Doctoral Dissertation Department of Social Sciences University of Naples “Federico II” ! ! Title: the Elusive Quest for Peace in Colombia

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Doctoral Dissertation Department of Social Sciences University of Naples “Federico II” ! ! Title: the Elusive Quest for Peace in Colombia ! ! ! ! ! ! Doctoral Dissertation Department of Social Sciences University of Naples “Federico II” ! ! Title: The Elusive Quest for Peace in Colombia. Past and Future Conflict Resolution Schemes ! ! Candidate: Krzysztof Krakowski Supervisor: Luciano Brancaccio ! ! ! ! ! Academic year: 2015 ! XXVII Cycle ! ! ! ! ! ! Krzysztof Krakowski CONTENTS ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! List of Tables and Figures……………………………………………………………………….…..…………3 Acknowledgements…..………………………………………………………………………….…..…………4 List of Abbreviations………….……………………………………………………………………………..…5 ! Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………….6 Part I Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Risks. Lessons from Colombia 1. Rethinking Colombian Civil War(s) 1946-2014. The Role of Forthcoming Peace Accords…….…..13 2. Partial Conflict Resolution 2003-2006: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programme. Towards Empirical Evaluation………………………………………………………………….40 Part II Successes and Failures of Colombian Paramilitaries’ Demobilisation 2003-2006. Quantitative Evidence 3. DDR in Two Colombian Regions. Between-Regional Comparisons………………………………..61 4. Sub-Regional Heterogeneity of DDR Outcomes…………………………………………………….97 Part III Post-Demobilisation Paramilitary Governance. Case Studies of Two Colombian Regions 5. The Logic of Paramilitary Violence (I). Evidence from Pacific Coast…………………………..…115 6. The Logic of Paramilitary Violence (II). Evidence from Eastern Plains…….….….………………154 Conclusion……………………………………………….…………………………………………………..185 References.…………………………………………………………………………………………………..191 ! !2 Krzysztof Krakowski TABLES AND FIGURES ! ! ! ! ! ! Table 1: Paramilitary violence in Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains per time period…..………….……….…62 Table 2: Paramilitaries, state and guerrillas’ interactions. Correlation matrix………………………………..84 Table 3: The modalities of paramilitary violence per repression period, 2001-2012………..………….……89 Table 4: The magnitude of paramilitary attacks per repression period, 2001-2012………………………..…91 Table 5.1: Victims’ profiles per repression period (I), 2001-2012……………………………………………93 Table 5.2: Victims’ profiles per repression period (II), 2001-2012………………….………..………………94 Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for variables in Models 1-3. Pacific Coast sample……………..…………103 Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics for variables in Models 1-3. Eastern Plains sample……………………….104 Table 7.1: The intensity of municipal paramilitary violence in Pacific Coast (2003-2009)..……….………106 Table 7.2: The intensity of municipal paramilitary violence in Eastern Plains (2003-2009)…………….…109 ! Figure 1: Conflict-related deaths and homicides in Colombia 1988-2008……………………………..…….41 Figure 2: Paramilitary violence. Department trends in Pacific Coast…………….…………..………………54 Figure 3: Paramilitary violence. Department trends in Eastern Plains…………………………………….…55 Figure 4: Paramilitary violence in regions. Mean department counts…………………………………….….80 Figure 5: Anti-paramilitary repression in regions Department means…………………………………….…80 Figure 6.1: Paramilitary violence and repression (I). Logarithmic values……………………………….…81 Figure 6.2: Paramilitary violence and repression (II). Logarithmic values…………………………………82 Figure 7: Anti-paramilitary repressive strategy per time period, 2001-2012….……………………………..88 Figure 8: Demobilisation statistics in Eastern Plains…..……………………………………………………157 ! Map 1: The territory of Eastern Plains……………………………………………………………..…….….175 ! !3 Krzysztof Krakowski ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ! ! ! ! First and foremost, I am grateful to Luciano Brancaccio for diligent supervision, insightful suggestions and helpful discussions in the last three years of my work on this doctoral thesis. His encouragement has been invaluable to bring this project to an end. Additionally, I would like to thank Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín who commented on some chapters of this manuscript and who introduced me to the community of prominent researchers working on organised violence in Colombia. His help included as well organising a seminar encounter at Law Faculty, Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá, on October 23, 