COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: FEDERAL-PROVMCIAL RELATIONS. THE CANADIAN -AT BOARD. AND THE MARKETING OF PRPJRIE WKEAT

Peter N. Ropke Department of Political Science

Submitted in partial fulfülment of the degree of Master of Arts

Facule of Graduate Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario July 1997

O Peter N. Ropke 1997 National Library Biblioth&que nationale of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, nie Wellington OttawaON K1AON4 Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Canada Canada

The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive Licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or seil reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be p~tedor othenirise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. This thesis attempts to explain both the unusual degree of federal-provincial harmony that had traditionally been evident in the area of prairie wheat marketing and the federal- provincial conflict that emereed in the IWO'S. It applies interest goup. globalization and govenunent-building approaches to explain federal-provincial relations conceming the marketing of prairie wheat and the Canadian Wheat Board. The thesis argues that an initial phase of harmony was founded on an interest group consensus favouring monopoly marketing, the absence of forces associated with globalization and a Iag of province-building behind nation-building. By contrast, wnflict later enipted as the full impact of globalization led particular provincial configurations of interesr groups to demand new globalized solutions for wheat marketing. This thesis shows that societal factors are central to understanding federal-provincial relations and that federal- provincial relations may be less conflichial than is often assurned.

Keywords: wheat marketing, interest groups, globalization, prairie wheat, federai- provincial relations, Canadian Wheat Board, Alberta Government, Saskatchewan Govemment, Manitoba Government, agriculture. To the glory of God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit

If%enJesics spoke again to the people. he sa~d."I am the light of the wortd. Whoever follows me will never walk in darkness. bu1 will have the light oflife. " John 8:?2 NIU

I hme been cnrcijied with Christ and I no longer [ive. but Christ [ives in me. The Ife I live in the body I [ive by fairh in rhe Son of God, who loved me andgave himselffar me. Gnluriam 2.20 (NIY) To God be the glory forever and ever. Amen. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Certificate of esamination Abstract Dedication Table of contents List of tables List of maps List of abbreviations

1 introduction

2 A Multiple Perspective Approach The Setting Other Approac hes Province-building and Nation-building hterest Groups Globalization Conclusion

3 Hamiony on the Prairies The Theoretical Setting The CWB - Precunors and contemporary manifestations The 1930's - Towards a monopolistic consensus in an era of provincial deference The 19403 - Solidification of the consensus The 1950's - Strong support, shifting foundations The 1960's - Continued support, signs of change The 1970's - Ongoing harmony despite si= of conflict in related areas The 1980's - Towards a dual-consensus Conclusion

4 ConfIict on the Prairies The Theoretical and Political Context The lWOYs- A multilayered breakdown of the wheat monopoly consensus Prelude to codict The conflict begins: Goodale takes control of federal wheat marketing policy Page

The conflict escalates: The Alberta Governrnent's response targets wheat marketing 67 Wheat smuggling, the FFJ, and the Inowledge and information revolution 71 No basis for compromise: Both sides stand firm as federal marketing panel report 75 The Alberta Govemment responds to the federal marketing panel report 77 The Saskatchewan Governrnent weighs in 79 A final event: The federal government responds to its marketing panel report and to the Alberta Govemrnent 82 Conclusion 84

5 Conclusion Summary and Findings The Future of Prairie Wheat Marketing

Endnotes

Vita LIST OF TABLES

Table Description Page

1 Number of Fanns .Prairie Provinces ...... -94

3 - FmPopulation as a Percentage of Total Population O Prairie Provinces ...... 94

3 Averaee Farm Size (Acres) .Prairie Provinces ...... 95 LIST OF MAPS

Description Page

1989 Alberta General Election ResuIts ...... -96

1993 Alberta General Election Results ...... 97

Per Capita Farm incorne - Alberta (1990) ...... 98

199 1 Saskatchewan General Election Results ...... -99

1995 Saskatchewan General Election ResuIts ...... -100

Per Capita Farrn Income - Saskatchewan ( 1990) ...... 101

1990 Manitoba General EIection Results ...... 1C2

1995 Manitoba General EIection Results ...... 103

Per Capita Fmlncome - Manitoba ( 1990) ...... 104 LIST OF ABBEVLATIONS

Full Narne

CAPA Canadian Agnculniral Policy Alliance CCA Canadian Cattleman's Association CFA Canadian Federation of Agriculture Cwl3 Canadian Wheat Board EEP United States Export Enhancement Program FFJ Farmers For Justice FTA Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement KAP Keystone Agicultural Producers NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NFU National Farrners Union UGG United Grain Growers Limited WGA Westem Barley- Growers Association WCWGA Western Canadian Wheat Growers Association WRAP Wild Rose Agicultural Producers WSGA Westem Stock Growers Association The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) has rnarketed prairie wheat since the 1930's. In the 1940's it became the sole marketer of that wheat. Although the CWB is a Crown corporation responsible to the federal cabinet, its marketing practices have also ken the subject of substantial provincial govemment interest, given the size of the wheat crop and its importance to the prairie provinces. Interestingly, despite the interaction of both orders of governrnent. federal-provincial relations in the area of wheat marketing had until recently remained strikingly cordial. By contrast to the broad array of conflict that began to emerge in the 1960 's in a number of other areas' such as the constitution. energy, îransportation, communicaîions, and fiscal arrangements, the federal-provincial relationship in maners involving the marketing of prairie wheat continued along a cooperative path. Since the beginning of the 19903, however, this tradition of hmony has been disrupted ly a federal-provincial dispute centred on Alberta over the fiiture of the CWB's wheat monopoly. This thesis will in part attempt to explain the unusual degree of federal-provincial hamony that was traditionaily evident in this area. Unlike many studies of federal- provincial relations, whîch are ofien forced to focus on conflict, ths examination has the abili- to instead consider the less common case of federal-provincial harmony. ' The case of wheat marketing provides a sWng indication that the study of federal-provincial relations may, even after the 19603, still involve an analysis of cooperation. Moreover. not only does this thesis afford an opportunity to study an anomalous area of federal- provincial relations, but it also provides an opportunity to examine the breakdown of ths anomaly. Accordingly, the thesis will thus also attempt to explain the recent emergence of federal-provincial conflict in relation to the CWB. in its attempt to account for both the tradition of hannony and the emergence of conflict in wheat marketing, the thesis uill emphasize approaches which have ûaditionally been accorded relatively little attention. Approaches focusing on govemmental factors, such as the constitution and the goverment-building ambitions of political and bureaucratie elites, have normally been emphasized in efforts to explain the nature of federal-provincial relations. However?this case study will attempt to demonstrate that an adequate explanation of both the traditional harmony and the recent conflict which have characterized federal-provincial relations in the wheat marketing field may ody be attained by introducing societal facton. Ln particular, the thesis will anempt to show that interest groups and globalization are important to understanding both the historicd and current relations between the federai govemment and the provincial goveemments in this area. For the purposes of thîs examination. the spotiight of fedeml-provincial relations will thus be seen to be focused on the social environment in which governments are embedded rather than on the govemments themselves. Chapter 2 begins the analysis of the marketing of prairie wheat with a review of the literanire dealing with the importance of various facton which influence the nature of federal-provincial relations in Canada- A nurnber of variables will be exmined: the constïtuîion, class. inmastate federalism, regio~lism~political cultureothe province- building and nation-building goals of bureaucratie and political elites, interest groups, and globalization. The objective of this chapter is to acquire an appreciation of the various forces which influence and contribute to determining the type of federal- provincial relations that will prevail in a given policy area during a panicular period. The chapter suggests that certain approaches should be weighted more heavily than othen in their ability to account for a number of questions raised by the period of hamony and the emergence of conflict in the field of prairie wheat marketing. These questions include the following: Why was a cordial and stable consensus amongst govemments historically evident in the wheat marketing ara? Wh? has ths consensus broken down? What factors expiain the timing of the conflict? Why have govemments become involved in the current debate over whether or not the CWB should retain its monopoly over wheat? Why have they taken dif'fferent stances in the debate? Although the analysis will demonsirate how the other perspectives rnay be viewed as complementq, it will conclude that certain perspectives should be highlighted Specifically, the globalizatios interest group, and govemment-building perspectives will be seen to be particularly useful. While each of these approaches potentially contributes to a greater understanding of al1 of these questions, the. will nonetheless each be seen to be especially capable of illurninating particular -pes of questions. The elobalization approach will be emphasized for its ability to explain stability and change in the naNe of federal-provincial relations involvine the marketing of wheat: the interest group approach will be emphasized for its ability to explain the stances taken by governrnents, both historically and currently, on the issue of how wheat should be marketed: and the government-building approach will be emphasized for its ability to explain the involvement of govemmental actors in the area of wheat marketing. Chapter 3 begins the examination of the evidence provided by the case of prairie wheat marketing. The chapter includes an historical ove~ewof federal-provincial relations in the area of prairie wheat marketing in the context of the theoretical framework laid out in the second chapter. The focal point of this historical analysis is the development of the CWB, which is currently responsible for the marketing of prairie wheat and barley that is desigated for expoxt or for domestic human consumption. By contrast to relations in other fields of public policy, which became increasingly conflictual with the governrnent-building of the 19603, the chapter demonstrates that the tradition of fairly cordial and workable federal-provincial relations continued in this area into the 1980's. Although the chapter offers an explanation for this continued harmony. namely the presence of a consensus amongst interest groups on the necessity for the CWB's wheat monopoly, it also shows that the bais on which ths consensus was founded had, by the end of the 19803, grown increasingly tenuous. In effect, a "dual- consensus" had emerged in which the consensus on the monopoly marketing of wheat was joined by a growing consensus whch emphasized the centrality of the fiee market. While the potential for conflict generated by powerful govemments and the ambitions and cornpetition of government-building elites was already largely in place by the 1970's. the full impact of the various forces associated with globalization had not yet been channeled through the interest group variable in the area of prairie wheat marketing to demolish the consensus. Chapter 4 consists of an analysis of the burgeoning federal-provincial confiict in the area of the monopoly marketing of prairie wheat. The CWB7smonopoly is seen to be challenged as the movernent towards a marketaientation gained momentum and the belief that farmers should be dlowed to market their own wheat outside the government's arrangements began to take hold The causes of this transition fiom cooperation to conflict are detemiined. The chapter suggens that, when they are taken together?the globalizatioq interest group, and governrnent-building perspectives may be seen to provide a theoretical framework that is consistent with the evidence provided by the events of the curent dispute. The examination serves to demonstrate that the increased impact of the forces of gIobalization has led a specific confi-mation of interest goups that use the power and ambitions of certain sets of govermnentai elites to demand

"dobalized"c. answers to the question of how to maximize producer rems and "freedorn". To be specific, powerful interest groups cause the Govemment of Alberta to contest the federal govemment's wheat monopoly. The chapter also suggests that because the stances of both the Alberta Govemment - which opposes the monopoly - and the Saskatchewan Govemment - which favours the monopoly - are relativelp en~enched? the focal point of the contlict is likely to be a fiction of the stance of the federal govemment, which appears to be more flexible. To these ends, the analysis concludes that rninisterial change is likely to have a greater impact federally than provincially. In particular. the Mews and the position within the cabinet of the federal minister responsible for the CWB will be seen to play a central role. Thus, the chapter also finds that the capihilation of the federal govemment to the demands of the Alberta Govemment wouid not likely restore harmony in the wheat marketing arena; rather, it is more likely that such an action would rnerely shift the focus to the Saskatchewan Government - federal goverment ais. Chapter 5 offers a bief summaïy of the study combined with a review of the significance of the fin&ngs and an assessment of the likely future of federal-provincial relations in the wheat marketing area. The chapter will give a summary of the consolidated ar-ment which emphasizes the applicabiliq of the three-perspective approach. in doing so, the chapter will also briefly highlight the importance of this thesis, whch lies in its reco-gition of the si_pificance of societal factors in explaining federal- provincial relations and its theme that federal-provincial relations may be les synonynous with federal-provincial contlict than is often assumed. In its assessment of the hture of prairie wheat marketing, the chapter wdl conclude that the three approach mode1 used in the analysis suggests that the restoration of harmony appean to be more probable in the long-term than in the short-term. Canadian federaiism has been examined from a nurnber of different perspectives. Each perspective emphasizes different elemems of the federal-provincial retationshp. This chapter will contend that while each approach ad& sornething to the analysis of federal-provincial relations in the area of prairie wheat marketing, some approac hes should for various reasons be weighted more heavily than others in their ability to account for both the harmony that once prevailed and the confiict that has recently emerged in the field of prairie wheat marketing. These reasons include the capacity of the factors encompassed by these approaches in their absence or presence, to explain stability or change, to explain the absence or presence of variations in governmental responses to changes and issues. and to account for the involvement of govemmental actors in debates concerning particular issues that may arise. in this regard, the most useful perspectives appear to be those which focus on govemment-building, interest groups, and globaiization. The analysis wïll therefore highlight these perspectives while sirnultaneously embedding them withm a framework that nevertheless includes other. less relevant, approaches. The controversies and debates both within and between the different perspectives will also be considered The thematic context of this examination will fint be briefly highlighted Next, the analysis will begm with a systematic consideration of a number of major approaches. In this regard, the constitution, class, intrastate federalism, regiomlism, political culture, the province-building and nation-building goals of bureaucratie and politicai elites, interest aoups, and globalization will each in tum be examined. analysis udI consider C fis these factors both individually and in their relationship to one another. The conclusions that may be drawn from this examination for the forthcoming chapten wilt then be considered

The Setting The traditional analysis of federal-provincial relations has usually focused on

Yeovernmentd factors. ' The cwent analpis, however, will concentrate on non- governmental variables. To be sure- govemmental acton are also important. Afier dl. the comection to govemrnental elites mut dways to be made in any attempt to account for the emersence of federal-provincial goïernrnental harmony or conflict. The question is one of emphasis: the government-building approach will be balanced against interea aoup and globalizahon perspectives which also appear to be central to the current wheat C marketing debate. The interest group variable in particular has traditionally been accorded relatively lirtle attention. In fact, even Richard Schultz, who, unlike Richard Simeon? acknowledges a substantial role for interest groups in federal-provincial disputes, nevenheless still places a heaiy emphasis on govemmental elites: in the final analysis. Schultz also fin& that interest groups are '-caught in the vice of federalism"'. whch is ultimately created bu gvemmental elites. By contrast, ùiis review of approaches ni11 set the stage for the examination of federal-provincial relations in the area of wheat marketing. suggesting that interest groups rnap, in cenain areas, altematively dnve either federal-provincial conflict or federal-provincial harmony. Ln addition to the traditional scope and application of the interen group approach considered in this chapter, the case analysis which follows will also step back to examine the societal factors in whch these oroups embedded: the centraiity interest goups \vil1 be reinforced by positioning Ci are of thern in the context of the demographic and geographic composition of their membership rosters. Globalization as the embodiment of a number of interconnected forces sweeping over provincial and international borders, is another variable that has not received much attention. Because it is a relatively recent phenornenon, at least in its full fledged modem version. it has, as ye~not been accorded the attention it now dernands. A~cordingly~the anaiysis attempts to recognize the rnultifaceted impact of the forces of globalization on the emergence of federal-provincial conflict. Likewise, the absence of these intercomected forces will be recognized for their contribution to the pnor tradition of federal-provincial harmony. This is especially urgent given the potentiall y wide-ranging nature of the forces associated with globalkation. This impact has been strikingly evident in the area of wheat marketing. Althouph other variables will occasionally conaibute to the examination of wheat marketing in forthcoming chapters, the govemment-building, interest group, and dobalization variables will be cenaal. Consequentl';, these supplernentary factors will CI be examined first in the analysis which immediately follows. The key approaches will then be explored in greater deîail.

The Constitution One approach to understanding federal-provincial relations has been to focus on the constitution. For the purposes of this examination. one impomt feature that has been hiphlighted in the literature relating to this approach is the uncertainty of the constitutional environment: govemmental acton are never sure of the exact constitutional scope of their powers. Peter Rwell points out that such uncertainty, evident in the Supreme Court's tendency to balance decisions favouring provincial governments with those favouring the federal govemment, may altematively exacerbate federai-provincial conflict because each order of govemem believes that it has a reasonable chance of winning or mute contlict because each order of govemment feels that it has a reasonable chance of losing.' Moreover. Russell also contends that determined governments are ofien able to circumvent unfavourable jud-gnents.' This may again either serve to exacerbate or mute contlict. It is also conceivable, says Russell, that \hithin such an en\lronment. governments may launch legal challenges as political weapons without ever intending to follow through. This uncertaine is readily evident in the areas that are of concem to the CWB; narnely cases involving the jurisdictional areas of "property and civil rights" and Vade and commerce" and those involving the Charter. In this regard, although Parsons ( 188 1 ) estabiished that intraprovincial trade and commerce is a matter within provincial jurisdiction - falling under property and civil rights - and international ûade and commerce and general trade and commerce are matters within federal j~risdictio~~the scope of these various categories of trade has remained uncertain. For example, decisions in Shonnon ( 193a), Home Oil Dhtributors ( 1%IO), and Carnation ( l968), which appeared to lean towards expanding the scope of intraprovincial trade, were unexpectedly connadicted in the ~M~niroboEgg Reference ( 1971 )."~imilar uncertainty is also central to Charter litigation, given that the case law associated with the Charter is not firmly established because the Charter has been in place for only a relatively short period of hme. Moreover, the Charter has had a lirnited impact on Canadian politics in -. large part because it bas not dealt with important areas of public policy.' In surn, the constitutional environment appears able to either exacerbate or mute federal-provincial conflict. However, its effect appears somewhat limited in the wheat marketing area lkslimited influence will be seen to include its relative inability to explain change and the presence or absence of provincial variations in responses to change. This limitation arises fiom the uniform and long-standing nature of the constinirional context throughout Canada. The constitutional approach will thus at most be seen to complement the main approaches with its ability to either reidorce federai- proklncial hannon- or to act as a potential outlet for federal-provincial conflict.

Class The class approach to analyzing federal-provincial relations emphasizes the potential for conflict between regionalized segments of the ding class. The nature of federal- provincial relations is thus seen to be related to the presence or absence of this class conflict. Garth Stevenson has argued that it is in the interest of provincially-based segrnenrs of the ruling class to strengthen their respective provincial govemments relative to the federal goverment;* because of the economic importance of resources to certain provinces and a significant amount of provincial jurisdiction over these resources, it becomes important for these provincially differentiated segments of the dingclass to ensure that provincial govemments have the meam by which to adequately carry out their resource-related functions. Thus, the main contribution of the class approach to the wheat marketing case is its ability to highlight the relationship between the interests of provincially differentiated producers and their respective provincial govemments. Specific sets of resource-based interests are viewed as the main determinants of whether federal-provincial relations will be hamonious (when these interests are absent or undifferentiated) or conflictuai (when they are present and differentiated). However, although this approach may, to a limited degree, be able to explain either the Iack of or the appearance of interprovincial variations in govemmental stances on issues, its ability to explain change rernains limited, given the stable nature of a number of elements central to the approach.10 Nevertheless? the abili'?; of the approach to explain change should not be totally discounted. To the extent that the relative importance of certain resources which coincide with provincial jurisdiction is for whatever reason altered the nature and intensity of federal-provincial hannony or conflict may also be altered Furthemore. such changes may also concexvably Vary fiom province to province becaw of interprovincial variations in resources.

Intrastate Federalism Inirastate federalism emphasizes the extent of regional representation in central institutions. 11 The presence of such representation is seen to promote hannony whle its absence is seen to promote cordlict. In other words, in the absence of intrastate federalisrn, temtonall-based conflict is encouraged because groups that would otherwise be represented at the centre will more readily tend to apped to the pre-eminent regional actor, namely the provincial govement- Mechamsms of intrastate federalism in Canada appear to either be on the decline or to have been absent entirely in most areas of federal-proilncial relations. Ln th~sregard, Caims points out that a number of dimensions of intrastate federalisrn that were once present in Canada have declined. " Accordmg to Cairns, this absence of inmistate federalism has been associated with federai-provincial conflict. The position of intrastate federalism in explaining the nature of federal-provincial relations also depends on which of its two variants is operative: the provincialist version or the centralist version. 15 The relative usefulness of these versions in promoting federal-provincial harmony has been the subject of debate. The provincialist version appears to have a greater potential for increasing federal-provincial cooperation. Nevertheless, proponents of the centralist version argue that workability will increase as power is shifted fiom provincial governments towards the federal goveniment. '' Such a line of reasoning appears to be inconsistent with the government-building. interest group. and globalization perspectives whkh point to the likelihood of continued provincial governrnent strength. By contrast, proponents of the provinciaiist version readiiy accept Y the existing power of provincial governments as a factor which must be acknowledged

and accommodated. ' In sum, although both venions may be seen to promote harmony, conflict appean more likely to emerge with the presence of the centralist than the provincialist version of intrastate federalism because it achowledges and recognizes the continuing power of provincial govemments. Thus. the absence of the provincialist version in the Canadian setting may supplement the main perspectives by hiw@dightingconflict. In addition, the intrastate perspective may also be seen to complement the main approaches in its ability to explain changes and the absence or presence of interprovincial variations in adjusmients in the federal-provincial relationship to the extent that elements of intrastate federalism are being increasingly diminished. Nevertheless, its ability to do so is limiteci, given that only skeletal remnants of intrastate federalism have ever been apparent in the area of prairie wheat marketing and, aside From the coostituency of the federal rninister in charge of the CWB. interpro\ïncial variations in the presence of intrastate mechanisms have not been evident.

Regîonalism Another approach that has been used to explain federal-provincial relations is that of regionalism. The idea of regionalism has been evident in the concept of '-western alienation". David Smith notes the persistent theme of a perception of "federal Party insensitivity" towards the vves~.'~Moreover. Donald Smiley points to ongoing resentment in the prairies stemming fiom the "mercantilist" policies of central Canada that effectively reduced the prairies to an "economic colony". " However, doubts ma' be raised about the reality of a united regional fiont of prairie govemments being fonned on the wheat marketing issue: regionalism does not accord well uith the differentiated stances taken by each of the prairie govemments in the current wheat marketing debate. Moreover, the same problem arises with the duality approach to explaining federal- provincial relations: the English Canadian unity suggested by the approach does not reflect the presence of fundamental interprovincial variation. I8 More gnerally, Roger Gibbins has theorized about the decline of prairie regionalism and the emergence of prairie provincialism. l9 In this regard. David Elton points out that political boundanes rapidly came to have economic and social significance despite their artificial creation." In sum, provincialism may be seen to supersede regionalism in line with. and supplemental to, province-building in explaining the centdity of govements in the current wheat marketing conflict." Sirnilarly, the absence of provincialism may be seen to be consistent with the prior era of hmony. Unlike regionalism, provincialism is able to account for the presence or absence of interprovincial variations in responses to issues. Its ability to explain change, however, is limited because the major changes in -eovemmental activism appear to have occurred pnor to the onset of conflict."

Political Culture Political culture has been approached fiom both a pan-Canadian perspective and a provincial perspective. Depending on the approach taken, plitical culture may be seen t~ either potentially ameliorate federal-provincial conflict or contribute to federal- provincial conflict. Gad Horowitz has taken a pan-Canadian approach which draws on the explanatory technique used by Louis ~artz.'~Horowitz concludes that the Canadian confi-mtion of conservatism, liberal, and socialism has led to a heightened predisposition towards toleration and compromise. Horowitz primarily intended to explain Merences between the political cultures of Canada and the United States. In doing so, he does not readily account for the interprovincial differences evident in the wheat marketing debate.'" Nelson Wiseman responds to this problern by emphasiring variations in immigration patterns. The variations in immigration patterns are taken into account by the provincially-oriented approach. Accordingiy, Wiseman points out that Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba were most influenced by the political cultures of the Arnerican mid-west, the United Kingdom, and Ontario respectively because of three separate flows of immigration and settlement. These "waves" of immigration are important because it is the initial political cultures that have the most profound long-term impact by forming the base on which funire modifications are made? In Alberta. the Arnencan impact, which brought with it values of ri@-wing liberalism and a laissez- faire amtude towards the operation of the mark- was most profound in rural southem and eastern Alberta, which represented the "key to political power".'6 By contrm in Saskatchewan there was a ~i~gnificantrural British population. which supported the presence of a social democratic and cooperative element." Finally, in Manitoba immigrants brought with them the ''ambi3gity and ambivalence" of --toc-touched liberali~rn".'~ In sum, the provincially-oriented political culture perspective suggests the potential for federal-provincial conflict by highlighting deeply rooted interproklncial differences. Moreover, this perspective may be seen to potentially infûse elements of other approaches, including those of province-building and interest groups, with conflicting provincial sensibilities. Although the approach dws not readily account for change, oiven its long-tenn and embedded naNe, it does suggest underlying reasons for 21 variations in provincial responses to issues that may be activated by particular provincial interest group ~o~~gurations,which are, in part, themselves a reflection of political culture.

Province-building and Nation-building This approach contends that the province-building and nation-building ambitions of political and bureaucratie elites is the key to explaining the nature of federal-provincial relations. Governments with divergent yet overlapping ambitions are seen to be locked into a '-destructive" cornpetition with one an~ther.'~A recognition of the strength of oovemments is central to this approach. Cairns points out that wealth and resources have LI been combined with an extensive jurisdictional base to make Canadian govemments more powerful than %est of the rnembers of the United ~ations"." Reminiscent of Stevenson's argument, provincial govemments are viewed as less willing to defer to the federal govenunent once a certain threshold of administrative and professional comperence has been attained in the provincial capitals. Moreover. the conflict encouraged by this situation is long-term and continuous according to this perspective. Cairns larnents that Canadian govements are li ke -'lurnbering mastadons in tireless cornpetition" that possess -'an infinity of weapons"; they are capable of deliberately and inadvertently harming one another but incapable of -'delivering a knockout blow"." This approach thus suggests that govemments, rather than provincial or national societies, are the driving forces of conflict. Nevertheless, other approaches may be seen to reinforce and be encornpassed by the dyamics of government-building. Cairns, for example, acknowledges the "workino- consîitution" can no longer "control and channel" govemmental activity in order that -'self-defeating competition" may be minimized." The uncertainty of j urisdiction analyzed earl ier may thus be combined with ever-present ambitions for governrnent- building tu produce a mutually reinforcing scenario of federal-provincial competition to occupy panicular policy fields. As Cairns contends, "slaclmess by one level of -. eovemment provides the occasion for a pre-emptive strike by the other"." in line with CI Russell's contention that the constitution is used by governments as a political resource, the govemrnent-building perspective also points to a lack of respect for the constitutional division ofjurisdiction through which formal constitutional settlements become a "dead language"." Moreover, Larry Pratt argues, from an Alberta-based perspective, that a "classm-based 3ynthesis of business and politics" is central to federal-provincial conflict." Pratt believes that the vast govemmental powen Cairns describes are being used to perpetuate and "de fend the province-building interests of an ascendant class of rndigeno zrs business entrepreneurs . .. and state administraton" (emphasis added).36 Thus, the ties between an administrative '-class"or interest and a business "class" or interest are readily acknowledged by Pratt. Ln other words, Cairns7govemmental actors may be viewed as "class" or interest goup actors from the Pratt and Stevenson perspective. Furthemore. such action is seen to result fkom frustration stemming fkom "a sense of dependency and - - subordination among elites in the periphery whch aspire to the top but feel blocked'." This will be seen to be particuiarly evident in the area of wheat and barley famiing, where a new and fnimated group of producerentrepreneurs is emerging as forces of globaiization intemi@. Moreover, this is also consistent with the centmlity of the divergent ambitions in the pvemment-building approach. as we11 as those of the political culture3* and interest group approaches. The govemment-building approach also anticipates the globalkation arguments of Thomas Courchene and situates them within the province-building perspective while sirnultaneously integrating elements of the political culture and constitutional environment perspectives. For example, Caims concludes that powerfid provincial "economic nationaiisms", which Courchene associates with the forces of globali~ation,'~ are a reflection of the desire of provincial elites to plan their own economic developmentJO Such planning is seen to be undertaken in relation to certain -'provincial values''. the specific characteristics of particular provincial econornies, and the scope of provincial juri~diction.~'The need for infonnality in the federai-provincial relationship advocated by Courchene in an effort IO decrease federal-provincial conflict is also implicitly present in the province-building approach with the recognition of the increasing irrelevance of the constinrbonal division of jurisdiction. Finally, although Caims emphasizes conflict, the approach rnay also be seen to explain hmony. In addition to bemg related to the absence of governrnent-buildmg in certain jurisdictions or policy areas, hamiony rnay also be a reflection of the dominance of either the provincial or federal order of govemment as a whole or in a particular policy area In other words, harmony may be fostered by the asymmetrical presence of govement-building, regardless of its extent. Moreover, harmony ma! also be consistent with govemrnent-building when the two orden have shared policy goals as they independently punue what they perceive to be in their own interests. In sum, the governrnent-building perspective suggests a powerfully reinforced environment of ongoing federal-provincial interaction. The approach thus makes hvo contributions to the current analysis: fia it suggests the importance of govemments themselves, whether or not they actually contribute to hannony or encourage federal- provincial conflict; second, it suggests that governmental elites may indeed, in some cases, create federal-provincial harmony or conflict. The use of the approach should emphasize its ability to hi+&light the basis for govemmental involvement in the wheat marketing debate, although not necessarily as the central factor in al1 cases. To îhese ends, govemment-building has been seen to combine with other perspectives in order to illuminate the importance of govemental actors in producing and perpetuating either federal-provincial harmony or confiict. The ability of the approach to explain change and the absence or presence of interprovincial variations in response to change, however, appears limited to the extent that the prairie govemments likely reached threshold levels of cornpetence or size in the area of agricultural policy Long before the end of federai- provincial harmony .

