Consultation Report No. 5
Military and Security Issues, and Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees in the Sudan
The Sudan Peace-Building Programme
African Renaissance Institute (ARI)
&
Relationships Foundation International (RFI)
United Kingdom
July 2002
Table of Contents
The Summary Discussion Notes included in this document were compiled under the Chatham House Rule. They do not reflect the opinions of any one participant but are drawn from the range of views expressed, nor do they necessarily reflect the views of the African Renaissance Institute or the Relationships Foundation International.
Section A
I. Preface 3
II. List of Participants 4
III. Recommendations by the Sudanese Participants 7
Section B
IV. List of Issues Considered and Ensuing Discussion 9
1. Re-establishing Security: Defining the Grounds for Cease-Fire and 9 Disengagement by Gen. (Retired) Elsir Mohammed Ahmed
2. Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration 25 of Combatants in the Transition Period: the Case of Sudan by Commander Majak D’ Agoot
3. What if Peace Comes? by Lt. Gen. (Retired) Mkungu Joseph Lagu 59
4. To My Fellow Sudanese: Which Way Forward? by Lt. Gen. (Retired) 71 Mkungu Joseph Lagu
5. The Conflicting Concept and Praxes of ‘National Security’ and 93 Their Implications on Military and Security Arrangements in the Sudanese Conflict by Dr Peter Nyot Kok
6. Defining the Role of the Military and Security Services Ethically, 99 Constitutionally and Politically by Ambassador Maj. Gen. (Retired) Andrew Makur Thou
7. A Security Sector Reform Guide for the Sudan: Including Potential 113 Donor Support and the Reintegration of Former Combatants by Colonel (Retired) Phillip Wilkinson
8. A Guide for the Armed Forces of the GOS and the SPLA on the 139 Possible Military Mechanisms for Cease-Fire by Colonel (Retired) Phillip Wilkinson
9. The Magnitude of Recent Waves of Displacement in the Sudan and 160 Their Effects by Dr Sharaf El Din Ibrahim Bannaga
10. The Status of the Displaced in the Sudan and the Extent of their Re- 187 Settlement by Dr Sharaf El Din Ibrahim Bannaga
11. The Process of Resettlement and Reintegration of the Displaced 229 Population by Dr Dharaf El Din Ibrahim Bannaga
12. List of Tables and Drawings - Background Information 264 for Papers 9 to 11 by Dr Dharaf El Din Ibrahim Bannaga
13. The Return of the Displaced: A Challenge to the Country and the 295 International Community by Professor Francis Mading Deng
14. Reintegration of Women and Children in Post-War Situations 312 by Dr Priscilla Joseph Koug
15. Response - The Sudanese Refugees and the Hope for Peace 329 by Mrs Khadija Hussein Dafaala
16. The Role of the Private Sector, Civil Society and Local NGOs in 332 Rebuilding Social and Human Capital and Ensuring Respect for Human Rights by Dr Ahmed Abdel Rahman Saeed
17. The Impact of a Peace Agreement on OLS and Long-Term 348 Development of Sudan Under Alternative Constitutional Frameworks by Dr Salafeldin Salih Mohamed and Dr Al-Haj Hamed M. K.
18. Potential Donor Support for the Reintegration of War Affected 365 Population Following the Signing of a Peace Agreement by Mr Elijah Malok Aleng
I. Preface
The Sudan Peace-Building Programme is a strategic partnership between the African Renaissance Institute (ARI) and the Relationships Foundation International (RFI). The overall goal of the programme is to help bring long-term, just and sustainable peace to the Sudan. The programme’s methodology is based around a series of informal, confidential and low profile consultations attended by senior Sudanese leaders linked to the key constituencies in the country, and representing all shades of social, political and religious opinion. The Sudanese participants decide on the key constitutional and economic issues for research and discussion at the next consultation. At the moment, the programme does not itself become involved in any official peace negotiations between parties to the conflict, but aims to prepare the ground for such negotiations and implementation of agreements reached at IGAD.
Over the last two years, the Sudan Peace-Building Programme has held five consultations to fulfil these objectives. The first consultation introduced the aims, methodology and activities of the programme to the participants and covered in general terms the issues of peace dividends, oil, water and alternative constitutional frameworks. The second consultation looked at (1) the Nile Waters and Agriculture and (2) Federalism and Self-Determination. The third consultation focused on (1) Self-determination, (2) the Oil and Gas Industry and (3) Religion and the State. The fourth consultation examined (1) the Alternative Constitutional Frameworks, (2) Alternative Transitional Arrangements and (3) Mineral Resources.
The fifth consultation focused first on military and security issues, and secondly on internally displaced people and refugees. Under the military and security heading papers were presented by senior military personnel from both sides of the conflict, together with international military and security experts, exploring the immediate cease-fire and disengagement, and longer term issues such as de-mining, disarmament and social reintegration of former combatants. Under the second theme, there was the opportunity to explore the scale of the problem, especially around Khartoum, and strategies for the resettlement and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees. Special attention was paid to the needs of women and children, as well as the role of the civil society and national and international Non-Governmental Organisations.
In its recommendations this consultation has focused on the development of a new phase to under-gird the implementation of the anticipated peace agreement emerging from the IGAD process. The new programme of formal meetings will be held under the name of “The Inter- Sudanese Consultation on Peace and Justice,” (ISCOP). The objectives, methodology and issues of the new programme were explored and agreed unanimously. We look forward to moving into this second phase of reconstruction with a renewed sense of hope that we can contribute to a peaceful, prosperous and just society which is built on the foundations of the consensus reached at past and forthcoming consultations.
Professor Washington Okumu Presiding Chairman Sudan Peace-Building Programme London and Nairobi July 2002
II. List of Participants to the Fifth Consultation
I. Chairmen
1. Professor Washington A. J. Okumu, Presiding Chairman, Vice- Chairman of ARI, Commissioner for Peace and Governance and Executive Director for Eastern and Central Africa 2. Viscount Brentford, Co-Chairman, RFI Chairman
II. Sudanese Participants
A. Sudan 1. Professor Yusuf Fadl Hassan 2. Ms Amira Yousif Adam Haroun 3. Professor Farouk Mohammed Kadouda 4. Mr Elzahawi Ibrahim Malik 5. Dr Sayed el-Khateeb 6. General Yousif Ahmed Yousif 7. Mr Reafee Sbu Jmoona 8. Dr Mohammed Elmukhtar Hassan Hussein 9. Professor Hassan Makki Mohammed Ahmed 10. Mr Rabia Hassan Ahmed 11. Ambassador Mathiang Malual Mabur 12. Dr Priscilla Joseph Koug 13. Commander Kon Majak Kon 14. Mr Abdeldaem Mohamedian Ali Zomrawi 15. Mulana Abel Alier 16. Mr Osman Khalid Mudawi
B. Kenya 17. Dr Peter Nyot Kok 18. Mr Telar Deng 19. Dr Justin Yaac Arop 20. Ms Rebecca J. Okwaci 21. Mr John Luk Jok
C. Germany 22. Dr Costello Garang
D. UK 23. Mrs Khadija Hussein Dafaala 24. General Mkungu Joseph Lagu 25. Mr Aldo Ajou Deng 26. Mr Suleiman Musa Rahhal 27. Mr Ahmed Draige 28. Mr Kamal Abdalla Tahir
E. Norway 29. Dr Sharif Harir
III. Paper Presenters
F. Sudan 1. Ret Gen Elsir Mohammed Ahmed 2. Dr Sharaf El Din Ibrahim Bannaga 3. Dr Priscilla Joseph Koug 4. Dr Sulafeldin Salih Mohamed
G. Kenya 5. Mr Elijah Malok Aleng 6. Commander Majak D’Agoot 7. Dr Ahmed Abdel Rahman Saeed 8. Dr Peter Nyot Kok
H. USA 9. Professor Francis Mading Deng
I. UK 10. Col. Philip Wilkinson 11. Mrs Khadija Hussein Dafaala 12. General Mkungu Joseph Lagu
J. Italy 13. Ambassador Maj. Gen. Andrew Makur Thou
IV. International Discussants
1. Mr Florian Fichtl, World Bank 2. Mr Marv Koop, UNDP 3. Mr Owen Green, Bradford University
V. International Participants
A. UK 1. Ms Rachel Sisk, Sudan Unit, Department for International Development and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK 2. Ms Jo Graham, Sudan Unit, Department for International Development and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK 3. Dr Alastair McPhail, Sudan Unit, Department for International Development and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK
VI. International Facilitators
1. Dr Michael Schluter, RFI Research Director 2. Mrs Grace Oloo, Gender and Women’s Officer, ARI 3. Dr Edward A. Christow, Executive Secretary and Research Manager, RFI 4. Dr Jeremy Ive, RFI Policy Advisor 5. Stephen J. Stordy, RFI Finance and Development Manager 6. Miss Sophie Bishop, Conference Administrator
VII. Apologies
1. Dr Kamal Obeid 2. Dr Al Shafea Ahmed Mohammed 3. Mr Ali el Safi 4. Dr Taiser Ahmed Ali 5. Professor Ibrahim Hassan Abdel Galil 6. Mr Mohammad Elamin Khalifa 7. Mr Wani Igga 8. Commander Simon Kun Pouch 9. Dr Mahboob Abdel Salam 10. Mr Salah Mohammed Ahmed Elameer 11. Dr Abdel Rahman Ibrahim El Khalifa 12. Mr Praveen Pardeshi, UNDP 13. Mr Mark Cutts, UNHCR 14. Mr Wayne Neill, Department of State, US 15. Mr Jim Dunlap, Department of State, US 16. Mr Alan Goulty, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK 17. Mr Kjell Hodnebo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway 18. Ambassador Josef Bucher, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland
III. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FIFTH CONSULTATION OF THE ARI/RFI SUDAN PEACE-BUILDING PROGRAMME
Preamble
We the participants attending an informal consultation, organised by the African Renaissance Institute (ARI) and Relationships Foundation International (RFI), drawn from many political constituencies in Sudan, hereby welcome the signing of the Machakos Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). We seek to further the ideal, which has been expressed at Machakos, and pledge ourselves to work together for a just, soundly-based, comprehensive and fully inclusive peace settlement in our country.
The Future Programme
We wish to continue our series of inclusive consultations which have the objectives of deepening our understanding and commitment to a shared vision for the future of our country and building up the necessary trust for the framing and implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement. We believe that the process developed by ARI/RFI, based on research papers prepared by Sudanese and international experts and discussed in a manner which allows full and free expression of views is creating consensus among us and providing the foundations on which we can build a peaceful, prosperous and just society.
It is our intention and determination to continue to support the IGAD process through the Inter-Sudanese Consultation on Peace and Justice (ISCOP) discussions. We shall do this in two ways: · firstly, by feeding the research and the results of our discussions directly to the IGAD parties, to the IGAD Secretariat, and to the Troika and Italian governments; · secondly, by building the background trust, reflection and practical action necessary to further the wider acceptance of the formal negotiation process.
The list of topics which we would like to consider at future meetings of ISCOP includes the following:
1. Preparation of the institutional framework and specific programmes and projects for the pre-interim and interim periods.
2. The organisation of public services (health, education, agricultural and veterinary services and law enforcement agencies) at national and regional levels.
3. The national and regional organisation of economic and monetary policy, including guarantees of the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital.
4. Promotion and protection of a culture of peace.
5. A shared recovery framework to enhance the contribution and benefits for Sudan from the international lending institutions and donor community.
6. Implementation of the Five Rs: Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Relief, Resettlement and Reconstruction.
Given the rapid progress already achieved at the IGAD talks, and the anticipation of a peace agreement and cease-fire, we wish to begin the ISCOP meetings as soon as possible so as to achieve maximum acceptance and sustainability of the peace process.
In addition, we wish urgently to appeal to all the parties to the conflict to agree to place their forces on defensive positions on all fronts and to facilitate unimpeded humanitarian access while the GOS and SPLM/A continue to negotiate.
IV. LIST OF ISSUES CONSIDERED AND ENSUING DISCUSSION
Paper 1 Re-establishing Security: Defining the Grounds for Cease-Fire and Disengagement by Gen. (Retired) Elsir Mohammed Ahmed
Executive Summary
After almost nineteen years of hostilities neither the government of Sudan nor the SPLM are any closer to achieving their stated objectives through the use of force. They come to this conclusion that there is no total victory in this war. Both sides have begun to examine the possibilities of a negotiated agreement, partly as a result of the military deteriorating situation, and the high cost of the conflict in terms of lives and money, and partly because there is now, more than any time else, a great concern from the heavy weight international community to get a final and fair solution for the conflict. Peace is a process and not a “one shot” solution, for any peace to be successful it is necessary to lay down a solid frame upon which peace can be built. Prior to the peace agreement certain military arrangements should be taken, this include: total stand down of military activities, cease-fire, disengagement of both sides’ troops, redeployment of both sides’ troops, mining activities, and demobilization. Disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating of ex-combatants are key process for achieving security. Demining is also a critical component of reestablishing security and development activities. A recovery and reconstruction program should be drawn from local perspective and donor also. The program should be built on the recent damage assessments and humanitarian activities. The challenge of such challenging and ambitious program stems from its very nature, while the opportunities are seen in the potential of the people and the future of the Sudan. Bearing in mind lessons from the past peace agreement which had been concluded in 1972 to end the conflict in Sudan, and other international experiences, several security issues have usually to be addressed after reaching a peace agreement. The theory and practice of verification suggests that the stability of any security agreement depends on how it is verified. We examine some available verification options in this paper. The Sudan Peace Building Programme
Re-Establishing security: defining the grounds for cease – fire and disengagement including De – mining activities
Purpose of the paper Over all goal Purpose of the Paper
How can security be The grounds for cease - fire Peace Agreement reestablished The grounds for Disengagement The grounds for Demobilizing A reconstruction and Redeployment Disarming Recovery Program Reintegration The grounds for de-mining
Building Government institutions and policies
Rehabilitating community services and repairing infrastructure
Restoring and upgrading social services
Social protection Challenges & Opportunities
The international experience Should the government of Sudan and SPLM succeed in reaching a peace agreement, their ability to implement will depend above all on political will of their respective leadership and on the will of the international community to share.
INTRODUCTION
Background
For over nineteen years the Sudan Government army and the SPLA have confronted each other in a severe and destructive civil war. The conflict has reached hundred of thousands of causalities from both sides. The population in the southern part of the Sudan has been tremendously affected by fighting n all aspects of their lives, from displacement to famine to breakout of diseases.
Ever since the first break out the war in 1983 endless negotiations have held to contain and resolve the conflict. International and regional organizations have put a great effort to bring an end to this conflict without any positive ends. Humanitarian operations have also been underway, however this cannot bring a final solution to the core cause of the conflict.
Now it has become clear that both fighting parties are showing great concern about the crisis after reaching the same conclusion that there is no total victory in this war. At the same time the international community is putting serious effort into solving the problem in the Sudan, and is putting to use heavy weight conflict solving resources and skills to reach a peaceful end for this conflict. The background for the war in the Sudan stems from the military; therefore to manage this conflict effectively it is advisable to begin with the military aspects and measures, without neglecting the lessons drawn from the previous peace agreements.
To face this conflict more effectively, and for more practical solution to this war, I believe it is more useful to think about a good process for handling the question of building peace in the Sudan. A process to handle all dimensions of the conflict at the same time. The most vital dimensions are the military and security dimensions. Simply because they are the platform from which all other dimensions take off.
In a rapidly changing international environment, a solution that seemed adequate in the 1972 and 1980s, or last month may be out of date this week. Therefore we should take a more proactive position in dealing with conflicts like the Sudan conflict. As we review the conflict in the Sudan we can see that both warring parities show more concern for having peaceful solution. At the same time it is evident that the international community is also showing great concern to reach a fair and lasting solution for the conflict. By pacing the southern Sudan region in its context, this paper aims at examining the necessary military and security arrangements for a long-term peace in the Sudan. The approach will be in two parts: part one will examine the grounds for a cease-fire and disengagement and de-mining, in addition to evaluating the dynamics of reestablishing security.
Part two will evaluate the international experiences with the conflict in the Sudan. Finally I will also look at the challenges and opportunities facing the two parties concerning the issues discussed in part one.
Area Description
The southern region is that area south of altitude ten north of the Equator and extends up north to part of Lake Albert. It is almost one quarter of the area of the country. It can be describes as follows:
Ø Volcanic and clay land with vast open land flooded in the rainy season. Ø Most of the area is covered with long grass and trees, which makes visibility difficult from air and land. Ø Many valleys and plain which impossible during the rainy season. Ø Rainy season continue from beginning of March to end of October. Ø Little or no infrastructure. Ø Most of the bridges are broken and roads are washed out. Ø Mined areas and lots of unexpected objects (UXO). Ø Regular air flights to Juba, Wau and Malakal. Ø Nile is passable from Kosti down to Juba. Ø Railways are partly passable from Babanusa to Wau. Part I
MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS
Stand Down From Military Operations
When we speak of a potential settlement for the conflict in the Sudan, we must think of a process rather than a one shot solution. The starting point of this process is to call for a complete stand down from military operations between the two warring parties, in other words to deescalate hostilities to a zero level. This should take the following shape. Ø A cease-fire accord. Ø An understanding to disengage military forces. Ø A redeployment to secure demilitarized areas. Ø A de-mining agreement. Ø Demilitarized area. The Cease - Fire Accord:
The objective of this accord will be to minimize the areas of disagreement and bringing the military operation to an end. This will include several conflict management mechanisms. Other measures will include restriction of any quantity enhancement of weaponry, refining any aggressive behavior such as offensives to occupy new territories or to dislodge vital troops. Further more prohibiting both parties of the conflict form building fortifications for existing territories.
This phase would require confidence-building initiatives such as enhancing communication between the two parties, regular meeting between area commanders to prevent increasing tensions, and close monitoring and observation of the cease-fire
The principles of the cease-fire agreement will be as follows:
Ø The cease-fire shall involve the cessation of hostilities between the Parties in the South immediately. Ø The cease-fire shall guarantee the free movement of civilians and goods, including humanitarian assistance, throughout Southern Sudan. Ø Specifically, this cease-fire entails the cessation of: a. Hostilities movements including reconnaissance and reinforcements, as well as hostile actions; b. All attacks by air or land, as well as all acts of sabotage and the laying of mines; c. Attempts to occupy new ground positions and movements of troops and resources from one location to another than the supply of food, clothing and medical support for military forces in the field; d. All acts of violence against or other abuse of civilian population, e.g., summary executions, torture, harassment, arbitrary detention and persecution of civilians on the basis of ethnic origin, religion, or political affiliation, incitement of ethnic hatred, arming civilians, use of child soldiers, sexual violence, training of terrorists, genocide and bombing of the civilian population; e. Supply of ammunition and weaponry and other war-related stores to the field; f. All hostilities propaganda between the Parties, including defamatory, untruthful, or derogatory statements, both within and outside the country. Ø The parties shall exercise control over all groups other than their own forces within their respective zones of control. They shall also promote the culture of peace and respect for civil and political rights and freedoms in those zones. Ø The parties shall communicate the cessation of hostilities through their respective command channels as well as to the civilian population by means of the print and electronic media. Ø The cessation of hostilities shall be regulated and monitored through the Joint Military Commission. Disengagement of the Forces:
The military disengagement between the two groups will entail several measures as a follow up to the cease-fire accord a continuation of de-escalation of hostilities, confidence building and exchange of information in addition to visits by the commanders to combat areas.
This phase will however move from the conflict management to conflict resolution since it will demonstrate the willingness of the two parties to find more comprehensive solution to their differences. It is also a link between the cease-fire and the redeployment phase.
Redeployment:
All troops from both parties shall move from their combat positions to defensive positions. The relocating of troops, to minimize the chance of conflict, implies gradual reduction of forces in the front lines positions and smooth dismantlement of forward pickets and observation posts. Forces would be then redeployed and repositioned in agreed upon areas. Other measures could include a limitation over flights; artillery batteries at various positions could remain in position.
The agreement on military disengagement could cover gradual downgrading of weapons. Military observers and joint patrols could be practiced to monitor the agreement and to verify agreed levels of military disengagement including the redeployment of troops to designate positions and the downgrading of weapons. Redeployment means: Ø The mutual withdrawal of troops from key passes to new positions. Ø The creation of “zone of complete disengagement” as a result of troops disengagement and redeployment. The delineation of this area of “Peace and Tranquility” would be “without prejudice” to the known position of either side. The agreement also reportedly includes pledges by both sides to refrain from reoccupying vacated positions. No new positions would-be allowed within the designated zone. Time schedules for disengagement and redeployment were to be worked out to the “Mutual satisfaction” of both sides, followed by the information of a joint commission that would be responsible for “delineation of Line Control. Until the area was formally delineated, monitoring mechanisms would be devised to prevent the occurrence of violations. Reportedly, either side could resort to “any means,” including the use of force, in the event of violation of these commitments.
DEMINING ACTIVITIES
Through weapons of war, landmines constitute a threat long after armed conflict has ended. The great majority of landmine victims are innocent civilians in pursuit of their livelihoods. The unpredictable security threat posed by mines is a major obstacle to resumption of normal life and economic, social and political development. In addition to mines, unexploded bombs or ammunition and discarded weapons pose an environmental and physical hazard. Besides the need for immediate care and physical rehabilitation for mine causalities, two critical longer-term challenges face governments and assistance agencies: landmine removal, and prevention of civilian causalities from landmines.
Landmines surveillance and surveys
The primary need in planning for landmine removal is to establish the extent of the problem. Detailed surveys are necessary to establish the location of minefields and mined roads and to determine priorities for mine clearance operations. These Mozambique and Angola was that an effective prioritization system did not exist and thus activities were not always focused on helping those who were most victimized by the mines. Better prioritization systems need to be developed to target the poor, and support the coping capacities of communities. Training of de-mining personnel The cost of producing a mine is US $3 – 20 whereas the cost of removing it ranges from $300- 1,000. While the use of expert personnel from private demining companies or NGOs may increase the cost of training, they have generally proven to be efficient as long as national counterparts are available and given maximum on-the-job training. Demining is primarily the responsibility of national agencies and personnel; trainees can often be recruited from military, or de-mining jobs can be created for demobilized soldiers. Trained de-miners may adopt a “toolbox” approach, choosing from a variety of suitable techniques. In general, however, demining is restricted to manual techniques that are slow and labour intensive. Faster methods used in military operations have not been adapted for civilian use Demining progress is best measured by the number of hectares cleared of landmines rather than the number of mines removed.
THE ROLE OF A THIRD PARTY – JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION
At this point of implementing the cease-fire and after military arrangement a third party role is needed. The specific role of the joint military commission shall include: Ø Determining the position of the two parties. Ø Monitoring the cease-fire between the two parties. Ø Monitoring redeployment of troops on both sides to their new positions. Ø Supervising the mapping and removal of mines. Ø Coordinating all military movements in the region. Ø Facilitating liaisons between the two sides in the region. Ø Putting into practice a dispute resolution mechanism. Ø Confidence building between the two parties. Ø Organization of the joint Military Commission.
The joint military commission shall be composed of three representatives from each party and a neutral chairman with two vice-chairman, the size of the commission should be drown according to the size of the operation areas of the region. International Monitoring Unit
An international monitoring unit shall be established to assist the parties to implement the agreement and maintaining the cease-fire. It shall work in collaboration with the joint military commission.
Mandate of International Monitoring Unit
Ø To observe and monitor the cession of hostilities. Ø To monitor disengagement of forces and redeployment. Ø To conduct liaison with humanitarian organizations. Organization of International Monitoring Unit
It shall consist of military and civilian personnel and the size of it should be according to the size of the area of operation in the region.
REESTABLISHING SECURITY
Demobilization, Disarming, and Reintegration:
Achieving peace and security is one thing and maintaining it is another. Building security means establishing a solid frame to strengthen and support peace process, with the primary aim being securing the situation from drifting back to conflict. Hence the question that rises is “What is meant by security?”
Security has different meaning depending on the context where it is used. However Broadly speaking we can define security as the freedom to live, work, travel without fear of direct or indirect threat. Based on this definition there are several issues that rise concerning security in post war times.
Death, displacement and disinvestment are inescapable results of security, in turn negatively affecting transaction costs and labour mobility and, hence, economic production. The (re)establishment of security is , thus , one of the critical tasks in the transition phase (Nat colleta et al. “Towards an architecture for sustainable peace and development” 1998)
Disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants are key interventions for achieving security. Removal of land mines is also an essential component of reestablishing normal development activities and undertaking productive investment, as is the conversion of military assets to productive assets. As with all aspects of post-conflict former adversaries and the degree of collaboration among donors, government and target groups. Planning for a demobilization and reintegration program (DRP) must begin early in the peace process negotiation process. Demobilization and reintegration programs are likely to be conditions of peace agreements. Since these agreements are essentially political compromises, however, they may set unrealistic timetables for subsequent activities, and may not even discuss program design or implementation issues. This may result in a lack of understanding about the resources and planning needed for an effective program. An incomplete, delayed, or poorly executed DRP threatens the peace process itself and can determine the success or failure of political negotiations, the program implementation, and the degree of donor support. Although the program cannot begin until the political situation is conducive to its implementation, greater dialogue regarding the program during the peace negotiation may have allow lead-time to secure the resources needed to avoid damaging delays. All relevant agencies should begin program planning as soon as possible. This may help avoid recalcitrance by combatants who base their compliance from disarmament on the unfolding conditions of the program. Once agreements are reached, implementation must follow rapidly to reduce the risk of relapse into conflict. The program must be viewed within the entire context of national post-conflict reconstruction, including the process of institutional and military restructuring, and with a view toward the needs of other segments of the population, particularly displaced persons and other vulnerable groups.
The end of civil war does not automatically lead to the end of insecurity. Indeed, the fear of personal violence and theft may increase in the aftermath of a war. Demobilization is sometimes accompanied by a rise in criminality. But a well-planned demobilization program that provides compensation to the demobilized soldiers can help prevent insecurity. The release of unprepared and often armed soldiers can lead to a significant increase in crime, rural banditry, and circulation of weapons in these countries.
The fear that the state may be overthrown also persists during the transition. There often is a continuing risk that war will be resumed. Governments can reduce military expenditure in the aftermath of civil war, but to prevent an increase in the personal or state level insecurity may need to make offsetting increases in the expenditure in the form of compensation to the losers.
The process of demobilization and reintegration of combatants may have some drawbacks that may constitute serious risks to the security of the state and individual. One of the main concerns is the number of weapons that need to be collected and registered so as to prepare them to reenter the society and find new jobs. The time frame of the security program needs to be carefully monitored. The longer the timeframe for disarming the thinner the chances for its success. Crime rates might increase if light weapons remain with individuals or groups who might choose to settle differences violently. Combatants will be less willing to hand in their weapons if they have no incentive or see real prospects for peace. Post conflict demobilization is a complex and sensitive logistical exercise and usually conducted in a rather short period of time. The reintegration phase is a long-term process. The large stock of weapons may be also be stolen or exported to other conflicts therefore tight control of armories is critical.
THE JOINT STRATEGIC RECONSTRUCTION AND RECOVERY PROGRAM:
The impact of the conflict on the south significant, thousands of refugees, displaced, development schemes collapsed, and agricultural activities stopped. Social and economic infrastructures are badly damaged. An outline frame for emergency assistance for the south should start immediately after a peace settlement is reached. A five-year recovery program should be drawn from the local perspectives and the donors. It should be built on recently completed damage assessment and humanitarian activities. The program should focus primarily on the following issues: Ø Building government institutions and policies, strengthening existing institutions and setting new ones. Developing policies for economic management is an urgent task. Ø Rehabilitation of community services and repairing infrastructures such as housing, telecommunication, power and water supplies. Ø Structure and upgrading social services in terms of health and education programs. Ø Boosting economic activities. Part II
THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
Grounds for a Cease - Fire and Disengagement: Addis Ababa peace agreement:
An international experience in solving the Sudanese conflict has been adopted since early 1971. At that time meetings were held with success between the government of Sudan and the southern Sudan liberation movement (SPLM). In the early 1972 all documents containing the agreement were ready including the constitutional arrangements, the southern provinces self- governance agreement, the cease fire agreement, the protocol for the agreement, the protocol for repatriation, relief and settlement among other documents.
The main concern following the agreement was how to implement it. Some problems were faced during the first of the agreement such as lack of infrastructure. Shortage of trained manpower and other problems like resource limitation. The international community offered considerable assistance due to the world economic realities of the 1970s. Some other problems were like military arrangements. The implementation of the agreement was both expensive and extensive. All lessons drawn from the agreement should cater for the building of peace in the Sudan.
The IGAD Initiative:
IGAD as a regional body backed and supported by the international community has an extensive experience with the Sudanese conflict. Our perspective is that we accept the principles of IGAD initiative but the question that rises is weather this initiative will solve the conflict or not. In other words the IGAD initiative is a means to an end not an end in itself.
The last ten years the IGAD initiative has developed from a mediator to a forum with Western support i.e. the friends of IGAD and lastly to a total IGAD. In my opinion, we are committed IGAD as an international body however, the capacity of IGAD to solve the conflict is questionable.
More recently a cease-fire agreement between the government of Sudan and the Sudanese People Liberation Movement (SPLM) has been reached in the Nuba Mountains area.
Last January the government of Sudan and the SPLM agreed to a written proposal under Swiss chairmanship, with Swiss and American facilitators. International monitors and a joint military commission combining Sudanese parties and the international observers have been establishing the cease-fire. The cease-fire continues to hold on ground, freedom of access between the government of Sudan and SPLM controlled areas has also developed. Five to six monitored sectors have been established, so far the joint committee has begun satisfactorily.
International Experiences and Reestablishing Security:
As mentioned in part I of the paper, reestablishing security has several dimensions: Ø Political Ø Social / Cultural Ø Economic Ø Humanitarian It is a fact of life that achieving peace is one thing and maintaining it is another thing. The challenge of maintaining security in my opinion is greater than reaching an agreement.
Indeed the international experience in reestablishing security in war torn areas of the world is beyond doubt. The objective is always to establish an environment that prevents a drift back to war. Infrastructure building and institutional capacity building are critical.
As far as the Sudan is concerned we are still in the stage of reaching a fair and lasting peace. The international experience in establishing security is rather moderate due to the lack of trust and confidence. UN agencies and NGOs are working hard in the humanitarian and relief operations.
There is still room for extensive international peace and security building efforts. Presently the JMM/ JMC is a framework that if successful can be implemented in other parts of Sudan.
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
The challenges and opportunities for such a comprehensive and ambitious program stem from its very nature. However with the proper analysis, commitment and determination the goals and objectives can be achieved.
The main challenges would be changing the mindset of the people involved in this conflict. A mindset that has been shaped over years cannot be changed overnight. More specifically and operationally the following changes will be of considerable hindrances: Ø Poor infrastructure to facilitate for the mission of the peace program. Ø Lack of training for the Sudanese parties. Ø Lack of confidence between the Sudanese groups. Ø Lack of up to date maps of the areas of operation. Ø Securing sufficient financial resources. Ø The Integration of forces.
