A edition Battle of Tsushima was Real Network Centric Warfare

Rear ADM (Ret.) Kazuo ITOH

I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 NCW Concept 2 Outline of the Battle of Tsushima 3 Information and Communications Network during the Battle of Tsushima 4 Telegraphs in and Great Doubling of the Baltic Fleet 5 The Outcome of the War, from the Viewpoint of NCW Factors Conclusion

Introduction The 21st century is the age of information. War in the information age is said to be Network Centric Warfare (NCW) rather than Platform Centric Warfare (PCW). The word “NCW” first appeared in public in the thesis written by then Vice Admiral Cebrowski.1 He talked about the Japanese Imperial Navy, which won the Battle of Tsushima in the Russo-Japanese War, first proving on an actual battle site the effectiveness of NCW, and the establishment of information and communications network, and the proper implementation of wireless telegraphs, was contributing factors to the Navy’s victory.2 In this paper, I am going to explore how the information and communications network was established, how wireless telegraphs were operated, and how network actually contributed to the triumph, during which NCW was truly displayed. These were the crown of the sweat and blood efforts by our patriotically-minded forerunners and predecessors, as well as the result of the brilliant team work between sectors of the military, the government and individuals.

1 NCW Concept (1) Background The Gulf War, which the Iraq started in 1991, ended surprisingly without much difficulty with the defeat of Iraq. The decisive difference between the coalition forces and the Iraqi forces was derived from the gap in the capabilities of information gathering and technology. The traditional style of a war, in which the number of platforms and the quality of weapons has a great influence over the way of fighting, was not applied in the Gulf War. Later, the United States recognized that war nature was shifting from PCW to another style suitable for the information age, after evaluating and reviewing the value of information and technology through the experiences of the Kosovo conflict, the Afghanistan War and the last Iraq War. Thus, the backbone of the arrival of the concept of NCW had already been introduced in the 21st century. (2) What is NCW? Now, the achievement of superiority in NCW had become a fundamental policy for military development in the United States. The definition of the NCW can be described as set forth below. “NCW derives its power from strong networking of a well-informed but geographically dispersed force. The enabling elements are a high-performance information grid, access to all appropriate information sources, weapons reach and maneuver with precision and speed of response, value-adding command-and-control (C2) processes and integrated sensor grids closely coupled in time to shooters and C2 processes.”3 (3) NCW and the Three Victorious Necessities Cebrowski opined that the following three elements are especially important to win a war in the information age. Each of these fighting elements in a war will become greater in value when concentrated on a network grid.4 ・ Information Superiority ・ Speed of Command ・ Self-synchronization

2 Outline of the Battle of Tsushima The Russo-Japanese War was kicked off with the Japanese Imperial Navy’s attack on Russia’s Lushun on February 8, 1904. The Japanese Imperial Army landed on the Korean Peninsula and marched to Manchuria by campaigning and confronting the Russian Army. The logistic line of Japanese Imperial Army was stretched out due to marching into the hinterland of Manchuria. It was the best for the to terminate the war under favorable condition during Japanese dominance on the field. The only remaining concern for the Imperial Navy was a battle with the Russian Baltic Fleet led by Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky. The biggest concern was the location of the battle. The question was which Strait, amongst the Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima Straits, the Baltic Fleet would take to reach the destination of . Japan was nearly sure about the route which the Baltic Fleet would take, having received various information, but it was still unknown which Strait would be taken by the Russian fleet. On a gray morning on , 1905, Auxiliary Cruiser “Shinano-Maru” found the Baltic Fleet going north in the west of Kyushu and reported it to the Japanese . Receiving this report, Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Togo immediately ordered sorties to the Combined Fleet forces which were already waiting in Jinhae Bay in . The Japanese naval forces intercepted the Baltic Fleet in the northeast water of Tsushima and achieved a complete totally destroyed the Russian Fleet. Upon this decisive victory and the conciliation of the U.S. President, Theodore Roosevelt, a treaty of peace was concluded between Russia and Japan in September 1905. The above was a brief outline of the Russo-Japanese War. From the viewpoint of the NCW, one can find many combat lessons that led up even to this information age.

3. Information and Communications Network during the Battle of Tsushima (1) Wire Cables Network Infrastructure In 1868, the Japanese new government decided that an electrical cable would be installed and run by own hands. The government saw the condition of Southeast Asian countries being colonized and he worried about allowing foreign capitals for installation of electric cables could allow the foreign powers to have a stepping stone to dominate Japan. Since then, the development of land lines was vigorously promoted initiated by this government policy. Thus, the information and communications network infrastructure was at its highest possible level during the period before the Russo-Japanese War was beginning.

