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Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Popular Protest in Modern China

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Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Popular Protest in Modern China Challenging The Mandate Of Heaven: Popular Protest in Modern China The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Perry, Elizabeth J. 2001. “Challenging The Mandate Of Heaven: Popular Protest in Modern China.” Critical Asian Studies 33 (2) (June): 163–180. doi:10.1080/14672710122544. Published Version 10.1080/14672710122544 Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:34732134 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, WARNING: No applicable access license found. CriticalAsian Studies 33:2 (2001), 163-180 CHALLENGING THE MANDATE OF HEAVEN Popular Protest in Modern China Elizabeth J. Perry Arguing thatpopular protesthas played anunusual rolein bestowing political legiti- macy in China, thisarticle traces continuities in state responses toprotestmove- ments fromimperial days tothepresent. The authorcompares thegovernment’s re- cent handling ofthree different types ofprotest: economically motivated actions by hard-pressed workers andfarmers, nationalistically inspired demonstrationsbypa- trioticstudents, and (atgreater length) religiously rooted resistance byzealous be- lievers. Thecentral authorities’tolerance toward localized strikes and tax riots, and theirovert encouragement ofprotests against thebombing oftheChinese embassy in Belgrade, contrasts sharply withthe harsh and unrelenting campaign ofrepres- sion thathas been directed against Falun Gong adherents. Explanations for these variant state responses aresoughtinhistorically grounded assessments ofthepoliti- cal implications of different types of popular protest. Nocountry boastsa more enduring or more colorful historyof rebellion and revolutionthan China. The Chinese traditionof popularupheaval stretches back well beyondthis century; indeed, records allow ustotrace itas far back as 209 B.C.E. when theChen She Rebellion helped totopplethe mighty Qin em- pireandgiverisetothefamous Handynasty .Over theensuing millennia,popu- larprotesthas formed aconstant andconsequentialtheme inChinese political history. China’s impressiverecord ofrebellion and revolutionis due notsimply to thecountry’s extraordinarysizeand longevity,butalsoto the fact thatcentral el- ements inChinese politicalculture havedirectly encouraged suchprotests.The Confucian (or Mencian, to be precise) concept of a“Mandate of Heaven” (tianming)bestowed instantlegitimacy uponsuccessful rebel leaders. This ISSN 1467-2715 print / 1472-6033 online / 02 / 000163-18 ©2001 BCAS, Inc. pragmatic precept differed markedlyfrom European notionsof a“divineright ofkings”and theJapanese belief inanunbroken lineofrulers descending from theSun Goddess,myths that militatedagainst challenges to thepowers-that-be. Inimperial China, one whomanaged to wrest thethrone byforce thereby gained Confucian sanction for hisrule; astheproverb put it bluntly,“Hewho succeeds isakingor marquis;he whofails isanoutlaw.”Of course thisdid not mean thatimperial aspirants were free toignore cultural ornormativebounds. Future emperors were expected todemonstrate theirclaim to theMandate by means ofvariousdivine omens and needed tocome toterms w ithConfucian elites if theywere to harbor anyhope of along-livedreign. Still,the relative opennessof the systemstood in starkcontrast tothatof other imperialorders. Politicalchallengers inChina— betheypeasants orforeign invaders— were permitted to make a bid for kingship through popular rebellion. AlthoughConfucian ismw as largely discredited inthetwentieth century,the connection between massprotest and politicallegitimacy remained intact. Sun Yat-sen’s “Three Principles ofthe People”helped inspirethe 1911 Revolution thattoppled tw othousandyears ofimperialrule, whileMaoZedong’s doctrine of “People’s War”fueled theCommun istvictory in 1949 —justas hissubse- quent call for “continuing therevolutio n”provided justificati on ofaCultural Revolution inthemid-sixties.Indeed, oneoftheprincipaldifferences between Chineseand Soviet Communismliesin theformer’semphasison masscriticism and masscampaigns. Like Mencius’s Mandate ofHeaven, Mao’s MassLine in- sistedon thereciprocal linkage between leader and led instakinga claim to higherpolitical morality .Whereas Stalin looked to thesecret police toenforce top-downorder, Mao repeatedly called uponthe Chinese massesto engage in classstruggle from below.This certainly didnot mean thatthe People’s Repub- licunder Maoeschewed theuseofstate surveillance —quitethe contrary —but itwas unusualamong Communistcountries inalsorequirin gordinarycitizens to participate actively in government-sponsored campaigns. Manyassumedthat the death ofChairman Maowouldspell an end to theim- portance