As far as the opportunities for the program are concerned the future and the potential of people the Sudan constitute the greatest opportunity to be gained: Ø The good will of the warring parties to reach an end to the fighting Ø The good will of the international community to build peace in Sudan. Ø The growing good relation between Sudan and its neighbors. Ø Sudan being the largest country in Africa sharing boarders with eight countries Sudan has the potential of playing a central and strategic role in the region. Ø The return of the Sudanese human resources abroad.
Verification Measures
The most significant lessons learned from he 1972 agreement and the Khartoum peace agreement is that the mechanism of implementation and the verification measures were poorly adopted which lead to the collapse of the two agreements. To avoid these mistakes a methodology of verification must be carefully adopted.
The phase “Trust but verify” has to been implicit to all arms control agreements since it entered the international security lexicon during the Reagan-Gorbachev years. The theory and practice of verification since the mid- 1980s suggests that the stability of a bilateral, regional, or international security agreements depends on how it is verified. This section examines available verification options for ensuring the stability of the future peace agreement on Sudan. Three conceptual mechanisms of verification are discussed. First, alternative levels at which verification can be accomplished are classified and their associated attributes discussed. Then, alternative measures by which verification might be sought at the various levels are identified. Finally, implications of alternatives verification options for agreement stability are analyzed.
At least four levels of verification can be conceptualized in the context of Southern Sudan. These include the use of national means as well as three levels of bilateral cooperation: minimal, moderate, and extensive. If verification is done by national means, would not require building domestic support in either country. At a bilateral minimal level of verification, date unilaterally obtained by GOS or SPLA might be occasionally shared with the other, either to substantiate an allegation of noncompliance, or to reassure the adversary about one’s own compliance. This level of verification may also involve limited cooperation in the collection of data without extensive sharing of information. Refraining from camouflaging military equipment would be an example of this type of limited cooperation. However, neither GOS nor SPLM would have much reason the data provided by the other, and verification would depend primarily on national means. Thus, bilateral minimal verification would involve low levels of permitted intrusiveness, cooperation, and data sharing, and would result in relatively low mutual compliance assurance. The confidence building potential of this level of verification also would be relatively low, but because of its virtually non-intrusive nature, it would be relatively, but because of its virtually non-intrusive nature, it would require minimal domestic support in either GOS or SPLM. A bilateral moderate level of verification would involve moderate cooperation between GOS and SPLM in sharing data obtained through the use o similar if not identical verification measures. This type of verification would require higher levels of permitted intrusiveness, cooperation, date sharing and compliance assurance, and would offer higher confidence building potential in return. However, the intrusive nature of bilateral moderate verification may cause public opposition. Thus, the success of the respective governments in building up the required domestic support would be an important factor in considering this level of verification. Finally, comprehensive cooperation in obtaining and sharing data is the hallmark of he bilateral extensive level of verification. This level would involve employing similar verification measures by both GOS and SPLM, and it would also require extremely high levels of permitted intrusiveness, cooperation, and data sharing. Indeed both states would expect receive the same kind of data provided on an equal basis from virtually identical sensors. Thus, bilateral extensive verification would be characterized by high mutual compliance assurance and would become more important in the decision of both governments to agree to this highly intrusive level of verification. Public support for bilateral extensive verification would likely occur only if the agreement on the dispute itself. In addition, cooperative verification, no matter how extensive, does not replace the need for information from national means.
It is important not to assume that a verification must be intrusive to be effective, or conversely that a verification method that is intrusive is necessarily effective.
Verification measures should be associated with verification levels at which they can be most appropriately utilized. In the context of the Southern Sudan conflict, GOS and SPLM would have to weigh the costs of intrusiveness of each type of verification measures against the benefits of compliance assurance in order to identify and select an appropriate package of verification measures to be applied at the agreed verification level.
The ability of the people of Sudan-North and South – to reach a durable, fair, and comprehensive peace agreement, and to end the conflict forever will be greatly enhanced by an understanding of the complex interrelationship between potential negotiated terms and adequate knowledge of verification methodologies. References:
Abel Alier, Southern Sudan. Ithaca Press, 1992. Reading
The Nuba Mountains Cease-Fire agreement. January 2002.
Reestablishing Security:The transition from wars to peace. World Bank Report
Paper 2 Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration of Combatants in the Transition Period: the Case of Sudan by Commander Majak D’ Agoot
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Since its creation, the Sudanese State has been inherently unstable and engulfed in internecine conflicts that are mostly indigenous in origin. Due to its exclusive, repressive, unjust, and inflexible policies, some significant constituencies among its people have organized various forms of violent guerrilla campaigns against the central authority. The factors that precipitated these resistive actions have had special catastrophic impact in the south of the country. Moreover, the revolts in the Sudan have always originated in the South. Put succinctly, the country has been involved in a protracted and destructive civil strife since independence in 1956 with only a brief lull brought about by the signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement.
Efforts to end the current round of fighting have been overly frustrating and illusive due to the degree of mistrust that exists between the north and the south as a result of dishonesty by the north in the past engagements. However, in the light of catalytic developments in the Sudanese peace arena in the aftermath of September 11th, there is an increased but cautious optimism that the Sudanese protagonists may arrive at a just settlement of the conflict allowing for interim arrangements. Although highly debatable, the end of this transition period may lead to an exercise of the right to self-determination by the southern Sudanese people in an internationally supervised referendum on two options: to continue a voluntary unity or to opt out for independence.
Evidence abounds that wars (interstate, civil or general wars) represent the primary roadblock to socioeconomic reconstruction of countries that are engaged in them because they divert massive human and material resources to the military sector. In the case of Sudan however, its strategic geographical location, expansive territory and porous borders, have allowed for ubiquitous increase in the use of small firearms in both the urban and rural areas. The definition of combatant is therefore less precise owing to mobilization of large segment of its population for military effort on one side or the other. Many militia and irregular armed bands have emerged and accountability or records of weapons distributed to them are often poor and nonexistent.
Meeting the complex short, medium, and long term challenge of DDR programme in the Sudan calls for expanded response by the warring parties, the regional groupings (IGAD and the
AU/OAU), the civil society and the international community. Generally, given a diverse range of spectra in which the DDR process may take place, the Sudanese context is defined, as the one in which there is no clear winner. That is, although the GOS, the SPLM, and the NDA have substantial power, each with fairly, well-organized military force, there is no one actor that can determine the outcome either through war or in peace negotiations. If the political agreement terminating hostilities is more ambiguous, the DDR process and the choice of who would stay in and leave the army takes on political significance since following the civil war power often stems from control over the armed forces.1
Thus, the success of the DDR process depends primarily on the political will of all the parties to the conflict to adhere to terms of the signed agreement. If a peace agreement does not create conditions for stability in the country, there will be no progress in the restructuring of the armed forces, the police, and security organs both in the north and the south in the transition period. Instead, the period following the cease-fire can constitute a limited repose allowing the warring parties to reorganize, rearm, and remobilize for the next phase of war. Indeed, some groups who do not perceive the peace process and the DDR programmes built into it as serving their goals may continue to maintain large secret caches of arms for use in the eventuality of resumption of hostilities.
The complexity of the Sudanese geopolitical landscape and delicacy of the current conflict environment makes it imperatively inevitable that the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration programme suitable for every constituency is separately organized. The universal disarmament effort covering armed civilians must take into account the political geography of each community and specific delicacies that are involved in every situation. For example, disarming the Toposa of Eastern Equatoria is inextricably intertwined to the degree of similar efforts taking place in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Carrying out similar efforts among the Dinka and Nuer of frontier regions (Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Upper Nile) should be linked to efforts undertaken by GOS to disarm the Baggara and Ruzeigat and vice versa. The case of the Gajak Nuer and Murle of Upper Nile can be approached separately given its own specific characteristics. Overall, the success of the DDR effort in the post conflict Sudan can be augmented by the goodwill and commitment of all the frontline states in the region.
1 See World Bank Discussion Paper-African Regional Paper Series (October 1993); written by Sarah Keener et al. Report No: IDP- 130 Page 60.
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms:
AU/OAU : The African Union/Organization of African Unity. Cdr. : Commander DDR : Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. DOPs : Declaration of Principles. GOS : Government of Sudan. HIV/AIDS : Human Immuno-deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. ICG : International Crisis Group IDPs : Internally Displaced Peoples. IGAD : Inter-Governmental Authority on Development. NDA : National Democratic Alliance. NIF : National Islamic Front. OLS : Operation Lifeline Sudan. PDF : Popular Defence Force. SPDF/A : Sudan People's Democratic Front/Army SPLM/A : Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army. SSLM : Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. UK : United Kingdom. UNICEF : United Nations Children's Fund. USA : United States of America. WCC : World Council of Churches.
"Weapons are tools of bad omen; no country has ever benefited from a protracted war!" Sun Tzu.
1. THEMES AND STRUCTURE:
This paper takes its key thread of analysis (Terms of Reference) from the proposition that a just and durable peace settlement shall only be realized through a set of the IGAD-type, principal benchmarks-popularly known as "IGAD's Declaration of Principles-DOPs".2
In section (2) the paper will portray the workings and dynamics of "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration process" using a specific theoretical framework set for it and that presents it holistically as an effective socioeconomic continuum rather than just disjointed and mutually exclusive parts. In other words, the paper intends to treat the disarmament and demobilization as concurrent activities while examining rehabilitation and social reintegration of combatants as one theme but observing the artificial dichotomy that separates between them.
In understanding the nature and complexity of the Sudanese civil wars it is useful to distinguish between their initiation, intensity, scale, and conclusion because it is arguably more important to marshal events in a historical perspective in order to establish the facts out of such study. In view of this, a brief historical overview of the Sudanese conflict shall be presented. These will constitute section (3) of the paper.
In order to carefully dissect this study into main themes we will begin by succinctly reviewing the past and present quests for peace. In this regard, successes and failures of the 1972-Addis Ababa Agreement will be evaluated as a thematic issue. The paper will further explore how to elicit lessons from that experience and that of other countries in the region that have just emerged from protracted wars and how these can be adapted to current Sudanese political- military environment. While holding a holistic view of the problem under consideration, special emphasis shall be given to what role can each of the main protagonists in the Sudanese conflict (GOS, SPLM/A, NDA) play in the process of downsizing their respective military forces in the
2 The Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) is an East African grouping concerned with development in the region. It has been mediating peace in the Sudan since 1994 and managed to commit the parties to the conflict to a set of objectives called "Declaration of Principles-DOPs" as a basis for negotiations. The issues summarized under the DOPs include a) Declaration that the history and nature of conflict in the country cannot be resolved through war. A lasting peace and stability rest upon Parties commitments to pursue peaceful settlement. b) Declaration that the right of people of southern Sudan to exercise self-determination in an internationally supervised referendum leading either to voluntary unity or independence must be affirmed. All parties to the conflict and major Sudanese political groups have committed themselves to right of the south to self-determination leading to voluntary unity or independence. It is also enshrined in the NIF's constitution following the signing of failed agreement in Khartoum in 1997 between it and a group of southern factions. c) Demanding the parties to the conflict to give unity a chance under specific set of conditions. d) Demanding that the parties agree on an "Interim Arrangements." And finally, f) it requires the parties to agree on cease-fire.
transition period. These are the themes that shall be considered under section (4). Section (5) concludes this study by examining regional and international linkages in terms of international donor support and its impact, management, as well as devising necessary monitoring and control mechanisms that satisfy the partners. Spatial spillover effects and complex challenges regarding regional peace and security in terms of illicit arms trade and smuggling will also be explored.
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:
2.1.Outline:
Demilitarization has often been an essential and contentious policy issue in the postwar socioeconomic rehabilitation and planning as well as in the transition towards democratic governance. Although fairly applicable in nature to countries emerging from civil strife, countries at peace also explore ways to shift human and material resources to non-military sectors of the economy for political and/or fiscal reasons. Such a transition can be dangerously interlaced and rife with misperceptions and manipulations particularly when a situation involves former foes. Though many developing countries that have been drawn into and wrecked by internecine and protracted civil conflicts have spent huge financial resources on war, military expenditure has often been a waste of resources that could have been put to other alternative, productive uses for sustainable development. This goal is partly achieved through the Demobilization, Disarmament, Rehabilitation, and Social Reintegration (DDR) Programme. This set of constituent but closely related activities that are encapsulated in the DDR programme, represents in practice different phases of an independent continuum with programmes often implemented simultaneously instead of sequentially given the large scale and timing of demobilization.3 For more elucidation, let us briefly consider these phases.
2.2 Demobilization:
This is generally perceived as a process of downsizing military forces and free reserve- manpower and skills for more productive activities (although this depends basically on the type of army being demobilized). Demobilization has its immediate and obvious costs and benefits such as the demobilization package that is often in the form of money given to combatants to restart a new life. While the number of soldiers on the payroll (or that will be on the payroll) is being trimmed, some costs may still be shifted elsewhere to support demobilized soldiers of vulnerable category (old, disabled, child, and female soldiers).
3 See World Bank Discussion Papers-African Regional Series, Report No. IDP-130 released in October 1993.
Encampments or demobilization assembly points, which is the first phase of actual demobilization, play an important role in the management and administration of the exercise including identification of the different groups of ex-combatants, and production of necessary documentation that help give the demobilized access to services. Thus, the end of demobilization process represents the discharge into a civilian life. By necessity, this should be preceded by intensive advisory and counseling programmes during the stay at encampment. The level of favorable response of the combatants to demobilization depends on effective elimination of information gaps (information asymmetries) about the existing reintegration programmes. That is, the more they are well informed that programmes such as training, employment promotion, credit schemes and so on maximize their individual welfare, the more ready and willing they will be to leave the encampment and to reap maximum advantage of services offered within the programme.4 Experience shows that encampment can be risky if resources provided to run the transit assembly points are inadequate. The duration of the demobilization phase is another crucial factor to its success. In the main, the shorter the demobilization phase, the higher are the chances for a smooth integration of combatants into civilian life. If the stay in the encampments is prolonged for whatever practical reasons, the time provided by these circumstances should be utilized in conducting basic training and orientation programmes that prepare combatants for their reintegration. Such programmes must, however, be linked with subsequent measures for reintegration (further education, vocational training, micro credit for self-employment etc). In the context of demobilization programme, such pre-departure orientation sessions with the demobilized combatants as well medical checks including HIV/AIDS prevention, details on the content of demobilization packages and how to start income-generating activities, family planning, environmental issues, and preparation of destination communities to receive them, are equally important. Meeting the complex short, and long-term challenges of demobilization, calls for an integrated, and prudent approach on the management of demobilization packages. It is generally recognized that the packages should be made available at the time of discharge in order to reduce the risk of discontent among the demobilized. However, different views exist on whether or not the package should be uniform for soldiers and officers or people depending on duration of service.
To some undefined extent, however, the main hurdle comes from the reluctance of the combatants to demobilize due to bonds of attachment and symbiotic relationships that build up between them and their military organizations. In other words, having been part of that
4 This emphasis relates to the one made in the "Draft Working Paper" by Ashraf El Nour of the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery of UNDP/Islamabad. The paper was released in November 2001 and dealt widely with demobilization of Combatants and Generating Livelihoods/Employment for Returning Refugees and Displaced People in Afghanistan.
organization for so long combatants may see little perspective for themselves outside the organization structures; thus, making it difficult for them to cope with reintegration. On the other hand, it has been found out that a significant number of combatants after the cease-fire voluntarily demobilize or disband themselves and melt into the population, in most cases with or without their arms rather than through the official planned and managed processes. By and large, the creation of a general willingness among the population to help the former combatants to reintegrate into society is crucially important.5 Because of bitter memories dating back to years of war, there often exists a set of perceptions and attitudes about soldiers that must be straightened in order to create a better environment for reintegration. This implies that a series of meetings and workshops must be organized to sensitize soldiers and communities about the benefits of the exercise.
2.3 Disarmament:
This process, by definition, implies a controlled collection of small and light firearms including ammunition. The separation of the users from the weapons is the basic objective of this exercise and can take place at several levels, depending on the situation, quantities, type, and logistics. Put succinctly, disarmament is a key prerequisite for creating a secure environment following a protracted civil war. However, it is a complicated task affected by many dynamic variables (for example, the political environment, porous borders with countries affected by prolific illicit trade in arms, weak capacity of the police to professionally and evenly enforce the law, poor or/and dispersed control of guns by many factions.) More often than not, there are two principal approaches to disarmament: · Disarming of Combatants: which is a main prerequisite for demobilized combatants discharge and is carried out in-situ when arriving at the identified demobilization encampments. · Micro-disarmament: which deals with disarmament process in a post civil war situation in the case of militia, irregular forces, and other armed civilians which include the seizure of weapons' tactics ranging from normal collection (upon registration) to gun-by-back programmes, or food for weapons.6
The success and effectiveness of disarmament plan depends on how well-organized is the system of registration, identification and monitoring so that a possibility of some soldiers disappearing with their arms, possibly joining irregular militia and factions not immediately
5 This explanation expands on the conclusions made by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion in its series of papers on "Demobilization and Reintegration-Opportunities for Human Development" Seminar reports. 6 This categorization is clearly spelled out in the series of papers on "Demobilization and reintegration-Opportunities for Human Development" published by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion.
included in or not yet reached by the programme is averted. Ideally, the registration must make use of the enrolment lists or the like as in use in the regular armies whereas militia and other irregular armed factions will have to be registered upon their presentation. It is therefore incumbent upon a Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration Commission to set up clear and precise criteria on how to implement the programme. That is, it will elaborate, apply, and maintain a computer based registration system. It will also be necessary to issue some kind of identity cards for ex-combatants, which will serve as a means of access to, and control of services, payments, and in provision of items to beneficiaries. Depending on the operational suitability, the implementing entities and their partners will work out the most suitable registration system that can also be used as the main instrument for monitoring.
2.4 Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration:
Reintegration refers to the process of joining the civilian society and economy once government forces and/or opposition forces are either downsized or disbanded completely. In other words, this implies transferring combatants to civilian status upon release; and then providing training/rehabilitation programmes to enable them and their families to become productive civilians. Generally regarded as inseparably intertwined into one process, no one aspect of reintegration or rehabilitation can achieve a sustainable outcome alone without the other. Although conceptually the two aspects have certain degree of artificial dichotomy, they can still widely be used as interchangeable notions.
The success of this phase depends primarily on the extent to which the relevant information have been gathered and compiled on the socioeconomic profile of combatants, their individual plans, goals and expectations. This information is gathered at the time of encampment during which combatants are screened, registered, and considered for the benefits and incentives of demobilization. This data bank will always receive additional data deposits on the social and economic absorption capacity of the return destinations chosen by the combatants (regions, localities, towns, villages, etc). In this vein, steps will have to be considered to coordinate and harmonize efforts and strategies with the implementing entities and partners managing the return movements that are related to IDPs and returning refugees since there are clear analogies in the standard operating guidelines.
In the vast majority of survey outcomes and experiences, ex-combatants have been found suffering from highly traumatic impacts on their personality that "render them a potentially difficult lot to handle" (El Nour, 2001). Some of the major psychosocial personality deficiencies that may be prevalent among them include drug addiction, negative personality changes (emotional, cognitive, behavioral), and impacts of stigma from HIV/AIDS infections.
"These issues become manifest in lack of personal responsibility, aggression, mistrust and lack of empathy for vulnerable individuals and groups" (El Nour 2001).
Among other beneficiaries of the programme, include the mosaic of typical vulnerable groups such as physically and/or mentally handicapped and traumatized ex-combatants, war victims, as well as socially handicapped victims (widows and orphans of those combatants killed-in- action).
3. CIVIL CONFLICT IN THE SUDAN: AN OVERVIEW
3.1 Political Evolution:
Sudan is a cradle of great ancient and modern civilizations of Kush, Alwa, Meroe, Muggara, Funj, and Fur. Although indigenous African people of the Sudan have obvious links to this heritage, they clearly have no stakes in the contemporary postcolonial Sudanese State. It was coercively lumped together by the Ottoman conquests of early 19th Century and has been largely used as a tool of oppression against them. Like its Ottoman predecessors, the Anglo- Egyptian Condominium dovetailed and beat it into such a cumbersome shape through conquests and warfare. It was therefore prepared for independence in January 1956 after half a century of Condominium rule without correct appraisal of its internal dynamics.7 In other words, from the point of view of southern Sudanese and other marginalized Sudanese, there is barely little ground, if any at all, to be proud of such an entity or pay allegiance to it. This is because the destiny of the Sudanese postcolonial state was shaped by colonialists and the Arabicised northern populace who became heirs to it.
Prior to independence, the British in particular realized that their policy had failed because it had caused a great deal of socioeconomic disparities between the north and south. Furthermore, it took cognizance of all indelible historical after-effects and woes of continued Arab incursions into the south for slaves and ivory and the Mahdist-northern hegemony in the period preceding the re-conquest. These factors led them to reconsider steps of administering Sudan on the basis of two autonomous but distinct entities. The other regions of Southern Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains which are predominantly African and that had in the past acted as an interface between these immiscible, heterogeneous, contentious, and highly repelling parts of the Sudan were turned into alternative hunting grounds for slaves by the Arab slave-traders. Overall, these practices further compelled the British to rethink and overhaul their policy for the Sudan. In the
7 Northern Sudanese progressive intellectual hardly come to terms with why southern Sudanese have virtually lost confidence in a mightier nation that they once created, built and defended. Southerners on the other hand retort that the kind of that ancient nation that their ancestors paid allegiance to, though territorially and ethnically different from modern Sudan, did not marginalize nor excluded them. They were the rulers and so had all the stakes to defend it.
1920s, the Closed District Ordinance that put Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, and Southern Blue Nile under special separate administrative arrangements was formulated and put into effect. Albeit this offered a genuine hope in the south and other marginalized areas that they would become a separate entity of their own, the short period of gestation given the policy and quick retreat from it dashed their hopes permanently. That change of policy was done ostensibly due to British belief that the southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, and Ingessina Hills, were inextricably interwoven by geography and trade to the Middle Eastern and Arabicised Northern Sudan.8
3.2 First Civil War
At independence, the debate concerning two different nationalist visions about the future of Sudan of whether to be completely independent or united with Egypt became an exclusive preserve of the northern elite that could not be trespassed upon by the south. Consideration of the southern Sudanese question was shelved in the margins of political activity which as a result sparked off political protests in the south in July 1955 leading to the Torit armed mutiny by southern troops in August 1955. Yet, in November 1955 southern members of parliament endorsed the proclamation of independence with clear provisions on greater federal arrangements for the south. Because these calls were not heeded, southerners understandably stepped an armed resistance to northern domination and neocolonialism.
"In the 1958 elections, the Southern Federal Party won 40 of the 46 southern seats, on a platform that demanded that a federal system of government be established, that English and Christianity have equal status with Arabic and Islam, and that the south has its own military force" (Hannum 1990:311).9 In November 1958, General Ibrahim Abboud seized power in a first ever coup in the country that abolished democratic structures including the parliament and took a tough line against dissent in the south. In October 1964, the Junta Government was removed from power by massive popular uprising in the north. It is believed that these protests were against the government's scorch earth policy in the south. In March 1965, the new civilian interim government convened what has come to be known as Round Table Conference to discuss the north-south relationship and when the conference could not draw closer to
8 Alier's recent paper on "Transitional Arrangements" to RFI-ARI's 4th consultation conference sets out historical facts on the Closed Districts Ordinance explaining the view that is prevalent in the south on true justifications of that policy. On the opposite side of the pole, northern scholars, politicians, and their apologists arguably counter this position by attributing the current plague of war to that policy for according to them it introduced divisions and the idea of parallel autonomous existence for the south as a distinct entity. Many southerners and other observers challenge that such line of thinking by retorting that it amounts to nothing but mere attempt score a weak debating point in the North-South long history of dishonesty, hypocrisy and mistrust. 9 See Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination-The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press) at 308-312.
agreement, a twelve men committee was appointed to make recommendations on key issues. Before the committee rendered its report, the crisis escalated in the south and the government reverted to violence.
Against this backdrop, the army staged another military coup in May 1969 that brought Marshal Nimeiri to power. The new military junta negotiated an end to the conflict with Anyanya guerrillas in Addis Ababa in March 1972 that would temporarily halt the bloodletting between the north and the south for the next eleven years.
3.3 Second Civil War:
The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1972 brought about a period of relative tranquility that lasted for a decade. However, in 1983 when the basic tenets and clauses that underpinned this Agreement were abrogated by the north with unmatched impunity, the second outbreak of war was rekindled with an added intensity, hatred, and ferocity. The mutiny, by units of 105th battalion in the southern town of Bor in May 1983, acted as a necessary precursory concussion to the formation of well-organized resistance movement. The Bor mutiny marked the birth of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Sudan People's liberation Army (SPLM/A). While the war has raged on for almost two decades now, it has been estimated that some two million people have died through war and concomitant circumstances. About three million more others have been internally displaced or taken refuge in the neighboring countries and overseas. Another unknown number of victims (combatants and non-combatants) have been physically maimed or sustained permanent disabilities due to war-related conditions.
Since its inception in 1983, the SPLM/A war effort has often acted as a catalyst for government changes in Khartoum. In 1985, barely two years into the war, the entrenched Nimeiri dictatorship was ousted by a combination of popular uprising, the war in the south, and opportunistic move by junta officers. Elections were held in the north and Sadiq al Mahdi was elected for his second tenure since independence. While the traditional northern political parties engaged in peace gimmicks with the SPLM/A their lack of serious actions on peace laid the road open for the NIF to hatch a take over plot. Thus, in the night of June 30th, 1989, the National Islamic Front Party (NIF) staged a coup d'état and took over power. Due to its unrivaled military organization, the NIF party put to use its bands of clandestine militia in the capital and a score of officers in the army to successfully usurp power in that black day in the history of the country. At this point, the army was terribly bartered in southern battlefields and had earlier threatened a take over bid if the trend of politics and general welfare for the soldiers did not change. Though the coup was met with an outright opposition, the NIF speedily wielded power and decisively silenced any internal opposition to date. However, corridors of dialogue between the NIF and SPLM/A were reactivated and Peace Conferences were held in Nairobi,
Addis, Abuja, and again Nairobi under the auspices of IGAD countries. Far from cynicism, peace conferences on Sudan have increasingly turned out to be talking shops dispensing nothing more than intransigent rhetoric and belligerence.
3.4 NIF Era and SPLM/A Internal Upheavals:
With the ascent of NIF to power, a new era dawned in the violent history of the Sudan. The government of El Beshir use of money, time, effort, and religious sensitivities to deepen cleavages between the north and south as well as proclaiming jihad (Holy War) against the south, have been consistent. Tribal militias were replenished with new generation of assault rifles while students and government officials became part of the Popular Defense Force (PDF). Firearms proliferated in this period more than in any other time. Though in the past the armed opposition in the north against the successive regimes was confined to the Nuba Mountain enclaves of southern Kordofan and southern Blue Nile provinces, the period following the NIF take over presented a different picture altogether. Since then, many constituencies in the north have taken up arms against the central authority under the umbrella organization-the present National Democratic Alliance (NDA) which has bases in eastern Sudan.
In the SPLM/A controlled areas however, the picture did not look rosy either. In August 1991, south was brought to a brink of defeat and unmanageable disaster when a bizarre "Bush Coup" was declared in the southern town of Nasir by three members of the then leadership-"the Politico-Military High Command." The Nasir coup culminated in a series of splits within the SPLM/A (the main resistance movement) and its offshoots in periods following the main rift. In an unprecedented manner, the events of August 1991 unearthed the phenomenon of insipid war- lordism in many parts of the war-ravaged south Sudan virtually introducing dangerous changes in traditional rules and modes of warfare, conflict prevention and management that endured among the southern tribes since the time immemorial. Arbitrary change of property ownership, plundering of villages, rape, and extra-judicial executions were commonplace and significantly ruled over the principle of law and order and good governance in the areas of Southern Sudan that were controlled by faction leaders allied to the government. In this connection and germane to this phenomenon was an overt employment of the policy of divide and rule as a weapon to weaken the southern resistance. Here, the promise of money and privilege of delegating control and power were used excessively by the government to foment dissension and disunity among insurgents. While the south had maintained an impeccable line of defense against policies of divide and rule by the north for many years since the formation of SPLM/A, the Nasir move gave the north the rarest opportunity ever to dissect it. In the immediate years following the split, firearms flooding out of the regime's armories swarmed the south and tribal militia armies mushroomed in the territory. Inter-factional fighting intensified while tribal and clan feuds
metamorphosed in armament and equipment to deviate considerably from uses of traditional weapons with less lethality to firearms with devastating effects.
3.5 External Linkages and Spatial Spillovers:
The civil war in the Sudan has not been wrapped in a cocoon; it obviously allows for a certain degree of interplay between internal complex political emergencies and external intervention in them. In that respect, the regional antagonisms and the internal political turmoil are believed to have found a common breeding ground to generate more conflicts and uprisings in virtually all the countries of the Horn of African region.
Given its strategic geographical situation in the continent abutting nine sub-Saharan and north African countries (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda, Congo DR, the Central Africa Republic, Chad, Libya, Egypt) and its massive resource endowments, Sudan can certainly be a fulcrum of the regional stability. However, due to perpetual armed challenge to the rule of its successive regimes since 1955 and its own brutal, repressive, and extremely violent modes of fighting against just wars of resistance, large segments of its citizens have crossed the international borders to the neighboring countries as refugees. Because of ethnicity and religion, these refugee and Diaspora communities have often attracted a wide-range of sympathy in the sub- Saharan Africa and the West. In similar vein, most of its neighbors have witnessed their own revolts and insurgencies that at times seek sanctuary, bases, and political offices in the Sudan. With such support available to insurgents from other countries, it is highly logical that this provokes legitimate but similar retaliatory measures to de-stabilize the neighbor.10 This cross- border dimension of the conflict renders the security and revenue generating capacity of these states ineffective in dealing with threats of "black economy" such as smuggling, trafficking in arms, humans, and drugs.
3.6 Peace Process: Current Trends and Future Prospects:
Though the IGAD peace process has apparently stalemated, the recent vigorous international interest in the Sudanese peace process as manifested by the troika-countries involvement (USA, Norway and the UK) provide a window of opportunity to build up momentum and content into the process. Worrying though to the government, the recent extensive rapprochement and unity agreements among the southern groups and leaders, especially reconciliation and unity
10 This point takes reference of propositions made by Professor Lionel Cliffe and Robert Luckham, 1999, "Complex Emergencies and State: Failure and the Fate of State", Third World Quarterly, 20.1, 1 February. Its main thematic emphasis is that violence against a neighbor provokes a similar retaliation thereby increasing instability and belligerence among these states. As governments become desperate to destabilize one another, lesser account is taken on whether the groups being armed and assisted enjoy a popular support back home or are just being a bunch of irresponsible lot.
agreement between the SPLM/A and SPDF/A, can be seen from a positive angle as a catalytic development to promote the peace process.11 Although the roadmap to navigate through this maze may require vigor, will, and consistency on the part of mediators, there is apparent hope that peace may come at long last to this war affected country.