2 Figure 2-1 shows the layout of submarine Manchuria Vladivostok cables, except military ones, laid in the surrounding sea areas of the Far East around the time of outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Most of these cables were laid by the Great Northern Telegraph Lushun/Port Arthur Company in Denmark (2) Military Water-Bottom cables Zhifu The Imperial Navy had secretly begun Pusan laying provisional military Water-Bottom Tsushima cables before the beginning of the War. Iki Yobuko Figure 2-2 shows the military Nagasaki Water-Bottom cables locations.

Fuzhou Okinawa

Taiwan

Figure 2-1 Submarine cables in the Far East

To Ulleungdo

To Lushun Shoshin Military Telegram Service Center

Jinhae Bay Pusan Tsushima

Palgupo Okinoshima Kottoi

Iki

Yobuko Jejudo Ainoura(Sasebo)

Figure 2-2 Military Water-Bottom Cables 5

3 (3) Wireless Telegraphs Marconi from , he succeeded communicating using a wireless telegraph using Morse Codes in 1895. He continued remodeling and developing it. In 1902, an examination of wireless telegraphs between a ship heading for America from Britain and the mainland of Britain was successfully communicated across the Atlantic Ocean. With this success, it was considered that the use of wireless telegrams for the purpose of ships’ communications. The Imperial Navy was interested in it and ordered a quotation of Marconi’s telegraph, but then the Navy had to give it up because of the vast amount of patent fees required, along with expensive instrument costs. Minster of Navy, Vice Admiral Yamamoto recognized the necessity of wireless telegraphs and decided to promote further development of Japanese telegraphs. As a result, in October , 1903, they completed making a new wireless telegraph that was capable of communicating a distance of 80 miles between ships, and the Imperial Navy adopted it as the “ Type 36 Wireless telegraph”. It was four months before the Russo-Japanese War began. Starting from the capital warship, all the and coastal watchtowers were equipped with wireless telegraphs by the time the Battle of Tsushima started. (4) Coastal Watchtowers The Imperial Navy had prepared alert positioning watchtowers in the coastal key areas. Electric wires for telegrams were put up to each watchtower. Also, were specially selected to be equipped with wireless communication system. Water-Bottom cables were laid to connect to the watchtowers in isolated islands. At the time of the Battle, more than 200 watchtowers had been established. Figure 2-3 shows the locations and the numbers of the watchtowers in the surrounding water areas of Tsushima Islands.

Telephone

Wire Telegraph

Wireless Telegraph

Figure 2-3 Costal Watchtowers 6 The patrol combatant ships at sea and the watchtowers were connected by wireless telegraph, and the watchtowers and the key areas in the mainland, including the Imperial headquarters were also connected by wired and wireless cable. 4 4 Telegraphs in Russia (1) Popov’s wireless Telegraph In a school textbook in Russia, Alexander Popov is named as the inventor of the wireless telegraph instrument. He developed a bell signal receiver whilst. This was nearly simultaneous with the time Marconi invented. While Marconi’s receiver adopted a “decoherer” cymoscope, which recover demodulation characteristics by hitting the coherer tube at every reception of signal, Popov’s receiver used carbon cymoscope detection, which receives sound signals by consecutively detecting magnetic waves. However, Russia had never made preparation like Japan did for the development and produce “Type 36 Wireless Telegraph” with the unity of military, bureaucrat, and civilian sectors. The wireless telegraphs designed by Popov were produced in the Russian brunch factory of Siemens Co., (latter-day, Telefunken Co.).7 (2) Great Doubling of the Baltic Fleet It was Russia’s great accomplishment that approximately 50 battle ships were brought to Tsushima from Libau in Russia, 18,000 miles distant. Ships were all equipped with wireless telegraph when they departed from Libau in October 1904. The wireless telegraph equipped on Russian ships was mainly the product of Telefunken Co., which was called “Slaby-Arco” type.8 Rozhdestvensky could not rely on their wireless telegraphs, which occasionally broke. The Russian Fleet had made an accident of shooting British fishing boats right after their departure from Libau. At that time, each ship in the Fleet emitted signals at the same time and caused interference and confusion without being able to grasp the correct information to know the true condition. This was one of the reasons for the commander not having faith to the wireless communication system. The Commander ordered silence mode to the Fleet on May 16, two days after leaving Van Phong Bay, Vietnam. He thought that outgoing signals should be only allowed for his necessity and wireless telegrams should only be used for the purpose of communication for general administrative matters, but not for operational purposes.9