Interest Groups The interest group approach has presented a varied portrait of the naNe of federal- provincial relations because of the rnyiad of frameworlis that have been employed. Depending on the circumstances, interest groups have been found to alternatively increase. decrease?or have no impact on the workability of federal-provincial relations. This analysis will contend that interest groups will either promote hartnony or create conflict dependhg upon whether their policy demands are the same or are differentiated across govemmental jurisdictions. Sorne indication of the degree to which this rnay occur is captured in the catego~esof various models. A nuanced view of the interest goup impact rnay thus be attained by cornbining and weighmg the insights provided by these models in relation to the specific case of wheat marketing. Richard Simeon has indicated that interest groups are largely irreievant in exacerbating or mutine federal-provincial disputes. The access of interest groups to the bargaining process of intergovernmental negotiations is seen to be limited, if not non- existent? Simeon concludes that *-at best interest-group concerns fom only part of a govement's goals" and that interest groups will be readily "jettisoned" when their Y '?jtatus or ideological goals" are not central to the matter at ha~~d.~'Simeon also argues that the secretive nature of the negotiations rnay also mean that interest groups remain oblivious to developments that might affect the successful pursuit of their demands. Although it ma? be readily applicable to man); cases, Simeon's view should be approached with caution for a number of reasons. First, other models and case studies have logically suggested interest groups ma! play at least a marginal role in federal- provincial relations in partmdar policy areas. For example, Grace Skogstad and Richard Schultz have demonstrated a prominent interest goup presence in the agxicultural policy and ûansportation policy arenas re~~ectivel~.~Second Sirneon acknowledges that interest groups do form part of the government7spolicy goals and that their impact ma? ~i~nificantlyincrease when their ideology and status assumes a central position. Third Simeon3 model also implies that the position of interen groups may improve as the secretive rnechanisms of elite accommodation are eroded One formulation that has suggested interest groups play a si_oiificant role in federal- provincial relations is Morton Grodzins' "multiple-crack hypothesis". Grodn'ns concludes, fiom a US perspective, that federal states allow more access points for interest groups than unitary stares because of the presence of two orden of govemment.'5 Groups are seen to move towards the order of governent that is rnost responsive to their objectives. In doing so, interest groups may "play one [order] off against the other"? This suggens that interest groups may contribute to federal-provincial conflict. The hypothesis rnay be seen to be especially applicable to the competitive environment outlined by the government-building approach. Moreover. such circumstances may be reinforced by constitutional uncertainty. The model employed by Schultz aiso takes issue wïth Simeon while simultaneously modiMng the Grodzins approach. By contrat to Grodnns, Schula atternpts to also account for the possible costs of a federal system from the standpoint of interest gro~~s.~' Within a realm of continuous bargaining, interest groups are seen to risk becoming involved in intergovemmental disputes and being used as a govemmental resource. This hypothesis is demonstrated by way of a case study of the Canadian Tnicking Association, which not only illustrates the role of an interest group in federal-provincial conflict, but also the dangers of playmg powemil govemments off against one another. The allegiance of an interest group with one order of govemment may make it the "enerny" of the other order of govemment; federal-provincial "hostilities" may be transmitted to the interest goups themselves." Thus, a pmticular group rnay become dependent upon one order of govemment which may no longer be willing or able to meet its demands to the extent it is vÎewed with suspicion by the other order of governrnent. The power of governrnents suggested by the govement-building approach is thus seen to be more heavily weighted than wlth the Grodzins hypothesis, while the interest group factor is seen to be more heavily weighted than in the Simeon model. A mode1 emphasizing pluralisrn has also been suggested The presence of "dispersed *te authoriw' and 'a weak associational system unable to coordinate the multiple. narrow*specialized groups comptine with one another" is seen to produce a situation where groups compete with one another as they attempt to capture the attention of particdar govemments.'9 The nature of the intluence of interest groups on federal- provincial interaction appears to depend on the type of pluralism. William Coleman and Grace Skogstad refer to three %es: pressure pluralism~clientele pluralism, and parentela pluralism. Pressure pluralism refers to the networks that emerge where groups mainly cany on -'a policy advocacy role" and the autonomy of state agencies is retainedSo Clientele pluralism is present when "state officiais are unable to differentiate themselves from organized interests?' although the role is dlthat of policy advocacy-." By contrast, the primacy of policy advocacy is displaced wiîh parentela pluralism, where interest groups occupy *-adominant place within a goveming political pq?"Parentela pldism is most likely to occur in provinces where the dominance of one party and a small number of industries is combined." These forms of pluralism rnay be viewed as points on a continuum extending from pressure pluraiism to parentela pldism. Forms closer to the pressure pole appear to be less likely to exacerbate federal-provincial conflict than those tending towards the parentela pole in circumstances where the demands of particular provincial configurations of interest groups are differentiated This is because provincial eovernment stances are more likely to be neutralized by cross-cutting pressures5' in the CI former situation than in the latter. In fact, govemmental stances may be clarified in the parentela case by relatively "unidirectional" pressures resulting from the presence of an interest group "monopoly" or "01igopoly~~.in other words, the pressure scenario tends towards allowing governments to more readily compromise with one another than the parentela scenario, which rnay instead clarifl any opposition that rnay be present Moreover, the parentela situation is also more consistent with Stevenson's analysis and its corresponding implications than is the pressure situation. The structure of interest groups may aiso make a difierence. Firs~a disrincrion ma? be made between "one province7' interest groups and interest groups operating in a number of provinces. Coleman contends that those operating in only one province are generally more likely to be effective than those operating across a number of provinces because of the difficulty multiple-province groups uill have in integratïng differing points of view." The single-province groups rnay thus again be seen to be more likely to contribute to federal-provincial conflict than the multiple-prokince groups to the degee that interea groups are provincially differentiated in their demands. Second Paul Pross concludes that a distinction rnay be made benveen those groups tending towards institutionalization and those tending towards iss~e-orientation.'~ lnsntutionalized groups are those with, among other things, "organizational continuity and cohesion", "stable memberships", "extensive knowledge" of relevant secton of government, and objectives that are broadly enough defined and resources that are CI significant enough to permit effective bargainhg with govemment over policies, while issue-oriented groups lack such characteristics. This dichotom y ma? again be viewed as a continuum. Issue-oriented groups have been seen to partly overcorne their weaknesses in relation to institutionalized groups by appealing to public opinion.'' In tum?this has been seen to force institutionalized groups to follow suit by undermining their d~minance.~~In line with the Schultz hypothesis. groups tending towards institutionalization would appear to be likely to play a greater role in promoting federal- provincial harmony or conflict than those tending towards issue-orientation. Nevertheless, the potential influence of issue-oriented groups shouid not be completely discounted in light of the power of the media, especially in cases where public opinion rnay be significantly swayed and cornpetitive govemments are stm&ing for support. The narure of the interests that are represented by groups rnay also malie a difference. For example, Skogstad claims that a distinction rnay be made between single commodity interest groups and general fm~s~anizations.'~ When compared with the latter, the former tend to be more market-oriented and particularly suspicious of the federal govement. To the extent that they associate with any govemment, single commodity groups are thus more likely to associate with provincial govemments than with the federal govemment. These groups are also more likely to question traditional assumptions and institutions. The emergence of cornrnodity groups would thus appear to be likely to exacerbate federal-provincial conflict as they compete with general fann organizations for govemental influence because of the tendency of the two types of aoups to articulate opposing sets of demands. Likewise, the presence of only one of the Iii two kinds of groups may be seen to promote federal-provincial hony,given that both orden of governent will be more likely be subjected to similar demands. Ln surn, noMithstanding the note of caution presented by Simeon, the interest group perspective appears capable of explaining both increases and decreases in federal- provincial conflict in a nuanced and detailed manner. The approach has also been seen to be capable of complementing other approaches. The usefulness of the interest goup approach in explaining the nature of federai-provincial relations, in light of the models presented, should be recognized for its abil@ to explain both stability and change. to the degree that the same groups remain preeminent or different groups corne to and fa11 fiom prominence. Alihough such turnover may be more likely with groups tending towaràs issue-orientation than institubonalization, other groups may also rise and decline as the impact of a changing global environment is felt in the field of wheat marketing. Similarly, the approach should also be heavily emphasized for its ability to explain the presence or absence of variations in provincial responses to issues, to the extent that specific provincial confiYmuationsof groups involved in the debate are varied in relation to one or more of the modeis examined

GIobalization The globalization perspective appears to potentially be central to explaining both confl kt in federal-provincial relations by i~ presence and harmony in federal-provincial relations by its absence. The concept of globalization will be seen to contain many forces. The chef concem of the curent analysis is how these forces are related to the governments and interest groups concemed with wheat marketing. As Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall, Thomas Courchene, and Vincent Cable have al1 pointed out in relation to one important aspect of globalization, the locus of decision-making is increasingly shifring from the nation-state to' among others, the private sector and regional governments.60 The "regional-international interface" is thus seen to be growing in importance with the ernergence of '-economic regions'' which are tuniing Canada into "a series of north-south, crossborder economies" that are separated by geography and indumial c~rnposition.~~As a result, provincial mde policies are increasingly reflecting a north-south regional focus. Courchene has even extended the argument into the realm of nationalism; to the extent that Endish-Canada's sense of national identity and uni- relies on the federal govemment's social programs, national identity will shifi towards provincial govemments and national uni- will become eroded as these lrinds of functions are transferred by the federal govemment to the provincial govemments. Addibonally, provinces have also been seen to increasingly compete with one another in "untraded interdependencies'?, which include the infrastructure, senices, and policy environment of a particular jurï~diction.~'Confiict may thus be seen to potentially arise from interacting forces relating to the intemationai setring nationalism, and untraded interdependencies. The characteristics of the globalization approach are also related to the other perspectives that have been examined Notwithsranding the simultaneous shifis to the privare sector, globalizatioo appean to reinforce the notion of province-building. In line \hith their ability to simdtaneously -Meand give'"', the forces of globalization may?for example, not only reinforce the ability of ambitious provincial political and bureaucratic elites to empire-build, but also force them into increasingly conflict-ridden defensive positions in efforts to protect what has already been built. In fact, a new round of province-building and i~ovince-rationalizati~n7'rnay even be conceivable. Moreover. the private sector may also directly augment federai-provincial contlict as the interprovinciai fragmentation of the interest group dimension is reinforced. The interest group dimension may in tum be strengthened by the nse to prominence of new or previously UIlllTlportant actors which ma) rely on the jurisdiction or power of particular provincial govemments and, hence, influence the fbture of wheat marketing. As seen, Courchene's view of provinces as *-economicnations" is hiohly reminiscent of Stevenson's *'class"-related notion of ten separate regional economic c~untries.~~The potential for conflict evident in these types of ties to provincial govemments. as well as the possible increased prominence of province-building, may be reinforced by the uncertaine of the constitutional environment. Moreover, the potential for confiict in the constitutional reaim may itself be supported by the need for constitutio~lflexibility resulting fiom the rapid, largely uncontrollable, and often unpredictable changes associated with the forces of globalization.66 In other words, constitutional ambiguity may be aggressively and explicitly exploited. Along these lines. François Rocher and Richard Nimijean point out that Canadian govemments face formidable obstacles when the? attempt to make formal changes to established institutions in response to the globalization of the ec~norn~.~'Sirnilarly, Benjamin Barber points to the movement towards a defacto. informal evolution rowards confederation as a solution-68 A number of dimensions of globalization appear to be partially responsible for the changes that are occurring. As discussed each aspect of globalization may be seen to reinforce and be reinforced by other perspectives that explain the nature of federal- provincial relations. A sample of some aspects of globalization may thus be in order? First, transnational enterprises have increased in prominence. Unlike muiti-national corporations, these enterprises can no longer be readily controlled by the "host countrq". Second, a knowledge revolution has occurred Knowledge is seen as becoming increasingly crucial for maintaining competitiveness. The hction of the governent as a source of knowledge appears to erode as the knowledge base of nongovernmental actors increases. It has been argued that the importance of resources will increasingly be judged by the degree of knowledge they contain. Third, globalization has also included an information revolution which is seen to "cornpress" the time and space of economic activity. This revolution appears to be "inherently decentralking" and capable of redefining the scope of public and pnvate sector desbecause individuals increasingly have the capacity to "access, transmit, and transform information" in ways that eovemments are largely unable to re-date. Founh. international economic regimes have CI been highly successfd in removing trade bamiers. fhis again alters the scope of -oovernrnent activity. Last, govemment regdation and taxation has also become increasingly difficult because of the increased rnobility of commodities such as wheat. In opposition to the general contention that globalization shifis powers from the federal government to the provincial governments, Ian Robinson has argued that "free capital agreements", such as the Uruguay GATT. tend to centralize economic and political power.70 Thus, --£teecapital agreements", which primarily serve to increase capital rnobility, are distin-@shed from "fiee trade agreements", which decrease tariff barriers." Robinson argues that centralkation results from the imposition of *'unprecedented legal restrictions" on provincial govemments by the federal government as well as the consmints irnposed by the market itself '' However, the imposition of legal restrictions assumes that the federal govemment is able to ensure proklncial pvemment cornpliance. The federal govemment's ability on this fiont appears to be in some doubt. In the legislative arena, the federal goveniment's treaty power is restncted from areas of provincial jurisdiction by the Labour Convenrions ( 1937) case while both -*POGG" and "'trade and commerce'' have been strict1J3 an4 as seen, ambiguously defined. Meanwhile. the credibility of a federal sovemment -'bluff' appears to be muted by the constitutional environment.'' To be sure, the uncertainty of constitutional jurisdiction ma? also conceivably increase the credibility of the bluff. Nevertheless, the net constitutional impact appean to diminish the bluff because of the power of provincial govemments as well as their abilin; to circumvent unfavourable j udgments. Meanwhile, the debate surrounding the effects of market constraints appears to centre more on the normative question of the extent to whch government should be constrained by the market than about a shift in federal-provincial balance. Where Robinson laments the decreased ability and scope of provincial governments to intemene in the economy as they increasingly compete with one another for private investment, Courchene embraces this cornpetition as an increase in provincial governent fieedom and stature. Any differential impact of market forces on the two orders of govemment is not necessarily self-evident Funhermore, like Courchene, Robinson forecasts an

increase in federal-provincial conflict as the st~tusquo is undermined by the impact of - - the forces of globalization.'' Thus, in addition to the relative implausibility of the Robinson position, the importance of Robinson's balance of power argument to the current analysis is also diminished because the potentïal for elobalization to increase federal-provincial conflict does not appear to have been placed in doubt. A word of caution may be in order in relation to an aspect of the possible nature of the conflict resuiting fiom the changes brought about by giobalization. To the extent tbat the ftderal government '~oluntarily"moves towards withdrawing from a particular policy are%confiict rnay gradually decrease, especially in the long-tenn. By con-, the potential for conflict in die short-term is relatively great because governments, as well as other actors such as interest groups and economic elites, may scramble to "defend thernselves" and establish new relationships as the previous sfatus quo is involuntarily challenged. In sum, the globalization perspective sujgests reasons for increased federal- provincial conflict when the forces associated with it are present in the wheat marketing area and increased federal-provincial harmony when these forces are absent from the wheat marketing area. The approach should be heavily weighted because of its pervasiveness and its mutually reinforcing and complementary relationship with other perspectives. in particular. this weightinj should emphasize the ability of the approach to explain stability in its absence and change in its presence.

Conclusion A number of different perspectives that atternpt to explain the nature of Canadian federalism have been examined. Each perspective has ken seen to contribute in some degree to the anaiysis of federal-provincial relations. However, these contributions Vary in their overall usefulness and the type of explanation to which they are mon suited. The perspectives focusing on govemment-building, interest groups, and globalization have been seen, at aprimfacie levei, to potentially offer the most usefùi explanations when applied to both the tradition of federal-provincial harmony and the emergence of federal-provincial conflict in the area of prairie wheat marketing. Although each of these approaches in some way may be seeo to touch on al1 of the major questions raised by both the unusual degree of harmony and the emergence of the current codicr in the wheat marketing are* they are nevertheless each particularly suited to emphasize one of these questions: the gwement-building approach rnay be seen to focus on explaining soveniment involvement in the area of wheat marketing; the interest group approach may be seen to focus on explainine the stances taken by govemments on the issue of how wheat should be marketed; and the globalkation approach may be seen to focus on eqlaining stability and change in the nature of federal-provincial relations involving the marketing of wheat. Moreover, these approaches have generally been seen to reinforce and lend plausibility to one another in their conceprual bases and logical implications. Accordingly, although other approaches will on occasion be seen to emerge and conmbute to the overall examination in a limited and supplemental marner. the analysis that follows will ernphasize a synthesis of the govemment-building, interea group, and

YZolobalîzation perspectives. In sum, each perspective has been seen to emphasize different elements of the tradition of federd-provincial harmony and the emergence of federal-provincial conflict in the wheat marketing area. By themselves, each of the three main perspectives emphasize ody specific aspects of both phases of the federal-provincial relations in ths area, leaving certain questions unsatisfactorily answered in relation to the depth of answers that appear to be available through the use of oîher approaches. Taken together, however. they appear to be potentially able to provide a helpful explanation for the both the harmony that has traditionally prevailed and the contlict that has recently emerged in federal-provincial relations involving the marketing of wheat. 3 EaRMO?r'Y ON THE PRAIRIES

Although the CWB was created in 1935 and has operated as the monopoly seller of Western Canadian wheat since 1943. it has only recently becorne the subject of sustained federal-provincial conflict. The reasons for this traditional absence of conflict will be exarnined by applying the govemrnent-building interest group, and globalization approaches identified in the previous chapter. Accordingly, this chapter will demonstrate that the combination of the forces associated with these perspectives, though evolvlng towards the increased conflict that would eventually emerge in the 19907s7was theoretically consistent with a tradition of relatively cooperative federal-provincial relations as they related to the continuation of the CWB's wheat marketing monopoly. The chapter will begin by bnefly hi_&lighting the applicabili~of the approaches within this harmonious penod of federal-provincial relations. Next. the current operations of the CWB will be bnefly reviewed along with its irnrnediate precurson. This will be followed by an examination of the evolution of the CWB and its context, as illuminated by the governrnent-building, interest group, and globalization approaches. from its inception to the end of the 1980's. Finally, the conclusions of the analysis will be briefly presented.

The Theoretical Setting The examination of the initial period of CWB harmony whch follows will focus on the insights provided by the govemment-building, interest group, and globalization perspectives. Although some of the other approaches will occasionally be seen to surface, they will do so by acting as supplemental reinforcements in a manner agreeing with that indicated in the previous chapter. As suggested, the main approaches will be shown to correspond with explaining the unusual degee of harmony present in the area of prairie wheat marketing until the 1990's. Within this framework, it is necessaq to recognize that Alberta and Saskatchewan will be seen to have assumed relatively prominent positions in the evolution of grain marketing policy, while Manitoba has tended to remain in the background. These differences are a reflection of the greater importance of wheat to the economies of Alberta and Saskatchewan an4 after the late 1960's, the relatively clear and internally reinforcing confi-mtions of interen groups in Alberta and Saskatchewan compared to the more "cross-cumng" and ambiguous configuration in Manitoba As Skogstad has pointed out. uniilte in Albe% where fmer opinion and thus the interest group configuration has tended towards a market-orientation, and in Saskatchewan, where these forces have tended to lend support to a govemmental-orientation Manitoba is divided on the matter.' The importance of these interen group configurations will be dealt with and clarified in the subsequent chapter in the contea of the bilateral conflict over wheat marketing that emerged between the Govemment of Alberta and the federal governrnent in the 1990's. Meanmhile, the current chapter. as a function of these circumstances. will of necessity accord more attention to Alberta and Saskatchewan than to Manitoba. Although the CWB's monopoly over the marketing of other commodities, such as oats and barley, eventually came under assault in the 1970's and 19803, its monopoly over the marketing of wheat, which not only represents the bedrock of CWB operations but is dso the single most important agricultural comrnodity produced on the prairies, remained unchallenged by the interest goups and the governments involved. The federal-provincial harmony that is evident prior to the 1960's accords well with the general tone of the era of "cooperative federalism". However. since the 1960's. the continuation of a hannonious federal-provincial relationshp in the area of wheat marketing will be seen to stand in stark contrast to the emergence and prevalence of conflict in other areas of federai-provincial relations involving matters such as energy, transportation, communications, fiscal arrangements and the constitution. The evidence provided in the examination that folIows will demonstrate that the interest goup perspective was initially consistent with this period of harmony. Prior to the 197OYs,the dominance of a set of powerhi interest groups that were undifferentiated on the issue of how wheat should be marketed went unchallenged: al1 consistently and enthusiastically supported the CWB's monopoly. However, the interen group approach would also appear to suggest that, with the emergence of market-onented commodity groups in the 19707s,conflict was imminent. Thu, by itself, the interest group perspective appears to only capture part of the foundation on which federal-provincial harmony was built given that the period of harmony on the wheat front lasted until the 1990's. Similarly, the evidence presented in this chapter will also show that the contlict indicated by the pvernment-building approach was initially muted by the lag of province-building behind nation-building in the prairies. However, because this lag will be seen to have been eliminated before the end of the period of federal-provincial harmony, the government-building approach, like the interest group approach, suggests that the foundation for this hannon? also included other factors. Meanwhile. on another dimension of the govemment-building approach, the importance of the federal minister in charge of the CWBI who has consistently been in favour the continuation of the CWB's monopoly, will be evident throughout the period under consideraiion in this c hapter. Thus, although sorne of the conditions necessary to the emergence of federal- provincial confiict in the wheat area ivre in place bp the end of the 19803, the? were not yet suficient to disrupt the hamony that continued to prevail. By themselves, the interest group and govemment-building perspectives might appear to suggest that conflict could have empted prior to the 1990's: monopoly-oriented general farm organizations had been joined by market-oriented commodity groups in lobbqing the federal govenunent and the governments of the prairie provinces, and powerfbl provincial govemments had emerged in the prairies to challenge the federal governrnent in other policy areas. However, when the interest group and govement-building perspectives are combined with the globalization perspective, which? as suggested holds the key to the timing of the conflict, the remaining reasons for the tradition of harmony become evident: wheat marketing had not yet been assauited by the full blossoming of the forces of globalization. in particular, the absence of fiee trade regmes, the lack of a suficient regional-int emational interface, the predominance of middle-sized fanns, the unavailability of helymarket information to farmen, and the lack of business education arnong fmers remained as factors supporting federal-provincial hannony. In other words. the presence of powefil provinces had not yet combined with market- oriented interest groups demanding globalized solutions to wheat marketing.

The CWB- Precursors and contemporary manifestations The purpose of ths chapter is to account for the sustained support that the CWB's rnonopoly on wheat marketing has received. In order to contextualize this examination. both the contemporary structures and operations of the CWB and the events leading to its initiai creation will be briefly reviewed A number of related technical and conceptual matters will also be deait with in the course of this prelimin- discussion. The CWB' is currently a crotiii corporation that acts as the monopoly or --single- desk" seller for wheat and barley grown in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and the Peace River region of British Columbia wtüch is either designated for expon or for human consumption in Canada. (In the past, the CW's jurisdiction has also included other crops and uses, such as oats, Bay, and gains designated for consumption by livestock). The board represents approximately 120 000 faxmen, has annual revenues of

almost 56 billion. and markets grains to over 70 countries, making it one of the lareestY sellers of grain in the world. The renimç from these sales are pooled, meaning al1 fmers receive the same price for any particular grade of +min on the bais of the average net retunis of the entire grade, and initial payments to the fmers, which are announced before fmers sign their contracts, are guaranteed by the board. The contracted grain is generaily accepted by the CWB four times each year. Accordingly, the CWB announces the percentage of each particular grade of grain it will accept under a @en contract series after it assesses the market demand for each grade, the availability of tnmsportation, and the quantity of grain that is offered by the farmen under the contract. The amount of gain that the CWB accepts wi11 thus vary fiom O per cent to 100 per cent of that which is initially offered by fmers. If the CWB does not accept 100 per cent of the grain offered, then fmers who offered that particular grade have two options. First, they can deliver the percentage of their initial offer that the CWB is willing to accept. Any unaccepted grain may then be automatically roiled over for consideration in the next contract series to the extent that this option was chosen by the fmer when the contmct was signed. Second, th- cm cancel their contract with the CWB within 14 days of the announcement. Producers who cancel their contracts or choose not to opt for the automatic rollover may subsequentiy offer their grain under the next contract series. The CWB rehirns al1 available profits to the fmers. nius, the gtmanteed initial papents to fanners are augmented by adjusmient payments. interim payments, and the final payment (includes deductions of CWB operating corn) to the extent that the CWB is able to obtain a higher net retum than that indicted by the initial paynents. The physical handling of the grain has traditionally ken done by the wheat pools acting as agents of the CWB.' Not only do these essentiaily farmer-owned CO-ops collect the grain harvest for the CWB, but they also sel1 production requirements, such as seed and fertilizer. In twn, the CWB then coordinates the trampnation of the grain to domestic and foreign markets. In this regard, transportath companies, includïng the Canadian railways, also act as de facto agents of the CWB. The CWB is controlled by three to Bve commissioners appointeci for an indefinite period (to age 70) by the federal government. Ln addition, the board also has an eleven member Advisory Cornmittee that is elected to four-year terms by producen. Although the Advisory Committee has no direct decision-making role, it is nevertheless mandated to advise the CWB on policy and operational matters and to serve as a conduit for communication between producers and the CWB. UItimate authority over the CWB rests with the federal minister responsible for the CWB. The monopoly status of the CWB itself may also be placed into the context of alternative scenarios. A number of alternatives are available within a continuum rangmg from singie-desk selling to open market selling. Aside from the polar options, "dual- marketing", which aims to allow famers the choice of selling their grain to the CWB or selling it on the open market, has ken suggested . "Continental marketing", a specific variant of dual-marketing, has also been offered as an alternative. A continental marketing scheme would allow producen to choose between CWB or open marketing for sales in Canada and the US while the CWB would retain its monopoly in overseas markets. The period immediately preceding the formation of the initial version of the current CWB sets the stage for an understanding of the configuration of the forces of fmer opinion and governrnental involvement that were present when the board was established by the federal govemment as a central marketing agency for wheat ' Ln the 19 17- 18 and 19 18- 19 crop years? Canadian wheat was rnarketed by the Board of Grain Supen-isors. which was abolished following the war as market uncertainty declined and inflation was less of a concem. In the light of this precedent, which demonstrated the ability of rnonopoly marketing to achieve higher rates of remfor €men, a national wheat board was established for the 1919- 1920 crop year in response to fmerpressure ernanating fiom the Canadian Council of Agriculture. This board, which again ran on the basis of pooling and monopoly selling, was eliminated in Au-mist of 1920 against the wishes of a vast majority of farmers. Accordingly, futures trading on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange was also immediately reinstated. In 1922, the federal government was again forced to respond to producer demands, which were now articulated through not only agiculturd interest groups, but also provincial governments. Although legislation to create a wheat board was drafted, the federal governent again displayed its reluctance by failing to enact this legislation. As a result, fmers began to organize Volmtary Contract Pools, which rnarketed 50 per cent of al1 wheat delivered between 1923 and 1930. Hoviever, governments retumed to their position as the central focus of fmer demands when these pools went bankmpt during the depression after 1930. As a result, the CWB was, as will be seen in the subsequent section, reluctantly created by the federal government during the 1930's. The failure of the federal govemment to gant the CWB monopoly status at ths time was indicative of this reluctance, which may be attributed to pressure emanating hmbusiness interests, such as the "grain trade" and the Council of the Winnipeg Grain ~xchange.' In this sense, the CWB was perhaps initially concepnüilized as a temporary replacement of the Voluntary Contract Pools, which also did not have monopoly status. The 1930's - Towards a monopolistic consensus in an era of provincial deference Although the views of fmenhad by 1935 evolved towards a consensus favouring the monopoly marketing of wheat, this consensus was not yet shared by the federal government. Provincial premiers, such as Brownlee of Alberta, who were in favour of the creation of a wheat board, were nevertheless ultimately successful in influencing the federal government's compromise decision to create a voluntary CWB! A lack of policy consensus was thus offset by provincial government input into federal government policy and the potential of sustained federal-provincial conflict over the issue remained muted. Vernon Fowke reinforces such an assessment by concluding that historically farmers have only been successful in pressing their dernands to the extent that those demands are - consistent with a paràcular pvernment's more general plans. ' In line with Fowke's assessment, the provincial govemments, at another level of analysis, in effect also becarne links by which famer opinion was transmiîted to an unpopular federal government about to cal1 an election in a era of substantial agrarian electoral influence.' The Bennett govemment may thus be seen to have attempted to improve its desperate electoral position by creating the CWB in the face of the possible increases in the suppon of Social Credit and the CCF by equally desperate farmers. This was also reinforced by the general tone of the govemment, which reflected attempts to deal with the crises precipitated by the war and the depression.' The extent of the emerging consensus amongst farmen, as well as the federai govemment's reluctance in the matter, becarne increasingly evident during the remainder of the decade. This ongoing disagreement culminated in 1939 when the federal government's attempts to disband the CWB, in line with the recommendations of the

Turgeon Commission, were met with widespread and detemiined opposition l0 However, these events also simultaneously demonstrated the federal governmenfs willingness to respond to the wishes of producers, producer groups, and provincial govemments; not only did the federal govemment not abolish the board, but it extended its juisdiction to include the eastem provinces. ' ' Although James Gardiner, the federal Minister of Agriculture (1935-57), continued to insist on the temporary nature of the

C WB as late as 1937, such a view was becoming untenable. l2 The federal government felt itself '-able to get out of the business of selling wheat". " Federal MPs increasingly recognized the "long-continued desire" of the western fmer for "some

1 * adequate plan of cooperative marketing of lus wheat". " Moreover. the strength of the voice of this desire was also reinforced during this period with the creation of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture (CFA) in 193 5, which as a general fmorganization representing fmenfiom across Canada, tended to favour govemmentai intervention in wheat marketing. The CFA thus joined the virtuallp manimous chorus of support for wheat board marketing emanating fiom the wheat vis.l5 Although Gardiner was never in charge of the CWB during his tenure as the federal Minister of Agriculture, he was nevertheiess the central figure in the federal governrnent 's movement towards the emerging consensus. Gardiner' s support of monopoly marketing was an enthusiastic reflection of the desires of his Saskatchewan constituency. '"iven the base of support and influence he established during his previous politicai position as the Premier of Saskatchewan, Gardiner served as a key link between provincial producer interests, on whom he also relied for political support. and federal government decision-making This was complemented by Gardiner's significant influence wlthin the federal cabinet, which in part was itself a product of his abilig to mobilize support for the federai Liberals throughout the West." Gardiner may thus also be seen to reflect the de facto presence of the centralist version of intrastate federalism. lS Moreover, the lack of federal-provincial friction created by such an intrastate arrangement is also a reflection of the lag in province-building behind nation-building during ths pend To the extent that any hint of the provincialkt version of intrastate federalism was evident, it depended on the coincidence of policy goals between the views of producen and producer groups represented by Gardiner and those of the provincial govemments. More correctly, this increasing federal-provincial coincidence of policy goals in effect amounted to the common influence of Iargely undifferentiated producer groups on both orders of governrnent. The lack of province-building and corresponding federal govemment dominance as well as the movement towards an increased consensus on the desirability of government regdation of wheat marketing with the election of the Liberals in Ottawa was apparent during the Dominion-Provincial Conference of 1935. The participants agreed on the "necessity for federal assistance in hding and maintaining markets" as well as the need for the *-immediate"creation by the federal govemment of mechanisms ro support ths goal.lg Moreover, the deferential attitude of the provincial govemments of the prairies was readily evident in their absence fiom some of the key meetings of the conference. Simultaneously, the conference per se also demonstrated the ability of provinces to provide input into federal govemment decision-making within the realm of interstate federalism. Finally, the conference confmed the pervasiveness of Gardiner's influence by showcasing his centrality during the discussions on a_griculture and marketing as the Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture and ~arketin~." The 1930's were thus an era during which cooperative relations between federal and provincial govemments were facilitated by a number of factors in a reflection of the federal-provincial relations of the period." Economic difficulties and political desperation stirnuiated the creation of the CWB and the initial movement of the federal government towards the emerging policy consensus forming around monopoly C marketing. This was facilitated by the unchallenged presence of interest groups favouring the monopolyoa lack of province-building and an absence of the forces of globdization.