2013 dedicated to the discussion of the arguments of my thesis. Finally, I would like to thank Connor Brooks and three anonymous reviewers for Latin American Politics & Society who helped me to improve technical part of this work. My further thanks go to the Department of Social Sciences, University of Naples “Federico II”, which awarded me a research grant to carry out this doctoral research, and in particular to my doctoral programme coordinator, Enrica Morlicchio, who has been most helpful in every aspect of my studies in Naples. Guido Piccoli, fellow PhD students and academic lecturers (i.a. Giacomo di Gennaro and Maria Cristina Ercolessi) played a huge role at the earlier stages of my work when I tried to clarify my research ideas and translate them into addressable questions and hypotheses. Then, I would like to thank Ricardo Rodriguez whom made my stay in Bogotá very pleasant experience and who voluntarily taught me practical Spanish in unbelievably short period of time. Last but not least, this thesis would have never been finished if not for the constant and unlimited support from Aleksandra Kubiszewska whom I dedicate this work. !4 Krzysztof Krakowski ABBREVIATIONS ! ! ! ! ! ACC — Autodefensas Campesinas de Casanare ACMV — Autodefensas Campesinas de Meta y Vichada AUC — Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia BC — Bloque Calima BLS — Bloque Libertadores del Sur CERAC — Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos CINEP — Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (Programa por la Paz) CIT — Centro Internacional de Toledo para la Paz CNRR — Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación COHA — Council on Hemispheric Affairs COP — Corporación Observatorio para la Paz DANE — Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística DDR — Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration DT — Diócesis de Tumaco ELN — Ejército de Liberación Nacional EPL — Ejército Popular de Liberación ERPAC — Ejército Revolucionario Popular Antiterrorista Colombiano FARC — Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia GMH — Grupo de Memoria Histórica GN — Gobernación de Nariño HRW — Human Rights Watch ICG — International Crisis Group INDEPAZ — Instituto de Estudios para el Desarollo y la Paz ISC — In-Sight Crime M19 — Movimento 19 de Abril MAPP — Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz NG — Nueva Generación NN — Noche y Niebla NVC — Norte del Valle Cartel UNODC — United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime VR — Vicepresidencia de la República ! !5 Krzysztof Krakowski INTRODUCTION ! When nearly three years ago I started my doctoral research in Department of Social Sciences at the University of Naples “Federico II” I intended to study the conflict resolution issues with reference to the Colombian civil war and its partially accomplished peace process in 2003-2006. I wanted to focus on the evaluation of the already applied resolution scheme in order to understand its achievements and shortcomings in terms of their implications for presently negotiated peace accords with the biggest insurgent group still operating in Colombia, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). What I found particularly interesting within the topic was the relationship between conflict resolution design/implementation and post-conflict risks of violence reemergence. I chose to analyse the Colombian war since it constituted an ideal case for comparative research with widely available systematic data. First of all, the Colombian conflict represents a particular type of sub-state wars with more than one violent conflict simultaneously going on in the territory of a single country. Even though waged almost independently, all of these sub-state conflicts belong to the same kind of irregular warfare characterised by the absence of ethnic, sectarian, or religious background which could have made a viable compromise unachievable (see Kalyvas and Kocher 2007a). For policymakers, the existence of such myriad of largely similar but still independent conflicts means total mess (Arias Ortiz 2012). For researcher, it guarantees perfect conditions for comparative research design. More importantly, the most recent peace process in Colombia (2003-2006) was concluded amid the ongoing warfare. Paradoxically, it actually facilitates the evaluation of the resolution’s successes and failures because it ensures the continuity of conflict data collection. What usually happens in the situation of fully resolved armed contests are radical changes in conflict monitoring strategies. The states, NGOs