of massmovements in thePeople’ s Republic of China(PRC). Deng Xiaopingannounced soonafter hisaccession topower thattheeraofmasscam- paignsw as indeed over.Actually ,however, popularprotests — somew ithat least implicithigher-level encouragemen t—have continued topunctuate the historyof the PRC inthepost-Mao period. The Democracy Wall movementof 1978-79,theanti-Japanese demonstrationsof 1985, the anti-Americanprotests of1999,andeven thestudentuprisin gof1989wereallstimulatedin partbythe expectation ofsupportfrom elements ofthe central leadership.AlthoughMao’ s successorshave been lessactive ininstigatin gpoliticalunrest thanwas the Great Helmsmanhimself, protesters remain unusuallyattentive tosignalsfrom the central leadership. Moreover, alongside these expresslypolitical initiativ es have occurred ahost ofother protests— from tax riotsto sectarian resistance —thatshare aremark- able resemblance topatterns ofunrest sofamiliar tostudents of imperialand Republican China.Farmers have banded together inassaultson tax bureaus to protestthe impositionofexorbitantsurcharges. Workers have launched strikes 164 Critical Asian Studies 33:2 (2001) and slowdownsto signaltheir dissatisfa ction withfactory closures and atten- dant layoffs. Religious sectarians have insistedon practicingtheirspiritual regimensinbolddefianceofgovernmentproscriptions. Inlightof China’s richand variegated traditionsof resistance, rebellion,and revolution,weshouldbe dulyskeptical of claims(such as thoseproffered by manyobservers during the Tiananmen uprisingof1989) thatnew outburstsof protestrepresent afundamental break withthe past.Although initial reactions to the1989 “democracy movement”stressed its novelty ,subsequentreflections ontheactivities of theprotesters —includingretrospectivesbytheprincipa ls themselves— questionedthe extent towhich their behavior constituted agen- uine rupture withearlier modesof protest.As Tiananmen activistLiu Xiaobo later conceded, Mostoftheresources andmethodswe madeuseoftomobilizethe masses were ones thatthe Commun istParty itself hadused manytimes be- fore.…As soonas webegan our revolution,w ebecame extremely con- ceited —justas ifwehadreverted tothetime of the Cultural Revolution and felt ourselvesto bethemost revolutio nary.As soonas wejoined the 1989 protestmovement, w econsidered ourselvesto bethe mostdemo- cratic. After all,had we notfasted for democracy anddevoted ourselvesto itand made sacrifices for it?…Our voice became the onlytruth. We felt as though we possessed absolute power. 1 Liu’s impassioned reflections are astingingindictmen tof theTiananmen protestas anundemocratic movementthat unwittin glyrecreated manyof the Democracy Wall, Beijing. “The Democracy Wall movement of 1978-79, the anti-Japanese demonstrations of 1985, the anti-American protests of 1999, and even the student upris- ing of 1989 were all stimulated in part by the expectation of support from elements of the central leadership.” (Photo courtesy of Amnesty International/Kristina M. Torgeson. URL: <http:// www.amnesty-usa.org/amnesty/asa/china/torgeson.html>.) Perry/Challenging the Mandate of Heaven 165 worstfeatures ofChinese Communistpoliticalculture. Hesuggests thatw hat masqueradedas thesprouts of civilsociety (e.g., autonomousstudent and worker associations)or as novelcultural practices (e.g., weddings on the Square) were inreality littlemore thanvariation son therepressive theme of Chinese Communistconvention.The searing experience ofthe Cultural Revo- lutionin particular,according toLiuXiaobo, has inhibited the developmentof agenuinelydemocraticperspectiveam ongChinese intellectuals. WhileLiu’ s critique isapoignant reminder thatsocietal initiativesinChina continue toreflect theheavy hand of statistinfluences ,weshouldnot thereby conclude thatpopular protest is forever fated to serve merely as the hand- maiden ofCommunistcontrol. During the1989 protests,for example, the au- tonomousworkers’ federations thatsprang uparound thecountry represented aheightened level ofantagonism between organized labor andthestate incon- temporary China. Challengingthe Mandate ofHeaven wasnever easy,butitdidperiodicallyoc- cur —inbothancient andmodern times.History suggests thata keyto thesuc- cess ofsuchundertakin gs layin bridging the(often state-imposed) categories thatset variousgroups of people against oneanother. Such divisions,although responsiblefor muchof the unrestthathascolored theChinese past,alsoposed seriousobstacles toconcerted popularimaginationandaction against thestate. Toovercome these hurdlesrequired the interventionoffarsighted individuals, whooften issuedfrom thelower rungs of theintelligen tsiaor local elite. Whether drawn from the ranksof students,teachers, militiacaptains, religious masters,bandit chieftain s,orCommunistcadres, such leaders have played a catalytic role inconvertingongoing
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