Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Popular Protest in Modern China

Challenging The Mandate Of Heaven: Popular Protest in Modern China

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Citation Perry, Elizabeth J. 2001. “Challenging The Mandate Of Heaven: Popular Protest in Modern China.” Critical Asian Studies 33 (2) (June): 163–180. doi:10.1080/14672710122544.

Published Version 10.1080/14672710122544

Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:34732134

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CHALLENGING THE MANDATE OF HEAVEN

Popular Protest in Modern China

Elizabeth J. Perry

Arguing thatpopular protesthas played anunusual rolein bestowing political legitimacy in China, thisarticle traces continuities in state responses toprotestmove- ments fromimperial days tothepresent. The authorcompares thegovernment’s recent handling ofthree different types ofprotest: economically motivated actions by hard-pressed workers andfarmers, nationalistically inspired demonstrationsbypa- trioticstudents, and (atgreater length) religiously rooted resistance byzealous believers. Thecentral authorities’tolerance toward localized strikes and tax riots, and theirovert encouragement ofprotests against thebombing oftheChinese embassy in Belgrade, contrasts sharply withthe harsh and unrelenting campaign ofrepres- sion thathas been directed against Falun Gong adherents. Explanations for these variant state responses aresoughtinhistorically grounded assessments ofthepoliti- cal implications of different types of popular protest.

Nocountry boastsa more enduring or more colorful historyof rebellion and revolutionthan China. The Chinesetradition of popularupheaval stretches back well beyondthis century; indeed, records allow ustotrace itas far back as 209 B.C.E. whenthe Chen She Rebellion helped totopplethe mighty Qin em- pireandgiverisetothefamous Handynasty .Over theensuing millennia,popu- larprotesthas formed aconstant andconsequentialtheme inChinese political history. China’s impressiverecord ofrebellion and revolutionis due notsimply to thecountry’s extraordinarysizeand longevity,butalsotothe fact thatcentral elements inChinese politicalculture havedirectly encouraged suchprotests.The Confucian (or Mencian, to be precise) concept of a“Mandate of Heaven” (tianming)bestowed instantlegitimacy uponsuccessful rebel leaders. This

ISSN 1467-2715 print / 1472-6033 online / 02 / 000163-18 ©2001 BCAS, Inc. pragmatic precept differed markedlyfrom European notionsof a“divineright ofkings”and theJapanese belief inanunbroken lineofrulers descending from theSun Goddess,myths that militatedagainst challenges tothe powers-that-be. Inimperial China, one whomanaged to wrest thethrone byforce thereby gained Confucian sanction for hisrule; astheproverb put it bluntly,“Hewho succeeds isakingor marquis;he whofails isanoutlaw.”Of course thisdid not mean thatimperial aspirants were free toignore cultural ornormativebounds. Future emperors were expected todemonstrate theirclaim tothe Mandate by means ofvariousdivine omens and needed tocome toterms w ithConfucian elites if theywere to harbor anyhope of along-livedreign. Still,the relative opennessof thesystem stood in starkcontrast tothatof other imperialorders. Politicalchallengers inChina— betheypeasants orforeign invaders— were permitted to make a bid for kingship through popular rebellion. AlthoughConfucian ismw aslargely discredited inthetwentieth century,the connection between massprotest and politicallegitimacy remained intact. Sun Yat-sen’s “Three Principles ofthePeople” helped inspirethe 1911 Revolution thattoppled tw othousandyears ofimperialrule, whileMaoZedong’s doctrine of “People’s War”fueled theCommun istvictory in 1949 —justas hissubse- quent call for “continuing therevolutio n”provided justificati on ofaCultural Revolution inthemid-sixties.Indeed, oneoftheprincipaldifferences between Chineseand Soviet Communismliesin theformer’semphasison masscriticism and masscampaigns. Like Mencius’s Mandate ofHeaven, Mao’s MassLine insistedon thereciprocal linkage between leader and led instakinga claim to higherpolitical morality .Whereas Stalin looked tothe secret police toenforce top-downorder, Mao repeatedly called uponthe Chinese massesto engage in classstruggle from below.This certainly didnot mean thatthe People’ s Repub- licunder Maoeschewed theuseofstate surveillance —quitethecontrary —but itwasunusual among Communistcountries inalsorequirin gordinarycitizens to participate actively in government-sponsored campaigns. Manyassumedthat the death ofChairman Maowouldspell an end tothe im- portance of massmovements in thePeople’ s Republic of China(PRC). Deng Xiaopingannounced soonafter hisaccession topower thattheeraofmasscam- paignsw asindeed over.Actually ,however, popularprotests — somew ithat least implicithigher-level encouragemen t—have continued topunctuate the historyof thePRC inthepost-Mao period. The Democracy Wall movementof 1978-79,theanti-Japanese demonstrationsof 1985, theanti-America nprotests of1999,andeven thestudentuprisin gof1989wereallstimulatedin partbythe expectation ofsupportfrom elements ofthecentral leadership.AlthoughMao’ s successorshave been lessactive ininstigatin gpoliticalunrest thanwas the Great Helmsmanhimself, protesters remain unusuallyattentive tosignalsfrom the central leadership. Moreover, alongside these expresslypolitical initiativ es have occurred ahost ofother protests— from tax riotsto sectarian resistance —thatshare aremark- able resemblance topatterns ofunrest sofamiliar tostudents of imperialand Republican China.Farmers have banded together inassaultson tax bureaus to protestthe impositi onofexorbitantsurcharges. Workers have launched strikes

164 Critical Asian Studies 33:2 (2001) and slowdownstosignal their dissatisfa ction withfactory closures and atten- dant layoffs. Religious sectarians have insistedon practicingtheirspiritual regimensinbolddefianceofgovernmentproscriptions. Inlightof China’s richand variegated traditionsof resistance, rebellion,and revolution,weshouldbe dulyskeptical of claims(such as thoseproffered by manyobservers during theTiananmen uprisingof1989) thatnew outburstsof protestrepresent afundamental break withthe past. Although initial reactions tothe 1989 “democracy movement”stressed its novelty ,subsequentreflections ontheactivities of theprotesters —includingretrospectivesbytheprincipa ls themselves— questionedthe extent towhich their behavior constituted a gen- uine rupture withearlier modesof protest.As Tiananmen activistLiu Xiaobo later conceded, Mostoftheresources andmethodswe madeuseoftomobilizethe masses were ones thatthe Commun istParty itself hadused manytimes before.…As soonas we began our revolution,w ebecame extremely con- ceited —justas ifwehadreverted tothetime of theCultural Revolution and felt ourselvesto be themost revolutio nary.As soonas wejoined the 1989 protestmovement, w econsidered ourselvesto bethemost democratic. After all,had we notfasted for democracy anddevoted ourselvesto itand made sacrifices for it?…Our voice became theonly truth. We felt as though we possessed absolute power. 1 Liu’s impassioned reflections are astingingindictmen tof theTiananmen protestas an undemocratic movementthat unwittin glyrecreated manyof the

Democracy Wall, Beijing. “The Democracy Wall movement of 1978-79, the anti-Japanese demonstrations of 1985, the anti-American protests of 1999, and even the student upris- ing of 1989 were all stimulated in part by the expectation of support from elements of the central leadership.” (Photo courtesy of Amnesty International/Kristina M. Torgeson. URL: .)