The 1940's - Solidification of the consensus The CWB's monopoly over the marketing of wheat was established in 1943," in line with the context of emergency federalism," and remained virtually unquestioned thereafter within a political context that corresponded with monopoly support. The increasing federal-provincial consensus on policy goals is central to the CWB success during this period In Iine with Fowke, one factor which was central to solidifjmg support for a marketing monopoly was the federal govemment's shift towards the idea bp virtue of its more general policy direction. The monopoly wheat marketing policy was part of the war effort of the federal govemment, whch included general price c~ntrols.'~ Furthemore, the federal government's increased cornmitment to orderly marketing even after the war was reflected in C.D. Howe's view that the CWB would -'continue indefinitelu''." Although the rnonopoly was? ironically, established in order to keep prices down, it was nevertheless reinforced by widespread producer group and provincial govemment support.26 Y The movement towards policy convergence under the careful scnitiny of producer interest goups was also evident in federal-provincial conferences. A 1942 conference called by the federal Department of Agriculnire. which included ministers, deputy ministers- senior officials and representatives of the CFA produced no evidence of conflict on the monopoly issue." Sdarly, conferences held in 1943 and 1945 discussed the details of supply management without debating the underlying principle of monopoly marketing? Finally, at a 1949 conference, although the merits of the Canadian wheat deal with the United Kingdom created conflict, with provincial govemments arguing that farrners should be compensated by the federal govemment for the favourable prices that were ptedto the British govemment,'g the monopoly statu of the CWB remained unquestioned In addition to underlining the policy convergence that was emerging on the marketing issue, these conferences also indicate the ongoing ability of provincial governments to have input into federal decision-making on issues concerning the CWB. The solidification of the consensus on monopoly marketing is also apparent in the expansion of the scope of the CWB into other commodities. The monopoly selling of coane grains, such as oats and barley, was fint suggested in 1943.j0 By 1949, not only was a consensus emerging which favoured such action, but the provincial govemments were actively involved in formulating the new policy. C.D. Howe, who as the Minister of Trade and Commerce was also the minister in charge of the CWB, conducted negotiations with the prairie provinces concerning the provincial legislation that would be necessas.'' Moreover, federal-provincial correspondence was substantial on the issue.'' The convergence of federal and provincial interests on the issue was evident in provincial reactions to the need for complementary legislation. Tommy Douglas, for example, emphasized that full cooperation would be forthcorning from the Government of Saskatchewan in a nurnber of wires sent to federal govemment officials, including C.D. ~owe."Moreover, in line with the province's political culture and the CCF's platform, the Saskatchewan legislanire aiso u~anirnouslyapproved a motion supportin2 '-a system of socialized orderly marketing"." Meanwhile, Alberta, a province with a political culture that is relative- hostile towards governent re-dation. passed its implementing legislation, the Alberta Coane Grains Act, before Saskatchewan. Given such a broad degree of consensusl oats and barley were, not surprisingly, brought under the CWB7smonopoly on 1 Augun 1949.'~The extent of the consensus is thus again readily apparent. Beyond the convergence of policy goals and the presence of provincial govemment involvement in federal govemment decision-making, the CWB was also reinforced on a number of other fronts. Although some farmers supported the Winnipeg Grain ExchangeYsnotions of "fieedom of choice"' the vast majority of grain producers. through the wheat pools and the CFA, continued to emphasize that they were f'ers, not marketers? This attitude was consistent with the failure of fmers to understand the workîngs of the market as well as a distru~of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. Moreover, the prairie wheat pools, which were the major allies of the CWB, were expanding their holdings.37 The hegemony of pro-monopoly interest groups was thus Meraugmenteci In addition, to the extent that an? CWgovemance issues were present they were essentially put to rest with the creation of an appointed eleven member CWB Advîsory Board in 1940." Swift federal governrnent action in this regard again corresponds with the hi& level of federal govemment responsiveness to provincial input. The 1940's ma? thus be seen to have witnessed the solidification of the consensus favouring the singledesk selling of wheat Cooperative federal-provincial relations were remforced by the uicreasing hegemony of pro-monopoly farm organizations, by the attitudes and limited educational levels of fmen, by the continued absence of international ?rade regimes and a regional-international interface, and by the nation- building ambitions of the federal govemment in a context of emergence federalism. in surn, the cooperative federal-provincial relations of the 1940's on issues conceming wheat marketing were readily rnirrored in the strengthening of the position of the CWB. The 1950's - Strong support, shifting foundations The continuing harmony of federal-provincial relations was reflected in the continuing support of the principle of singiedesk selling by both orden of pvemment in line with the cooperative federalism that prevailed in the 1950's.~~The extent of this support was especially evident at the level of political leadership. in line mlth a general shift in the tone of government policies towards ~eynesianism.~John Diefenbaker, for example, set the tone for the federal government by strongl- favouring an intenientionist governmental policy in agriculture.'" This was reinforced by the increased ernphasis on a-gicultural policy. Moreover, the attitudes of Gordon Churchill and Alvin Hamilton the federal Ministen of Agriculture during this period, Fully corresponded with the ~overnment3tone and made them particularly receptive to the influence of the pools and C- the CFA. In addition, Hamilton's attitude was also a reflection of inadvertent provincial

Cgovernment policy influence as well as an indication of overall policy convergence; Hamilton was influenced by John Brakenos"Lethbridge Charter", which promoted the use of governments in expanding marketing opportunities." Accordingiy. Hamilton advocated the expansion of CWB sales to cornmunist counaies. The policy goals of Diefenbaker and Hamilton also marked a movement towards increased confrontation with bureaucrats, who generally favoured free-market approaches."' The commitment of key fi-mes within the federal gvernment to the expansion of the marketing scope of the CWB climaxed in 196 1 as Hamilton peaevered in the face of hostility emanating not ody fiom his own bureaucrats but also from officiais within the Department of Finance and the Department of Extemal Affairs over proposais to se11 wheat on credit to the Chinese government. In a manner similar to that of the development of the NEP by Pierre Trudeau and Marc Lalonde in the late 1WO's,* Hamilton was able to prevail because of both his own status within cabinet and the unrelenting support of the prime rninister. In addition to the China policy, the Diefenbaker government also demomared its commitment to the CWB by increasing the marketing of wheat as "food The weight of the debates in Ottawa was consistent with the federal government's policy direction. To be sure, a rninor amount of anti-monopoly opposition was present.'6 Nevenheless. the main cnticism of the CWB was that it did not market al1 grains." Accordingly, calls were often made to extend its monopoly to cover commodities such as -e and fi= which were traded in ~inni~e~.'l'Moreover. the consensus that was emerging, which favoured miniminng fiitures trading and supponing CWB singledesk selling was also reinforced by submissions to the cabinet fiom the CFA.'~ The provincial side of the policy consensus also remained solid The Manitoba Government's suppon of monopoly markehng was reaffirmed by a producer plebiscite which resulted in an ovenvhelrning endorsement of single-desk selling '0 Likewise, there were no si_- of opposition fiom Alberta during this penod. Moreover, in line wiîh its political culture, CCF leadership, and dependence on the wheat economy, Saskatchewan remained at the forefiont of CWB support. The Saskatchewan le@slature_ for exarnple, unanimously approved motions, which were supponed by the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool and the Farmers Union, requesting that al1 grains be subject to the CWB monopoly (and that al1 specuiative marketing be ended) and that the CWB be made permanent." (Until 1967, the CWB was subject to five year intervals of "Parliarnentary review and renewal".)" Moreover, during the debates on these motions MLAs readily achowledged that they, as farmers, were not cornpetent to market their own grain? Such an assessrnent was reinforced by the prohibitively hi& cost of marketing at the time. For example' C.O. Swartz, who would eventuaily become a successful export-broker, spent $10 000 in the eariy 1950's on long-distance telephone fees alone in order to sel1 his first order of flou to a buyer in china." The dependence on the marketing capabilihes of the CWB is thus readily evident prior to the information and kaowledge revolution that would later occur. Although various other factors which reinforced the monopoly of the CWB essentially remained solid, the first signs of some of the forces of globalization nevenheless became increasingly evident during this penod. First an initial "consolidation" of farms occurred in the 1950's.~~This marked the beginning of a movement towards larger producers, who tend to more readily adhere to the fiee-market liberalism of global trade regirnes. With the exception of fmers in Alberta, most larger producers declared bankruptcy during the 19301s. Thus, although an increase in the number of laser producers was occurring in the 1950's throughout the region, Alberta already had a significant head start. Moreover, the medium-sized producers. who tended to support the policy consensus that had emerged, were thus also those producers who were rnost in decline? Second, the institutions which would eventually usher in a new level of globalization in the area of wheat marketing were also beginning to take shape in the form of GATT rules on agiculturai traduis5' To be sure, the consequences of the movemenr towards fiee trade? including the harmonization of transportation standards which would later reinforce the erosion of the Cm's monopoly status, were not yet evident. Moreover, the GATT niles on agriculture, whch marked the begiming of this shift in 1948, were relatively weak because of the inclusion of a waiver which ailowed signatories to _mrthemselves exemptions to these des. Ln fact? the US became the first country to exercise such an exemption in 1955. Nevertheiess, the implementation of the GAlT rules marked a sipficant depamire in the area of globalization of trade flows. The 1950's thus marked the confinnation of the policy consensus that had becorne apparent in the preceding decade. WhiIe the stren_gh of the support for single-desk selling was apparent in the actions of both federal and provincial govemments and producer groups, hints of the forces of globalization were beginning to emerge. In sum, the ongoing cooperative nature of federal-provincial relations is again evident.

The 1960's - Continued support, sips of change By contrast to the increasing federal-provincial conflict in other area~,~'the n1xleu.s of shared policy goals in the area of wheat marketing remained strong during this penod. in fact, during a debate conceming the question of whether or not the CWB's existence should be made perpetual,59a general and largely unchallenged consensus emerged that the abolition of the CWB by any funire govemment was incon~eivable.~~Moreover, periodic calls for the expansion of CWB operations continued. For exampie. the House of Cornons debated a motion that demanded the CWB's jurisdiction again be eniarged to include the eastem provinces. Furthemore, enthusiastic endorsements of the CW were widespread The CWB was congratuiated by members of ail parties for its record of accomplishrnents, admired for its ability to handle international marketing, and even endorsed as a *'socialinic" s~ccess.~'Enthusiastic and widespread support. in line with that of the 1940's and 1950's, thus continued in the wheat marketing area. Although they did not disrupt the ongoing federai-provincial cooperation at this point shiffs in the pillars supporting this consensus and federai-provincial harmony were continuing. As indicated, they would, however, not culminate to create contlict in the until the 1990's. Most ~i~pificantly,the first signs of province-building were becoming increasingly evident by the middle of the decade. In 1965, for example, the annual meeting of the premiers of Alberta, Saskatchewan. and Manitoba, hown as the "Prairie Economic Council", was formally establishe~i.~~In addition to reflecting the growing power of provinces. the Council may also be seen to provide hmts of the regionalkm present prior to the full swing of province-building as well as the regionalîzation of economics in an increasingly globalized worid. Although they are still central, federal- provincial ties may be seen to be declining in importance relative to such regional ties, whch would eventually emerge as the hub of the regional-international interface? especially in Alberta. The provincial-building ambitions of political elites were starkly evident in Saskatchewan during this period. In 1969, Ross Thatcher began to interfere directly with the operations of the CWB by bartering Saskatchewan wheat for other products in international markets6' One deal, for example, involved bartenng 100 000 bushels of wheat for two transfomers to be used by the Saskatchewan Power Corporation. Efforts at federal-provincial cooperation were however not vet absent; Thatcher was optimistic that 25 million bushels of wheat could be successfully marketed with the aid of the federal govemment. Nevertheless, Thatcher negotiated a series of deals involving 4 million bushels which were undermined by the refusal of Otto Lang, the federal governent rninister responsible for the CW?to provide the wheat that was required to CI conciude the deais. in addition to providing the first signs of challenge to the CWB's monopoly as a manifestation of province-building, the episode also serves to demonstrate the immediacy of the confiict that can result fiom the ambitions of federal government elites being challenged by provincial elites; Thatcher and Lang may also have been engaged in a cornpetition to determine who would be the '-moa prominent Liberal" in saskatchewad6 Moreover, the incident also reflects both the increased presence of the signs of globalization as well as its limitations at the tirne. Alrhough the CWB monopoly bas challenged by an increasingiy powerful regional economic actor in the fom of the Government of Saskatchewa the challenge was not yet occurring at the producer interesî group level in the absence of the information and knowledge revolution. The expertise of the Saskatchewan Govemment was still required if the wheat was to be successfully marketed In fact, the Saskatchewan Govemment even required the assistance of the federal govemment if the scale of those efforts were to be increased. Moreover, the incident also did not represent a surtained federal-provincial conflict over the issue of monopoly marketing itself. In fact. Thatcher, who might have fawured more Saskatchewan Government input, nonetheless, by his actions, appeared to recognize the need for monopoly marketing. Although the marketing of wheat was still beyond the capabilities of most producers during the 19603, the decade nevertheless provided the first evidence of the successfd marketing of another comrnodity by individual producen. The marketing of rapeseed, through the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, began in 1%je6' To be sure; the marketing of rapeseed was aided by the information mechanisms of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange; farrners were not yet information self-~~cientin line with the dual-markehg that would later be endorsed by commodity-based interest groups. Nevertheless, the beginning of a series of demons~ationsof successful marketing outside of monopoly constmints was apparent. The role of such "demonstrations" as rnechanisms that may increase the conf~denceof producers and change their perceptions of the range of marketing options that was available is evident in the statements of prominent groups. such as the Manitoba Faxmen' Union, which opposed the initiative? The first major challenge to the hegemony of pro-monopoly groups, narnely the wheat pools and the CFA, also occurred during ths period. In 1969, the federal govemment provided funding in order to create the Canada Grains Council, which rapidly became oriented towards fkee-market liberali~rn.~~The possibility of increased goal divergence between governments was thus heightened to the extent that the new organization could capture the ear of panicular govemments in opposition to the continued strength of the pro-monopoly groups. At a more general level, the Council may aiso be seen to have served to articulate and lend credibility to an opposing viewpoint per se . apm from any direct govemmental influence, which was previously not readily possible. Finail', the arena of international wheat trading itself continued along the trajectory established in the previous decade. The US govenunent continued to rely on export subsides to compete for international market share. For example, the US govenunent in 1963 supported US4 billion of exports with USS1.5 billion of exports subsi~iies.~~'0le the aggressive use of such export subsidies would evennially open the US market to Canadian producen by decreasing the supply of wheat within the US, this

would not occur until the 1990's . in surn, federal-provincial cooperation remained predominant in the 1960's. While the consensus surrounding the continuation of the CWB9swheat monopoly was not in doubt, changes were, however, occurring which would ultimately lead to the conflict of the 1990's: new market-oriented interest goups were tentative[- emerging and producers began to show signs of independence in other cornrnodity areas. Nevertheless, the foundations which supported the CWB remained strong enough during this period to prevent any sustained challenge to the policy consensus, much less federal-provincial conflict even on issues not directly relating to the board's wheat monopoly.

The 1970's - Ongoing harmony despite signs of conflict in related areas The consensus of support for the single-des); selling of wheat remained in tact during the 1970's. in fact, even the Government of Albe- which assumed a leadership role in establishing vanous forces which would eventually challenge the wheat monopoly in the 1990's, continued to strongly support the board's wheat monopoly. For example, a motion that was introduced in the Alberta legislature, whch called for findine waps to expand the CWB7soverseas sales, was endorsed by Alberta's Minister of ~griculture.~' Moreove- the Minister also emphasized that the CWB should continue to be the sole exporter of wheat. Similarly, Peter Lougheed endorsed the CWBYswheat monopoly in a letter to the Prime Minister, in which he stated that the Alberta Government -'tend[ed] to support the concept of the Canadian Wheat Board as the sole grain exporting apncy for Canada". Moreover, Lougheed even emphasized within the letter that the "concerns [he] expressed are not intended to be criticisms of the performance of the Canadian Wheat Board ~ornrnissioners''.~' Thus, in stark contrast to the federal-provincial conflict that emerged in areas such as the constitution. enerz policy. transportation policy. and communications policy, the harmony in the wheat marketing area continued undiminished" The continuation of shared policy goals on the monopoly issue was also reinforced by the ongoing input of provincial govemments into federal govenunent decision-making in wheat marketing. This included federal-provincial meetings of ministers and deputy ministers of agriculture. first rninister meeting. and correspondence between officials.'" Examples of such input are plentifid: consultations with the Government of Alberta which were supported by Unifm (an Alberta-based general fam organization &liated with the CFA)," resulted in the creation of a separate pool for maiting barley in 1977:'~ at the First Ministers Conference on the Economy in 1978, the participants agreed to jointly implement a "grain marketing strateg";" in 1979, the premiers of the prairie provinces, the federal rninister responsible for the CWB, the presidents of the CPR and the CNR, representatives from the CWB, major grain companieq and the CLC ail participated in a special Conference on Grain Handling and Transportation. The conclusions which emanated fiom the conference reflected the cooperative relations in wheat marketing during this era: participants generally agreed on -'certain requirements for the irnprovement of Canada's ability to deliver gain for export" and unanimously agreed that 3he physicai limitations of the system had to be verc corne''.'^ Thus, to the extent that the CWB was chailenged, the challenge ody occurred on rnatters not directly concemed with its wheat monopoly; federal-provincial harmony in the area of wheat marketing was never in doubt. Although the successful pnvate marketing of other specialty crops, such as rye, fiax, and canola, as well as feed grains began to occur during this penod, the wheat monopoly was not cha~len~ed;'~the wheat monopoly could only be challenged after producers gained Mermarketing expertise and confidence and a continental market for wheat became viable in the l99O7s,gwen the size and importance of the crop. Producer confidence might have been building but globalization in the area of wheat marketing was still in its infancy. To be sure. as early as 1973, representations were made by the Alberta Mininer of Agriculture to oficials of the CWB, the federal Minister of Agriculture and the federal rniniaer in charge of the CWB to give both provincial governent officiais and producers a "much more prominent role in the functions and operations of the Canadian Wheat ~oard''.~~By the end of the decade, the Alberta Govemment's demands had risen to the level of first minister confrontation and escalated to emphasize mechanisms of provincialkt intrastate federalism. within a context of growing tensions in the areas of energy policy and the constitution. in addition, the confîictual nature of the disagreement was readily evident in a hostile exchange letters between Lougheed and Trudeau. in which Lougheed accused of the federal goverment of 'being out of touch", while Trudeau charged that Lougheed was attempting to politicize the CWB." Moreover- these proposais were even aansfened into the emotional and syrnbolic realm of mega- constitutional politics8' by vimie of their inclusion in Hamony rn DNersq, the Albena Govemment's position papa on constitutional change.83 However, even at this point, federal-provincial harmony on the issue of monopoly marketing of wheat was not jeopardized; indeed Lougheed, who readily supported the monopoly and continued to publicize this support in his remarks in the Alberta leg~lature.~merely wanted more input into CWB operatiom. Specifically, the Alberta proposal called for 40 per cent of the representation on a newly constinited Board of Govemors. which would effectively control the CWB. Lougheed held that the representatives might include MLAs and, in line with tnist ties and shared professional noms, members of Alberta3 public se~ce with expertise in the ares? Far fiom tqmg to abolish the wheat monopoly, the Alberta Government intended to strengthen and work more closely with the CWB throughout this period? Moreover, while the traditional dominance of pro-monopoly interest groups effectively ended in the early 1970's with the emergence of a number of commodity groups, such the Paliiser Wheat Growers (now the Western Canadian Wheat Growers Association (WCWGA)), the Western Barley Growers Association (WBGA), the Canadian Cattleman's Association (CCA), and the Western Stock Growers Association (WSGA), their emergence had no imrnediate eEect on federal-provincial harmony in the wheat marketing area. Sf Nevertheless. by conaast to the general fmorganizations? these pups tended to favour market-oriented solutions over the monopoly selling of will Y Accordin&. these groups were. as become apparent. reinforced by the increasing impact of globalization in the area of wheat marketing. Furthemore, the character of commodity pups, in addition to their presence per se, also contains seeds of the federal-provincial confiict that would empt during the 1990's; although they are aggessively hostile tom.rds al1 govemments, they are parhcularly distrustfd of the federal govemment.89 As a resdt, the stage became set for an eventual challenge of the prior policy consensus to the extent that these groups had the potential to become key actors within partïcular provinces. in mm, their influence in the intergovernmental arena would become amplified through powemil political and bureaucratic province- building elites? The presence of comrnodity groups, as well as their ernerging ties to provincial govemments, was also reinforced by govenunent fundtng. The Govemment of Alberta, for example, began to fund the Palliser Wheat ~rowers.~~Furthemore, both orders of govemment immediately included these groups in consultations despite their small size and recent arriva1 on the ~cene.~'The influence of these goups was Meraugmented by the publicity they were accorded in the media, which emphasized their cnticism of the traditional pro-rnonopoly groups, and the support they immediately received fiom large agicultural ~or~orations.~'Simultaneously. intemal tensions were rnounting within the traditionaiiy pro-monopoly general fann organizitions, such as the CFA and Unifm, further increasing the possibility for a future erosion in CWB Nevertheless' these new interest groups and changes to old groups were merely establishmg themselves during this period. Although the proposais of the Alberta Government considered earlirr reflected those of the rising market-oriented comrnodity groups, such as the Palliser Wheat Growers, they were also not antithetical to the views of the traditional groups. '' Also, the demands of these new groups were still limited to increasing direct and effective producer representation on the CWB. In sum, although interest groups were proliferating the? were not yet differentiated on the wheat marketing issue and thçir

c.governmental influence was not yet fimly established. Province-building aiso continued to grow during this period. The Alberta Govemment was again at the forefront. Alberta, for example, established its Mini-/ of Federal and lntergovernmental Affairs in 19 72. However. the province-building ambitions of Aibarta elites were most strikingly evident in their demands for increased mechanisms of intrastate federalism and. as will be seen increased direct provincial participation in a globalized economy. In tandem with the rise of provincially influential commodity groups, the prairie premiers also become increasingly supportive of their respective provincial configurations of producer interests within a setting of increasing concem over economic ~orn~etitiveness.~~Nevertheless. by contrast to other areas of federal-provincial relations, province-building in the wheat marketing area continued to feed federal-provincial harrnony. The forces of globalkation, which wnuld, on a nurnber of fronts, eventually demolish the consensus on federai government led monopoly marketing of wheat in the 19907s, were also continuing to establish themselves. The end of the CWB7sdomestic feed--gain monopoly in 1974 heralded the increased presence of multinational corporations in the wheat indu-, which, in their mutually reinforcing association with commodity groupsl would evennially undermine the position of the CWB." Cargill was' for example, able to significantly expand its Canadian operations while simultaneously assuming a leadership role in lobbyïng Canadian govemments for open market policies.3s The impact was overwhelming; in 1974 alone, Cargill bought 308 grain elevators? Furthemore. the prairie wheat pools became increasingly unsuccessfùi in competing with the private sector in the 1970'~~within this context of proliferating transnational corporations.' " Provincial govemments were also becomtng more involved in agriculturd issues in the international arena, which was previously left Iargely in the han& of the federal govemment and the CWB. The Govemment of Alberta assumed the lead in estabiishing international offices during this period. By the end of the decade, it had trade offices in London, Tokyo, and Los Angeles.'" Alberta was dso the only province to engage in international agiculnirai trade missions at the time. The Alberta Govenvnenq for example, even headed a trade mission to the USSR in 1976 on behalf of the Cm.'O' The Govemment of Alberta was also at the forefront of demands for increased provincial govemment input in GATT negotiations. '" Moreover, an increased consensus, again led by Alberta, amongst the govemments of the prairie provinces on the need to expand export marketing oppoxtunities for wheat and information on such opportunities became evident during first minister, premier and agriculture minister conferences throughout the decade. 'O'' To these ends?the Alberta Govemment established a task force to assess the

CWB7sability to identiQ export marketing opporhinities. 'O5 Although the CWB'S monopoly on marketing remained unchallenged and the gove-emments involved were aiIl forced to rely on the CWB's expertise in obtaining market information prior to the information revolution, a heightened level of provincial govemment involvement \vas becoming increasingly evident as a reflection of province-building, the presence of commodity groups, and the general rise of the forces of globalization. Finally, the federal govemment's support of the monopoly continued to reflect the attitudes of the federal minister in charge of the CWB. Although Eugene Whelan. the federal Minister of Agriculture for most of the decade, remained staunchly in favour of market intervention and was later supponed by an equally activin deputy minister in the person of Gaetan ~ussier,'" he lost responsibility for the CWB in 1971 to the more influenthl and market-oriented Lang. 'O' Nevenheless, even Lang, though more sympathetic to the market-onented views of commodity groups, continued to support the wheat monopoly, gken that it was also supported by these groups. 'O8 Although the consensus on the monopoly marketing of wheat remained in tact throughout the 19703, the base on which this consensus was forged was increasingly evolving in a number of mutually reinforcing ways. Furthemore, the Govemment of Alberta assumed a central role in this evolution from the outset. It did not, however. challenge the wheat monopoly in its quest for increased provincial input into the operations of the CWB, in a reflection of the, as yet, limited infiuence of globalization and commodity gmups during this pend In surn, the nucleus of harmony continued to prevail, thanks to a continued consensus on the policy- of wheat marketing. The 1980's - Towards a dual-consensus In a remarkable contrast to the escalating federal-provincial conflict in a number of other fields, federal-provincial harmony continued to prevail in the area of monopoh. wheat marketing.1o9 In other words, the consensus on the monopoly marketing of wheat remained in place. However. cooperative relations in other. non-wheot CWB matters began to increasingly rely on a new rnarket-oriented consensus that became especially evident after the Mulroney governent assumed office in 1984. Thus: an ideologically inconsistent 'dual-consensus" may be seen to have, in part, supported cooperative federal-provincial relations on the subject of wheat marketing during this period when the CWB is viewed in its entirety (ie. a market-orientation in crops other that wheat was cornbined with a monopoly-orientation in wheat). Moreover: the emergence of such a dual-consensus, as well as the general long-terrn tmjectory towards a market-orientatioq may be seen to present a concerted challenee to the traditional wheat monopoly- consensus, especially to the extent that the intemal contradiction of the dual-consensus invites the likelihood of a reassessment of marketing policy over the long-term. In other words, because the inconsistency of the policy consensus will likely have to be resolved, its resolution w-ill likely favour a market-orientation gwen the general trajectory of government policy in a rapidly globalking world- As suggested, the consensus on the monopoly selling of wheat \vas still pensive during this period. Even in Alberta, the province at the forefiont of the shift towards a market-orientation the agiculture minister endorsed the CWKs -'excellent job" in exporting wheat. l 'O Moreover, the minister also stated the he "would reiterate Fs] support for the CWB in those areas where it has performed well". l" To be sure, a motion calling for the withdrawal of Alberta fiom the CWB's jurisdiction was moved in the Alberta legislature. '" However, in the debare which followed, members, including the member who had introduced the motion, fully endoned the CW's monopoly marketing of wheat."' In a manifestation of the dual-consensus, the Alberta Minister of Agriculture denied that support for the FTA was in any way linked to a plan to abolish the CWB as a 'Total distortion". '" In fact, the minister viewed the FTA as "an avenue of oppomuiig" for the CWB to increase its sales to the US market.' " Jake Epp captured the persuasiveness of the support by claiming that "it appears to be almost as if one w]

mes to outdo the other in tems of their loyal- to the Canadian Wheat Board". 'l" Similarly, Don Mazankowski recognized that "in the final analysis, fmers line up in

support of the Canadian Wheat Board? ' " Such support for the wheat monopoly was mirrored in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, where, for example, Grant Devine public- commended the CWB's "excellent job of marketing wheat and barley" in the Saskatchewan legislature in a reflection of Saskatchewan's ongoing support for the wheat monopoly . Devine emphasized that "it was a Progressive C onservaa've govemrnent that

established the Canadian Wheat Board .. . and it 's [sic] Progressive Conservative

lS Cgovemments that have supported the cooperative system". ' The Premier of Saskatchewan also applauded the part efforts of Alvin Hamilton to sel1 Canadian wheat in China. Similarly, Manitoba3 Minister of Agriculture expressed his confidence in the

commissioners' handiing of wheat desto the Soviet Union. Il9 Furthemore, the duai-consensus and the corresponding federal-provincial cooperation was, nomithstanding Alberta's cornplaints of the previous decade, reinforced by the continued availability of opportunities for provincial govenunent input into federal govemment decision-making. The evidence indicates the continuation of constant communication between federai and provincial govemment officials. "O The agiculture ministers of a11 three prairie provinces also continued to be invited to meet with officials of the CWB. "' More generally, the federal PC governent prided itself on the extent to which it allowed for consultation on agiculturd matters.'" Annual federal-provincial conferences of agriculture ministers, as well as other federal-provincial discussions, also continued to remain cordial. At a conference of ministers and deputy rninisten of agriculture in 1986, for example, the federal Minister of Agriculture emphasized that the federal govemment and the provincial govermnem cannot aff'ord to

"work at cross purposes". IZ3 Similarly, at the 1987 Federal-Provincial Agiculture Minister and Deputy Agculture Minister Conference, the federal minister highlighted the need to share information and ideas and consequentiy announced his idea for the establishment of a new -stem to share information about market opportunities.'" Instances of cooperation, including in the realm of federal-provincial conferences, will also become evident in forthcoming sections in the context of other maners. Although the absence of the full impact of the education and knowledge revolution. the regional-international interface, and fiee trade regimes continued to prevent a breakdovin in federal-provincial agreement on the wheat monopoly, the multifaceted impact of globalization on the wheat monopoly-consensus began to assume an ever more central position during this period- TObega the prospect of htwe federal-provincial contlict, to the extent that the federal govemment was to continue on ifs market-oriented approach, was foreshadowed by Roy Romanow's condemation of multinational corporations. As will be seen, these corporations, dong with the Alberta Govemment, lobbied the federal govermnent to remove oats from the jurisdiction of the CWB. "' Also, a 1983 brief by the National Farmers Union (NFLT) (a general farm organization created in the late 1960's and early 1970's which opposed market-oriented sol~nons)~'~ to the Macdonald Commission asserted that the federal govemment was "attempting to industrialize the fmsector at the expense of smaller famiers".'" Cargill was seen to have had the 'ear" of the PCs. in fact, the federal Department of Agriculture even hired a Cargill executive who. by 1988, was in charge of coordinating the minis-3 commodity strategies. lZS Not surprisingly, a 19 89 Ietier fkom the Deputy Minister of Agriculture stating that Carpill's views were "consistent with the governrnent's polie'; direction" readily voiced Romanow's concem. "' The continued increase in farm consolidation represents another side of this induûialization (Tables 1,2,3). Tables 1.2, and 3 show the neady decrease in the nurnber of fmsand farm population and the steady uicrease in the size of farms since the 1950's. In this regard, a Senate agiculture cornmittee report in 1988 projected that consoIi&tion and increased cornpetition was likel y to continue in the future. '30 This is, moreover, consistent with and reinforced by the beginning of the education and information revoluti~n,~~' which would eventually decrease the reliance of producers on the marketing expertise of the CWB and feed the confiict of the 1990's by providm_p them with the information which is necessary to independently market the own produce, as well as the ability to use that information effectively. A new generation of better educated farmers with links to brokers in futures markets and professionals at universities was bepinning to emerge in the 1980's. Moreover, many of these fmenalso began meeting in groups in order to Merrefine their knowledge. The movement towards industrialized agiculture and laye fmswas therefore strengthened because fmen were establishg ties with "non-fami capitalist sectors" and using expensive equipment to bankrupt smaller cornpetitors. These types of famiers thus reinforced the presence of the new commodity goups. Direct persona1 links of producers with buyers were, however. not yet evident. Thus, the CWB's expertise was not totally undermined on a wide and easily accessible scale to the extent that the internet and adequate personal cornputer technology was not yet available. The global econom-also undermined the position of the CWB in the area of Canada's trading relationship witb the US. First, while the full implications of the open market would not be felt until the 1990's. its emergence began with the sigmng of the FTA in the late 198OYs7which Alberta in particuiar wholeheartedly s~~~orted'~' Similady, the Government of Alberta was also at the forefiont of lobbying the federal govemment for provincial participation in GATT negotiations, in another manifestation of the regionaiization of globalization. "' Simultaneously, Alberta emphasized the need to make agriculture a priori% in the talks. *j4 Second, the outbreak of the US-EC wheat war and the consequent enactment of the 1985 US FmBill and Export Enhancernent Program (EEP), which radically increased US expon subsidies, created a vacuum in the US market. causing Canadian wheat sales to the US to increase significantly; wheat exports to the US increased by approximately 900 per cent between 1989-90 and 1993-