and international community observers tend to overlook the existence !6 Krzysztof Krakowski of low-intensity post-conflict violence as long as it does not take any political turn. Call (2002) observes, for example, that in El Salvador post-conflict violence was on a constant increase for the period of at least ten years since early 1990s, and still went almost unnoticed internationally. Call finds that although the majority of post-conflict violence was either perpetrated by armed gangs formed by ex-conflict participants, or reflected newly-established law enforcement authorities’ inability to control crime, it was never considered as having anything to do with just terminated civil war. As a result, Salvadoran conflict resolution is unanimously judged as the success story, even if it left the country as one of the world’s most insecure places — the situation which continues until present. Coming back to Colombian case, the fact that the most recent peace process offered only partial conflict resolution meant,
Recommended publications
  • Informe 2013 Bacrim
    Las BACRIM despue s de 2013: ¿prono stico reservado? BERNARDO PÉREZ SALAZAR CARLOS MONTOYA CELY A mediados de 2012, el ministro de defensa, Juan Carlos Pinzón, dio un parte de tranquilidad frente a las bandas criminales –bacrim–, señalando que en 934 municipios del país “no hay presencia de bandas criminales”.1 No aclaró el alcance de la expresión “no hay presencia” ni la definición de “banda criminal”. Tampoco refirió cómo llegó a la mentada cifra de municipios. En todo caso la declaración contrastó visiblemente con el parte que a principios del 2011 habían entregado las autoridades de la Policía Nacional, con el general Oscar Naranjo a la cabeza, al indicar que las vendettas y los ajustes de cuentas entre narcos representarían el 47% de los 15.400 homicidios registrados en 2010. Dadas las violentas disputas territoriales que se registraban en aquel entonces por el control del “microtráfico” en sectores urbanos de Medellín entre alias “Sebastián” y “Valenciano”, así como por rutas de narcotráfico en Córdoba entre “Paisas” (aliados a los Rastrojos) y “Aguilas Negras“ (aliados de los Urabeños), no es de extrañar que una nota informativa cubriendo la noticia se hubiese titulado: “Las bacrim cometen la mitad de los asesinatos en Colombia”.2 Declaraciones sobre el tema del entonces ministro del Interior, Germán Vargas Lleras, entregadas también en enero de 2011, no fueron menos inquietantes, y se resumieron en el titular “Las bacrim ya actúan en 24 departamentos colombianos”, lo que propició que algunos analistas refirieran la presencia de
    [Show full text]
  • Fuerzas Militares
    Editores Hubert Gehring El presente libro reexiona sobre los nuevos roles domésticos e internacionales de las Fuerzas Militares en la construcción de paz y Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas el fortalecimiento del Estado, luego de que el Gobierno colombiano, en cabeza del expresidente Juan Manuel Santos, negoció y acordó el n del conicto armado interno con la mayor y más antigua guerrilla: las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC-EP). No obstante, el posacuerdo ha implicado para las FF.MM. la continuidad de misiones no convencionales, como la lucha contra el ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional), las disidencias de las FARC-EP, las bandas criminales ligadas al narcotráco, la minería ilegal y la depredación del medio ambiente, así como también tareas Fuerzas Militares de apoyo al desarrollo estructural e institucional del país. Sin embargo, el posacuerdo plantea también un cambio para que de Colombia: se abran escenarios en misiones convencionales, como el control de las fronteras de manera conjunta con otros países de la región La Fundación Konrad Adenauer (KAS) es una fundación para combatir actividades criminales transfronterizas y confrontar nuevos roles y desafíos político alemana con orientación democráta cristiana las nuevas amenazas que enfrenta el sistema internacional. Así Autores allegada a la Unión Demócrata Cristiana (CDU). mismo, las FF.MM. advierten la necesidad de concebir sus roles nacionales e internacionales Carlos Enrique Álvarez Calderón institucionales en relación con la importancia de armonizar su Mario Arroyave Quintero Para la Fundación Konrad Adenauer, la principal meta de transformación con los procesos de ampliación democrática, Javier Alberto Ayala Amaya nuestro trabajo es el fortalecimiento de la democracia en emergentes en el mismo posacuerdo, al igual que adquirir Jaime Baeza Freer todas sus dimensiones.
