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The Persian Wars Reading Notes

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The Persian Wars Reading Notes The Persian Wars Reading Notes ● Read each section and complete the Reading Notes (Complete Sentences! Follow Instructions!) ● Stay on task. Work at a Level 1 with the person next to you (Partner Work Expectations) ● You will have 5 minutes for each section 28.2: The Setting and Combatants 1. How did the Persians build their empire? The Persians built their empire by conquering neighbors, especially using archers 2. How did King Darius rule the Persian Empire? King Darius divided kingdom into 20 provinces, established tax system, allowed people to keep customs/religions 3. What happened during the Ionian Revolt and why was it important? Persians had conquered Ionians. Athens sent soldiers/ships. Only made Persians mad. 28.3: The Battle of Marathon 1. Summarize the Battle of Marathon Greeks refused to pay tribute to Darius. Darius sent his army. Miltiades led the Athenians to victory using superior weaponry and strategy. 2. Write a headline that summarizes the battle Persians Seek Conquest but No Match for Miltiades 3. Why did the Greeks win the battle? They used clever military strategy and better weaponry The Legend: ● An Athenian runner named Pheidippides was sent to declare victory to Athens from the battlefield ● He ran the 25 miles back to Athens after fighting in the battle ● When he arrived in the city he announced “We’ve won!” and died of exhaustion ● This is the source of our modern Marathon races 28.4: The Battle of Thermopylae 1. Summarize the Battle of Thermopylae Xerxes created “bridge” to cross Hellespont. Athens and Sparta joined forces. Athenian navy fought Persians at sea, Spartan army fought Persians on land. Leonidas led 300 Spartans to stand against 180,000 Persians. Although heroic, Spartans were overwhelmed and Persians advanced to Athens. 2. Write a headline that summarizes the battle Despite Spartan Heroics, Persians Advance to Athens 3. Why did the Persians win the battle? They knew the geography of the area and used clever strategy The Legend: ● Upon the Persians offering for Leonidas to join them: "If you had any knowledge of the noble things of life, you would refrain from coveting others' possessions; but for me to die for Greece is better than to be the sole ruler over the people of my race." ● After telling the Greeks to surrender their weapons, Leonidas famously replied: “Come and get them.” ● Upon being told the Persian arrows would “block out the sun” a Spartan soldier proclaimed: “So much the better...then we shall fight our battle in the shade.” 28.5: The Battle of Salamis 1. Summarize the Battle of Salamis Athens was destroyed after Thermopylae. Themistocles led the Athenian navy. He tricked Xerxes into sending his ships into a narrow waterway at Salamis where the Greeks surrounded them and destroyed their fleet. 2. Write a headline that summarizes the battle Themistocles Outwits Xerxes, Destroys Persian Fleet 3. Why did the Greeks win the battle? The Greeks won through clever military strategy and knowledge of geography. 28.6: The Battle of Plataea 1. Summarize the Battle of Plataea Xerxes ordered the Persian army to attack Athens once more in the spring. Athenians joined together with Spartans to defend Greece against the Persians. A force of 80,000 Greek soldiers destroyed the Persian army and ended its threat. The alliance between Athens and Sparta proved to be a key factor. 2. Write a headline that summarizes the battle Athens and Sparta Join Together, End Persian Threat 3. Why did the Greeks win the battle They were joined together as allies. News Article from a Key Battle Your task is to write a news article as if you had witnessed one of the battles of the Persian Wars that we have discussed. Include: ● A headline (can be one you already created) ● A summary of what occurred at the battle ○ At least 5-6 sentences ● A photograph (detailing the battle) ● Interviews with people involved ○ Be CREATIVE! *You aren’t just stating facts; write it as if you’re a reporter..
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