94. 135 This was reinforced by Canada's inability to compete with the US and EC subsidies in other foreign Although this contrîbuted to enhance CWB sales to the US in the short-term, it also laid the foundations for creating a viable and temphng export market for individual Canadian producers, especially to the extent that they increasingly have the information and education to trade on their own 13' and US prices are higher than the pooled CWB price. The idea of selling wheat in the US on a massive scale without an export permit issued by the CWB was, however, not yet ~onternplated.''~Third, Canadian farm programs became increasingly besieged by the US, in line with the market-oriented tone encapsulated in the FTA. Is9 Moreover. the

CWB itself also came under increased US pressure. lJo The foundations of Alberta's eventual assault on the CWB7swheat monopoly were also firther men-mhened during this period. In addition to its prominent role in a number of areas already discussed, the Alberta Government's leadership in various other areas of

"dobalization were also readily apparent. In a reflection of the begnning of the emergence of the regional-international interface, as well as the notion of province- building, the govermnent of Alberta was at the forefiont of forgins the instinitionalized international links which were beguuiing to emerge during this period. For example, the Alberta-Montana Boundary Advisory Comrnitiee was established in 1985 for the routine exchange of information on agriculture and other rnatters."" Alberta also assurned a key role in the making of the Provinces-States Accord, whkh was signed in 1986 between the US National Association of State Departments of Agnculhire and the ten provincial agriculture departments to facilitate cross-border "dialogue and information exchange" in order to decrease agriculhiral %ade irritants". 14' The Alberta Govemrnent also increased its trade missions and meetings with US counterparts. In line with the increased importance of international, as opposed to interprovincial, ties, these meetings and missions were not coordinated with other provinces or the federal govement. In 1 9 82, for example, Lougheed led a nade mission to New York. '" Later that year a group of eight state trade directors representing the Western Govemors' Conference visited Alberta to prepare for a number of individual trade missions from the western States. lu in 1983, Alberta's Minister of Federal and lntergovemmental Affairs arranged meeting mith the Govemor of Montana, the Govemor of Colorado, and the Western Governon' Policy Organization to discuss Alberta-Western US relations and coopera~ion."~The minister also later spoke at the Montana Charnber of Commerce where he emphasized the need for Mertrade liberalization. Alberta was, however, also at the forefront of keeping marketing at the centre of federal-provincial conferences, which served to reinforce cooperative relations in the short-term. In facî, it was at Alberta's request that the 1984 conference of federai and provincial ministers of agriculture focused on the impact of international trade on agriculturai policies. '& Moreover, in line with attempting to increase provincial input in marketing, the conference established a Federal-Provincial Trade Poiicy Cornmittee to allow for ongoing provincial govemment involvement in the development of Canada's made policy. In a reflection of the growing dual-consensus, Western Premiers' Conferences and Premiers ' Conferences throughout the decade continued to emphasize the need to cooperate in the development of a new agncultural trade strateg and increase trade liberalkation. ''" Finally, Alberta Govemment aiso contributed to the new consensus by endorsing the establishment of a gain exchange in Cale-. "' However. the need for such an idtution again suggests that the full effects of the information and knowledge- revolution had not yet been felt. This is Merdemonsîrated by the Alberta Government's perceived need to establish its own wheat board if the CWB's governance problems were not overcome. "''Again, although increased provincial input was desired the federal-provincial agreement on the monopoly marketing of wheat remained unchallenged. The general trajectory towards the new dualtonsensus was, moreover, strengthened by and reflected in the election of the Mulroney govemment in 1984. The tone or agenda of the new federal govemment was thoroughiy market-oriented, with an emphasis on decreasing the "distortion of market sipals'? and adjusting to international conditions.l" At the 1985 meeting of federal and provinciai ministers of agriculture, for example, a federal government background paper assened that not much could nor should be done by govements in the area of international marketing of commodities. 'j' This tone was reinforced in a number of ways. Like the Diefenbaker governrnent, the Mulroney government made agriculture a hi& pnority item. However, by contrast to the aggressive and interventionist nature of Diefenbaker's ministers of agriculture, Mulroney's first Minister of Agriculture, John Wise, allowed the agicultural policy agenda to be set outside of his ministry. 15' Agricultural policy was therefore more susceptible to the federai goverment's market-oriented agenda not oniy because of the passive amtude of the Minister of Agriculture, who mi@ well have been more readily influenced by general farm organizations than other ministers, but also because this passive amtude reinforced the centralized market-oriented attitudes of an increasingl?; "institutionalized cabinet. Accordingly, both Don Mazankowski (Aiberta) and Bill McKnight (Saskatchewan), as the key representatives of the wesf, ovenvhelmed the influence of Wise in cabinet decision-making. Moreover, although the integration of the Minisny of Agriculture into the cornmittee system had already been reinforced by a new deputy minister, Peter Connell, in 1982, a new dimension was added by the Mulroney govemmenti a cabinet operations cornmittee was establishea fiom which Wise \vas excluded, in order to regdarize weekly agenda-setting meetings of key ministers. Final! y, Wise's lack of influence over CWB policy was also au-mented by his inability to exert control over his junior minister, Charlie Mayer. who, as Grains and Oilseeds Minister, was responsible for the CWB. As a result, the influence of market-oriented groups was also directly reinforced by the atîitude of Mayer himself, in addition to their general affinity with the tone of the federal govemment. Mayer was particularly receptive to the Canadian Agriculturd Policy Alliance (CAPA), which was founded in 1987 by commodity groups, cattlemen, and the United Grain Growers Ltd.. In fact, members of CAPA were even appointed as govemment advisors. The federal government also reinforced the ascendancy of commodity groups through structural reforms of the Department of Agnculhire. The department was restructured into comrnodity-based divisions and policy-making began to focus on b-commoditystrategies". 'j3 Moreover. the federal governrnent consulted extensively with the WCWGA in order to set the agicultural agenda for its second tem. The re-orientation of the Department of Agriculture towards the free market since the time of Whelan reached its pinnacle when Don Mazankowsh became the Minister of Agriculture in 1988.'j4 Manzankowski7sclout as Deputy Prime Minister, govemment house leader, and President of the Privy Council, as well as his free market orientation. which was consistent with his role as the Minister in Charge of Privatization, gave the department a direct line into the heart of the "institutionalized and market-oriented cabinet. Although the shift towards a market-orientation was also reuiforced by the increased prominence of agricultural economists within the Department of Agriculture during this petiod, the attitude of the minister himself remained key. In other words an activist minister coula with the support of key governmental elites, potentially overcome such an orientation. The wheat monopoly, however. rernained in place during this period because commodi- groups, although they had the ear of the minister, were not !et in a concerted marner attempting to change the way wheat was marketed The new dual-consensus was readily evident in the major direct attack on the CWB that occurred during this penod; a general consensus emerged arnongst the relevant governments to end the CWB's monopoly on oat marketing in 1989."' As seen. the comrnodity groups, which tended to favour market-oriented policies, had the advantage in the federal govemment's consultation process, while the general fmorganizations. which tended to favour govemment regulation, were virtuaily ignored The importance of the atîitude and position of the federal minister in charge of the CWB as well as the interest goups thernselves is thus apparent The movement towards the increased dominance of commodity groups was also aided by the contiming problems facing general fmorganizations which had already become evident in the previous decade. By contrast to the growing influence and market-centred unity of CAPA, general Farm organizations that supported the CWB, including the CFA and Unifarm, had major intemal battles during this penod over the fùture of the Crow rate.'" In fact, Unifarm (now Wild Rose Agricultural Producers), subsequently appears to have moved towards a stance that may also be consistent wïth a rnarket-~rientation,'~'thus Merreinforcing the shift in the configuration of interest eroups in Alberta towards the market pole. Y A movement towards increased provincial govement lobbying is also evident. As the number of powemil federal govement departments that have direct input into agricultural policy increases with the institutionalization of the cabinet, the incentive of interest groups to lobby provincial governments, which may have fewer input points as well as higher interest group sensitivity, increa~es.'~'Such a scenario is, moreover, consistent with Stevenson's analysis of interprovincial class divisions and Cairns's notion of province-building. It is also in line with the regionalization evident in the impacts of

"elobalization discussed earlier to the extent that provincial clout is increasing within the Canadian federation. This is Merreinforced by the regionalization of agicultural issues in the media as agriculture becomes increasinçjy less important to Canada as a whole. in other words, regional media outlets cover fami-related issues to a far greater extent than do national media outlets. The impact of agicultural issues and interest groups on provincial governments is thus Merintensified This also serves to increase the potential development of regional or provincial mediaaiented interest roups. Ln surn, aithough the consensus on single-desk marketing of wheat remained in force durin; the 19803, it was unconifortably and ambiguouslp joined by an emerging market- oriented consensus. The foundations of the previous consensus were continuing to be eroded on a nurnber of munially reinforcing fionts. summarized in the rnarch towards the market-orientation. In particular, the forces of globalization were central to this shift and were readily embraced by a new federal governrnent as well as the Government of Alberta. The federal-provincial harmony of this period was a reflection of the dual- consensus that emerged as well as the remnants of the factors which tradi~ionalI>~have been seen to have reinforced the wheat monopoly of the CWB. However, the seeds of potential federal-provincial conflict are readily evident in the contradictions and arnbiguity of the dual-consensus and the context of strong provincial governrnents and interest group differentiation in which it is situated.

Conclusion This anaiysis has revealed that the presence of specific confiCig.ufationsof factors in the area of the marketing of prairie wheat have theoretically corresponded with a tradition of relatively cooperative and harrnonious relations as they relate to the CWB 's rnonopoly. However, ths analysis has also indicated that the unintempted harmony of these relations has masked changes that have occurred in their foudation. Moreover. it is in the context of Alberta where these changes are moa profound and politically influentid on a number of mutually remforcing fronts. In other words, althou& similar changes were evident in al1 prairie provinces, Alberta nevertheless appeared to be rapidly differentiating itself from other provinces. The initial apex of harmony was founded on an Ottawacentred, interest group suppted consensus which allowed for a relatively minimal yet entirely satisfactoe level of provincial govemment input in wheat marketing decisions. Neither provincial govemments nor interest groups were differentiated on either the issue of rnonopoly marketing of wheat or ~ovemmentalre-dation and marketing more generally. Moreover, these initial harmonious relations were seen to continue in the wheat marketing area despite the ernergence of province-building and the appearance of provincially-differenhated configurations of interest groups. This was possible because the blossorning of the forces of giobalization had not yet occurred: althou& the stage had been set for the channeling of these forces through powemil provincial govemments and market-oriented interest groups. key elements of globalization, such as the opening of the US market the information and knowledge revolution, and the Ml-fledged emergence of the regional-international interface, had either not yet or just be_w to appear. However, by contrat to the initial harmony, which was unambiguously and consistently centred on the wheat monopoly-consensus, the evolved harmony is seen to be supported by a dual-consensus, which ambiguously places the wheat monopoly- consensus in tension with a market-consensus. Given that the dual-consensus is intemally contradictory, that the foundations suppminp it are shifting towards the free market- consensus, and that the provincial support for each consensus is varied, the seeds of imminent conflict appear to be evident. Nevertheless, while the necessary conditions for federal-provincial conflict were taking shape, the- were not ?et sufficientlÿ in place for harmony to end prior to the 1990's. 4 COSFLICT ON THE PRLURIES

The CWB's wheat marketing monopoly ha4 by the mid-199O7s, become the subject of federal-provincial conflict. Althou_eh each of the approaches to explainine federal- provincial contlict is to some extent consistent with and contributes to an understanding of the current wheat marketing dispute, this chapter \vil1 suggest that, similar to the prior pexiod of harmony, the explanatory power of three of the perspectives is particularly hi&. These three perspectives will be seen to be able to address major questions raised by the onset of the curent conflict While each approach is insufficient when viewed in isolation. taken together the globalization, govemmental elite, and interest pup perspectives appear to be able to provide a useful theoretical framework that agrees with the evidence provided by the dispute. As such, the? are able to incorporate and account for a large portion of the key changes and events that have occurred in the 1990's in the singledesk selling of wheat. Accordingly, the chapter will focus on these interrelated perspectives while nevertheless briefly considering, where appropriate, the supplemental nature of other perspectives in each of the three areas of explanation. The chapter will begin by bnefly reviewing the context of the current situation and how this context relates to the major approaches under consideration. Next, a detailed examination of the mdtifaceted breakdown of the previous govemental consensus on single-desk wheat marketing will be conducted. Finally, the conclusions of this examination will be presented by way of an integrated explanation involving globalization, govemmental elites, and interest groups.

The Theoretical and Political Context An era of relatively tranquil federal-provincial relations conceming the marketing of wheat from the prairie provinces appears to suddenly be over. However, this change in federal-provincial relations should not corne as a complete surprise: as seen, the dispute currently focusing on the future role of the CWB in wheat marketing is as much embedded in the lustory of the prairie region as it is the result of more recent changes and events. Nevertheless, significant questions are raised: Why did this dispute occur now? Why is there a governmental dispute? Why is it centred in Alberta and not Saskatchewan or Manitoba? The anaiysis of the period of harmony in the area of prairie wheat marketing has already revealed the histoncal development of various conditions whch underlie the current dispute. These conditions were necessary but not suficient to spark a sustained federal-provincial contlict. in particular. the forces of globalization, including the education and information revolution, the regional-intemational interface, and free trade regmes. had not until the 1990's reached the required threshold for relahvel~large scale producer independence in marketing. The review of si-pificant approaches to explaining federal-provincial relations in Chapter 2 has suggested that the presence of federal-provincial confiict may be exacerbated by the muiti-faceted impact of the forces of globalization, the govement- building ambitions of provincial and federai political and bureaucratic elites, and the presence of particular interest group formations in different governmental setrings. The initial review of these perspectives also reveaied the cenaality of globalization and the eovemental power associated with the resdts of the province-building and nation- C building ambitions of elites. For the globalization perspective this centrality is a reflection of its pemasiveness, while for the govemment-buildmg perspective ths centrality corresponds with its position, by its veq nature, at the heart of federal- provincial conflict. Moreover. globalization was seen to be weighted most heavily in its ability to explain change, while government-building was seen to be weighted most heavily in its ability to highlight the nature of the political environment, whch in this case is conflictual. Meanwhile, the interest group approach was seen to be best able to explain provincial variations in response to change. The evidence provideci in this chapter will indicate that the globalization perspective appears to be consistent with the current federal-provincial debate conceming the fiiture of the marketing of prairie wheat. This approach will be seen to include a number of aspects: the blossoming of the information and knowledge revolution, the expansion of free trade regimes, the increasing centrality of the regionai-international interface, and the increased geographical separabon of regrons. As such, the approach will be shown to best correspond with understanding the timing of the change in federal-provincial relations in the wheat ares The globalization perspective, with its sweeping and undifjenriared impact, does not however, by itself necessarily suggest why federal- provincial conflict or differentiated govemmental stances have been apparent in the debate. Although the interest group approach also contributes to an understandmg of the reasons for the timing of the conflict? its pnmq contribution lies in its correlation with the intergovernmental vaxiation in stances evident in the dispute. The particular interest eroup confi_wations of Alberta, Saskatchewan. Manitoba and Canada wiill be seen ro be CL readily consistent with the respective pro-dual marketing, pro-monopoly, noncornminal and pro-monopoly stances of the govemments of those jurisdictions in the debate on a nurnber of rnutually reidorcing levels. In addition to the traditional scope of the perspective outlined in the theoretical chapter, the interest group approach will be expanded by considering the social base of the groups involved in the marketing debate. Consequently, particular interest group configurations will be briefly analyzed in relation to the partisan complexion of electoral maps and income levels of fmers. In other words, the analysis suggesrs that at a certain level, parricular provincial confi-mtions of interest groups rnay be seen as an institutionalized provincial surnrnary of producer concems. given that they will individually tend to reflect the desires of the demographic composition of their mernbership. The govemment-building perspective will be seen to complement the globalization and interest goup approaches by finther highlighting wh?; the various forces of giobalizaîion may lead to federal-provincial contlict when they meet with the particular institutions of a number of powerfd pvernmental actors. As a result, the potential conflict identified in this approach will be seen to be supported by the evidence of the case of wheat marketing. At the provincial order of govemment, the contribution of the government-building approach will be seen to rea pnmarily with the idea that provincial govemments have, as demonstrated in the previous histoncal analysis, al1 reached a threshold of cornpetence and power that serves to make thern key playen in any dispute over the continued desirability of the federal governrnentoswheat marketing policy . However, another element of the government-building perspective appean to have remained relatively muted at the provincial order of government: the historical and cunent evidence indicates that the actions of the pro$lnciaI governments are driven more by the desires of particuiar provincial configurations of interest groups and the social bases on which the? are founded than by the ambitions of govemmental elites per se. In other words, interest goup have been able to use the formidable resources of provincial governrnents in order to ampli& their demands because of a combination of their stren-gb in particular provinces and the electoral concerns of the governments involveci By contras, at the federal order of govemment, the full scope of the governrnent-building perspective appears to prevail in the wheat marketing area Not only has the federal govemment reached Cairns' threshold of power and cornpetence. but its policy smce in the field of wheat marketing will be seen to be more a resuit of the ambitions of eovemmental elites, in particular the federal minister responsible for the CW.than of C the demands of a particular set of interest groups. This is consistent with Skogstad's findings: the minister at the national level is subjected to a wider range of interest group intluence than his provincial cornterparts and is, consequently, les tied to any particular confi3guration of these groups. '

The 1990's - A multilayered breakdown of the wheat monopoly consensus The govemmental consensus whch had been evident in the wheat marketing area throughout the history of the CWB crumbled in the 1990's. Intergovemmental conflict appeared where harmony once prevailed. The conflict began with the Chrétien govemment's opposition to the continental barley market, which was established by the previous federal govemment upon the request of the Alberta Governent and amounted to dual-marketing for barley in the onshore market. More generally, it soon became apparent that the new federai minister responsible for the CWB opposed the dismantling of any part of the CWB's monopoly. The Aiberta Govemment, however, was unwilling to accept such a stance: its response escalated the conflict by calling for an end to not only the CWB's monopoly on bariey, but also its monopoly on wheat. Faced with a bwgeoning debate over the future of the CWB, the federal pvernment consequently commissioned a thorough examination of prairie grain marketing. Although some hope was initially held that this examination wouid provide a framework for putentially resolving the conflict it quickly become clear that the repon of the panel wouid provide no bais for compromise. îhe Alberta Govemment soon responded by launching two legal challenges to the wheat monopoly and supporting one other challenge which was already undenvay. Meanwhile, the Saskatchewan Government weighed in by threatening to challenge Alberta's legal actions. In the federal govemment responded to Alberta's threats by introducing legislation in late 1996 which retained the CWB's monopoly and proposed only superficial changes in other areas. As a result of these events, the period of federal-provincial harmony ended in the 1990's. Indeea the preiiously harmonious relationshp was replaced by s~inedconflict.

Prelude to conflict The positions taken by the govemments of the prairie provinces on the fhre of wheat marketing in the early 1990's reflected those suggested by the historical analysis of the previous chapter, while the federal govemment's stance, as will be seen, appean to have reflected the attitude of the minister responsible for the CWB hirnself as well as the change in governing parties. Although the relations between the federal govemment and the Alberta Govemment remained harmonious toward the end of the Mulroney era as both govemments moved toward embracing fiee market principles. their last act of cordiality would later serve to i_pite the conflict.' This final chain of events began with a proposal from the Alberta Government in 1992 calling for the irnplementation of a continental barley market.' Under this arrangement whch would only apply to the North American market, famers could either use the CWB or sel1 their own barley. In a final example of cooperation, the Mulroney govemment dutifdly implemented the continental market idea during the following summer without hesitation. ' The continental barley market proposal may be seen to provide the first evidence of the impact on govemrnental policy of the heightened geographical separation of regions resulting from globalization which made its appearance in the 1990's and would also later become evident in the area of wheat marketing. By contrast to the est-west divide of previous decades. the regionai divide began to occur on a north-south basis across the prairies: border area farmen were more likely to be able to take advantage of various aspects of globalization than their peers in more northerly areas. who faced higher transportation costs. This was apparent in the support for the Alberta Government's continental barley marketing proposal, which was directly related to the distance of farmers from the Canada-US border.' To be sure. this -gradient of support for dual- marketing was also closely associated wlth the size and income of the fmers involved." Nevertheless, the direct correlation between closeness to the border and fmer support for the proposal, whch is etidem in the base of interest group rnembershp rosten; was strikmg. The final barriers to north-south trade that were still in place prior to the 1990's for border area famiers were thus being removed. In this regard. the Alberta Goverment continued to be at the forefiont of Canada-US provincial-state relations by strengthening ils ties with Montana within the context of the FTA- Two agreements conciuded in the early 1990's involving the trucking industry are of particdar importance to increasing the competitiveness of Aiberîa wheat farmen and promoting this new regonalization by decreasing their transportation costs to the US.' The Shelby increased Vehicle Weights agreement allowed Alberta's truckers to increase their loads on the highwap to railway connections in Shelby, Montana. The second agreement involved a Joint AlbertaiMontana Vehicle Inspection Station at the CoutWSweetgrass border. which Merdecreased transportation costs by implementing joint inspections. The Alberta government also reached an agreement with the govemments of Mexico, California, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, and Montana to "eiiminate al1 variations in trucking regulations between their juri~dictions".~With ths agreement, whch was inspired by NAITA, the transportahon costs of Alberta's producers were, for exarnple, decreased by an additional 20 per cent on each trip to Mexico dong the so-called Canamex North American Transportation Corridor. This Merreinforced north-south trade ties for Alberta's producers, panicularly to the extent that ûade barriers remained in effect between Canadian provinces.9 Overall, the forces of globalization, clearly evident in the new barley agreement, were pushing Alberta towards a new north-south orientation. The confier begins: Goodole takes contrd offderai whear markering poircy Although the first stages of the transition toward the embrace of some of the key forces of globalization were conducted without disrupting the "dual-consensus'-, conflict was soon evident. With the election of the Chrétien government in 1993, the continental market for barley medinto a point of serious contention. Given the Chrétien govemment's general, if somewhat rnuted, continuation of the market-oriented tone of the Mulroney era, the ambitions of the new federal minister responsible for the CWB. Ralph Goodale, were to be of key importance to this change in attitude. In Iine with the govemment-building perspective, Goodale may be seen to have been an ardent defender of7as Cairns might put it, the past govement-building and nation-building policy decisions of the federal governrnent in the fomi of the CWB. In ùiis regard Goodale ha4 by al1 indications; consistently been a firm advocate of the status quo for the CWB. Io In fact? his forthcoming opposition to the continental barle? market \vas made apparent even before the Liberals assumed office. 'l Goodale7sstance was also consistent with the base of his political support as a former Saskatchewan Liberal leader. The new federal govemment's open and clear opposition thus reinforced that of the Saskatchewan Government, which also contended that the marketing advantages of the CWB would be eliminated with dual-marketing. " in what would be the opening saivo in the current wheat marketing debate, the Government of Saskatchewan intervened to help obtain an indefinite injunction which ended the continental barley market afler only six weeks of operation.'' in response. the Govemment of Alberta irnmediatelp becarne involved in attempting to appeai the injunction.14 The debate was further propelled by a Charter challenge launched by 2 1 fmers, the Western Barle): Growers Association (WBGA), and the Alberta Barley Commission in response to the end of the continental barley market." This lawsuit contended that the CWB's monopoly violated the %eedom of association", the "freedom of mobility", and the "'guarantee of equal benefit of the law without discrimination" because the CWB Act applied only to prairie fmers.l6 The federal govenunent's position in the debate reflected the views of the interest groups that it used as a resource to reinforce its nation-building ambitions. As previously indicated. the federal minister responsible for the CWB is the key actor in determining the direction of federal govemment policy in the area of wheat marketing. This view is supponed by the comments of interest group officials. who consistently contend thar the single most important factor in detetmining the influence of a particular interest group is the minister himseif. '' Such a dynarnic was also historically evident: as seen. in the Mulroney era, the ministers involved in determining wheat marketing policy often favoured smaller and less well established market-oriented commodity groups to the general fann organizations based on personal and govemmental preferences. Moreover, Y Skogstad3 observation that provincial govemments are more closely tied ro the paàcular interest groups in their region than is the federal govemment is also consistent wîth such a dynamic:IS a particdar federal minister in charge of the CWB has more choice in deciding whch groups will be accorded a more favourable hearing than do provincial ministers who are directly tied IO the pamcular confikmation of prominent interest groups within their jurisdiction. There is also a larger pool of interest groups fiom which to choose. In addition, @venthat the federal governent by its nature as the national government, coven al1 of the temtory of multiple-province interest groups, the influence of such groups is snonger and more coherent at the federal order of

Ygovernment than at the provincial order of govemment. Within dus context, the interest group confiYgurationfavoured by Goodale was consistent with his pro-monopoly stance and thus also with the conflict which consequently began to emerge between the federal govermnent and the Govemment of Alberta on the issue of prairie wheat marketing. Goodale's interest group preferences were clear. Althou& he immediately attended the annual meetings of the wheat pools upon being appointed to the agriculture portfolio and was receptive to the suggestions of the National Farmers Union (?JFü)fiom the outset, he refused invitations to meet with representatives of the Western Canadian Wheat Growen Association (WCWGA) and the WBGA.19 In fact, Goodale became the fint agriculture minister to address an annual meeting of the NFU in eleven years.'O As will be seen, the minister, in these actions, favoured those interest groups which would come to supporr the continuation of the wheat monopoly over those which would come to support the concept of dual-marketing. The relative effectiveness of pro-rnonopoly groups over groups favouring dual-marketing in dealing with the current federal minister was also readily codirmed by interest group officiais? To the extent that Goodale's ompolitical-base mattered-" it also reflected this interest group confi-guration; as will be seen, the influence of general fm organizations and other pro-monopoly groups was geatea in Saskatchewan.

The characteristics of these three groups '3 and their eventual stances on the issue of wheat marketing might thus be briefly considered in order to more full>-understand the nature of Goodale's actions. To begn, the NFü would corne to favour the continuation of the single-desk selling of prairie wheat. In line with the position that would subsequently be articulated by the Govemment of Saskatchewa it believed that dual- marketing was an illusion (ie. that supplp management would necessarily end once open market selling was also allowed). NFLJ membenkip numbers were highest and most evenly spread in Saskatchewan, strong in the northem and central region of Alberta and moderate in the southem region of Manitoba The membership distribution also expressed an income cleavage: poorer farmers were more likely to be memben of the NN than richer fmers. The NFü's influence was very mngin Saskatchewan, moderate in Manitoba, and virtually non-existent in Alberta. In fact, the organization had traditionally ken influential in Saskatchewan regardless of the partisan stripe of the goverment in power. Thus, an already strong base was reinforced by the presence of an C NDP government with a leader dedicated to retaining the CWB monopoly over wheat. As seen, the NFU ahbecarne influential with the federal government in the early 199OYs,given the pro-monopoly views of the minister responsible for the CWB. The stance of the NFU was neatly summarized in its brief to the Western Grain Marketing Panel, whch would be appointed in 1995 by Goodale to "lead a comprehensive examination of western grain marketing is~ues":~'no submission was more supportive of the CWB than that of the MU. Not only did the NN support the continuation of the monopoly, but it even recommended extending it to the marketing of other grains and oilseeds. By contrast to the NN, the WCWGA strongly favoured dud-marketing for wheat. Of its 6000 members, 42 per cent resided in Alberta, 35 per cent in Saskatchewan, and 23 per cent in Manitoba. Its membership base vvas strongest in the central comdor of Alberta and southeastern Alberta. Similar to the W, members were also concentrated in the southem region of Manitoba and fairly evedy disnibuted in Saskatchewan. Unlike the NRT, however, the WCWGA tended to attract ncher fmers. Moreover, the WCWGA's influence was extremely snong in Alberta. In fact. the Alberta Governent often depended upon the WCWGA to provide background information on policy questions. The ideologcal convergence of the WCWGA and the PC governrnent in Alberta was also emphasized by its officials. By contrast to the NN, the generallp weak influence of the WCWGA in Saskatchewan regardless of soverning Party was reinforced by the presence of an NDP govement. Meanwhile, the organization's rapport in Manitoba was fairly strong, though less than in Alberta. The WCWGA strove for consistency in its stances on major issues that transcended provincial boundaries, while on single province issues, the regional office of the province involved assumed the lead. In stark opposition to that of the MU, the WCWGA7s brief to the federal marketing panel ernphasized that the freedom of the individual fmerto market gain should not be jeopardized for '-dubious" advantages. In addition to the WCWGA, the WBGA, although it was nomally a relatively minor group, was able to use the --spillovereffect" resulting from the short-lived continental barley market and its ties to the WCWGA and the United Grain Growers Lirnited (UGG) to heighten its profile. The WBGA. in line with its allies, favoured dual-marketing and was most influential in Albena. In this initial stage of the conflict, the federal government thus displayed its fundamental opposition to any change in the wheat marketing operations of the CWB. In doing soothe minister responsible for the CWB \vas willing to use interest groups as a resource to supplement the basic nation-building ambitions of the federal govemment. The previously established dual-consensus was breaking dom.

The confier escolores: The Alberta Government 's response targets whear marketing The scope of the breakdown in consensus soon became clearly apparent. In May of 1994, the Alberta Government began to cal1 for an end to not only the CWB's monopoly on barley. but also its monopoly on wheat? To these ends, the Govemmerit of Alberta presented a proposal which suggested thar the CWB3 rnonopoly should be retained for its sales to offshore markets and eliminated for wheat exports to the US and Mexico. Alberta's Minister of A-aiculture claimed that --theessence of the proposa1 [wu] to move away from a regulated system to one whch [would bel market-based and which [would allow] for cornpetition among gain companies and transporttion inter est^'-.'^ This stance was also reinforced by Alberta3 Deputy Minister of Agriculture, who pointed out that the sysxem broke down whenever there were *-unforeseenchallenges" because it was "rules-drives not marketdriven" and lacked flexibili~." From this point op the Alberta Govemment consistently advocated a dual-marketing regime for wheat. where the use of the CWE3 would be a matter of individual choice instead of being mandated by law .

