 8 Despite over five decades of research into diversionary theory, empirical evidence supporting the causal relationship between domestic turmoil and adventurous foreign policy has been contradictory.31 Gelpi argues that the reason for this variance is because most empirical studies focus primarily on the enticements political leaders have to actually employ force and fail to consider the alternative solutions for quelling domestic unrest.32 He contends that by distinguishing between authoritarian and democratic leaders the results would change. His study supported his hypothesis by demonstrating that democratic leaders are more likely to use diversionary force to divert public attention away from the home front, while authoritarian rulers would more likely use direct force to settle unrest, causing them to be less vulnerable to use diversionary force.33 Meernik and Waterman, in studying diversionary force regarding U.S. presidents, find little evidence linking domestic political conditions and the use of force internationally.34 They also contend that the rallies that occurred as a result of the use of diversionary force were short-lived and ultimately ineffective in order to secure a leader’s long-term success in office.35 Note, however, that Fearon argues democracies present their intentions more clearly and credibly than nondemocracies, “ameliorating the security dilemma between democratic states,” therefore actually decreasing its preference to use force.36
Much work has been done on the relationship between regime type and a leader’s propensity to use diversionary force. Kisangani and Pickering argue that the definition of regime type has not been fully explored in the literature on the use of diversionary force. They differentiate between mature and consolidating democracies, stating that consolidating democracies are more likely to use diversionary force than mature
31 Brett Ashley Leeds and David R. Davis, “Domestic political vulnerability and international disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, (1997): 820; Jack Levy, “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace,” Annual Review of Political Science 1, (1998): 144. 32 Gelpi, “Democratic Diversions,” 275. 33 Gelpi, 275. 34 James Meernik and Peter Waterman, “The Myth of the Diversionary use of Force by American Presidents,” Political Research Quarterly 49, (1996): 575. 35 Meernik and Waterman, “The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force,” 575. 36 James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” The American Political Science Review, (1994): 577. 9 democracies. They also contend that there is a similar relationship between an established autocracy and a “new cohort,” that the established autocracies place a preference on repression as opposed to the new cohorts, who would be more likely to use diversionary force.37 Regardless of which regime type studied, Kisangani and Pickering content that when an administration is politically vulnerable, it increased the probability that a leader would employ diversionary tactics.38
Miller’s work on the importance of political structure regarding a leader’s preference to use diversionary force began a transition away from realist theory and began examining how a nation’s internal distribution of power can constrain foreign policy makers.39 He argues that domestic structures are important regardless of the type of government; distribution of power within a state can impose constraints that make government structure and domestic considerations relatively unimportant in making foreign policy choices. Miller concludes that domestic structures do have an effect on the propensity of foreign policy makers to use diversionary force to further their personal political ambitions.40 Sobek attempts to go beyond the conventional scope of the literature by examining seven different examples in Renaissance Italy (1250-1494) in order to analyze the effect of regime change on a government’s propensity to use diversionary force.41 The city-states examined switch periodically decidedly republican regimes to largely oligarchic regimes, thus providing an appropriate context to analyze the varying behaviors between democratic and oligarchic administrations. Sobek’s concluded that oligarchies were more likely than republics to initiate wars during times of domestic turmoil. Republics, conversely, showed a propensity to use force against city-states that were undergoing challenges to their republican systems.42
37 Kisangani and Pickering, “Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention,” 28. 38 Kisangani and Pickering, 28. 39 Miller, “Domestic Structures,” 756. 40 Miller, 756. 41 Sobek, “Rallying Around the Podesta,” 35. 42 Sobek, 35. 10 A major issue in the literature has been the difficulty in isolating domestic unrest as the major factor a leader would choose to engage in militaristic foreign policies.43 Tir contends that it is territorial disputes which are the major factor in allowing leaders to use diversionary force; the public tend to react to territorial issues intensely, and the “embattled leader could attempt to manipulate and exploit this proclivity by launching specifically a territorial conflict”.44 Tir’s research, however, concludes that that the initiation of military force over disputed territory is linked to economic underperformance.
4. Conclusion of Literature Review
Each of the three major schools of thought in international relations gives us different insight as to why and when a country will use the threat of foreign invasion. The realist school can provide insight by arguing a state’s desire for power and security is a paramount driving force and all other actions and policy choices reflect that desire. The constructivist school of thought allows for the study of the more diverse desires of a state and includes society and culture as important aspects when envisioning foreign policy decisions. Liberalism places an added emphasis on economics and state and international institutions, all of which could play a key role in influencing policy makers. These three schools of thought show that power, security, economics, social or cultural factors can help determine why and when a government would use the threat of foreign invasion, intervention or even domestic security threats.
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES
The three theories of war—realism, constructivism, and liberalism – provide competing explanations for when and why a government may use security threats to generate a rally around the flag effect.
The concept of legitimacy can serve as an explanatory variable for the pursuit of diversionary policies. I will utilize Weber’s model of legitimacy, which is the idea that
43 Jaroslav Tir, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict,” The Journal of Politics 72, (2009): 415. 44 Tir, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War,” 415. 11 legitimate domination is maintained through the motivations of obedience. He speaks to three different kinds of legitimacy: traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational.45 All three types of legitimacy are acceptable to create the consent of the governed; however, in democracies, rule of law and adherence to a constitution are the standards for measuring legitimacy. There must be an aspect regarding the consent of the governed in order for the leader to lead with any degree of legitimacy.46 The level of legitimacy a leader enjoys, especially in a democracy, can be determined by polls, frequency and degree of civil unrest, and elections, among other quantifiable factors.
The first hypothesis, coming from the realist school, is if legitimacy is waning for a particular leader, then they will likely use diversionary threats of war to shore up legitimacy. Since a leader in power wants to remain in power, diversionary threats are invariably an option. Regardless of the strength of a state’s democratic institutions, diversionary threats would be a viable way for a leader to shore up domestic support. The next hypothesis is constructivist, in that a state’s society and culture would be driving forces behind the decision to use diversionary force. If a state uses diversionary tactics to build in-group and out-group identities, then there should be evidence of government officials using identity-based politics focusing on such markers as class, ethnicity or faith. The final hypothesis is that democratic states are more likely to use diversionary force than autocratic states. An autocratic state has more traditional options, including overt repression, while a democratic state has to alleviate domestic unrest within the confines of rule of law and respect for civil liberties. A democratically elected government would be more likely to use diversionary tactics before it attempted any sort of overt repression. The liberal theory of war suggests that the workings of domestic politics, which are conditioned by both international and state institutions, explain diversionary tactics.
45 Martin E. Spencer, “Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority,” The British Journal of Sociology 21 (1970): 125. 46 Ryan Salzman and Adam Ramsey, “Judging the Judiciary: Understanding Public Confidence in Lain American Courts,” Latin American Politics and Society 55, (2013): 80. 12 D. RESEARCH DESIGN
The research design will analyze evidence for each of the three hypotheses by assessing evidence in two case studies: Peru’s pursuit of a Maoist insurgent group, Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path; and Venezuela during the transition from Hugo Chavez to Nicolas Maduro.47 Sources utilized will include peer-reviewed books, journal articles, public opinion polling data, and other academic research. Contemporary news articles will also be important because they may reflect public perception of leadership and focus.
The first case study, Peru, will focus on President Alberto Fujimori’s war against Shining Path in 1992 when the leader of the insurgency, Abimael Guzman, was captured. This case is distinct from the Venezuelan case in that the threat to the regime was domestic. Sources to determine public opinion before, during, and after the operation will be reflected in the contemporary local media, including newspapers, public opinion polls, and academic writing. Comparing the change in public opinion will indicate the level of success the diversionary force achieved, and low public opinion prior to the capture of Guzman could be considered a trigger for the employment of diversionary force.48
The second case study focuses on Venezuela’s foreign policy during the transition from Hugo Chavez to Nicolas Maduro, covering the years 2012 to 2016. Chavez constantly employed security threat rhetoric while Maduro, during his first year in office, put Venezuelan troops on emergency alert in anticipation of an American invasion. This research will compare changes in Maduro’s rhetoric and public opinion over the three-year time-frame using the same criteria and media sources as the Peruvian case study.
E. THESIS OVERVIEW
The first chapter of this thesis has primarily focused on providing definitions of key terms, introducing my argument, and expanding the review of existing literature. The second chapter will focus on the Peruvian case study of Fujimori’s regime; and the third
47 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, “Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences,” (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2007), 75. 48 John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), 217. 13 chapter the Venezuelan case study. Finally, in the conclusion, I will present the results of the thesis, evaluate the competing hypotheses, and consider implications for Latin American foreign policy.
14 II. ALBERTO FUJIMORI: USE OF DIVERSIONARY TACTICS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM TO INCREASE DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR HIGH-RISK POLITICAL MANEUVERS
For the nation of Peru, 1992 was a year filled with dramatic events with substantial consequences: Fujimori’s dissolution of the Peruvian congress, the election of a single- chamber congress, and an increase in violent attacks perpetuated by Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), resulting in the capture of the organization’s leader. Less than two years after winning a dramatic democratic election as a major underdog, President Alberto Fujimori’s autogolpe (the dissolving of Congress in 1992 by the executive), put him and his administration in the precarious position of being without constitutional legitimacy, in a nation where the constitution was the law of the land. Many of the events prior to the 1992 capture of Abimael Guzman (the leader and founder of Sendero Luminoso), two years into Fujimori’s election, challenged the constitutional form of government, as well as threatened the government’s monopoly on the legitimate use of power, thereby challenging its legitimacy.
There were many reasons why Alberto Fujimori used diversionary tactics in the suppression of Sendero Luminoso, a domestic security threat that challenged the legitimacy of the regime. The inability to completely control the public narrative, his role as a populist (with the inherent vulnerabilities of needing constant popular support), and the opportunity to conduct suppressive operations against Sendero Luminoso—as a near-universally reviled organization— presented Fujimori’s regime with credible reasons to employ diversionary tactics. This chapter seeks to explain the extent of President Fujimori’s use of diversionary force against a domestic security group in the form of operations suppressing Sendero Luminoso, leading to the capture of Sendero Luminoso’s leader, Abimael Guzman, in September of 1992. It will also explore his role as a populist leader and manipulation of the free press in order to maximize the impact of Guzman’s capture.
