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Battle of Tsushima Was Real Network Centric Warfare

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Battle of Tsushima Was Real Network Centric Warfare A edition Battle of Tsushima was Real Network Centric Warfare Rear ADM (Ret.) Kazuo ITOH I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 NCW Concept 2 Outline of the Battle of Tsushima 3 Information and Communications Network during the Battle of Tsushima 4 Telegraphs in Russia and Great Doubling of the Baltic Fleet 5 The Outcome of the War, from the Viewpoint of NCW Factors Conclusion Introduction The 21st century is the age of information. War in the information age is said to be Network Centric Warfare (NCW) rather than Platform Centric Warfare (PCW). The word “NCW” first appeared in public in the thesis written by then Vice Admiral Cebrowski.1 He talked about the Japanese Imperial Navy, which won the Battle of Tsushima in the Russo-Japanese War, first proving on an actual battle site the effectiveness of NCW, and the establishment of information and communications network, and the proper implementation of wireless telegraphs, was contributing factors to the Navy’s victory.2 In this paper, I am going to explore how the information and communications network was established, how wireless telegraphs were operated, and how network actually contributed to the triumph, during which NCW was truly displayed. These were the crown of the sweat and blood efforts by our patriotically-minded forerunners and predecessors, as well as the result of the brilliant team work between sectors of the military, the government and individuals. 1 NCW Concept (1) Background The Gulf War, which the Iraq started in 1991, ended surprisingly without much difficulty with the defeat of Iraq. The decisive difference between the coalition forces and the Iraqi forces was derived from the gap in the capabilities of information gathering and technology. The traditional style of a war, in which the number of platforms and the quality of weapons has a great influence over the way of fighting, was not applied in the Gulf War. Later, the United States recognized that war nature was shifting from PCW to another style suitable for the information age, after evaluating and reviewing the value of information and technology through the experiences of the Kosovo conflict, the Afghanistan War and the last Iraq War. Thus, the backbone of the arrival of the concept of NCW had already been introduced in the 21st century. (2) What is NCW? Now, the achievement of superiority in NCW had become a fundamental policy for military development in the United States. The definition of the NCW can be described as set forth below. “NCW derives its power from strong networking of a well-informed but geographically dispersed force. The enabling elements are a high-performance information grid, access to all appropriate information sources, weapons reach and maneuver with precision and speed of response, value-adding command-and-control (C2) processes and integrated sensor grids closely coupled in time to shooters and C2 processes.”3 (3) NCW and the Three Victorious Necessities Cebrowski opined that the following three elements are especially important to win a war in the information age. Each of these fighting elements in a war will become greater in value when concentrated on a network grid.4 ・ Information Superiority ・ Speed of Command ・ Self-synchronization 2 Outline of the Battle of Tsushima The Russo-Japanese War was kicked off with the Japanese Imperial Navy’s attack on Russia’s Lushun on February 8, 1904. The Japanese Imperial Army landed on the Korean Peninsula and marched to Manchuria by campaigning and confronting the Russian Army. The logistic line of Japanese Imperial Army was stretched out due to marching into the hinterland of Manchuria. It was the best for the Japan to terminate the war under favorable condition during Japanese dominance on the field. The only remaining concern for the Imperial Navy was a battle with the Russian Baltic Fleet led by Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky. The biggest concern was the location of the battle. The question was which Strait, amongst the Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima Straits, the Baltic Fleet would take to reach the destination of Vladivostok. Japan was nearly sure about the route which the Baltic Fleet would take, having received various information, but it was still unknown which Strait would be taken by the Russian fleet. On a gray morning on May 27, 1905, Auxiliary Cruiser “Shinano-Maru” found the Baltic Fleet going north in the west sea of Kyushu and reported it to the Japanese Combined Fleet. Receiving this report, Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Togo immediately ordered sorties to the Combined Fleet forces which were already waiting in Jinhae Bay in Korea. The Japanese naval forces intercepted the Baltic Fleet in the northeast water of Tsushima and achieved a complete totally destroyed the Russian Fleet. Upon this decisive victory and the conciliation of the U.S. President, Theodore Roosevelt, a treaty of peace was concluded between Russia and Japan in September 1905. The