Doctoral Dissertation Department of Social Sciences University of Naples “Federico II” ! ! Title: the Elusive Quest for Peace in Colombia
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
! ! ! ! ! ! Doctoral Dissertation Department of Social Sciences University of Naples “Federico II” ! ! Title: The Elusive Quest for Peace in Colombia. Past and Future Conflict Resolution Schemes ! ! Candidate: Krzysztof Krakowski Supervisor: Luciano Brancaccio ! ! ! ! ! Academic year: 2015 ! XXVII Cycle ! ! ! ! ! ! Krzysztof Krakowski CONTENTS ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! List of Tables and Figures……………………………………………………………………….…..…………3 Acknowledgements…..………………………………………………………………………….…..…………4 List of Abbreviations………….……………………………………………………………………………..…5 ! Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………….6 Part I Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Risks. Lessons from Colombia 1. Rethinking Colombian Civil War(s) 1946-2014. The Role of Forthcoming Peace Accords…….…..13 2. Partial Conflict Resolution 2003-2006: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programme. Towards Empirical Evaluation………………………………………………………………….40 Part II Successes and Failures of Colombian Paramilitaries’ Demobilisation 2003-2006. Quantitative Evidence 3. DDR in Two Colombian Regions. Between-Regional Comparisons………………………………..61 4. Sub-Regional Heterogeneity of DDR Outcomes…………………………………………………….97 Part III Post-Demobilisation Paramilitary Governance. Case Studies of Two Colombian Regions 5. The Logic of Paramilitary Violence (I). Evidence from Pacific Coast…………………………..…115 6. The Logic of Paramilitary Violence (II). Evidence from Eastern Plains…….….….………………154 Conclusion……………………………………………….…………………………………………………..185 References.…………………………………………………………………………………………………..191 ! !2 Krzysztof Krakowski TABLES AND FIGURES ! ! ! ! ! ! Table 1: Paramilitary violence in Pacific Coast and Eastern Plains per time period…..………….……….…62 Table 2: Paramilitaries, state and guerrillas’ interactions. Correlation matrix………………………………..84 Table 3: The modalities of paramilitary violence per repression period, 2001-2012………..………….……89 Table 4: The magnitude of paramilitary attacks per repression period, 2001-2012………………………..…91 Table 5.1: Victims’ profiles per repression period (I), 2001-2012……………………………………………93 Table 5.2: Victims’ profiles per repression period (II), 2001-2012………………….………..………………94 Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for variables in Models 1-3. Pacific Coast sample……………..…………103 Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics for variables in Models 1-3. Eastern Plains sample……………………….104 Table 7.1: The intensity of municipal paramilitary violence in Pacific Coast (2003-2009)..……….………106 Table 7.2: The intensity of municipal paramilitary violence in Eastern Plains (2003-2009)…………….…109 ! Figure 1: Conflict-related deaths and homicides in Colombia 1988-2008……………………………..…….41 Figure 2: Paramilitary violence. Department trends in Pacific Coast…………….…………..………………54 Figure 3: Paramilitary violence. Department trends in Eastern Plains…………………………………….…55 Figure 4: Paramilitary violence in regions. Mean department counts…………………………………….….80 Figure 5: Anti-paramilitary repression in regions Department means…………………………………….…80 Figure 6.1: Paramilitary violence and repression (I). Logarithmic values……………………………….…81 Figure 6.2: Paramilitary violence and repression (II). Logarithmic values…………………………………82 Figure 7: Anti-paramilitary repressive strategy per time period, 2001-2012….……………………………..88 Figure 8: Demobilisation statistics in Eastern Plains…..……………………………………………………157 ! Map 1: The territory of Eastern Plains……………………………………………………………..…….….175 ! !3 Krzysztof Krakowski ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ! ! ! ! First and foremost, I am grateful to Luciano Brancaccio for diligent supervision, insightful suggestions and helpful discussions in the last three years of my work on this doctoral thesis. His encouragement has been invaluable to bring this project to an end. Additionally, I would like to thank Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín who commented on some chapters of this manuscript and who introduced me to the community of prominent researchers working on organised violence in Colombia. His help included as well organising a seminar encounter at Law Faculty, Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá, on October 23, 2013 dedicated to the discussion of the arguments of my thesis. Finally, I would like to thank Connor Brooks and three anonymous reviewers for Latin American Politics & Society who helped me to improve technical part of this work. My further thanks go to the Department of Social Sciences, University of Naples “Federico II”, which awarded me a research grant to carry out this doctoral research, and in particular to my doctoral programme coordinator, Enrica Morlicchio, who has been most helpful in every aspect of my studies in Naples. Guido Piccoli, fellow PhD students and academic lecturers (i.a. Giacomo di Gennaro and Maria Cristina Ercolessi) played a huge role at the earlier stages of my work when I tried to clarify my research ideas and translate them into addressable questions and hypotheses. Then, I would like to thank Ricardo Rodriguez whom made my stay in Bogotá very pleasant experience and who voluntarily taught me practical Spanish in unbelievably short period of time. Last but not least, this thesis would have never been finished if not for the constant and unlimited support from Aleksandra Kubiszewska whom I dedicate this work. !4 Krzysztof Krakowski ABBREVIATIONS ! ! ! ! ! ACC — Autodefensas Campesinas de Casanare ACMV — Autodefensas Campesinas de Meta y Vichada AUC — Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia BC — Bloque Calima BLS — Bloque Libertadores del Sur CERAC — Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos CINEP — Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (Programa por la Paz) CIT — Centro Internacional de Toledo para la Paz CNRR — Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación COHA — Council on Hemispheric Affairs COP — Corporación Observatorio para la Paz DANE — Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística DDR — Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration DT — Diócesis de Tumaco ELN — Ejército de Liberación Nacional EPL — Ejército Popular de Liberación ERPAC — Ejército Revolucionario Popular Antiterrorista Colombiano FARC — Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia GMH — Grupo de Memoria Histórica GN — Gobernación de Nariño HRW — Human Rights Watch ICG — International Crisis Group INDEPAZ — Instituto de Estudios para el Desarollo y la Paz ISC — In-Sight Crime M19 — Movimento 19 de Abril MAPP — Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz NG — Nueva Generación NN — Noche y Niebla NVC — Norte del Valle Cartel UNODC — United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime VR — Vicepresidencia de la República ! !5 Krzysztof Krakowski INTRODUCTION ! When nearly three years ago I started my doctoral research in Department of Social Sciences at the University of Naples “Federico II” I intended to study the conflict resolution issues with reference to the Colombian civil war and its partially accomplished peace process in 2003-2006. I wanted to focus on the evaluation of the already applied resolution scheme in order to understand its achievements and shortcomings in terms of their implications for presently negotiated peace accords with the biggest insurgent group still operating in Colombia, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). What I found particularly interesting within the topic was the relationship between conflict resolution design/implementation and post-conflict risks of violence reemergence. I chose to analyse the Colombian war since it constituted an ideal case for comparative research with widely available systematic data. First of all, the Colombian conflict represents a particular type of sub-state wars with more than one violent conflict simultaneously going on in the territory of a single country. Even though waged almost independently, all of these sub-state conflicts belong to the same kind of irregular warfare characterised by the absence of ethnic, sectarian, or religious background which could have made a viable compromise unachievable (see Kalyvas and Kocher 2007a). For policymakers, the existence of such myriad of largely similar but still independent conflicts means total mess (Arias Ortiz 2012). For researcher, it guarantees perfect conditions for comparative research design. More importantly, the most recent peace process in Colombia (2003-2006) was concluded amid the ongoing warfare. Paradoxically, it actually facilitates the evaluation of the resolution’s successes and failures because it ensures the continuity of conflict data collection. What usually happens in the situation of fully resolved armed contests are radical changes in conflict monitoring strategies. The states, NGOs and international community observers tend to overlook the existence !6 Krzysztof Krakowski of low-intensity post-conflict violence as long as it does not take any political turn. Call (2002) observes, for example, that in El Salvador post-conflict violence was on a constant increase for the period of at least ten years since early 1990s, and still went almost unnoticed internationally. Call finds that although the majority of post-conflict violence was either perpetrated by armed gangs formed by ex-conflict participants, or reflected newly-established law enforcement authorities’ inability to control crime, it was never considered as having anything to do with just terminated civil war. As a result, Salvadoran conflict resolution is unanimously judged as the success story, even if it left the country as one of the world’s most insecure places — the situation which continues until present. Coming back to Colombian case, the fact that the most recent peace process offered only partial conflict resolution meant,