15 A. FUJIMORI’S RISE TO POWER AND CONSOLIDATION AS A POPULIST LEADER
Alberto Fujimori’s election in 1990 was extraordinary in Peru’s history for several reasons. Peru’s established political parties were unable to garner enough support to succeed in the election, after the failed presidency of Alan Garcia (1985–1990) had tarnished the American Popular Revolutionary (APRA) Party, the coalition of leftist parties that had a strong running in 1985 split in 1989.49 The two remaining conservative parties forming a coalition to endorse the candidacy of the novelist-turn-politician Mario Vargas Llosa, the only true challenge to Fujimori during the 1990 election.50 Fujimori led a populist campaign as an outsider, and challenged the established parties by providing a political alternative to the current system. Philip Mauceri, in his book “State of Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru,” introduces the Fujimori campaign by stating that “few observers expected Alberto Fujimori, an unknown ex-university rector, to eclipse the traditional political parties or the well-financed campaign of the internationally famed novelist Mario Vargas Llosa in the 1990 presidential elections.”51 However, Fujimori’s campaign successfully completed the unlikely upset.
Vargas’ proposal to address the fiscal environment and economic downturn that Peru was trudging through involved austerity measures and other liberal economic reforms aligned with the “Washington consensus.”52 The Washington consensus consisted of a series of reforms designed to end inflation and promote direct foreign investment, but came at an enormous cost, forcing the privatization of nationally owned industries, which would have likely resulted in Peru’s natural resources becoming owned by foreign investors.53 These policies did not resonate with a public that was well aware of the difficulty that
49 Susan C. Stokes, “Democratic Accountability and Policy Change: Economic Policy in Fujimori’s Peru,” Comparative Politics 29, no. 2 (January 1997): 220, http://www.jstor.org/stable/422080. 50 Stokes, “Democratic Accountability and Policy Change,” 220. 51Philip Mauceri, “State under Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru,” (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996). 52 “Peru: Impact of the ‘Fujishock’ Program,” Turkey - Government Population Policies, (Sept. 1992): www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-10324.html. 53 Peru: Impact of the ‘Fujishock’ Program. 16 austerity measures would bring. Vargas’ proposition included structural reforms that would in turn lay off government workers, making his campaign appear to be endorsing the stance that unemployment and hardship were acceptable costs to improving the Peruvian economy at large.54 Vargas’ campaign promised to end the economic downturn but at the expense of the lower and middle classes. His campaign appeared detached and uncaring, especially coming from the educated, elitist Vargas, when juxtaposed against Fujimori’s populist rhetoric.
In direct contrast to Vargas’ austerity plan, Fujimori campaigned by appealing to the lower and middle classes by advocating a plan to stabilize the economy, increase the size and centrality of the federal government, and implement measures to minimize job losses and recession. The plan to stabilize the economy was not based on the ‘shock therapy’ inspired by the Washington consensus and promoted by Vargas; instead, Fujimori’s plan was to get inflation under control through “negotiated price control and wage indexation, only then should gradual adjustments be made in the prices of public sector good and services and in the exchange rate […] stabilization without recession.”55 Fujimori openly opposed any sort of shock that would occur as the result of stringent fiscal adjustments, shocks that would inevitably hit the most destitute the hardest. The shocks proposed by the Washington consensus and Vargas would, according to Fujimori’s economic advisors, lead to further income concentration, a move likely to be politically suicidal for a new populist government. Austerity measures, Fujimori and his campaign argued, would further concentrate income and ultimately hurt the general welfare of the people.56 Aside from harming the administration’s popular image, the autogolpe also seriously jeopardized Peru’s readmission into the international financial community, making his domestic popular support even more important in order to boost the international community’s perception of the administration’s legitimacy.57 Fujimori’s lack
54 Stokes, “Democratic Accountability and Policy Change,” 212. 55 Stokes, 213. 56 Mauceri, State under Siege, 13. 57 Eduardo Ferrero Costa, “Peru’s Presidential Coup,” Journal of Democracy 4, no. 1 (1993): 30. doi:10.1353/jod.1993.0010, 35. 17 of affiliation with the established parties also helped him gain notoriety and popularity among Peruvians who viewed the established political parties with distrust.58 Peruvians hoped he was a leader that “could offer hope and new ideas to a nation wracked by social, economic, and political crisis.”59
Fujimori’s background made him a uniquely qualified candidate for a populist movement; he was the son of Japanese immigrants, an agronomist, a mathematics professor, and a former president of La Molina Agrarian University, which made him appeal to a wide range of demographics. The advent of “Fujipopulism,”60 as Kay refers to it, seemed “dependent on executive philanthropy bankrolled by a liberal state.”61 To paraphrase, the kind of illiberal democracy and populist government that Fujimori created would not have been possible without enormous executive investment in shoring up domestic legitimacy.
The autocratic, populist nature of Fujimori’s administration necessitated the maintenance of a positive portrayal by the media. Fujimori’s use of press manipulation was extensive and exceptional; the monopolization of domestic press and fusion of “criminality and authoritarianism”62 was virtually unparalleled in the Western Hemisphere during the modern era. He and his intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinoswere responsible for coercing, discrediting, and monopolizing the vast majority of the domestic press. The Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN) was Peru’s powerful intelligence service created in 1960, headed by Montasinos and charged with presenting the president as a legitimate and qualified leader. This partnership between the executive and SIN worked to undermine Fujimori’s political opponents and members of the opposition press corps.63
58 Costa, “Peru’s Presidential Coup,” 29. 59 Costa, 29. 60 Bruce H Kay, ““Fujipopulism” and the Liberal State in Peru, 1990–1995,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 38, no. 4 (December 01, 1996): 60, http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 10.2307/166259?ref=search-gateway:ae5882e419ee8d5e8fd29f1bd13ddb02. 61 Kay, “Fujipopulism,” 56. 62 Catherine M. Conaghan, Fujimori’s Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere, (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburg Press, 2006), 140. 63 Conaghan, “Fujimori’s Peru,” 140. 18 The executive moves that left Fujimori politically vulnerable deserve further elaboration, especially his attempt win a third term and the increasingly public evidence of the intelligence service’s extrajudicial activities. The 1993 constitution extended presidential term limits from one to two terms. The Congress that had changed the constitution to allow for a second term was the new Congress after the autogolpe, a Congress that was deeply sympathetic and indebted to the regime.64 Therefore, his attempt to win a third term was a political stretch beyond what was conventionally acceptable. The SIN’s extrajudicial activities included clandestine surveillance on the Peruvian press, as well as physical threats and assaults against political opponents and unsympathetic media.65 Arguably, the weakening of Fujimori’s political position limited his legal options to shore up domestic support, leading to use of diversionary force.
Montesinos, the head of SIN, held enormous power in the government, maintaining a high level of respect and fear so that even Fujimori was loathe to cross him: “everyone who had dealt with Montesinos over the years had reason to fear him whether he was in power or not.”66 Montesinos’s job was to ensure that Fujimori’s hold on power maintained the administration’s legitimacy despite the bad press that resulted from the deterioration of democratic transparency and the autogolpe. A good example of Fujimori and Montesino’s abuse of power was the action taken against Fujimori’s former spouse, Susana Higuchi de Fujimori, who became an outspoken critic of her husband. She was a notorious whistleblower of Fujimori’s charity scheme, which involved the president’s Japanese relatives “mismanaging and trafficking in donations of clothing from Japan.”67 She quickly rose from critic to potential political rival. However, the Congreso Constituyente Democratic (CCD) nullified the threat by legislating an electoral law prohibiting close relatives of the executive from being eligible to become president, vice president, or a
64 Calvin Sims, “15 Years Of Fujimori? Peru Faces Its Future,” The New York Times, December 08, 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/08/world/15-years-of-fujimori-peru-faces-its-future.html. 65 Conaghan, “Fujimori’s Peru,” 141. 66 Conaghan, 233. 67 Conaghan, 86. 19 congressional member, a law known colloquially as “Ley Susana.”68 She attributed the increased scrutiny of her travel, political dealings, and instances of abuse, including dispositions regarding Fujimori she considered torturous, to Montesino’s powerful SIN.69
In 1992, after the autogolpe, Fujimori dramatically increased his rhetoric concerning the negative impact of Sendero Luminoso and made their demise his priority, which started with the capture of Guzman in 1992. The seizure of Abimael Guzman, the leader of Sendero Luminoso, in September of 1992, allowed Fujimori to divert public attention away from the autogolpe. Costa writes, even though the “fight against Sendero is by no means over, there can be no denying that with this one swift blow the government took a giant step toward recouping its prestige and regaining popular confidence.”70 More importantly, the capture of Guzman boosted Fujimori’s approval rating from 61 percent in August to almost 75 percent in September, a significant increase.71 This boost allowed Fujimori to push through Congress a two hundred million dollar reinvestment to help stimulate economic growth, a clear grasp for electoral votes in the upcoming election in January 1993.72 Fujimori’s rising popularity in the polls, and his ability to push through the economic reinvestment package after the capture of Guzman demonstrates that his administration had increased its relative power within the Peruvian government.