Perry/Challenging the Mandate of Heaven 165 worstfeatures ofChinese Communistpoliticalculture. Hesuggests thatw hat masqueradedas thesprouts of civilsociety (e.g., autonomousstudent and worker associations)or as novelcultural practices (e.g., weddings on the Square) were inreality littlemore thanvariation son therepressive theme of ChineseCommuni stconvention.The searing experience oftheCultural Revo- lutionin particular,according toLiuXiaobo, has inhibited the developmentof agenuinelydemocraticperspectiveam ongChinese intellectuals. WhileLiu’ s critique isapoignant reminder thatsocietal initiativesinChina continue toreflect theheavy hand of statistinfluences ,weshouldnot thereby conclude thatpopular protest is forever fated to serve merely as thehand- maiden ofCommunistcontrol. During the1989 protests,for example, theau- tonomousworkers’ federations thatsprang uparound thecountry represented aheightened level ofantagonism between organized labor andthestate incontemporary China. ChallengingtheMandate ofHeaven wasnever easy,butitdidperiodicallyoc- cur —inbothancient andmodern times.History suggests thata keyto the suc- cess ofsuchundertakin gslay in bridging the(often state-imposed) categories thatset variousgroups of people against oneanother. Such divisions,although responsiblefor muchof theunrest thathascolored theChinese past,alsoposed seriousobstacles toconcerted popularimaginationandaction against thestate. Toovercome these hurdlesrequired theinterventi onoffarsighted individuals, whooften issuedfrom thelower rungs of theintelligen tsiaor local elite. Whether drawn from theranks of students,teachers, militiacaptains, religious masters,bandit chieftain s,orCommunistcadres, suchleaders have played a catalytic role inconvertingongoing strategiesofcompetitioninto large-sca le political movements.The state, too,was acritical variable inthe equation; a poorlyexecuted repressioneffort could stimulate,rather thanstymie, the spirit of political protest. Expectations of Stability Theadvent ofanew millenniumaffords anopportuneoccasion totake stockof thehistorical legacy ofChinese protestand itscontinui ngimpacton thecon- temporary scene. The PRChascertainly seen itsshare of massmovements, many(but by no means all) ofwhichwere elite-inspired, ifnot overtlyinsti- gated. According togovernment pronouncements, however,1999 wastobe different. As thefiftieth anniversaryofthefounding ofthePRC, thefinal year ofthe oldmillenn iumw assupposedto beprotest-free —atimefor officially orches- trated parades, butnot for unofficial demonstrations.Stability ,rather than spontaneity, was the watchword of the day. The year 1999 wasseen as potentiallyproblema tic notonly because it marked ahalf-century milestonein thehistoryof CommunistChina,but alsobe- cause itwas abanner anniversaryyear for other critical events intherecord of Chineseprotests: the eightieth anniversa ryof theMay FourthMovement of 1919, thefortieth anniversaryoftheTibetan Revolt of1959, thethirtieth anniversaryof theconclusion ofthemassmobiliza tionphaseoftheCultural Revolu- tionin 1969, thetw entieth anniversaryof theDemocracy Wall movementof

166 Critical Asian Studies 33:2 (2001) A protestor tries to break police lines in front of the U.S. embassy in Beijing on Sunday, 9 May 1999. “In the case of the 1999 student protests against the [NATO] bombing of China’s Belgrade embassy, we find a considerable degree of overt central government support — sanctioning the demonstrations on national television, providing buses to take students to foreign embassies and consulates, and even supplying the slogans that they should shout once they got there.” (AP/Wide World Photos/Chien-min Chung)