    [Show full text]
  • Targeting Civilians in Colombia's Internal Armed
    ‘ L E A V E U S I N P E A C E ’ T LEAVE US IN A ‘ R G E T I N G C I V I L I A N S PEA CE’ I N C O TARG ETING CIVILIANS L O M B I A IN COL OM BIA S INTERNAL ’ S ’ I N T E R ARMED CONFL IC T N A L A R M E D C O N F L I C ‘LEAVE US IN PEACE’ T TARGETING CIVILIANS IN COLOMBIA ’S INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT “Leave us in peace!” – Targeting civilians in Colombia’s internal armed conflict describes how the lives of millions of Colombians continue to be devastated by a conflict which has now lasted for more than 40 years. It also shows that the government’s claim that the country is marching resolutely towards peace does not reflect the reality of continued A M violence for many Colombians. N E S T Y At the heart of this report are the stories of Indigenous communities I N T decimated by the conflict, of Afro-descendant families expelled from E R their homes, of women raped and of children blown apart by landmines. N A The report also bears witness to the determination and resilience of T I O communities defending their right not to be drawn into the conflict. N A L A blueprint for finding a lasting solution to the crisis in Colombia was put forward by the UN more than 10 years ago. However, the UN’s recommendations have persistently been ignored both by successive Colombian governments and by guerrilla groups.
    [Show full text]
  • Un Análisis De Seguridad En La Frontera Colombo-Venezolana
    UN ANÁLISIS DE SEGURIDAD EN LA FRONTERA COLOMBO-VENEZOLANA 1 Director León Valencia Agudelo Subdirector Académico Ariel Ávila Martínez Coordinador Paz y Postconflicto Diego Alejandro Restrepo Investigadora Nacional Pares Paola Andrea Perdomo Consultores regionales Eliana Paola Zafra Hector Augusto Niño Leticia Carolina Hernández Asistente de investigación Lina María Gaitán Enlace territorial Jhon Fredy Cabrera Comunicaciones Tomás Aguirre Mapas y datos Andrés Narváez Figueroa Diseño y Diagramación Laura Sanabria Herrera Con el apoyo de UN ANÁLISIS DE SEGURIDAD EN LA FRONTERA COLOMBO-VENEZOLANA 2 DESCRIPCIÓN BREVE La dinámica de la violencia criminal en la zona de frontera se caracteriza por la existencia de grandes mercados ilegales y la alta presencia de estructuras armadas ilegales. Este documento caracteriza y analiza las actuales condiciones de seguridad de la zona de frontera entre Colombia y Venezuela, a partir de la identificación de las principales Estructuras Armadas Ilegales (EAI) que hacen presencia allí, su accionar, los repertorios de violencia contra la población civil, las economías ilegales y las medidas institucionales en materia de seguridad que tienen lugar en este territorio. UN ANÁLISIS DE SEGURIDAD EN LA FRONTERA COLOMBO-VENEZOLANA 3 UN ANÁLISIS DE SEGURIDAD EN LA FRONTERA COLOMBO-VENEZOLANA CONTENIDO UN ANÁLISIS DE SEGURIDAD EN LA FRONTERA COLOMBO-VENEZOLANA INTRODUCCIÓN 6 Estructuras armadas ilegales en la frontera entre Colombia y Venezuela 7 Escenario 1: La disputa territorial en el Catatumbo 10 y el área metropolitana
    [Show full text]
  • COLOMBIA Executive Summary the Constitution and Other Laws And
    COLOMBIA Executive Summary The constitution and other laws and policies protect religious freedom and, in practice, the government generally respected religious freedom. The government did not demonstrate a trend toward either improvement or deterioration in respect for and protection of the right to religious freedom. Illegal armed groups, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), killed, kidnapped, and extorted religious leaders and practitioners, inhibiting free religious expression in some areas. The National Liberation Army (ELN) continued to threaten members of religious organizations. Terrorist organizations generally targeted religious leaders and practitioners for political rather than religious reasons. Organized crime groups that included some former members of paramilitary groups also targeted representatives and members of religious organizations. There were some reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice. U.S. embassy representatives met with representatives of a wide range of religious groups and the government, and supported preservation of sites of religious and cultural importance. Section I. Religious Demography The government does not keep statistics on religious affiliation, and estimates from religious leaders varied. A majority of the population is Roman Catholic. According to the Colombian Evangelical Council (CEDECOL), approximately 15 percent of the population is Protestant, whereas the Catholic Bishops’ Conference estimates that 90 percent