The federal governrnent's reply to the proposal served to indicate Ïts intransigence on the issue of wheat marketing: the Aberta Governrnent received no response from ~oodaie.'~Throughout this period, Goodale simply continued to dismiss "every suggestion" that the CWB's rnonopoly was up for discus~ion.'~The lack of federal government action heightened the federal-provincial tensions. Alberta's Minister of Agriculture responded by threatening that a -'real problem" had been created bu the federal government's failure to respond. Moreover, he also pointed out that "in business

. . . it is unwise to ignore what our customers are telling you".'%e Alberta Govemment later reinforced these threats by declaring that it would move unilaterally to create a system of dual marketing if the matter was not dealt with soon. In this regard? the Agriculture Minister of Alberta also claimed that although the federal government refused to acknowledp that "the world is changing", it would soon "have to change uith l

In line with its threat, the Govermnent of Alberta organized a "Market Choices implementation Cornmittee'- in December 1995 to determine whether or not the Alberta Governrnent could take unilateral actions to help Alberta's producen circurnvent the - * CWB's monopoly3- Although the formation of the cornmittee finally drew a response from federal govement, which amounted to changing customs laws to stop the illegai export of wheat which had by this point become a widespread indication of the need for change. it predictably semed to heighten the conflicr." The conflict \vas reinforced because, as wili be seen, the media exposure of these srnugglers and their interest group, the Farmers For Justice (FFJ), reaffimed the resolve of al1 interest groups favowine dual- marketing to increase their pressure on the Alberta Govemment. The actions of the Alberta Govemment were a reflection of the gro-ing interest aoup pressure. As opposed to the federal govemment and its relationship to interest Y groups, in which the former essentially used the later as a resource in pursuing its govermnent-building goals, the Alberta Govemment was forced to react to the dernands emanating from the interest group confi_guration present withn its jurîsdiction. The WCWGA, for example, insisted that its pressure on the govemment, as well as that of other institutionalized groups, would continue to escalate because of the actions of the smugglers associated with the FFJ? Accordingly, the WCWGA called for 'a wide- .- ranghg overhall of Canada's entire gain .. . marketing -stemv." Given its "insider stahd' in the Alberta Department of Agriculture, the WCWGA also, not surprisingly, fully endorsed the Alberta Govenunent's proposal to end both the barley and wheat rn~no~olies.~~Likewise, the WBGA emphasized to the Alberta Govemment that fmers were 3aying they want[ed] a choice" when the? resoned to illegl actions in the face of federd govemment intmosigence." The position of the Aiberta Governrnent, however, was consistent with not only the influence of the WCWGA and the WBGA, which were introduced earlier, but also that of Wild Rose Agnculhiral Producen (WRAP) and interest groups representing cattle ranchers in the province. In line nith the WCWGA and the WBGA, WRAP also favoured dualmarketing for wheat. In this regard, WRAP emphasized the "&dom to chose", believing that the fom of marketing that was optimal for a particular cornmodity depended on its market and the condition of that market; either deregdation or supply management may be acceptable, dependmg on the circumstances. The or_gmization had members only in Alberta and attracted the support of wealthier famiers, although poorer farmers also supported the organization. Its strongest base of support was in the southeastem region of the province. WRAP's influence within the Aiberta Govemment itself was strong and, given the right federal minister responsible for the CWB, traditionally had the potential to enjoy fairly even policy input in both orders of government in its submission to the aforementioned federal marketing panel, WRAP emphasized that the future of grain marketing should be determined in a plebiscite of grain producers. This was very much in line with the ad~e~sementsof the Alberta Government, which were eventually aired in Alberta to support the govemment's dual- marketing stance.3g Similarly, a number of livestock producer associations also periodicall?; entered the debate ro support dual-marketing, given their interest in reducing feed costs. These groups were dso most influential in Alberta and had their largest membenhip base in the southeastern part of that province. The stance of the PC government of Alberta in the marketing debate thus reflected the confi=pration of interen groups in Alberta. The regional dimibution of strength of the institutionalized produal marketing groups, namely the WCWGA and WRAP, corresponded extreme!~well with not only the area of strongest PC support (narnely southeastem Alberta) but also with the region that contained the richest wheat fmers in al1 of the prairies (Maps 1.1,3).'9 Maps 1 and 2 indicate the consistency of the PC electoral strength over the two elections which spanned the emergence of the conflict- Map 3 indicates a correlation beween PC electoral mength and the location of higher income producers. By con- the pro-single desk NFü's region of greatest support was in the central and northem part of the province' in which the PCs were electorally weakest and a larger number of poorer farmers resided. Moreover, on the pro-monopoly side, the weakest of the major groupsothe NRI, was also a multi-province group. By con- the pro-dual marketing side was bolstered by the highly influential WRAP, which was also the on& major singe-province goup present in Alberta. In a reflection of the increasing solidification of the rnovement towards a market-orientation, WRAP was, as indicted in the previous chapter, traditionally more disposed towards pvemment regdation and assistance programs prior to the 1990's.~' The impact of groups favouring dual-marketing was also reinforced by the presence of the WBGA and livestock associations, which were also most influential in Alberta. The formation of the Market Choices Alliance in 1994, which eventually included the WBGA, the Alberta Barley Commission, the WCWGA and the UGG, additionally strengthened the dual-marketing orientation.'" Furthemore, the multi-province nature of the WCWGA \asoffset by its locational advantages relative to those of the NFU in relation to PC geographical dominance. The NFU was also weakest in Alberta, while the WCWGA \vas strongest. The Alberta Govemment thus heightened the conflict during this period by threatening the future of the wheat monopoly. It followed up this threat by organizing a committee to consider whether it would be possible for its fmen, with its help, to circurnvent the operations of the CWB. Although the federal government had set up a panel to consider the future of prairie grain marketing, it refused to open any discussions involving the CWB's wheat and barley monopoly with the Alberta Govemment.

Whear smugglzng. the FFJ, and the kmwiedge and information revulutton The Alberta Govenunent's conflict wiîh the federal govemment was, in part. dnven by established interest groups, such as the WCWGA and WRAP. In addition, the Government of Alberta also had to be concemed uith the EJ; which represented another source of pressure for ending the wheat monopoly. This grassroots impetus for conflict can to traced to early 1993 when two border-area Manitoba fkrmers: Dave Sawatzky and Andy McMechan, began expurîing grains under CWB jurisdiction without a CWB These two men would eventually become central figures in founding the RJ as an issue-oriented interest group focusing on the right of individual famiers to sell their own grain. By the end of 1993,40 truck loads of grain were being smuggled on a daily basis. Wihn the context of this smuggling, which did not necessarily distinguish between barley and wheat (al1 that mattered was that a higher US price \vas available). as well as the Charter challenge, the issues raised by the continental barley market dispute quickly spread to the area of wheat marketing and found a receptive governrnent in Al berta. Thus, the barley marketing dispute won became essentidly indistinguishable fiom the wheat marketing dispute. In fact, given the overall importance of the wheat crop to the prairies relative to that of the barley crop, the fiiture of wheat marketing came to dominate the debate. The burgeoning federal-provincial confiict was Meraugrnented when the full extent of the smuggling first became known. In February 1994, the first reports of grain smuggling began to appear in the media? By June 1994, US customs natistics revealed that 387 000 tonnes of gain had been illegally exported in 1993.~SawatAq who had already assumed a high media profile and "hero" status amongst a number of producers, became the first person to be fined under the federal goverment's new "anti-smuggling" law in September of 1994.'~ However, withui the context of a sympathetic configuration of interest groups in Alberta 367 000 tomes of grain (ten per cent of the total grain trade with the US); approximately the same amount as in the previous year, made its way illegally across the border in 1994 despite the new federal law? Furthemore, a standoff involving Sawatzlq, as well as McMechan and a hrdfmer, Bill Cairns, who would al1 help found the FFJ, occurred after Sawatzky wras threatened with the prospect of being arrested upon rernoving a roadblock and driving a grain ûxck across the border without a CWB permit. Sawatzky was fined 52600 as a result of the incident." The Sawatzky and McMechan fmswere subsequently "raided" by the RCMP, who seized their financial records. The producers opposing the CWB's wheat monopoly, who were soon to have the ear of the Alberta Goveniment as members of the new issue-oriented FFJ, was thus Merreuiforced Indeed, & this point, the wheat marketing issue had entered the unworkably emotional and symbolic realm usually reserved for constitutional politics. As a result, the determination of both sides in the debate grew steady during 1994. By November 199.1: pro-market choice rallies as well as pro-rnonopoly counter demoostrations began to become more fiequent, Merincreasing the pressure on the govemments invol~ed.~~ the choice often by C Although pro-market rallies were organized the group of fmers soon to be known as the FJ,they were also supported by the WCWGA and WRAP. By contrast, the counter-demonstrations were generally organized by the NN and counted on the support of the CM. In iine with the increased media exposure of the debate and the continued determination of those involved, incidents involving grain smugglers continued unabated in 1995, and ultimately reinforced the pressure on the Alberta Govemment. J9 The central event of 1995, however, occurred during the summer when the activities of the main smugglen were powemilly reinforced with the founding of the FFJ. The Y officia1 institutionalized groups supporting dualmarketing were thus drarnatically joined by an issue-oriented group. The FF+Jrapidly grew to include 500 to 800 very vocal members who were at the centre of the ongoing grain smuggling saga. This membership ws large. composeci of fmers who lived within mckin_edistance of the Canadian-US border in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Although it was originally founded by producers in Manitoba, producers in southeastern Alberta soon readily ernbmced the moup. AS seen' the Alberta Government, aven its previous interest goup configuration. C tended to most readily support the ETJ, while the Saskatchewan Government tended to most readily oppose the group. Thus, the FFJ, as the one issue-oriented group that was of any consequence, also had its Iargest impact in Alberta; the FFJ found its govemmental ally not in Manitoba, where it was founded, but in Alberta where influence of other interest groups favouring dual- marketing interest groups was unparalleleci. As seen, its main area of strength coincided with the region containing the wealthiest famers and the bedrock of Alberta's PC support. The strength of the FFJ in Alberta was also relnforced by the support that it received fiom the WCWGA and the WBGA, which were both established interest groups that were, as seen, also most influentid in the province.5@Moreover,the memben of the EJwere readily aware of îheir ability to increase support for their cause with each of their actions. " In tum,this rnay be seen to have increased the pressure on the Alberta Governent by way of the estabiished groups. Although it had support in Manitoba and Saskatchewan among border region famiers who tend to favow dual-marketing, the FFJ's geographical location and ideoiogical position did not accord well with that of the Saskatchewan NDP no- as will be seen, tvivith the cornpetitive interest group configuration of either Saskatchewan or Manitoba. Moreover, gïven this smctural difference, the group's multiple province nature tended to place it at a greater theoretical disadvantage in Saskatchewan and Manitoba than in Alberta Just as the activities of the srnugglen supported the movement towards increasing the pressure of interest groups on the Alberta Government, the activities of the smugglers - and other farmers - were also supported by underlying factors that did not fully emerge until the 1990's. One of these factors was the knowledge and information revolution, which became increasingly evident in the fieid of wheat marketing in the 1990'~~ effectively ending the CWB's marketing information monopoly in the North Amencan market. Beyond the actions of the FFJ, the implications of ths revolution were also readily recognized by the institutionaiized interest gro~ps.'~Thus, aithough the foundations for the revolution were laid in previous decades, the flowering of the revolution did not occur until the 1990's. The divergent views of younger and older farmers on the wheat marketing issue provides ready evidence of the impact of the knowledge and information revolution: fmers who favoured duai-marketing tended to - - be under the age of 50' while those over 50 tended to support the CWB monopoly." A number of interconnected factors relating to the knowledge and infomtion revolution underlay this divide; although the movement towards more hi@ y educated, "information hungry" fmers was evident prior to the 19903, the importance of these factors increased as fming increasingly became a capital-intensive business. With the rationakation of the farm sector in the 198OYs,wheat fming increasingly tended to emphasize the importance of business management shlls. Moreove- many of the farmea who survived the 1980's began to grow non-CWB crops they could market themselves usuig their newly acquired expertise to trade their crops on commodity markets or sel1 them directly to buyers outside of the commodity market. Sucb success was translated into farmer confidence in other areas, such as the marketing of CWB crops, whether or not it was j ustified This revolution was also theoretically dependent upon the advances in information technology which occurred in the 1990's. These changes were again evident in the wheat firming sector. By 1993, a large and growing number of fmshad home computers linked to satellite information services, such as Globa-Li& which provided the latest information that could impact commodity prices, including news from the Winnipeg and Chicago markets and weather infornation from around the world" The produal marketing fmers were then able to access the sarne information as brokers in order to use their business management skills to market their own crops. In sum, it appears that a new generation of farmers increasingly felt cornfortable and confident in marketing its own products given both its skills and the availability of infonnation. In fact, increasing numbers of fmers claimed that the CWB was not "sman enou&" to market their product.sï Moreover, the age divide also suggests that the trend towards market approaches is likely to continue to increase as older farmers leave the business. Nevertheless. the information revolution had its limits: a distinction may be made between onshore and offshore markets. While the sldIs and the information to market wheat may have been adequate for tramactions in Canada and the US, offshore markets added problems that were not liliely to be overcome in the short-term. For example, offshore transactions were impeded by language problerns and transportation dificulties, which were not of concem in the North American market, particularly for border area farme~s.'~Even staunch opponents of the CWB acknowledged the contïnued pre- eminence of the CWB in offshore marketing. Dual-marketen thus readily conceded that the "connectionso' and the "expertise" of the CWB allowed it to sel1 wheat in places that individu& as well as transnational grain companies could not even have "dream[ed] ,f7 - 57 The impact of the revolution was thus greatest in the North American market. The dual-marketing approach may therefore be viewed as a naturai reflection of this offshore-onshore dichotorny. In sum, the howledge and information revolution may be seen to have cleared the way for the marketing of wheat outside of the CWB monopoly. The impact of the revolution is evident in the actions of the FFJ and wheat smugglers more generally. The conflict that emerged between the Alberta Govemment and the federal government was supported by these changes in the availabiiity of information and howledge.

No baszs for compromise: Borh sides stnndfirm as federd marketing panel reporz released In 1995, the federal government appointed its nine-member Western Grain Marketing Panel to study the future of prairie grain marketing. On 1 July 1996, after iistening to presentations and submissions of fmers and fmerorganizations fiom across the prairies, the federal marketing panel concluded its examination of Westem grain marketing and released its eagerly awaited report. Although the report rnight have had the potential to offer the heworkfor compromise, it became immediately obvious that this potential had not been anained. Ln fact, the panel itself confirmeci the pervasive and embedded extent of the conflict in its observation of the presence of "a deep and fundamental division .. . among farmers".j8On the economic front, the panel recornrnended that while most classes of wheat for export and Canadian human consumption should continue to be marketed through the board famiers should have the option of selling a small portion of their wheat outside the board's monopoly. Althou& such sales would be still be made with the involvement of the CWB, the board would use prices established through the Mi~eapolisGrain Exchange or the Winnipeg Cornrnodity Exchange. On the govemance front, the panel recommended that the board should be govemed by a partially elected Board of Directors composed of a majority of fmers. Although the Klein governrnent called for the immediate implementation of the recommendations of the federal marketing panel's report, it also indicared that the report did not go far enough. jg Paszkowski7scriticisms focused on the contention that producers of wheat and barley designated for export or domestic human consumption should have the same "marketing choice" as producers of grains outside the CWB's rnon~pol~.~~By contras& Goodale believed that the report went beyond what was desirable or neces~ary~~ The need for the federal marketing panel's examination, the report itself, and the reactions to it al1 reflected the increasingly globalized setting in which prairie wheat marketing began to find itself In fact, the need to expand international regimes in the area of wheat marketing was, by this time, generally acknowledged by dl governments invo1ved6' Aithough Alberta continued to assume the lead in pressing for a cornpetitive and market-oriented apculniral policy, al1 first ministers agreed to pledge their cornmitment to GATT principles as they related to agriculture, including decreasing al1 trade dmoning subsidies, increasing access to international markets, and implementing enforceable trade Accordingly, the access to the US market secured by the FTA in the late 1980's was reinforced by the NAFTA in 1993 and the GATT in 1995.& Beyond opening the US market, the deepening of international regimes had also served to increase the direct and explicit pressure on Canadian governrnents to reevaluate the CWB's onshore rn~no~ol~.~~For example. the Canada-United States Joint Commission on Grains recommended that the CWB be "restmctured" either on a commercial or voluntary bais.* Among the Canadian governments, the latter suggestion was readily endorsed by the Govemment of Alberta The Klein governrnent, for example. emphasized the need to make the CWB more "transparent?' in light of GATT and NAFTA.~' Accountability and economic issues were thus also seen to be interrelated and munially reinforcing Moreover, ever broadening fiee trade regimes reinforced and accelerated Alberta's longer-tem redirection of trade towards the US from the previous east-west axis. as previously indicated6' Accordingiy, Alberta had by this tirne, within the larger setting examined above, strengthened its ties to two relatively self-suficient trading regions: the Rochi- Mountain Corridor, which included Alberta, B.C., Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Idaho?and Colorado, and Cascadia which included Alberta, B.C.? Montana, Alaska, Washington and Oregon. As seeq this accelerated redirection was readily evident in the transportation sector!' To be sure. Alberta's integration into a regonal economy was limited by the economic and social ties of Canadian federa~ism.'~Nevertheless, the movement towards the regonal-international interface in Alberta in particular, and also the West more generally, was readily evident.

The Alberta Government responds IO the federai marketing panel report Although the Govemment of Alberta was initially inciined to limit its imrnediate response to the federai marketing panel's report to calls for its rapid implementation, interest group pressure soon forced the Alberta Government to move beyond such a response and to escalated the federal-provincial conflict by ushering it into the constitutional realm. This initial attitude was evident in the Alberta Govenunent's disinclination to move ahead with litigation in the wheat marketing area; Alberta's Deputy Minister of Agriculture had tned to avoid a "head-on confrontation" with Ottawa at least witil the federal marketing panel's report had been released because of fean that Alberta might lose." The Govemment of Alberta had in other words, hoped to avoid Merconfrontation by using the report as a vehicle for compromise. Alberta's prdual marketmg interest groups, however, appeared to have held out no such hope once the final report of the panel was made available to them. Any restraint in interest group pressure evident prior to the release of the report immediately vanished. The Alberta Govemment was thus subjected to a barrage of interest group pressure to take action on the matter of the future of wheat marketing, particularly after it smed that it might stop work on the legal challenges it was considering." The rernarks of the president of the WBGA who berated the Alberta Government's initial reaction as a Ibetrayal" and denounced the Alberta Minister of Agriculture as a "weak ally" who did not have 'rhe courage or political will to pay more than lip senrice to the issue", provides ready evidence of the pressure faced by the Alberta Government during this penod from -- interest goups in the province. " Accordingly, the Govemment of Alberta soon moved to accommodate the dernands of these groups and became involved in three major legal actions relating to the wheat monopoly. First, the Govemment of Alberta attempted to seek a declaration in the Federal Court of Canada that the CWB delivery contract progam vas invalid under the CWB AC^? In other words, the CWB Act was challenged on the bais that the actions of the federal govenunent were illegal under its own legislation. In particuiar, the Alberta Govemment contended that the program was one-sided in favour of the CWB, allowed for arbitrary action, and thus did not allow farmen to manage risk, uncertainty, and cash 80w. Second, the Alberta Govemment simultaneously launched the Alberta Marketing Choice Program Reference case, which drew on the work of the Market Choices hplementation Committee. This action sought to refer a number of questions relating to a program that the Alberta Government had designed for presentation to the Alberta Court of Appeal. The program in question would allow the Goveniment of Alberta to buy grain grown in Alberta fiom famers resident in the province and sel1 that grain in the US market. Thus, the most significant question was the contention of the Alberta Govemment that it could expon grain without a license because the CWB Act did not speciQ that it applied to any govemment. Third, the Govemment of Alberta also began to support the Charter challenge examined earlier.75 Moreover? the Alberta Minister of Agriculture, within the context of îhese lawsuits, also again threatened to move unilaterdly to create a "dual-market" for wheat invohng the language and tactics of the hyper-conflictuai realm of Canadian constitutional politics.76 Furthemore, the competitive ambitions of governmental elites were also evident in the suggestion that an Alberta Wheat Board may be created, perhaps in line with the reference case? The conflictual nature of the federal-provincial relations in this area was also himighted by the concem that Alberta Govemrnent bureaucrats expressed over the possibility of federal govemment "retaliati~n".'~Clearly? the legal actions had exacerbated the dispute.

The Saskatchewan Governent weighs in The interest goup confiCrnirationthat faced Saskatchewan3 governmental elites also quickly becarne evident in response to the iitigation involathe Alberta Govement. It \vas not the federal goovement' but the Govemment of Saskatchewan that initially threatened to biock Alberta's challenges.'g The clearly pro-rnonopoly stance of the Saskatchewan Govement, which underla); this threat, was readily e~identin its initial

reaction to the federal marketing panel's report By contrast to the AIberta Govemment. the Govemment of Saskatchewan claimed that the report went too far towards dual- marketing and that it was not an accurate reflection of the majority of submissions to the panel. whch it claimed favoured the continuation of single-desk ~elling~~ Saskatchewan's Minister of Agriculture stated that he was upset by the recommendations of the report.8' Ln line with the growing emotion and symbolism of the confiict Saskatchewan's Minister of Crown Investments even uttered profanities at memben of the FFJ who were present while he was addressing a pro-monopoly rallp at Rosetown. He also suggested that the FFJ's members were the types that 'destroy . .. social programs" and that "freedom of speech" might have reached its lirnits with the FFJ.~' Governmental conflict was even evident in relation to the activities of the ad- monopoly fmers themselves when the Govement of Saskatchewan demanded that a border sign erected by the FFJ stating "Welcome to Canada, the only countxy in the free world that jails it's [sic] fmers for growlng and selling their own wheat" be remo~ed.~' By contrast, the Alberta Government refüsed to cooperate with a Canada Customs request bat Alberta legislahue officiais help in dealing with an ami-monopoly protestg The Saskatchewan and Alberta govemments also responded with their own newspaper and radio advertisements re~~ectivel~.~'This conflict was also becoming evident in the Advisory Cornmittee to fhe CWB, where candidates favouring duai-marketing fiom Alberta were increasingiy running against those favouring monopoly-marketing from ~askatchewan.~ The escalation of the federal-provincial conflict outlined to this point, which centred on the gowing involvement of the Saskatchewan Governrnent, reflected a new and more concerted round of fmeragitation in July and Au,- of 1996. Although these efforts began with a mlly in Regina of 100 fmers associated with the FFJ in another show of support for ~c~echan,~'pro-monopoly farmen soon responded in convincing fashion. Rallies supporting the single-desk selling of wheat were held in Regina, Rosetown. Winnipeg, Edmonton (at the Alberta legistue), and Oak Bluff attracting 150, 1500,600, 700' and 600 producers respecti~ely.~' Saskatchewan's actions aIso refiected those of the NFU, which condemned the federal marketing panel's report as "disingenuous'- and as representing an "interim step towards dismantling the ~oard".~~Beyond putting pressure on the Saskatchewan Governent the NFU immediately began a letter writing carnpaign against the Marketing Panel report by publishing a sample letter as an însert to the Wëstern ~roducer? In addition, the CWB's bureaucrats published a critique of the report and faxed a letter fiom a fmerto news or~gmizationsto demonstrate "popular support" for the rnon~~ol~.~' In this regara the srance of the Govemment of Saskatchewan, as with that of the Alberta Govement, was also st~ikinglyconsistent wvith the configuration of interest groups in Saskatchewan. The regional distribution of membership of the WCWGA and the NFü was fairly even both within the region of NDP support and within Saskatchewan more generally (Maps 4,5). The areas of NDP electoral success in the last two Saskatchewan general elections are laid out in Maps 4 and 5, which show the geographical location of MLAs by their partisan affiliation In addition, the geographical distribution of poorer farmers, who tend to favour single-desk selling, also accords well with the regions of NDP support seen in Maps 4 and 5. Map 6 shows the geographical distribution of fmen by their relative fami incornes. Not surpisingiy, these findings are consistent with the large difference in the influence of the NFü and the WCWGA in Saskatchewan. While the WCWGA had its weakest influence in Saskatchewan, the NRI had its strongest influence. Moreover, while the WCWGA's membership numbers were moderate in Saskatchewan, the NFü had its largest membership base in the province. Ln addition, multi-province goups would have theoretically tended to have been mosr effective in Saskatchewan because of the absence of powefil Saskatchewan-specific interest groups. In other words, given the relative influence of the different types of eroups, cererisparibus, the less idiuential groups wouid have been more innuential in a Y seîting where othenvise more powerful groups were absent. Furthemore, producer interests, when viewed ùuough interest group oqanizations, appear to have been strong, united, and certain. The interest group confiamation in Saskatchewan thus appean to have readily reinforced the singledesk selling stance of the Saskatchewan NDP. The interest group configurations and the societai forces that underlay these configurations thus also served as a Merindication of the degree of contlict in the wheat marketing area in the 1990's: federal-provincial conflict might have also erupted with a pro-rnarket federai minister in charge of the CWB. Instead of being centred in Alberta, the conflict would likely have been centred in Saskatchewan. Althou* often dnven by pressure fiom interest groups, Cairns' image of govemments as "lumbering mastadons in tireless cornpetition" is thus again evoked. By contrast to the other prairie govemrnents, the Manitoba Government was noticeably absent from the debate. As with the stances taken by the Aiberta Government and the Saskatchewan Govemment, however?interest groups again played a central role: this absence was iess a reflection of a lack of province-building than of the particular configuration of interest groups in Manitoba, which were more b'cross-cumng"92than in Alberta and Saskatchewan. This crosscutting balance between interest groups on both sides of the wheat marketing debate in Manitoba was made possible by the presence of Keystone Agricultural Producers (KAP), which was an institutionalized group operating only in Manitoba. Like the NFUoKAP favoured single-desk selling and tended to attract poorer farmers. In its federal marketing panel submission, KAP strongly supported CWB marketing and emphasized not only the need for singie-desk selling, but also the need for pooling and the governmental pamiership proklded by the CWB. The configuration of interest groups in Manitoba thus tended to correspond to the noncomrnittal stance of Manitoba's PC ~overnment." The area of mongest influence of the MU, WCWGA and KAP accorded well with the areas of PC suppon (Maps 7,8). The rnaps, covering the provincial general election immediately before and derthe debate began, show the area of PC support in the southern part of Manitoba by highlighting the partisan dimibution of MLAs. As indicated, Manitoba was a province of fairly strong WCWGA influence and moderate duence for the NFU. Moreover. the WCWGA and the NFU should in relative tenns have been less influentid than KAP mven the multiple province organization of the fomier groups and the single province Y organization of the latter group. Thus, the influence of groups favouring single-desk selling and those favouring dud-marketing appear to have been relativelp balanced. This balance was also reinforced by the geographical distribution of farmers in Manitoba by income (Map 9). Map 9 shows that Manitoba's wheat growining region, which \vas also the region that elected PC MLA's, included fairly even numbers of farmers tending towards the low end, centre, and hi& end of the income continuum.

A final evenr: Thefederd governent responds tu the federal marketing panel report and the Albertu Government The federal govemment's response to the federal marketing panel report, which favoured the stance of the Saskatchewan Government, Merfiieled the conflict. In September 1996, Goodale announced his intention to introduce changes to the CWB ~ct.~'ïhe centrality of Goodaie in formulating the federal government's position, whose unwillingness to compromise continued to exacerbate the conflict, was again evident: Chrétien claimed that he was "confident that the wheat board [was] there to stay" as a prelude of support for the forthcoming legislation that Goodale had fomulatedg5 The federal govemment's specific position in the debate was introduced by Goodale in the fom of Bill C-72 in December of 1996. This proposed amendment to the CWB Act retained the CWBoswheat monopoly while making superficial changes to increase CWB accountability to famers and minor changes in the way the board would market pins.% Furthermore, to the extent that the federal government was willing to make changes reiating to govemance issues, on which dlgovemments in principle agreed, the economic issues related to the debate over the merits of single-desk selling versus dual- marketing assumed even pater prominence following the introduction of the amendment. The conflict, predictably, showed no signs of easing. In facf both sides reinforced their positions. Althou@ the Alberta Government remained reluctant to pursue iü legal challenges in the face of Bill C-72, it was again forced into a belligerent stance by its interest group configuration. The president of the WBGA, for example, threatened that the Alberta Government had "'better get tuned up" to its mandate of creating a duai- market or presumably pay the electoral c~nse~uences.~~Accordingly_ although Alberta3 Minister of Agriculture would have preferred not to resort to legal measures, he was 1:evertheless forced to hire eight lawyers and convene meetings "throughout the province to discuss the ramifications of Bill ~-72".~~Moreover, he voiced his displeasure with the fact that the proposed Board of Directors contained in Bill C-72 wouid have no more real decision-making authoiity than the previous Advisory Cornmittee, that dl marketing operations would remain '-secretive and monopolistic", and that the changes would not increase the efficiency of the CWB.~' In another indication of the interest group pressure on the Alberta Government as well as the fhretrajectoq of the conflict another member of the Alberta Government suggested that the province should escalate the conflict further still by assuming more of a proactive position, rather than merely reacting to an unresponsive federal govenunent As a result, Alberta's Minister of Agriculture clairned that he would consider establishing an Alberta Wheat Board after the Alberta Court of Appeal ruled on whether the CWB Act applied to the Crown."' Furthermore, although the arguments of the Charter case were dismissed by Justice Muldoon in an April 1997 decision, the ding was immediately appealed by the Alberta Government and the interest groups involved in the case.'0' Despite Alberta's actions and threats, however, Goodaie claimed that he intended to reintroduce Bill C-72 without alteration in the Chrétien govement's second terdo3 Ln additioq the federal government's pro-monopoly stance on wheat marketing was Mer reinforced afier the 1997 federal election with the elevation of Goodale's clout within the cabinet. Goodale, as the minister responsible for the CWB, joined the mnks of the inner cabinet as he moved from agriculture to become the federal resource minister. 'O4 The continued codict aiso reflected the underlying frustration and determination of market-oriented producers which also remained readily evident: in particular, the jailing of producers for attempting to market their own grain was perceived to have been unjustified by the farmers and interest groups involved who viewed it as "heaky-handed intimidation7, .105 Moreover, convictions involvhg fines also conrinued. '" in this regard, the FFJ organized the "Andy 5007', a mass illegal border crossing in response to McMechan's perceived "politicai incarceration 77 .107 The determination of the media sawy FFJ, as well as other interes groups favouring dual-marketing, was also Mer reinforced during this pesod by the federal govemment's plebiscite on barley marketing, held in early 1997, which was perceived to have been "rigged by groups favouring an end to single-desk selling because the dualmarketing option was not included. log The vice-president of the WBGA denounced the plebiscite as merely se~ngas a "diversion for Bill C-72". 'O9 In sum, the federal legislation to amend the CWB Act was the last of a series of events which served to ipteand escalate federal-provincial conflict. In a marner indicative of the conflict of the period, Bill C-72 did nothing to soften the dispute over wheat marketing. By contrast to the federal-provincial hamiony of previous decades. federal-provincial conflict continued unabated in the 1990's.