1979, thetenth anniversa ryof theTiananmen uprisingand itsbloody June 4 suppressionin1989. Inasmuchas thecommemorationofanniversariesis itself acommonpretext for protestin China,the year wasapproached withtrepida- tionby the leadership . 2 Toensure thatpotential protesters hadno space in whichto mark these anniversaries,Tiananmen Square wasclosed for renova- tionsuntil shortly before theOctober 1National Day celebrations.As thingsde- veloped,how ever, before thecurtain could berung down on theold millen- nium,China was rocked withall manner ofprotests:tax revoltsby farmers in thecountrysi de, petitiondrives by laid-off workers and displaced residentsin thecities, student demonstrat ionsagainst theNA TObombingof theChinese embassyin Belgrade, and even aconvocation ofreligioussectarians rightout- side the central leadership compound of Zhongnanhai. Despiteits avow ed intentionto oppose all formsof protest,the state actually responded inquitedifferent waysto these variousexpressio nsofpopulardis- content.3 The government ruthlesslyrepressed theFalun Gong believers who hadamassed peacefully outsideZhongnan haion April25, despitethe fact that theywere arguably theleast violentof all thedemonstrati onsthat occurred in Chinathat year. Toward theprotests by farmers and workers,the authorities showed aconsiderabledegree oftolerance. And officials activelyencouraged the student protests that erupted after the Belgrade bombing of May 8. These seeminglycontradicto rygovernment responsesmake considerably moresense ifviewed inhistoricalperspective. The central government’s muted response tothe protestsby farmers andworkers hasanancient pedigree. From Perry/Challenging the Mandate of Heaven 167 imperialdays to the present, economic protestsdemandin gasecure livelihood were generally seen as asignalof local distressthat should be dealt withby grassrootsofficials. As Mencius hademphasized,itwastheresponsib ilityofgov- ernment toprovide for thepeople’ s welfare. Butsince economic difficulties tended tobe localized, theonus of alleviatingthemfell tolocal-level officials — countymagistrates or provincial governors. Similarly,todayit is the mayor of Chongqingmunicipalityor themagistrate ofRenshou countywho is expected tocope withpetitionsby laid-off workers ortax revoltsby hard-pressedfarmers. “Moral economy”protestslaunched inthe name of subsistencehave occurred withremarkable frequency inrecent years inboth rural and urban China.In 1993, for instance, according toa top-levelgovernment report the countrysidewitnessedsome 1.7 millioncases ofresistance, primarilytax resis - tance, ofwhich6,230 cases were classified as “disturbances”( naoshi) that en- tailed severe damage topersons or property.The confrontationsthat year ex- acted astaggering tollof deathsand injurieson some8,200 townshipand countyofficials. 4 Farmers werenotaloneinexpressingeconomic grievances. In thefinal decade ofthetwentieth century,according toofficial statistics,more than1.5 millionindustri aldisputesw ere officially recorded and processed by arbitrationormediationcommittees. 5 Since manymoredisputesoccur thanare officially registered, we can assume an impressive level of labor strife as well. So long as suchconfrontati onslimit their demands tocalling for adecent livelihoodand solong as theyremain localized, thecentral government has generally stayedout ofthepicture —except toencourage local officials todeal fairly withthe protesters. In the case of ataxicab drivers’strike in thecity of Changsha,for example, central authorities intervened topersuade themunici- palgovernment to rescind itsplan to raise license fees to alevel beyondthe means ofmanydrivers. When tax revoltsby farmers have promptedcentral in- tervention,it hasusually been to remindtow nshipand countygovernments thattheir fees andsurcharges mustnotexceed 5percent offarmers’income, as stipulated by national regulations (which have been widely ignored). 6 Inshort,the central government —likeitspredecessors inimperialand Re- publicanChina — hasdemonstrate dacertain degree of tolerance and even sympathytoward economicallydriven protests, provided that they remain clearly bounded inbothscale andaspirations.Claimsto abasicsubsistencethat staywithin local confines have seldombeen deemed especially threatening by Chinese regimes, and so—incontrast toprotests motivated by explicitlyreli- giousor politicalagendas —historicallyhave notattracted agreat deal ofcen- tral anxiety or attention. Nationalisticallyinspired student unrest isanother storyaltogether, however. In thecase ofthe1999 studentprotests against thebombing of China’s Belgrade embassy,wefind aconsiderabledegree ofovert central government support— sanctioningthedemonstrati onson national television,providing busesto take studentsto foreign embassiesand consulates,and even supplying theslogans that they should shout once theygot there. Here, too,the historical lessonsare telling.Patriotic student movements have provedpolitical lyincen- diaryin Chinaever sincetheOpium Wars ofthemid-ninet eenth century opened

168 Critical Asian Studies 33:2 (2001) Chinese governmentstocharges ofbeing soft onimperialism.The May Fourth Movement of1919,whichrailed against Japaneseincursionsafter World War I, resulted inthedismis salof thethree discredited officialswhohadsign ed the Treaty ofVersailles.More importantly,ithelped give riseto theChineseCom- munistParty (CCP) itself.The Communistrevolut ionwasalsoat core amove- mentofnationalisticallyinspired students,whosubsequentlyreached outto other allies— firstw orkers,then p easants—inan effort totoppleagovern- mentthatthey charged was remissin itsrespons ibilityto guard China’s na- tionalsovereig nty. Thecurrent regime isthusdeeply afraid ofjingoisticstudentmovements, es- peciallyif theyseem likelyto linkup withother social groups,and onlya few years ago itbanned studentdemonstrat ionsthat called for recovering the Diaoyutai(Senkaku) Islandsfrom Japanese control. Butwiththe bombing on 8 May 1999 havingcreated visiblemartyrs, it w as simplytoo hazardous for the government totry to disallowstudent demonstrati onsaltogether. Moreover, theincident occurred onlyfour daysafter theMay Fourthanniversa ry(and less thana monthbefore JuneFourth) whenhistorical parallel swere oneveryone’s mind.7 Jiang Zemin— likehis predecessors in1919 —riskedbeing accused of failing toprotect Chinese sovereigntyunless he seemed to be respondingat least as vigorouslyas thestudents to this affront tonational pride.And thus, withinhours of thenew softhebombing, the regime reversed itspolicy of dis- couraging all formsof studentactivism and allowed, even encouraged, edu- cated youthsto taketothe streets toexpress theirpatriotic outrage. Whatbetter wayfor JiangZeminand companyto reclaim thegloriousmantle ofnationalism that had once enveloped their party. Falun Gong Let usturn now,and at greater length,to theFalun Gongcampaign —where the authoritiesadopted apolicyof harshrepression ,incontrast tothetacit tolerance thatthey show ed toward small-scaleeconomic protestsby workers and farmers ortheovert supportthat they provided to nationalisticstudents. Even morethanin these other instances,the Falun Gong case isreplete withhistori- cal resonance. As thesuppress ioncampaign against Falun Gongsuggests,the Chinesestate recognizes thedangers inherent incross-classand cross-territorial expressions ofpopularprotest. While geographicallyconfined movementsaimed atimprov- ing theeconomic lotof one social group are (and were) countenanced,move- mentsthat spill across jurisdictionaland/ oroccupationalboundariesare (and were) viewed ascause for seriouscentral concern. Imperialedicts condemned sectarian groupsnotonlyfortheirheterodox beliefs, butalsofor theirtendency toattract itinerantsand merchants aswell assettled peasants,to encourage in- terminglingofthesexes, andtouprootpeoplefrom theirassigned places inthe social hierarchy.Thebreaching of“proper”societal divisionswas—along with heterodoxy — grounds for severe repression. Thegovernment-directed campaign against Falun Gong (or “Wheel ofLaw” as itis often rendered intoEnglish) is reminiscen tbothof Maoistcampaigns