According to assessment by John Prendergast of Washington-based International Crisis Group (ICG) in his Congressional hearing report, there appears to be a window of opportunity for peace created by the aftermath of September 11 that has effectively brought the GOS into the fold of international coalition against terrorism. The long USA policy of supporting the people of southern Sudan in humanitarian relief and the transition assistance packages to opposition controlled areas, give it a clear leverage over the SPLM/A and the opposition NDA. Prendergast also maintains that the positions of the government and the SPLM are too entrenched to reconcile through conventional facilitation alone. He recommends a more assertive diplomatic effort backed by much leverage than currently exists. However, how these leverages are augmented and maintained to widen this window of opportunity shall remain a major US policy challenge on Sudan.
4. SEARCHING FOR POLITICAL SOLUTIONS AND MANAGING RISKS: 4.1 Outline:
Since its emergence in the world geopolitical map as an independent-sovereign entity in January 1956, the Sudanese State has been inherently unstable and virtually threatened by intense possibility of internal political wreckage, collapse, or rift. Because it has been overly exclusive, repressive, unjust, and inflexible to find a new formula for reconstituting itself on a new basis acceptable to all its citizens, sizeable aggrieved segments of its population have revolted against it. This has taken various forms of massive armed, organized, and equally violent guerrilla campaigns against its central authority for thirty-six years of the forty-six years of its existence. These revolts have always emanated from the South, which mostly constitute a challenge to political and/or territorial integrity of the existing neocolonial state. Put succinctly, the state has been often simultaneously the origin, the target, and the arena for these civil conflicts that have ravaged it since the Torit mutiny of August 1955.
11 The year 2002 has witnessed major paradigm shifts among majority of southern Sudanese leaders and rival groups who after bitter animosities that have been on for a number of years. In that vein, early this year, Riek Machar accepted to join the SPLM/A in an agreement he negotiated and signed in Nairobi with Dr. Garang. In March 2002 in London, another reconciliation meeting was mediated by a group of eminent southern Sudanese elders to iron out differences between the SPLM/A and Mr. Bona Malwal. Khartoum views these developments as enhancing south's advantage to score decisive advances in the war. Southerners, on the other don't rule out this possibility but think rather differently that the rapprochement will enhance their ability to negotiate and force their demands on the table as a solid voice.
As an instrument of policy, successive governments in the north have continually transformed and managed the pattern and form of this violent conflict through effective organs of repression to further their goals of absolute control of political power and resources. Quite simply, due to the centrality of war in the political management of the Sudanese State there have been two major and long-drawn incessant streams of violence (1955-72 and 1983 to present) pitting the South against the North. Even at the time when the State was well disposed to prevent, manage, or resolve these conflicts, nothing was done to achieve that since the civil war serves the interest of minority ruling cliques. Evidently, the Sudanese State since its inception has fundamentally lacked in capacity to handle, inhibit, or resolve even small scale ethnic conflicts among its various constituent groupings due to its fragile status, lack of impartiality, and moral authority to mediate peace among them. Indeed, at the core, the most clear-cut and disturbing phenomenon relates to the widespread inability of the state to adequately identify, recognize, and address satisfactorily the root-causes of the conflict. The Sudanese modern history is riddled with such examples of trickery and dishonesty; each time the north must add countless last straws to kill the Camel not merely breaking its back (1956, 1983, 1997) and initiate fresh round of fighting in earnest.
In this light, we shall now examine DDR process within the context of 1972 Addis Accord and explore how the main protagonists in the current war can deal with challenges posed by it if a just and durable agreement is reached on the fundamental issues of the conflict.
4.2. The 1972 Addis Ababa Accord:
4.2.1.Background:
After seventeen years of armed resistance launched in 1955 by the southern insurgents against the central authority in Khartoum, a window of opportunity to achieve peace finally opened in 1972. The World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Imperial Government of Ethiopia under Emperor Heile Silasse, mediated and facilitated peace negotiations between the Junta Government of Field Marshal Nimeiri and Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) led by General Joseph Lagu in Addis Ababa.
Although Nimeiri was under intense military and political pressure from the communists and traditional parties in the north and perhaps desperately yearning for alliance with the south, evidence abounds that he entered into peace talks with the SSLM quite reluctantly.12 According to retired General Omer Mohamed El-Taib's interview with Sudan TV network of 17th August 1999 on the catalysts for the 1972 agreement, it was clear that he entertained a make-believe that the Anyanya insurgents were weak and at the verge of being defeated by the Sudanese
12 Ibid.
army.13 He stressed that the government went to Addis after scoring a string of decisive blows against the Anyanya in the battlefields of the south. He made reference to the battles fought around Morta and Owinykibul in Equatoria province, Sobat Mouth in Upper Nile province, and along the railway in Bahr el Ghazal province in which according to him the Anyanya lost some of its top brass officers. He also made mention of how the regime survived a Communist-led coup in 1971 and successfully clamped down on Ansars-organized Aba revolt.14
The government also guessed, perhaps rightly so, that the duration of conflict was becoming longer something that could have created frustration among guerrillas, sapped their will-to- resist, and diminished a probability of military decisive outcome in favor of Anyanya and the SSLM. The Anyanya resistance also did not enjoy substantial or massive external support either from countries of the region or internationally. Southern Diaspora was relatively small in size, poor in organization and influence, and diverse in objectives to generate financial support and political lobby abroad. The country had little reserves (if any at all) of readily exploitable natural resource rents in the form of primary commodities such as gold, uncut diamonds, and timber to allow the insurgency to finance its war efforts internally. The population was poor and its resource base could not sustain a war of longer duration though they were relatively self-dependent as evidenced by the fact that there were no international humanitarian relief operations seen in the south during that period. Overall, the government felt it was time to strike a good deal that could favor the north and help government consolidate its grip on power.
On the part of the south however, a notable dissonance to these accounts largely predominates. While the war was prolonged and doubling in socioeconomic hazards and costs, the SSLM as a political movement was beginning to improve on its organizational and leadership capabilities to achieve internal cohesion within the south and champion its cause of struggle. On the military side of things, the Anyanya was rapidly evolving into an organic military component with an emerging-adequate military structure and command and control system that could have lent it more advantage to prosecute the war of liberation decisively. Logistically, the Anyanya was beginning to receive a windfall of supplies as well as offers of training from some friendly countries and sympathetic groups to revamp its capacity. Furthermore, in the 1970s, the Cold
13 Rtd General ElTaib was appointed by Nimeiri as his First Vice President toward the end of 1970s to replace General AbdelMagid Hamid Khalil. He was also in charge of security in the country and was known of being professed loyalist to Imam Nimeiri. He vowed to serve him even at the verge of his collapse. He serves as the deputy Commander of southern command in Juba during the army offensive against Anyanya positions in Equatoria in 1970s. 14 This was transcribed from the series of statements made by General Omer El-Taib, the Former First Vice President and Chief of National Security Organ during Nimeiri era to Sudan TV programme called "Rumuuz fi Hayatna" of 17th August 1999. Given his key position in the Southern Command Headquarters in Juba in the early 1970s, his close association with Marshal Nimeiri, and his subsequent ascension to the second highest political post in the country as well as running the national security, General El-Taib's statements can not be taken lightly. They represent at core a summary of what could have been strategic conclusions of the government about the war at the time of Addis Ababa agreement.
War contest between the western bloc on one hand and the eastern bloc on the other was at its zenith of engulfing the African continent. All the wars (civil or inter-state) fought during this era polarized protagonists and their potential allies along some form of interest priorities and ideological alignments. So, it is apparent that if the SSLM had not even signed the agreement, the south would have still stood some good chances to organize a formidable resistance to take the war to its logical conclusion or secure a better deal on the negotiation table.
However, it appeared that the tempi for reaching the settlement had increased and SSLM/Anyanya as well as other southern shades of political opinion in the government controlled towns decided to give peace a chance if in the main it could address the issue of self- rule for the south. Among the SSLM politicians and Anyanya commanders, there was a momentous call for a convention to discuss and rectify the agreement but this was brushed aside as an impediment to peace by the SSLM/Anyanya leadership. The agreement was therefore signed and implemented with an incommensurable rush and haste. In implementing its main clauses in the years prior to second outbreak of war, the north demonstrated arrogance and belligerence as if the agreement was an exercise to seal the fate of a vanquished (south) in a glorious ceremony presided over by the victor (north).
Following the declaration of cease-fire by the contending parties in early March 1972, the Anyanya fighters were asked to encamp in designated locations in southern Sudan for eventual absorption and demobilization. According to the accord, about 6,000 Anyanya guerrillas were to be absorbed into the Sudanese army, 3,000 more into other organized forces while the rest of combatants of up to 8,000 were to be demobilized, disarmed, and reintegrated into civilian life. In theory, the demobilized ex-Anyanya combatants were to be prepared for a civilian life as well offered chances of employment. Unfortunately, in practice and to the embryonic detriment of the accord, "majority of them were left in limbo".15 In the case of absorbed Anyanya fighters, the criteria used for grading them were neither appropriate nor convincing; another factor that sowed an early seed of discord among them. Demobilization as such was a phenomenon restricted to "rebels-Mutameridiin" or ex-Anyanya guerrillas and should not have covered the Sudanese army that actually swelled in size and expenditure during the years of civil conflict.
Because Addis Ababa agreement was crisis-ridden and flawed in its main underpinnings from the beginning, structures and institutions that it created could not be expected to deal decisively with the post-conflict challenges such as demobilization, disarmament, rehabilitation, and social reintegration of the former fighters/guerrillas.
A broad consensus prevails among analysts that a durable peace and success of post-conflict reconstruction depends on the correct identification and resolution of the root causes of war. It
15 This phrase is from the SPLM Manifesto of July 1983 on the historical background and root causes of the present conflict.
is also recognized that political instability leading to violent outburst of conflict may stem from failures of dealing with the after-effects of the war that has just been ended (peace management). In post-war settings, some less radical ex-Anyanya fighters who were not absorbed into the army dissolved into their respective communities of origin (often with or without their weapons) and pursued survival strategies ranging from production for own consumption to petty informal activities. Others belonging to this category but less uncertain about the fragility upon which the agreement was drawn, chose to remain in exile for a number of years in the neighboring African countries either as refugees or melting into the local social fabric and subsequently attained citizenship. To the extent that there was array of options before the ex-Anyanya guerrillas who did not benefit from the aftermath of war and therefore had no stakes in the peace process, some of them preferred to take upon more risk. That is, some continued to maintain sporadic resistance to the regime and defy the agreement even to the point of fighting their former colleagues who were now part of the government security apparatus and who were readily deployed against them.
One incident of this kind involved a government contingent under William Nyuon (an ex- Anyanya officer and then absorbed government army Regimental Sergeant Major) and a dissident unit under Anyanya Captain John Kuaneén in Pangak district in late 1972. The latter was overwhelmed and slain and Sergeant Nyuon received a special promotion to the rank of captain and badges for a meritorious performance. This signaled similar strings of witch-hunt of the former Anyanya fighters opposed to the agreement elsewhere. Others who were even absorbed and did not approved of the agreement for reasons that are multiform and extremely subtle in nature initiated early flare-ups. (That is, Wau and Aweil mutinies in Bahr el Ghazal- 1976, Akobo mutiny in Upper Nile-1975, near explosions in Juba-1974, Kapoeta-1975, and Juba mutiny-1977.) These outbursts, though contained and dealt with decisively by the army, claimed the lives of many high ranking southern Sudanese officers majority of them being ex- Anyanya commanders of outstanding and upright military leadership.
With the change of government and advent to power by the Derg Junta in neighboring Ethiopia at the height of cold war era, these groups reorganized and took succour inside Ethiopia under the new regime. Shelter, food, protection, arms, and equipment were provided to this new generation of southern Sudanese guerrillas. When relations between Qadafi El-Jamahirya and Nimeiri Sudan were at their lowest ebb, additional ounces of support trickled to Anyanya-Two training camps inside Ethiopia from Tripoli. The Ethiopian reaction originated in part from trying to pay back in kind the neighbor for its observed interference and role as a constant source of instability and threat to its territorial integrity and existence. However, the poor handling of post-war issues by the Sudanese government of unification and creation of the national army, disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and social reintegration of the ex-
Anyanya guerrillas provided a breeding ground and fresh launching pad for another round of rebellion.
4.2.2. Lessons learned:
While in practical terms, the period following the signing of 1972-Addis Ababa peace agreement was jam-packed in a jumble of activities relating to implementation of the agreement, it is widely recognized that little attention was given to emergent issues of post- conflict era concerning the combatants (ex-guerrillas). Failure to address these potentially destabilizing factors undermined the agreement while still a fledgling. Now with the benefit of hindsight the following key lessons can be drawn from that experience: a) The implementation of the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities rested squarely on the commitment and sense of judgment of warring parties once both sides declared in a political agreement that their objectives could not be achieved through military means but through peaceful settlement of the conflict. However, these commitments and goodwill gestures could have provided large measure of dividends if an element of international and/or regional monitoring mechanism was built into the process. It ultimately turned out to be a sort of unfair game without referees to administer its progress. b) The agreement did not establish an exclusive institutional framework from both parties to deal with demobilization, disarmament, rehabilitation, and social reintegration of combatants. If at all there were institutional approaches to these issues, then these were quite ad hoc indeed; treated at times as part of general returnees resettlement programme and in the other part, put at the behest of the Army General Headquarters that was northern- dominated at its exclusive discretion. c) Demobilization was, however, restrictively directed on the large portion of the former Anyanya fighters. Overall, no schedule was given for downsizing military forces of warring parties and the future plans and criteria for the formation of the national army. Clearly, the trend was one way absorption not a merger of equals. d) Although a general amnesty was declared following the signing of the agreement, many ex- Anyanya fighters felt quite unsafe to separate with their arms and remain in the society where they could still mix-up with their former foes turned friends. Effective demobilization programme would have provided an ample time and opportunity to implement a pre-departure reorientation sessions. e) Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration form a continuum.16 Effective demobilization preparation and analysis could have encouraged voluntary disarmament at
16 This theoretical treatment of the DDR process as a continuum was derived from the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) papers on Demobilization and reintegration-Opportunities for Human Development. The paper in reference is
the implementation stage, which was and still is the safest. Because the 1972 DDR Programme was ill-conceived and as such could not succeed at the demobilization stage, other phases like rehabilitation and its follow-up corollaries and reintegration suffered the same fate. In other words, even the necessary financial support for demobilization and reintegration programme was not available. f) Because the peace agreement was treated as a homemade product, the international community was not sufficiently mobilized to provide funds and expertise to ensure the success of the DDR Process. g) Regional and other spatial spillovers relating to the process of demobilization and disarmament were not thoroughly examined. The weapons stockpiled during the Anyanya war of liberation were either collected or retained by the owners who did not approve of the agreement but could not overflow across the borders to stoke other conflicts. Perhaps, because on average, the Anyanya stock of arms was relatively small, the contiguous phenomenon of arms trafficking that subsequently became prevalent in the region in the last half of 1970s was not observed. In similar cases in the region that would succeed the first civil war (1955-72), that trend was consistently observed; e.g., the overthrow of Amin in Uganda (1979), the fall of the Derg in Ethiopia, (1991) the demise of Saiad Beri and collapse of the Somali State (1991).
4.3. Ending the Current War and DDR Programme in the Transition Period:
4.3.1. Political Context:
Assuming the current war is ended through negotiations on the peace table within the IGAD- DOPs framework, the current NIF government, the SPLM and the NDA umbrella organization will form a representative interim government in the Centre. The north and the south shall be however administered by two separate systems of government. The SPLM prefers to call this relationship a "Union of Sudanese Confederation." The NIF Government would like to maintain a kind of arrangement very much similar to what was prescribed in Khartoum peace agreement and now based in Juba in the form of "Coordinating Council for Southern States" as a "Transitional Solution Modality". Other forms of maintaining common existence during the interim period includes what was paraphrased by the American Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as "One Country Two Systems". Political nomenclatures aside, the protagonists (NIF-Government, SPLM, and the NDA) have made various commitments on the right of southern Sudanese people to exercise of self-determination in an internationally supervised referendum after an interim period to be agreed upon. The content of the interim
"Demobilization in the Horn of Africa: proceedings of the International Resource Group-IRG Workshop, 4-7 December 1994,
arrangements for the south and north as well as defining powers of the central authority could be the key issues in any negotiation.
Thus, the framework for this study will not examine other possible but extreme scenarios such as: · An overall state collapse or/and division as a result of escalated military activity and failure by the parties to negotiate peace. · Military option leading to defeat of the Sudanese army and possible demise of the NIF regime and rise to power of opposition NDA · Or, military option culminating in the NIF victory over opposition forces thereby enabling it to consolidate and maintain its grip on power. Though there could still be some form of insurgent activity, this can be ineffectual and posing lesser threat to ability of NIF to govern.
However, some of the postulates and characteristics of the DDR model that shall be developed in this analysis are not dissimilar from those that will face a victor or any party administering over a large chunk of territory and population under these extreme scenarios.
If a comprehensive settlement is reached by the warring parties in accordance with the IGAD- DOPs and positing that the options for interim arrangements take any of the forms referred to earlier, a cease-fire and immediate cessation of hostilities will be announced. This will cover all the theatres of war in the southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, the southern Blue Nile and Eastern Sudan. A Joint Military Commission comprising equal number of representatives from the NIF Government and SPLM will be constituted with international monitors to effect disengagement and redeployment of forces. Bearing in mind the past sensitivities and fragile and shaky confidence that should have otherwise been restored by reaching an agreement on a peaceful settlement, the SPLM should be allowed to re-organize and re-deploy its army and security organs in the south. The present NIF Army will re-deploy in the north. However, special technical committee composed of both the SPLM and NIF Government will work out details of redeployment in the southern Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountain. Another committee with similar undertaking can be designated by both the NDA leadership and the NIF Government to work out modalities of disengagement and redeployment in the eastern Sudan. The bottom line is that all parties to conflict must downsize their military forces in the transition period to an acceptable level that reduces belligerence and ensures stability. Hence, this part of study will be strictly carried out in the context of a transition period assuming that the main contending parties reach an agreement on the fundamental issues of war and agree in principle to mutually reduce the size of their respective military forces.
Addis Ababa.
4.3.2. GOS Role:
Although statistics on the numbers of servicemen in the GOS army are hard to come by, a broad consensus prevails among military analysts that it is generally one of oversized armies in the developing world. Evidence abounds that all the able-bodied young adults of the ages between 16-38 are liable for a conscription and compulsory national service. Recently, school compounds have been turned into conscription and training sites that led to large number of draft-dodgers among students leaving the country for exile. Enrolment into college education is conditioned on undergoing military training and at least two years of national service in the "Bushes of Sudan" or related war zones. Whether for the purposes of psychological warfare and propaganda or otherwise, the figures often given by Sudan's Television and Radio networks put each batch upon passing out at something between 35 and 40 thousand annually. Besides the regular Army and the police, the GOS has a plethora of superfluous paramilitary units with special allegiance to the NIF such as the "Popular Defense Forces-PDF."
Other armed affiliates include many notorious militia bands in the western and southern Sudan that are widely known for their infamous practices of abduction, slavery, torture, pillage, devastation of villages, and killing and maiming of innocent civilians. Examples of these government-sponsored players are: · The Baggara and Ruzeiggat Arab militias in the western regions of Kordofan and Darfur. · A myriad of southern militia groups such as Poulino Matip militia in western Upper Nile, Ismail Konye Militia in Pibor, Tanginya militia in Pangak, Gatwic Dual militia in Waat, Clement Wani militia in Terkeka, Theopholis Ocheng militia in Torit, and Abdel-Baqi Ayii militia in Aweil. Some of these were among splinter groups that signed the failed Khartoum peace agreement.
Although the Khartoum peace agreement made a brief mention of rehabilitation of war victims in its Chapter Six, (Article 8:xii), the core issues of DDR process were neither elaborated upon nor given a special framework in which they could have been tackled. Perhaps because the war was largely on in most parts of war-ravaged south, the parties to the agreement could not set up a framework for DDR programme; or alternatively, there was no will on the part of the government to initiate such process. Apparently, wider disparity existed between the treatment offered the wounded-in-action, and other war victims such as widows and orphans associated with the factions that signed the agreement and those who suffered the same fatalities and traumas on the side of the government during the war. Indeed, the government had set up an organization called "Munazamat el Shaheed or Martyrs Organization" to oversee the welfare of wounded and relatives, widows, orphans, of the northerners killed-in-action.
On the occasion of signing of Khartoum agreement, General El Beshir stressed that "the creative nature of the agreement was emphasized by the fact it had been concluded by
conviction with no coercion-from either side." He further said that the agreement was "solely a Sudanese endeavour and a purely national message in concept and origin."17 In practice however, the implementation of Khartoum agreement left a lot to be desired. It clearly delineates between reality and ceremonial rhetoric; and symbolizes the extent to which deceit and dishonesty can thrive in any domestic peacemaking efforts by Sudanese alone that are not externally mediated or observed.
In spite of the fact the GOS will possibly be designated a role by the peace agreement to deal with DDR issues in the north. To ensure success, the GOS must draw lessons from the failure of Addis Ababa accord and the Khartoum peace agreement which both crushed under the northern management though they dealt with issues affecting the south. It will have obvious devastating effects and backlashes in the north if the GOS does not plan and implement DDR programmes to benefit its former combatants and reduce the size of its military forces to peacetime capacity. The essence of peace settlement is always to reduce military expenditure (peace dividend) and instead, to increase spending for urgent reconstruction requirement and restoration of health and education services. Another dividend is in reducing human casualties and hunting spree that target endangered wildlife species as a result of wanton use of firearms. The ongoing tribal tension in western Sudan between the indigenous African and the Arab settlers backed by the government will destabilize that region even after peace agreement is signed if effective DDR process is not designed for the north. Naturally, southern Sudanese who have been part of GOS war making capacity will obviously remain in the south. The SPLM must effect immediate measures on implementing the general amnesty and draw up strategies for confidence building between it and these groups. Once this is achieved, some combatants of the ex-militia groups can form part of the army and security forces in the south like the SPLA. Those among them who shall fall within the category covered by the DDR process (mainly old, female, wounded and child soldiers), also like some of the SPLA combatants shall be encamped, demobilized, disarmed, and reintegrated into civilian life. However, that will be entirely determined by the SPLA reorganization dictates and resources immediately available for DDR projects.
4.3.3. SPLM/A Role:
From existing data on the two internal wars fought in Sudan (Anyanya War 1955-72 and the current war 1983 to the present), southern Sudan has been predestined by both the connivance
17 Khartoum Peace Agreement was signed on the 21st of April 1997 in the Republican Palace in Khartoum between the Government of Sudan and plethora of small breakaway southern factions that formed an umbrella group called the South Sudan United Democratic Front (SSDF) prior to the agreement. However, during the signing each constituent organization delegated a representative to append a signature on its behalf. Some of the statements attributed to General El Beshir in this paper are few of the excerpts from his speech marking the occasion.
and accident of history as an arena for these military contests. In the first Anyanya war for instance, all the battles for control of the south became the main strategic military goal pursued by both sides. Historical evidence shows that not even a single skirmish was fought outside the south as part of the contest. In the current war however, the SPLA has devised a multifaceted and manifold political and military strategy that has enabled it to engage the Sudanese army wherever its means and capacity can permit. Politically, the movement has managed to galvanize wider constituent appeal and has manifestly reached out to other marginalized parts of Sudan of equal socioeconomic neglect as the south.18 Yet, since the outbreak of the current round of fighting, statistics of major engagements involving large troop deployments have been in the south. That clearly demonstrates that both sides to the conflict still regard control of the south as an important trophy for deciding the direction of ending the war.
To enhance its counterinsurgency strategy, the GOS has armed many tribal militia groups opposed to the SPLM/A and elements of Ugandan opposition like the LRA and West Nile Bank Front that still have bases inside southern Sudan. Until recently, major breakaway groups opposed to the SPLM continued to receive weapons and ammunition from the GOS. Tribal chiefs and renegades have formed paramilitary units that are sponsored by the GOS to supplement its efforts.
Against this backdrop, the SPLM/A will have a weightier task in tackling challenges of postwar socioeconomic rebuilding and recovery in general and the DDR process in particular more than the GOS. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants of different backgrounds including the disarmament of the heavily armed population across southern Sudan will be key to success of transitional recovery initiatives and long-term reconstruction of southern Sudan. In spite of complexity of the process, it however remains the most critical activity for ensuring human security and development of the war-torn southern Sudan.
The SPLM/A leadership has demonstrated that it has a full grasp of these challenges when it embarked unilaterally on demobilizing 9,000 of its combatants below the age of eighteen; otherwise known conventionally as child soldiers. The SPLM/A set up a Task Force to coordinate with the UNICEF/OLS and other international agencies the child soldier DDR programme in early 2001. In retrospect, because of enthusiasm and haste that characterized the programme, many pitfalls became apparent in the planning and implementation stages of the process. Though some good work was done at the transit encampments, resources that were available fell short of matching the needs of demobilized at the social reintegration stage. Obviously, these resource-shortfalls in the social reintegration stage, caused demobilized child
18 Marginalized Sudan is an SPLM/A term for war-afflicted and peripheral parts of Sudan that have experienced serious economic neglect and deprivation unlike the riverian Arab north that have dominated politics and unfairly plundered the resources of the country for its own development. See SPLM manifesto of 1983 and its recent version of 1997.
soldiers to lose faith in the programme and often threatened to return to their previous units if the new civilian life and DDR programme did not provide any incentive for them. Because there were a lot of infighting on the part of NGOS community on allocation of roles, efforts by the SPLM/A Task Force on Demobilization and UNICEF/OLS to include women associated with the military in the DDR process was shot down.
While the SPLM/A initiative to rid its army of child soldiers is commendable, experience has shown that mere interest in doing something is not a sufficient condition to ensure that a project of such broad scope will be undertaken and successfully accomplished. Programme of this magnitude can only be possible with the encouragement and generous financial and material support of the international community. However, the child soldier DDR programme though largely successful was a tip of iceberg of a bigger impending task. That is, although help can be sought from abroad, the onus of transforming the post-conflict, war-fed political economy will fall on the SPLM/A. In other words, the child soldiers could have been swayed from believing that only military activities can offer them opportunities to exploit their potential. Also on gradual note, the demobilized child soldiers could have been helped to gain faith in restarting a new civilian life knowing through reorientation programme that their taking part in the process of economic reconstruction maximizes the welfare of the entire society of which they once fought for its liberation. However, despite all these hurdles, the SPLM/A DDR programme targeting the child and female soldiers provides a test of will and ability of the SPLM/A to deal with challenges of post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. While different facets of success and failure characterized the process, like in any other project or programme these can be balanced or rectified through intensive appraisals and ex-post evaluations.
The future of the south hangs on finding and balancing responses to governance and power sharing claims in order to cement national consensus and reconciliation. One of the major challenges for the SPLM/A in the transition period will be to build on more southern political groundswell in order to secure effective homegrown solutions and mandate. This will prepare a good ground for the SPLM/A to tackle complex and overarching task of demobilization, disarmament, and social reintegration of ex-fighters including those who once took part in hostile acts against it. The new army, other organized forces, and security in the south, by necessity, will have to be drawn mainly from among the ranks of SPLA fighters during the transitional period. However, the need to make them representative of all ethnic and tribal groups including reintegrating elements of the former pro-Khartoum militia into them must be well borne in mind. Hannum (1996: 26) explains that "there are few, if any, nation-states in the world whose population reflects an entirely homogenous ethnic, cultural community to the exclusion of all other." Even the state of Somalia that is assumed to be in relative terms, ethnically and culturally homogenous, was shredded by clan-based rivalries to the point of
collapse after the demise of Saiad Beri regime. Southern Sudan has learnt lessons from its own internal dissension throughout many phases in its history of resistance though in the majority of cases the northern hand could not be entirely ruled out.
As for policy options on DDR programme in the south in the transition period, the SPLM/A will have to overhaul and revitalize its Task Force for Child Soldier Demobilization. This organ has already achieved some degree of success in ridding the SPLA of child soldiers and limiting further recruitment of children into the army and has a wealth of experience in the DDR process. Once policy guidelines are made on the requisite size of the army, police, security organs, etc., the SPLM/A will empower the Task Force/Commission, the SPLA GHQS, and other partners to draw plans for encampment phase of demobilization. This phase should cover the SPLA and all the southern militia groups affiliated to GOS. Reorientation phase and other pre-discharge activities including HIV/AIDS awareness will begin while the necessary demobilization packages are being prepared. Networking with communities of origin that will be ultimate destination for demobilized fighters will also be intensified. Given the wider scope of the problem and the delicacies that maybe involved, there will be a need to take a piecemeal approach to the process. This will ensure that every step accomplished serves as an additional building block in accomplishing the overall task and as another incentive to generate willingness in other ex-combatants to join the process. The role of the World Bank and international donor community in general, will be of special centrality for the success of this programme.
Depending on the type of political agreement reached by the two warring parties, special technical committee will be modeled by the SPLM/A leadership to meet the needs of the SPLA fighters in the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile. Being part of the SPLM/A, the sons and daughters of these areas have served in many parts of the south as southern Sudanese have also done the same in their areas. There will be no any sensitivity on their part or on the part of southerners to keep forces mixed during the interim period and embark on a single DDR programme. However, this will depend on the kind of political package worked out for these areas by the agreement and cease-fire arrangements for the SPLM/A controlled areas outside traditional south.
By and large, the scope of arrangements that provide some degree of disarmament and decommissioning schemes are unlimited under the models prescribed in the preceding paragraphs in dealing with the DDR process involving ex-fighters. However, different approaches will have to be sought in tackling the problem of clan and tribal youths that are locally recruited along the lines of patrilineal age-set in the southern Sudan and who have adapted to use of arms since the outbreak of war. The persistent desire to take part in pseudo- military organizational structure for social, economic, or psychological reasons can place
dangerous hurdles on the road to complete and successful war-peace transition. Culturally, some tribes accept the ownership of firearms by their members that is at present contiguously affecting other tribal groups who in the past shunned the idea. The fact that clan and tribal skirmishes and cattle rustling have turned overly devastating due to rampant use of firearms in them bespeaks the phenomenon. The SPLM/A thus will need to transform itself into credible central authority in the south to provide security guarantees for disarmed individuals, clan, or tribal groups in this category especially against raids from other armed neighbors across the international borders. It is also incumbent upon to reinforce its efforts to avail and mobilize necessary incentives for these warriors to disarm so as to ensure that the culture of peace thrives and that of war diminishes or banishes into the margins of human activity. Lessons can be drawn across the border from experience of the NRM government in Uganda on how it dealt with Karmoja warriors in Moroto district. Far afield to the west, the implications of plans to disarm the Kamajosia chiefdom-based militia in Sierra Leone after reinstatement of the Kaba government can also be thoroughly examined.
4.3.4. Eastern Sudan and the NDA Role:
The DDR programme in the NDA-GOS contested eastern Sudan can only follow as a package of comprehensive resolution of the conflict involving the political forces in the whole country. Such an all-party rapprochement must be genuinely based on key fulcrum of adopting a just, democratic, social, economic, and political system that extends beyond the transition period regardless of outcome of referendum in the south. Depending on the type of agreement that can be reached by the parties, cease fire and amnesty and indemnity arrangements, the GOS and NDA leadership can set up a joint commission to oversee the DDR process in the eastern Sudan. The process will cover the NDA and GOS forces in the area.