    [Show full text]
  • Los Rastrojos – Extortion – Political Agenda – Police Corruption 13 March 2012
    Country Advice Colombia Colombia – COL39989 – Los Rastrojos – Extortion – Political Agenda – Police Corruption 13 March 2012 1. What is the status of Los Rastrojos – currently active, size, areas of activity (i.e. is its activity confined to particular regions of Colombia)? Los Rastrojos (or „The Stubble‟ in English) is active in Colombia and remains heavily involved in drug trafficking. Since its inception in 2002, the size and reach of the Los Rastrojos has rapidly increased and it is now one of the most powerful drug trafficking organisations in Colombia.1 A 2012 report published by the Brookings Institution2 states that Los Rastrojos is „by far the largest [drug] cartel in Colombia today‟.3 Similarly, in June 2011 Just the Facts4 noted that Los Rastrojos is „likely the most powerful “new” paramilitary group‟ in Colombia.5 In October 2011, Rodney Benson6 of the US Drug Enforcement Agency stated that Los Rastrojos – along with several other criminal organisations – continues to control key coca cultivation and transit areas throughout Colombia and receives a large proportion of its operational funding from drug trafficking.7 In several regions of Colombia, Los Rastrojos has developed alliances with other drug trafficking organisations including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) (both of which are leftist groups) and the notorious drug trafficker, Daniel „El Loco‟ Barrera Barrera.8 1 Insight (undated) 2011, Rastrojos, 25 February http://insightcrime.org/criminal-groups/colombia/rastrojos/item/63- rastrojos-profile - Accessed 7 March 2012 2 The Brookings Institution is a not-for-profit public policy think tank organisation based in Washington DC, America.
    [Show full text]
  • Documento N° 10 Balance Del Primer Semestre 2018
    Documento N° 10 Balance del primer semestre 2018: nuevos actores violentos y asedio a los liderazgos sociales Reynell Badillo Sarmiento Balance del primer semestre de 2018: nuevos actores violentos y asedio a los liderazgos sociales Reynell Badillo Sarmiento* Mayo de 2018 Indice´ 1. Introducci´on 2 2. Los sures de Bol´ıvar, Cesar y C´ordoba:actores armados, rentas ilegales y nuevas violencias 2 2.1. Sur del Cesar . 3 2.2. Sur de Bol´ıvar.................................... 3 2.3. Sur de Cordoba´ . 4 3. Nuevos actores violentos: los Grupos Armados Organizados 6 4. Panorama de la violencia en el Caribe colombiano durante el primer semestre del 2018 8 5. Conclusiones 14 6. Referencias 14 *Internacionalista de la Universidad del Norte con enfasis´ en Ciencia Pol´ıtica y Relaciones Internacionales. Asistente de investigacion´ en el Centro de Pensamiento UNCaribe.Contacto: [email protected] 1 1. Introducci´on A pesar de que desde el 2012 la confrontacion´ armada es practicamente´ inexisten- te en la region´ Caribe, en territorios rurales de los sures de los departamentos de Bol´ıvar, Cordoba´ y Cesar permanecen expresiones armadas ligadas al sostenimiento de rentas ile- gales (sobretodo cultivos il´ıcitos y miner´ıa ilegal). Estas dinamicas´ se han sostenido du- rante el primer semestre de 2018, siendo el Ejercito´ de Liberacion´ Nacional (ELN) el actor preponderante en el Cesar y en Bol´ıvar, y las autodenominadas Autodefensas Gaitanis- tas de Colombia (AGC) o Clan del Golfo, el principal grupo causante de violencia en el departamento de Cordoba,´ con presencia tambien´ en el sur de Bol´ıvar.
