Chapter 4 Nato Post-Cold War: Search for a New Identity
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CHAPTER 4 NATO POST-COLD WAR: SEARCH FOR A NEW IDENTITY I. INTRODUCTION This chapter seeks to highlight the relevance of NATO after the end of the Cold War. It is divided into three parts: (I). Disappearance of the U.S.S.R, (II). New Challenges and (III). Evolution of a New Framework. PART I: DISAPPEARANCE OF THE U.S.S.R Throughout history, military alliances have formed to balance either countervailing power or the perceived threat thereof. They have collapsed when the need for a balance disappeared as a result of either power crumbling or threat perceptions changing. While the origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation can be found in its members’ perceived need to balance rising Soviet power in the aftermath of the Second World War, the collapse of Soviet imperial rule in the late 1980s did not lead to NATO’s demise. For that reason, NATO is often referred to as the most successful military alliance in history. Not only did it prove to be the key instrument in defending its members against Soviet attack or subversion and in helping to speed Soviet disintegration, the Atlantic Alliance survived and at times, thrived in the decade since the disappearance of the Soviet threat robbed NATO of its main raison d’etre. If success is measured by longevity, then NATO has rightly earned its historic designation. For a full half century-with forty of the fifty years just ended dominated by the Cold War. NATO has served as a foundation stone of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, many deeming it in fact the ‘cornerstone’. Now in an international security landscape greatly different from the past, sweeping changes have posed a need for careful re-thinking of what NATO will be and do in the years that lie ahead. When the Cold War ended, at the end of 1989, it was expected that an ideal world, based on understanding, cooperation, disarmament and peace world emerge. As one of the bloc leaders (Soviet Union) disintegrated and possibility of unipolar world emerged, it was expected that under the leadership of the United States, a new world order free from conflicts, disputes and wars would emerge. The United Nations was being perceived as focal point of rallying of all peace-loving forces. The US President George Bush had said, with the touch of Wilsonian idealism, that ‘We have a vision of new partnership of nations that transcends of Cold War – a partnership based on consultation, cooperation, and collective action, especially through international and global organisations.’ Bush had hoped that the partnership would be ‘united by principle and the rule of law and supported by an equitable sharing of both cost and commitment’. Later, Bush’s successor President Bill Clinton had spoken of the dream ‘of a day when the opinions and energies of every person in the world will be given full expression of thriving democracies that cooperate with each other and live in peace.’ The United States had proclaimed its intention to build a new world order by applying its domestic values to the world at large. The greatest concerns of the past regarding peace and security in and among the world’s major nations are vastly diminished. Now the focus is on the outbreaks of violence of a new order, still deadly in their effects but far lesser in scales than those of the past: ethnic conflict, genocide, ancient enmities, terrorist attacks, fundamentalist insurgencies, and the ever possible depredations of rogue states, limited in number but threatening to regional peace and stability. Given such changes and challenges, it is essential to look ahead to consider in depth the future role of NATO, the missions it should perform and the institutional responses that are now required. The NATO served as a battering ram and military enforcer in the cold war against the Soviet Union. With the Cold War over, why NATO?1 First, in a world full of crises and conflicts where history moves fast and is full of surprises, NATO still served its main strategic purpose: to maintain the common defence and security of its member countries. In the immediate aftermath of Soviet imperial rule, few were ready to throw the Alliance overboard.2 The need to hedge against an uncertain future was reflected in the new Alliance strategic concept, adopted in November 1991 by NATO Heads of State and Government just days before the Soviet collapse.3 This concept pointedly noted that the need to “preserve the strategic balance in Europe” would remain one of NATO’s four fundamental security tasks. Today, it does so with fewer troops and at lost cost. NATO serves as the insurance policy against the remaining risks and new dangers. Once dissolved, an effective Alliance could not be recreated overnight. Secondly, the transatlantic relationship is the most stable and valuable geo-political asset on the globe today, bringing together the world’s two largest trading zones and the two regions with the greatest global outreach and sense of global responsibilities. “How could we seriously hope to achieve a more stable world without strategic alliance of these two major power centers? Where else but in NATO could they coordinate their policies and pool their capabilities to deal with major security challenges, as was done so successfully in the Gulf War?” said the Secretary General.4 Moreover, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe already rely upon the stabilizing influence, which the 1 West, Jim, Who Needs the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation?, People’s Weekly World, 21st March, 1998. 2 Ibid. 3 Daalder, Ivo H., NATO In The 21st Century: What Purpose, What Missions?, Brookings Institution, April 1999, pp.6-28. 4 Speech by the Secretary of NATO General Manfred Worner at the inaugural conference of the Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom, London, 26th November 1993. Alliance exerts around its periphery. The disintegration of NATO would increase the risk of conflict in Europe dramatically. Thirdly, one of the greatest achievements of the Atlantic Alliance has been to put an end to the bad habits of European power politics.5 There was simply no longer any need for secret pacts and cordial, or not so cordial, ententes. The American presence for a stable balance between former rivals and enemies. It even made possible the realization of German unification without a major crisis in West European politics. By contrast, the dissolution of NATO or the disengagement of the United States from Europe could and would undermine the European integration process. This would be damaging not only for Western Europe and the United States, but would also gravely effect the political and economic transition of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are urgently looking for links to the political, economic and security institutions of the West. Fourthly, the Alliance has always meant more than providing a countervailing balance to Soviet power. To a considerable extent, NATO evolved into a community of like- minded states, united not just by their opposition to Soviet communism but also by their determination (as the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 stated) “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilizations of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”6 Over time, NATO grew from being an alliance principally dedicated to protecting its members against military threat or attack into the principal institutional expression of the transatlantic community states and the western values that both defined and united them. Together, the NATO allies formed a viable, yet pluralistic security community, one where (with possible exception of Greece and Turkey) the thought of setting its dispute among its members by the threat or use of force has been ruled out a priori. That community remains as vibrant today as it did at the height of the Cold War. Fifthly, when the military organisation was established in 1949 to give full expression to the collective defence commitment of the Washington Treaty, the basis was laid for a large bureaucracy, staffed by many thousands of people dedicated to the organisation and its mission.7 When old soldiers may fade away, large organisations rarely do. After 5 Daalder, Ivo H., NATO In The 21st Century: What Purpose, What Missions?, Brookings Institution, April 1999, pp.6-28. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. initially resisting the need to change, the NATO bureaucracy responded by seeking to adapt its mission and structure in a manner relevant to its new environment. On the military side, internal adaptation has taken the form of a streamlined and more flexible command structure capable of deploying military forces rapidly and over greater distances than was the case during the Cold War. 1. FROM DEFENCE OF EUROPE TO DEFENCE OF EUROPEAN VALUES With the Cold War, NATO had a defined enemy and a clear function – to defend Western Europe against conventional or nuclear assault from the communist world. Without the Cold War, it had no clear enemy or function, other than oiling its guns. 8 Politically, the Alliance had sought new missions to retain its relevance – from peacekeeping to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the process, NATO has not only survived but also seen transformed into a politico- military entity that differs in many significant ways from the organisation that stood ready to meet a Warsaw Pact tank assault across the Fulda Gap.9 In Europe, post-cold war American security policy has had three main objectives:10 (i). To further the integration of Western Europe, (ii). To integrate Eastern Europe into the Western structure; and (iii). To integrate Russia into the Western circle.