Apart from the role of GOS to demobilize its pseudo-military organization called the Popular Defense Forces (PDF), it must address together with the NDA the issue of proliferation of firearms in the eastern Sudan. Though the recent conflict has added more stock of arms to the area, this matter takes its roots in long civil conflicts that wrecked the neighboring states of Eritrea and Ethiopia since the 1960s. Because of common ancestry and lineage, tribes across the border in Eritrea and Ethiopia could found easy succour and protection in eastern Sudan. When the conflict intensified many Eritreans and Ethiopians were displaced and took refuge in Sudan sometimes with or without arms. Furthermore, the fall of Mangistu regime sent off large segment of troops on retreat into eastern Sudan. Whether or not the process of disarmament was done efficiently at the border remains a mystery. However, it is believed that the Beja tribes of the Red Sea Hills and Rashayida pastoralists are among the heavily armed civilians in the country.
4.3.5. MINES AND DE-MINING PROGRAMME:
One of the major catastrophic legacies of any war is the long term devastating effects of buried landmines. They continue to maim people, threaten security, and inhibit free movement of goods and factors of production (people, animals, and machinery). Although mine estimates in the case of Sudan is in few hundred thousands, some of the dense minefields are around potential agricultural lands, wood fuel reserves, road trunks, and around main centres of administration. Due to inadequate sketching and record keeping by the parties to the conflict on the locations, type of casing, and fusing systems (including activators) used, mine-clearing efforts in postwar Sudan will be slow and dangerous. However, it is imperative upon the parties to the conflict to undertake joint-mine-clearing actions once a cease-fire agreement is signed.
5. CHALLENGES TO DDR PROCESS IN THE POST-CONFLICT SUDAN:
From a practical viewpoint, there are numerous challenges that will impact upon or even undermine successful implementation of the DDR process in the transition period in the postwar Sudan. This maze of challenges covers a wide range of conflict transformation analyses that must consider the following core risks in order to develop a coherent and effective DDR strategy: a) The success of the DDR process depends primarily on the political will of all the parties to the conflict to adhere to terms of the signed agreement and eliminating chances of a country relapsing to war. If a peace agreement does not create conditions for stability in the country, there will be no progress in the restructuring of the armed forces, the police, and security organs of the state/entities. Instead, the period following the cease-fire can constitute a limited repose on the part of warring parties to reorganize, rearm, and remobilize for the next phase of war. Indeed, some groups who do not perceive the peace process and the DDR programmes built into it as serving their interest may continue to maintain large secret caches of arms for use in the eventuality of resumption of hostilities. Such risks however, can be averted if the international monitoring mechanisms built into the agreement are effective and resourcefully organized. An additional measure of risk reduction is premised on linking the DDR process to a wider political and socioeconomic context to include all the main parties to the conflict, their affiliates, and armed communities. Guarantors to the agreement and monitors to its implementation will have to be identified extremely quickly and carefully to preclude a return to conflict and an increase in the level of rural banditry and urban crime. b) The complexity of the Sudanese geopolitical landscape and delicacy of the current conflict environment makes it imperatively inevitable that the demobilization, disarmament, and
reintegration programme suitable for every constituency is separately organized. Although this can be viewed as politically appropriate and viable approach, the reality of the situation points to the contrary. That is, there will be numerous sets of problems for the implementation of a project of this complex nature. However, such obvious flaws associated with this kind of approach can still be averted through good project preparations and analysis, appraisal, implementation and built-in methods of evaluation. c) If the DDR programme is to be successful, the international community should be obliged to commit resources into it. However, any international involvement should go in line with how the parties to the peace agreement perceive the political, economic, social, and cultural climate in the country. The problem of bureaucratic management of funds by the donor agencies often inhibits the system, creates delays and makes it more cumbersome, weak, and inefficient to influence, monitor, or control the DDR process. If the DDR programme becomes technically inflexible in responding to influx of demobilizing fighters because there were funding lags to meet early procurement needs and demobilization packages may be insufficient, the combatants will lose interest in the process. In this respect, measures to adopt a DDR system that is transparent and accountable will be explored by all partners operating within a particular framework in order to enhance its neutrality and image and ensure speed in implementation and guaranteeing fair and equal treatment for all combatants. After all, what partly led to catastrophic failure of Addis Ababa accord was the lack of well thought out DDR programme for the ex-Anyanya combatants. If there was such a programme adequately reinforced with transparency, good faith, and momentum, premature flare-ups following the signing of the agreement would have been averted. Apart from roles assigned to state/entities and political organizations, civil society organizations such as religious bodies and NGOs would be well placed to perform a role in this process and add a greater dimension of accountability to it. The media service would also be sought to provide coverage and recording of the DDR process as it unfolds and to inform and encourage skeptics and pessimists among the combatants and participants to take an active part in the process. d) Many border communities in southern Sudan have experienced violent cattle rustling by the raiding parties across the international borders. This will definitely complicate any national disarmament drive as these communities and political leaders who hail from them may not readily submit to dictates of national policy other than physical security of their communities and constituencies. If there is no political consensus on the part of leaders than there will be complete lack of transparency with regard to arms collection. e) A threat from unexploded ordnance and landmines around the main towns, roads, and old battle sites will continue to affect efforts of rural resettlement of returnees and economy. A
joint mine-clearing action must be undertaken by all parties to the conflict to remove and clear mines. This can also offer employment opportunities to demobilized ex-combatants who have or can acquire basic sapper skills. f) If the simmering conflict environment in the Horn and the Great Lakes regions still exists especially in the Congo-DR, Chad, the Central African Republic, Uganda, Ethiopia, surplus weapons may spill over the borders through arms trafficking to be used there. Moreover, if the phenomenon of high demand for arms for cattle rustling purposes in Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia also persists, the weapons that are now being made idle by peace process in the Sudan can be traded across. If stores containing collected arms are not well managed and guarded or collected weapons are not immediately destroyed, corrupt officials and individuals among those charged with their management may turn them into business shops thereby resulting in a cycle.
6. CONCLUSION:
The main purpose of this study was to examine critically the 1972 accord in the context of the DDR programme and steps leading to the creation of the national army comprising the elements of ex-Anyanya combatants and the Sudanese army. The lessons elicited from this experience and its appraisal were to serve as rear-sight mirror to assist in another iterative process of conjuring "algorithms" for DDR programme in a mirage of inconclusive peace efforts. However, in spite of scant progress and baffling gambits at the peace front, there is cautious optimism that the warring parties may reach a deal to break the current intricate web of stalemate. In that fashion, identifying roles for the main protagonists (GOS, SPLM, NDA) as well as exploring challenges for the DDR process in the transition period in particular and in postwar situation in general became the main focus of this study. However, some fairly strong caveats must be attached to conclusions reached in these analyses: · The success of the DDR programme rests squarely on the political will of the parties to the conflict to implement the agreement. In other words, unless the parties create political, economic and security climate commensurate to postwar challenges, the ubiquity of weapons in both the combatant and civilian spheres will remain to be a thorn in the flesh of postwar "government's" socioeconomic rebuilding efforts. · The success of the DDR programme rests also in part on the willingness of the donor community to commit funds and other resources into it. Without timely donor assistance, the parties to the conflict and especially the SPLM and NDA will lack sufficient resources to plan or launch effective DDR process of their own. In expansive country like Sudan with porous borders in which the definition of combatant is less precise owing to mobilization of large segment of its population for military efforts on one side or the other, accountability
and records of weapons distributed are often poor and nonexistent. Put slightly differently, the process will with no doubt be resource-intensive. · Unless the cease-fire agreement is internationally supervised and monitored, transparent disarmament and demobilization may remain to be highly illusory owing to long history of mistrust and animosity between the parties. In the interest of brevity, what emerges therefore from this study is that effective planning, implementation, and management of the DDR process in the Sudan in the transition period or in the postwar era will obviously assist in the permanent peace-building efforts in the country.
References: Hannum, Hurst. 1996. Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination. The University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia. Spencer, Denise. 1997. Bonn International Centre for Conversion, BICC Paper 8: Demobilization and Reintegration in Latin America, Bonn. Gabb, Sean. 1997. The Sudan Foundation: The Khartoum Peace Agreement. de Waal, Alex. 1997. Food and power in Sudan: a critique of humanitarianism. African Rights, London. Woodward, Peter: The Sudan: The Unstable State. 1990. Lyne Reinner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado. El Nour, Ashraf. 2001. UNDP Papers: Demobilization of Combatants and generating Livelihoods/Employment for Returning Refugees and Displaced People in Afghanistan. Kingma, Kees and Vanessa Sayers. 2002. Bonn International Centre for Conversion, BICC Paper on Demobilization in the Horn Africa. Alier, Abel: Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured. 1991. Ithaca Press Exeter. Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffer. 1998. On the Economic Causes of Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers 50:563-73. ______.2000. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. The World Bank Manuscript, Washington, DC. Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffer, and Mans Soberdom. 1999. On the Duration of Civil War. The World Bank Manuscript, Washington, DC. Murdoch, James C., and Todd Sadler. 2001. Economic Growth, Civil Wars, and Spatial Spillovers. Khalid, Mansour. 1990. The Government They Deserve: the role of the elite in Sudan’s political evolution. Kegan Paul International, London. Deng, M. Francis. 1995. War of Visions: conflicts of identities in the Sudan. Brookings Institution, Washington.
Discussion on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration of Combatants in the Transition Period: the Case of Sudan.
Formal Response by Discussant, Florian Fichtl, The World Bank The World Bank has a supporting role to the political process. In order to avoid delays, and compliment the work of partners in the humanitarian sector, the World Bank should be prepared for the declaration of a peace settlement when the environment is right for investment. The World Bank have tried to expand their role into development. However, post conflict situations are defined as early engagement in the rehabilitation and demobilisation programme. For example, in Sierra Leone the Bank worked with the Government in the demobilisation and the rehabilitation process.
Both papers pointed out the need for effective neutrality in the demobilisation and rehabilitation programmes. In Sierra Leone there was a military reintegration programme. It was in full swing. However, the plans were not finalised and the ex combats refused to leave the location. There is the need to see a demobilisation programme and support to civil society and economic infrastructure etc. It is important to have an even handed approach because if there is no reintegration then life will not return to normal.
There is capacity in the areas most affected by war. If the capacity for civil administration is limited then working with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) becomes important. Co-ordination mechanisms become necessary and technical details need to be worked out.
The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme may not include retrieval of small arms.
The timing and start up of the rehabilitation process must be considered in order to avoid delays. Demobilisation has a political effect in it and therefore transparency is needed in this regard.
The issue of spoilers has not been addressed. If the parties agree to agree, how do you deal with spoilers?
The role of the World Bank is to encourage the development bank to stay up to date and stay involved. They have a strong track record in terms in obtaining resources.
You need to involve the World Bank at an early stage in the process. This has not always been done, which results in confusion and delay.
Summary of Discussion
1. When the cease-fire was announced in 1972, and it was announced that the Anya Nya were to be demobilised, the size of the Anya Nya increased five times. There is a question of the size of the present armies and other military forces including militias.
2. There are categories of people to care for post war. How many internally displaced are there? These are going to be the points of concentration post-war - not a plan for disarmament. These are going to be a resource for future development.
3. At this stage, somebody needs to be sought to provide the necessary funds for research into refugees and IDPs. In 1972, research was done by the UNDP as to what would be required, but it did not address the numbers of those displaced or refugees. We need to get a precise number to determine the need.
4. It was recognised that the factions in the East of the country should also be examined. There are people there who also have grievances and also need to be treated as combatants. The Sudanese problems are so integrated that cannot compartmentalised. The Sudanese are diverse but all need to share in the wealth and political power. These peripheries express their grievances in different ways.
5. Consideration must also be given to the non-SPLA Southern militias. There is the question of what we will do with those forces that will remain outside the army. They will need ex-trauma counselling as well as primary education.
6. It was recommended that the armed forces need to be built on sound professional lines. The intake to the army therefore needs to have certain regulations. For example, previously the Anya Nya figthers could not all be taken because they were not all fit for consideration as army recruits. However, some were taken on as police and prison warders.
7. Some participants were concerned that the army could interfere in political affairs.
8. Sudan is not similar to Sierra Leone etc., rather it is unique. The Sudan needs a system that will govern the country for the people. Demobilisation will need to be negotiated.
9. The essential need of de-mining for redevelopment was strongly expressed.
10. One of the questions which would need to be address is as follows: how do you disengage the forces before demobilisation?
11. The nature of the government will determine the sort of army which is made. How is a united army founded which will provide a strong basis for a strong Sudan?
12. Regarding concern about the militias. The problem of the proliferation of arms in the Sudan has been created by the civil wars in the surrounding African countries, which has resulted in the introduction of arms to the Sudan. In addition, there are fighters scattered around all the Eastern and Southern area. They will need to be covered by a joint commission.
Paper 3 What if Peace Comes? by Lt. Gen. (Retired) Mkungu Joseph Lagu
Mr. Chairman, Ladies and gentlemen:
I wish to talk about what follows, or the series of events if and when peace comes. It may be on the horizon by the grace of God. The moment the main text of a peace agreement is concluded and signed, comprehensive cease-fire follows. Each one of the opposing top commanders orders his forces to halt hostilities, and the opposing forces await further instructions from their respective commands. Supplementary to the main text of the agreement will be the definition and the establishment of: 1. (a) A Cease-fire Commission, and (b) a Joint Technical Military Commission. 2. The interim period and its duration 3. The security arrangement within the interim period 4. The Provisional Arrangements (Government or Governments) within the interim period.
We have had examples of these in the Sudan following the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement, which was a unique agreement and may not repeat itself. The level of distrust was not as high by then as it is now.
The cease-fire Commission
The membership of the Commission was entirely Sudanese, drawn from the then standing government army and from the Anya-nya freedom fighters, the military wing of South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), equitably. Chairmanship was left to government forces on the understanding that they had more experienced personnel. Their task was to monitor cease-fire violations. Goodwill prevailed on either side for the peace achieved to hold. Relatively things went well and there were hardly any violations of the cease-fire in the earlier months following
the signing of the agreement. The freedom fighters were camped separately from the government forces.
The joint Technical Military Commission
It was composed as the above, their task was the intake and absorption of the anya-nya guerrillas into the Sudanese army and the other auxiliary forces as agreed in the peace accord and decommissioning the left-outs and fitting them in civil departments. As the unity of the country is still uncertain, integration of the two forces will not be immediate. The south may have to sustain a separate force until within the interim period. Absorption or integration may be local within the south. That is absorbing or integrating with the SPLA, the other factions that broke away from it, or those southerners who collaborated with the Sudan Government forces known as the friendly forces.
The Interim period and its duration
18 months was the duration of the Provisional Southern Regional Government that came about by appointment. Thereafter, a general election was held in the south that brought about an elected regional assembly that chose its executive council, the regional government in accordance with the terms of the peace accord. The forth-coming interim period will be in accordance with the provision of the peace accord that will be signed.
The security arrangement within the interim period
That is the precautionary arrangement to safeguard against violations, especially by the more advantaged, the government and to ensure the security of the members of the other side and those citizens identified with them during the interim period. This time the precautionary measures will have to include clearance of land mines to ensure safe returns to the common people, the internally displaced people and returnees from exile. The project is presented below after the next paragraph.
The Provisional Arrangements (Government or Governments)
In the previous arrangement, the main text of the Agreement was Self-Government in the South within the one Sudan. Assuming that the next agreement will follow the IGAD DoP, my proposals are as stated in my open letter under the headings, The Interim arrangement, page 12. And the security arrangement under the system will be as stated thereafter under the heading, Structure and Function of the Regular Forces in the same letter below at the same page.
CLEARANCE OF MINES IN THE SUDAN INTRODUCTION
The following project is proposed to deal with the removal or the destruction of all land mines, anti personnel mines and other dangerous implements of war that remain a hazard to life and must be dealt with to enable the Sudanese to resume a normal lifestyle without danger in the future. The history of landmines in the Sudan dates back to the Second World War when mines were laid in the desert of Northern Sudan, some of these remain in place to date. Further mines were laid during the Anya-nya War again some may still be in place. No serious effort seems to have been made in the past to ensure that these mines were all cleared. Following recurrence of hostilities, many still remain to maim and kill innocent people and kill livestock. Since the start of the current war more extensive use has been made of all types of landmines, in addition to anti-tank mines and anti personnel mines, there are other unexploded ordinance and cluster bombs in many places. It was recently reported that 251 minefields have been identified in the south of the country and there could be many more. This has resulted in a legacy of up to possibly 2,000,000 mines of one type or another in the countryside, which will have to be cleared. Due to the conditions prevailing at the time of hostilities these mines were not lifted by the forces that laid them and have been left behind in the ground, mainly unmarked, or if scattered from aircraft, or abandoned as the result of disturbance by shelling or otherwise they are left totally unmarked. The government of the Sudan has been responsible for the laying some of these mines and should in turn be responsible for the financing of their removal once peace is achieved. The area covered by this proposal includes all six provinces of the Southern Sudan. Also parts of the North in the provinces of Southern Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, Kassala and Red Sea, where mines may have been laid. Some may be more seriously affected than others, and until we can obtain more accurate information it is assumed that Eastern Equatoria will be the worst affected, but all will need the same attention. Throughout this project the intention is to employ Sudanese nationals where ever possible resorting to others only when there is no Sudanese available. It is appreciated that there has been clearance of mines by local authorities in areas where the war has passed over, such as around Yei and other towns in the South. The people who have been involved in this clearance will be a great asset, as they know how to go about the work. The new scheme can build on their expertise. To establish a figure of the mines laid it will be necessary for all sides in the conflict to give any information in their possession, as to the types of mine laid, numbers used and where they were laid. There must be information somewhere in the records of the numbers of mines that were made available for use in this conflict by both sides; this will give a base from which we can proceed. The type used is most important in that the training programme can be geared with the
emphasis on dealing with these types. On the actual location of mine fields, they must provide any maps or other evidence as to where and when mines were laid. This can only happen when peace is declared. The local population must be consulted to find out what they know about any minefields in their area, they may have seen people actually laying mines. The first priority must be the provision of personnel who are able to survey and map the areas where the initial survey indicates that there are mines in specific areas. Up to date maps will be required to enable accurate pin pointing of the mined areas. The second priority is to map all the areas adjacent to towns and villages where mines have been laid, establish where these mines are, demarcate these areas with a suitable fence to keep out livestock and ensure that these areas can be clearly seen and people warned of the danger. It will also be necessary to identify areas away from the towns and villages where mines may have been laid, such as approaches to stream or river crossings or cross roads, water supplies or other special places, these areas are to be treated in the same way with fences and notices. This will give an indication of the numbers of personnel that will be required to carry out the eradication programme. Temporary accommodation will have to be found for classroom and living accommodation for the instructors and trainees who will be needed for the mapping programme.
INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
It is proposed that a permanent institute be established which will become a centre for training, research and development. Specialists will be trained so that they are competent to deal with any explosive device, booby trap, bomb, and with all types of mine that may be encountered. Some of this extensive training will have to be given outside the Sudan. There is a need for an institution of this nature to keep up to date with new technology. The specialists thus trained would be available to help other countries and to use their knowledge through out Africa if required. This institute will be built in Juba. The Institute will be responsible for the organisation, co-ordination, planning and implementation of this project and for the training of teaching personnel who will be needed to staff the Mine Eradication Training Schools. For very many years into the future there will be a need for people who are trained in the location and eradication of landmines. These people should be readily available at the minimum of notice.
MINE ERADICATION TRAINING SCHOOLS
The greatest difficulty in implementing a project of this nature will be to have sufficient numbers of properly trained personnel available, who are aware of the inherent dangers of mine location and disposal and are willing to carry out the work. This raises the question of who is best for the job: a person who is completely reliable under all circumstances, does not take a risk under pressure, has the absolute trust of his fellow workers and is fully trained in the art of mine location, recognition of type of mine and the way to dispose of it without risk or danger to himself or others. This can only be achieved by strict personnel selection and training. The most important thing throughout this project is SAFETY. There will be other personnel to be recruited: Teachers, Doctors, Technicians, and Plant Operators etc. If there is to be any impact on the problem it will be essential to set up an on- going training programme as soon as possible, where personnel become available trained in mine clearance. One suggested way to obtain the personnel needed is to advertise through out the army or any other fighting forces that have been involved during hostilities, for anyone interested in taking up employment in the field of mine clearance and disposal. This would target those who may have been responsible for laying the mines in the first place. The applicants would then be screened and, if found suitable, taken to a training school for training in the art of mine clearance so they can carry out the work. It will be some time before any trained personnel become available to commence the actual work of clearing the mined areas. This time should be used to get on with the construction of the training schools, which will become the centre for the co-ordination and control of the mine clearance programme in that Province. It must be borne in mind that the clearing of the whole countryside of mines will take a long time and all efforts should be made to recruit trainees from each area where mines have been laid and form them into teams so that local people will comprise the team that will clear their home areas. Wherever possible a complete team should be formed from the local people. The team leader will be an essential element of the personnel structure and should be a local person wherever possible, thereby ensuring that there will always be someone on hand to deal with any mines that may be located in the future. Once a team is formed it will be allocated an area of operations and will be responsible for that specific area once these areas are known.
EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS
All operational staff will be fully insured. Initially there will of necessity be the requirement to employ expatriate staff to train local people recruited for the project in the art of survey and mine clearance, once training is completed it will be necessary for the trained teams to be
supervised until they are competent. Although no time scale has been suggested the services of expatriates will be dispensed with as soon as appropriate. Pay scales 1. Sudanese Nationals Sudanese Nationals will be paid at the scales laid down by the Ministry of Labour against their qualifications if there is no scale for the post a suitable equivalent scale will be used, the exception being the people who are engaged on actual mine eradication who will receive an additional sum. Once they have completed a satisfactory probationary period all personnel will be given a service contract covering all conditions of employment this contract will be renewable dependant on need.
Pay scales 2. Expatriate Staff For the period that they are employed they will be paid the going rate plus any other benefits that they would receive on a similar project elsewhere in the world. Appendix 5 Pay scales.
MINE CLEARANCE 1 Roads It is essential that action is taken as soon as possible to clear the major roads between the towns of all mines to a distance of 25 metres from the centre of the road on both sides, making a mine free area of 50 metres. This will allow vehicles to park off the road if necessary. This area must be demarcated and notices displayed to inform the public that there might be mines beyond the demarcated area. When the carriageway and verges of all the roads are cleared it will be possible to gain access to the major southern towns in safety. 2 Major towns Demarcation, fencing and clearing of mines in the areas in or adjacent to towns to allow free movement of people and livestock: Juba, Torit, Nimule, Yei, Kapoeta, Bor, Malakal, Wau, Rumbek, Maridi, Mundri, Yambio. These are the areas that could be most affected and need to be dealt with as soon as possible due to the population density. Information may be more readily available as to mined areas in these places and the number of people at risk is so much greater. It will be necessary to accurately establish the numbers of people in each town and village so that a detailed development plan can be drawn up. This development plan should cover as far as possible all aspects of development, Health, Education, Agriculture etc.; we can for instance,
once we have accurate numbers, estimate future requirements of the necessities of life. To this must be added the natural increases of population. 3 Other Towns and Villages. No attempt has been made to list by name the numerous smaller towns and villages that have been affected by the war but they are of significant importance as these are the areas where both humans and livestock are at risk. It should be noted at this point that over the years of trouble the land surrounding towns and villages has become denuded of trees which have been cut down for security reasons resulting in large tracts of cleared land causing longer journeys for the collection of wood fuel by the people, increasing the danger from mines and bringing erosion to the countryside. This is possibly the area where most of the mines have been laid and there may be considerable soil disturbance. Once an area is cleared of mines consideration will have to be given to its future use, the land may not be suitable for crop production and may be more suitable for long-term development. It will be important that the ownership of the land in question is established at this point. The rightful owner should decide as to what use the land should be put. Consideration may be given for this land to be included in a possible-co-operative forestation project. Once established the forest will provide wood fuel in the form of logs or charcoal. Before clearing of mines takes place a prioritised list will have to be made taking into consideration such factors as the economy of the area, the need to be able to cross the area for communication purposes or other important factors to ensure that the most beneficial cost efficient use of mine clearance personnel is made.
TIMESCALE
It is essential that an initial survey be conducted along all major roads of communication between the towns so that a clear understanding of the situation is established as soon as possible. This will identify the areas that need early attention. An expatriate survey team will be sent to Sudan once hostilities cease to carry out this exercise. They will immediately commence training local personnel in this work while carrying out the survey.
FINANCIAL COST
There are at least 700 different types of mines manufactured worldwide in a variety of shapes, sizes and colours. It costs about $ 3 to produce an anti-personnel mine. The cost of laying a mine is covered in the expense of waging war. However, to locate and remove the mine from
the ground when hostilities cease may cost between US $ 30 and $ 300. If this figure is correct a vast sum of money will be required to deal with the problem. The financial implications of a project of this nature cannot be assessed, as there is no known criterion at present of the average cost of mine clearance.
FUNDING
To finance this project it is proposed that a charge be made of US $ 0.50 (fifty cents) on every barrel of oil exported from the Sudan on to the world market with immediate effect until such time as the whole of the Country is cleared of mines. The funds resulting from this charge are to be placed in an internationally supervised and monitored trust fund operated by the World Bank, strict control must be established from the outset, funds must be readily available for the implementation of the programme that can be drawn down without delay. Nothing should stand in the way of getting the project underway so that the clearance of all mines is dealt with as soon as possible.
DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1. JUBA RESEARCH INSTITUTE
The Juba Research Institute will be the Headquarters of this mine eradication project and will be built in Juba. It will be properly laid out so that office accommodation and storage space is provided in sufficient quantities to accommodate all the officers, staff and equipment that will be needed for the training programme for mine eradication and thereafter, as the centre for specialised training in Explosive Ordinance Disposal. With classrooms and lecture theatre facilities as required. There will also be a fully staffed hostel with 30 double bedrooms for students with full facilities for dining and relaxation. A board of governors will be appointed who will define the role of the Institute its activities and policy, this board will be the authority who will authorise the draw down of funds to finance the implementation of the mine eradication programme from the World Bank Trust Fund set up for this purpose. The Principal and a staff of competent people who will be responsible for both long term and day to day running of the Institute will implement the board’s policy. One of the first things to be done at the Institute will be to train the teachers who will staff the Mine Eradication Training Schools. It is expected that this training will take six months involving the training of 60 specialists required for the training schools. Temporary accommodation must be found for this institute to enable a start to be made on the mine eradication training schools programme as soon as possible.
2. MINE ERADICATION TRAINING SCHOOLS
If we are to make any impact on the problem it will be essential to have an on-going training programme where 100 personnel become available trained in mine clearance every 3 months. Initially a total of 1,000 trained personnel, are aimed at from each training school, which will make up 40 teams and will take a period of 30 months to achieve. This figure multiplied by 6 proposed training schools will give a total force of 6,000 personnel available for the actual clearing of mines. These numbers will have to be reviewed from time to time in the light of experience and need. Each of these training schools will be the base that will coordinate the mine clearance programme for that province. It will have a fully operational hostel to accommodate the students during training. It will have a catering section, which will provide all food, and other requirements for the working camps, which will be situated along the roads during mine clearance.
Proposed sites for the training schools are 1. Torit Eastern Equatoria 2. Maridi Western Equatoria 3. Bor Junglei 4. Rumbek El Buheyrat 5. Wau Bahr el Ghazal 6. Malakal Upper Nile
These locations have been chosen for two reasons, the first is that there may have been extensive mining operations around these towns during the conflict. The second is that these locations are the larger towns with some of the facilities required to enable a start to be made on the training programme in temporary accommodation. Each training school will be sited on a selected site and designed with its future use in mind. There are many uses that come to mind and each one will have merit. In this plan it is proposed that these schools, once sufficient people have been trained to clear the mines in that province should then become tourist class hotels. Once peace is established and it is safe to travel between towns, there will be a great demand for hotel accommodation especially from tourists. Mine Eradication teams for the Southern Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile regions will be trained at the Malakal and Wau training schools.
3. MINE ERADICATION Eradication Team As trained personnel become available they will be formed into teams. A team will consist of 1 Supervisor / Leader and 6 units of 4 trained mine seekers per unit making a total of 25 people. Each of these teams will have the support of the technical team who will have the plant equipment and machinery to back up the eradication teams work where necessary. Accommodation for the mine eradication teams in the field will be in portable Accommodation units or tents.
4. CLEARANCE OF MINES 1. Roads of communication. The cost of clearing mines on a section of road 150 kilometres in length in Zimbabwe, which took a period of 20 months to complete, was ECU 10,000,000 or the equivalent of U.S.$ 6,200,000. This road had been extensively mined, in some places a density of 8,000 mines per kilometre were found. It is not expected to find this type of mine density in Sudan. In this distance of 150 Kilometres over 250,000 anti-personnel and directional fragmentation mines were cleared. This works out at U.S.$ 24.80 per mine. When considering the cost per kilometre of road cleared it is U.S.$ 41,500. At this rate the cost of clearing the roads in this project will be U.S.$ 223,000,000. The clearance of mines on the major roads to a distance of 50 metres from the centre line of the road to allow movement between the towns will be the first priority in the clearance of mines section of the project. There will have to be staging points along the road so that vehicles may be able to park off the road if necessary due to breakdown or other reason, it is proposed that the staging area be a section of road 300 metres long by 200 metres wide fenced and clearly demarcated as a safe area every 60 kilometres, this area will be used in the first instant by the mine eradication team to set up camp while clearing the road. Toilet facilities in the form of deep pit latrines will have to be dug and buildings built at these points. It is planned that a bore- hole be drilled to provide a permanent water supply. A total of some 85 staging areas may be needed.
Major roads Juba To Nimule 198 Kilometres Juba To Yei 161 Kilometres Yei To Aba 61 Kilometres Yei To Kileba 68 Kilometres
Yei To Maridi 160 Kilometres Yei To KajoKaji 142 Kilometres Juba To Torit 135 Kilometres Torit To Kapoeta 148 Kilometres Kapoeta To Lokichogio 98 Kilometres Juba To Yambio 430 Kilometres Yambio To Wau 440 Kilometres Wau To Nyamliel 135 Kilometres Wau To Raga 290 Kilometres Wau To Mundri 410 Kilometres Juba To Bor 160 Kilometres
The under mentioned roads are important access roads but can only be used in the dry season from December to May each year. They will have to be cleared once conditions are suitable. Bor To Malakal 800 Kilometres Bor To Pibor Post 400 Kilometres Pibor Post To Akobo 170 Kilometres Malakal To Nasir 400 Kilometres Malakal To Renk 600 Kilometres Total 5,406 Kilometres
The following gives an approximate figure of major road kilometres for each of the Provinces. Eastern Equatoria 1,331 Kilometres Western Equatoria 870 Kilometres Bhar El Ghazal 835 Kilometres Junglei 1,370 Kilometres Upper Nile 1,000 Kilometres Total 5,406 Kilometres
Once the mines are cleared from the major roads of communication the emphasis will then be on clearing the roads to the minor towns and villages to give vehicular access.