Fujimori’s administration demonstrated its use of diversionary tactics in order to undermine international organizations and their attempts to democratize Peru. The Organization of American States (OAS) was the primary vehicle with which the United States, along with the other major western hemispheric nations, attempted to persuade and apply pressure to the Fujimori regime to decrease its authoritarian tendencies and hard- handed tactics against Sendero Luminoso (which will be covered later in this chapter). The
68 Sally Bowen and Richard Bauer, “The Fujimori File: Peru and Its President 1990–2000,” (Lima, Peru: Peru Monitor, 2000), 102–4. 69 “Peru’s Ex-President Fujimori Wanted Alan Garcia ‘Dead or Live’ in 1992,” Traveling and Living in Peru, October 28, 2006, https://www.livinginperu.com/news-2652-law-order-perus-ex-president- fujimori-wanted-alan-garcia-dead-or-live-in-1992/. 70 Costa, “Peru’s Presidential Coup,” 38. 71 Costa, 39. 72 Costa, 39. 20 OAS achieved only minimal success, and Fujimori and Montesinos were able to frame the OAS’s attempts to regulate the Peruvian democratic process as American manipulation. The CCD was the watchdog of the democratic process within Peru, and its powers were dramatically reduced under Fujimori’s administration, which was a major concern of the OAS.73
Fujimori, along with SIN director Montesinos and his intelligence apparatus, were able to hold power despite major domestic turmoil and a glaring lack of constitutional legitimacy for a decade because of their understanding of the use of diversionary tactics and a stringent hold on the press corps. The limited media technology in 1992 paper newspapers and government regulated television stations made this generally successful control of the press possible, limiting the necessity of more robust or elaborate uses of diversionary tactics.74
B. FUJIMORI’S ROLE AS A POPULIST LEADER
As a populist leader, Fujimori needed to maintain a positive public profile. Fujimori falls comfortably in Crabtree’s definition of populist leadership as a “charismatic leadership and the cult of personality; authoritarianism and disdain for representative institutions; a penchant for corporatism and social mobilization; the use of nationalism and a degree of xenophobia against perceived ‘enemies.’”75 Crabtree continues, populism as a “means of social control rather than mobilization, typically involving a complex web of clienteles relationships at all levels of society,” which is equally in line with Fujimori’s populist strategies.76 Fujimori’s role in suppressing free press and obsession with public image fits perfectly with Crabtree’s interpretation of populism.
73 Conaghan, “Fujimori’s Peru,” 49. 74 Susan Morgan, “Fake news, disinformation, manipulation and online tactics to undermine democracy,” Journal of Cyber Policy 3, no. 1 (July 2017): 40, DOI: 10.1080/23738871.2018.1462395. 75 John Crabtree, “Populisms Old and New: The Peruvian Case,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 19, no. 2 (2000): 164, doi:10.1111/j.1470-9856.2000.tb00097.x. 76 Crabtree, “Populisms Old and New: The Peruvian Case,” 164. 21 Despite controlling and owning the country’s most productive assets, the Peruvian state remained one of the weakest in the region during the 1980s and early 1990s.77 However, as long as Fujimori kept popular support he could rule without the consent of established Peruvian institutions: as explained by Crabtree, “the populist tradition is, in large part, a reflection of this weak institutional development (the failure of institutions to meet popular demands), emerging because of the need to engage tacit support of the population without conceding political power.”78 In this context, Fujimori’s populist rule was dependent on popular support more than institutional support, which gave him greater incentive to use diversionary tactics.
Throughout his initial campaign for president, Fujimori made impressive inroads with the rural population. Although by no means unique, his success and personal touch connecting with the generally excluded elements of society allowed him more freedom and power to ostracize the established Peruvian elites and formal institutions, players who traditionally were able to provide a check to the executive.79 He was even known to drive a tractor (referred to by the friendly press as the “Fuji-mobile”) at campaign events in a transparent attempt to appear in touch with the population outside of Lima.80 Fujimori’s flavor of populism depended upon his personality, as well as largesse provided by the state, the finances of which had been largely coopted by Fujimori’s party. Due to his popularity, Fujimori was able to push through economic austerity plans like Fujishock, which was Fujimori’s introduction of the Washington Consensus. Fujishock privatized state industries, liberalized the trading system, and other implemented other requirements of the International Monetary Fund into the Peruvian economy. Fujimori was able to survive his implementation of Fujishock, despite what was described as Lima’s transition to a city with “Bangladesh salaries with Tokyo prices.”81 Fujimori’s implementation of Fujishock, was far more politically acceptable than if Vargas Llosa had implemented the same thing, on
77 Kay, “Fujipopulism,” 59. 78 Crabree, “Populisms Old and New: The Peruvian Case,” 166. 79 Kay, “Fujipopulism,” 56. 80 Conaghan, “Fujimori’s Peru,” 17. 81 “Peru: Impact of the ‘Fujishock’ Program.” 22 which Vargas Llosa had campaigned unsuccessfully.82 While this phenomena could have been a symptom of the Sino-Nixon effect, the results of the autogolpe did not have the same result; it took the capture of Abimael Guzman to temporarily restore the government’s popularity.83
C. FUJIMORI’S FIGHT AGAINST SENDERO LUMINOSO
Fujimori’s fight against established institutions put him at odds with entrenched political parties and the independent media. Fujimori’s regime was overtly populist and depended on popular support to counter the animosity from and disdain of the country’s traditional leaders. This made his fight against the Sendero Luminoso, and especially the capture of Abimael Guzman in September of 1992, paramount to pacifying any potential or active actors working against the regime.
Sendero Luminoso had been a bloody thorn in the side of Peru since the 1980s, and provided an opportunity for Fujimori to win popular support using diversionary tactics. Sendero Luminoso was founded by former university professor Abimael Guzman, who started the organization based upon Marxist ideology. In 1980, Guzman launched his campaign to overthrow the Peruvian government and replace it with a socialist regime. Sendero Luminoso’s main goal, according to the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, was to “destroy existing Peruvian political institutions and replace them with a communist peasant revolutionary regime, while resisting any influence coming from other Latin American guerrilla groups like the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), as well as from foreign ideologies.”84 Sendero also made it a point to thwart government sponsored social programs, directly challenging Peruvian politician’s ability to reach directly to the disenfranchised rural populations. There are several different accounts of exactly how many people were killed by the Sendero Luminoso, but by the time Fujimori came to power
82 “Peru: Impact of the ‘Fujishock’ Program.” 83 Benjamin Lessing, “Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin America,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 266. 84 “The Rise and Fall of Shining Path,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 6 May 2008, www.coha.org/ the-rise-and-fall-of-shining-path/. 23 at least 60,000 Peruvians had lost their lives in the conflict.85 Holmes and De Pineres describe the lack of discretion in the violence employed by both the Peruvian counterinsurgency forces and Sendero Luminoso in regards to targeting the poor, while the remainder of the country certainly felt the acute side effects of the conflict’s violence and aggravation of the rural populations.86 The enormous amount of internally displaced people, lost economic opportunity, and degradation of the government’s monopoly on the use of force had taken its toll on the rural population and deteriorated the nation’s belief in their government’s ability to govern their own territory.
For Alberto Fujimori, operations against Sendero Luminoso represented a dependable option to ensure popular support; Sendero Luminoso was almost universally reviled, both among the rural population and the Lima elites. Graham and Kane’s project on relative influence of Fujimori’s spending on voting compared to changes in voting patterns illuminated the effectiveness of his counterinsurgency efforts in regards to popular support. Graham and Kane’s project recognized that the public judgment of an administration’s efforts was dependent mostly upon major economic trends and countering security threats.87 By the time Fujimori successfully executed his autogolpe in early 1995, he had less public support than he had previously enjoyed. Security was the most salient point for Peruvian voters, and as such was a priority for Fujimori’s domestic agenda. According to Costa,
Fujimori’s counterterrorist triumph boosted his already impressive popular approval rating…. The capture of Guzman not only strengthened the president’s hand vis-a-vis the parties, but also allowed his finance minister to declare a recovery of confidence in Peru that would help boost economic
85 Salomón Lerner Febres, “Truth Commission: Peru 01,” United States Institute of Peace, (August 2003), www.usip.org/publications/2001/07/truth-commission-peru-01. 86 Jennifer S. Holmes and Sheila Amin Gutierrez De Pineres, “Sources of Fujimori’s Popularity: Neo- Liberal Reform or Ending Terrorism,” Latest TOC RSS, (PNG Publications, Sept. 2010), www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/tpv/2002/00000014/00000004/art00006. 87Carol Graham and Cheikh Kane, “Opportunistic Government or Sustaining Reform? Electoral Trends and Public Expenditure Patterns in Peru, 1990–1995,” Gujarat - Poverty, Growth, and Inequality (English) | The World Bank, (The Worldbank, 1 July 2010), documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 580711468758346056/Opportunistic-government-or-sustaining-reform-Electoral-trends-and-public- expenditure-patterns-in-Peru-1990-1995. 24 growth and lead to the reinvestment of the $200 million that citizens had withdrawn from domestic banks since 5 April 1992.88