Perry/Challenging the Mandate of Heaven 169 against alleged “counter-revolutionaries”and of earlier, imperialinitiativ es against allegedly “heterodox”sectarians. Inasmuchas thecurrent regime triesto distingu ishitself sharplyfrom such antecedents, thecampaign hasexposed ahostof ironiesthat raise thequestion of justhow mod - ern and reformist thepost-Mao leadership actu- allyis. In strikingout against theWheel ofLaw, were Jiang Zeminand companysimply reinvent- In the Falun emblem the ingthefamiliar wheel ofrepressionof heterodox swastika symbol represents the sects forged bytheirpredecessors ?And does his- Buddha School and the Taiji toryoffer anyclues astothelikelyconsequences (Yin-Yang) symbols represent of this heavy-handed state response? the Tao School. Governmentpropagandaagainst thepractice ofFalun Gongdominated boththeair waves andtheprintmedia for weeks after thecampaign got under wayinJulyof1999.Thousandsw ere reportedly sent to labor camps,and hundredsto prison, in conjunctio nwiththe crackdown. Dozens mayhave died atthehands of thepolice. This was ofcourse hardlythe firsttime that the post-Mao authorities had struck out against allegedly “sectarian”activities. During thepast two decades, thegovernment hascracked down onall manner ofsecret societiesand undergroundreligiousgroups as well as onrebellionsinspiredby avarietyof folk beliefs. 8 The fear of qigong practices (or breathing and martial arts exercises) turning intopolitical protests is also notanew concern for thepost-Mao leadership .At thetime ofthe1989 demonstrations,government hotlinesw ere establishedin themajor citiesto encour- agecitizens toreport anysuspiciousbehaviorby qigong masters.9 Nevertheless, thelaunchin gofafull-scale campaign against asingle organizationofthissortis indeed unprecedented. Notsince theSuppressi onofCounter-Revolutionaries Campaign intheearly 1950shaveweseen suchsustained national attention directed tothe threat ofsectarian resistance, andnever before have wewitnessed an attack of this kind on but a single target. Whydid the leadership elect toundertake thisdrastic initiative—aninitia- tiveso outof stepwith its attitude toward labor disputes,tax riots,or even student nationalisticdemonstrati ons? Timing,scale, and compositionhelpto ac- count for thedifference. As noted earlier, theyear 1999 was approached as a momentof potential trouble bythe PRC authorities.Publicsecurity officials surelythought they had eliminated thethreat ofmassdemonstrat ionsin the capital whentheyclosed Tiananmen Square for renovationsduringthefirst half oftheyear, convenientlypreventingwould-be protesters from commemorating May Fourth— or,more dangerous still,June Fourth— atthesite of thosehis- toric events.Thus they were shockedwhen 10,000 Falun Gongadherents from all over thecountry and all walksof life suddenlymaterializ ed infront ofthe leadershipcompound of Zhongnanhaito demand official recognition oftheir religiousassociation .Whilethegovernment hadshownincreasing flexibilityto- ward localized, interest-basedprotestsin recent years (e.g., demonstrationsby laid-off workers atparticularfactories orinparticular cities),it remained deeply

170 Critical Asian Studies 33:2 (2001) fearful ofcross-regional and/orcross-classactions. Hence theroundup in 1999 ofDemocracy Partyactivists (who had established branches across thecountry withparticipa tionfrom workers aswell asintellectuals),and hence theantipa- thytoward Falun Gong. That theInternet wasevidently serving as amobiliza- tionalw eapon forFalun Gongpractitioners,as ithadforDemocracy Partymem- bers as well,was alsohighly disturbin gtothe leadership .Thisnew means of communicationw as capable of easilytranscendi ng spatialand occupational barriers and was also stubbornly resistant to state surveillance efforts. Offurther concern was thefact thatso manyFalun Gong adepts were members oftheCommuni stParty,includinghigh-levelofficials inthegovernment and army.Althoughparticipa tion(and even leadership)bypartycadres andPLA soldiersin sectarian unrest isbynomeans unprecedented, inthepast those in - volvedwere generally low-levelofficials withoutnational influence. Inthiscase, however, theformer director ofthe301st ArmyHospital in Beijing —adoctor withconsiderab le standingamong thepolitical elite —hadbeen advising high-levelcadres toturn toFalun Gong. At atimewhenCCP leaders find them- selvesideological lyadrift and presidingover an increasinglymoribundparty apparatus,the emergence ofalarge social movementwhose diverse member- shipexhibits remarkable commitmentand enthusiasm,hasthecapacity tomo- bilizeon anationwide scale, and maintainssecure international communica- tions, is anything but a welcome development. Here, too,historical memories are disturbing. Much oftheexplanati on for theCommuni sts’rapid risetovictory half acentury ago layinthedefection ofso manyelements oftheancien regime. When Guomindang membersat all levels began togo overtotheCommun istside,the civilwar tilteddecisively in favor of therevolutio naries. 10 ThusJiangZeminwas understandablywaryofthefact that many CCP members had joined the Falun Gong. Whether oneinterprets theregime’s reaction against Falun Gong asrational suspicionorasirrationalparanoia,thecontradictionsofthecampaign havelaid bare manyof theironies of Communistrule. When thecampaign was first launched, theauthoriti es declared Falun Gong tobe a“heterodox religion” (xiejiao)—thetradition alterm employedby theimperial Chinese state todes- ignate thosegroups, such as the millenar ian WhiteLotus Society ,whoseprac- tices were deemed antithetical to itsown Confucian dictates. In sucha discourse, “heterodox religion”is contrasted to“orthodox religion”— whether of theConfucian or Communistpersuasio n.The initialw ave of thecampaign counterposed the“ heterodox”views of Falun Gong leader LiHongzhi to the correct tenets ofMarxism-Leninism.Whereas Marxism-Leninismchampion ed materialism,Falun Gong espousedidealism. Rather thanbe misledby thefalse teachings ofthecharismatic Li Hongzhi,citizens were enjoined torally around thecentral partyleadership and itsproper doctrines. Framing theproblem in thisfashion had the unintend ed effect, however, of puttingFalun Gong ona roughlyequal footing withthe Communi stParty .On theone sidestood Li Hongzhi andhisheterodox teachings, ontheother sidethecentral leaders and theirorthodox teachings. Intheinterests of stabilityand unity,ordinaryChinese were asked to reject Falun Gong in favor of the CCP.