2. Major Towns Areas around the towns that are known to be mined must be dealt with as soon as sufficient teams for the clearance of the major roads are in place. As additional mine clearance teams become available they will be used on this part of the project, and remain there until all mines are dealt with and the area is once again safe
3. Other towns and villages Again these areas will be dealt with as additional mine clearance teams become available. All teams will be subject to transfer to other areas once they have completed their appointed area under the policy of the original prioritised listed.
4. Other areas not included above These areas are not clearly defined as they may not be close to town or village, but would include areas that take in important observation points such as hills or other strategic points. Once all areas are cleared of mines the teams will be returned to their original base where they were trained. I have prepared this project proposal with the help of friends in the UK who have been to the Sudan and assisted in re-construction in the south and travelled there extensively. They are ready to make their services available when peace is regained. In addition, I have alerted my colleagues in WCARGA (Worldwide Consultative Association of Retired Generals and Admirals) to get prepared and be on the call to contribute in landmines clearance operations in the Sudan.
Joseph Lagu Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Presented at 5th Sudan Peace-Building Programme July 22 – 26, 2002 Codicote, Nr. Hitchin, Hertfodshire, SG4 8TL
Paper 4 To My Fellow Sudanese: Which Way Forward? by Lt. Gen. (Retired) Mkungu Joseph Lagu
Prelude
My fellow Sudanese, Fraternal greetings from me Joseph Lagu, son of Yakobo Yanga your compatriot from Moli section of the Madi tribe. I was born in Momokwe, a hamlet in Moli area and bred in Nimule, southern Sudan. I attended schools at Akot in Dinka Agar area, Bahr el Ghazal Province, Loka in the Pajulu tribe territory, Yei River District, Equatoria Province, and then Rumbek for the secondary school, again in Agarland. Subsequently, I went to military academy at Omdurman in northern Sudan. I speak three of the southern languages: my mother tongue Madi, Dinka and Acholi, besides Arabic and English. I lived, worked and travelled extensively in the Sudan: from Nimule to Wadi Halfa and from Kassala to El Geneina. In this respect I know my country, the Sudan. By conviction, I took up arms to fight for the justifiable cause of South Sudan in an attempt to repel what looked like northern cultural aggression that I detested. When the north indicated acquiescence to halt that type of pressure, again by conviction, I made peace with the then leadership in the north, March 1972. I strove to consolidate that peace by remaining to serve as an officer in the armed forces for six years, quite unprecedented a move in revolutionary struggles. I was thereafter elected President of Southern Region of Sudan. Following that I was appointed Vice-President of the Republic. After the demise of that government, I sought leave to remain in the UK. I was recalled to the Sudan by Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi of an elected government in 1988 and subsequently appointed a roving ambassador. I was confirmed in that assignment by the government that followed. I dropped out of the system voluntarily in August 1998 in order to be able to express my views on the outstanding political issues in the country impartially.
I have served my country in three distinct but interrelated capacities namely: as a soldier, a politician and a diplomat. I have been an officer in the regular army and a guerrilla commander. I experienced both war and peace. Because of my eagerness to share with you my experiences, reflections and vision, I am writing to you this letter - which is my second exposition. I wrote to you the first letter in April 1991, when I was serving as our country’s ambassador to the United Nations. The purpose of this letter is: a) to explore the way forward by reflecting upon past and current situation in our country, b) to provoke and promote serious discussion, with a pragmatic view to attain peace and normality in our country, c) to draw a proposal for an interim political arrangement pending a referendum, currently a popular call amongst southerners, the result of which shall decide the future of the country and status of the south.
Background to the Conflict Fellow countrymen, time has come to reflect upon the impact of the atrocious civil war which has ravaged our country since 1983. It is time to seek solutions towards the attainment of peace -- for it is peace that our people yearn for and desire today -- it is what they must have! The people of our country especially southern Sudanese, have known little peace, since the dawn of independence 46 years ago. The principal cause of the civil war in the Sudan has been political disparity between north and south. This imbalance was partly a legacy of the colonial era. As we know, similar struggles have arisen elsewhere in the third world and in the African continent.
When I took up arms to fight against injustice being inflicted upon the people of southern Sudan, it was my conviction then as it is now that all men are equal and should have the freedom and opportunity to fully participate in the political processes and development of their country. The people of southern Sudan have been politically oppressed and marginalised for a long time. Some northern Sudanese political ideologues then and now seek to destroy the African culture and identity of southern Sudanese. They try to do so by imposing the Islamic faith and Arabism on the principally African and Christian people of southern Sudan. Though a political agreement was signed in Addis Ababa, March 1972, giving southern Sudan an autonomous status within a unitary Sudan, it did not take another leader to abrogate it. It was President Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri himself who signed the peace agreement with the south that watered the agreement down and eventually abrogated it, June 1983. The apparent steps towards the abrogation of the agreement precipitated the second armed conflict that erupted in May 1983.
I follow with great concern that since then about three million people have lost their lives either in battle, or as a consequence of the war, due to diseases, malnutrition or starvation. Many more live in Diaspora either in neighbouring countries or far afield in Europe, Canada, Australia and America. Thousands who have fled to northern Sudan in search of peace and hospitality found very little of those. Instead they are subjected to continuous harassment, forceful relocation and have no easy access to food or shelter. This is dehumanising. School-age children too, find difficulty to secure education, and if they do, are instructed in Arabic and taught the Islamic faith against their will and the will of their parents, if they are still alive. None of the successive governments stand free of blame from this abuse of power since the eruption of the ongoing conflict in May 1983. It is to be noted that any infrastructure which was established during the relative peace, 1972-1982, has been reduced to rubbles. It is against this background that I ask the question, “My fellow Sudanese, which way forward ?”
A challenge to Sudanese. Since the reconciliation between France and Germany, western Europe has become a dynamic power for the world dialogue of peace. It was western Europe that kept the dynamics of hope which finally broke the Marxist stronghold of eastern Europe. There are still problems and social excesses in Europe, but there is also a dynamic quest for an enlightened world where religious and cultural values of Africa and Asia are gaining acceptance and respect. It is incumbent upon the Sudan government to demonstrate a positive attitude towards peace and reconciliation. This will give the impression of a realistic and forward looking politics. Since independence, our country has experienced many political dynamics. Political parties and military juntas of different political shades and colours have all had the chance to rule or mis-rule the country, without resolving the standing national political problems. It is high time that a system is designed to accommodate all the different political aspirations and expectations expressed by all the different sectors of the Sudanese population. I wish to emphasize that this would be the prerequisite for attainment of sustainable peace and stability in our beloved country.
Positive moves I noticed some moves, aimed towards softening the situation taken by the government since August 1995 that I considered relevant moves. These were the ministerial changes, the reorganisation of the security organs, the release of political detainees; and the rather relaxed security situation that followed. Subsequently, the relaxation embraced political tolerance that allowed other political view points to be expressed freely inside the country. After the events of the 11th of September the Government of Sudan became more cooperative with the US and the international community. This made potential friends of the country hopeful that the government was preparing the grounds for political dispensation that will advance the cause of internal peace and open the door to national reconciliation. It is my perception that the moves, if advanced, will improve government relationship with the wider world community.
Practical steps The need for attaining peace with justice cannot be over emphasized. If someone were to ask me a down-to-earth question, what would you Joseph Lagu do in these circumstances, my reply would be: 1. To advise a cease-fire and immediate halt to the fighting. The opposing forces to freeze where they are at the time of announcement of such a cease-fire and peace talks continue as is the case now in Sri-Lanka. The oil companies to suspend operations in the south until peace agreement is concluded. 2. To urge the incumbent administration to renew overtures for peace with the south which offers a link with the north through a single southern authority within the structure of a national government similar to the Addis Ababa Agreement, 1972. That is to be adopted as an interim arrangement. 3. To encourage and broaden open national debate without pre-conditions as this could provide the basis for achievement of comprehensive and sustainable peace. 4. To solicit for declaration of multi-party politics, general amnesty, lifting harzadous measures obstructing other political parties, and registration of the SPLM and political wings of the other remaining opposition groups as legitimate parties.
In my opinion these moves will indicate positive steps towards national reconciliation. It may lead to the evolution of a new political system involving the various shades of political opinions in the country. And, could enable members of the present administration to participate in any future government of national reconciliation, without being victimised. I perceive that the process may result in a new revolution for genuine peace and reconciliation in the pattern of South Africa.
I had always felt welcomed during visits to the Sudan. I wish to register the warmth and attention I received both from the government and the public especially in May and September 1996 and later in May-June 2001. I realised that our people still had confidence in what I have to say, and expect my contribution towards the achievement of peace in our country. I felt most obliged and would therefore wish to do something to meet that trust. In May and September 1996, I had the chance to meet principal political figures. I met the President of the Republic and his then deputies, as well as the then Speaker of the Assembly and deputies. I also met the then Minister for Foreign Affairs and few other Ministers. In addition, I met two of my former colleagues: Sayed Sadiq el Mahdi and Sayed Abel Alier. With the latter two, my main contention was that, it was the duty of the three of us to moderate political temperature. This was by the virtue of our being considered elders at national level. It was clear that they concurred with me. After all, they too would not wish the political situation to deteriorate any further than it already had. Mr. El Mahdi said that his decision to remain in the country, despite constant harassment by the security forces indicated his commitment to non-violent methods as means to resolving political problems. “That is my practical demonstration of goodwill.” He said. In the May-June 2002 visit I also met the President, the second Vice-President, and the Chairman of the Southern Coordination Council. I was offered the courtecy to be taken to Juba to talk to the people there and also hear from them. In Khartoum I also met the Secretary General of the ruling party, the National Congress. I expressed my views and also heard from him. I met other officials involved in the peace process. During that visit I also met my two colleagues and comrades, Sayed Sadiq el Mahdi and Mr. Abel Alier. We exchanged views and shared experiences as before. The purpose of the visit was to advise a halt to the war while peace talks continue, and strive for a national understanding: south- south dialogue parrallel to north-north dialogue then panSudan dialogue. I believe that is the way to peace in the Sudan.
My visit to New York, January 1996 The significance of the Moral Re-armament’s international work has attracted the attention of intellectuals, as a result of a book entitled, Religion the missing Dimension of Statecraft. The organisation is renamed Initiative for Change (IC). Its Office in New York provides liaison between Initiative for Change, the diplomatic missions as well as the United Nations Secretariat. This book which impressed the Archbishop of Canterbury, who made a specific reference to it in his address in Khartoum and at Al- Azhar University, is the product of a study sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It took the US State Department to task, for its failure to understand the sensitivity and importance of religious culture, which guide nations in the making of national policies. The secularisation of international diplomacy leads to failure, the book argues. It is therefore opportune and quintessential to appreciate the value and the contribution made to human condition by the great religions.
My visit to New York coincided with the Security Council’s decision to support the Ethiopian request for the extradition from Sudan of those allegedly involved in the attempted assassination of President Mubarak. At the same time the Secretary General’s office announced that the amount of humanitarian assistance needed to compensate for the effect of the war in the Sudan was over $100 million for 1996. “Does this not make the need for peace urgent?” I reasoned. Among those I talked to was ambassador Legwaila of Botswana, a member of the Security Council, who was to assume presidency of the Security Council in March 1996. He was of the impression that any peace initiative by government of the Sudan would be welcomed by the UN Security Council. I then inferred from this that a serious peace proposal from the Sudan Government would have a positive impact on how the Security Council would view the extradition question.
This prompted me to propose to the government that I be invited to open a dialogue between the government and leadership of the SPLM/A. I indicated that this effort for arbitration could be extended to include northern opposition groups. In a letter to the President of the Republic, I had this to say: “The decision to impose the Sharia Law in the Sudan was not of your government but that of former President Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri, in addition, your government did not initiate but inherited the current conflict from preceding regimes. If you share my views, I would suggest that you initiate concrete proposals for peace. My position as a former anya-nya (the guerrilla army preceding SPLA) leader, President of the HEC for the Southern Region, and Vice-President of the Republic, gives me a unique position for the task of mediation at national level.
It was a sad day when the Addis Ababa agreement was breached, Mr. President; since then you will agree that our country has known little else, but war and poverty. Is it not time to revisit the principles of the Addis Ababa Agreement? It might be that concessions have to be made by your government to elicit response from the people of southern Sudan to resume a solution modeled on Addis Ababa. I believe this is the only way forward and I strongly commend it to you. I also hold the view that the Sudan should be a federation of two states, equal in status: north and south. Each state with its institutions empowered to impart educational, religious and cultural development to sustain their respective identities. At this juncture, it is imperative for northern Sudanese to recognise, accept and leave southern Sudanese to practice and develop their own culture. For I believe this is the cardinal point of the continuous unrest between south and north and for the ongoing civil strife, and it must be addressed in any new political or constitutional arrangement”.
Sadiq el Mahdi had to go into exile On 10 December 1996 in a surprise move the Ansar leader, Sayed Sadiq el Mahdi escaped from the Sudan. There were reports that he was waited for at a spot specified by a group of friends where he was air-lifted by a helicopter. On 12 December, two days after, the exit was in the world news headlines, the BBC radio world programme and television channels were reporting on the dramatic escape. I watched over the Middle-East Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) Arabic service, Mr. El Mahdi being received in an Eritrean country-side by the Secretary-General of the Umma party, Dr. Omar Nur el Daim. No helicopter apparently appeared at the scene of the reception. The departure of Mr. El Mahdi from the Sudan appeared to contrast sharply with the principle which he said he stood for during my visits in May and in September 1996. Whatever its merits or demerits, the defection of Mr. El Mahdi indicated the beginning of a new development that was soon to be.
It seemed the opposition NDA alliance waited for Mr. El Mahdi to join them in exile, because the opposition forces hitherto silent, resumed military actions shortly after Mr. El Mahdi joined them. In January 1997, the Sudan Allied forces (SAF) started some military operations against government positions bordering Eritrea. On 12 January 1997, Northern Sudan Brigade (NSB), an SPLA regiment in the north, overran the towns of Kurmuk and Geisan along Ethiopia-Sudan border threatening the strategic town of Damazin and nearby Roseires hydro-electric dam. The opposition groups called for a popular uprising. Whilst the government was urging the same population for a popular support to repel what they believed was a foreign backed invasion of the Sudan from north-east. Khartoum announced that the country had been invaded by a force of combined Tigrean armies of Ethiopia and Eritrea.
After about a month’s interlude, the SPLA forces were on the offensive again. They launched a series of lightening attacks as from 6 March, this time from the south along the borders with Uganda’s West Nile Province. Similarly Khartoum reported the invasion of the country by neighbouring Uganda. The invading forces overran army posts of Kaya, Morobo, Iwatoka and Limbe (Juba - Yei Kajo Keji road junction). On 13 March, the Arabic Middle East Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), interrupted its programme and announced the fall of Yei to the SPLA while Loka and Lainya were under siege. Those out posts of Yei subsequently fell to the SPLA as well, bringing the SPLA closer to Juba, the capital of South Sudan. The strategy seemed to be to encircle the government forces, exhaust and force them to rebel to join the opposition in toppling the system.
Amazing! Unprecedented strange political scenarios were taking place in the Sudan at the time.
The opposition forces comprising of SPLA, SAF, NDA have grouped into an alliance on one side: Whilst Riak Machar’s SSIM/A, SPLM/A Bahr el Ghazal group and the incumbents of Khartoum administration on the other. Incredible! It seems strangely in politics, interests or basic need for survival supersedes logic.
Laughable situations What is more ludicrous is the behaviour of some of the northern leaders when out of power! They don’t seem to indicate any sign of patriotism in such situations. 1. Fieldmarshal President Leader, El Imam Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri, who precipitated the eruption of the ongoing conflict tried to suppress the new movement ruthlessly. He used all means he could grab to do so. In his attempts to isolate the south, he sought friendship and cooperation of leaders of the immediate neighbouring states. Subsequently, he commissioned the training at the Sudan Military Academy large numbers of military officers more specifically, for two neighbouring states: Uganda and Tanzania. Certainly, the then Ugandan leader, Dr. Milton Obote, was aware that the services rendered to his country could only amount to a political bribe. He must have been equally aware, that he was expected in return, not to allow southern Sudanese to use Uganda as a sanctuary. Rather, he was expected to turn such fugitives to the Sudanese authorities across the borders, should another conflict erupt in the Sudan. What one could not read at the time were the thoughts in the mind of the Tanzanian leader, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere.
In furthering such cynical moves, the Fieldmarshal was jammed in series of clandestine contacts with other leaders, including those of the State of Israel supposedly at war with the Sudan. Consequently, the Imam President, flew to Nairobi, Kenya, and met reportedly, none other than Ariel Sharon. One Israeli leader, the Arabs regard as the most radical and belligerent towards them, of all Israeli leaders. The meeting accounted for took place somewhere outside Nairobi. There, the transportation of the Fallasha Jews from Ethiopia through the Sudan was presumably concluded or advanced. Apart from the financial reward he was alleged to have received from the Israeli government, the Imam President, scored his important point -- he secured the friendship of the Israelis. A vital guarantee that southern leaders would be turned away by the Israelis should they go to them again to seek military support. Confident of the results of his diplomatic manoeuvres, the former President irritated the political atmosphere, to precipitate the ongoing conflict.
On losing power, the Fieldmarshal made advances for an alliance with the SPLA in order to regain power. This is ludicrous. He shamelessly sought the alliance of those he drove into rebellion and wanted to use them to overthrow the government of the day in Khartoum. What a man? When the country was no longer under his leadership, the government there is bad and must be dislodged, even with the help of mutineers, the Imam perceived. He was alleged to have promised to resolve the southern problem on his return to power. Would he? That alliance nonetheless, failed to materialise! I learnt from the SPLA that the Fieldmarshal declined to meet their modest request, to help with provision of clothes (uniforms) for the guerrillas to prove his seriousness. Thereafter, SPLM/A leadership lost interest and could not trust the Fieldmarshal any longer. Plainly, that has become the case with most southern compatriots. The former President, outwardly behaving as a chameleon; one day a communist, another day an Arab nationalist, or a Pan-African, over displayed the change of colours. He exhibited that by exercising Machiavellian type of politics too much, during the 16 years of his rule. Consequently he lost ground in the country -- sad for him, in the south, that was for good.
2. The Khatmiyya sect leader, the patron of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Sayed Mohammed Osman El Mirghani, rushed to the front line in Damazin when the SPLA launched their first penetration into northern Sudan in November 1987. He subsequently championed a call to the Arab world to support the Muslims in the Sudan under the Umma/DUP coalition government, 1986-89. He appealed for support to repel an invasion by ‘alien infidels’ as he termed them, from the south. The same man later became the leader of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) which included those he called 'alien infidels.' Is not that ludicrous? Ironically he thereafter resolutely pleaded with the same Arab world to support the alliance, spearheaded by the SPLA, those he once referred to as alien infidels. He did this in his drive to shatter the ongoing administration in Khartoum.
3. The Ansar sect leader and President of the Umma Party, Sayed Sadiq el Mahdi, Prime Minister of the Umma/DUP coalition government at the time, declared a state of emergency when the SPLA made the incursion into the north. He tried to push through the assembly a bill that would have legitimised the then existing militias, that included the dreaded murahileen, allegedly raised by him and therefore loyal to him. Those, reportedly, wrecked such havoc on the Dinka of Bahr el Ghazal. The same man escaped from Khartoum and found himself safe and sound in the headquarters of the NDA in Asmara. He was received with fervour there on defection from the Sudan. Subsequently he became the chief spokesman of the new opposition front, comprising of former rivals and enemies: the northern political parties grouped as NDA, and their southern counterpart, the SPLM. An unprecedented situation! However, the Ansar leader didn’t seem to fit comfortably well in the NDA, an organisation chaired by his life long rival. After four years in a relative discomfort he took another serious decision and announced his plan to return to the Sudan to do politics from within. Apparently, he was assured by the government that it was possible for him to lead his opposition party from within. He believed them. The system had announced general amnesty, allowed other political parties to operate within the Sudan and relaxed restrictions of free exppressions to attract the opposition groups. The Ansar leader duely returned to Khartoum in May 2000 and had a populous reception by his ansar followers and other curious onlookers, a contrast to the dramatic escape four year earlier.
4. The National Islamic Front (NIF) leader and founder, mentor and champion of the Islamic system in the Sudan, Dr. Hassan Abdallah Turabi, followed the same trend of action as the above mentioned three leaders, following a split in the NIF due to power struggle between him and the President. He had indicated plans to unseat the President through an act of the assembly. President Beshir moved decisively and swiftly. He dissolved the National Assembly to render Dr. Turabi toothless. The quarrel led to the split of NIF with the President’s group emerging stronger. The weaker group was progressively isolated and its members were placed under security surveilance. Subsequently, the militant among them including their leader were apprehended and placed behind the bars. The NIF founder, one that strove to bring to power the ongoing administration, turned nowhere else other than to the SPLM/A for alliance. He intucted those still loyal to him to go to meet SPLM/A representatives at an appropriate venue to scheme together to unseat the Beshir government. That is what prompted President Beshir to order his apprehension with some of his friends as mensioned above.
It isn’t a surprise any more. It has become the culture of the northern leaders as seen from the behaviour of those preceding the last actor, Dr. Hassan Abdallah Turabi. Coincidently, the NIF squabble for power and the split occurred around the same period with the return and populous reception accorded to the Ansar leader.
Things did not remain that good in the Umma Party, the political organ of the Ansar movement however. Following his seemingly triumphant return, it has been rumoured that the Ansar leader began to experience acts of insubordination from his cousin, Mubarak el Fadil el Mahdi. The actions of this other Mahdi as it is now clear seems to have caused a schism in Sudan’s largest political party. Whichever way one look at it, it is another set back. Any splits in any of the political groups or parties at this stage is a set back in contrast to mergers, which I consider as positive steps.
In summary however, one doubts if any of the four mentioned characters will ever behave differently should they come to power again in Khartoum. Yet, one's assumption may be wrong. It remains to be seen. Nevertheless, I doubt if any one of the four personalities will ever exercise political power again in the Sudan. If by miracle that happens, I hope the lucky survivor will benefit from the past mistakes and behave differently, having passed through the hard school of life.
Doubtful endeavours These political scenarios were not only strange but time proved that they could not be feasible. The position of SSIM/A and SPLM/A Bahr el Ghazal group was that of independence for South Sudan -- which must be said was and still is the popular aspiration of the people of South Sudan. It was unlikely that the NIF administration in Khartoum would accede to that, which however they did but tactically. As it turned out, it was only a move to pass time and survive. They prepared to dishonour it. At the time the position of the SPLA leader (Col. John Garang) was not clear. He also maintained a tactical position. The rank and file in the SPLA concurred with that of the other southern political groups, the right of self-determination for the people of South Sudan. It is the stand of SPLM at the IGAD sponsored peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya, that started on 17th of June 2002. During the visit of the UN Secretary Genenral to the Sudan this month, the Sudanese Minister of external relations, Sayed Mustafa Osman Ismail declared, “We have all come out of our tactical positions and are now in our true colours, Government and SPLM”. That ends the doubtful endeavours.
Compatriots, the situation in the country requires us citizens to turn to our senses: consult one another, ponder unselfishly, and seek guidance for peace and reconciliation in our country. Also we should appreciate the positions of the two combatant groups who now seem to understand what they are fighting for. Let us aim to construct a political arrangement that will accommodate all sides where victory will be to the Sudanese people as a whole and not to individuals, groups, or communities. I did agree with Mr. Abel Alier in his open letter addressed to the President of the Republic and the then Speaker of the National Assembly. In the letter he maintained that there was then sufficient basis for comprehensive peace talks, which according to him should include all the parties involved in the conflict. He added that concerned citizens who have not taken up arms, must also be involved in the peace process. He pointed out that the material for contention was provided by the following:
1) IGAD Declaration of Principles 1994, 2) Asmara Resolutions 1995 and 1996, 3) The letter of the Concerned Southerners 1995, 4) The Peace Charter, April 1996, signed between the GOS on one side, and SSIM and Associates on the other.
Fellow compatriots, let us stand together to see that an agreement is reached with justice for all. First and foremost, it is the Sudanese to secure that. Other nations and people can only act as catalysts to enable us Sudanese to reach an agreement and attain peace.
Focus on Northerners. I wish to refer at this point to you our northern compatriots. I believe there is still room to find a solution to the north-south conflict within one geographical Sudan. This can possibly be a form of union between south and north as two equal partners. I have consistently pointed out as early as the 1980s that a decentralised southern Sudan should be linked to the north through a single southern authority. This should be integrated into any emerging peace formula.
Perhaps you will want to know that most southern Sudanese resent the paternalistic attitude you demonstrate towards them, more-or-less as Egyptians display towards you. Again, this is a legacy of the colonial era: the grades of human beings was determined by the colour of skin they wore. Those with the white skin (colour of the imperial race) top and down wards as the colour of skin darkens to black (slave race colour) that we in the south wore. Our country was jointly ruled by Britain and Egypt with the latter being a junior partner in the condominium in accordance to the grade of human evaluation at the time. During the time, the Egyptians bowed to the British, and lorded over the Sudanese. And in turn, you bowed to the Egyptians and wanted to lord over us. This is the cause of our conflict with you. Why do you behave towards southerners as the imperialists do towards subject people, if truly you regard southerners as compatriots? You may have to convince them (southerners) that you do accept them as your equals just as they are, and not primitive people under your rule to be civilized. You may have to be content to retain your culture to yourselves. In addition, I advise that you keep your hands off southern matters. I observe that these are the main causes of resentment and hostilities. The south will reciprocate and reconsider its position with the north more favourably, if you take note of these and adjust your conduct accordingly. The outcome could be voluntary assent by the south to remain linked with the north in a form of a union, federation or confederation. I hope you will take my advice and reconsider your attitude towards the south and southerners.
The Interim arrangement For the interim period, I suggest that we explore political arrangement based on the Addis Ababa Agreement. In which case there should be established two self-governing regions in the Sudan. The northern region comprising of the six provinces of the north, as at the time of independence. It may have Khartoum as its capital. The component part in the union will be the southern region comprising of the three provinces of southern Sudan. This is to have as its capital the town of Juba as was the case following the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement. In my opinion, Kosti is an appropriate location for the new capital of the federation or confederation, in view of its central position.
Sovereignty and the supreme command of the armed forces should be vested in a five-man head of state commission with rotating chair. It should be recalled that this was the system the country adopted at independence in January 1956. This, in my opinion, will be acceptable to the various segments of the Sudanese community as a compromise solution. Whereas, at independence, the commission composed of one southerner and four northerners, this time it has to be fair and proportional. In other words, it should consist of two southerners. This will take into account the in-homogeneity of the south, a region that is inhabited by two distinct categories of peoples: the sedentary peoples of the equatorial crescent and the semi-nomadic pastoral peoples of the riverain plains. These are to be reflected in the commission. The three seats of the north should be allocated geographically: to the east, north, and west, but not to be apportioned to the political parties as was the case before. That system of allocation did not take into account even distribution of seats to the regions.
The federal government or the common authority of the confederation is to be similarly selected and composed. Each of the nine provinces, designated at independence, must be represented at least by one cabinet minister. This is essential, if the federal government is to have a truly national character. It is my vision for a stable and prosperous Sudan, a vision that could bring the warring, ethnic and religious groups in the country together. It will reduce discontentment, fear, marginalisation, or domination. As the regions will be self governing, and political power shared over what remains to be catered for at the centre, no region will be dominating, or marginalised.
Structure and Function of the Regular Forces Experience has shown elsewhere, and in the Sudan, that the command of an armed force once dominated by a section of the community, can be hazardous to democracy. Such a force will strive to alienate segments of other communities from the centre of political power. This is true because the armed forces have proved to be a massive power base in our part of the world. It is therefore essential that the composition of the armed forces is re-structured and balanced.
· The infantry: the basic element of the force should be restructured on the basis of the former Sudan Defence Force (SDF) with its units locally recruited. The system will have administrative advantages. For instance, familiarity with and use of local means of transport will be cheaper for the government. It will reduce the distance to be covered by the soldiers and their families on their way home or back from holidays. It will also reduce the spread of the killer virous (AIDS) as soldiers will remain with their families most of the time within their military districts. · The cadres of the air force, the navy and the other support arms, are to be recruited from all the provinces on a quota basis. · The staff and the rank and file of the external and internal security agencies should be similarly mustered as the above. · The police, the prison wardens and other auxiliary forces should be mobilized and deployed locally. In addition, there should be a federal police force, with limited duties to discharge local as well as national tasks. The federal police should have the task to observe and discharge professional standards within the police force nationwide.
The Forces must be apolitical It is imperative for the armed forces and the auxiliary forces to adopt an apolitical stance on national issues. The government of the day should desist from using the forces to their advantage vis-à-vis their political opponents.
It appears extraordinary to expect the police and the armed forces to uphold the national constitution and preserve the unity of the country if the population at large does not feel any bond of common citizenship. A constitution that is not drawn up and ratified by a common consensus is likely to be seen as being imposed by a privileged segment of the population on the others hitherto marginalised by the system. Such a constitution does not carry any justice or validity in the eyes of those who feel so marginalised. It is an established fact that anything imposed is looked at with contempt, and therefore subject to rejection. Let us learn from the history of other nations. Great empires have crumbled, albeit attempts to impose their culture and values on others. The use of the armed forces to preserve a standing system can be oppressive. This situation usually arises when political power in a country is not balanced and the composition of the armed forces conforms with the imbalance.
The people of southern Sudan have been for a long time edged off from fair representation in the armed forces. Consequently they have been subjected to political oppression, cultural bondage and military occupation. It resulted in the suppression of their political expressions and aspirations. It is to be recalled that since independence, southerners have consistently and systematically advocated a federal system of government as the most appropriate system that can accommodate the expressions and development of the various cultures of the Sudanese people. Sadly, this has been misconstrued by some northern political ideologues to mean secession. That category of northerners who have patronising attitudes, like our former colonial masters, regard the south to be their dominion and the people there their subjects. To them, the call for federation amounts to denying them the motive to ascend as masters over southerners. Those political ideologues forget that southerners contributed in the struggle for the independence of the country. Therefore, like any free people elsewhere in the world, they are entitled to their human and political rights. Instead of waging an atrocious war against the people of southern Sudan, the north should realise the irrelevance of the situation and must accept the realities and welcome to resolve national political problems through dialogue. This is the acknowledged norm in the current world situation. The riverain people of the north, obviously those who stepped into the shoes of the former colonial powers, must accept the other peoples of the Sudan as their equals, to participate fully with them in the affairs of the country as equal citizens. Thus aiming to create a situation that is conducive for the development of the nation and for keeping the country united. To act otherwise will result in the alienation of the other peoples, consequently, diminishing the chances of uniting the country.