It is worth noting the particularly brutal counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts of Peruvian counterterrorism actors in their attempts to limit, repress, and eliminate the violent extremist organizations in Peru, particularly Sendero Luminoso. Sendero Luminoso was a domestic security threat and had qualities of both a terrorist organization and an insurgency, and could be defined as either or both depending on their strength, goals, and tactics.89 Guzman’s original intentions were to overthrow the Peruvian government and replace it with one sympathetic to his Marxist ideology, making Sendero Luminoso a clear candidate as a traditional insurgency, necessitating the need for traditional counterinsurgency techniques and strategies. However, as their insurgency progressed and it became apparent that such lofty goals as overthrowing the government were not imminently feasible, Sendero Luminoso displayed traits more affiliated with a terrorist organization, including targeted attacks and assassinations, prompting counterterrorism (CT) techniques and strategies to be employed against the organization. Despite the clear indications that Sendero Luminoso was a full insurgency in places, the Fujimori regime’s insistence that it be treated solely as a terrorist organization allowed government forces to employ measures appropriate to the threat.90 While Sendero Luminoso was correctly considered a “group of butchers who attacked government forces and agents and preyed on unarmed peasants, every person killed by Peru’s army and police forces was, ipso facto, a ‘terrorist.’”91 By defining enemies of the government as terrorists, Fujimori was able to employ diversionary rhetoric more freely, and evade more of the culpability regarding his administration’s security forces human rights violations.92
88 Costa, “Peru’s Presidential Coup,” 39. 89 Michael J. Boyle, “Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 86, no. 2 (2010): 335, http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 40664070. 90 Richard Clutterbuck, “Peru: Cocaine, Terrorism and Corruption,” International Relations 12, no. 5 (1995): 77, doi:10.1177/004711789501200506. 91 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clark, and Chad C. Serena, “Mexico Is Not Colombia,” RAND Corporation, May 05, 2014, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR548z2.html. 92 Clutterbuck, “Peru: Cocaine, Terrorism and Corruption,” 88. 25 The tactics and techniques employed by government forces in an attempt to destroy Sendero Luminoso resulted in gross human rights violations. According to Paul, Clark, and Serena, even though the conflict ended with a victory for the Peruvian government with the capture of Abimael Guzman, the “means of achieving victory were controversial at best. The strategy and tactics employed by the Peruvian government were fundamentally inhumane if not outright criminal.”93 Much of the violence perpetuated by both the terrorist organization and governmental forces was an attempt to compel local peasantry to support their respective sides of the conflict.94 It is clear that “Victims of the violence came from all sectors of Peruvian society and included school teachers, government officials, peasants, business owners, drug traffickers, and actual combatants.”95 During the peak of the conflict in the mid-1980s Peru led the world in disappearances, and in the first ten years of the conflict around twenty thousand Peruvians were killed, a half million were displaced from their homes, and nearly $10 billion in property and infrastructure was damaged.96
When the government began striking back in early 1981 its attempts were mostly “ad hoc and ill conceived.”97 While there are many examples of extrajudicial punishments and atrocities committed under the guise of counterterrorism, two major examples need highlighting: the Barrios Altos massacre and La Cantuta killings. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (La Comisión De La Verdad Y Reconciliación), which published its findings in 2003 on the government’s acts during the counterinsurgency operations, devoted separate reports for both the Barrio Altos massacre and La Cantuta
93 Paul, Clark and Serena, “Mexico Is Not Colombia,” 24. 94 Paul, Clark, and Serena, 34. 95 Guillermo Rochabrún et al., “Family, Culture, and ‘Revolution’: Everyday Life with Sendero Luminoso,” Shining and Other Paths, (Duke University Press, September 1998), https://www.dukeupress.edu/Shining-and-Other-Paths/. 96 William Yaworsky, “Target Analysis of Shining Path Insurgents in Peru: An Example of U.S. Army Psychological Operations,” Academia.edu - Share Research, July 29, 2009, http://www.academia.edu/7713671/ Target_Analysis_of_Shining_Path_Insurgents_in_Peru_An_Example_of_US_Army_Psychological_Operat ions. 97 Paul, Clark and Serena, “Mexico Is Not Colombia,” 38. 26 killings.98 Both of these atrocities occurred in the early 1990: the Barrio Altos massacre occurred on November 3, 1991; La Cantuta on 18 July, 1992, after the government unleashed its security forces in what Nelson Manrique described as the “indiscriminate use of terror against the peasantry.”99 Both atrocities were later used as evidence against Fujimori’s violation of human rights.
The Barrio Altos massacre by the Grupo Colina (a military intelligence squad directed by SIN and Vladimiro Montesinos) murdered “fifteen civilians, including children, at a neighborhood chicken diner in Lima.”100 The government denied any involvement and military officials refused to testify. The administration then used a sweeping measure to halt any judicial inquiries into the Barrio Altos massacre.101 The case was not investigated until four years after the massacre, and helped contribute to the case against Fujimori for his human rights violations.102
The case of La Cantuta, which occurred a year after the Barrio Altos massacre, was in response to Sendero Luminoso’s Tarata bombing in Lima which resulted in over 40 dead. The La Cantuta incident involved the abduction, torture, and murder of nine students and a professor at Lima’s La Cantuta University by Grupo Colina. Grupo Colina then buried the bodies before uncovering and reburying them in another location after the congress had raised questions. The cover-up of the massacre garnered additional negative press for Fujimori; the body of Mariella Barreto, one of the student’s murdered, was found in 1997 showing signs of ante-mortem torture. Barreto’s colleague, Leonor La Rosa, appeared on television weeks after Barreto’s body was found, declaring she had been tortured and Barreto murdered in retaliation for press leaks. She claimed the leaks involved
98 “Comisión De La Verdad Y Reconciliación,” Comisión De La Verdad Y Reconciliación, August 28, 2003, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/. 99 Nelson Manrique et al., “The War for the Central Sierra,” Shining and Other Paths, (Duke University Press, September 1998), https://www.dukeupress.edu/Shining-and-Other-Paths/. 100 Conaghan, “Fujimori’s Peru,” 105. 101 Conaghan, 105. 102 “Barrios Altos,” Center for Justice and International Law, https://cejil.org/en/barrios-altos. 27 Grupo Colina’s efforts to suppress both the free press and opposition politicians.103 These highly publicized accounts of governmental efforts to suppress domestic terrorism and the subsequent cover-ups proved detrimental to the Fujimori regime’s ability to retain power, and contributed to the eventual ouster of the administration.104
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
Fujimori’s heavy-handed counterterrorism strategy reflected his attempt to take advantage of the importance that the Peruvian public put on domestic security. As has been previously stated, Fujimori’s approval rating improved substantially after the capture of Guzman, especially in the aftermath of the autogolpe.105 Fujimori’s aggressive attempts to subdue Sendero Luminoso indicates he was using diversionary strategy in order to gain more political capital, providing him with the domestic legitimacy necessary to acquire power with the Peruvian government.
The populist aspect of Fujimori’s regime forced his administration to place a premium on popular support. He could not rely on previously established institutions, the free press, or the international community to support his claim to power, so his administration focused on manipulating, and at times coercing the free press to conduct aggressive counterterrorism operations against Sendero Luminoso. Fujimori used diversionary tactics in order to compensate for his reliance on popular support as illustrated by his efforts against Sendero Luminoso. The lack of institutional and press support catalyzed Fujimori and Montasino’s efforts to consolidate executive power and undermine both other governmental institutions and the free press.
103 Conaghan, “Fujimori’s Peru,” 66–72. 104 Steven Levitsky, “Fujimori and Post-Party Politics in Peru,” Journal of Democracy, (July 1999): https://muse.jhu.edu/article/16971. 105 Costa, “Peru’s Presidential Coup,” 39. 28 III. VENEZUELAN CAUDILLISMO: USE OF DIVERSIONARY TACTICS AND DEPENDENCE ON POPULAR SUPPORT
Nicolas Maduro’s use of diversionary tactics has been widely reported and generally accepted as one of his preferred tactics. Wyre Davies commented on Maduro’s diversionary rhetoric saying that “perhaps…that is the real reason behind all the talk of ‘imminent invasion’ and ‘foreign aggression’: to create the emergency conditions that would enable the armed forces to deal with internal dissent.”106 While invoking the specter of foreign threat is not a new tactic from either Maduro, or his predecessor Hugo Chavez, this chapter will focus on Maduro’s use of diversionary tactics since becoming president of Venezuelan in 2012 and compare changes in public opinion and the administration’s rhetoric, specifically as it relates to using the United States as the primary adversary.
Chavismo, the populist movement that supported Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, is also important to understand in order to grasp the salience and effectiveness of Nicolas Maduro’s use of diversionary tactics to shore up domestic support. Chavez relied on a “characteristic mode of linkage between voters and politicians, a relationship largely unmediated by any institutionalized party, and that it bases itself on a powerful, Manichean discourse of ‘the people versus the elite’ that naturally encourages an ‘anything goes’ attitude among Chavez’s supporters.”107 Hugo Chavez relied on this specific type of populism, commonly referred to in Latin America as caudillismo, for support for his coup as well as the continued popular legitimacy of his administration. Brian Loveman defines caudillismo as the “rule by any kind of pre-eminent leader who derived authority more by an ability, through force of character and patronage, to command the loyalty of a substantial band of armed followers, than from adherence to the rule of law or the constitution.”108 Caudillos, the populist leaders that defined caudillismo, used violence, the threat of
106 Wyre Davies, “Venezuela: Maduro Evokes Spectre of Foreign Threat,” BBC News. May 23, 2016, accessed November 06, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36357495. 107 Kirk Hawkins, “Populism in Venezuela: The Rise of Chavismo,” Third World Quarterly 24, no. 6 (2003): 1137, doi:10.1080/01436590310001630107. 108 Brian Loveman, For La Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1999). 29 violence, or other extrajudicial means, in many cases circumventing established institutions, to accomplish their own political ends. Chavez personified the populism of a caudillo, however it was his strong leftist, anti-globalism, and more specifically his tenacious anti-United States stance, that gave him a strong platform in the wake of the failure of several pro-Western, IMF-backed governments on the continent.109
Nicolas Maduro’s ascension to power, the Venezuelan institutions that allow him to remain in power, and the strategies and rhetorical techniques he used to maintain power, were all created and cultivated by Hugo Chavez. Therefore, this chapter will explore the history behind the rise of Chavismo and the institutions and political strategies that allowed Chavez and now Maduro to maintain control of the Venezuelan state.