Conclusion The analysis has tested various approaches in order to determine those which are central to explainhg the increased federal-provincial confiict in the area of prairie wheat marketing in the 1990's. No one perspective was able to adequately account for al1 aspects of the dispute. Taken together, the globalization, goverment-building, and interest group perspectives have been seen to provide a usefûl theoretical framework consistent with the evidence provided by the events of the contlict as well as the historical foundations laid out in the previous chapter. Accordingly, the chapter has suggested that, $vert the qualitative as well as quantitative expansion of globalization, a specific set of interest groups. centred in Alberta but also present elsewhere, began cailing for "globalized" solutions to the economic demands of wheat producers and using the power of govemrnents and the ambitions and cornpetitive nature of govemmental elites to press these demands. in a manner simïlar to that of the debate which surrounded the implementation of Part iD of the Trwportation Act where interest groups "played off' the two orden of govemrnent against each other-' 'O the evidence suggests that interest groups were willing to lobby whichever govemment was mon receptive to their demands in order that their demands may be amplified by the expertise and consritutional power of that governrnent. Although the impacts of globalization were felt throughout the prairies, an interest goup configuration espousing market-oriented restnicturing was most readily combined with a willing provincial governrnent in Alberta The hstorically evident globaikation-oriented ambitions of Alberta3 govemmental elites was thus hamessed by a powerfid and mutuaily reinforcing set of interest groups with new "giobalized demands for the marketing of wheat. The politically mobilized impact of globaiization in Alberta does not, however, provide suscient evidence that the wheat marketing dispute mut necessarily be centreed in Alberta. Given the powerfil and rnutually reinforcing patterns of interest group strength in the prairie provinces, the chapter suggests that the focal point of the dispute was more readily dependent upon the stance of the federal govemment which, as seen, was more flexible than provincial government stances. The dispute rnight well have been centred in Saskatchewan had the federal minister responsible for the CWB been more responsive to the demands of market-oriented interest groups. In conclusion, the globalization, govemment-building and interest group perspectives together appear to be consistent with expiaining the outbreak of federal-provincial conflict in the wheat marketing area in the 1990's. Although the influence of interest goups and govemmental etites had been felt for some time in the wheat marketing arena? the multifaceted impact of the emergence of globdization on these variables was new. This final chapter will begin by giving a brief surnmary of the midy. This summary will also serve to highlight the significance of the findings of the thesis. namely that societal factors are in some cases central to understanding the nature of fderal- provincial relations and that the notion of federal-provincial relations may be less synonymous with federaf-provincial conflict than is often assumed This will be followed bu a brief assessrnent of the likely future of federal-provincial relations in the area of wheat marketing in relation to the three approach mode1 used in the analysis.

Surnmary and Findings The review of the literature on the nature of fideral-provincial relations reveded that some approaches are better suited to explain the field of prairie wheat marketing than others. Two socieral approaches were seen to be particularly useful. The globalization perspective appeared to have the potential to ovenvhelm other factors in ils abilie to explain stability in its absence and change in its presence: its forces were not ody wide- ranging, indeed international, in their scope, but also mdtifaceted The sweeping effects of the growth of international regimes, the cornbined maturation of the knowledge and information revolutions, and the increasing instinitionalization of the regional- international interface were seen to provide a far-reaching explanation for stability and change. Although also able to account for stability and change, the interest group approach was seen to complement the globalization perspective with its ability to account for the presence or absence of intergovemmental variations in stances taken on the issue of monopoly marketing. Although these socially-based perspectives form the core of the model, they were also joined by the government-building perspective in order to account for the involvement of governmental actors during both periods. Like the dobalization perspective, the government-building approach was seen to be usefûl Y because of its broad applicability. More specifically, the central conîribution of the perspective was seen as twofold: to highlight the importance of the presence of powerful and resource-rich governments per se and to account for the possible role of ambitious govemmental elites in federal-provincial relations. Chapter 3 demonmated the cen~alityof societal approaches in explaining the tradition of federal-provincial harmony that until recently prevailed on the issue of wheat marketing. During this penod, a consensus had emerged by the 1940's thar supported the monopolization of wheat marketing through the CWB. AIthough the chapter identified changes in the structure of ths support that would evennially lead to federal-proklncial conflict, the support for single-desk selling and federal-provincial cooperation in wheat marketing remained in place unül the 1990's. In this regard. the chapter showed that this hamony was supported by both the presence of an interest group consensus on the matter and the absence of a nurnber of forces associated with globaiization. The structure of interest groups in the area of wheat marketing had two phases. During the tirst phase, the wheat monopoly-consensus. once it became established, kvas initially centred around the CFA, whch favoured govemment invention in wheat marketing. While other smaller interest groups were also active, the CFA managed to reüun a vimd rnonopoly of govemmental influence. The second phase was marked by a proliferation of influential interest groups. The CFA was joined by a number of other groups in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Although some of these groups also favoured governrnent intervention, othen favoured a market-orientation. The stage was thus set for potential federal- provincial disagreement on the issue of wheat marketing. During both phases of this period of federal-provincial harmony, however, these interest groups remained generallp undifferentiated in their support of the CWB wheat monopoly.

Federal-provincial harmonp \\.as also seen to be consistent with the absence of the full impact of various forces associated with globaiimtion, which would later relentlessly sweep across the area of wheat marketing. Although some of the foundations were beine laid for the blossoming of international regimes, the regional-international interface, and the information and knowledge revolution, these forces had not yet reached a critical mas in the wheat marketing area. Both the proliferation of interest groups and the tentative emergence of globalization in the wheat marketing area towards the end of ths period were, however, seen to have contributed to a federal-provincial harmony which was centred on an arnbiguous and internally inconsistent dual-consensus, which combined the initially unambiguous wheat monopoly-consensus with a market onented- consensus that had emerged in other areas. Although an initial lag of province-building behind nation-building in the prairies had been overcome and a differentiated set of interest group actors were in place, the forces of plobalization had not emerged to the point where these market-oriented interest groups wouid begin to demand a globalized solution to the problem of wheat marketing on a provincially-differentiated basis. Therefore. the tradition of federal-provincial harmony in the field of wheat marketing continued to prevail even as conflia emerged in man'; other areas of federal-provincial relations begiming in the 1960's. Chapter 4 again demonstrated the centralie of the forces of globalization and interest groups to the federal-provincial relations in the area of wheat marketing in the 1990's. By contrast to the findings of the previous chapter; however: these variables now served to destroy rather than to perpetuate federai-provinciai harmony. The impact of the full force of globalization was readily evident. By the 1990's, the regional-international interface was well established in Alberta and the opening of the US wheat market through international regimes and the information and knowledge revolution was occurring in al1 three provinces. Now that a viable alternative existed, interest groups began to take differentiated stances on the future of the CWB wheat rnonopoly. Mile the cross-cutting interest group configuration of Manitoba resulted in a noncornrnittal stance on the issue by the Manitoba Governrnent, the respective produal marketing and pro-monopoly stances of the Alberta Govemment and the Saskatchewan Government reflected the positions of more unidirectional and mutually reinforcing provincial interest group configurations and served as a bais for conflict. Although interest groups at the provincial order of govemment recognized the importance of govemmental resources in helping them meet their objectives, the role of pvernrnental elites suggested by the government-building approach was otherwise ovenhadowed by the centraiity of these groups: interest groups pushed a reluctant Alberta Govemment into an escaiating conflict with the federal govemment in an effort to use Alberta's vast govemmentai resources to their promote their goal of the establishment of a dual market for wheat. By contrast, at the federal order of govemenf the ambitions of govemmental elites assümed a more centrai role: it was the rnînister in charge of the CWB who chose and used a particular configuration of interest groups as a resource to reinforce the monopolistic direction of the federal govemment 's nation-building ambitions. The orientation of the federal minister in charse of the CWB thus determined the mis of the conflict; because of his pro-monopoly stance, the conflict became centred in Alberta. Overall, the chapter served to demonstrate how federal-provincial conflict erupted as the historically present globalization-onented ambitions of Alberta's governmental elites, already beniWdyand tentatively present in the previous chapter. were hamessed by an influentid and mutually reinforcing set of interest groups with new globdized demuids for the marketing of wheat and opposed by a determined federal minister. The foregoing sumrnary points to the important findings of this thesis. First, the thesis suggests that societal factors, such as globalization and interest groupsoare in some cases central to understanding the nature of federal-provincial relations. Second, the thesis also indicates that the federal-provincial relationship rnay in some areas be more harmonious than is often assumed. Cairns' image of Caaadian governments acting like

-'lumbering mastadons in tireless cornpetition--,l which captures the emphasis that has often been placed on not only on the centrality of governrnental factors, but also on the presence of federal-provincial conflict?is thus challenged by the findings of ths study.

The Future of Prairie Wheat Marketing The analysis in the preceding chapters suggests that in the short-term, conflictual federal-provincial relations are likely to continue. In the longer-term, however, the thesis suggests that federal-provincial harmony may be restored as the forces of globalization continue to wash over the prairie provinces and the federal govemment. The likehhood of the continuation of the current federal-provincial conflict in the short-tem stems fiom a nurnber of facton which tend to severely limit the range of solutions available. In rhis regard, any solution must take into account a nurnber of factors flowing fiom the perspectives wed to explain both the histoncal federal- provincial hamonp and the curent federal-provincial dispute. To begm, the forces of àobalization are not likely to dissipate in the near hime. Moreover, given the pervasive Y nature and international scale of these forces, the evidence also suggests that the changes they usher in are not likely to be stopped or even readily contained with govemmental action. Likewise, amidst the development and presence of such strong and wide-ranging forces, the presence and influence of market-oriented interest groups is also unlikely to decline. in fact, the trajectory of the larger environmental changes embedded in the

c.dobalization approach suggest that, in the long-terml the uifluence of such market- oriented groups will only increase. Meanwhile, in the short-tenq the embedded and mutually reinforcing nature of the interest group confi-mations in the prairie proklnces must also be accornmodated in any solution which intends to restore a harrnonious federal-provincial relationship. In particular, the stances of the Alberta Government and the Saskatchewan Government must be acknowledged: not only are the positions of these governent clearly opposed to one another, but this clarity is a reflection of the presence of provincially-differentiated configuratious of powerful interest groups. Similarly, any solution mut also acknowledge the continued presence of powemil provincial governments and influentid govemmental elites. The resources, expertise, and ambitions of govemments, by their very nature, are not likely to suddenly disappear. Beyond these constraints, the nature of the debate itself also places a limit on the range of viable solutions: the dispute is not amenable to a prairie-wide compromise that establishes a rniddle ground between the dual-marketen and monopolists. If, for exarnple, producers are given even the slightest authority to seil their own wheat outside the mechanisms of the CWB, then a dual-market would be operational. Thus, the options available consist of eîther a dual-market, as favoured by the configuration of interest groups in Alberta, or a continuation of the CWB monopoly, as favoured by the configuration of interest groups in Saskatchewan. Similarly, the analysis has also suggested that a change in the stance of the federal minister responsible for the CWB would most likely not mean an end to federal-provincial conflict in the shon-term. Given that Saskatchewan's position is also solidy consistent with its interest group configuration, a federal govemment capitulation to Alberta's demands wï11 likely have the effect of merely shifting the centre of the conflict from one federal-provincial venue to another. The oniy short-term solution to the conflict would thus appear to be an asymmetrical marketing arrangement in which each of the prairie govemments is given the authonty to establish its own wheat marketing regime. Such authority would have to be granted to provincial governments on a province-by-province basis because anp arrangement that leaves the option at a producer level would result in prairie-wide dual marketing. Under such an arrangement, the CWB monopoly could?as a result, continue to operate for provinces choosing to remain in its jurisdiction. Moreover, the Muidoon decision., whch found that the CWB monopoly does not ~lolateCharter rights despite applying only to fmers on the prairies, suggests that a legal challenge to the potentially asymmetrical nature of such an arrangement by, for example. dis_auntled promarket farmen living in monopolistic Saskatchewan would likely not be upheld To be sure, at the individual level, such an asymmetrical solution would not satise al1 producers, especially those living in the southern region of Saskatchewan. The objective of this section is not, however, to address the concems of producers, but to assess the likelihood of a restoration of federal-provincial hannony in the short-term. In the final analysis, even an as~mmetricalapproach appean unlikely to be a viable option in the short-tenu: the devolution of power that it entails will probably remain adthetical to the nation-building

"goals of the curent federal minister responsible for the CWB. By contrast, the longer-rem prospects for a restoration of federal-provincial hamony appear to be more promising. Previous chapters have indicated a prolonged trend towards the emergence and solidification of a dual-marketing orientation brought on by the forces of globalization. To the extent the these forces continue to be felt, an eventual movement of the interest group configurations of Manitoba and Saskatchewan towards the dual-marketing solution already favoured by Alberta's interest group configuration appears possible. Under such conditions, circumstances could allow for the restoration of federal-provincial harmony, to the extent that a future federai minister responsible for the CWB cornes to favour dual-marketinç as the impact of globalization on the federal govemment continues to grow. In conclusion, the impact of societal forces has been significant in the area of prairie wheat marketing Historically, these factors served to create an unusual oasis of federai- prokincial hannon! centred around a consensus on the merits of single-desk selling. More recently, these sarne variables have combined to produce an arena of federai- provincial conflict focused on the fiinire of the CWB's monopoly as the forces of globalization indiscriminately swept across the area of prairie wheat marketing. Table 1 Number of Farms - Prairie Provinces

-- Province 1941 1 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991

Man. 58 024 52 383 43 306 34 98 1 39 442 35 706 Sask. 138 713 112 018 93 934 76 924 67318 60 840 Alta. 99 732 84 315 73 212 62 703 58 056 57 345

Sources: Adapted fiom by author Erom Statistics Canada 199 1 Census of Canada A~cultureCanada Catalogues 95-364,9533 1, 95-383,93-35 1, Table 1; David A Hay and G,S. Basran, "The Western Canadian Farm Secror- Transitions and Trends." In The Politicai Economv of .krîcuhre in Western Canada. G.S. Basran and D.A Hay. eds. (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988). p.4. The corresponding £igues for 1996 are as follows: 23 341, 56 979. 58 990, 1 12 992 for Manitoba, Saskatchewan Aiberta and Canada respectively. The Aiberta figure rnay be indicative thar Aberta has already adjusted to the demands of giobalizauon more than other jurisdictions. Joshua At~arn"Offbeat and off-board - agiculture is booming," Alberta Re~ort,3 June 1997.

Table 2 FmPopulation as a Percentage of Total Population - haine Provinces

Province 1941 1951 1981 1991

Man. 1 34.6 38.2 18.8 13.3 9.4 7.3 Sask. 57.4 48.0 33.0 25.2 18.6 16.3 Alta. 48.2 36.7 3 1.6 14.6 8.5 7.0

Sources: Adapted fiom by author from Stausücs Canada 199 1 Census of Canada, .Agriculture Canada Catalogues 95-364.95-37 1,95-383,93-35 1, Tables 35 and 39; David k Hay and G.S. Basran, "The Western Canadian Farm Seaor: Transitions and Trends." In ïhe Political Economv of Amiculture in Western Canada. G.S. Basran and D.A Hay, eds. (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988), p.22. Table 3 Average Farm Size (Acres) - Prairie Provinces

Province 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 2991

Man. 29 1 338 420 543 639 743 Sask 432 550 686 845 952 1 091 Alta. 434 527 645 790 813 898

Can. 237 279 359 / 463 513 598

Sources: Adapted fiom by author fforn Statistics Canada 199 1 Census of Canada ..lgiculture Canada Catalogues 95-363. 95-364. 95-370, 95-371. 95-382,95-333, 93-350, 93-35 1, Tables 3.1. 35; David A. Hay and G.S. Basran "The Western Canadian FmSector: Transitions and Trends." in The Political Economv of .4-giculture in Western Canada. G.S. Basran and D.A Hay. eds. (Toronto: Garamond Press. 1988), p.22. Yap 1 1989 Alberta General Election Resuits

Lib

Source: Adapted by author from Chief Electoral Officer of Alberta, Repn of the Chief Electoral Onicer on the General Elmion of the Twenrv-Second Leoisiative Assernblv. Mondav. March 20~.1989 (Edmonton: Province of Aiberta. Alberta Legislative Assembly. May 16, 1989). Map 2 1993 Alberta GeneraI Election Results

Lib. mj

Source: Adapted by author £iomChief Elenoral Officer of Al- Rpnof the Chef Elmoral OScaon the Cietterai Elmion of the Twentv-Third LePislative Assembly. Tuesdav. June 15~.1993 (Edmonton: Province of Alberta Alberta Legislative hsembly. hg. 16. 1993). Map 3 Per Capita Farm Income - Albena ( 1990)

more than $25 000

S20 O00 - S25 000

SI5 O00 - 320 O00

SI0 000-315 O00 less than $10 000

Data source: Cornplieci and categorized by author fiom Amiculhuai Profile of Alberta, 199 1 Census, StatiMcs Canada .&icultural Division (Ottawa: MLuner of Indunry. Science and Technology. 1992). Per capita incorne was determined by the following formula: (totai gros kmreceipts - total expenses)/ total number of farms. Map 3 f 99 1 Saskatchewan General Election Results

Source: Adapted by author fiom Chief Electoral Officer of Saskatchewan, Twenrv-Second General Election October 21. 199 1 Remon of the Chief Electorai Officer (Regina. The Chief Electoral Officer of Saskatchewan, 1992). NDP

Lib. PC Map 6 Per Capita FmIncome - Saskatchewan ( 1990)

iess thaa $10 000 1 I

Data source: Complied and categorized by author fiom APnculhid Profile of Saskatchewan, 199 1 Census, Starimcs Canada, ilgridturai Division (ûttawa: Minister of Indusuy, Science and Tahnology. 1997). Per capita income was detemiined by the following fonda: (total gross fa.receipts - total expeuses)/ totai number of h. Map 7 1990 Manitoba General Election Results

Source: Adapteci by author from Chief Electoral CXEcer of Manitoba Statement of Votes: Rewrt of the Chief Electorai Officer Rirruam to Section 142l2) of The Eltxtïoris Act on the Th-Sinh Provincial General Election AD^ 25. 1 995 (Winnioee: Elmions Manitoba 1995). >[ap 8 1995 Manitoba General Election Results

fC NDP

Source: Adapteci by author Corn Chef Electoral Officer of Manitoba. Statement of Votes: Re~onof the Chief Eiectord OEcer Pursuant to Section 142(2) of The Elections Act on the 'Ihirtv-Sixth Provincial Gened EIection AD^ 25. 1995 (Winnipeg:- Elections Waba1995). Map 9 Per Capita Farm Income - Manitoba ( 1990)

categorized by author nom MnilRiral Profile of Manitobq 199 1 C-S. Statistics cana& Ag-iniltucal Division (Ottawa: ~Mhiserof hdus~ry,Science and Technology, 1992). Per capita income was detennined by the following formula: (total gross fmreceipts - total expenses)/ total number of faims. ENDNOTES

Chapter t

1 Another case mdy which also in part focuses on federal-provincial harmony is Kathryn Harrison's analysis of emuonrnental policy Kathryn Harrison Passingthe- Buck- Federaiism and Environmentai Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996).

Cbapter 2

' For example, .Alan Cairns, "The Other Cnsis of Canadian Fededsm." In Constitutio~Governmenr and Society in Canada: Selected Essays bv Aan C. Cairns. Douglas E. Williams. ed. (Toronto: hlcC1elland and Stewart, 1988); Alan Cairns, "The Govements and Societies of Canadian Federaiism." In Constitution, Government. and Society in Canada: Selected Essavs bv .Aian C Cairns. Dougias E. Williams. ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988); 3. Stefan Dupré, "Reflections on the Workability of Executive Federalism.- In Perspectives on Canadian Federdism. R.D.OlIing and MU'. Wesunacott. eds. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Cana& inc., 1988); D.V.Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-HU Ryerson Ltd.. 1 987). pp. 1 58- 16 1.

' Richard Schulq "Interen Groups and inrergovemmental Negotiations: Caught in the Vice of Fedeali~rn.'~in Canadian Federalism: Mvrh or Rea3hy. 3" ed. J. Peter Meekwn ed. (Toronto: Methuen 1977).

3 Peter Russeli, "The Supreme Court and Federal-Provincial Relations: The Political Use of L@ Resources." In Pers~eaiveson Canadian Federdism. R.D. Oiiing and MW Wesaacott. eds (Scarborough: Prentice-HaJl Canada hc.,1988). p. 93. Other authors have pointed to additional effects of the constitution. One prominent esarnple is Cairns. who has discussed the ICPC's tendency to favour the provincial order of govenunent in its decisions. Alan C. Cairns. "The Living Canadian Constitution." In Canadian Federaiism: Mvdi or Reaiity. 3" ed. J. Peter Meelasoq ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1977).

' Russell. The Supreme Court and Federai-Provincial Relations." pp.94. 98

It should be noted that s.95 of the ConWtuRon Act. 1867 authorires both orden of govemment to legislate in the area of agriculture. However. as Hoge has pointed out. rhe courts have turned 5.95 into an empty sheli by dealing with agriculturai matters in relation to other areas, nich as property and ciMi rights and made and commerce. Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law in Canada 3" ed. student ed. (Scarborough: Came11 Company Limited, 1996). pp. 533-533,636.

7 Peter Russel "Canadian Consuaints on Judicialization fiom Without," International Politicai Science Review, 15.3, 1994. Other authors have disagreed. For example. F L. Morton, "The Effect of the Chaner of Rights on Canadian Federalism," Publius, 2S:3, Surnmer 1995,

8 Garth Stevenson, "FederaIism and the political economy of the Canadian state." In ïhe Canadian state: politicai economv and uolitical Dower. Leo Panitch, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p.78.

A spiiiover effect is also evident. As the mength of provincial govemmuits reaches a certain tbreshol& it becomes ever more essentiai for other elements of the bourgeoisie, beyond those directly engaged with the resource-based industries, to reinforce their ries to the provincial governent in question. This suggests that the strength of the provincial goverment itself rnay ultirnately encourage class-based federai-provincial conflict, inespective of the presence or strength of a provincial resource sector. This suggests that the strength of the provincial govertunent itself may dtimately encourage "c1ass"-based or interest-based federd-provinciai confiict, irrespective of the presence or strength of a provincial resource sector. m.

1 O NaniraI resources are not Likely to suddeniy move f7om one province to another. Similady, once a certain threshoId of provincial men-& is reached. provincial _govemments,as wiii be seen in the ne= section. are unlikely to subsequently regress in power. Finally, the long-term and pan-lanadian stability of the characteristics aEeccine jurisdictional divisions has already been suggested by the coIlStitutiond factor.

' ' The inpanate perspective may also be dehed by panicular characteckics: the instirutions of the central govenunent are viewed as an outiet for the "open clash of regonal interests and their attempted harmonization"; and the emphasis is placed on compromise between regionai representatives whose capaciq to bargain [and block proceedings] is not entirely based on the size of their electorates". cUan C Cairns, From interstate Federalism to btrastare FederaIism in Canada. institute Discussion Paper 5 (Kingston Queen's u'niversity. insitute of Mergovermnental Relations. 1979), pp 4-5. An economic critique of the kaastare perspective has also been presented. Michel Ldghas concluded that a Tripie-E Senate wouid likely lead to more "fiscal inefficiency" because the '-minimum winning policy-coalition" would be broadened. It is, however, workability, not efficiency, that is centrai to the current analysis. Moreover. federalism itself is not necessarily the most e6cient system of government regardless of whether the interstate or the intrastaîe perspective domhates, given the proMeration of govenunents and the necessity of inter~ovemmentalnegotiations. Furthemore, Lusztig focuses on merely one possible mechanism of intramte fderaiisq namely the Canadian Senate. Michael Luszcig, "Federaiism and hstitutional Desip: The Penls and Politics of a Triple-E Senate in Canad%"hblius. 25:1 (Winter 1995). p.50. By conuast, the interstate perspective may be defked by a number of other characteristics: the emphasis is placed on the division of federal and prot-incial jurisdicrïon; disputes involve aitering this division of jurisdiction; the degree of centrabation or decentraikation of a particular distribution of juridiction is centrai to disputes; and the central goverment operates "essenûally on the basis of national majorities- Cairns, From lnterstate Federaiism to Irrtrastate Federalism in Canada p.4.

'' These include the elimination of the nomination of Senators by provincial govemrnents, the rnove away fiom a period were federal Cabinets were "collections ofregionai notables with independent poiitical bases", and the elimination of the ability of -Ws to bargain with the ernersence of suict parry discipline. M., pp.5- 7. The relative absence of intrastate rnechanisms is also suggested by Donald V. Smiiey and Ronald L. Watts. Donaid V. Smiley and Ronaid L. Watts, Intrastate Federaiism in Canada (Toronto: Lniversity of Toronto Press 1985).

l3 The centralin version of intrastate federalisn emphasizes the representatjon of regional interem in the federal order of government. The provinciahst version of intrastate federalism emphasizes the direct representation of provincial govemments in the federal order of government.

" Srniley and Watts, Inmastate Federaiism in Canada.

" Cairns, From Interstate Federalism to Inmate Federalism in Canada, p. 18.

16 David E. Smith 'Party Stru&es to Win the Prairies." Gi Parw Politics in Canada. 7~ ed Hu@ G ïhorbm ed. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1W6), pp.446-46 1.

1: 1: Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada, pp. 158- 16 1.

1s The long-term and persistent presence of federal-provincial confiict stemming from a French-English dudïty is hardly in doubt. Donald Sdey. David Bell. and Kenneth McRobens. among many others. have - - - -- wrkten exensively on the subject. For example, Srniley, The Federal Condition in Canada; David L.J. BeU. The Roots of Disunitv: X Smdy of Canadian Political Culture. Revised ed. (Toronto: University of O'cford Press. 1992); Kenneth McRobens. "Living with Dualism and Multiculturaiisrn." In New Trends in Canadian Federaiism. Francois Rocher and Miriarn Smith, eds. Peterborough: Broadtiew Press. 1995). However, Cairns points out that one of the reasons why the crisis of French-En@sh relations has remained unsolved is because of the centrality of the powerfirI govermentai institutions analyzed earlier. Alan C. Cairns, "The FraCmentation of Canadian Citizenship." in Beloneing: The Meaning and Future of Canadian Cirizenshi~ William Kaplan, ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993). Although a correspondence eràsts bctween the French side of the duality and the Governént of Quebec. the sarne is not true of the En@sh side where nine provincial governments and the federal govenunent may be seen to ambitiously cornpete. This asymmetry means that regionalism or. more correctiy. provincialism rnay be seen to influence codlict to a pater extent tha. dualism. Cairns' institutional view is however not the hi word. McRoberts suggests, by way of the lack of success of pan-Canadian biiin-euaiism. that some caution is in order. Insinitional noms must to some degree reflect societal structure ifthey are to be successfitI. McRoberts, "Living with Duaiïsm and iMulticuiruraIism."

19 Roger Gibbins, Prairie Politics and Society: Resjonaiism in Decline (Toronto: Butterworths. 1980).

" David Elton, "Federalism and the Canadian Wea." in Perspectives on Canadian Federalism. RD. Oliirig and M. W. Westrnawtt, eds. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada inc., 1988). p.347.

" Where duaiism does not find expression in Engiish-Canada re@onalism finds expression in the form of provinciaiism.

" As seen, regionalism's usefdness at explaining change and provinnd variations in responses to change is poor because of its long-term and "extra-provincial" character. in addition, any changes that occurred in relation to the increased activism of govefnments with respect to the perception of western dienation in the example are largely confjned to the 1970's and 1980's. Thus. neither approach readily explains the rapid changes that occurred in the 1990's in the area of prairie wheat marketing.

" Gad Horowitz. -Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism Li Canada: An hterpretation." In Panv Politics in Canada. 7" ed Hu@ G. Thorbum ed (Scarborou&: Prentice Hall Canada Inc.. 1996). pp 146- 147. 150-151.

'' This is part of the more general theoretical problem imroduced by Horowitz: Why is socialism relatively weak where toryism appears srrongen (Atlantic Canada)? Converseiy. why is socialism strongest where toryism has traditionaiiy been relatively weak (Saskatchewan)?

" Welson Wsemaq *-ThePattern of Prairie Politics." in PmPolitics in Canada. 7" ed. Hu* G Thorbwn, ed. (Scarborough: Prentice HaU Canada Inc., 1996), p.43 1.

26 m..pp.429430. Meanwhile, British working-class immigrants, who brought with them a "iabour- socialist efement" hman industrialiang United Kingdom, were concentratecl in urban centres without any poiiticai cfout in a poiitical landscape of rural overrepresentaion. -4s a result of this distribution of immigrants, the UFA, the Social Credit Party, and the Progressive Conservarive Party have enjoyed majority -govemments bas& on rural strength, wMe the CCFNDP have floundered at the hands of their wban-based support. m.,p.443

"~hisuicreased the tmdency for the relatively large nurnbers ofruraiiy-based continental immigrants to etectoraiiy suppon the CCF.in addition not only were there fewer herican immigrants living in Saskatchewan than in Alberta, but those that did immigrate to Saskatchewan had less poiitical dout because they were non-Ando-Saxons. M.,pp.43 7-438 " The ruraii-skewed eleaorai map favoured the prominence of the -'tory-touched iiberalism' of the immigrants from Ontarîo who mled in rurai areas. which aifowed Liberal Conservative. and Farmer eovernments to initidy dominate provincial poiiucs. In fact. Manitoba has even been categorized as behs devoid of a -'disanctive political minire.- The politicd impact of the cultural forces of Ontario and thus of the United Kingdom has been relatively baianced since the late 196û's afier the hDP cpined the informal support of the Manitoba Farmers Uni04 which tended to have a membership that came largely Eom poorer and more nonhern farmers of a continental ethnic background. Rand Dyck Protincid Politics in Canada: Towards the Tum of the Cew.3" ed (Scarbomugh: RenticeHall Canada Inc.. 1996). p.381: Caro&nJ Tuohy. Policv and Politics in Canada: InSUnitionalized .4mbivalence. (PhiIadelphia: Temple University Press. 1992). p.4; Wiseman -'The Pattern of Prairie Potitics." pp.435436.

'9 Caûns, "The Other Crisis of Canadian Federalism."; Cairns, "The Governments and Societies of Canadian Federdism."

m.,p. 189

" Cairns, The MerCrisis of Canadian Federalisqr p. 187 -- '-m.. p.171

33 -ibid.. p. 185

3J -ibid.. p. 189

'' LqPratt, The state and province-buildin~:Alberta's devdopmem strategy..* In The Canadian state: political economy and ~olitic2Dower. Leo Panitcb ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1977). p. 133.