5. The Outcome of the War, from the Viewpoint of NCW Factors Looking over the facts mentioned above, I can point out the root of Japanese Victory. I consider that there are three key factors for winning a war: Information Superiority, Speed of Command, and Self-Synchronization. (1) Formation of the Information and Communications Network The Imperial Navy secured its “information superiority” utilizing an information and communications network and wireless telegraphs. The telegram from “Shinano-Maru” on discovery of the Russian Fleet, arrived at 0505, and the Fleet Flag Ship “Mikasa” left the port at 0555. The main unit of the Japanese fleet left at 0634. They made unusually “Speed of commanding”. Information regarding conditions of the enemy such as the number, kind, courses, speed and formation of ships came from the Cruiser “Izumi” she took over watch mission from “Shinano-Maru” and was shared with each ship. Information such as the color of the enemy ships as being black and the funnels being yellow was turned the information into knowledge shared by all. How remarkable it was that a network system comprising both wireless and cable telegraphs between watchtowers and ships, contributed to the operational achievement. There was a good example showing how well wireless telegraphs were used. According to

5 telegraph communication records from the Warship “Izumo” the number of signals received during the battle, was 117 messages on May 27, and 112 on . If there was no use of these telegraphic messages, it is open to question whether such a complete victory. (2) Blocking the Russian Information and Communications Network To gain own “information superiority” also means preventing the enemy from gaining “information sharing”. Japanese military forces made various sabotage operations against the Russian network. The Japanese Imperial Army had cut off land telegraphic and telephone lines in Korea, which were connected to both Qing and Russia, and the Imperial Navy seized control of telegraph offices in Pusan and Masan before the beginning of the War. Communication lines were connected from a fortress in Lushun to other places such as Dailaian, Mukden, and further to Vladivostok and Europe through land cables. The Army also disconnected these lines. There were submarine cables laid from Lushun to Zhifu in Shangdong Peninsula and telegraphic cables connecting Lushun and the Russian inland via Zhifu. As a matter of course, the Imperial Navy disconnected the cables in Zhifu right after the outbreak of war. Furthermore, A Japanese navy officer broke into the Russian Consulate building in Zhifu and vandalized its wireless telegram system. Also, the Navy broke away from the submarine cable between Nagasaki and Vladivostok. The Navy evacuated cables from the sea, and reused them as provisional military Water-Bottom cables linking among Korea, Tsushima, and the mainland of Japan. This was brilliant and there was no waste of the methods they created. (3) The Active Role of Dispatch Boats The fine showing of dispatch boats should not be overlooked. One dispatch boat was assigned to each Japanese fleet. When dispatch boats are located between ships engaging in communications, the distance of communications becomes longer. Dispatch boats may be allocated between the fleet and coastal stations and may link up telegraphic messages. The Navy used the dispatch boats for information exchange with the shore by deploying them inside and outside ports and offshore near watchtowers. Moreover, dispatch boats undertook the role of relay ships for flag stream signals within the visual signal range. Squadron one with six of battle ships and cruisers, always moved in trail formation during combat, while Dispatch boat “Tatsuta” took a position on the opposite side of the gunwale of the formation. In a trail formation, there is always time consumption for the transition of the flag signal to reach to the last ship, since each ship has to receive the signals from the next ship sequentially. However, if a dispatch boat is positioned there, the next ships can raise their signal flags at once by observing the signals from the dispatch boat. The performance of the dispatch boats can be regarded as an achievement of “Information Superiority” and “Speed of Command”. (4) Issues of ’s Command and Control The internal communications in Russian Fleet were not smooth. Rozhdestvensky who were considered to be dogmatic and authoritarian, supposedly, there was atmosphere that no subordinate officers could give one’s opinions or even questions. In fact, no operational meetings were held when the Third Fleet, led by Rear Admiral Negogatov, joined to the main fleet. No commanding officers of the ships were informed about the route to the destination of Vladivostok, either. Without communications, the “self-synchronization” would be totally beyond their power. Military organizations require imperative command-and-control channels and communication means. On May 23, four days before the outbreak of the Battle of Tsushima,

6 Deputy Commander Rear Admiral Folkersam, who was on his sick bed, passed away, but Rozhdestvensky kept it secret for the reason that the news would shatter sailors’ morale. The Commander’s flag praised the “Oslyabya”, on which Folkersam had been on board. The Sea Battle began at 1408 on May 27. Russia’s flag ship “Suvorov” had been damaged and became no better than an obsolete vessel after 30 minutes from the beginning of the battle. The Commander in Chief was also wounded severely and became incapable of commanding the ship. However, it was at the dusk of that evening that Negogatov finally heard from “Bezupreshchny”, about the transfer of the wounded Commander to Destroyer “Buiny”, and his reception of the commanding authority as the Commander-in-Chief. Nebogatov raised a signal “Conform to Movements of me, Steady on course 023” but the timing had been already lost. There had been no command since 30 minutes after the outbreak of the sea battle. It was obvious that the Russian fleet were not able to exert their combat power enough given the absence of commanders.