A. THE RISE OF CHAVISMO AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER
Venezuela had a stable political history since the 1960s, maintaining a democratically elected government for over 40 years prior to the ascent of Chavez, which set it apart from other Latin American countries at the time. However, even with a democratically elected government, Venezuela has had pervasive problems, such as political corruption, which exacerbated the already dramatic divide between socioeconomic classes.110 Income inequality as measured by the Gini Coefficient was 48.8 in 1994, with the top 3 percent of land owners owning 76.5 percent of the land.111 When Carolos Andres Perez (1989–1994) took office in 1989, he adopted and implemented a “difficult austerity program … as part of the effort to reform Venezuela’s economic system [that] require sacrifices from all citizens.”112 This reform was viewed as necessary in order to combat the enormous income disparity that existed in the country.113 The government at the time was forced to accept assistance from the International Monetary Fund after
109 Hawkins, “Populism in Venezuela: The Rise of Chavismo,” 1138. 110 Yasmine Coupal, “Macroeconomic Populism in Venezuela” (Stanford: Stanford University, 2003). 111 Freddy Dominguez, “Chavez: La Revolution Pacifica y Democrática,” Editorial Panapo, (1999). 112 Coupal, “Macroeconomic Populism in Venezuela,” 20. 113 Dominguez, “Chavez: La Revolution Pacifica y Democratica.” 30 Perez realized that the economy was unlikely to recover without IMF assistance. Perez planned to remake the economy along the lines of the Washington Consensus, something Alberto Fujimori’s (1990-2000) predecessors attempted to do as well, and in mid-February he implemented the austerity program which included devaluing the currency dramatically, raising the prices of necessary commodities and services like gasoline and transportation, and eliminating highly popular subsidies for the majority of food items.114
The shock of the austerity program was immediate and dramatic, and it disproportionally affected the lower and middles classes. The austerity measures contracted the GDP by eight percent, causing the already declining purchasing power of the average Venezuelan to be reduced by half compared to 1980, and over 64 percent of the population was below the poverty line.115 The social repercussions of the austerity measures in Venezuela were severe, as illustrated by declining per capita income that had dropped by 34.8 percent by 1998 from its 1970 level.116 There were major economic benefits that came from the privatization of certain industries, especially domestic oil, and reduced governmental participation in the market, placing the Venezuelan economy on the path that would lead to enormous future growth. However, these benefits had negligible positive effects on the middle and lower classes largely due to the economic discrepancy between the highest social class and the rest of the nation, as well as noted corruption in the government.117
It is relevant to understand that the price of gas and oil, and its influence on the Venezuelan economy, increased exponentially during the past few decades; between 1970 and 1980 the price of oil increased by an astonishing 948 percent.118 During this time
114 John Martz, “United States Policy in Latin America: A Decade of Crisis and Challenge,” The SHAFR Guide Online, (1995): https://doi.org/10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim190100025. 115 Coupal, “Macroeconomic Populism in Venezuela,” 21. 116 Jeffery R. Webber, “Venezuela under Chavez: The Prospects and Limitations of Twenty-First Century Socialism, 1999–2009,” Socialist Studies/Etudes Socialistes, no. 1 (2010): https://doi.org/ 10.18740/s47w2r. 117 Coupal, “Macroeconomic Populism in Venezuela,” 21. 118 Webber, “Venezuela under Chavez.” 31 consumers saw their purchasing power decline, the gap between rich and poor widened, and the elites (business people, politicians, journalists, and public officials) continued to maintain their luxurious lifestyles. More and more, Venezuelans were asking themselves where the billions of petrodollars had gone. The perception of corruption in government became a dominant theme in the popular press.119
Urban poverty increased from 18 to 33 percent from 1980 to 1990, and the social and economic decline instigated many violent riots in major cities, including the capital, Caracas, where the protests became known as the Caracazo.120 This cumulated in a riot in February 1989 when citizens looted supermarkets and local shops until the military, under the orders of the Perez administration, restored order through force, resulting in hundreds of Venezuelan deaths.121 Government corruption, combined with increasing economic stratification and urban violence, created a society more susceptible to the rise of a populist leader like Hugo Chavez.
It was within this political climate that Hugo Chavez began establishing himself in politics. Chavez’s public life largely began with his first attempted coup, which ended in failure in 1992 but resulted in increased notoriety among the population. Chavez’s reasoning for attempting the coup was salient among the Venezuelan population; he claimed the coup “provides for the correction of violations of the Constitution specifically where…corruption is concerned.”122 He emerged from the failed coup attempt appearing as a patriot, fighting corruption, and subsequently made promises to fight corruption, and develop the lower and middle classes socioeconomic condition.123 He was able to give a public address after the failed coup, which resulted in 20 dead and dozens injured. That address is considered his entry into politics, even more than the coup itself.124 The failed
119 Coupal, “Macroeconomic Populism in Venezuela,” 21. 120 Anna Ayuso and Susanne Gratius, “Venezuela: History,” EUROPA WORLD PLUS, (Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group, 2016). 121 Ayuso and Gratius, “Venezuela: History,” 3. 122 Louis Wolf. Goodman, W Burggraaff, and R Millet, “More than Failed Coups: The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations,” essay, in Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), 60. 123 Ayuso and Gratius, “Venezuela: History,” 4. 124 Ayuso and Gratius, 4. 32 coup began the process of unleashing political and social forces, the same forces that had previously surfaced during the 1989 riots, which “dramatically and irreversibly changed the country’s political, institutional, and economic landscape.”125 The failed coup attempt also set a precedent for attaining power outside the constitutional legal guidelines.
Against this background, President Rafael Calera (1994–1999), the incoming president, pardoned Chavez in March 1994 during a general amnesty for all the military and civilians who had participated in the failed coup attempts.126 He was able to win the 1998 presidential election with 56.2 percent of the popular vote.127 Calera continued his strategy of using populist rhetoric to criticize his rivals, the wave of recent privatization, political corruption, and even the armed forces, which he was convinced did not support his regime.128 Calera’s populist strategy set a precedent for Chavez’s rise to power, and Chavez’s popularity is what allowed him to create the institutions that kept him in power so long, the same institutions that keep Nicolas Maduro in power despite his lacking many of Chavez’s caudillo qualities. Chavez, in keeping with his populist image, labeled his impoverished constituents the “Fifth Bolivarian Republic” in order to clearly separate his movement from the social and political decline of the former Fourth Republic, which was headed by his predecessor President Calera.129 Chavez’s rise to power is commensurate with the Left Turn movement, the political period in Latin America named after the socialist traits of its governments. Other states during this period also had leftist governments rise to power, in many instances after years of political exclusion from the established administrations, including the administrations of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003–2010) in Brazil in 2002 and then Dilma Roussef (2011–2016) in 2010; Nestor Carlos Kirchner (2003–2007) and Cristina Kirchner (2007-2015) in Argentina in 2003; Evo
125 Coupal, “Macroeconomic Populism in Venezuela,” 22. 126 Coupal, 22. 127 Dominguez, “Chavez: La Revolution Pacifica y Democrática.” 128 Coupal, “Macroeconomic Populism in Venezuela,” 22. 129 Ayuso and Gratius, “Venezuela: History,” 4. 33 Morales (2006–2019) in Bolivia in 2005; Rafael Correa (2007–2017) in Ecuador in 2006.130
Chavez, and his ensuing administration, broke away from previous Venezuelan governments in several important ways. His party, the Movimiento Quinta Republica (Fifth Republic Movement or MVR), was “more a movement than a consolidated political party”131 in that it was more unorganized and had appeal outside of the traditional political spectrum. His administration purposefully weakened democratic institutions, especially legislative and media independence, replacing them with Bolivarian institutions that supported his socialist agenda,132 and created a new constitution that served as a guide to establishing the Bolivarian socialism his administration strove to implement.133 Many of the Venezuelan institutions that were replaced by those loyal to the Fifth Republic were schools, universities, ministries, and social programs that had direct contact with the Venezuelan people and therefore gave Chavez and his movement a greater ability to promote the movement’s agenda.134 The MVR, from the very beginning of its existence, served as the vehicle for Chavez’s rise to power. The movement consisted of a large group of civilian and military activists, and they were able to channel the popular desire for rapid change into political action, with Hugo Chavez as the leading front-man.135
The democratic revolution that the MVR led, propagated by Chavez, directly contributed to the weakening of democratic institutions, mainly through a series of referendums through which he gained direct power over several branches of government. The first referendum, in 1999, was for a constituent assembly that would be used as a “vehicle for overhauling the nation’s neo-corporatist political system.”136 The referendum
130 Manuel Anselmi, “Post-Populism in Latin America: On Venezuela after Chavez,” Chinese Political Science Review 2, no. 3 (2017): https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-017-0066-y. 131 Ayuso and Gratius, “Venezuela: History,” 5. 132 Coupal, “Macroeconomic Populism in Venezuela,” 23. 133 Ayuso and Gratius, “Venezuela: History,” 5. 134 Ayuso and Gratius, 5. 135 Hawkins, “Populism in Venezuela,” 1142. 136 Steve Ellner, “The Radical Potential of Chavismo in Venezuela: The First Year and a Half in Power,” Latin American Perspectives 28, no. 5 (2001): 7, https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582x0102800502. 34 replaced the representative model with one of direct popular support, which led to a powerful leader largely independent of and unchecked by the nation’s remaining institutions.137 This referendum, and two others in 2000, became the ways in which Chavez was able to gain direct power over several government institutions, including the National Assembly.138 The referendums also set the dangerous precedent of legitimacy based solely on popular support, further deteriorating the independence and power of the institutional checks on Chavez by allowing his regime to proclaim that it represented the ‘true’ will of the people. The referendums succeeded in part because of the Chavez administration’s focus on the poor governance and corruption of the previous political system, thus perpetuating a cycle where deteriorated democratic institutions were unable to check Chavez’s power. Moreover, Chavez’s administration had more freedom to present more referendums limiting independent checks on the regime.139 The referendums also served to further the cult of personality, with the implication that Chavez personally had the mandate of the Venezuelan people, which further exacerbated the corrosion of democratic institutions.140
The first popular referendum approved a new constitution that began the transformation into Chavez’s autocratic, populist regime that Nicolas Maduro inherited. The constitution “emphasizes that Venezuelan democracy is participatory and protagonistic, not merely representative.”141 The constitution also explicitly banned the privatization of the state-owned oil company Petroeos de Venezuela (PDVSA), an entity that provided the administration with the ability to control many aspects of Venezuela’s economy. Control of PDVSA gave the regime access to state-generated oil revenue, which allowed it to consolidate its control over a society that was becoming more and more dependent on the government for employment and social security.142 Both the referendums
137 Hawkins, “Populism in Venezuela,” 1143. 138 Coupal, “Macroeconomic Populism in Venezuela,” 26. 139 Coupal, 27. 140 Hawkins, “Populism in Venezuela,” 1142. 141 Webber, “Venezuela under Chavez,” 23. 142 Webber, 23. 35 and the new constitution shaped Chavez and his MVR’s Fifth Republic into an entity that was much more dependent on the person of Hugo Chavez, and less accountable to other democratic institutions. These conditions persist into the administration of Nicolas Maduro.
