Why Kyrgyzstan Won't Gain from the Protracted Border Dispute With

Why Kyrgyzstan Won’t Gain from the Protracted Border Dispute with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan? “Completing delimitation and demarcation of state boundaries will not shelve the entire conflict potential. There is certainly a need for a lasting comprehensive approach with elaboration on an adequate and effective model of cross-border cooperation,” researcher Konstantin Larionov writes in an exclusive article for CABAR.asia. Follow us on LinkedIn One of the most sensitive and complex issues on Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy agenda is the unresolved fate of state boundaries that has two dimensions: first, the relationship among local communities in the border areas and cooperation between neighboring states. Border conflicts arise due to incomplete processes of demarcation and delimitation of state boundaries in areas where they are of significant economic importance. Amidst the unfolding events in the country, yet another incident on the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border on October 25 appears especially disturbing[1]. Pending is also the question of borders with Uzbekistan. The total length of a highly complex Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border is approximately 970 kilometers. Batken oblast borders on Sughd, and Osh in the south – on centrally administered districts and the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region of Tajikistan. Whilst the border running along the Turkestan range is not an issue, its Fergana part, however, is intricate by contested parts. Besides, some experts recognize the Fergana Valley as a “place of latent interethnic conflict”[2]. While industries shun these regions, agriculture is widespread. Therefore, locals highly value each meter of land and each liter of water. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, for now, have failed to clearly demarcate their common boundary, leaving nearly 519 kilometers with disputed status. Of roughly 60-70 disputed areas[3], about a dozen are problematic and potentially explosive. The situation with Uzbekistan appears somewhat more optimistic. This is facilitated by emerging economic ties and warming social relations. Kyrgyzstan’s border with Uzbekistan stretches a total of 1,379 kilometers, of which nearly 5% (about 200 km) are not demarcated. There are 15 checkpoints along the border. Citizens of two countries mainly transit from Dostuk Avtodorozhniy checkpoint located at the junction of the cities of Andijan and Osh. Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan boundary disputes. Conflicts along Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Why Kyrgyzstan Won’t Gain from the Protracted Border Dispute with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan? border The modern Kyrgyz state celebrates its centenary. The state commenced the establishment of its national and political borders following the collapse of the USSR. Both the Tajik and Uzbek sides in addressing issues of delimitation and demarcation of state boundaries today appeal to the maps of 1924-27, while Kyrgyzstan appeals to the outcome of the 1955 parity commission. In this article, we will courage territorial and boundary disputes since 1991. Since the 1990s, following the collapse of the Union, about 143,000 hectares of Tajikistan’s land were left on Kyrgyzstan’s territory, wherein 2,600 hectares of Kyrgyzstan’s remained respectively in Tajikistan’s territory. A similar situation is observed on the Kyrgyzstan- Uzbekistan border. The social cohesion that prevailed in the Ferghana Valley had crumbled down by the approach of the authorities in the three states. Authorities and media have inculcated primitive national identity models confined by the eminence of only one, the titular ethnic group. Fostered corruption and border regulations had had an impact on the use of cross- border workforce and the mobility of people in general[4]. The question of delimitation and demarcation of state boundaries has become more acute in the early 2000s. The process of delimitation and demarcation of the border with Tajikistan starts in 2002. In 2006, the two states form an intergovernmental commission. The commission faced immediate difficulties in determining where Kyrgyzstan ends, and Tajikistan begins. The growing border tensions in the early 2000s did not make disputed regions as conflict- prone as we see them today. At the same time, border contradictions were amassing. The significant conflict potential in the cross-border areas has crystallized only in the last six years. On the other hand, in the 1990s and early 2000s, the population of the Fergana Valley was not as voluminous as it is now, so it was not clear how limited are resources in this region. Besides, the population’s material needs were not yet as high as they have been over the past 12-15 years. Furthermore, the growth of nationalist sentiments, actively supported by education and