Perry/Challenging the Mandate of Heaven 171 Theunwittingimplicationwasthattw ocompeting sects were locked inmor- tal combat, each vyingfor theallegiance ofthemasses. When thestate accused Falun Gongofhavingcaused numerousdeaths through suicide, starvation ,and mental illness,one could hardlyhelp but compare itsrecord favorably against thedevastation wrought byLand Reform, theGreat Leap Forward, andtheCul- tural Revolution — not to mention the June Fourth massacre. Perhapsit dawned onsomeone intheMinistry of Propaganda thatthis w as notaparticularlyflattering way inwhichto represent theCommuni stParty.In anyevent, after afew daysof thisapproach, thecampaign tooka new turn.In- stead ofcontrasting Falun Gong “heterodoxy”toCommunist“ orthodoxy,”the principaloppositio nwas now presented as one of “superstition”versus “ science.”Prominen tastronomersand physicistsfrom themajor universitiesand research academies were trotted outto denounce LiHongzhi’ s apocalyptic propheciesabout theend ofanage ( moshilun).Whereas Lihadallegedly pre- dicted theadvent ofacomet thatwouldgenerate aglobal explosionthatonlyhe could deflect, scientistsresponded thatthe chances ofsuchan occurrence that year were aremote oneinfifty billion.Nonetheless,theyproceeded soberlyto calculate theprecise force thatLi Hongzhiwould havetobeable tomuster in or - der torepel sucha comet were itinfact onitsway ,andpronounced hisalleged boast“ impossible!”Meteorologi stsfor theevening televisionnew salsotook care toreassure viewers thatthe partial lunareclipse onJuly28wasnocause for alarm —despitepopular beliefs thatunusualastrologicaloccurrences are asign of the loss of the Mandate of Heaven. Physiciansand psychiatriststestified tothedeleterious physicaland mental healtheffects ofFalun Gong. Televisioncameras tookview ers insidemental in- stitutionsto observe cases of“qigong deviation”( qigongpiancha ), a Chinese category ofmental illnessallegedly broughton bythe practice ofFalun Gong techniques.Victims of Falun Gong, notpreviouslynoted for fillingmental hos- pitals,w ere nowsaidtoaccount for morethan40 percent ofthepatientsin Chi- nese psychiatricwards.Psychologi stsexplained howcontinuou sexposure to thebooks, tapes, videos, Internet homepage, andother paraphernaliaofFalun Gong could inducea“true believer”mentalityin whichfollowers wouldbewill- ing to follow blindly any command issued by the supreme leader. Tobesure,government officials were notwithoutsome justificationinhigh- lightingthe bizarre belief systemthat underpin ned thepractice ofFalun Gong. Followers ofthefaith were saidto derive therapeutic benefits from theregular rotation ofaspiritualw heel implanted intheirstomachs by thecharismati cau- thorityof LiHongzhi. Those who mastered theregimens ofthereligion were promisedsupernatu ral powers thatranged from levitationto x-ray vision.And, unlikemany other qigong groups,Falun Gong believers seemed todevote at least asmuchenergy tohonoring their leader —whowas investedwith divine attributes — as to honing their exercise skills. Attuned tothe internatio nal backlashthat the repression campaign was boundto generate, government televisionstations invited experts inlaw and philosophytoexplain thatsuppressi onofanunregistered,and thusillegal and illegitimate, organizationwas nota violationof humanrights. Social scientists

172 Critical Asian Studies 33:2 (2001) testified thatFalun Gong’s capacity toamasslarge numbersof otherwise uncon- nected people simultaneouslywas aclear threat tothe general social order — somethingthat could notbe tolerated inany modern polity.Officially sanctioned religiousspecialist sdecried the“ feudal superstition”of Falun Gong, in contrast to the “normal religion” that they themselves espoused. For weeks after thecampaign began, each nightpictures w ere broadcast of huge pilesof Falun Gongmaterials thathad been either voluntarilyturned over bypractition ers or confiscated inpolice raidson bookstoresand publishing houses.(Interestin gly,thePeople’ s Liberation ArmyPress w asresponsiblefor a number ofFalun Gong publications.)Some were disposedof ingigantic bon- fires, othersw ere recycled. Relatives ofFalun Gong victimstestified about the terrible tragedies thathad befallen theirloved ones. Former adherents alsobe - gan tocome forward toexplain howthey had been hoodwinkedby LiHongzhi and toexpress regret at theirgullibi lity.Physicaleducation teachers pointedto healthyalternative stoFalun Gongintheform ofbadminton,ballroomdancing, bowling,and thelike. Happy pictures of thosew hohadkicked theFalun Gong habitand were now pursuingmore benign varietiesof exercise began toflood the evening news. Thebasicpatterns ofthegovernment ’soffensive were familiar from decades ofprevioussuch mobilized suppressi onefforts, from theanti-rightistcampaign ofthe1950s tothe anti-spir itualpollutio ncampaigns ofthe1980s. However, judging from discussionswithpeople inChinaat thetime, this particular campaign wasnotaresoundingsuccess.While mostofthosewith w homI talked ac- cepted thatFalun Gong’s organizational capacities were apotential danger and assumedthat Li Hongzhiw asahustlerw ithanefarious agenda, beitpoliticalor simplypecuniary,theyfound thegovernment’streatment ofthecase something of apublicembarrassment.The draconian nature ofthecampaign was suggestive of adeeplyfrightened and insecure central leadership.People wondered out loud:Hadcrimesso seriousas towarrant thearrest ofthousandsreally occurred? The state produced no convincingevidence todemonstrateanyactual dis- ruptionof publicorder from Falun Gong —aside from thefact thatso manyof itsowncadres hadenlistedin themovement. 11 Althoughthe authoritiestried to argue thatFalun Gong memberswere interfering withflood control workby demonstratingoutsidepublic agencies, thetelevisionfootage revealed thaten- trances and exitsto publicbuildin gs hadbeen keptconspicuo uslyopen by Falun Gong protesters.The gatherings were non-violent and remarkably disci- plined.While thegovernment insistedthat these demonstrationswere themost seriouspolitical threat since the1989studentuprisin g,itwashard tosee why. The weakness ofthestate’ s case was plain,its accusations rife withobvious inconsistencies,ironies, and exaggerations.Thegovernment claimed tobe jus- tified incracking down onthegroup because itwasnotofficially registered, but theFalun Gong demonstrationshad been promptedprecisely by adesire for theofficial recognition and registration thatthe state refused togrant. Theau- thoritiescastigated Falun Gong for being feudal and un-scientific, whileat the same timedenouncin gitsuseofcutting-edge Internet technology topropagate its message both nationally and internationally.

Perry/Challenging the Mandate of Heaven 173 Historical Analogies One ofthegreatest ironiesof thecampaign layin the state’ s reluctance toac- knowledge thehistorical considerati onsthat so clearly laybehind its heavy- handed reaction toFalun Gong. As everyone withwhom I spokewas quickto pointout,thereal fear wasthatthemovement w ouldturnintothe sortofsectar- ian-inspired rebellion for whichChinese historyis famous.Indeed, bylabeling thegroup a“heterodox sect”( xiejiao)and cracking down relentlesslyon its practitioners,the authorities invited just suchhistorical allusion s.From theY el- lowT urbansto theWhite Lotus to theBoxers, thefolk religion and breathing regimens of“heterodox sects”proved to beavolatilemix in timesof dynastic crisis.Although the official media didnot draw attention tothis historical anal- ogy,itwascertainly notlostonthepublicatlarge. Thefact thata popularcentral televisionserial chronicled thestory of thefirst Ming emperor, ZhuY uanzhang —amendicant monkwhosefourteenth century risetopower came inthemidst ofaWhiteLotus-ins piredrebellion —served onlyto highlightthe linkage between pastand present. Fear ofthelossoftheMandate ofHeaven wasgenerally seen asthedriving force behindthe campaign, butthis “ feudal superstitious” belief could of course not be officially admitted. As thehistorical record teaches us,the vast majority of Chinese sectarian groupsw ere inclined toward politicalquiescence. Thetrigger forprotest,more often thannot, lay w iththe state. Government repressionw asa commonpre- cipitantof overt rebellion. 12 Thusif thecurrent effort toeliminate Falun Gong

Anti-Falun Gong posters. Designer: Cheng Guoying. From the collection of Stefan Landes- berger. (Left) E13/892. Jianjue yonghu Zhongyang guanyu chuli “Falun Gong” feifa zuzhide jueding [Firmly support the decision of the Central Committee to deal with the illegal organization of “Falun Gong”], Sichuan meishu chubanshe, August 1999, print no. 85410. 3590. (Right) E13/891. Chongshang kexue, pochu mixin [Uphold science, eradicate superstition],Sichuan meishu chubanshe, August 1999, print no. 85410.3589.