Challenging the Armed Forces In the 46 years of Sudan’s national history, the armed forces have been repeatedly challenged in the south, because of their seemingly alien composition. They are seen in their present form as an instrument for advancement of northern culture and domination. It is to be noted that northern culture has been, and is still regarded as alien in the south. These sentiments have become progressively shared by people from other parts of the Sudan, outside the riverain region of the north. Since the dissolution of the Equatoria Corps (Units of the SDF in southern Sudan before independence), the rank and file units of the armed forces brought from the north, mainly blacks from the marginalised areas and officered by the brown riverain northerners, are viewed by southerners with contempt. They are regarded as mentioned earlier, instruments of oppression. To the southerners, these are occupation forces designed to maintain northern hegemony or colonial rule. Southern youths anticipate the days when they will expel those aliens and liberate their country. This is a factor in the continued civil strife. Contrast this with the relative peace during the regional government, when the anya-nya soldiers were integrated into the national army and deployed predominantly in the south. The situation gave southerners a sense of security and confidence, in which case, they had a measure of control over their lives within their region. Troubles came when an attempt to upset the preponderance of southerners in the southern garrisons was uncovered!
Misuse of the regular forces Compatriots, take caution! Let us learn from experiences of the past. The armed forces do not always necessarily remain in the barracks to discharge their designated duties. Experience has shown that from time to time they violated the very constitution they were supposed to uphold, preserve and honour. They crossed over into politics, whenever they could, where they clashed with politicians -- in short they became an alternate political band rivaling that of the civilians! Typically, they seize power in military coups d’ etate by capturing important military and civil installations in the capital. They depose civilian governments and assume power through the barrel of the gun. It is to be recalled that since independence, the army has seized power three times. Although initially the coups have been bloodless, they became bloody following subsequent counter coup d’etate attempts.
It is to be comprehended that the armed forces are staffed by fellow human beings who have human feelings, fears and ambitions. Some of them join the army to make their living as other people do in other professions. Drawn from a wide cross-section of the population, it may be unrealistic to expect them to have unwavering single dimensional political loyalty. They are not obliged to uphold indefinitely a military ruler. The armed forces dropped General Abboud to whom power was handed supposedly by the then Prime Minister, Abdullah Khalil, after they supported and applauded the General for six years. Following that, the armed forces sided with the mob in an uprising and ended the rule of Fieldmarshal Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri, after sustaining and keeping him in power for 16 years. In later years of his rule, they even paid him baya allegiance in accordance to Islamic rites, when he declared himself Imam (Islamic religious and temporal leader) as well. It is to be recalled that the Fieldmarshal seized power, at the rank of Colonel, from an elected civilian Prime Minister, Sayed Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub. Obviously, the armed forces can be relied upon for political support for sometime, but not always. As authenticated by the examples above, the armed forces can be a double-edge sword.
Unprecedented political and military alliances In the mid-1990s, strange and unprecedented political and military developments occurred in the Sudan. Of course they were not genuine, time remained to prove that, not long thereafter. The northern politicians who rigorously advocated military defeat of Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), whilst in power, had in opposition become allies of the southern based politico-military movement. Similarly, the yielding to self-determination for the south by the ongoing system which has a programme to islamise and arabise the south and keep it within a united Islamic Sudan was a deceptive move. Amazing! There was ostensibly a surprise move. Unexpectedly, the Islamists were those evidently moving towards an understanding with the supposed extremists elements of southern liberation factions! These were: South Sudan Independence Movement, SPLM/A Bahr el Ghazal group, SPLM/A Bor, and the Equatoria Defence Force. The declared aim of those groups is the independence of the south. It was to that effect that the incumbent administration signed a Peace Charter with leadership of those allied factions. Now the same administration wants to jump off from that commitment. Incredible! At the time, the warring factions in the Sudan were grouped into two hostile camps: across racial and cultural divides. Few would understand this sort of camping or grouping, because the political and cultural differences that divided the people behind them which precipitated the civil war had not been resolved. One presumed that the purpose of government understanding with those allied factions, as opposed to NDA-SPLA alliance was consequence of politics of survival, leave alone the so called tactical consideration. This is affirmed by the saying: In politics, there is no permanent enmity and no permanent friendship, what is permanent is interest.
Certainly, those alliances could only be construed as politics of convenience. Logic and patriotism do not seem to have place in this type of political scenario! The dynamics of politics in the Sudan necessitate the grouping of politicians into two categories: patriots and opportunists. The latter predominate the political culture in the country. More often than not, these opportunists, either in the government or in the opposition movements, change allegiance when power changes from hand to another in the country or movement. These political opportunists lack consistent political direction and often, as indicated above, desert their leaders once they are out of power. Besides, there are disgruntled politicians who resort to, or, instigate military rebellion so as to ovethrow the government of the day. Those go underground or filter out of the country to connive against an incumbent administration. Subsequently, they seek alliance with any opposition to an existing system. One example is that the NDA has allied with the SPLA, the very movement, whilst in power, they had contemptuously, with the northern masses behind them, termed mutineers. Conspicuously northerners use the term derogatorily to mean southern freedom fighters or separatists. They have not used the term in reference to the northern opposition elements, not even against those who took arms to fight the government in Khartoum.
It would be unfair, however, to term all Sudanese politicians and soldiers, as opportunists. There are patriots and statesmen among them, those put national interest first. I appeal to that category of Sudanese to objectively address the causes of the atrocious civil war and heed to the aspirations of the southern people. This will promote the cause of peace and political stability in the country. It is time to resolve this conflict congenially in order that the country may attain prosperity, long denied to it. Contemporary Southern Sudanese should be clear in their objectives in the endeavour to change northern hearts and minds. It may be wise that they stick to the political objectives they inherited from their predecessors, which in the first place motivated them to take up arms. On the other side, the present northern leaders should refrain from exploiting ethnic differences and divisions in the south, because southerners are capable of playing the same game these days. Together we should embark on re-constructing a political system that will accommodate the aspirations and needs of all Sudanese.
Inter-regional and intra-regional conflicts Since independence, the Sudan has not fought wars with other countries. For most of the past four decades, the country has been waging an atrocious war against itself, destroying its people, and material resources. The north-south conflict started at the eve of independence, August 1955. The present civil war erupted on 16 May 1983. Through experience and tenacious efforts, southerners have now acquired military skills which formerly have been northern exclusive possession. When it became clear that the anya-nya officers in Sudan army were gradually being phased out, some of the remaining officers of the former guerrilla army found themselves pressed hard against the wall. That pressure forced them into rebellion to form the SPLA; since then, the subsequent northern regimes failed to exercise restraint, wisdom and statesmanship, to handle the issue. In stead, they responded by greater militarisation of the north and the use of force to subdue the south. This they thought is the most appropriate method to resolve the conflict. Inevitably, the policy plunged the country into a civil war of a greater magnitude never experienced before.
It needs to be mentioned here that further destruction of lives occurred within the south, when the movement split in 1991 into Torit and Nasir factions as they were referred to after the schism. These factions were later renamed, SPLA mainstream and SPLA-United. No sooner were these groups established than there were further inter-factional defections and counter defections. This was followed by fierce, bloody battles between the factions. The divisions were prompted and inspired principally by tribal loyalty. It is noticeable that when southern leaders quarrel, the northerner, their supposed opponent, becomes a distant enemy. They tend to turn their guns on each other more vigorously than when fighting an external aggressor. The enemy who is near becomes a greater threat to survival than the distant one! The result is always disastrous on the common people. As the saying goes, it is the grass that suffers when the big game fight. The inter-factional combat among the various factions of the SPLA has no doubt tarnished the legitimate cause of the southern people, opening a dark, unprecedented chapter in the history of South Sudan. With the capture of Kurmuk and Geisan and raids on Kassala Town, the war had been taken to the north. Notwithstanding, in the north too, the military has been drawn into internal conflicts since the late 1950s by squabbling politicians. The army is made to defend or unseat regimes. During the first series of squabbles, 1959, several brilliant officers, mostly infantry school instructors, were condemned and executed after an abortive attempt to dislodge General Abboud’s regime. Later, at the time of a subsequent military regime, the bloody incident at Wad Nubawi, Omdurman occurred. This was followed by the murder of a prominent spiritual-political leader, Imam el Hadi Abdelrahman el Mahdi, leader of the Ansar Sect. Inconceivable, at the time, that such disastrous events could occur among northern Sudanese.
The above events, were but few examples of disastrous intra-regional, and inter-regional, complex and senseless, political and military squabbles in our country.
Power Struggle Fellow Sudanese, let us also remember the series of bloody and abortive coup attempts designated to depose the May Regime. Let us reflect on those who fell in defence of the system and those who were killed while fighting to eliminate it! This baseless destruction of human lives is orchestrated by the so-called educated class who form the bulk of the political and military elite. Their endless struggle for control of power, political and national institutions, without prerogative to humanity is irrelevant. It cannot be justified. There is a need, I believe, to review the situation. Is it not timely that we acknowledge that things have not gone well as they should have been and seek guidance about the future? We may all have no peace in our greater days if things continue in this sequence. It is better to act now and put things right before it is too late. Presently, the situation in our country can be rightly summed up as ‘power struggle’ among the intellectual population, which unfortunately has adversely affected the welfare of the common people.
In reviewing the circumstances that have befallen our nation, it is befitting and timely thereunder to reflect upon the verses of a mindful caring British poet, Janet Mace: After the battle the giants part, one licking his wounds alone in sullen peace, one trumpeting triumph to the jungle trees, but the grass remains, stamped on, tramped on, will it wave again in the wind and the rain? The people watch helpless when leaders struggle for power, national needs forgotten. One, prevailing, holds brief precarious sway, some plan and plot to triumph another day, but the people remain, afraid, bewildered. Who will ease their pain and give them hope again?
The Significance of Peace For at least 30 years out of 46 years of independence, the Sudan has engaged in a war of self- destruction. For that long, our people have had no experience of real peace or prosperity. Our lives and histories have been littered with monstrous destruction. In this context, therefore, the achievement of peace should have a profound impact on the life of the common person. Inevitably, it will also have impact upon the lives of political and military elite, who have themselves been born or bread into the culture of war. The attainment of peace will also be a tribute to the many mothers and wives left aggrieved by the loss of their sons or husbands, due to the war. For the Sudanese, peace will have two dimensions: 1. intra-ethnic conciliation among warring tribes, 2. inter-regional political conflict resolution between north and south.
It is to be hoped that national political processes will develop thereafter. Along side that will be the realisation that in a democracy, differences of political opinion, parties, or otherwise, are tolerable and legitimate. A realisation that will then not provoke the desire to physically terminate the existence of opponents. New dimension will then be nurtured by personal acquaintances and appreciation of one another’s views, on which to build so that true democracy may become the accepted norm.
As the third millennium progresses, the global political climate will be that of tolerance and co-existence. The trend will be to share political power and national wealth or material resources. To secure such a comprehensive peace, concerted commitment by all Sudanese is obligatory. This will require the restructuring of the entire political system based on multi- party democracy and federalism as well as restructuring of the armed and auxiliary forces to be compatible with the system. Most important is the right of the regions to develop their educational and cultural institutions to meet the aspirations of their respective peoples. In my mind, this will provide the check and balances, the different nationalities and religions need to feel secure within the national political structures and processes. It is only then that the Sudan will be at peace with itself. It is never too late to avert the country from total anarchy and disintegration. It is never too late either to avoid the magnitude of savagery and disoderly dismemberment of the country as had occurred to former Yugoslavia, or dissection with parts coming under the rules of antagonistic war lords as for the case of Somalia. Let us save our country from falling into that situation. This is my wish and dream, to that end, I direct my prayers, my peace anthem:
Lord send blessings to Sudan, renew goodness in our land, Lord hurry our salvation: draw our peoples towards you, let them worship you. And, in peace inhabit the Sudan; God bless our nation.
Recommendations Therefore I recommend: 1. The halting of the war, cessation of all hostilities by all combat groups and freezing of all combatants where they are at the time of such announcement while peace talks continue as is the case now in Sri-Lanka. 2. Halting of oil exploitation pending restoration of normalcy in the region. 3. The recognition and registration of SPLM and other political wings of the liberation movement as legitimate political parties as adopted in post-apartheid South Africa. 4. The holding of general elections in the south and in the north separately and simultaneously. 5. The institution as an interim arrangement of two regional assemblies: to be based in Omdurman and Juba for the north and south respectively. 6. The institution of an interim national assembly by joint sittings of the interim regional assemblies. 7. The election by the interim national assembly of a supreme commission that will exercise the powers of the head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. 8. The institution by the respective regional assemblies their respective executive councils to be based in Khartoum and Juba respectively. 9. The interim national assembly to elect a federal prime minister who will appoint federal ministers on directives set by the interim national assembly. 10. The supreme commission and federal government may temporarily function from Khartoum and Juba alternatively until their premises are constructed in the new capital to be -- Kosti.
Signed Joseph Lagu, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Former 2nd Vice-President of Sudan
An independent interlocutor Chairman, Peace Action for Sudan & Africa (PAFSA) C/O Diaspora Unit C2 3 Bradbury Street London N16 8JN Summary of Discussion on What if Peace Comes? and To My Fellow Sudanese: Which Way Forward?
1. An army needs to be constructed which does not allow dominance to any ethnic group (see Letter to the Sudanese by Joseph Lagu). There is the problem of what to do with the land mines.
2. Clearance of land mines will be an important task in our activities. We have good experience in the Nuba Mountains - since the agreement, the Mines Clearance Task Force has been put in place. This experience has been put into practice. This is non- controversial - aimed at helping the people who are maimed. Both GOS and SPLM/A have both signed the agreement banning land mines. In the South, there are two NGOs, one is: Operation Save Innocent Lives. It took 4 months after signing the Nuba Mountains agreement for food aid to arrive there (with 2 months left to run). The Joint Military Command has not been able to get to their HQ where the mines were laid, because the road was mined.
3. One of the tasks of the interim period might be the removal of landmines.
4. Local people could be trained to use the dogs to smell out the landmines.
5. There is the question of the army. Do we need a big army for the Sudan, and who is our enemy for the future? Is it better to invest in an army or in development? Look at the experience of Kenya which has a small army.
6. We do not need the huge army in Sudan, then train the population at large to use arms to use them when war comes with a small standing army. The interim period and the provisional government would depend on what materialises. The army should be a balance of different regions so that one region does not dominate.
7. The question is what we mean by disengagement. Are there mechanisms and processes for disengagement?
8. In Sri Lanka they had a cease-fire whilst the peace talks were going on. What is the point of fighting? Why not declare an immediate cessation of hostilities? Can we take the freezing in place and then create some form of separation (defined differently)? Weapons sites can be established as part of a graduated process.
9. There are three types of cease-fire. The cease-fire being talked of here is a comprehensive cease-fire. It is at the end of the DOP, and can be dealt with rapidly by the military experts. There are 2 other types which might be looked into. The first is that the parties, in order to be quiet in the negotiations, could pass secret orders to their forces to be on the defensive so that if the other side does not shoot at you, do not engage. This itself could be another step. This was done by General Lagu and General Nimeiri in 1971. The third possibility is the verbal cease-fire, according which the parties agree mutually not to make any political statements for an agreed time in order to allow the space necessary to come to an agreement.
Paper 5 The Conflicting Concept and Praxes of ‘National Security’ and Their Implications on Military and Security Arrangements in the Sudanese Conflict by Dr Peter Nyot Kok
Introduction
A.
(1) Justification: Civil society view on 'national security and military arrangements in the search for a solution to the Sudanese conflict (2) Liberation/human rights and national security (3) National security, state security, regime security (4) Governance and national security
B. National Purpose/National Mission:
(1) Predatory mission (2) Expansive mission (3) Peace, freedom, prosperity, respect for international law, peaceful co-existence and good neighbourliness.
C. Two Visions of the Sudan I. Conservative-hegemonic vision
(1) The conservative - hegemonic vision:- held by social forces that have benefited from the state formation in the Sudan from 1821 to independence (2) Redistributive-restructural vision of state and nation-building maintain a 'United Sudan' with minimum of decentralisation (3) Run from Khartoum (4) North-Central Sudan as the dynamo of the Sudanese economies with trickle down effects to the regions. (5) Arabic and the official / national language (6) Islam as the state religion and sharia as the source of laws
II. Redistributive - restructural vision
(1) Maximum and meaningful decentralisation, de-concentration of central Government powers (2) Economic and developmental empowerment of the regions (3) Restructuring of state institutions (4) Affirmation of African Sudanese cultures in education, mass media, and popular culture (5) So called "national institutions" to truly reflect national diversity in purpose, policies, personnel etc. (6) Foreign relation to de-emphasise Arabo-centrism and balance it with
the African - Sudanese dimension. Peaceful and friendly relations with all countries on the basis of mutual benefit and advantage.
III. Third Vision is a compromise of the two visions
There are nuances within each visions vision. But all the three have implications on the concept of 'national security' and particularly in the structure, organisation, ethos of military and security forces. Hence, there is nothing as a 'national army' in the strictest sense. Look at the composition of the Sudan armed forces: (1) Officer class; (2) The rank and file; (3) Tank corps; (4) Paratroopers units; (5) Artillery corp; (6) Army forces; (7) Military intelligence leadership; and (8) Special commands units: police, security apparatuses (see police violence)
IV. Military and Security Arrangements in an interim period
· Constitutional disposition · Renouncing the use of force for keeping the unity of the Sudan, or popular struggle for justice
· Security and military arrangements for the south and other marginalised areas
· Threats to livelihood security of the people of the South. Drang nach Sudan.
V. Concluding Observations
· New methods of training
· Peoples army, people's security
· New realities 'created; by the present government
· Separation and disengagement of forces
Northern Command
E.g. Corp - Hayan - West Arab - East Arab - Artillery regions
Dr Peter Kok Former Lecturer at Law University of Khartoum; A Practising Lawyer in the Sudan; Senior member of SPLM, presently the Chairman of the South Sudan Law Society based and working in South Sudan. A human rights activist and for a long time an active member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London). Interested in Strategic and Security issues in general. Has written and edited books and articles on governance, constitution and liberation. Summary of Presentation
The paper was delivered from the perspective of civil society. They need to enquire about what is the prevailing concept and praxis. In the Sudan, there are two main visions of the Sudan we would like to build. These influence our concepts of national security. 1. Conservative hegemonic vision of the Sudan 2. Restructuring and redistributive vision of the Sudan
The first is held by those forces, which have benefited from the process of state formation in the Sudan. This precipitated certain structures of economy. The groups which benefited tend to be the those who then become custodians, based in Northern and Central Sudan, expressed themselves in Arab terms. Succeeded to British colonial powers, expressed in Arab terms. Want to build a unified state and economy driven by Northern and Central Sudan with the benefits trickling down to the other regions.
Left out the African element, concentrated in the Southern Sudan, who hold to the second vision Sudan in which power not concentrated in the centre but in the regions. We want the institutions to be restructured in a way which fairly reflects the diversity of Sudan. Earlier on, the demand of this group was not for separation but for fairness, but gradually they were pushed to demand state for their own, even to the point of separation.
There is a third vision which is a mixture of the two, which allows a mixture of the two (strong under Nimeri), but because there was no political base, it is swayed from side to side
All three have implications for national security. These will be discussed shortly.
It is unwise to be overly happy about the Machakos, when the Government of Sudan is simply accepting what it should have done already. Why should people be complimented on this? Nor should the SPLM delegation be complimented simply for doing their duty.
Security and military arrangements. Note that the regime, state and national security are not necessarily the same thing. One of the justifications of oppressive acts, is the appeal to national security. In the Sudan, we don't have a consensus about what constitutes national unity. Few states really score more that Sudan on the absence of national consensus on essentials. For some, it is to agreement the security of the Islamic nation, for others the regions as a whole. Prepared nevertheless to come with fellow Sudanese on what constitutes national security. Military intelligence regards the different ethnic groups as a threat to national security - ideological and racial groups are regarded with suspicion. There is the fundamental existential threat to national security. The future of the Sudan lies in Southern Sudan where the agricultural lands and strategic minerals are. Northern Sudan has exhausted its development "Drang nach Suden". The land has to be taken by force. For the people living there, it is a threat to policy formation.
After Aboud closed Parliament, the idea was that they could bring in the army to clear the wings. Later the Nasserites called in their cadres to clear out the Parliament. Also the communists called in Nimeiri. The NIF later also used their cadres to upset the political equation.
The South lose out in all this, because no coups organised from the periphery of Sudan succeed. No attempts by military against military do succeed. The way that the Sudanese army is organised means that most of the officer corps from the hegemonic classes with the rank and file comes from the periphery of Sudan. Certain units are organised. It is unlikely that you would find people from the marginalised groups in the officer corps, especially in those units capable of decisive strikes against key targets.
Something has changed since the NIF has taken power, there is more representation of ideologically hegemonic groups.
You could pull of a coup similar to that with respect to Quebec which Pierre Trudeau pulled off. He said that if Quebec chose to separate from Canada, that he would not use force to keep it in. This reassured everybody that the process was now to be confined entirely to the political forum. This commitment is still missing from Machakos.
The military and security arrangements should be those based on a broader concept of national security - "livelihood security": nobody should die from famine, curable diseases, being shot etc.
Formal Response by Discussant, Dr Owen Greene, Bradford University, to The Conflicting Concept and Praxes of ‘National Security’ and Their Implications on Military and Security Arrangements in the Sudanese Conflict.
There is simply so much to do after a peace agreement. There are so many expectations, but people are open to change. There are the existing structures which need to be respected so that things do not fall apart. In a peace agreement, you need to continue to listen to the commanders, but to others as well.
One of the keynotes of Dr Peter Nyot Kok's paper is the importance of clarifying what is meant by security. You need to ensure human security. In a post-conflict situation, it is important that we are clear about what the priorities are as a whole. What do people care most about in relation to the reform of the army, police, demobilisation etc.?
There is a lot of experience with the DDR processes, but many serious mistakes have been made. These need to be re-integrated into society; but if too many resources are devoted to them, this can also cause resentment by the population at large. On the whole, people are realistic, but they need to be reassured that their voice is heard.
To the military, the existence of small arms are not important; but it is a key issue in society at large, for example for domestic use.
De-mining is a complex business. For example, who owns the land after it is de-mined? One lesson is that these are not solved unless it is recognised that these issues need to be faced. You need to find the structures to deal with this.
Donors often come late especially when it is a question of security issues. So much can be done without outside assistance, but once the donor assistance comes, it can come from all different directions. It is important for societal groups to think about this now. It is important to start the dialogue early. You need not just to talk to donors, but to people in other parts of the world.
The main point is that there are many opportunities. Now there are great opportunities to get significant assistance with the collection of surplus weapons and de-mining budgets. Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda were co-operating in such a programme.
Paper 6 Defining the Role of the Military and Security Services Ethically, Constitutionally and Politically by Ambassador Maj. Gen. (Retired) Andrew Makur Thou
SECTION ONE - INTRODUCTION
The subject chosen by the organizers of the Sudan Peace-Building Programme for presentation is so important not only to me as a Sudanese but to all those peace loving people who would wish to see Sudan in peace. And before I start to elaborate on my paper. I would take this opportunity to thank the organizers of this consultation and those who initiated my participation on this important subject. I have been asked to define the role of the Military and Security Services ethically, constitutionally and politically. The subject is so vast that I will not be in a position to give you all the details due to the time factor but will try to give you issues of significant importance to the subject concerned. I have to start with some vital information about the Sudan, after which to talk about the historical background of the Sudan army, its role in politics and governance, the effects of Military based governance on the Army and other Security Services. Sudan, with its strategic location, is the largest Country of the African Continent, comprising of an area of 2.5 million square kms, which is about the size of Western Europe. It has an estimated population over 34 million people according to the 1999 estimates. The country is sharply divided by geography, race, culture, ethnicity and religion. On the religious and racial composition, the Muslims become the majority and those of Arab origin constitute about 31 % of the population and the rest are Africans. It has the longest and protracted civil war fought for 36 years in 46 years of independence in the continent. A war that has claimed lives, destroyed properties and consumed great part of our resources and energies with the displacement of over (4) four million people and massive emigration around the world. The continuation of this war with brutality and atrocities by both parties has created distrust and loss of confidence between the two peoples. (North and South).
SECTION TWO - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SUDAN ARMY.
A- Like all armies in Colonial and protectorate countries, the Sudanese modern army was preceded by:
(i) A Turko-Egyptian army on which the Turko-Egyptian administration was based [1820 1885]. They came to Sudan as an invasion army, coupled with trade in, among other things, human chatters. They were joined from inside the country by traders who became agents for the slave trade. It was this administration that
reached the South and linked the two parts under one administration (South and North). (ii) Anglo-Egyptian army on which the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Administration
was based [1898 — 1956], which administered the South and North separately under what they called “The Closed District Act” in the 1920s within one umbrella of the British governor general. Even during these two periods, the southern Sudan still maintained its separate identities. These diversities were kept separately - one Islamic Arab in the north, and the other African non Islamic in the South. Movements of these two peoples were restricted under this act until after the independence in 1956. In 1947, Juba Conference was held between representatives of the North and the South and the British Administration. It was in this conference that conditions of unity between North and South were laid down as follows: (i) To promote the socio-economic development of the Southern Sudan. (ii) To keep the identity of the South through a separate Government. (iii) To have one legislative body in which the South and the North would send their representatives . Five years later (1952), Egypt, Britain and Sudan Northern political leaders met in Cairo and agreed on Self-government for the Sudan. Southern Sudan was not represented in these meetings, even what was agreed in Juba conference was not fulfilled i.e. Self Government Status. On the basis of this Self Government Agreement, elections were conducted in these two parts of the country for the National Parliament. It is in this Parliament that Southerners requested not to vote for independence unless the Southern Sudan was to be granted a federal status to enable itself to run its own affairs. On the 10 of December 1955, the Northern Political Parties in Parliament agreed to the request for a federal system of government in the Sudan. It was worded that federal system will be given due consideration after the independence. On the basis of this agreement, the Southern representatives in Parliament accepted to vote with the Northern Sudanese for independence from Egypt and Britain. After the Sudan obtained the independence status - first January 1956, the Northern Political Parties went back on their word on the issue of federation for the South. In 1958, a call for federation became illegal and many Southerners who advocated a federal government for the Sudan were either jailed or they jumped across to the neighbouring countries of Uganda, Congo, Kenya and Ethiopia. The youth joined armed resistance movement of the South i.e. Southern Sudan Liberation Movement and Anya-nya -(SSLM/Anya-nya). I was one of those youth that joined. In 1965 in March, a Round table conference was held, composed of a 12-man committee - 6 from the South and 6 from the North. They came out with resolutions which actually formed the main part of the Addis-Ababa agreement. In 1972, the armed resistance of the South with its political leaders reached an agreement with the then Sudan government (Nimeiri‘s Regime) called the Addis-Ababa Agreement. In this agreement the Southern Sudan obtained an autonomous regional government which gave substantial security, economic, financial, executive and political powers. The part of the armed resistance of the South became part of the national army and police and other organised forces were stationed in South Sudan. Some of the young officers of that army included myself and Colonel Dr John Gareng, the current leader of the SPLM/A. In 1983, after the discovery of oil in South Sudan, three things happened:- (i) All powers assigned to the South by the Addis-Ababa Agreement were withdrawn by the central government This included the power to have oil revenues or royalties from the south go to the regional treasury. (ii) Islamic Sharia Laws were introduced. (iii) Most of the members of the resistance army were transferred from the South to the North and some retired untimely from service- [Details in the Addis-Ababa Agreement Section Six].
B- In 1885 - 1898, the Mahdist Army took the position of a ruling body, headed by the Khalifa who was the head of the army but it did not take long before it was re-conquered by the British, though the Mahdia tried to maintain the same link which the Turko-Egyptian administration had established and maintained.
In the three administrative periods in the Sudan, the Military figured high in the administration of the Country. This was specially the case in the Southern Sudan.
SECTION THREE - THE SUDAN ARMY FROM 1900 - 2002
The Sudan army was from 1900 to recent times structurally decentralized. There used to be about six Commands by then, composed of “Haggana” in the central Sudan - El Obeid, the Eastern Corps in Gadaref the Western Corps in El Fasher, the Southern corps in Torit, which was later shifted to Juba, the Artillery Regiment at Atbara and “the Camel Corps”; Air force and the Navy were formed in later years after Independence. These formations were later changed to Command system, and these Commands received recruitment of their manpower from local regions of Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan, Northern Sudan and the Southern Sudan. Suddenly, ethical and political changes took place in the South, following the mutiny of the Southern Sudanese non-commissioned officers and men in Torit - the then H.Q. of the Southern command- Equatoria Corps) on the 18th August 1955. The effects of this mutiny will be explained in the next pages to come. At present, the Sudan Army is a well established army comprising of land, Navy, and Air Forces.
SECTION FOUR - ROLE OF THE ARMY IN POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE.
(a) The first Military government [1958 -1964]
The army has always been used by various organizations or parties to promote their political and ideological programmes, particularly the 1958 coup was publicly supported by the two religious leaders of UMMA and D.U.P. parties. Though this government made some significant developments in the country, it brought along with it Islamic project to the South. Southern tribal chiefs were forcefully given Islamic names as a means to convert them into Islam. Friday was declared in the South as a resting weekly day, which was totally rejected by Southern Community through general strikes in the whole of Southern Sudan. The expulsion of foreign Missionaries and severely circumscribing the right to open church schools, followed by placing all schools under government control. This was during General Ibrahim Aboud’s regime.
(b) The Second Military Government May 1969 - to April 1985:
This Military Coup was planned with encouragement of the Sudan Communist Party. This party when it realised that the Government they supported was not doing according to their planned ideological programme, they decided for a new coup which failed after 3 days. As a result, the consequences were very drastic against the communist leaders in the Sudan. The Sudan was until that period, was a secular State. Things began to take different shape when Nimeri the President of the Republic by then, underwent transformation of character and disposition. Being Pan-Arab Socialist, he turned to be an Islamic fundamentalist. In 1977, he issued a presidential decree prohibiting the manufacture, possession, sale and consumption of alcoholic drinks. Few years later, Islamic Sharia laws were introduced where flogging, limp amputation, cross amputation and crucifixion were carried out even to Christians. The only good deed Nimeiri made was when he concluded the 1972 Addis-Ababa Agreement with help of mediation of church organizations, which he later nullified in 1983.
(c) The third transitional Military government - [1985-1986].
Similarly the transitional Military Council and government were backed by the National Islamic Front in the persons of the chairman of transitional Military Council (Field Marshall Abdel Rahman Sawar El Dahab) and the Prime Minister of the transitional Government (Dr. Gezouli Dajálla). This transitional Military government maintained what Marshall Nimeiri had established until they handed over power to the elected government of Mr. Sadig El Mahdi in 1986.
(d) The fourth Military Government 1989 to the present day
The 1989 Military coup was planned and executed with the full support of the National Islamic Front, although some Sudanese and foreign circles were doubting the truth behind the ideology of the coup leaders. They remained puzzled until Sudan was declared as an Islamic State.
I do not want to go into details of every thing but as you could see from my report, most of the governments in the Sudan were Military governments. It will be observed that since independence of the country on first January 1956 to the present time (2002), the army has ruled the country for a total of 36 years out of 46. In essence, the army controlled and fought against the South for 35 years out of the period of 46 years of independence. The period during which the South enjoyed peace and freedom was 11 years of the Addis-Ababa Agreement - from April 1972 to 16th March 1983. From what has been stated in the paragraphs above it is clear that who controls the army has the upper hand in running and controlling the affairs of the State.