B. FAILED COUP AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. RESPONSE
Despite the popularity Chavez enjoyed during his first few years in power, by 2001 he had begun to experience a marked decline in popularity. As the administration successfully passed referendums, created a new constitution, and cultivated Chavez’s cult of personality, the movement began to suffer defections as more moderate allies turned away from the MVR. At the beginning of 2002, Chavez’s approval rating had declined dramatically, falling to below 40%.143
This left his administration vulnerable for the first time since taking over control of the Venezuelan government, and his attempt to bolster his ratings during this time is telling; he used polarizing and fear-inducing rhetoric to shore up support for his administration. He gave long televised speeches that broadcasters were required to air; the speeches again targeted the media, members of the opposition, foreign countries, and private businesses, encouraging the population to organize and defend the revolution. Despite the newfound resistance to the Chavez administration, he continued to push forward with attempts at a number of reforms, including the curriculum of the education system (by making it more in line with the Bolivarian ideology), land redistribution, and stronger ties to countries fundamentally opposed to the United States, especially China, Libya, Iraq, and Cuba.144 This purposeful polarization, combined with increasingly negative polling numbers, contributed to the partial success of the 2002-attempted coup. The coup was unsuccessful due mainly to the actions of the interim civilian president Pedro Camrona (2002), who quickly began issuing edicts as well as initiating vindictive investigations against those in
143 Hawkins, “Populism in Venezuela,” 1143. 144 Hawkins, 1143. 36 the former government.145 The interim government quickly lost legitimacy and Chavez was soon back in power.146
The attempted coup in 2002, during which some in the Venezuelan military temporarily overthrew Hugo Chavez and replaced him with Pedro Carmona, deserves particular attention, especially in regard to the United States’ response to the coup. As Crandall writes, “While it was loathe to admit it, the Bush administration’s response (or lack thereof) to the coup became as newsworthy as the coup itself. The impact of the officials’ fateful decisions on the U.S.-Latin American relations continues to this day.”147 While the coup was ultimately unsuccessful, the ambiguous response of the United States had lasting implications and undermined the Bush administration’s official line of supporting democratic governments and democratic transitions of power. Chavez, and later Nicolas Maduro, would use this incident as an example of the intent of the United States to support a non-democratic transition of power in Venezuela.148 While Chavez’s relationship with the United States was never warm, the attempted coup marked the beginning of his administration’s perception of the United States publicly as a legitimate existential threat. Both Chavez and Maduro administration’s official rhetoric reflected this perception, and from this time forward focused on the United States, and other western powers, as much as it did on domestic threats. This view also had regional implications for the Chavez regime as the growing Left Turn movement in Latin America was already showing signs that it was largely anti-United States; the idea that the United States would support, however passively, a coup overthrowing a democratically elected Latin American administration made other governments more sympathetic to the Chavez regime.149
145 Hawkins, 1144. 146 Russell Crandall, The United States and Latin America after the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 120. 147 Crandall, “The United States and Latin America,” 120. 148 Crandall, 123. 149 Anselmi, “Post-populism in Latin America: On Venezuela after Chavez,” 414. 37 C. DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
After the attempted coup, Hugo Chavez’s foreign policy stance became firmly anti- United States, a position solidified during the Presidency of George W. Bush and the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. The most infamous expression of this increasing animosity was Chavez’s speech at the UN General Assembly when he publicly ridiculed President Bush.150 His remarks began with
the Devil is in the house … the devil came here yesterday and it smells of sulfur still today.… As the spokesman of imperialism, he came to share his nostrums to try to preserve the current pattern of domination, exploitation, and pillage of the peoples of the world. An Alfred Hitchcock movie could use it as a scenario. I would even propose a title: The Devil’s Recipe.151
The rhetoric did not change when Nicolas Maduro took over in 2013 when he said, just days after his election, that President Obama was the “grand chief of all devils.”152
Hugo Chavez, and Nicolas Maduro since he assumed presidential responsibilities in 2013, have openly favored a multipolar global political system, contrasting with the unipolar world order espoused by the United States.153 Chavez viewed Venezuela as a “small second power”154 in this new multipolar world. Venezuelan foreign policy under both Chavez and Maduro has acted against United States foreign policy initiatives in Latin America, partly in order to expedite the multipolar world order, but also because Caracas has viewed, and continues to view, the United States as a security threat. Many of Venezuela’s foreign policy initiatives exhibit many aspects of what Mark Williams refers to as “‘soft balancing’—a strain of balance of power politics whereby weaker states employ non-military tools to protect their interests, and to delay, frustrate, and undermine a
150 Simon Romero, “Venezuela Strengthens Its Relationships in the Middle East,” The New York Times, August 21, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/21/world/americas/21venez.html. 151 Silvia Calderon and Mirya R. Holman, “Sharing the Same Demons: The Venezuelan-Iranian Alliance and Their Anti-U.S. Ideology,” FAU Undergraduate Research Journal, (2014), http://journals.fcla.edu/faurj/article/view/82869/0. 152 “Venezuela’s Maduro Pans ‘Devil’ Obama.” Taipei Times, 6 May 2013, www.taipeitimes.com/ News/world/archives/2013/05/06/2003561602. 153 Jonathan Eastwood and Thomas Ponniah, “The Revolution in Venezuela: Social and Political Change under Chávez,” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 154 Eastwood and Ponniah, “The Revolution in Venezuela,” 260. 38 hegemonic state’s capacity to impose its preferences.”155 The Venezuelan tendency, under both Chavez and Maduro, to use soft balancing as a foreign policy technique, is complementary to the idea of internal balancing; in this case using diversionary tactics to balance against formal institutions.156 The low level of institutionalism and the popular aspects of the regime allowed Chavez and Maduro to balance internally to support their foreign policies.157
Venezuela’s view of the United States as its most dangerous security threat has been consistent for both Chavez and Maduro’s regimes, and constitutes an additional reason why the use of diversionary tactics have been successfully employed by both autocrats.158 Deteriorating relations between the two countries supports the Maduro regime’s ability to amplify and continue this rhetoric, as well as ensure a sympathetic ear from the Venezuelan population.159
D. MADURO’S USE OF DIVERSIONARY TACTICS
From the beginning of his administration, it was evident that despite Maduro’s lack of charisma, he was able to retain Chavez’s strong executive powers. Michael Penfold writes that even before Maduro was elected president, he seemed “less concerned [then Chavez] about gaining popular support and will likely rely on state patronage networks and social programs to shore up his position.”160 This reliance on patronage, backed
155 Mark Eric Williams, “The New Balancing Act: International Relations Theory and Venezuela’s Foreign Policy,” The Revolution in Venezuela: Social and Political Change Under Chávez (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University David Rockefeller Center for Latin American studies, 2011), 259. 156 Eastwood and Ponniah, “The Revolution in Venezuela,” 262. 157 Hawkins, “Populism in Venezuela,” 1150. 158 Michael Hernandez, “The Complicated U.S. Relationship with Venezuela,” Truman Center, 2014, http://trumancenter.org/doctrine-blog/the-complicated-u-s-relationship-with-venezuela/. 159 Ciara Nugent, “Venezuela and the History of U.S. Intervention in Latin America,” Time, January 25, 2019, https://time.com/5512005/venezuela-us-intervention-history-latin-america/. 160 Michael Pendfold, “Maduro Moves Up,” Foreign Affairs Magazine, March 11, 2013, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2013-03-12/maduro-moves. 39 extensively by corrupt government practices and access to illicit financing,161 arguably makes Maduro less susceptible to popular backlash than Chavez’s administration. Nonetheless, despite his administration being less vulnerable to domestic challenges, Maduro still utilizes diversionary rhetoric to hinder opposition groups.
Indeed, the Maduro regime has used inflammatory rhetoric in many instances, including against private Venezuelan businesses and other domestic entities depicted as enemies of the socialist regime. Maduro once stated, after the PSUV defeated the opposition in a 2013 mayoral contest, that his “economic offensive against private businesses would continue and that, ‘We’re going in with guns blazing, so watch out.’”162 His regime campaigned on economic reform in order to defeat the “shadowy economic conspiracy he incongruously blames for hyperinflation and economic collapse.”163 In 2018, he focused on Venezuela’s economic failings, and although it downplayed the extent of the economic decline, he laid the blame primarily upon this shadow economy, a vague reference to private domestic businesses with Western connections.164 During a visit by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to Caracas in May 2018, Maduro made multiple references to “oligarchs”165 and their responsibility for the country’s economic issues. He even accused local businesses of artificially inflating prices prior to the election in efforts to delegitimize his administration’s economic policies.166
Maduro invokes the United States’ past aggressions in Latin America as a looming national threat. During his inauguration speech in April 2013, which itself was full of
161 “Treasury Sanctions Nicolas Maduro’s Son for Serving in Venezuela’s Illegitimate Government,” U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, June 28, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/ news/press-releases/sm719. 162 Steve Hanke, “Venezuela’s Playbook: The Communist Manifesto,” Cato Institute, December 16, 2013, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/venezuelas-playbook-communist-manifesto. 163 Moisés Naim and Francisco Toro, “Why Nicolás Maduro Clings to Power,” The Atlantic, May 30, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/maduro-venezuela/561443/. 164 Naim, “Why Nicolas Maduro Clings to Power.” 165 Corina Pons and Girish Gupta, “Venezuela’s Maduro Says Will Win in ‘Economic War’ Post- Election,” Reuters, May 9, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-election/venezuelas- maduro-says-will-win-in-economic-war-post-election-idUSKBN1IA3KM. 166 Pons and Gupta, “Venezuela’s Maduro Says Will Win in ‘Economic War.” 40 references to the U.S. threat, a protester stormed the sage and grabbed the microphone from Maduro before security was able to subdue the intruder.167 Maduro then used the incident to justify heightened security since the Obama administration was attempting to incite a coup. He called the Obama administration “fascists! They disguise themselves, but they have very evil intentions against not just our people but against the people of the continent.”168 He claimed the media was being controlled by the United States, specifically the “oligarchies of the continent—and those who rule them from Washington—who want political control of Venezuela.”169 During that same speech, he spoke of the people of his country harassment by the permanent aggression of the U.S. controlled media. He responded directly to U.S. President Trump’s use of the term Monroe Doctrine during President Trump’s address to the UN General Assembly the day before, saying the doctrine was an “imperialist expression of ownership of the Americas…which the United States wanted to continue giving orders to the world in the twenty-first century as it did in the preceding one.”170 Maduro’s rhetoric clearly reflected that of Chavez, using the United States and its foreign policy as a major threat to Venezuela as well as displaying open contempt for U.S. private industries.