174 Critical Asian Studies 33:2 (2001) does notsucceed, theauthoritie sarelikelyto have turned aonce tranquilfriend intoan implacable and formidablefoe. Like theanti-sectari an efforts of the Qianlong emperor intheeighteenth century,orfor thatmatter oftheGuomin- dangearlier inthetwentieth century,theirheavy-handed initiativ esagainst “heterodoxy”and “feudal superstition”may well provecounterpro ductive inthe long run.13 Whether ornotthegovernment prevailsin itseffort toeliminateFalun Gong as an organization,the suppressi on campaign exposed profound vulnerabili- tiesin thestate’ s gripon society.Equallyimportan t,thesortsof demonstrations sweeping Chinaat theturn ofthemillenni um—whether launched by qigong practitioners orbyanti-Americanstudents— served notice thatpopular protest inChinaisnotacarbon copyof thesocial movementsfamiliar inWestern societ - ies.As analysts,we woulddo well toapproach suchexpression sofpublicsenti- ment ontheirterms, rather thanassume (as manyoutsideobservers did during theTiananmen demonstrationsmorethana decade ago)thatthe w ellspringsof politicalchange layonly w iththose marching behinda replica oftheStatue of Liberty. ThroughoutChinese history,massprotests have playeda special role inbe- stowing politicallegitimacy —whether according toConfucian orCommunist principles.This contributes toa distinctivedynamicof state-societyrelations. On theone hand,Chinese politicalculture (whether framed interms of the Mencian Mandate ofHeaven orintermsof Mao’s MassLine) encourages and empowers protesters torise upfrom theranks ofsocietyto challenge state leaders.On theother hand,precisely because oftheimportance ofpopularprotest topolitical legitimacy ,state authorities —betheyemperors orgeneral secretar- iesof theCommun istParty — moveaggressively tocondone or tocondemn particular outbreaks ofprotestactivity .Populardemonstrat ionsthat go beyond thearticulatio noflocal economic grievances areeither welcomed assupportive ofthereigning orthodoxyor else theyare banned asexpressionsofheterodox superstition.As aresult,Chinese protesters themselvesare unusuallyattentive tosignals from thestate. Therequest byFalun Gongadherents for official recog- nitionand registrationisonlythelatest inacenturies-oldtraditionof appeals by social movements for government approval. Theclose relationshipbetween state authorizationandsocial movementsin Chinaraises some questionsconcerning theapplicabilityof general theoriesof contentiouspoliti cs,develop ed for themost p art on thebasis of European and American cases. Althoughthese theorieshave certainly not ignored the roleofthestate, theyhave generally been content tosuggest anegative correla- tionbetw een state strength andpoliticallythreatening social movements.Revo- lutions,according tothisline ofanalysis,are facilitated byweak statesincapable ofrepressingchallenges totheir ow nsurvival. 14 There is,ofcourse, anobvious —possiblyeven tautological —logic tothis insightthat applies, at least inhind- sight,to anyrevolutio nary outcome. ButtheChinese experience argues for ac- knowledging a larger, more pro-active role for the state. Itisnotjustthat state weakness mayencourage protest;rather, popularpro- testsare often inspiredby the very strength of state exemplars.Take Falun

Perry/Challenging the Mandate of Heaven 175 Gong, whoseorgan izational structurecloselyresemble sthatof theChinese CommunistParty .Inboth cases, individualsbelong tolocal branches whose leaders arestrictlysubservien ttothe directivesof thenext level inatightlyorga- nized, territoriallybased hierarchy.Whileordinarymembers of onebranch may have littledirect contact withm embers of other branches,theirleaders are plugged intoan extremelyeffective systemof communicationandcommand. Priortothegovernmentcrackdown,Falun Gongboasted morethan28,000lo- cal branches (knownas liangongdian or practice points)whose leaders reported to more than1,900 supervisorystations ( fudaozhan)thatin turn reported tothirty-nin egeneral stations( zongzhan)at thelevel of province, autonomousregion, andmunicipality.At thecenter stoodthe Wheel ofLaw Re- search Society ( falun dafayanjiuhui ). The structural isomorphismbetween Falun Gong and theCommun istParty was duenotonly to Falun Gong’s desire toelude state surveillance througha dispersedcellular pattern (perfected bytheCCP during itsow nrevolutionary years for asimilarpurpose). The congruence wasduealsoto thefact thatthe CommunistPartyrepresents an extremely powerful, indeed virtuallyirresist- ible,organizati onal template for anygroup tryingto operate incontemporary China. Bythesame token,territory designated aspolitical lysacred bytheChinese state exerts atremendouspullon potential protesters.Thus, despite the enor- mousdangers inherent inpublicassemblies at Tiananmen Square, membersof theoutlaw ed Falun Gongmovementare drawnback again and again tothat site preciselybecause itis the state-sanctio ned politicalcenter of thecountry .A Reuters report during thelunar New Year’scelebrationsinFebruary 2000 makesclear thismagnetic, mimeticconnection between theChinese state and its would-be challengers: Defiant membersof theFalun Gong spiritualmovement kept up protests inTiananmen Square onSaturday after thebanned group marked theYear oftheDragon withone of itsbiggest demonstrationson thevast plaza. Plainclothes police swarmed thesquare, detaining at least half adozen people,the morningafter scores of Falun Gong protesters triedt ounfurl Buddhist bannersnear China’ s most prominent flagpole bearingt hena- tional standard . As lunar New Year’s revelers looked on,police swoopedacross the square and detained more than100 people,kicking and punchingsome, witnessessaid.… Despite the beatings, Falun Gong memberskept up chantsof “Falun Dafa”— “Great Law oftheWheel” — even insidethe de- tention centre. Thedemonstrationis thelatest evidence thata nationwide crackdownhasfailed tocrush members’ allegiance to thegroup which China’s Communistleaders banned inJulylast year and labeled an “evil cult”in October. Authoritieshave done theirutmost to keep Falun Gong membersfrom thecapital, checking identitycards atrailwayand bussta- tions,and setting uproadblocks onroutes intothe city.Theyhave handed outharshjail sentences toFalun Gongleaders, and detained thousandsof members.Y et Falun Gong hasbeen attempting ever bolder acts ofprotest.