38 The need for such class-based, as weii as govement-baseci. approaches is highlighted by the politicai culture approach when it is appiied to Aberta. .As uill be seen the politicai culture approach appears to be unable to explain the phenornenon of large sale goverbental intervention in a province with a "fiee enterprise, laissez-faire" political cuiture. To be sure. the political culture approach does however indicate that in relative terms such intervention wili iikely rernain more muted in Alberta than in other provinces. -eiven similar circumstances. In this contex?. the ~overnment-buildingand class-based approaches ma? be given greater weight in their abidity to explain governmental involvement, whiie the usefdness the politicai culture approach rnay be weighted in favour of its ability to expiain interprovincial variations in federal- provincial conflict. Wisemaq "The Pattern of Prairie Politics."

39 Thomas J. Courchene, Celebrating Flexibih: An interpretive Essav on the Evoiution of Canadian Federalisrn. C.D.Howe Benefactors Lecture 1995, Montreal, 16 October 1995.

JO Caims, "The Govemments and Societies of Canadian Federalism."

'' Richard Simeon. Federal-Provincial Diplomaev The makino ofrecent poolicy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1WZ), p. 144. 44 Grace Skogstad. "The Farm Poticy Cornmunity and Public Poli- in Ontario and Quebec." In Poliq Communities and Public Poky in Canada: X Structud A~~roach.WiUiam D.Coleman and Grace Sko-mad. eds. (Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman 1990) and Schultz "Interest Groups and intergovernrnental Xegotiations."

'' Schul~%teren Groups and htergovemmental Relations,' p.375: Monon Grocizir~~,The Federd Synern." In American Federalism in Perspecsive. Aaron Wddavsb. ed. (Boston: Littie. Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 256-277.

46 Schultz, "Interest Groups and Intergovernmental Relations." p.375.

49 William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad, "Polit). Communities and Policy Networks: A Structural Xpproach." Ln Poliw Communities and Public Policv in Canada: A Structural A~~roach.William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad, eds. (Mississauga: Copp Clark Pirnian Ltd., IWO), p.27.

" -ibid.

'=-ibid.

5-4 Skogaad, The Politics of .4&dtural: Policv-Makine in Canada (Toronto: Lrniversity of Toronto Press. 1987). p.32

" Wdliam D. Cole- 'Federalism and interest Group Organimtion."

'6 -4. Paul Pross. .-Pressure Groups." in The Pro~incialPolirical Systerns D.J. Bellamy et al.. eds. (Toronto: Methuen. 1976). pp. 132- 134.

- Hu& G. Thorburq "Interest Groups and Poiicy Making in Canada.'' In Pmy Politics in Canada. f'h ed. Hu& G. Thorbm ed. (Scarborough: Rentice Hall Canada Inc., 1996), p.27. 5s -ibid.. pp.32-33

59 Skogstad, The Politics of Am-ialtural Poiiw-Makine in Cariada, pp.29-30.

60 Courchene, Celebrating Flexibilitv. pp. 15. 25; Leicent Cable, "The Diminished 'iation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," Daedalus, 1242 (Spring 1995). pp.23-53; Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall, After the Nation-State: Citizen, Tribalism and the New World Disorder (London: HarperCollins Pubiishers, 1 995).

61 Courchene, Cetebrating Flexibility, pp.43-53.

" -ibid., p.54

'' M.,pp. 1-70 65 Stevenson, "Federalism and the political econorny of the Canadian state."

67 François Rocher and Richard Nhjean, "Global Economic Resmchiring and the Evolution of Canadian Federaiism and Constinnionalism." In Yew Trends in Canadian Federalism. François Rocher and rvlinam Smith eds. (Peterborough: Broadview Press. 1995), p.277.

68 Benjamin Barber, "Jihad Vs. McU'orid." in Bravinu the New World: Reading- in Contem~oran:Politics Thomas M.J. Batman et al., eds. (Toronto: NeIson Canada, 1995). pp.33-24.

09 The foilowing exarnpIes are among those discussed by Courchene. Courchene. Celebratino Flexibilin;. pp. 16-1 7.

70 Ian Robinsos "Trade Poticy, Globahtion, and the Future of Canadian Federalism" In New Trends in Canadian Fedwaiism. François Rocher and 'vliriam Smith, eds. Peterborough: Broadview Press. 1995)

Chapter 3

Grace Skogstad, The Politics of A-icuiturai Poticv-Making in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1987). p.32

' Basic information on the CWB from The Western Grain Marketing Panel Report ~ïmipeg:The Western Grain Marketing Panel JuIy 1.1996): CWB Xews Releases; CWB .hua1 Re~ons.

The Western Grain Marketing Panel Rewn, p.9; Kenneth Kidd, "Grain Stomq- Report on Business Ma~azine,June 1997. p.42.

'' The pre-1935 era is covered in What Part Should Farmers Take in Makins Canadian Wheat Poliw?. (Winnipeg: Manitoba Department of Agriculture, 1941 ); Sko--ad. The Politics of .4&cdtud Polio-- Making in Canada, G.E. Britneii and V.C. Fowke, Canadian Agriculture in War and Peace 1935-50 (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1 962)

Man Levine, The Exchange: 100 Years of Trading Grain in Wvinipeg (Winnipeg: Peguis Publishers Limited. 1987). pp. 172- 1 73.

6 Skogstad, The Politics of .Lgricultural Poticv-Makin - Vernon C. Fowke, Canadian Ag-icultural Policv- The Historical Pattern (Toronto: LTniversityof Toronto Press, 1946), p.9. Skognad. The Politics of Aqinilturai Poiicy-Making in Canada, pp.4041

Moreover, the Bennett government's cautious approach may also have been the produa of the ambiguous constitutional position of the area of wheat marketing: a House of Cornmous cornmirtee had pretiously advised tbat the creation of a wheat marketing board "in peace tirne . . bu the federai governent would be an unconstitutionai invasion" of the areas of "property and civil rights" and "matters of a local nature" if the declaratory power was not used. M..p. 194

10 Britneii and Fowke, Canadian Agriculture in War and Peace 1 93 5-50, p. 199

" J.G. Gardiner, Debates House of Commons Canada, 9 March 1937, p. 1636.

13 Bntnell and Fowke. Canadian -4miculture in War and Pace 1935-50, p.200

II For example, E.G. Haosell, Debates House of Comrnons Canada, 5 March 1937, p. 15 16.

" Barry K. Wilson Famine the Synem: How Politics and Famiers Shape Aeculturai Policv (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1990), p. 142.

16 Lekine, The Exchanse, p.210; David E. Srnirh, '-James G. Gardiner: Political Leadership in the Agarian Community." in Swords and Plouehshares: War and Agiculture in Western Canada. RC. Macleod. ed. (Edmonton: Universil of .Aiberta Press. 1993). p.2 15

17 Herrnan Bakvis. "Political Parties, Party Govemments and htrastate Federalism in Canada." In Parties and Federalism in Austrdia and Canada. Campbell Sharman ed. (Canberra: Federaiism Research Centre The Austrailian National University, 1994), p.7.

18 To these ends, Herman Bakvis has conctuded that Mackenzie King "transforrned the cabinet into the singe most important intrastate instinition Canada has known". Moreover, Gardiner is viewed as a central figure in this intrastate institution; BakMs asserts that Gardner continued to exercise '-considerable influence'- over the "impressive political machine" he had built in Saskatchewan even &er his arriva1 in Onawa. M. Gardiner may thus be viewed as an institutionaiized regonal minister akin to those associated with regionai economic development agencies today. Donald Savoie, RRegjonal Economic Develoument: Canada's Search for Solutions. 2& ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992). l9 Dominion-ProvinciaI Conference, 1935.

20 The growing consensus on the desirability of singie-desk selhg was also reinforceci on two other fionts. Firn, the issue of CWB governance was not -et important to producers. In fact, statements by federd government ministers claiming that it was not in the public interest to divuige information about the operations of the C WB went unchallenged. For example, J. G. Gardiner. Debates House of Commons Canadq 9 March 1937. Second, the cransportation of wheat by the CWB was facilitateci by the presence of the Crow rate. The Crow rate was made statutory in 1925 and. beg5nnins in 193 1. was applied to ail prairie wheat expons, regardless of the raiiway used or the direction of travel. Toni Owen Carter, "Breakthrou& on the Crow: Ottawa promises to pay out the Crow benefit, but an election will probably corne first." Alberta Re~0k-L12 Apd 1993, pp.22-23; Teny Johnson, "After the Crow, new hope in the country," -4lberta Report, 2 1 August 1995, p. 15.

" Donald V. Smiley, "Federal-Provincial Confbct in Canada-" in Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality. jd ed. J. Peter Meekisorr ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1977); J. R. Mallory, "The Five Faces of Federalism." In - -- Canadian Federalism Mvth or Realitv. 3* ed. J. Peter Meeluson ed. (Toronto: Methuen 1977): Rand Dyck. Canadian Politics: Cntical approaches. ?"d ed. (Scarborou& Nelson Canada 1996). pp.84-87.

" The monopoly was established by order in council PC 7942 on 28 September 1943

23 Mallory. --TheFive Faces of Federalisrn" pp. 73-24

24 A meagre supply of wheat within Canada combined with nsing world prices for wheat to prompt concern within the federd eovernment that it would not be able to meet its wheat seIlhg cornrniments in a cost effective manner. Moreover. the wartime management of the Canadian economy, which dependeci upon the ability to regdate prices. was also potentiaily jeopardized by a fdure to control escalatins wheat prices. Britneil and Fowke, Canadian .&culture in War and Pace 1 93 5-50, pp. 2 14-2 15.

26 -ibid., p.215

" M.;Debates House of Comrnons Canada, December 1942, January 1943

23 Britneli and Fowke. Canadian A&culmre in War and Peace 193 5-50, pp.2 1 7-2 18

29 Debates House of Cornmons Canada, 30 May, 1950. pp.3019-3026.

30 Debates House of Commons Canada, 30 March 1943. p. 1698.

" Debates House of Commons Canada, 7 February 1949, p.283. 1385.

32 For example, Debates House of Cornmons Canada, 18 March 1948, p.2337

33 Tommy Douglas, Saskatchewan Debares and Proceeding;~,4 March 1948, pp.47-54.

34 Saskatchewan Debates and Proceedins, 4 March 19% p.54

3 5 BritneU and Fowke. Canadian A9Jiculnue in War and Peace 1935-50, p. 240.

36 Levine. The Exchanoe, p.209. 37 -ibid., p.212

'* Debata House of Commons Canada, 27 $une 1940, pp. 1208- 12 12.

39 Smiley. 'bFederal-Provincial Conflict in Canada," p.3; hlallory. TheFive Faces of Federatism" pp 25-26. Dyck Canadian Po titics, pp.84-87.

40 Skogstaci The Politics of Aaricultural Poliw-Making in Canada, p.44.

4 1 Wdson, Farming the Svstem, pp.32-33, 54-57. -

43 This was reinforceci by the dismist both Diefenbaker and Hamilton had for bureaucrats. LI G. Bruce Doem amd Glen Toner. The Politics of Enerq- ïhe Develo~mentand lmplemenrarion of the ';EP (Toronto: Methuen 1985). pp 3 1. 3933.

46 For exampie. Debates House of Cornmons Canada 2 1 March 195 1. p. 1398

47 For example, Debates House of Commons Canada, 5 June 1950, pp.3 178-3 179.

49 Debates House of Commons Canada, 16 March 195 1, pp. 1195- 1 196.

'O Leonard D Sesbitr.. The Case Aginst the S~eculativeMarketing of Grain, Aiberta West Pool. l9SZ. p-8.

5 1 Saskatchewan Debates and Proceedings, 15 March 1955. pp.52-6 1; Saskatchewan Debates and Proceedings. 14 March 1957. pp.65-68

'' Western Grain Markethg Panel Re~ort,p.5.

" Saskatchewan Debates and Proceedin~s,1 5 Yarch 1955. pp. 52-6 1: Saskatchewan Debates and Proceeduios, 14 March 1957, pp.65-68.

'4 Levine. The Exchanoe, p.2 19

5 5 Bob Stiriing and John Conway, "Fractions Among Prairie Farmers." in The Political Economv of Aaiculture in Wenern Canada. G.S.Baran and DA.&y. eds (Toronto: Garamond Press. 1988). pp. 73- 83.

56 in additioh aansportation problerns were causiog hcreased concem. Because of the impact of uiflatio~ the Crow rate was no longer profitable for the railwavs. Johnson "Mer the Crow. new hope in the country," p. 15. As a result, gaindependent branch lines were being increasingy neglected by the railways compaties. The politicai effects of this negect were irnmediately evident. For example. the Saskatchewan legislamre unanimously adopted a resolution dngfor an adequate supply of boxcan. Saskatchewan Debates and Proceedines. 9 March 1959. pp.68-73. Furthemore. hYRs of an emerging govemance issue were ahevident; caUs were made for "producer representation" on the CWB beyond that of the appointeci Adviso~Cornmirtee. For example. Debates House of Commons Canada 30 May 1 950. pp 20 18-30 19

" Wilson, Famiins the Sytem, p.240.

58 Smiley. "Federal-Provincial Conflict in Canada," p. 3

59 Western Grain Marketin? Panel Report, p.5.

60 Debates House of Cornmons Canadq 27 March 1962. p.2142.

6' Debates House of Comrnons Cana 15 October 1962, pp.536-544.

62 Debates House of Comrnons Canada, 26 March 1962. pp.2192-2 199 63 Rand wck Provincial Politics in Canada: Towards the Tum of the Cenq3" ed. (Scarborou&: Prenrice Hall Canada Inc.. 1996): p.364. This would becorne the Western Premiers' Conference in the 1970's with the addition of B.C

64 Thomas J. Courchene, Celebratine Flexibilitv: An Interpretive Essav on the Evolution of Canadian Federaiism. C.D.Howe Benefactors Lecture 1995, MomreaL 16 October 1995

65 WI~SORFarmin~ the Svstem pp. 190- 19 1.

67 Levine, The Exchanee, p.223.

68 ';Uthough the transporfation issue had yet to be aanslated Ulto a ~Stahedpoliticai concern, problems were continuing. Because the railway companies were obligated by virtue of the Crowsnest Pass arrangements to transport grain irrespective of the tosses they were now incurring, they continued to delay any investment in new boxcars and withhold maimenance on their gaindependent lines. Johnson "-Mer the Crow, new hope in the counrry." p. 15. (The CPR in 1897 agreed to reduce eastbound Eeight rates in perpetuil in retum for construction subsidies. This was, as seen extended to the C'SR and westbound rates in 193 1 .) The debare over CWB acmuntabiiity was ahconànuing. The 1960's marked the beguullng of a long debate which extended into the 1980's over which department should have jurisdinion over the CM%. Until the 1960's. the responsibility officially rested with the Minister of Trade and Commerce. Debates House of Commons Canada, 26 March 196'. p.2 189. The govemance issue. which became increasin& associateci with the debate surroundhg the adequacy of producer and govermentai inpu, was also raised at a generd level; an increasing number of calIs for consultation \?th producer goups were e~ident.For example, Debates House of Cornons Canada, 30 November 1%2, p.2 189.

69 Levine. The Exchange, pp. 113- 1 3-3.

70 Wilson, Famine the Svstem, p. 16.

'' Aiberta Hansard. 9 Wovember 1972, pp72-25 - 72-32

Alberta Hansard 8 May 1978, p. 1077

73 Frederick J. Fletcher and Donald C. Wallacel -bFederal-RovinciaiRelations and the Making of Public Policy in Canada: A Review of Case Studies." In Division of Powers and Public Policy. Richard Simeon Research Co-ordinator (Toronto: Cniversity of Toronto Press. 1985). pp 160-167

74 for example, Alberta Hansard, 8 May 1 978, p. 1077; Alberta Hansard, 16 May 1978, p. 1254; ~lberta Hansard. 72 Iune 1979. p.494.

75 Skogstad, The Politics of Aericuitural Policv-Making in Canada, p.3 1. f6 .LUbena Hansard, 15 April 1977, p.760

TI Department of Federal and Lnrergovernmental Affairs for Aiberta, Fifi .huai Report to March 3 1 1978.

78 Department of Federd and htergovemmental .4fEairs for Aberta, Sixth .Annual Re~onta March 3 1 1 979.

79 Although Otto Lang, as the minister responsible EOr the CWB, proposed extending the board's monopoIy to cover rapeseed. rye. and flax in 1971. the matter was subsequently put to a vote in a 1973 plebiscite of producers &er pressure fiom producer groups and the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. The results, which revealed that only 46.2 per cent favoured single-desk selIing. indicate fiinher rnovernent towards the popularity of open marketing for crops orher fhmr rvhear. Farmers also une'rpectedly voted to mket canola themselves in 1973. ïhe demonstration effecz provided by the successfirl marketing of rapeseed in the 1960's was seen to have prokided a "psycholo@cal" advantase to the open market alternative in the vote. In the shon-terrn. however, Lang concluded that producers who supported an open market for a specialty crop nich as canola would likely have not supported an open market for wheat. The trajectory towards an open market was reinforced in 1973 when the federal governrnent ended the CWB's rnonopoly over the domestic marketing of feed grains. Moreover. the federal govement rnoved unilateraiiy in the marter. 3Lithough harmonious relations siil prevailed beween the Aiberta Government and the federal govermnern on the matter. the same was not tme of relations between the Saskatchewan Govenunent and the federd govemment. The Aiberta Governrnent was not only more market-oriented. but ah,as niil be made clear in the next chapter, more affecteci by the growin_o influence of pro-market interest goups and cattle fanners than other _ooveniments. It is not surprising. therefore. that .Alberta was instrumental in heiping to initiate the change. hide fkom the feed grains issue, however, harrnonious relations between the federal eoverment and the Saskatchewan Governent on the wheat rnonopoly more -generally remaineci in place. Levine, The Exchange, pp.225-226; Terry Johnson, .'Young, skilled and anti- -~overnrnent." .Aiberta Report, 13 September 199; ; Wilson Farming the Svnem. p. 143

80 Alberta Hansard, 26 Apd 1973, p.47-2475.

'' Wilson. Famine the Svnern, pp 19 1- 192. " Peter Russeil.. Constitutional Odvssev- Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?. p ed (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1993).

" Hannony in Diversitv: A New Federalism for Canada. Alberta Govemment Position Paper on Constitutional Change. October 1978. p. 12.

84 For example, Alberta Hansard, 8 May 1978, p. 1077

86 In tine with its increasing emphasis on econornic diversification, the Govemment of Aiberta began to assen that the CWB represented a bamer to the success of secondq rnanufacturing in the protince. Accordingly, it began to demand jurisdiction over gains that were both grown and processed in Alberta. in fact. .Alberta even attempted to use the consritutionai ambipities of the area as a politicai weapon by Framing the issue in the context of the "right" of provinces to control secondary rnanufacturing. Aiberta Hansard. 9 Yovernber 1972, pp. 73-30 - 72-3 1 ; Aiberta Hansard. 15 ApriI 1977. p. 759. g; Johnson, "Young, skilled and anti-government," p.24; Skogstad, The Potitics of .4~~L~~IturalPolicv- Making in Canada p.30

SS Skogstad, The Poiitics of Aoridtufal Poticv-Makine in Canada, p.30. -ibid. 90 Richard J. Schultz, Federalism., Bureaucracy. and Public Policv: The Potitics of Hïghway Trans~ort Remlation (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1980).

9 1 Aberta Hansard, 11 March 1971, p.55.

9' Wilson. Farming the System, p. 143 93 -ibid., p. 143. 146

94 Lang succes~yresponded to protests fiom the CFA and avoided a producer plebiscite on the issue by asking the CFA to o~anizethe vote. kno**g that it wodd not be able to establish the logistics of the vote because of intemal divisions. m..p. 143. Moreover. the CFA was also subsequentiy used to assess the impact of the new feed grains poiicy . Aiberta Hansard. 15 Apnl 1977. p. 76 1.

95 Debates House of Cornons Cana& 25 lmuaxy 1973, p.634.

" Wson. Farming the Svnem, p. 190

97 -ibid.. p. 143 98 -ibid.. p.273

39 Levine, The Exchan~e,p.327.

Stirling and Conway. --Fractions.Amone Prairie Fmers." p 79

101 Depaxunent of Federal and intergovernmentai Mairs for Alberta Siah .ku~ualReport to March 3 1 1979

'O' Alberta Hansard, 8 December 198 1.

103 Peter Lougheed, Abena Hansard, 8 May 1978, p. 1077

104 for example, Department of Federai and inter~overnmemaiMàks for Alberta, Sixth Annuai Report to Varch 3 1 1979. p.53.

I OS Saskatchewan Debates and Proceedin~.25 May 1978, p.323 1.

1 O6 Moreover. the Mnistry of A@cuiture was itself becornins increasin-y market-oriented at the bureaucratie ievel. Wilson, Farmin~the Svsterq p.57.

1°' 1°' -ibid., p 69

108 The position of the CWB was tùrther undermineci by changes the quota system used to determine wheat deliveries to the CWB The base for the quota -stem was changed fiom the number of seeded acres to the number of cultivated acres in order to prevent fiauci and ease administration. Producer incornes became a fùnction of the number of acres owned rather than the amount of production per acre. -4 further uicemive to increase farm size, in addition to the increased economies of scde needed to compete in an increasingiy c.dobalized marketplace, is thus apparent. C.M.Williarns, *'Srnail "p" Politics (Policies) Ln Western Agriculture." In ïhe PoIiticd Econornv of Aaiculture in Western Canada. G.S.Basran and D..4 Hay, eds. (Toronto: Garamond Press. 1988). p.70. The CWB's transportation piilar also suffèred fùrther erosion. The railways were now threatening to close gain-dependent branch lines that were deemed unprofitable. Pressure was thus increasing to abolish the Crow rate. To be sure, producer support for the Crow rate was readïiy evident in the strong and widespread opposition to Lang's suggestion that the Crow rate mi@ be abolished. Severtheless, the debate surrounding the hueof the Crow rate not only served to help create and reinforce the existence of many commodity groups. nich as the WCWGA and the WBGA, but also helped to weaken the general fmer organizations, such as Unihand the CFA, by exacerbatirtg their interna1 divisions. This initial round of the Crow debate culrninated in 1983 when the federal governent repIaced the Crow rate with a Crow benefit. which was an annuai subsidy paid to diectly to the railways. The division amongst producers was again clear: Livenock producers, most of whom fmin -4ibena favoured a "pay-the-producer- plan which wouid not encourage exports as readiiy as the railway subsidy. Carter. "Breakthrough on the Crow.*- pp.22- 33: Johnson "Youn_e, skilled and ami-govemment."; Shafer Parker Jr.. "Sask Pool braces for a Crow-less fiinire." .Alberta Report. 14 Ausust 1995. p. 15. Simultaneously, the railways were aiso havine problems in hancihg the increasing volume of raiiway traffic. This led to a series of uncoordinated short-term masures by the federal govemment which were Iargely unsuccessfll. Johnson. "-4fier the Crow, new hope in the country." p. 1S. The extent of these problems is clearly evident in the growing concern over transportation in the prairie provinces. For example. during the 1979 federal-provincial conference on agiculture. the Agiculture Mirister of Manitoba emphasized and focused on problems that were emereg in the .transportanon and grain handling systern. Similarl';. althougb he continued to emphasize his thorough suppon of the CWB's wheat rnonopoly. -Ailan Blakeney also expresseci continued concern over the -gain handiing. However, the ultirnate expression of the extent of the transportation problems was seen in the need to convene the 1979 special conference discussed earlier. AE. Blakeney, Saskatchewan Debates and Proceedina, 18 May 1978, p.2990; Downev Pro~osedAgricultural Deveio~mentStratem. FederaI-Prokind Conference of Mnisters and Deputy Ministers of Agriculture, 24 July 1979; Johnson, "Mer the Crow. new hope in the country." p. 15. log Fietcher and Waiiace. -'Federal-Provincial Relations and the Making of Public Polie in Canada.,. pp. 160- 167; J. StehDupré. "Reflections on the Workability of Exedve Federalism." In PersDectives on Canadian Federalism. R. D. OUing and M. W Wenmacott. eds. (Scarborou@: Prentice Hall Canada Inc.. 1988).

110 Emest Dougas Isley, Alberta Hansard, 14 August 1989. p. 1388.

Il' However. the muiister's comments also reveal the fin hints of the fonhcomllig barley debate. which was to become the first sustained assault on the CWB, by clauning that the CWB's enom in this area were ody "reasonably eood" . m.

"'Aiberta Hansard, 8 December 198 1, pp.2 190-2194.

Il4 Peter Elzina, Aiberta Hansard, 10 December 1987, p.233 8.

116 Jake Epp, Debates House of Cornmons Canada, 18 October 1983, p.28105. Gordon Towers (MP, Red Deer), for exarnple, claimed that "an expiosion" would occur if the CWB was abolished because a vast majority of fimers in the West suppon the CWB. Gordon Towers, Debates House of Cornons Canada, 16 May 1984. p.3795

Il? Don Mazankowski, Debates House of Cornons Canada, 17 October 1983, p.28089 l l8 Saskatchewan Debates and Proceedines, 19 March 1989. p.392.

Il9 Manitoba Debates and Roceedings, 11 June 1980, pp.4658-59.

120 for exarnple. Alberta Hansard, 12 September 1986, p. 164 1, Manitoba Debates and Proceedings. 4 Marcfi 1 987; Saskatchewan Debates and Proceedinq 20 IuIy 1 989. p.2809.

12' Aibena Hansard, 20 October 198 1. p. 1 17 1 lZ2 Who4 Farming the Svstern. P. 132. l" uN~te~for aa Address by the Honourable John Wke From the Ofnce of the Miniaer of Agriculture,- Interprovincial Conference of Ministers and Deputy Ministers of .bpicufture. 25-27 Aupn 1986.

124 "Openhg Remarks DY the Honourable John Wise Minister of Agriculture," Federal-Provincial .+culture .Mnister and Deputy AgxicuIture .Wster Corference. 14 July 1987.

Saskatchewan Debates and Proceeding, 16.4ugua 1989. p.4014.

126 Skogstad, The Politics of AgSiculturai Policv-Makino, in Canada, pp.29-30

'" Wdson, Famiino the Svstem, p.47. 128 -ibid., p 273

Iz9 -ibid. 130 -ibid., p.270.

13' Stirling and Conway, "Fractions Amans Prairie Famiers,- pp. 77-79

132 .Aiberta Hansard, 10 December 1987. p.2338.

133 Peter Eha,Alberta Hansar4 16 September 1986. p. 1703.

13' Terry Johnson, 'Gripins in the USA" Alberta Re~on,28 June 1993. Terry Johnson, "It's tirne to cal1 the Yankee bluff," Alberta Re-port, 9 May 1994. p.20

137 Less expertise is required to seii wheat in North America than offshore because oc among other tactors, fewer transportation and language diffculties

138 .;Uberta Hansard 21 March 1984, p.90. To obtaui an export permit, producers mus se11 their wheat to the CWB and then repurchase it.

139 The Crow benefit came under attack by US officiais as a trade-distortirtg subsidy by the middde. Wdson, Farrninc the System, p.243.

1M -ibid., p.268

141 Department of Federal and Intergovermental M'airs for AIberta, Thineenth Annuai Raort to March 3 1 -1986.

14' 14' Depamnent of Federal and Intergovermental Anairs for Alberta. Fourteenth Annual Report to March 51 1987.

143 Depanment of Federal and intergovemmental AfEÜrs for Aibeitq Tenth Annual Re~ortto Mach 3 1 -1983. '4 Department of Federal and Intergovernmd Affairr for Aibmq Eleventh Annual Reoon to March 3 1 1984.

146 Department of Federal and Intergovenunentai Mairs for Alberta, Tweülti Annual Report to March 3 1 1985

1-87 for exampie, Department of Federal and intergovenimeatal AfFâirs for Alberta, Tweiflh huaiRmrt to 'clarch 3 1 1985; Department of Federal and intergovernmental AEairs for Aberta, Thirteenth .4nnuai Repon to March 3 1 1986.

'" Schmidt, Albem Hansard, ?O November 1980, p. 16 17- 16 18.

''O Wdsor~,Famine. the Svnem, p.25

151 -ibid.. p.21 '" W.. p.54; for "Uimtutionalized" cabinets sa Dupré, "Reflectioos on the Workability of Executive

Federalism." lS3 -ibid., p. 146

lS5 Wh9Farrnine the Systq p. 148; Aiberta Hansard 14 August 1989, p. 1388; Saskatchewan Debates and Proceedinss, 20 July 1989. p.2809.

"6 Striling and Conway, ''Fractions Arnong Rarie Famiers," p.80,

"'Information ~ppliedby Ron Leonhardt, President. Wild Rose Apiculrural Producers. 7 November 1996

"'Skognad, The Polilics of A&cuiaual Poliçv-Makine in Canada, p. 163; W~SORFarmin~ the S~stem pp. 137-13s.

"'Wdsoq Famine the Svstem, pp.208-209.

Chapter 4

1 Grace Skogstad, The Politics of Aericuinrral Policv-Making in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1987). p. 163.

'The tone of the Aibena Govanment was set by Klein, who transformeci the PC Party f?om an interventionist, managerial. urban-orient& party to a laissez-faire. "popuiin pw'.This is reinforced by Klein's domination of the bis cabinet and party as weU as by his wnsistently high personal popularity. AUan Tupper, "Debt. Populim and Cutbacks: Alberta Politics in the 1990s." in PmPolitics in Canada. f ed. Hugh H. Thorbum, ed. (Scarborou$: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1996). pp.470.474. Moreover, this is readily in Line with Alberta's traditions: party leadership in Alberta has been idenafieci as probably the "singie mosr important factor in Alberta politics" which "has sometirnes bordered on hero worship". Dyck. Provincial Politics in Canada: Towards the Turn of the Cennirv. jd ed. (Scarborouh: Prenrice Hall Canada Inc.. 1996). p.5 16.

3 Aiberta Hansard 17 June 1992, pp. 1439- 14.40.

Aberta Hansard. 22 April 1993. p.333 1

6 The correlation is most powdin .Alberta's case.

8 Department of Federd and Inter~ovenimentaiflairs for Albena, Twentv-Third Annuai Re-port to March 3 1 1996, p. 14: Christopher Serres, "Truckers. stan your en@nes." Alberta Re~ort,27 June 1994. p.9.