Conclusion Initially, the tile of this essay was “NCW and the Battle of Tsushima” However, I decided to change the title “the Battle of Tsushima was a true NCW”. I strongly recognized how extensively the NCW was unreeled during the entire the Russo-Japanese War. I have respectful admiration for the men who succeeded in developing a communication system to be used in actual battles within a short time, and the efforts and sense of responsibility of the people who formed the network and developed wireless telegraphs for the nation. Considering this, it is regrettable that the Japanese became high-handed and stopped thinking forward after the victory of the Russo-Japanese War. As a lesson from the War, the things emphasized were the naval aspects such as the strength of ship amour and the size of the warships, arms capability such as powers, and tactical matters as represented by fire techniques and a T-shape formation tactic. There was even a clause of combat lessons such as “spirit of attacking whenever enemy ships were seen.” Was there such a big difference between spiritual strength and morale between the Japanese and the Russians? There were many Russian officers and sailors who died with the sinking ship because they refused to become a captive by surrendering or being rescued, or those who continued firing guns from the ship whilst it was sinking. Scant differences of machine power (material) and tactical power (immaterial) could appear as a huge margin because the Combined Fleet fought under the umbrella of “information superiority.” Cebrowski once said, taking a stance based on the concept of NCW, that modern-day war could be won even with the weapons used during World War II, as long the war was engaged in with information superiority.10 We should know that the value of information has been relatively more reinforced than the value of weapons in the age of information. Emotional spirits and morale can change overnight but science and technology always make us faced with reality. I think that education related to science and technology is necessary for naval officers. We need to remember as a historical fact, there were many people who thought about the future of Japan and understood the true nature of information and communication. Kind acknowledgement to Takuya Ueji for assisting with the translation.

7 NOTES 1. Arthur K. Cebrowski, “Network Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future”, Proceeding, January 1998 2. Lecture, Japan Maritime Staff College, , 25 October 2000. 3. Cebrowski, op.cit.p.35. 4. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka and Frederick P. Stein: Network Centric Warfare (CCRP, 1998) from http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_NCW.pdf 5. Chief of Japan Imperial Navy, “Gokuhi-bon Meiji 37-8-nen Kaisenshi (Japanese), (Naval War History 1994-1995, Secret)” Dai-4bu, 4kan, Gunyou-Denshin-Renraku Suiteisen Ichiranzu (Chapter4, Section4, Figure Military Water-Bottom Cables), 1911. This is in safekeeping in the archive of National Defence College. 6. Ibid, Sasebo-Chinjifu-Kannai Bourouzu (Figure Sasebo-District Coastal Watchtowers) 7. Ichirou Tomizawa, “Kaisen wo meguru jouhou tuushin kankyou to A.S.popov (Japanese), (A.S.Popov and Circumstances of Telecommunications Technology for Naval Battles)”, Journal of the Pacific Society, May 2005, pp. 24-29. 8. Ibid, p.31. 9. M. Domecq Garcia, “Nihonkai-kaisen kara 100-nen −Argentine Kansen Bukan no Shogen− (Japanese), (After a hunded years, from the Battle of Tsushima −Record by Argentina Military War Observer at Tsushima−)” Taka- Shobo-Umi-Press, 6 April 2005, p.256. 10. Lecture, Japan Maritime Staff College, Tokyo, 25 October 2000.

PERSONAL HISTORY

Name: Kazuo ITOH Date of Birth: 14 September 1947 Present Post: NTT DATA Corporation (September, 2003 – Present) Advisor, National Security Business Unit, Second Public Administration Systems Sector Office mail address: Toyosu Center Bldg. Annex, 3-9, Toyosu 3-chome, Koto-ku, Tokyo 135-8671, Japan Office E-mail address:[email protected] (My return address) Office Phone numbers: +81 3 3532 7269 Office Facsimile : +81 3 3532 7348 Present Address: 20-18, Maekubo Minami 2-chome, Moroyama-cho, Irumagun, Saitama-ken, 350-0463, Japan Education: March 1970, Graduated from National Defense Academy Business Career: April 1970 – August 2003 Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Retired as Rear Admiral, Deputy Superintendent Officer Candidate School

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