176 Critical Asian Studies 33:2 (2001) Last month[February 2000], memberstried to hang agiant portrait of their U.S.-basedguru, Li Hongzhi, overthepainting ofMaoZed ong which overlooksthe square, theInformatio nCentre ofHumanRights and Dem- ocratic Movement in China has reported. 15 (my emphasis) As thisnew sreport indicates,intense state repressionmay worktoradicalize —rather thaneliminate—popularprotest.Thisphenomenonhasalready beguntoreceivesomeattentionintheliteratureonsocialmovements, 16 but theways in whichstate practices themselvesencourage imitationby protesters remainsunder-appr eciated. The provocativesubstitutionofBuddhistbanners for thenational flag andofMaster Li’s portraitfor thatofChairman Maosuggest thetremendous temptationsthatthe official trappingsof state holdeven for those who rise up to challenge the powers-that-be. The tendency for protesters totake cues from official symbolsof authority can befoundinanypolity ,butit isparticularlypronou nced inauthoritarian systemsw herethestate exercises avirtualmon opolyover political discourse. Insuchcontexts, theclever appropriation andinversionof officially sanctioned ritualsand ceremonies for subversivepurposes is aprominentfeature ofpro- testbehavior. In China, w here popularprotest is culturall ysanctioned and where thecustom of “waving thered flag toopposethe red flag”has anancient pedigree thatlong predates theCommun istera, thispractice hasbeen honed into a high — and often highly ironic — art form. Justas variousdemocratic politicalcultures have given definitionto distinc- tiveFrench, English,and American repertoires ofcollective action, soauthori- tarian societiesalso manifest identifiablestylesof protest.In China,the ironic invocation(and, throughpuns, the inversion )ofofficial rhetoric, thecreative use of historicalallegory ,and thecounter-hegemonic commemorationofstate- sponsoredholidays are exceptionallywell-developed means ofchallengingau- thority(just as Russianpol itical cultureisfamed for itssardonicjokes). China offers richmaterial from whichtodevelop abetter understandingofsuchp he- nomena, whileservingat thesame timeto exemplify amoregeneral typeof po- liticalsystem in whichthe boundaries between state andsocietyare lessstarkly drawn thanin liberal democracies. AlthoughChina (with the exception ofcon- temporary Taiwan)hasnever enjoyed democratic rule, ithasexperienced avari- ety of authoritarian regimes: imperial, Republican, and Communist. Thosew hohold the reins of power inBeijing todayare of course acutely awareofthishistoricalrecord. Itispreciselyin lightof thefamiliar Chinesepast —includingthehistory of theChinese CommunistParty itself —thatthe regime’s seeminglyinconsiste ntandillogical responsesto contempora ryprotests become explicable. Whilepopular protest in China bears adefinite resemblance tounrest inother authoritarian polities,the differences are alsostark and significant. Sidney Tarrow writes of authoritarian states in general: That authoritarian statesdiscourage popularpolitics is implicitin theirvery definition.In particular, theysuppress the sustained interaction of collective actors and authoritiesthat is thehallmark of socialmovements.… Repressive statesdepress collective action of aconventional and confrontational sort,b utleavethemselvesop en toun obtrusivemobilization. 17

Perry/Challenging the Mandate of Heaven 177 Likeother authoritariansocieties,the PRChascertainlywitnessed thedevel- opmentofwhatJamesScott termsa “hidden transcript”o fcritical dissent. 18 ButCommunistC hinapartscom panywiththese other countriesinhaving periodicallyencouraged —indeed compelled—itsci tizenstoexpresstheir private criticismspu bliclyinthe form ofbig-character posters,struggleses- sions,den unciation meetings,d emonstrations,and the like.The Cultural Revolutionw as themost dram atic, albeitcertainlynotthe only,i nstanceof thiseffort. TheCommuniststate’s sponsorshipofmasscam paignsi srelated toafundamental tenet ofChinese political culture thatl inkseffectivepopu- larprotest andpolitical legitimacy.AlthoughMao’s massli nedeparts signifi- cantlyfromMencius’sMandateofHeaven, theysharethebeliefthat“torebel isjustified.” Repercussions State sponsorshipof publiccriticis minChinahas had a number ofimportant repercussions.For onething,ordina ryChinese aresimplymore familiarwith modesofcollectiveprotest thanwewouldexpect ofapopulation livingunder suchtightp olitical supervision.Ritu alized assomeaspects ofmasscri ticism became duringtheCultural Revolution,these routines nonetheless constituted part ofarichrepertoi reofprotesttechniqu esavailabletocitydw ellers andcountry folk alike.Public exp erience withprotest may well explainwhy it wasChinathatgot therevolutionaryball rollin gacross theCommu nistw orld in1989.Itsurel yhelpsexplainhowthe Tiananmen protestersproved so skillful atcapturingworldwideattentionwiththeird ramaticactions:festive marches complete withcolorfulbannersandstirring music;sti ngingattacks onpolitical authoritiesinwallposters,sp eeches, andteleviseddebates; even somber hunger strikes— allfoundprecedentsin earl ier, elite-inspired campaigns. Yetultimatelythevoicingof thehiddentranscript proved far moreunsettling elsewhere intheCommun istworld thanturned outto bethecase for China. Preciselybecause protestw as bothroutine and officially circumscribed,once thetop leadership initiated a clear course ofrepressionmost of thepopulace wasquickto fall intostep — withconcerns for personal safety and perhapssta- bilityrapidly overshadow ing theeuphoria ofpubliccriticism. After all,this too wasafamiliar drill— harkingback tothe anti-right istcampaign of1957,themil- itarysuppress ionof Cultural Revolution massactivism in 1969, theclearing of Tiananmen Square inApril1976, and theclampdow non Democracy Wall in 1979. InChina,unlike Eastern EuropeortheSoviet Union,both leaders and or- dinarycitizens knew howtoput thegenie ofmassprotestback intothe bottle of state socialism. What thisaugurs for thefuture isofcourse impossibletopredict withconfi- dence. Certainly thepost-Mao reforms aregenerating new pretexts for protest, asconcerns about excessive taxes and factory closures have joined long-stand- ing resentment toward official privilegeand bureaucraticcorruption.Equally significant,the opportun itiesfor forming cross-classand cross-regional coali- tionsare expandingapace withthe unravelin gof manyof thestate-impo sed