9 ïhe cornpetitive position of the Canadian trucking industry has also been reinforceci by the abolition of the Crow benefit, which was enthusiasticaily supported by the Govemment of Alberta and the tirtuai crisis that has developed in the transportation of grains by rail. The Crow benefit was eliminared as of 1 -4ugust 1995 with a 51.6 billion one-tirne cornpensatory payment to farmers. Xot only wouid fùture fieight rates be higher, but the payment was ody adequate to cover two years of non-subsidized fkeight costs. Manitoba Saskatchewan and mena (and the Peace River region) received 16 per cent ($258 million). 56 per cent ($902 million), and 28 per cent (440 million) of the payment respectively. Aiberra Hamard, 26 April 1994; Davis Sheremata, "The Crow dies with a flutter." Aiberta Re~ort,13 March 1995, pp. 18- 19. in addition to nsing costs, the effectiveness of railway transport appears to have deciined to an abysrnal nate. In the 1996-97 crop year, for example. fmers los more than %50 million in shipping del- charges and sales. As a result of these delays, more than 1.5 million tomes of grain had to be camed over to desin the next crop year. This unprecederned level of poor service may be partly attnbuted to the deregulation of the railway industry that occurred since the early 1990's. AccorduigIy, the CWB even 6led a "tevel of seMces complaint" with the Canadian Transportation Agency which accused CN and CP of failing to provide "adequate transportation services . . . to eastern and western ports and to US.destinationsn thereby '-seriously affea[imj the CWB sales program pool return revenue. fmer deiives-y opportunities and demurrage costs". Moreover, the erosion of the transportation piiiar may also be seen to interact with the new configuration of interest loups in the wheat market are& which will be dealt with shody: the Western Canadian Wheat Growers Association officiailyopposed the initiarion of the service complaint. "Advisory Comrnittee Applauds CWB Initiative," jdvisorv Cornmittee to Ttie Canadian Wheat Board News Release, 15 Aprii 1997; "CWB mes cornphnt with Canadian Transportation Agenq," CWB News Release, 14 April 1997; "Radways require regdations, says Advisory Co-me," Advison Cornmittee to The Canadian Wheat Board News Release. 25 Apd 1997; "Wheat growers betray &ers, says Advisory Cornmittee," Advisory Cornmittee to ïhe Canadian Wleat Board News Release: 26 May 1997.

10 For example, Sharfer Parker Jr., "The Minister of suspense," 23 September 1996, p.20; From the outset of Goodale's appointment, the president of the National Fmers Union was confident that Goodale wouid "reverse.. .Mayer's empbasis on deregulation and eeer trade". Similady, interest groups favouring dual- markefing are more wiiiing to lay the blame for a iack of change at the feet of Goodale than at the feet of the CWE3 itself. Goodale's views are also reflected by hïs pariiamentary secretary who dismisseci the resuits of an Alberta Govwnment referendum in which 66 per cent of barley producers and 62 per cent of wheat producers voted in fàvour of having the option to export their grains outside of the jurisdiction of the CWB as merely the "opinions of only one province". Debates House of Commons Canada, 6 December 1995. p. 17280- 1; Terry Johnsoq "Crackdom on the grain srnuggiers," Alberta Report, 19 September 1994, p.25; Parker. Jr.. "A Liberal view of agriculture." p.20. " Debates House of Cornmons Canada, I Auest 1993. p. 13-196

12 The Western Grain Marketine Panel Report Fipeg: The Western Grain Marketing Panet, 1 July 1996). pp. 3 1-32.

13 Saskatchewan Debates and Proceedhws, 25 April 1995, p. 1 766.

1J Aiberta Hansard, 4 October 1993. p.637

15 Shafér Parker Jr., "After the &est, the storm," Alberta Report, 11 September 1993

'"*R~LL~~a vinory for famiers. says Advisory C~mmittee.~Advisoe Comrninee to The Canadian Wheat Board. 15 April 1997; loshua Avrarq "New moves in the bariey battle," Alberta Re~ort.,7 April 1997; David Roberts, "Wheat Board's monopoiy upheld." Globe and Mail, 15 April 1997. Robert Owen "Whq. not an Alberta Wheat Board?," Alberta Report, 17 Febnrary 1997, p.22.

17 Information supplied by Leonhardt, President. RW.7 November 1996; Darrin Qualman Execuuve Secretary of the NFU, 5 November 1996; Ailana Koch. Executive Director of the WCWGA 4 December 1996.

1s Skogstad, The Politics of AoridturaI Policy-Makine: in Canada, p. 163.

19 Te- Johnson "A short rnemory on barleu.'' Aiberta Re~ort,38 Febxuq 1994. p. 16.

20 Shafer Parker Jr., "Goodaie cements the CW's powers." Alberta Report, 23 Decernber 1996, p. 15.

" Informarion supplied by Leonhardt. President. WRAP; Quahan. Executive Secretary of the hm:Koch Executive Director of the WCWGA

" The popularity of this stance with his constiaients is reflected in Goodale's victory in the 1997 election. Not only was Goodale the only Liberal who managed to win a seat in Saskatchewm but he did so in convincing hhion winning by a margin of more than 4000 votes. "Prairies," Globe and Ma.& 4 June 1997.

3 The characteristics or facts relating IO the interest groups in this examination and in the anaiysis of provinciai configurations that foilows origkte £tom the foliowing sources: Qu- Executive Secretary of the M;Koch Execuùve Director of the WCWGA., Jererny Pames, Mernbership Secrerary of the WCWGA 5 November 1996; Leonhardt. President, WRAP,;Dyck, Provincial Politics in Canada, p.390; Keystone .4-gricuiturd Producers General Council. Mernbership Report. Meeting of the KAP Generai Cound, 23 October 1996; Western Grain Marketin-e Panel Report; Shafer Parker Jr., 'No let-up by the fie-market farmers," Alberta Repon, 7 October 1996, p. 19 (for FFJ); SWer Parker Jr., "A sociaIist quest in the wheat market," Alberta Report, 9 September 1996, pp. 18-19 (for FFJ); Shafer Parker Jr., "Backs to the wall, but fighting os'' Aibena Report, 23 December 1996 (for FFJ).

24 The Western Grain Marketing- Panel Report, letter to Goodaie.

" Te- Johnson, "The car czars catch heckn Alberta Repon. 23 May 1994, p. 16. The media exposure has ben Iargely sympathetic, in panicular in Aiberta Rewn.

28 Terry Johnson "Giving away the grain fwnAlberta Report, 15 August 1994, p.7. " Terry Johnson -*Putringthe bureaucraq on the table." .Alberta Re~on3 1 July 1995. pp 1 8- 19

Johnson %iving away the grah m''p.7

3 1 Shafer Parker Jr.. "Mayhem at the border.'' Albena Report, 25 hiarch 1996. p.22.

'' Terry Johnson, The Alberta Wheat Board?," Albenïi Report, 27 ,May 1996, pp.20-21.

33 -4sa resuit. spot-checks and fines became increasingiy eequent (The maximum penalty is a fme of SjOOO and 2 years in jd.) The federai government was, however, stdi reluctant to charge famiers akhiiyunder the CWB Act because of the uncertainty of the constitutional context. To the extent that this is the case. federal governent officiais might weU fear rampant smuggiing in the face of an unenforceabie law. Johnson "Crackdoun on the grain smuggiers." pp.2.I-25.

Y Terry Johnson "The wheat board hds its scapegoats," Alberta Report, 3 October 1994, p.24.

" Johnson. --Thecar czars carch heck- p 16; Koch Phone interview by author

37 Ter* Johnsos '-Grain-legging runs rampant," Alberta Reporg 4 Juiy 1994, p.20.

38 Walter Paszkowski Alberta 'vlinister of .44giculture, Food. and Rural Development. Personal correspondence, 15 November 1996.

39 Ail map outlines used in this and other sections are rnodified by author fkom the Asiculturai ProfiIe of the province concerned. PeTlodically. additional information fiom other maps is used. This information is fiom the sources indicted on the maps. The sue of dies is not necessady to sale in ali cases. hwme maps are by "census division" for Saskatchewan and by '-census agriculnual rerpion" for Manitoba and Albena.

" The Western Grain Marketing Panel Report. p.32.

41 The Market Choices Miance was formeci in response to the injunction which ended the continentai barley market. Subsequdy, the alliance also wamed to end the wheat monopoly in line with the blending of the two demands that becme evident Johnsoq "A shon merno? on barley." p. 16

" Davis Sheremata, "The smugglers' day of reckoning," Alberta Rem% 3 April 1995, pp.21-22.

43 Johnson. -'.A shon memory on barley," p. 16.

44 Johnson, "Grain iegging ruus rampant," pp. I 9-20.

'' Johnson "The wheat board fkds its scapegoats." p.24.

47 Sheremata, "The smugglers' day of reckoning," p.2 1.

48 Terry Johnson, "The wheat board fels the heat," Aiberta Report, 7 Xovember 1994. p.20

49 For exampte, three trucks containing illegai loads were seized in October of 1995. ïhe owner of this min, who aiso happened to be the spokesperson for the FFJ, was irnrnediately able to organize a rally ittmded by approximaîely three hundred hersin Boissevairs Manitobq where they foda procession stretching for appro'amately two miles to the local border crossing. "Voting wirh their trucks." Report, 16 October 1995. p 23

'O Shafer Parker Ir., "The @ovescorne off in the grain war," Aiberta Reporg 29 Apd 1996. p.

" Johnson. The wheat board finds its scapeoats." p.21

--57 For example. Ahna Koch of the WCWGA points out that many people who are in the agricultural sector went &ou& university and see -'agriculture as a positive place to do business". Koch dso points out that "&mers have taken it upon thernselves to educate themselves on marketing" which means they more likely tend to "put their effons into crops where they cm use their management skilis to the ultimare Iimit" Joshua .4vram, "Ofkatand off-board - agriculture is booming," Alberta Rewrt, 2 June 1997, p.23.

'' Te- Johnson ..Young. skilled and ami-govemment." Alberta Repon 13 September 1993. p.20

'' Johnson. "Grain-ie@ng runs rampant." p.20.

'6 Shafer Parker Ir.. Thowiil6eight my wheat to lapan?.* Alberta Report, 20 January 1997. p. 16.

SI - Saskatchewan Debates and Proceedings, 25 ,ipriI 1995. p. 1769

'O Shafer Parker Jr-, Therepon is in and everyone's furious," iüberta Report, 29 July 1996. pp. 14- 17

'' .'Paszkowski CaiIs for Grain Panel Repon ro Be lmplemented Imrnediately." Govemment of Aiberta News Release, 12 Juiy 1996.

61 This assessrnent is based on the minister's lonser terni reaction. For his initiai reaction see Parker Jr., "The repon is in and everyone's fkrious..' pp. 13- 17.

in fàct, international vade niles were, for example. a centrai conrniuting finor to the abolition of the Crow benefit. Parker Jr.. "Sask Pool braces for a Crow-less future," Abma Report. 14 Augst 1995. p. 15.

03 Final Comuniaué, FiMinisters' Meeting on The Economy, 24-25 March 1993.

64 For example. under the FTA and the NrZFTA in addition to the dispute salement mechanisrns. which also serve to sustain Canadian access, the US can ody impose tarifi%on Canadian wheat if Canada has made a "significant change" in its Earm "suppon" pro,ms. Moreover, under the GATT arrangements. even this Iimited option is entirely eliminated. Canada can also retaliate under GATT by imposing restrictions similar in nature to those of the US. Terry Johnson "Uncle Sam rattles his sabre over wheat." Aiberta Repon, 25 Idy 1994, p. 19; Johnson, "Giving away the grain farrrl" p.8.

6' Te- Johnson, %iving away the grain fan" p.7

66 Johnson, "Purting the bureaucracy on the table," p. 18.

" Walter Paszkowski, qbma Hansard, 22 Febmary 1994, p. 166

68 Ckstopher Serres, "Al1 trade routes lead sou&" Alberta Report, 27 June 1994, pp.6-8. -0 -ibid. -1 Johnson "The .4ibena U'heat Board?''

2 Parker fr.. "The report is in and everyone's fiirious," p. 17

74 , Alberta Launches Court Actions," Goverment of Alberta News Release. 22 July 1996. Under the current delivery program, fmers are abie to offer their *gain for delives under CWB contracts four times per crop year. The CWB announces an acceptance IeveI dter it makes as assessrnent of the amount of grain offered under each contract and the market demand for that grain. See. for e.uaniple. '-C WB .hnounces Series A Contract Acceptance," CWB News Release, 26 November 1996.

" "Ruhg a victory for farmers. says Adiixixy Cornmittee.'. , Ak~am.5ew rnoves Lt the barley banle..-: Roberts. "Wheat Board's monopoly upheld." ; Owen, "My not an Aiberta Wheat Board?." p.22.

76 Parker Jr.. '--4Liberal view of agidrure." p.32.

T; Johnson, 'The Alberta Wheat Board?," p.20.

19 "Canadian Wheat Board mus be changed fmers say in poii," Globe and Mail, 9 September 19%.

80 Parker Jr., 'The report is in and everyone's fÙrious,'* p. 17

" Parker Jr.. -A sociast quen in the wheat market," p. 1 S.

53 Parker Jr.. "So let-up by the fiee-market farmers." p. 19.

Shak Parker Ir.. Themonopotins mike back" Alberta Repo~~,26 August 1996.

R6 The configration of inrerest groups and their stances on the wheat marketin%issue that has developed in the 1990's has also dernonstrated the potential to reinforce itself by beginning to challenge the traditionai consensus of the -4dMsory Cornmittee to the CWB, which has also been a pillar of support for the CWB's wheat monopoly. -4n increasing number of candidates seeking elecrion to the Advisory Committee favour dual-marketino. In fact. concem was voiced over the possibility of an "unofficial date" of dual-marketers capturing a majority of seats in the last round of elections in 1994. Again, candidates houring duai- marketing tend to be fiom Alberta, whiIe candidates fiom Saskatchewan tend to favow the continuation of single-desk sekg. Moreover, in what may be an indication of the firture direction of the Comminee, it has decided to support the amendment to Bill C-72 to allow for dud-marketing in oats. rye. flaxseed. and canola. To be sure. the Advisory Cornmittee has dso cIaimed that dual-rnarketing for wheat and bariey is a "myth". Moreover. the vast rnajority of candidates elected are in favour of single-desk selüng. Nevenheless, the potentid for codka is increasing as dual-marketers continue to make gains, especially @en the provincial distribution of dual-marketing support and the general dissatisfaction with the -- -- accountability of the CW."BLU C-72 amendment is a positive move," îhe Advison- Commntee to ïhe CWB News Release. 23 Apnl 1997; Johnson, "The wheat board feels the hm." p.20; -'Ruhg a tictory or farmers."; Saskatchewan Debates and Proceedmes, 25 April 1995, p. 1765; Western Grain Marketing Panel Reuon, p.35.

87 Parker Jr., "The report is in and everyone's fixïous."

Scon Edmonds, "Farmers raüy round wheat board,' Globe and MaiL 15 t\u_min 1996; .'Famers rdy to support wheat board," Globe and Mail, 25 July 1996; Parker Ir., "The rnonopolists stnke back," p. 16. By the end of Jdy, more than 125 hershad been chaqed with grain smug_etig. Parker Jr . "The report is in and everyone's fbrious."

89 Parker. "The report is in and everyone's firious." p. 16

90 Parker Ir. ."The rnooopolists strike back" Alberta Rmrt, 26 August 1996, p. 16.

92 Skogstad suggests that govements will more likely be noncornminal when they are subjected to cross- cutting interest goups influences than when the interest poup pressures are reïn5orcing (as was uaditionaiiy the case). Skogstad, The Potitics of Aizrkdtural Policv-Makinn in Canada, p. 163.

93 "Canadian H'heat Board must be changed fmers say in poil."

94 David Roberts, "Wheat monopoly stays, Ottawa says," Gfobe and Mail, 7 September 1996.

95 Parker Jr., "A socialist quest in the wheat market," p. 18

% The legisfationproposes hat the ment commissioners be replaceci by a board of directors and a CE0 (the president). However, the initial board would be appointed by the minister, the mirlister would decide when eldons wili commence, and the president wodd aiways be appointed by the minister. in addition, althou@ the legislation suggests that changes to the CWB could be introduced if the board of directors supportai them, the Canadian Grain Commission deemed the changes can be made without "jeopardizing quality". and farmers themselves vote for the changes. the federd Minister of Agricuiwe must st.iLi introduce the changes to the cabinet. Moreover, the Canadian Grain Commission is appointed by the fideral govwnment, thereby eEectively creating a federai sovernment veto over chanaes. -4dditiondy. the board of directors will not be able to recommend an end to singie-desk seUing to the fedd govemment. The legislation alço introduces changes involving the technical aspects of the Cm's marketing de.the CWB will be aiiowed to makc cash purchof grains, the CWB will be aiiowed to discontinue pool accounts and distnbute their funds at any tinte. and the CWB wiU be aiiowed to "hee prices". h another sign of the growing suength of duai-marketing, however, the legislarion has also ken amended to aiiow for the possibility of hcluding oats, rye, flaxseeà, and canola to the CWB's mandate on a dual-marketing basis. Parker Jr., "Good.de cements the CWB's powers," p. 15; "Wheat board changes coming," Globe and Mail. 4 December 1996; "Bill C-72 amendment is a positive move."

97 Avram, 'Wew moves in the barley banle," p. 15.

98 Owen "Why not an Alberta Wheat Board," p.22.

99 Parker Ir., "Goodale cements the CWB's powers," p. 15.

I O0 Owen, "Why not an Alberta Wheat Board," p.22 - - '" Joshua Awam --Nowor never for an .Alberta What Board'." PJbena Revon, 5 May 1997. p. 19.

'O2 Roberts, "Wheat Board's monopoly upheld." ; "Fmpanel appeals wheat-act dine," Globe and Mail, 10 May 1997.

103 "Political parties rnake their agicultural policies public," The Advisorv Cornmittee to The Canadian Wleat Board Xews Release. 33 May 1997

'O4 "The Liberal cabinet," Globe and Ma& 12 June 1997.

105 Parker Jr., -'The @oves corne off in the grain wu," p. 18. As seen. McMechan was jaiied widi comlcted murderers. McMechan was released in December 1996. der spending five months in jd.Shafer Parker Jr., -'The strong arrn of the law." Aiberta Repon, 9 September 1996. p. 18.

Fourteen fanners were mniicted of iiiegaiiy sehg in an "act of defiance of the CWB" (Of these, four were aiso convicted of failing to provide "proper documents") ; twehe Aiberta fmers were convimed for fkiiing to surrender their vehicles (Ofthese, nine were also convicted of f%hgto provide a CWB export license). The &st incident occurred in December 1996 and the second in iMarch 1997. in the f3-s case. the farmers were each fineci $4000 for fàilir~gto sunender th& imcks to aistom officers (the four fmers who were convicted of the additional charge received an additionai fine of $6000). In the second case, each herwas fined $2500 (the nine fàrmers convicted of the addftiond charge were assessed an additional 55000 fine). Joshua .4vram, "The barley vote campaitg goes on the road.- Aberta Re~ort.20 January 1997; Awq"New moves in the barley battle.", Parker, "The strong arm of the law."; 'Protesting fmers convicted." Globe and Mail, 7 Decernber 1996.

'O7 A- "N~Wmoves in the barley banle.-

108 The anger was also intensifiecl because ody CWB permit holders were automaticaily eiigible to vote and the provincial breakdown of the vote is not to be released. (63 per cent of farmen voted to retain the Cm's barley monopoly.) "The silent rnajority has spoken. says -4dklsory Cornmittee," The Advison. Cornmittee to The Canadian meat Board News Release, 25 Mach 1997; Avram, "New moves in the barley banle.-

109 Owen, "Why not an Alberta Wheat Board," p.32.

"O Richard J. Schultz, Federalisrn Bureaucracv. and Public Poli?: The Politics of Hiehwav Trans~on Regdation (Montrd: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1980).

Chapter 5

' Nan Ca-, "The Other Crisis of Canadian Federaiîsm." in Constitution Govemxnent. and Societv in Canada: Selected Essavs bv Alan C.Cairns. Douglas E. W-Uiarns. ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. l988), p. 187. "Advisory Committee applauds CWB initiative," Advisov Committee to The Canadian Wheat Board News Release. 15 Apnl 1997.

Agriculture Canada Strategic Directions to 1990: A Planning Document Ottawa: Agriculture Canada, 1987.

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Aaicultural Profile of Manitoba 1991 Census, Statistics Canada, Agncultural Division. ûttawa: Minister of Indusny, Science and Technolog, 1992.

Aoricultural Profile of Saskatchewan. 1991 Census, Statistics Canada, Agcultural Division. Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Science and Technolog-, 1992.

Akcultural Statistics for Ontario 1993. Publication 70. Toronto: Ministry of Agriculturel Food and Rural Affairs, 1994.

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Alberta Hansard.

"Alberta files court challenge to wheat-board monopoly,'' Globe and Mail. 23 July 1996.

"Alberta Launches Court Actions,'' Government of Alberta News Release. 27 July 1996.

The Alberta Progressive Conservative Party. Our Plan for a better Alberta. Edmonton: The Alberta Progressive Conservative Party, 1993.

Allen. Ted, "Wrone question about the wheat board, Mr Minister." Globe and Mail. 1 8 November 1996.

Avrarn, Joshua, 'The barley battle vote campaip goes on the road," Alberta Report. 20 Januq 1997.

,"New moves in the barley battle," Alberta Report. 7 Apnl 1997.

-- ,Wow or never for an 'Alberta Wheat Board':" Alberta Rewrt. 5 May 1997. -- "Offbeat and off-board - a-aiculture is booming," Alberta Report. Z June 1997.

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BritneU, G.E. and Vernon Fowke. Canadian A.icuIture in War and Peace 1935-50. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.

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-- . From Intersîate to Intrastate Federalism in Canada. Lnstitute Discussion Paper 5. Kingston: Queen's University, uistitute of Intergovenunental Relations, 1979.

? ''The Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalisrn." In Constitution, Government. and Society in Canada: Selected Essavs bv Alan C. Cairns. Douglas E. Williams, ed. Toronto: McCIelland and Stewart, 1988. , "The Liklng Canadian Constitution." In Canadian Federalism: Mvth or Realin;. jrded. J. Peter Meekisoq ed. Toronto: Methuen 1977.

,"The Other Crisis of Canadian Federalism." In Constitution, Government, and Socie~in Canada: Selected Essavs bv Alan C. Cairns. Douglas E. Williams. ed. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988.

Careiess, Anthon? G.S. Initiative and Resmnse: The Adaptation of Canadian Federaiism to Remonal Economic Develo~mentMontreai: McGill-Queen's Universih Press, 1977.

The Canadian Wheat Board Annual Report Various years.

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Carter. Colin A. and R-MA. Loyns, "The CWB: Hallmark or Millstone in Prairie Grain Marketing?'-, Policv ODtions. June 1996.

Carter. Toni Owen, "Breakthrough on the Crow: Onawa promises to pay out the Crow benefik but an election will probabty corne first," Alberta Rewrt. 12 April 1993.

'Changes in Western Grain Marketing," Policv Statement. Department of Agriculture and Ar@-Food. 7 October 1996.

'Thief Commissioner Defends CWB Before Farrn Writers," CWB News Release. 19 September 1996.

Chief Electoral Officer of Alberta Rewrt of the Chief Electoral Officer on the General Election of the Twentv-Second Leeislative Assemblv. Monday. March 20", 1989. Edmonton: Province of Albe- Alberta Legislative Assembly, May 16, 1989.

Chief Electoral Officer of Alberta Remrt of the Chef Electoral Officer on the General Election of the Twentv-Third Legislative Assemblv. Tuesdav, June 15& . 1993. Edmonton: Province of Alberta, Alberta Legislative Assembly, Aug. 16, 1993.

Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. Thirtv-Fifth Generai Election Report of the Chief Electoral Officer Pursuant to Section 193 of the Canadian Elections Act. Ottawa: Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, 1993.

Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. Thirtv-Fifth General Election Officia1 Voting Results. Ottawa: Chief Electoral Oficer of Canada, 1993. Chief Electoral Officer of Canada. Thiry-Fourtb General Election Rewrt of the Chef Electorai Officer Pursuant to Section 193 of the Canadian Elections Act. Ottawa: Chef Electoral Officer of Canada. 1988.

Chief Electoml Officer of Manitoba. Statement of Votes: Rewrt of the Chief Electoral Officer Pursuant to Section 142(2) of The Elections Act on the Thutv-Sixth Provincial General Election A1lril25. 1995. Winnipeg: Elections Manitoba, 1995.

Chief Electoral Officer of Saskatchewan. Twentv-Third General Election June 2 1. 1995 Rewrt of the Chief Electoral Officer. Regina: The Chief Electoral Officer of Saskatchewan, July, 1996.

Chief Electoral Officer of Saskatchewan. Twentv-Second General Election October 2 1. 199 1 Rewn of the Chief Electoral Officer. Regina: The Chef Electoral Officer of Saskatchewan, 1992.

Ciarke. Harold D. et ai. Absent Mandate: Canadian Politics in an Era of Restructwin% 3d ed. Toronto: Gage Educationai Publishing Company, 1996.

Coleman, William D. and Grace Skogstad, eds. "Policy Cornmunities and Policy Neîworks: A Structural Approach." In Policv Communities and Public Policv in Canada: A Structural A~~roach.Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1990.

Collison, John, "Volume, volume, volume," Alberta Rewrt. 14 April 1997.

Communiqué. Interprovincial Conference of Ministers and Depu? Ministers of Agriculture. 25 August 1986.

Communique from Western Premiers' Conference. 23 Apd 1980.

Communiqué frorn Western Premiers' Conference. 26 March 1979.

Communiqué of the Conference. Federal-Province Conference of Ministers and Deputy Ministen of Agriculture. 24 July 1985.

Comrnunicrué No. 1: A.aiculture and Renewable Resources. Western Premiers* Conference. 29-30 May 1986.

Communiaué No.3 : Strengthenina Aaiculture. Western Premiers' Conference. 26-28 July 1989.

Courchene, Thomas J. Celebrating Rexibilitv: An Intemetive Essav on the Evolution of Canadian Federalism. C.D. Howe Benefactors Lecture 1995, Montreal, 16 October 1995. Comey, John C.. "Drawing Electoral Boundaries." Ln Canadian Pmies in Transition. znded A. Tan-gay and A-G. Gagnon, eds. 1995.

TWBannounces Senes A contract acceptance," CWB News Release. 26 November 1996.

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"CWB renews annual supply agreements with JapqmCWB News Release. 27 November 1996.

"CWB renews Educational Accord with Brazil," CWB News Release. 26 November 19%.

"CWB says grower criticism is unwarranteci," CWB News Release. 2 October 1996.

Debates House of Commons Cana.&.

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Doem, G. Bruce and Glen Toner. The Politics of Enerw: The Development and implementation of the NEP. Toronto: Methuen, 1985.

Dominion-Provincial Conference, '1 93 5.

Dotvnev Promsed Aixicultural Deveio~mentStrateAm. Federal-Provincial Conference of Ministen and Deputy Ministers of Agriculture. 24 Juiy 1979.

Dupré. J. Stefan, "Reflections on the Workability of Executive Federalism.'? In Pers-pectives on Canadian Federalism. R.D.Olling and M. W. Westmacott, eds. Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1988.

. University of Toronto. Department of Politicai Science. Personal communication. 1993.

Dupré, J. Stefan, et al. Federalism and Policv Development: the case of adult occu~ationaltraining in Ontario. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973. Dyck. Rand "The Canada Assistance Plan: the ultimate in cooperative federaiism." Canadian Public Administration. Vol. 19. No.4. Winter 1976.

- , "Canadian Politics: Critical A~proaches.Toronto: Nelson Canada. 1 996.

. Provincial Politics in Canada: Towards the Tum of the Century. 3d ed- Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1996.

,"Relations Between Federal and Provincial Parties." In Canadian Parties in Transition. 2" ed A. Tanguy and A-G. Gagnon, eds. 1995.

Edmonds, Scott, "Farmers rally round the wheat board," Globe and Mail. 15 Augst 1996.

Elton, David, .'Federalisrn and the Canadian West-" In Perspectives on Canadian Federalism. R.D. Olling M.W. Westmacott, eds. Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1988.

"Fm panel appeals wheat-act ruling," Globe and Mail. 10 May 1997.

"Farmer's acquitta1 upheld," Globe and Mail. 23 April 1997.

"Farmers rally to support wheat board," Globe and Mail. 25 July 1996.

Farrell, Kenneth R. The US Farm Bill, US Trade Policv. and WorId Grain Markets. Presented at the hterprovincial Conference of Ministers and Deputy Ministen of Agriculture. 75 July 1986.

Final Commuiqué. First Ministen' Meeting on The Economy. 21-25 March 1992.

Fletcher, Frederick J. and Donald C. Wallace, "Federal-Provincial Relations and the Maliing of Public Policy in Canada: A Review of Case Studies." In Division of Powers and Public Policv. Richard Simeon, Research Coordinator. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.

Fowke, Vernon C. Canadian Abcultural Policv: The Historical Pattern. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1946.

Garland, S.W. and S. C. Hudson. Governent Involvement in Aa-iculture. Report for the Federal Task Force on Agriculture. Ottawa: Department of Agriculture, October 1968.

Gibbins, Roger. Prairie Politics and Socie~:Reeionalism in Decline. Toronto: Butterworths, 1980. Governent of Alberta News Release. Federal-Provincial Conference of Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Agriculture. 24 July 1979.

Grodzins, Morton. -'The Federal System." In Arnerican Federalism in Pers~ctive. Aaron Wildavsky, ed. Boston: Linle, Brown and Company, 1967.

Harmonv in Diversitv: A New Federalisrn for Canada. Alberta Govermnent Position Paper on Constitutional Change. October 1978.

Harrison, Kathryn, Passino the Buck: Federalisrn and Canadian Environmental Policv. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996.

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Hogg, Peter. Constitutional Law in Canada- 3* ed- student ed. Scarborough: Canwell Company Limited 1992.

Horowitz, Gad, "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation." ln Partv Politics in Canada. 7" ed. Hu& G. Thorburn, ed Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1996.

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Intergovernmental Conference of Ministers and Deputv Ministers of Aerriculture. Various conferences.

Johnson, Terry, "Mer the Crow, new hope in the count~~,"Alberta Report, 21 August 1995.

;"Alberta Pool heads south7" Alberta Rewrt. 3 July 1995.

"The Alberta Wheat Board?,'? Alberta Reoort. 27 May 1996.

."The car czars catch heck," Aiberta Report 23 May 1994.

--? iCrackdow-n on the grain smugglers,'? Alberta Rewrt. 19 September 1994.

,"Dog-eat-dog cooperation," Alberta Rewrt. 19 August 1996. , "Giving away the grain fm," Albem Rewn. 15 Au_misst 1993.

,&Grain-legging runs rampan&" Alberta Rewrt. 4 July 1994.

-- , "Grain trading enters the info age," Alberta Rewn. 16 December 1996.

,"Griping in the US4" Alberta Rewrt. 28 June 1993.

, "Here corne the dere_datonl" Alberta Rewxt. 1 6 May 1994.

"It's time to cal1 the Yankee bluff," Alberta Remn. 9 May 1994.

. -'Make way for the gants." Alberta Repon. 70 November 1993.

,"Moving grain from farm to market: Even without Crow reform, trucks are winning business away fiom rail"' Alberta Report. 18 October 1993.

, "Putting the bureaucracy on the table," Alberta Report. 3 July 1995.

"A short memory on barley," Alberta Repon. 28 Febw1994.

,"Uncle Sam rattles his sabre over wheat," Albemi Report. 15 Auwt 1994.

-'The wheat board feels the heat,-' Alberta Rewrt. 7 November 1994.

, "The wheat board finds its scapegoats," Alberta Rewrt. 3 October 1994.

-- "Young, skilled and ad-govemrnent: A new seneration of fiee-market farmers is remaking prairie agriculture," Alberta Rewrt. 13 September 1993.

Kavana* D'Arcy and Terry Johnson, "Dr. Jekyll and Mr: Hehn," Alberta Rewrt. 19 August 199 1.

Kenny, Eoin, "Rural counties meet to lure Alberta cabinet," Globe and Mail. II Novernber 1996.

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