propaganda; land grabbing encouraged by the authorities without pondering economic planning that had exasperated border tensions at that time. Why Kyrgyzstan Won’t Gain from the Protracted Border Dispute with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan? Under these circumstances, in the Batken and Isfara regions, hotbeds of tension had been established along the Vorukh – Ak-Sai and Kak-Tash – Somonien. It fueled conflicts in the adjacent territory between the local communities of Bobojon, Gafurov, and Leilek regions. Also, residents of the bordering localities in Maksat, Internationale, Kulundu, Arka (Kyrgyzstan), and Ovchi Kalacha, Histevarz often conflict over the ownership of land plots. As for the situation with the Uzbek side, relations between the two countries were compounded by the position of the Karimov regime and the non-cooperation of parties. For instance, after the Batken war in 1999-2000, Uzbekistan had deployed mine barriers throughout the Sokh and Shakhimardan enclaves, which led to annual casualties and loss of livestock. Only in 2004, with the assistance of international organizations, Uzbekistan began demining the enclave territories. Also, the parties many times unilaterally closed their borders without notifying their neighbor. Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan relations deteriorated after the 2005 Andijan events when the Uzbek side declared that aid to the rebels was rendered through the territory of Kyrgyzstan. Then the former President Bakiev refused to extradite the rebels who fled to Kyrgyzstan. Locals are often victimized by border disputes. Here is why: on January 4, 2013, Uzbek border guards shot and killed a Kyrgyz citizen, who, according to them, illegally crossed the border as a smuggler. On January 6, 2013, residents of the Khushyar village (Sokh enclave), aggrieved with respect to Kyrgyz border guards that emplaced power transmission poles on their territory, had attacked the neighboring Kyrgyz village of Chabrak. In response, the Kyrgyz side blocked roads linking the enclave with Uzbekistan. On September 23, 2013, in the Zhiyde-Aryk area of the Kadamjai district in Batken, Kyrgyz border guards wounded an Uzbek citizen who found herself on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. In September 2013, the Ungar-Too mountain with an undecided status that locates the antennas of Kyrgyz TV and cellular companies became a matter of dispute between the republics. This case demonstrates how corruption obscures the border delimitation and demarcation processes. The events of March 18, 2016, had marked a new round of tension. Uzbekistan moved two armored personnel carriers, two trucks, and nearly 40 servicemen to the disputed area in Chalasart (Jalal-Abad), and set up a roadblock on the Kerben-Ala-Buka road section, blocking the passage of Kyrgyz citizens at the Dostuk-Avtodorozhny checkpoint and Madaniyat- Avtodorozhny. Tashkent said that the reinforcement had to do with “security Why Kyrgyzstan Won’t Gain from the Protracted Border Dispute with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan? during the Nowruz holiday.” Kyrgyzstan’s State Border Service took the actions of Uzbekistan as the border violation. In response, Bishkek demanded the withdrawal of heavy equipment and servicemen from the disputed area, introduced enhanced control at its borders and closed the border for Uzbek residents at Baimak-Avtodorozhny, Kensai-Avtodorozhny, and Kadamjai-Avtodorozhny checkpoints. After that, the former President of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambayev gave an ultimatum: if Uzbekistan does not withdraw its equipment and military personnel from the disputed area, then Bishkek will reconsider its participation in the SCO summit in Tashkent. He also turned to the CSTO for help in resolving the dispute. The Permanent Council of the organization held an extraordinary meeting in Moscow On March 25, 2016, where heads of the border services of the conflicting parties renegotiated. On March 26, Uzbekistan withdrew equipment and military personnel from disputed areas. In March 2015, Kyrgyzstan transferred onto its balance several economic facilities that belonged to the Uzbek SSR: land plots, motor depots, civil defense facilities, hydraulic structures, and other facilities located in the Osh, Batken, and Jalal-Abad regions. In April 2016, the Kyrgyz government nationalized four Uzbek resorts: Rohat, Dilorom, Zolotye Peski, and Buston. On August 13, 2016, Kyrgyz police detained an Uzbek policeman for violating the border in the Ala-Buka district. On August 22, at the disputed area of the two countries on Mount Ungar-Too, officers of the Uzbek Interior Ministry landed from a Mi-8 helicopter. They demanded that the detained officer be released. The Kyrgyz side released the detained Uzbek policeman on the same day. On August 24, Uzbek police detained four Kyrgyz engineers of the Kerben radio relay station on Ungar-Too under the pretext

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