SECTION FIVE - THE EFFECTS OF THE TORIT MUNITY 18th AUG. 1955
It is important here to point out the effects of the Torit mutiny on the Military and Security Services. Most elements in the police and prison forces were transferred to the Northern Sudan, in particular the Southern Sudanese officers and non-commissioned officers and men. In their places, Northern Sudanese were transferred to replace them. In addition to local government, officers and District Commissioners of the South were transferred to the North and replaced by Northern Sudanese. Security Committees from the District to the Province levels were chaired by the public administrator. Membership of the Security Committee at all levels of the administration included heads of the army, police and prison forces. This practice has been followed and observed since the first Military Government of 1958-64. The role of these forces in the Southern Sudan was to fight against rebellion and to maintain law and order. Recruitment to the Military, Police and Prisons Colleges was severely restricted for Southerners on Security Considerations. This practice was brought to an end by the Addis-Ababa Agreement.
SECTION SIX - THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT 1972:
This Agreement was concluded between the government of the Republic of the Sudan and the
Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and the Anya-nya — the Military Wing in Addis Ababa on the 27th February 1972. By the terms of this agreement, the followings were put under consideration:- (a) The re-composition of the Southern Command with the South fully reflected at that level and as well as the National level. The Southern Command was reduced to 12,000 officers and other ranks and was reconstituted - 50% officers and other ranks from this number were absorbed or recruited from the Anya-nya Army, the other 50% were from the old forces, mainly but not exclusively, from the Northern Sudan. The Police and prison forces as well as public administration were Southernized as from the time this agreement was initialled. (b) By virtue of this agreement, 3,000 officers and men from police forces who were previously stationed in the South were transferred from the South to the Central authority in Khartoum for distribution to their various provinces in the Northern Sudan. The same principle and procedures were applied to 1,500 officers and other ranks in the prison forces. In essence then, composition of the Military and other security Services was fundamentally altered. Yet both elements in the South and the North were not completely satisfied with this arrangement. Elements in each region felt they got too little in the deal. The North viewed these arrangements as having given the South too much power that it could utilize to effect secession. In addition to this, the general view in the officer ranks in the Northern controlled army, Police and Prison Forces was that the level of education and the standard of training of the Anya-nya officer cadres was low and constituted a disadvantage to the Sudanese disciplined forces. On the other hand, the South viewed the Military and security arrangements to have been a disadvantage to the South. The general view was that there should have been a separate army and a State Security organ for the South, in addition to a separate Police and Prison Forces. The Military and Security arrangements of the Addis-Ababa Agreement were covered by the Sudan Constitutional Decree N°5 of 1971 and were included in the Sudan Constitution of 1973. The central government developed a State Security organ in the South to compensate for an army in the South which was no longer wholly controlled by the North. The State security in the South was headed by a Northern Sudanese cadre. This organ was viewed by the South as a window of the North to spy on the South. (c) Citizens of the Southern Sudan would thenceforth constitute -“a sizeable proportion of the people’s armed forces in such reasonable numbers as will correspond to the population of the Sudan”; (d) Subject to the provisions of the constitution in (article 2) the people’s armed forces within the Southern Sudan and out side the framework of National defence would be controlled by the President of the Republic on the advice of the President of the High Executive council. (e) Temporary arrangements for the composition of Units of the people’s armed forces in the Southern Sudan would be as agreed in the Protocol for Military arrangements.
These Military and Security arrangements were essentially political. Their ethical justification was that all citizens from different regions of the Sudan are entitled to serve in the armed forces. These political and constitutional arrangements were abrogated by the President of the Republic (Marshall Gaafàr El Nimeiri) on 5th June 1983 contrary to the previsions of article 34 of the Southern provinces Self-Government Act 1972: Article 34 states: This act shall only be amended by a majority of three-quarters of the people’s assembly and with the approval of a majority of two-thirds of the citizens of the Southern region in a referendum to be carried out in Southern Region.
The implementation of the Addis-Ababa agreement was carried out with success through formation of commissions namely: (a) The joint cease —fire commission. (b) The joint Military commission. (c) The Repatriation, Relief and Resettlement commission. These commissions with their various functions were very effective and successful. We should learn lessons from them.
SECTION SEVEN - THE CURRENT CIVIL WAR:
At present both the Sudan Army and the Sudan People’s liberation Army are engaged in a protracted civil war in which issues such as power, wealth sharing are raised, along side the issue of state and religion. The Sudan army is strong as well as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and none of them is winning the war in its favour; could political and constitutional settlement be reached without addressing and agreeing on the status, purpose and re- composition of the Sudan army? Would the parties to the present conflict affirm the present Sudan army - its composition, structures and purpose? What will become of the (SPLA) Sudan People‘s Liberation Army Forces? Will they be satisfied with demobilization to assume civilian life? The Sudan army is presently mobilized on the basis of an Islamic army that contributes in the promotion of Islamic project on a Jihad footing (Holy war) (Article 122 of’ 1998 Sudan Constitution). Will it be possible to review and alter that purpose and with what effect on the constitution? Could two or more standing armies be organized and established in one State? Or could the practice in Switzerland be adopted. Each of the 23 Cantons (States) has its own Army. The Swiss army is only used for National defence if the Swiss Republic is threatened from without. The history summarised about the Sudan [1820 2002] makes clear that a future army must be every body’s army or alternatively that the idea of having two or more standing armies and other Security Services deserves prudent debate. The moral, that is the lesson to take from the Military and Security arrangements of the Addis- Ababa agreement and the practical problems encountered in the implementation is that the Military and Security arrangements, will not be easy to agree upon. Judging from the difficulties encountered in the past who will control what Military and Security power probably constitute the crux of the matter. Are there examples in the world where a nation-state has two or more armies? Well, Switzerland is there as an example. It may be necessary to look at the Military am Security arrangements in Switzerland. A number of Constitutional issues have to be addressed here. Military and Security arrangements may be viewed within the context of the purpose am composition of the army. What do you want your army to do for your State? One thing seems clear: a constitutional, political and military settlement within a united country may be frustrated by a Military Coup that cancels the agreements reached. How do you politically, ethically and constitutionally safeguard against Military coup that aims to undo a settlement? Switzerland is an example of many standing armies within one federal or (Confederal) State.
The European Union is another example — a British army, , a French army, a German army, an Italian army etc, all within a European Union, with NATO forces as a super National army. Another point that has to be borne in mind is that a vote in an Internationally supervised referendum may be heavily influenced by the type of Military and Security arrangements the parties have agreed upon. In other words, a vote to affirm the unity of the Sudan will depend on whether the Military arrangements agreed upon are acceptable to voters or not. Both the North and South have already agreed that the Southern peoples are entitled to self — determination since it is an unquestionable and inalienable right of the people. Hence, a referendum will have to be conducted to ascertain their views on any agreement reached by the parties.
SECTION EIGHT - SECURITY AND THE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS ARISING FROM A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD:
(a) The Sudan Army versus Sudan people’s Liberation Army:
Today the present civil war involves officers and men of the Sudan Army versus Sudan People’s Liberation Army officers and men. This compares with the officers and other ranks of the Sudan Army versus officers and other ranks of the Anya-nya Liberation army in the first Civil War [18th Aug. 1955 to 27th Feb. 1972], which I mentioned in the previous sections of this paper. Assuming that both parties have reached or will reach an agreement based on a negotiated Constitutional Settlement -(Sudan Government versus Sudan People ‘s Liberation Movement) for a confederal status for the Sudan during an interim period, the following steps could help to implement the future agreement based on lessons learnt from the Addis-Ababa Agreement: (i) Definition: Sudan government armed forces shall mean the forces of the Sudan that have been physically engaged in operations in the Southern Sudan. Any Malisia forces, private armies, mercenaries, foreign technicians and instructors do not fall into this category and their presence in the Southern Sudan should be terminated. (ii) The Sudan People’s Liberation Army forces (SPLA) shall mean steamline SPLA Forces in the South of Sudan, Nuba Mountains and Ingessina. (iii) Belligerent forces shall mean forces of the Sudan Government and SPLA that have been engaged in combat against one another in the Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains and lngessina.
(b) Organization:
(i) Formation of a supreme confederal Authority to govern the country during an interim period. (ii) Formation of a joint Military High Commission or command to deal with any security aspect of the agreement. The Commission shall be formed from the two belligerent forces to supervise all the Military and security arrangements agreed upon by the two parties. The chairmanship of the commission shall be alternate. (iii) Formation of a joint confederal cease-fire commission which shall include International Military Monitors, to observe any violations of the cease-fire agreement by the belligerent forces and to report regularly to the supreme confederal authority. (iv) Oil is a strategic commodity which is located in the conflict area, and is considered one of the factors that fuels the war; its exploitation should have to be agreed upon by both warring parties. (v) The belligerent forces shall be accommodated in separate barracks and in different areas out of touch with one another and out of range. (vi) The deployment of the belligerent forces shall be the responsibility of the joint Military high commission who should gear their efforts only for National defence. (vii) Since Southern Sudanese Citizens feel frightened about the presence of Sudan Government forces in the Southern Sudan, a Southern Sudanese Para-Military police should be formed to be responsible for law and order in the towns and the rural areas. Their physical and visible presence in the Southern Sudan is conducive to normalization of the situation and the removal of fear from the Southern Sudanese as well as bridging the gap for confidence building which has been lost between the two parties (South and North). (viii) The supreme confederal authority shall be responsible for the administration and logistical arrangements for all the belligerent forces including the Para-Military Police. While in barracks, each force shall be responsible for its own equipment, training and Military discipline. (ix) It shall be the duty of the United Nations high commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) in
conjunction with the supreme Confederal authority and the para — Military police to scrutinize the repatriation of the Southern Sudanese to the South, if they so wish, and with the help of the repatriation and resettlement commission.
CONCLUSION:
It will be observed that since the independence of the country on first January 1956 to the present time (2002), there has been four Military governments out of a total of six after the independence and only two were the civilian governments, that of 1964-69 and 1986 89 respectively. In this case, the army has ruled the country for a total number of 36 years out of 46. In essence, the army controlled and fought against the south for 35 years of the total period of 46 years of independence. The period during which the South enjoyed the Addis-Ababa Agreement peace was from 1972 - 1983. Since 1947 (Conference) up to date, lots of agreements have been dishonoured, causing a great deal of lack of confidence and distrust between the two peoples (South and North). To bridge such a gap, confidence and trust building arrangements have to be developed by the two parties during an agreed transitional period arising from a negotiated settlement. There are lessons to be learned from the Addis-Ababa Agreement, mainly on the Military and Security arrangements, which were essentially political. Their ethical justification was that all citizens from different regions of the Sudan are entitled to serve in the armed forces, with clear hope that a future army must be everybody’s army, otherwise people will be bound to disintegrate. From the Military and Security arrangements of the Addis-accord there were practical problems encountered in the implementation of the agreement as expressed by the two parties in their opinions or views. They should have to be avoided in any future settlement. Also, a constitutional political and military settlement within a united country may be frustrated by a military coup that cancels the agreements reached. People have to think and plan of how to safeguard against such concepts. References:
1.- The Round Table Conference 12 man committee Resolutions March 1965
2- The Addis-Ababa Agreement Feb. 1972
3- The Southern Provinces Regional Self Government Act, 1972. (1972 Act N°4).
4- Alier, Abel: Southern Sudan: too many agreements Dishonoured —Ithaca press, p. 18.
5- The Republic of Sudan Constitution (1998) Article 122.
6- Asmara Resolutions (1995), Sudan peace agreement (1997), National call (2000).
Abbreviations:
DU.P Democratic Unionist Party
GOS Government of Sudan
SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army.
HQ Headquarters
SSLM Southern Sudan Liberation Movement Formal Response by Discussant, Dr Owen Greene, University of Bradford, to Defining the Role of the Military and Security Services Ethically,Constitutionally and Politically.
The Addis Ababa agreement was abrogated by a coup. How do you build in reassurances so that you are not vulnerable to a coup? You will need to focus on building long-term institutions.
It is worthwhile reflecting on the experience from other countries. You need to build in concerns but also recognise real security needs. It is unfortunate that the end of armed conflict always results in deaths when agreements do not address the other security issues. Even mine laying can continue. The question is how to develop on the basis of what exists now. There is a challenge to build new police forces and border control.
In considering the future of the existing armed forces, we need to look at the future of the police, the border guards and other armed groups.
One key issue relates to the police and the para-military police, which it is important to consider at this stage. With police, there are no constitutional problems. It can be quite regionally based. It can include para-military police, who can help to defend their communities in a relatively decentralised way. This adds to the reassurance about the need for decentralisation, especially if it is in particular areas. You need to link people in community policing, forensics and border guards (it is not automatic that armies play the role of policing borders).
With respect to the army, the issues are very important. I am not sure that the constitutions of Switzerland or the EU are the best models - but they illustrate that different models are possible. To protect against a coup depends on the political system, but also a strong professional army, which sees itself as distinct from politics. You need to defend the political agreement - but two standing armies will be difficult to remove later. However, you can have territorial forces, which can supplement the regional paramilitary forces.
You need to think about the real needs of communities in the transitional phase. You need to get to grips with the militias and the private forces. These groups need either to be disbanded or to be regularised in the era after the civil war.
Summary of Discussion on The Conflicting Concept and Praxes of ‘National Security’ and Their Implications on Military and Security Arrangements in the Sudanese Conflict; and Defining the Role of the Military and Security Services Ethically, Constitutionally and Politically.
1. The army should remain as a professional army in the interim period. Professionalism is needed at this particular juncture.
2. The North is not uniform, it is composed of the West, East, Centre and the North. In the West, there is chaos at present, where the Government of the Sudan has used helicopter gunships. There are similar problems in Eastern Sudan and Nuba Mountains which ought to be addressed.
3. The army is currently politicised but that does not represent a safety mechanism to defend the country. The same is true for the north and the south where the politicians and must oversee how the country could be demilitarised.
4. There are many roots of the coup d'états in the Sudan. The politicians have used the military to come eventually into power. However, when the military comes it disbands democracy and reverses previous trends. Many politicians have come to power through military coups. We have to find an answer to this question. This raises the concern of the maturity of the parties and how they should conduct themselves. For example, people in the army took over Radio Umdurman and the people quickly submitted to them. Why did they challenge them and march on them? Why is it that very few come to take over and people give in? Why does this process happen through middle ranking officers? It is the fault of the elders. The youngsters must not heed to these coups d'états.
5. After the agreement is signed we must aim to build security and development with both long and short-term views. The role of the army and security is to run these functions. We have to see internal and external threats from both perspectives. Every part of the security organs has a different function. How do we reorganise the army and security forces?
6. The paper raises many questions relating to the role of the army. What the army should do and what is national defence and external threat? The Sudanese army has been used as a tool to crush internal descent. What will be the purpose of any future army? How is it going to be composed and representative of all constituencies in the Sudan? The issue of the army will need to be discussed in the next round of negotiations. The army could undermine the rule of law in the future if it is not properly used. The army should be small and professional. How are the police going to be formed around the interests of its citizens? We need to establish the army on such a basis that it does not become a threat to the future of the country.
7. There are SPLA forces in the Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile. Any agreement reached in Kenya will have to stress on the separation of forces. Where will the government forces in the South be placed?
8. Why do we need such a big army? For any agreement to succeed it must hinge on agreed security arrangements. This will depend on the mission of the army, its objectives and needs. The Sudanese army has been used to defend a strong centre. Since independence the threat has been internal. In the future the army will not defend a strong centre.
Paper 7 A Security Sector Reform Guide for the Sudan: Including Potential Donor Support and the Reintegration of Former Combatants by Colonel (Retired) Phillip Wilkinson
This paper was written by Colonel (retired) Philip Wilkinson, who is a Senior Research Fellow at the International Policy Institute (IPI) at Kings College, London. Apart from providing advice to the UK government on the conduct of their own Strategic Defence Review, IPI has provided similar assistance to the governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, East Timor, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone and Rwanda. This paper is based upon the lessons learned from that collective experience.
SECTION ONE - INTRODUCTION
Broad Conception of Security
1. Traditionally the term ‘security’ has had purely military and defence connotations. It was connected in most peoples’ minds with threats to the territorial integrity of the state from external aggression and internal subversion. These military threats clearly still require a military response. But it is now generally recognised that ‘security’ implies much more than military security. In the words of Clare Short the UK Secretary of State for Development “Security is development and without development there can be no security. Development means economic, social and political progress”1. In short, the contemporary security agenda includes the whole gamut of governance; economic, social, ecological and demographic issues that now face us, in addition to those more traditional threats that require a military response. It involves dealing with problems as varied as oppression and injustice, unemployment, poverty, inadequate health care, disease and the breakdown of law and order.
2. Promoting security means dealing with all these problems which prevent us from building a more just and humane world in which human beings are better able to realise their aspirations and potential. But we must be realistic. There is no such thing as absolute security, either for states or citizens of states. All states, even Superpowers2, have to settle for relative security, and poor states may have to settle for less than might be acceptable elsewhere. The plain truth is that the levels of security, both personal and state, which are taken for granted by the citizens of post
1 Speech given by Clare Short 17 January 2000 at Lancaster House, London.
2 As demonstrated by the attacks of 11 September 2001 upon the USA.
Cold War Europe are probably unattainable anywhere in Africa in the immediate future. That is not an expression of despair but a warning that security goals need to be grounded in political, military and economic realities.
3. For countries coming out of conflict and when the state edifice may be extremely fragile and national income negligible, the challenges are particularly demanding, and may include the need to promote national unity, justice and reconciliation, the reconstruction of the public and private sectors and the need to develop respect for human rights and cultural, ethnic and religious diversity. The ending of conflict usually involves third party intervention by the United Nations (UN) or other regional arrangement such as the African Union, and this involvement may extend to include assistance with various aspects of recovery and reconstruction, sometimes referred to as ‘nation building’. In the aftermath of a civil war, nation building will usually include the restructuring and retraining of the security sector to peacetime levels. This activity is often referred to as Security Sector Reform (SSR). But there are many, including this author who consider the term SSR pejorative and when conducted by outsiders patronising, that is unless the word reform is applied to all elements of the public sector. For the purpose of this paper, the term Security Sector Transformation (SST) will be used to refer to efforts to restructure and retrain the security forces. SST ideally should be conducted as a domestic initiative and/or with outside support and assistance but should only ever be externally imposed in the direst of circumstances.
Role of the Security Sector
4. No two states use the same model for the design of their security sectors. Every state security sector is different and dependent on its history, culture, international and regional environments, and domestic circumstances. In the first instance, the state security sector, in particular the armed forces are designed to defend the state’s national integrity and sovereignty, and national interests. In addition, well-managed and competent security services can help establish the rule of law and create an environment that is conducive to productive social and economic activity that will benefit all citizens. A well-managed and cost effective security sector can help states to allocate scarce resources more efficiently in the fiscal round and in pursuit of national development goals, and to deter unlawful and violent challenges to the rule of law and peace.
Definition of the Security Sector
5. The security sector is generally considered as comprising:
· the state security services that have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (i.e. the armed forces, the police, paramilitary
forces, the intelligence services and other statutory bodies that may play a security role at national or local levels, including militias and private security firms); and
· the elected and duly appointed civil authorities that are responsible for control and oversight of these institutions. Dependent on the form of governance these may include relevant members of Parliament and oversight committees or appointees, the Executive, national security agencies, defence, finance and interior ministries, the judiciary, non-governmental groups with a mandated regulatory role, etc.
SECTION TWO - SECURITY SECTOR TRANSFORMATION PROGRAMMES
Governance Principles
6. In line with this broad view of security, the active involvement in the security sector transformation process of a wide range of state institutions and non-state entities, including civil society and private sector groups, will promote ownership and stability, and help to create a well-functioning state system. An integral component of this broader system of governance is the security sector, comprising those institutions that have a direct role to play in protecting the state and the communities within it. While there can be no prescriptive model for security sector management, there is a broad security review process that all states constantly need to address and review in order to legitimise and strengthen their security capabilities. This process should be underpinned by a series of governance principles and these are:
· Broadening, deepening and legitimising the public debate on security issues
· Strengthening the legal framework that governs the security sector
· Making security policy-making and decision-making practices more effective and responsive to citizen’s needs
· Strengthening mechanisms for civil oversight and direction of the security forces
· Strengthening systems for managing security personnel and resources A broad definition of security underscores that efforts to ensure national defence, public security and the rule of law are closely linked. Emphasis is also placed on the central role that the civilian sectors of government have to play in managing the security sector and, in particular, the specific problems that may arise due to weaknesses in civilian capacity. Achieving effective security-sector governance is, therefore, a responsibility for both civilians and members of the uniformed security services.
Governance of the Security Sector
7. The in-place political model will largely determine how the security sector is governed. In a presidential system the President may be the Commander in Chief, however, no matter how the political system is defined, the over-riding principle must be that the security sector is democratically accountable to its citizens via the legislature and judiciary, irrespective of the command and control arrangements to the executive. Exactly who in the executive commands what will be determined by a strategic security review, but in most countries the military armed forces are commanded by a Ministry of Defence and other members of the security sector, the police and intelligence services by the Interior Ministry, except when a major element of the intelligence services is deployed abroad when they may work to the Foreign Ministry. In all cases, responsible ministers must be accountable to the head of government, and the totality of the executive must be democratically accountable to its citizens. An arrangement of checks, balances and oversight is necessary to maintain the trust and confidence of its citizens. ‘Parliament’ should establish oversight by selected individuals or committee. Such individuals or committee should have complete and free access to all information and activities and should be prepared to brief back to ‘parliament’ on a regular basis and be held accountable. Vetting of individuals for such committees should be based, first and foremost on competence. Such issues of governance should be determined constitutionally.
Financial Accountability and Management
8. Like all agencies of the public sector, the security sector must be accountable. Incidences of fraud and corruption are particularly prevalent at all the interfaces between the public sector and the commercial world. Within the security sector, weapons procurement and the setting of commercial contracts are the most prevalent areas of fraud and corruption. In incidences where national security and commercial interests demand a degree of secrecy, oversight may be limited to individuals who have been specifically vetted for the task, but that does not make them any the less accountable to ‘Parliament’.
9. There is also a tendency in the security forces to generate ‘off-budget’ income and expenditure. Such incidences should be judged on a case-by-case basis, as they may be unaccountable to external audit but not necessarily immoral. The generation of income in order to pay pensions to war widows, as has occurred in Sri Lanka and elsewhere, would suggest there is a deficiency in the system of care rather than corruption. Whilst the existence of defence industries is unusual in developing countries, where they do exist, their role and relationship with the military and government as a whole should be precisely defined so as to ensure they are open to the same degree of scrutiny as the rest of government business. It is also important that
the responsibility for the disposal, as well as purchase of military hardware is specified and controlled.
10. Whatever the case, an accounting system of checks and balances should be put in place that ensures transparency and oversight, and ensures cost effectiveness within the national fiscal round. The establishment of a national audit office may allow oversight of the complete public sector and the involvement of the World Bank, IMF or regional development bank can provide the necessary expertise when the indigenous human capacity is limited.
The Challenges
11. Developing countries face new and complex challenges in the post-Cold War security environment. Alongside traditional territorial defence, they must manage new security threats of both a military and non-military nature. These may arise from terrorism, sectarianism, religious differences and other internal violence, control of borders, cattle rustling and other illicit trafficking, illegal exploitation of a country’s resources, and other personal security concerns relating to self and property.
12. As if that was not enough, countries emerging from civil wars face an additional swathe of challenges. Much of the infrastructure necessary for a state to function and provide a basic level of services may have been destroyed and the people may have been severely traumatised by the conflict. Reconciliation of the former warring groups will prove a major challenge, as will the need to recreate an integrated and functioning society. Women’s groups may have a vital role to play in effecting societal reconciliation. In addition, civil society, including a free media may have been destroyed and need reconstruction. Human capacity building will inevitably be a major problem that may take decades to resolve. While this problem may be partly resolved by a return of the Diaspora many qualified individuals will be offered employment and salaries by international aid agencies and non-government organisations with which the government will not be able to compete. As a consequence the burden of government falls on the few and they may be overwhelmed by the day-to-day business of crisis management. As a consequence immediate post conflict governments rarely have time to look over the horizon to see problems coming and to develop policy and policy responses accordingly. External assistance in policy formulation can fill this gap until an indigenous capacity is developed.
13. As a critical element of the public services, countries emerging from conflict will need to restructure and rebuild their security sector in order to meet peacetime needs. It is highly likely that the police will have been destroyed as a law enforcement agency or mutated into an armed
militia engaged during the conflict. This will require the reconstruction of the police, and a working judicial and penal system, and respect for the rule of law. In addition, it is highly likely during a time of conflict that military forces will be expanded at a rate that exceeds the capacity to fully educate them to fulfil those functions subsequently required for peacetime, such as peacekeeping and assistance to the civil power in times of natural disaster. As a consequence, at the end of the conflict the armed forces may be bloated and need retraining and educating for peacetime duties, although they may be battle-hardened. Post conflict, the pace of transformation to a peacetime establishment and level of professionalism for the security sectors will be dependent upon the confidence that the former warring parties have in the peace process and the new security environment post conflict.
14. Even when the major parties are fully committed to the peace process, there may be disparate elements that would wish to sustain the conflict for their own political or personal agendas. Security sector transformation should therefore be tied into the broader peace process, and the achievement of certain goals or designated criteria on the road to peace may be used to define success or failure, and the next steps in the peace process.
External Support
15. It is a fundamental principle in support of sustainable development that every state process of governance must be domestically owned. As Rocky Williams has argued security sector reform should be based upon a “national consensus” and viewed as a “national endeavour”3. This requires engendering sufficient levels of civil society support for security reform initiatives by an active policy of engagement using a variety of mechanisms, including the media and workshops. Attempts by international donors to impose reform programmes on target countries will fail in the longer-term. Countries being offered security sector transformation assistance should beware those donors offering ready made solutions based upon their own security sector models. No two models can be the same and only those developed and owned by nations will survive over time. When it is necessary for the international community to impose certain conditions as part of a peace settlement, it is essential that sufficient flexibility should be built into the agreement to encourage and facilitate a transfer of responsibility back to domestic ownership at the first safe moment. The Dayton Agreement of 1995/6 that ended the war in Bosnia enshrined the principle of two entities each with their own armed forces. This is proving counter-productive to long term development but without a revision of the agreement,
3 Unpublished paper entitled, “Guiding Principles for the Provision of External Support to Security Sector Reform Processes” by Colonel (retired) Rocky Williams, ISS, Pretoria, 1999.
integration and cost efficiency savings are not possible. In Bosnia, NATO is providing assistance by chairing various specialist joint (Federation and Bosnian Serb) committees that NATO has established, dealing with such single issues as force structuring, common logistics, doctrine and training. Most military decisions are forced through committee by NATO but then stalled at the political level by reference back to the right of separation enshrined in the Dayton Agreement. In countries where donors have supplied specialist advisors such as Sierra Leone, East Timor or Rwanda, there is less dependency and a greater exercise of indigenous initiative, and as a consequence, more sustainable development.
16. When external actors are involved in security sector transformation programmes, the key challenge is to provide assistance in ways that encourages social and political engagement and interaction, as well as improving the cost effectiveness of the security forces. Changes that involve democratic process and the development of an ethos of service to all peoples take time and will not be self-sustaining if they are imposed from outside. An over-emphasis on applying technocratic solutions to security-sector problems, before there is a political climate that is conducive to institutional change, may be counter-productive. External assistance to security- sector transformation programmes should therefore be intended to help governments fulfil their legitimate security functions more effectively and efficiently by improving the way in which they conduct security policymaking, allocate and use state resources, and account for this to the public. In the short term this will require technical military and other assistance to enhance professionalism within the security sector and stabilise the situation. In the longer-term objectives are to bring management and operational practices within the security sector closer into line with democratic norms, respect for human rights and sound principles of public sector management. As a consequence, assistance teams that are offered by donors that focus only on one specialist area of the security sector, such as the military or police can create an imbalance that may need correction later. Better to design a strategic security architecture at the outset that addresses civil military relations and issues of governance before delving into more technical areas. This would suggest that the most effective donor assistance should be, in the first instance, multidisciplinary, before specialist teams commence technical programmes. In Bosnia, for example technical military training commenced before the size of the armed forces or the terms and conditions of service, and therefore individual throughput, had been agreed. As a consequence, scarce resources in terms of time, money and effort have been wasted. By comparison in Rwanda, East Timor and Sierra Leone more logical and top-down processes have been developed, with the assistance of multi-disciplinary assistance teams that are likely to be more appropriate and therefore long-lasting.
The External Actors
17. Should external assistance for security sector transformation be sought by governments, there are three major categories of external actors who may help, bi-lateral donor nations, regional and international organisations, including the International Financial Institutions (IFI) and non-government organisations (NGO), including private security companies. From a recipient perspective, the key defining criteria is who is paying for the assistance. Unless funded by donors, support from private companies will have to be bought. The use of private companies and the unregulated purchase of arms and non-transparent commercial deals may prove counter-productive to the long-term goals of security transformation and will have a negative impact on donors. Security sector transformation programmes, even if that includes a large measure of ‘downsizing’ will not be cheap. The costs of integrating former antagonists, demobilisation and resettlement grants, restructuring and professionalisation will all ensure that there will be no immediate peace dividend. The understanding of donors and their financial support for security sector transformation and other reconstruction programmes will be essential for progress and sustainable development overtime.
Functional Assistance
18. External assistance initially may be required to establish the necessary level of security for political, social and economic development to commence. This may require the deployment of observers to monitor peace agreements, peacekeepers to ensure compliance, and negotiate and mediate where necessary, and provide technical support to humanitarian efforts and/or elections. In certain countries, such as East Timor, with little or no experience of self-government the international community may also need to provide the full complement of government and public services until the local capacity to do so has been developed. Once security and a political infrastructure and process have been agreed, host governments may request security transformation assistance in three general functional areas, technical security, governance and financial management. However, as has already been discussed, in the first instance, assistance may be needed that embraces all functional areas to ensure that a balanced civil military architecture is established which sets the scene for subsequent technocratic assistance.
· Technical security assistance may be provided by members of the security forces from donor countries or regional organisations – armed forces, police forces and intelligence services and relevant civil authorities such as ministries of defence, justice and interior. The UK government is providing security sector assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone within the broader context of a UN peacekeeping mission. In addition, direct UN support may be legitimised within the mandate of internationally constituted peacekeeping forces or civilian police missions.
· Governance advisors may be provided directly by donor countries, generally from development ministries where they exist, or by NGOs financed by donor countries. A focus on the management of the security sector that is consistent with democratic principles and sound governance practice, and supports poverty reduction strategies is considered as essential element of sustainable development.
· Multilateral financial development assistance can be provided by the World Bank, IMF, UNDP, and regional development banks or directly by donors. They can support security transformation and wider development programmes by the provision of direct financing or advice, information, technical assistance and co-ordination services.
SECTION THREE - SECURITY POLICY
Definition of Policy
19. If countries are to develop a sound political and institutional basis for conducting their affairs that is consistent with democratic principles and sound governance practices and which supports and promotes the welfare of its citizens, it is critical to formulate coherent and cost- effective policies for all areas of government activity and fiscal spending. Policy concerns the employment of resources and concepts to achieve ends or objectives, usually called national interests. A policy making process should ideally look beyond institutional boundaries and clearly define objectives and outputs that support the government’s broader strategic objectives, taking into account the effects and repercussions of that policy over the longer-term. The more inclusive the policy development process, the greater its relevance to the greatest number of people, and therefore its likely sustainability.