    [Show full text]
  • Colombia's New Armed Groups
    COLOMBIA’S NEW ARMED GROUPS Latin America Report N°20 – 10 May 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. MORE THAN CRIMINAL GANGS?.......................................................................... 2 A. THE AUC AS PREDECESSOR ..................................................................................................3 B. THE NEW ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS ......................................................................................6 III. CASE STUDIES.............................................................................................................. 8 A. NORTE DE SANTANDER .........................................................................................................8 1. AUC history in the region..........................................................................................8 2. Presence of new illegal armed groups and criminal organisations ..............................8 3. Conflict dynamics....................................................................................................10 4. Conclusion ...............................................................................................................11 B. NARIÑO ..............................................................................................................................11 1. AUC history in the region........................................................................................11
    [Show full text]
  • La Ultima Bacrim En Pie? : El Ascenso De Los Urabeños En Colombia
    PERSPECTIVAS N O 3/2014 ¿LA ULTIMA BACRIM EN PIE? El ascenso de los Urabeños en Colombia Jeremy McDermott Octubre 2014 Los Urabeños son hoy por hoy el poder criminal dominante en Colombia. Conformados tras la desmovilización de los paramilitares en 2006, y como parte de una nueva genera- ción de bandas criminales (BACRIM) que emerge en ese contexto, Los Urabeños permiten observar la transformación de los grupos criminales desde la conformación de los grupos paramilitares descendientes del Cartel de Medellín de Pablo Escobar. Este paper se propone contar la historia de la expansión de Los Urabeños, en Colombia y en el mundo, así como sus disputas y triunfos sobre más de una treintena de bandas cri- minales. Frente a ello, más allá de describir la permanente guerra entre bandas criminales, este texto presenta cómo Los Urabeños consiguieron articular alianzas fructíferas con otros actores relevantes del bajo mundo en Colombia, lo que les permitió construir una red criminal compleja y extensa. Sin embargo, este documento sugiere que actualmente Los Urabeños no poseen el mono- polio absoluto de su poder criminal, así como una hegemonía perfecta sobre los traficantes de drogas en Colombia, en tanto han encontrado resistencias locales por parte de otras Bacrim, entre las que se cuentan Los Rastrojos en Buenaventura y La Oficia del Caribe en Santa Marta. Incluso, la estructura del comando central de esta organización delictiva, no tiene control directo sobre más allá de una pequeña fracción entre las muchas que usan su nombre o franquicia. A este respecto, muchos jefes regionales que pueden hacer parte del comando central son actualmente independientes y autosuficientes en términos financieros y dirigen todos los aspectos de su actividad criminal en sus áreas de influencia.
    [Show full text]
  • Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Home > Research Program > Responses to Information Requests Responses to Information Requests
    Responses to Information Requests - Immigration and Refugee Board of C... http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/ResRec/RirRdi/Pages/index.aspx?doc=45... Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Home > Research Program > Responses to Information Requests Responses to Information Requests Responses to Information Requests (RIR) respond to focused Requests for Information that are submitted to the Research Directorate in the course of the refugee protection determination process. The database contains a seven-year archive of English and French RIRs. Earlier RIRs may be found on the UNHCR's Refworld website. 4 April 2011 COL103710.E Colombia: Whether the Black Eagles (Águilas Negras) have links to former paramilitary groups, such as the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC); criminal activities of the Black Eagles, including extortion and drug trafficking; state response to the Black Eagles (2008 - February 2011) Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa Origins of New Paramilitary Groups or Criminal Bands Despite the Colombian government's efforts to demobilize paramilitary groups, which started in 2002 (CCR Mar. 2011, 7), new groups have sprung up (ibid., 8; Human Rights Watch Feb. 2010, 3; Saab and Taylor 2009, 456). The demobilization process focused on the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) (ibid.; US 11 Mar. 2010, Sec. 1; Human Rights Watch Feb. 2010, 3), which is made up of 37 paramilitary groups (ibid.). Human Rights Watch, in a report on the new face of violence in Colombia, refers to the new groups as "successor groups" because they have taken over "the criminal operations that the AUC leadership previously ran" (ibid.).