Maduro’s use of the United States as the primary culprit of Venezuela’s issues continued into 2019 as Kenneth Rapoza writes in February of 2019 depicting Maduro’s circuit with the international press; “Maduro has been doing the rounds with international media. Today it was the Associated Press story (which covered an interview by Maduro in which he blamed Venezuela’s economic difficulties on U.S. President Trump). Earlier the week, it was the BBC, where he said that humanitarian aid was a ploy by the U.S. to make
167 “Swearing-In Ceremony for Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro,” C-SPAN, April 19, 2013, https://www.c-span.org/video/?312264-1%2Fswearing-ceremony-venezuelan-president-nicolas-maduro. 168 Juan Forero, “Nicolas Maduro Is Sworn in as Venezuelan President after Disputed Election,” The Washington Post, April 19, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/venezuela-to- swear-in-nicolas-maduro-as-president/2013/04/19/ab0cfed6-a917-11e2-8302-3c7e0ea97057_story.html. 169 “Maduro ‘Brings the Truth’ about Venezuela to UN Assembly; Says He Is Ready to Meet U.S. President Trump UN News,” United Nations News, United Nations, September 28, 2018, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1021002. 170 “Maduro ‘Brings the Truth’ about Venezuela to UN Assembly.” 41 his government look bad.”171 In an interview with ABC News Anchor and Chief National Affairs Correspondent Tom Llamas in February 2019, Maduro constantly compared Venezuela’s deteriorating situation with that of the United States. When asked if he would allow Juan Guaido, the U.S.-recognized interim president of Venezuela, to return to Venezuela after his meeting in Bogota, he stated that the United States was “trying to fabricate a crisis to justify political escalation and a military intervention in Venezuela to bring a war to South America. U.S. using diplomacy have been anticipating all these attacks. This meeting in Bogota is a part of that policy to attempt to establish a parallel government in Venezuela outside of the constitution.”172 When asked directly about the possibility of a U.S. invasion of Venezuela, Maduro, after referencing to the U.S government as “the extremist government of the Ku Klux Klan that directs Donald Trump,” stated that the U.S. is interested in attacking Venezuela not due to humanitarian concerns, but because of its vast oil reserves.173
Maduro launched his most dramatic attack against the United States in March 2019 when he blamed the United States for conducting an attack on Venezuela’s electricity system. During a televised nationwide address, Maduro stated that the White House ordered this attack, which was a “demonic plot to force him from power by crippling the country’s electricity system with an imperialist electromagnetic attack.”174 He explicitly stated the U.S. ordered the attack, and then describes the United States’ strategy of war as criminal, citing examples from Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan and Syria.175 This direct accusation was in response to domestic issues, and can be viewed as an explicit example
171 Kenneth Rapoza, “Maduro Blames Trump For Venezuela’s Great Depression,” Forbes Magazine, February 15, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/02/15/maduro-blames-trump-for- venezuelas-great-depression/#4b1ca6eb2418. 172 Tom Llamas and Joshua Hoyos, “Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s Defiant Interview with Tom Llamas: TRANSCRIPT,” ABC News, February 27, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/International/ venezuelan-president-nicolas-maduros-defiant-interview-tom-llamas/story?id=61318540. 173 Llamas and Hoyos, “Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s Defiant Interview with Tom Llamas: TRANSCRIPT.” 174 Tom Phillips, “US Pulls All Staff from Venezuela as Maduro Blames Blackout on ‘Demonic’ Trump Plot,” The Guardian, March 12, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/12/nicolas- maduro-blames-demonic-trump-plot-for-blackout-crippling-venezuela. 175 Phillips, “US Pulls All Staff from Venezuela.” 42 of the Maduro regime assigning culpability to an external entity in order to divert popular dissatisfaction away from the regime.
Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro used rhetoric as a diversionary tactic to retain popular support. I argue that the above examples of incendiary rhetoric were attempts to shore up popular support for the Chavez and Maduro regimes and divert culpability for declining economic and social situations from their own administrations to that of the United States and its Western allies. While the institutional and financial backing of Maduro’s regime make it less susceptible to popular dissent, it continues to use diversionary rhetoric to steer public opinion in favor of the administration.
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
Despite an entrenched democracy and powerful institutions, Hugo Chavez was able to ride a wave of populism into power, followed by his protégé Nicolas Maduro who took the reins of power in 2013 after Chavez’s death. This wave of populism, Chavismo, deteriorated Venezuela’s independent democratic institutions, putting power into Chavez’s hands in the executive branch. The populist aspect of Chavez’s rise to power and subsequent power consolidation required popular support to combat the existing independent democratic institutions, and both Chavez and Maduro employed diversionary tactics to shore up domestic support. While Maduro may not be as vulnerable as Chavez was to the whims of popular opinion due to his control over entrenched corrupt bureaucratic and administrative institutions, he has still employed diversionary rhetoric to attribute culpability for domestic issues to external actors, especially the United States.
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44 IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
This thesis sought to understand when and how Latin American leaders use diversionary tactics and the threat of force in the democratic era. Toward this end, it reviewed two case studies, Alberto Fujimori’s regime in Peru from 1990 to 2000 and the administration of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, from 2012 to the present. This chapter provides the results of this research. It first provides a comparative analysis of the two case studies, comparing both the credibility of the threats to each regime and the independence of the other political institutions in their respective governments, followed by the findings of the research, and a discussion about future research opportunities on the topic of diversionary tactics in a democratic milieu.
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PERU AND VENEZUELA
The Peruvian and Venezuelan cases indicate the use of diversionary tactics and strategies in order to shore up domestic support. Both the Alberto Fujimori and Nicolas Maduro regimes employed diversionary tactics when their respective holds on power were tenuous. These cases demonstrate that a nation’s history, its social institutions, and its governmental institutions can influence an administration’s use of diversionary tactics. Using the threat of foreign invasion, intervention or domestic violence appealed to Fujimori and Maduro as an alternative to public attention on domestic issues or executive consolidation.
Table 1 depicts a comparison between the Peruvian and Venezuelan case studies, using Threat Credibility and the Independence of Political Institutions during the early and late periods of the administrations as the two variables. These values—low, medium, high—effected when and how Fujimori and Maduro used diversionary tactics in order to shore up domestic support or evade public attention on executive power consolidation.
Each case study had different threats with differing credibility; Sendero Luminoso was a markedly more credible threat to Fujimori’s regime than a Western invasion led by the United States has been to the Maduro regime. The threat posed by Sendero Luminoso
45 during the early period of Fujimori’s administration is considered High and was the most salient issue among voters. The capture of Guzman and the resulting dissolution of Sendero Luminoso drastically reduced the threat to the regime; therefore, the Threat Credibility during the later period is Low/Medium. While the Maduro regime uses the threat of a U.S. invasion as its most potent threat, the lack of U.S. aggression as well as the almost three decades that have elapsed since the last major U.S. intervention in the region, the Venezuelan case study’s Threat Credibility is described as Low in both the Early and Later periods.
The second variable is the Independence of Political Institutions in each of the case studies during both their respective early and later periods. Fujimori came to power as a constitutionally elected president and quickly found himself beset by opposition forces in other governmental institutions. However, through the autogolpe, pressure on the Peruvian independent media, and the success against Sendero Luminoso, he was able to limit the independence of Peru’s political institutions to a Medium. The later period saw a resurgence of Peruvian political institutions that were eventually able to pressure him out of government into exile in Japan, showing a High level of independence. Venezuelan political institutions have a Low level of independence in both the early and later periods of the Maduro regime. Maduro inherited an administration that was dependent on the executive for both political purposes and financing, and that situation did not change enough to raise the description above Low.
46 Table 1. Comparative Analysis of the Autocratic Administrations of Alberto Fujimori and Nicolas Maduro
Administration Early Period* Later Period** Attributes
Case Peru Venezuela Peru Venezuela
Threat Credibility High Low Low/Medium Low
Independence of Medium Low Medium/High Low Political Institutions
* Peru (1990–1995), Venezuela (2013–2015) ** Peru (1996–2000), Venezuela (2016–2019)
1. Analysis of Threat Credibility
The administrations of Fujimori and Maduro used the threat of violence as a diversionary tactic to divert public attention from domestic issues. The Fujimori regime’s diversionary threat, Sendero Luminoso, scores a High during the early period, while it receives a Low/Medium score during the later period. The Maduro regime’s diversionary threat, a U.S. invasion, has a Low Threat Credibility score during both the early and later periods. The Fujimori regime used the credible threat posed by the insurgent group Sendero Luminoso to divert attention, while Maduro used the threat of foreign intervention, particularly from the United States. Both threats had degrees of credibility that enabled to employment of diversionary tactics.
a. Early Period
In the Early Periods of the Fujimori and Maduro regimes, the credibility of the threat facing the Fujimori regime was High and that facing the Maduro regime was Low. With an estimated sixty-nine thousand deaths caused by the guerrilla war with Sendero Luminoso, the organization presented a credible threat to the Peruvian government and
47 society.176 Fujimori used the need for increased security to protect against Sendero Luminoso as a major part of his election campaign. His administration’s efforts against the organization, especially the 1992 capture of Guzman, increased his popularity enough to will a re-election in 1995 despite the negativity that followed the autogolpe. The definite credibility of both Sendero Luminoso’s capabilities as well as Fujimori’s concrete efforts against it successfully enabled his regime to divert public attention from his unconstitutional executive consolidation and suppression of the Peruvian media.