above was a brief outline of the Russo-Japanese War. From the viewpoint of the NCW, one can find many combat lessons that led up even to this information age. 3. Information and Communications Network during the Battle of Tsushima (1) Wire Cables Network Infrastructure In 1868, the Japanese new government decided that an electrical cable would be installed and run by own hands. The government saw the condition of Southeast Asian countries being colonized and he worried about allowing foreign capitals for installation of electric cables could allow the foreign powers to have a stepping stone to dominate Japan. Since then, the development of land lines was vigorously promoted initiated by this government policy. Thus, the information and communications network infrastructure was at its highest possible level during the period before the Russo-Japanese War was beginning. 2 Figure 2-1 shows the layout of submarine Manchuria Vladivostok cables, except military ones, laid in the surrounding sea areas of the Far East around the time of outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Most of these cables were laid by the Great Northern Telegraph Lushun/Port Arthur Company in Denmark (2) Military Water-Bottom cables Zhifu The Imperial Navy had secretly begun Pusan laying provisional military Water-Bottom Tsushima cables before the beginning of the War. Iki Yobuko Figure 2-2 shows the military Shanghai Nagasaki Water-Bottom cables locations. Fuzhou Okinawa Taiwan Figure 2-1 Submarine cables in the Far East To Ulleungdo To Lushun Shoshin Military Telegram Service Center Jinhae Bay Pusan Tsushima Palgupo Okinoshima Kottoi Iki Yobuko Jejudo Ainoura(Sasebo) Figure 2-2 Military Water-Bottom Cables 5 3 (3) Wireless Telegraphs Marconi from Italy, he succeeded communicating using a wireless telegraph using Morse Codes in 1895. He continued remodeling and developing it. In 1902, an examination of wireless telegraphs between a ship heading for America from Britain and the mainland of Britain was successfully communicated across the Atlantic Ocean. With this success, it was considered that the use of wireless telegrams for the purpose of ships’ communications. The Imperial Navy was interested in it and ordered a quotation of Marconi’s telegraph, but then the Navy had to give it up because of the vast amount of patent fees required, along with expensive instrument costs. Minster of Navy, Vice Admiral Yamamoto recognized the necessity of wireless telegraphs and decided to promote further development of Japanese telegraphs. As a result, in October , 1903, they completed making a new wireless telegraph that was capable of communicating a distance of 80 miles between ships, and the Imperial Navy adopted it as the “ Type 36 Wireless telegraph”. It was four months before the Russo-Japanese War began. Starting from the capital warship, all the destroyers and coastal watchtowers were equipped with wireless telegraphs by the time the Battle of Tsushima started. (4) Coastal Watchtowers The Imperial Navy had prepared alert positioning watchtowers in the coastal key areas. Electric wires for telegrams were put up to each watchtower. Also, were specially selected to be equipped with wireless communication system. Water-Bottom cables were laid to connect to the watchtowers in isolated islands. At the time of the Battle, more than 200 watchtowers had been established. Figure 2-3 shows the locations and the numbers of the watchtowers in the surrounding water areas of Tsushima Islands. Telephone Wire Telegraph Wireless Telegraph Figure 2-3 Costal Watchtowers 6 The patrol combatant ships at sea and the watchtowers were connected by wireless telegraph, and the watchtowers and the key areas in the mainland, including the Imperial headquarters were also connected by wired and wireless cable. 4 4 Telegraphs in Russia (1) Popov’s wireless Telegraph In a school textbook in Russia, Alexander Popov is named as the inventor of the wireless telegraph instrument. He developed a bell signal receiver whilst. This was nearly simultaneous with the time Marconi invented. While Marconi’s receiver adopted a “decoherer” cymoscope, which recover demodulation characteristics by hitting the coherer tube at every reception of signal, Popov’s receiver used carbon cymoscope detection, which receives sound signals by consecutively detecting magnetic waves. However, Russia had never made preparation like Japan did for the development and produce “Type 36 Wireless Telegraph” with the unity of military, bureaucrat, and civilian sectors. The wireless telegraphs designed by Popov were produced in the Russian brunch factory of Siemens Co., Germany (latter-day, Telefunken Co.).7 (2) Great Doubling of the Baltic Fleet It was Russia’s great accomplishment that approximately 50 battle ships were brought to Tsushima from Libau in Russia, 18,000 miles distant. Ships were all equipped with wireless telegraph when they departed from Libau in October 1904. The wireless telegraph equipped on Russian ships was mainly the product of Telefunken Co., which was called “Slaby-Arco” type.8 Rozhdestvensky could not rely on their wireless telegraphs, which occasionally broke.
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