    [Show full text]
  • Colombia: Paramilitary Successor Groups and New Criminal Bands
    Responses to Information Requests - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Page 1 of 7 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Home > Research Program > Responses to Information Requests Responses to Information Requests Responses to Information Requests (RIR) respond to focused Requests for Information that are submitted to the Research Directorate in the course of the refugee protection determination process. The database contains a seven-year archive of English and French RIRs. Earlier RIRs may be found on the UNHCR's Refworld website. 22 March 2012 COL104030.E COL104030.E Colombia: Paramilitary successor groups and new criminal bands (bandas criminales, bacrim), including areas of operation and criminal activities; state response to successor groups and bacrim, including reintegration of combatants and assistance offered Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa 1. Successor Groups and New Criminal Bands (Bacrim) InSight - Organized Crime in the Americas (InSight Crime), an NGO dedicated to "the research, analysis and investigation on organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean" (InSight Crime 7 Mar. 2012), indicates that, after the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) demobilization in 2006, of more than 30,000 paramilitaries, "many remained at large or abandoned the process;" furthermore, "[n]ew criminal gangs have inherited the paramilitaries' weapons, personnel and modus operandi" in Colombia (ibid. 2 June 2011). Similarly, several sources state that paramilitary successor groups are led by former paramilitary members (Human Rights Watch 2012; The Economist 14 Jan. 2012; InSight Crime 11 Mar. 2011; El País 28 Jan. 2011). The Colombian government has labelled the new criminal bands "bacrim" [derived from the term bandas criminales (Human Rights Watch Feb.
    [Show full text]
  • Venezuela: ¿Un Estado Mafioso? Venezuela Se Ha Convertido En Un Eje Del Crimen Organizado En La Región
    Venezuela: ¿Un Estado mafioso? Venezuela se ha convertido en un eje del crimen organizado en la región Foto por Fernando Llano/AP Images Tabla de Contenidos 1. 7 razones para considerar a Venezuela como un Estado mafioso ...............3 2. Narcotráfico en el régimen venezolano: El “Cartel de los Soles” .................14 3. La delegación del poder estatal: Los “colectivos” ...........................................25 4. La delegación del poder estatal: Los “pranes” ................................................37 5. Colombia y Venezuela: Siameses criminales ...................................................52 6. Honduras y Venezuela: Golpe de Estado y tráfico aéreo de cocaína ...........63 7. República Dominicana y Venezuela: Tráfico de cocaína por el Caribe .......73 8. Venezuela y El Salvador: La exportación de ayuda y corrupción ................83 7 razones para considerar a Venezuela como un Estado mafioso Foto por Seth Wenig /AP Images No hay ninguna definición universalmente aceptada de lo que constituye un “Estado mafioso”.1 A continuación se presentan siete argumentos por los que pensamos que Venezuela puede ser considerada como tal y cuáles son las implicaciones de ello para esta turbulenta nación andina como centro regional del crimen. 1. Penetración del crimen organizado en altos nivel de las instituciones del Estado Durante los últimos tres años, InSight Crime les ha seguido la pista a individuos que, creemos, tienen vínculos con el crimen organizado y han ocupado u ocupan actualmente altos cargos en las instituciones del Estado venezolano. Hemos encontrado a 123 funcionarios quienes, creemos que con seguridad, están involucrados en actividades criminales. Por razones legales no publicamos la lista completa, pero algunos de los casos más evidentes se nombran en la sección denominada “El narcotráfico al interior del régimen venezolano: El Cartel de los Soles”.
    [Show full text]