While the threat from the United States has become more credible since the imposition of economic sanctions in 2017,177 the lack of U.S. aggression against Venezuela has reduced its credibility as a threat to the Venezuelan government. Despite this lack of credibility, Maduro has had success using diversionary rhetoric using the United States as the primary aggressor. Strong control over both political institutions and state-controlled media give Maduro advantages not available to Fujimori, which allowed him to use diversionary tactics successfully despite the lack of a credible threat. Maduro rhetorically connected the U.S. foreign policy to Venezuelan elites in opposition to the regime, thus extending the foreign threat to his domestic enemies.
b. Later Period
The Later Periods of the Fujimori and Maduro regimes differ in that the credibility of the threat against the Fujimori regime deceased from High to Low/Medium, while that facing the Maduro regime remained the same at Low. The successful counterterrorism operations against Sendero Luminoso, particularly the capture of Guzman, reduced the threat that the organization posed to the Peruvian population as well as Fujimori’s administration. The Maduro regime, despite the introduction of U.S. sanctions in 2019, is
176 Ellis, R. Evan, “Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean: From Evolving Threats and Responses to Integrated, Adaptive Solutions,” (Lanham, MY: Lexington Books, 2018). 177 “Issuance of Venezuela-related Executive Order and Associated General Licenses,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 22, 2019, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC- Enforcement/Pages/20170825.aspx. 48 at a low risk of a U.S. or Western invasion, therefore the credibility of the threat remains Low.
Despite the difference in the credibility of Sendero Luminoso and a U.S. invasion, both Fujimori and Maduro were able to employ diversionary tactics successfully to shore up domestic support, and keep public attention away from domestic issues or their own attempts to consolidate executive power. Therefore, the credibility of the threat was not paramount to the success of diversionary tactics; both Fujimori and Maduro used them successfully despite the difference in credibility.
2. Analysis of Institutional Effects on the Use of Diversionary Tactics
Political institutions in Peru and Venezuela played important roles in the administrations of Fujimori and Maduro and their use of diversionary tactics. The independence of the political institutions in both countries differed; Peruvian institutions actually gained more independence from the early period into the later period, going from Medium to Medium/High, while those in Venezuela remained Low throughout both periods.
a. Early Period
During the early period of the two regimes, the political independence of Peruvian institutions was Medium, while that of Venezuela was Low. Fujimori’s rise to power was within the confines of the Peruvian constitution; he was initially lawfully elected in a free election, it was not until his later re-election in 1995 that his election was contested as illegitimate. Maduro, as Hugo Chavez’s chosen successor, had issues regarding legitimacy before he was even sworn in as president. However, Venezuelan political institutions have demonstrated less independence than Peruvian political institutions during the Fujimori administration.
Fujimori was constantly at odds with the Peruvian government’s other political institutions. His use of diversionary tactics succeed in allowing his regime to conduct the autogolpe without a major drop in public support, especially after the capture of Sendero Luminoso leader Abimael Guzman. The degree of independence displayed by the
49 legislative branch and the domestic media were major reasons Fujimori employed diversionary tactics. His efforts, with the help of the SIN, to curtail press independence helped perpetuate his diversionary rhetoric, but the press’s independence remained largely at odds with Fujimori’s efforts to consolidate executive power. It was during this early period of Fujimori’s regime that the political institutions were unable to maintain enough independence to successfully combat Fujimori; however, they were able to maintain pressure on the regime.
Maduro inherited a consolidated executive branch as well as a government financially and politically dependent on the regime, eliminating the need for him to conduct an autogolpe or other drastic consolidation efforts that plagued Fujimori. Despite the issues regarding his election in 2013, Maduro’s rule was not seriously contested until Juan Guaido’s ascension in 2019. The lack of independent political institutions in Venezuela has limited the need for the regime to employ diversionary tactics; Maduro, and Chavez before him, certainly used diversionary rhetoric constantly, but the lack of independent institutions make that use less necessary to ensure the regime’s survival.
b. Later Period
The later period of the Fujimori and Maduro regimes differ in that the Peruvian political institutions increased their independence to Medium/High, while those in Venezuela remained Low. Peruvian political institutions were able to eventually play a major role in Fujimori’s abjuration from the presidency, demonstrating the increased independence of those institutions. Venezuelan institutions have remained largely dependent on the Maduro administration. With the increased pressure from both Guaido and the international community to step down, Maduro has used diversionary tactics to pacify antagonistic elements within Venezuela, resulting in stagnated political institutions.
The different levels of institutional independence between democratic institutions in Peru and Venezuelan case studies had limited effect on the propensity of the two autocrats to use diversionary tactics. Both regimes had legitimacy issues, and used diversionary tactics to shore up domestic support for their administrations. Fujimori’s aggressive consolidation efforts and media repression empowered Peru’s political
50 institutions against him, while Maduro was able to avoid such aggressive consolidation efforts initially because of his regime-sponsored government with limited institutional independence.
B. FINDINGS
A comparative study of the Peruvian and Venezuelan cases shows that a regime will use diversionary tactics and the threat of force in order to shore up domestic support, or divert public attention from events that portray the regime in a negative light, regardless of both the credibility of the perceived threat or the independence of other political institutions. Both the autocratic regimes of Alberto Fujimori and Nicolas Maduro used the threat of force, via diversionary tactics, such as diversionary rhetoric and extending culpability to non-regime elements, continuously during the periods discussed in the case studies.
The difference in the credibility of the threat to the Peruvian government and the threats to the Venezuelan government demonstrates that the autocratic rulers employ diversionary force regardless of credible threats. Fujimori’s efforts against the real threat of Sendero Luminoso were tangible, and Sendero Luminoso was actively initiating violence against both the Peruvian government and the Peruvian people, while Venezuela has not had to contend with an impending U.S. invasion to which Maduro constantly alludes. While the increased economic pressure by the United States in 2019 has increased the credibility of the threat, Maduro’s use of diversionary tactics remained frequent. The credibility of the threat had little effect on both the Fujimori and Maduro regimes’ use of diversionary tactics.
The difference in the independence of political institutions between the Peruvian and Venezuelan case studies had a minimal effect on either of the regime’s use of diversionary tactics. Fujimori used aggressive efforts to limit the independence of both Peruvian political institutions as well as the media, which negatively affected his popularity. However, his use of diversionary tactics remained consistent throughout his time in power, regardless of the independence of other Peruvian institutions. Maduro began his term as president with a consolidated executive branch as well as limited freedom of 51 the press; however, he has regularly employed diversionary tactics, such as diversionary rhetoric alluding to an impending U.S. invasion, to divert public attention away from domestic turmoil. The Peruvian and Venezuelan case studies both showed a steady use of diversionary tactics, which were minimally impacted by the independence of competing political institutions.
The Peruvian and Venezuelan case studies show that autocratic regimes will employ diversionary tactics and the threat of force in an effort to shore domestic support or reorient public attention whenever they have the opportunity. Both Fujimori and Maduro were consistent in their use of diversionary tactics throughout the case study regardless of the factors discussed.
As of this writing, there are major protests in several Latin American countries including Peru, which went through another autogolpe in October 2019.178 While the outcome of this autogolpe was markedly different from Fujimori’s in 1992—the Peruvian Congress quickly suspended President Martin Vizcarra—some of the rhetoric used by his supporters is similar to that employed by Fujimori. A member of Vizcarra’s New Peru party presents a telling example; “what has happened is that we have avoided a coup, a coup against the constitutional court and the president. With this dissolution, President Vizcarra has returned the power to the people.”179 The propensity to use diversionary force remains relevant in the Peruvian government.
Nicolas Maduro’s regime continues to retain power in Venezuela despite the rise of Juan Guaido, Maduro’s increasing isolation in the international community, and aggressive sanctions by both the United States and the European Union. These developments have not had an effect Maduro’s use of diversionary tactics, despite the increasing credibility of the threat of foreign invasion. Maduro’s use of diversionary force continues unabated.
178 Simeon Tegel, “Peru’s President Dissolved Congress. Then Congress Suspended the President,” The Washington Post, October 1, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/perus- president-dissolved-congress-then-congress-suspended-the-president/2019/10/01/7b404cd6-e451-11e9- b0a6-3d03721b85ef_story.html. 179 Tegel, “Peru’s President Dissolved Congress.” 52 This thesis shows that Latin American leaders tend to use diversionary force whenever the opportunity arises. The frequency of its use does not change do to the credibility of the threat nor the independence of other political institutions. The threat of foreign invasion, intervention or domestic terrorism has a powerful rally around the flag effect that leaders use to increase domestic support for their regimes as well as divert public attention away from issues detrimental to their ruling administrations.
C. FURTHER RESEARCH
This thesis is centered on when and how Latin American leaders used diversionary force. Further research is needed to determine the effects of diversionary force and what variables contribute to its effectiveness. Efforts to pressure the Maduro regime by the United States and the European Union would benefit from knowing if the increased credibility of the threat increases the effectiveness of Maduro’s diversionary rhetoric, as aggressive economic pressurization efforts have had an effect on Venezuela’s economy.
Additional research into the effects of an independent media on the effectiveness of diversionary force would also explain how important that institution is to maintaining a democratic government.
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