178 Critical Asian Studies 33:2 (2001) controls oftheMaoistera. Much willdepend uponthe w ayin whichthe government authorities choose torespond to the growing unrest inbothcities and countryside. Regardless ofhowthe evolving tensions play out, however, up- coming scenarios are certain tobear theimprint of pastpractices —including those of Chinese Communism itself. Maoistinitiativescontinue toinfluence modesof thoughtand behaviorin the contemporarypost-Maoperiod, but in many w aysChina today resembles the ChinaoftheRepublican —oreven thelateimperial— eramorethanit does the Chinaof Mao’s Cultural Revolution.As marketsreemerge andstate-erected social barriers crumble, classrelations arereconfigured inamanner thatmaywell rekindle thefires ofrebellion and revolutionthatburned sobrightlyin anear- lier age. Thepowerful cross-cuttingsocial coalitionsof thelate nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were inpart aproduct ofrelativelyw eak state capacity, butmore importantlythey also reflected theappearance ofnew social classes (e.g., an industrialproletariat) and new social identities(e.g., youthsand women). These developmentshadmomentou simplicationsfor thenature ofprotest, helpinggive riseto such massive and politicallysignificantevents as theMay FourthMovement of1919, theMay ThirtiethMovement of1925, and theCivil Warunrest ofthelate 1940s. Under theRepublic, thenotion of urban citizen- ship (shiminquan)tookon special meaning, implyinganew and powerful claim for urban residentsof all social classes to participateinlocal politics. Fueled byanalliance ofintellectuals,workers,and merchants,successive w aves ofpopularcontention duringthefirsthalf ofthiscentury constituteda dramatic turning point in Chinese history. Althoughthese expressionsofnewfound communityand discontent paved thew ayfor thevictoryof Communism,theMaoist state reversed suchtrends, se- verely constrainingthepossibil ityof cross-classinitiativ es.In amanner towhich hisimperial predecessors aspired,but never fullyattained, Mao provedamaz- ingly adept at limiting potentially threatening societal interaction. During theMaoist period, a rigidhousehold registratio nsystem( hukou zhidu)wasimposedthatseverelyrestrictedmigrationandeffectivelysevered relationsb etween villagers andurbanites.M oreover, withincities separate places ofrecreationwereestablishedfor workers andintellectuals,whilethe bourgeoisiewas virtuallyeli minated. Gone were the teahousesan dcafes thathadserved asmeetingplaces formembersofdifferentclasses duringthe Republican era. Workers now spenttheir leisure timeatworkers’cultural palaces, whileintellectualscongreg ated atwriters’an dartists’associations. Inthepost-Maoperiod,thebreakdownofthese social restrictionsmayonce againencouragecross-classallianceswithapotentialforpoliticallypowerful collective action. Much haschanged over thepasthalf century,ofcourse, from cultural values totechnologicaladvances. And yet,to the extent towhichpopular protest and politicallegitimacy remain inextricablylinkedin thepublicmind,w ecan antici- pate thatfuture generations ofChinese mayalso rise up tochallenge theMan- date of Heaven.

Perry/Challenging the Mandate of Heaven 179 Notes This article isdrawn from theintroducto rychapter of Challenging theMandat eof Heaven? Popular Protestand StatePower inChina (Armonk, N.Y.:M.E.Sharpe, forthcoming). Thevolume offers arevised selection oftheauthor’s previously published essays onChinese popular protest, from late imperial days tothepresent. 1. Liu Xiaobo, “ThatHoly Word, ‘Revolution,’”in Popular Protestand Political Culture inModern China, ed. Jeffrey N.Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J.Perry (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1994), 315, 318. 2. Elizabeth J.Perry,“Chinese Anniversariesin International Perspective,” Har- vard AsiaQuarterly 3, no. 3 (summer 1999). 3. See Jeffrey Wasserstrom, “TheYearofLiving Anxiously: China’s 1999”( Dissent, spring 2000)foraninsightful discussion ofhistorically grounded differences in government reactions totwo ofthethree types ofmovements discussed here —which Wasserstrom dubs the“Solidarity Scenario”and the“Religious Revolt Scenario.” 4. Foreign BroadcastInformat ion Service (FBIS), 8 August 1994, 18. 5. Ching Kwan Lee, “Pathways ofLabor Insurgency,”in Chinese Society:Change, Conflict, and Resistance, ed. Elizabeth J.Perry and MarkSelden (London: Routledge, 2000). 6. FBIS, 11 June 1993, 13. 7. Jeffrey Wasserstrom makes this point in “The Year of Living Anxiously.” 8. Elizabeth J.Perry,“Rural Collective Violence: TheFruits ofRecent Reforms,”in ThePolitical Economy of Reform inPost-Mao China, ed.Elizabeth J.Perry and Christine Wong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press: 1985); and Eliza- bethJ. Perry,“Crime, CorruptionandContention inContemporaryChina,”in TheP aradox ofChina’s Post-Mao Reforms, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press: 1999). 9. Dangdai (The present age), no. 39(25 August 1990), 14-15; FBIS,26Decem- ber 1990, 29. 10. Suzanne Pepper, Civil WarinChina: ThePolit icalSt ruggle, 1945-1949 (Berke- ley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978). 11. InShanghai, forexample, Iwastold bythevice-director ofthePropaganda Bu- reau thatmore than10 percent ofthe5,000-plu sFalun Gong practitionersin the city were party members. 12. Daniel L.Overmyer, FolkBuddhist Religion: Dissenting Sectsin Late Tradi- tional China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976). 13. Prasenjit Duara, “Knowledge and Power in theDiscourse ofModernity: The Campaigns against Popular Religion in Early Twentieth-Century China, Jour- nal ofAsian Studies 50, no. 1 (1991): 67-83. 14. Charles Tilly, FromMobilizati ontoRevolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wes- ley,1978); and Theda Skocpol, States and SocialRevolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 15. Reuters World Report , 5 February 2000. 16. Donatella Della Porta, SocialMovements, PoliticalViolence, and theState: A Comparative Analysis ofItaly and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1995). 17. Sidney Tarrow, Power inMovement:Social Movements, CollectiveActionand Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 92-93. 18. James C.Scott, Dominationand theArts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990).

180 Critical Asian Studies 33:2 (2001)