The Influence of Security on Government Policies
20. The security, foreign and defence policies of any state are rooted in perceptions of its interests and how these can best be protected and promoted. The most important duty of any government is maintaining the freedom and integrity of its territory and its people. Most states will also seek to secure a range of broader interests – political, economic and development. Externally, national defence and the defence of a nation’s legitimate interests abroad may be achieved through a broad range of military, diplomatic, political, economic and development levers. Deterrence, treaties, regional arrangements, arms control and peacekeeping are all elements of external security or foreign policy. Security policy as such is generally considered too wide a concept to be addressed by one government ministry in one policy statement. Security concerns and influences tend therefore to be addressed in all government policy
statements, but in particular foreign and defence policies for external issues and the interior ministry when related to the rule of domestic law.
The Relationship between Personal Security and Development
21. A number of recent studies by the World Bank and others have concluded that the greatest concern of the poor in developing and fragile countries is the security of their person, their property and their belongings. The symbiotic relationship between security and personal development is now widely accepted and, as a consequence, development actors are increasingly engaging on shared projects with those from the security sector. The security of individuals, their property and communities within a country, as well as the more traditional external defence and security requirements are increasingly addressed in one holistic security policy statement. The concept of domestic internal security relates not only to the establishment of the rule of law, but in developing countries, also to policies such as poverty reduction programmes, food security, reconciliation of ethnic and religious tensions, and health care programmes for such diseases as HIV and malaria. An understanding of the needs and demands for personal security is necessary to ensure an appropriate division of responsibilities and resources between military forces and those responsible for the domestic rule of law such as the police, judiciary, penal services and customs and other border forces.
Security Policy Formulation and Evaluation
22. In fragile nations, the establishment of a security policy framework is best conducted at the highest level of co-ordination in that country, generally presidential or cabinet level. At one level down the formulation of security policy and cross-departmental co-ordination and evaluation can generally best be conducted by the establishment of some form of national security council or committee. In countries where the major threat is deemed to be from internal insurgency, the lead for security policy formulation may rest with the internal security ministry or home office. However, should the major threat or risks be considered as external, the foreign ministry might lead on security policy formulation. Security policy formulation, especially in fragile states is perhaps the most difficult and complex area of policy development but it is a necessary precursor to the formulation of foreign and defence policy. Having formulated and disseminated policy, it is necessary to establish supporting measures and plans to ensure policy is translated into appropriate actions and can be evaluated and validated as changes occur to the international and domestic strategic environment.
Constitutional Determinants of the Security Sector
23. In developing nations, and in order to determine the responsibility for security policy formulation and evaluation, the roles and missions of the security forces should be
constitutionally defined. In more developed nations, these roles should already be inculcated in the professional culture of the security sector and deter members of the security forces from straying outside of their defined functional area of responsibility. In less well-developed nations, however, and in particular those in transformation, the duties, responsibilities and over- sight mechanisms of the security forces will need to be evolved as constitutional development matures. This process should determine civil control mechanisms and differentiate between internal police and external military functions, and any other areas of functional responsibility and or overlap. The responsibilities of the intelligence services, any border security or customs forces and their relationships with the other security forces and government should also be constitutionally defined.
The Significance of a Defence White Paper
24. The presentation of policy in the form of a white paper may have been overtaken by more sophisticated means of communication in more technically developed nations. However, in less well-developed nations a policy statement, in the form of a ‘white paper’ may remain the most cogent and effective method for a government to disseminate policy to citizens. Such a public announcement of its defence policy by a developing nation is a declaration of confidence in its transformation to a more democratic and inclusive form of government. It is not only a statement of competency to its own citizens but also that it has nothing to hide from national or international audit. A defence ‘white paper’ will contain the conclusions of a strategic review, a rational of how those conclusions were determined and lay out in a transparent manner the ‘route map’ that the government has decided for the future. As such a ‘white paper’ creates a ‘yardstick’ against which government actions can be measured and the government held democratically accountable.
The Unique Nature of Defence Policy and its Relationship with Military Doctrine
25. The key and germane feature in all policy formulation is the relationship between ways and means to achieve ends, with the emphasis on the outcome and the achievement of objectives. The means or resources available will be finite, however, the ways or concepts and the degree of prescription authorised by policy to achieve ends will be context driven. In government departments, other than the Ministry of Defence, policy direction will generally reach down to the lowest level and directly determine actions, for example the setting of educational curriculum and educational objectives by the Department of Education. However, in areas of defence activity, whilst defence policy determines military missions and tasks, allocates resources and establishes parameters and assumptions, it is military doctrine, rather than policy that guides the actual conduct of military operations. Policy sets the parameters within which doctrine provides the intellectual framework of understanding of the approach to core business
(warfare), in order to achieve success. Doctrine is the body of thought and common vehicle of expression that underpins the development of defence policy; it is informative, whereas policy is essentially prescriptive.
26. The challenge in the area of defence policy and doctrine development is to ensure that policy lessons learned at the political level and doctrinal lessons learnt at the tactical level coalesce into one symbiotic and coherent process. However, security and defence policy formulation will rarely be revolutionary but evolutionary, except in the context of extraordinary strategic and political change, such as the end of a civil war or radical new innovations, whether technical or conceptual. Policy evaluation and reformulation requires that current best practice be constantly reviewed such that lessons are learnt and applied. The development of policy and doctrine should be a dynamic and on-going process of evolution such that new operational challenges are predicted and pre-empted.
Future National Vision and Defence Support to that Vision
27. All national policies will address the challenges of a future operational environment and this environment should be the subject of considerable study to ensure those missions, tasks and resource allocations remain relevant and appropriate. However, policies will also be shaped by a government’s vision of how it wishes to conduct itself and do business. This vision will be shaped by the history, culture and ethical and moral values that a nation aspires to.
SECTION FOUR - THE SECURITY POLICY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
General.
28. The process chosen for security policy development will be country specific and depend largely on the overall state of that country’s development and the capacity of government and civil society to engage in the process. Essentially the process will be either ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ driven or possibly a combination of the two. The disadvantage of a top-down approach is the need to develop consensus at the highest level from the outset. Whereas a bottom-up process should enable many minor details to be resolved prior to the involvement of senior officers and ministers. The weakness of a bottom-up driven process however, is that it may not involve senior officers and ministers from the outset and therefore be very wide of what the executive wants. A combination of the two approaches, which provides top-down general direction but allows junior officers and officials the latitude to resolve minor details before drawing in senior officers and officials for major decisions and further direction, seems
most likely to be successful. For a country, immediately post civil war, and in the early stages of transformation to a democratic form of government, the capacity of both government and civil society to develop inclusive policies may be extremely limited. Civil society, as it is traditionally defined, may have been destroyed by the war or may never have existed. In these circumstances, outside assistance may be necessary to help develop civil society. However, whatever the detail of the process, there are certain development principles that should be considered.
Local Ownership and Inclusivity
29. Any outside assistance programme should be based upon local indigenous ownership of both the process and product, and should be as inclusive as possible. Consultation in the development process should be as wide as possible and include input from the armed forces themselves, other government stakeholders, the academic defence community, civil society groups, trades unions, non-government organisations and when appropriate individual citizens. Input can be generated by roving teams soliciting input, engagement with the media and through the media to citizens or by seminars, workshops and open debates. The importance of having a coordinated, cogent and comprehensive public information strategy to support policy development cannot be over emphasised. It may also prove useful to establish a panel of experts to provide advice and act as a ‘sounding board’ for emerging ideas and recommendations.
Transparency
30. Inclusivity of itself is not enough to engender consensus and support for the process of policy formulation unless the subsequent decision process is transparent. Disclosure is often an anathema to bureaucrats, unless they have been rehearsed in the requirements of the public domain. If decisions are taken in smoke-filled rooms and not taken under public scrutiny they will always be regarded with suspicion by the media and the public. The rationale behind decisions can be disseminated to civil society through meetings or the publication of papers and essays. There are certain defence policy decisions that for reasons of public security or commercial confidence cannot be fully open. Where this occurs, and in order to maintain the trust and confidence of its citizens, ‘parliament’ should establish oversight by selected individuals or committee. Such individuals or committee should have complete and free access to all information and activities and should be prepared to brief back to parliament on a regular basis and be held accountable. Vetting of individuals for such committees should be based, first and foremost on competence. Such issues of governance should be determined constitutionally. This is particularly relevant when those decisions are to
do with money and financial accountability. The media, both press and television can be given access to the policy development process and its enactment to ensure maximum visibility of all decisions.
Accountability
31. Within a democratic process of government, whether no-party, one-party or multi-party democracies, the principle of accountability to citizens and civis is paramount. Without accountability there is no democracy. The precise methods of oversight and accountability, in the form of various checks and balances will be country specific, however, they should be constitutionally defined. Generally ‘Parliament’ has the prime and direct responsibility for oversight and accountability, however, the media should ensure the involvement of citizens if only indirectly in the first instance. The appointment of parliamentary select committees is the normal method of ensuring direct oversight and accountability to parliament and indirectly to citizens.
Consensus
32. Part of the process of building confidence, trust and support in policy development is to ensure consensus. This is tied into openness, transparency, inclusivity and accountability. Consensus building will need to be finely judged but should be built incrementally to ensure solidarity. If possible, each policy development step and decision should be validated both within government and civil society before the process moves on. It is most important to ensure that the Treasury or Finance Ministry is actively engaged in this consensus. If the treasury is not involved and does not cost and endorse each incremental step, the danger is that the final product may not be fiscally achievable and the viability of the policy statement undermined. The achievement of consensus within civil society will be difficult to judge, but can be gauged by feed-back from all communications with the public sector, supported by public opinion polls and focus groups.
SECTION FIVE - THE LOGIC UNDERPINING DEFENCE POLICY FORMULATION
General
33. While no two national processes of defence policy formulation will be the same, they will essentially follow the logic sequence described below.
· Determination of defence objectives within wider national security framework.
· Development of defence assumptions.
· Threat assessment and evaluation of present and future operational environment.
· Prediction of resource availability and technological advances.
· Formulation of missions.
· Estimate of required components of capabilities; moral, physical and conceptual.
· Defence force development and configuration.
· Allocation of tasks.
· Establishment of evaluation, lessons learned and review process. As this logic process develops, individual steps may need to be revisited and the whole process should be considered cyclical and iterative. Also many of these steps will overlap and/or may need to be considered concurrently.
International Stakeholders
34. There will be many international, regional and domestic stakeholders in the security and defence policy formulation and evaluation processes. In the immediate aftermath of a major civil war, it may be necessary for international bodies such as the UN, World Bank or military alliance such as NATO to take on major areas of national reconstruction and development or even to run the country for an interim period. In addition, a country could find itself playing host to several hundred NGOs of varying degrees of professionalism and usefulness. In such cases, it may be advisable for the host government to conduct a ‘stakeholder analysis’, to analyse the strengths, weakness and objectives of those who consider themselves stakeholders, in order to decide how they can best be utilised in the reconstruction of the country. It is essential that a recipient country takes control of its own development and of the actions of the various stakeholders. Seven years of heavy engagement by the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina has created a dependency culture such that the government, as it is currently constituted, is backward looking, exercises very little initiative and is not making the progress that it aught4.
Domestic Stakeholders
35. Domestic stakeholders will include all elements of government, especially the treasury, the defence forces themselves, any defence related industries and civil society, which may include the media, academia, non-government organisations, including women groups and as far as
4 These are the views of the author who has been working with NATO, the UN and OSCE to assist the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to restructure and retrain their armed forces and police.
practicable every tax payer. The identification of stakeholders should be early in the formulation process to ensure their engagement is timely. The more inclusive and transparent the process, the greater the likelihood of the product being accepted and supported by stakeholders. The importance of policy development would suggest that those directly involved in policy formulation and assessment should be specially selected and trained. In addition, efforts should be made within government departments to ensure those manning levels in policy departments, including technical and administrative support, as well as expertise, remains commensurate to the task.
Determination of Defence Policy Objectives within Wider Security Interests
36. The formulation of defence policy objectives is best conducted in an integrated fashion within government, and balanced within the context of the ends, ways and means allocated to wider foreign and security objectives and resource levels. Defence policy objectives will generally be defined in the context of foreign policy goals, except when the most prevalent threat to national survival is from internal insurgency or terrorism. The early involvement of the foreign ministry in defence policy formulation is therefore necessary to ensure coherence between foreign and defence policy objectives, and the involvement of the treasury should ensure that objectives are fiscally realisable within national constraints, and balanced with other security and public sector spending requirements. Military objectives will generally relate to the defence of national territory and sovereignty, the protection of legitimate overseas interests and dependencies, alliance commitments and support to international and internal law and order agencies.
Determination of Rule of Law Objectives
37. Initially, rule of law objectives may be determined by the minimum available and acceptable level of individual security. If not already in existence, the first priority may require the codification of a process of law and justice that is democratically acceptable, and the allocation of resources to ensure effective practice. This may require a major construction or reconstruction of physical infrastructure as well as human capacity, rather than mere transformation and retraining, as is generally the case for military forces. The UN is the most usual supporter of police and justice programmes. Military support to the police is an important area to be addressed.
Development of Policy Assumptions
38. Assumptions will provide the broad guiding principles for the formulation, evaluation and implementation of all government policies. The development of security assumptions will generally fall out of the definition of security, foreign, defence and rule of law goals, resource
limitations, and extant government best practice and commitments. Typical defence planning assumptions may relate to regional or alliance commitments, or a determination to conduct all government business in an inclusive, open and transparent manner. Or there may be certain immutable facts concerning the strategic environment that should be considered as defence planning assumptions, such as a particular threat profile, or the fact that technology will have an exponential effect upon information technology and weapon development. And as technology becomes cheaper and more available ‘off the shelf’; it comes within the consideration of even the most under-developed country as a specific defence assumption. Concerns relating to international and domestic crime and the numbers of qualified personnel available for recruitment to the police force will be typical assumptions relating to rule of law policy goals.
Threat Assessment and Examination of Current and Future Operating Environments
39. Depending on the information and intelligence available, threats from potentially hostile military forces or criminal elements are quantifiable in terms of capability and intention. Security threats on the other hand may be multidimensional and multifaceted, especially in less well-developed countries, which by their very definition are fragile. In which case, a security threat assessment may be very wide and cover all areas of government activity. Threats are first and foremost measured against the vulnerability of national interests and then more broadly as risks and potential risks inherent in other government policies that may require protective measures. An examination of technical and social trends in a future projection of the strategic environment is essential to ensure that security, foreign and defence policies remain relevant, cost effective, and determine force development and equipment procurement plans. Threat assessments within a prognosis of the future operating environment can be greatly assisted by the active involvement of defence analysts and academics.
Projection of Resource Availability and Technological Advances
40. Defence and other policy planning can only be determined in the fiscal round and based upon all known financial planning assumptions, projections and priorities. For example, in developing countries the average military defence budget will vary between 1.5% and 5% of GDP and be 5 to 10 times greater than the police budget. However, the money available for the appropriate development of the security forces may be constrained by the International Financial Institutions who may make aid and development assistance conditional upon a reduction of defence and security sector spending. It is an unfortunate paradox that those developing countries most in need of strong economic growth to fund development programmes, including the transformation and modernisation of its armed forces are generally the countries with the least available resources. ‘Right sizing’ should be more appropriate than
‘down-sizing’ and right sizing may incur additional costs. Technological advances, for example, especially in information technology, whilst expensive may in the longer-term increase cost effectiveness. The computerisation of personnel and pay records can greatly facilitate career management, whilst at the same time limit corruption.
Formulation of Missions
41. An examination of the ‘ends’ and ‘means’ available will determine the ‘way’. An assessment of the national interest within the current and future operational environment, balanced against extant resources and fiscal projections will determine the missions and ultimately the tasks of the security forces. National defence and commitments to any regional arrangements or military alliance will generally be considered an absolute obligation. Support to wider national security interests, whether diplomatic, commercial or philanthropic may be open to wider debate, especially with civil society. The peacetime security functions of the military and how they relate to police functions should be separated and constitutionally defined and/or widely debated and exposed to civil society to ensure that the functional demarcation between the various security forces is understood and accepted by the citizens at large.
42. Missions and tasks will be used as the basis for planning for force design and the prioritisation of resources. Once defined, missions and tasks can be costed to facilitate the budgetary process. Missions will cover current priorities and longer-term requirements. In certain developing countries the military may become involved in business ventures such as agricultural land reclamation projects or minor industrial projects. The military may be the only institution with the capacity to manage, however, there is always the danger that the involvement of a state’s instruments of power in business ventures can lead to corruption. The interface between the military and civilian business interests is always an area prone to corruption and extortion, however, if all necessary checks and balances are in place, such that all incomes are ‘on-line’, accountable and audited, the military involvement in business can bring benefits to the nation. A realignment of missions or a major demobilisation programme may create a surplus of weapons, which unless properly controlled may find their way onto the ‘black market’ and fuel subsequent criminal activity.
Estimate of Required Components of Capability: Moral, Physical and Conceptual
43. There is a commonly used and generic checklist of required ‘components of capability’ that will guide security force design and development, weapon procurement and operational practice. These components of capability are necessary to perform the core functions. These core functions may best be described in terms of identifying the causes of a problem, isolating
that problem and applying the resources to achieve the desired resolution. They are the functional components that all security forces need to conduct their business, although the priority given to each and the overall balance between them will vary. They are:
· Command and control (within a multinational environment), to include liaison with civilian agencies.
· Manoeuvre is the intellectual capacity to exercise initiative and operate freely in pursuit of objectives, irrespective of the confusion and difficulties inherent in any operational or business environment (doctrine and training).
· Mobility and counter-mobility relates to the physical ability to move through the operational environment (vehicle movement) and the ability to maintain that mobility against counter- measures, (counter mines).
· Resolution is the ability to apply resources to achieve immediate operational success. In the military environment this relates to firepower, however, in a police environment it may relate to the means to effect arrests.
· Protection is necessary for survival and the continuance of operations.
· Intelligence and surveillance are necessary to enhance awareness.
· Logistics relates to the delivery of resources, maintenance and sustainment. These components will contain moral (motivation, leadership and management), physical (manpower, equipment, logistics and training) and conceptual (policy and doctrinal) elements that will all need to be considered within the transformation process in any developing nation.
Force Development and Configuration
44. The force development process is designed to structure forces to accomplish the missions of today and for the foreseeable future. The components of capability, as described above, can be used as an initial force development tool. More specifically, the organisation of a country’s security forces will reflect its history, culture and strategic circumstances, including its resource levels. That said, there is a remarkable similarity in how security forces organise themselves around the world. Within the military building blocks, such as companies and battalions are almost universal; it is only the overall size and equipment choice that varies. This standardisation greatly simplifies defence force policy formulation for non-military technocrats and also facilitates military force assessments in developing countries. On the other hand, force development and transformation is complicated by the requirements of technological advances and equipment procurement, and the conservative culture prevalent in some security forces. Areas for consideration in policy formulation and assessment should not only include active units but also training establishments and headquarters, and business practices.
Establishment of Evaluation, Lessons Learned and Review Process
45. Security policy, as with all policy development is an iterative and dynamic process and requires qualified and competent managers. Continuity in post over time will enhance that competency, however, it is still necessary to set in place formal mechanisms, including a corporate memory, to conduct regular policy reviews, in order to learn lessons and evaluate relevancy and progress, and make changes as appropriate. This should be a holistic and integrated process, which ideally should also include various supporting reviews of sub- components of the system.
SECTION SIX - RESTRUCTURING
Introduction
46. The size and shape of the security sector will be broadly determined by the state of the peace process and within the political context agreed by that process. For example in Sri Lanka, while there is a ceasefire in place, the peace negotiations have yet to decide the future political configuration of the country, whether it should be a (con) federation or whether the Tamils should have a more independent status. Until that has been agreed, the future configuration of the security sector is uncertain. In Bosnia, the Dayton Agreement allowed the Federation of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, and the Bosnian Serb Republic to retain separate armed forces and two Ministries of Defence (MOD). This is not operationally cost effective and financially unsustainable within the dire financial circumstances of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet the two factions are loath to integrate their forces into one, even though it would release a large sum of money that could be better spent on poverty alleviation, jobs, education and development. Currently the donors are applying enormous financial leverage on the Tri- Presidency in Sarajevo to ‘downsize’, integrate, rationalise and professionalise their armed forces under one MOD.
Integration
47. Having broadly determined, within a wider security and defence review, the roles and missions, size and shape and governance oversight mechanisms for the various elements of the security sector, the next major challenge is the practicality of restructuring. In outline, this will involve selecting, training and integrating those from the former antagonists who are to remain in the new integrated security sector, and demobilising and resettling the remainder back into civilian employment. The selection of those to remain will set the scene for all subsequent integration and reconciliation challenges. Selection must therefore be as fair and impartial as
operational effectiveness will allow and even then it may be necessary to sacrifice short-term operational effectiveness for the longer-term goal of reconciliation.
Reconciliation
48. The process of integration requires the delicate task of reconciling former antagonists. The extent of the psychological challenge will rest largely on the nature of the conflict and the degree to which human rights abuses and possibly ethnic cleansing and genocide were practiced individually or as a matter of policy. Reconciliation is difficult without justice. Justice may be exercised internationally by the International Criminal Court, in the case of war crimes or domestically, by best domestic cultural practice. This may take the form of a truth and reconciliation commission or the exercise or a more traditional local practice such as the gacaca courts in Rwanda. Gacaca courts are conducted at village level and are fully participatory by all the villagers. Essentially, if an accused admits to his guilt and demonstrates remorse, the villagers are encouraged, in the spirit of reconciliation to deal leniently with the offender. Once justice has been done, and this may require a period of re-education, reconciliation is best effected by the fair, even-handed and impartial treatment of all ex-combatants. This process must ensure that, as far as possible, those individuals who are selected to remain in the security forces are placed equitably with those of equal competency, status and rank, irrespective of their previous incarnation. Subsequently, there should be equal promotion prospects for all within the security sector. The active involvement together of former antagonists in the security forces has enormous symbolic significance and goes a long way to prevent backsliding from the parties in the peace process.
Disarmament
49. Disarmament may be conducted in a variety of different formats. It may be designated as an essential prerequisite to the peace process or tied by degree to incremental steps within it. It may be staged symbolically between parties or conducted by geographical areas. It may be conducted by degree of lethality, with heavy weapons such as artillery, tanks and fighter aircraft first, before small arms, or be any combination of all the aforementioned. But what is certain is that combatants will be extremely loath to hand in their personal weapons if their own safety and that of their families or tribal/ethnic group can not be guaranteed. Confidence in the peace process, plus an international presence as an additional guarantee is essential if a demobilisation programme is to succeed. When confidence is not high, it may be necessary to place weapons and small arms in controlled holding sites and centres, from where they can be withdrawn should security break down.
Demobilisation
50. The demobilisation of combatants of either gender and their families, and child soldiers must be accompanied by a programme that is designed to resettle former combatants into civilian life with the minimum disturbance to themselves and the society into which they are moving. This may require a process of general schooling for child soldiers and more formal trade training for adults, in order to allow them to find civilian employment and subsist. In the aftermath of a civil war or genocide, there will almost certainly be a desperate societal need for skilled tradesmen and heads of families. In addition, the demobilisation of former combatants, who may be either the victims or perpetrators of human rights abuses or both, as is often the case, will require an extensive and sustained programme of psychological counselling.
Resettlement
51. The resettlement of former combatants into civil society will require that every individual receives a financial ‘start-up’ grant and if possible a pension. This will be determined by the potential of individuals to find accommodation and work, and sustain their immediate families. Those who have been incapacitated through injury will need special consideration. Every individual case, whether male, female or child will have to be decided on its own merits. In addition to looking after the individuals to be resettled, it is in their best interests, and of the country as a whole, if the sections of society, town or village, into which individuals are to resettle, are assessed for their suitability to receive veterans. Factors such as housing and job availability, and the wishes and concerns of locals should be taken into account. Competition for scarce housing and jobs may lead to an unhelpful friction with in-place locals. Once the initial resettlement has occurred, a system of monitoring and further counselling should be put in place. This will require the establishment of regional offices that are accessible to veterans, including those who have been disabled. Such centres may also have the resources to deliver and administer further low interest or no cost loans to veterans. By monitoring and analysing the progress of the resettlement programme governments can make amendments and adjustments as the need arises.
Conclusion
52. Previous experience indicates all too clearly that should any part of the disarmament, demobilisation, integration, reconciliation or resettlement programme fail, there is a very real danger that former combatants will go back into the bush and revert to violence and crime to sustain themselves. It is for this reason that money invested in this process is money well spent. When the UNDP demobilisation programme in Rwanda ran out of money in 1999/2000 and collapsed, several thousand soldiers went back into the war in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC). This year as part of the Lusaka peace process for the DRC, the World Bank has allocated $25 million for a demobilisation and resettlement programme for all combatants in DRC, irrespective of their ‘party’ allegiance.
SECTION SEVEN - TRAINING
General
53. In any civil war many civilians will be called up for military service at short notice and given little formal training before they are dispatched to the ‘frontline’. In addition, many civilians will join official militia and local defence groups and illegal bandit gangs or become freedom fighters. In the aftermath of a civil war, the status of freedom fighter, insurgent and/or member of the government armed forces will only be of historical significance, as they may all need to be inducted into the new security forces. What will be of significance, however, will be their state of training and their professional culture. Both will need to be considered in a training need analysis, in order to develop common training standards and interoperability, and a professional ethos of service to all peoples of the country.
Training Needs Analysis
54. In order to achieve the required training standards it is necessary to conduct a training need analysis. This should examine current training standards and processes, develop and publish the required standards that are to be achieved, and establish the educational processes and training mechanisms to achieve those standards and goals. This will need to be based upon an analysis of the training throughput in terms of students in order to determine the level and standard of instructors and the training facilities. This will need to cover individual training and education, and collective, unit and formation training. Students required not only technical training but also to develop a common ethos of service and this is a matter of education rather than training.
Training Syllabus and Objectives
55. There is a marked similarity between military training courses, syllabus and objectives of different countries. Hence students can receive relevant training at international courses run out of country, or by adapting general syllabus to suit one’s own purpose. In addition, there are common standards for international peacekeeping operations produced by the UN. Peacekeeping training is an excellent medium for transforming training that is focused exclusively on war fighting to one more akin to peacetime soldiering. And, of course UN
peacekeeping is an excellent generator of income and a demonstration that a country has become a responsible and credible member of the international community.
Training Assistance
56. Training assistance may be provided directly by donors with the deployment of training personnel or teams to the various elements of the security sector, or may focus more specifically on training the trainers. Training the trainers is generally considered a more cost effective option. Support will rarely be provided for the reconstruction of military training bases unless they are specifically related to peacekeeping. However, donors are generally more willing to support the reconstruction of police barracks. Donor support may also be provided to train the civil service, especially those involved in accounting and procurement, and to educate civil society and the media in the role they can play in the security debate. In addition, donors may offer places to middle and high ranking officers and civil servants on their own management courses.
SECTION EIGHT - GENERIC CONTENT OF A DEFENCE WHITE PAPER
57. In order to assist in defence policy development the paragraph headings of a series of defence white papers are below. Despite the marked differences between the countries, their defence policy statements (white papers) are on the surface remarkably similar. The defence policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina is different because, under pressure from the international community, the Government produced defence policy before conducting a strategic security and foreign policy review. As this paper is being written the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is trying to back engineer the process and conduct a comprehensive strategic security review. The lesson is that governments should develop their own policy initiatives, rather than reacting to pressure from the international community.
· UK (1998)
Chapter 1 A Strategic Approach to Defence Chapter 2 Security Priorities in a Changing World Chapter 3 Defence Missions and Tasks Chapter 4 Deterrence and Disarmament
Chapter 5 The Future Shape of our Forces Chapter 6 A Policy for People Chapter 7 Equipping the Forces Chapter 8 Smart Procurement Chapter 9 Defence Support for the 21st Century Chapter 10 Resources Chapter 11 Conclusion: Modern Forces for the Modern World Appendix A Strategic Defence review – Supporting Essays (published separately)
· Republic of South Africa. (1995)
Chapter 1 The Challenge of Transformation Chapter 2 Civil-Military Relations Chapter 3 The Strategic Environment Chapter 4 Role and Functions Chapter 5 Human Resource Issues Chapter 6 Budgetary Considerations Chapter 7 Arms Control and the Defence Industry Chapter 8 Land and Environmental Issues
· Cambodia (2000) Chapter 1 Impact of History on Cambodia’s Defence
Chapter 2 Cambodia’s Strategic Outlook Chapter 3 National Defence Policy Chapter 4 Roles of the Cambodian Armed Forces Chapter 5 The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces in the new millennium (the future force development)
· Rwanda (2001 - provisional only, as provided by the author to the Government of Rwanda) Chapter 1 A Strategic Approach to Security Chapter 2 National Interests and Goals Chapter 3 Effective Governance and Democratisation
Chapter 4 Security Missions and Tasks (Military and police) Chapter 5 A Policy for People Chapter 6 Demobilisation and reintegration Chapter 7 Equipping the security Forces Chapter 8 Enhancing National Productivity Chapter 9 A Fully Integrated security Forces – The Sinews of the Nation.
· Bosnia and Herzegovina (2001) Chapter 1 Introduction – Dayton Peace Agreement Chapter 2 Political Military Framework Chapter 3 Strategic Guidance for defence Policy Chapter 4 Purpose, Structure and Organisation of the Armed Forces Chapter 5 Command and Control Structure
Paper 8 A Guide for the Armed Forces of the GOS and the SPLA on the Possible Military Mechanisms for Cease-Fire by Colonel (Retired) Phillip Wilkinson
The Peace Process and the Need for a Strategic Plan and Architecture
· As has been repeated stated there is no template solution to the complex challenge of creating peace and stability in the Sudan. No matter whether there is a nation-wide cease- fire or one limited to the Nuba mountain area before a peace agreement, there are some general principles that should be considered in order to ensure that the military processes reinforce the peace, rather than act as a cause of further friction. In the first instant it is necessary to create a political strategic plan or vision that links all activities whether diplomatic, humanitarian, developmental, economic, social and security related. For example the cessation of fighting in a particular area and the creating of a safe area of tranquillity may be necessary for the delivery of aid. The delivery of aid and emergency relief is a necessary precursor for creating the conditions in which developmental plans can be laid. Such incremental steps forward are not possible without security and all these activities will help to build confidence in the peace process.
· In every strategic plan there will be many different functional lines of activity and it will generally be necessary to develop objectives along those functional lines that may be seen as stepping stones towards the eventual goal of a self-sustaining peace. The development, oversight and management of this plan should not be imposed upon Sudan but developed inclusively by all parties with the assistance of the international community. Irrespective of the ultimate political architecture chosen by the people of Sudan, during the critical interim period the management of the strategic plan and the co-ordination of the various involved activities will require the establishment of a joint control element at the highest level. It is this control element that will determine priorities and manage resources between the various functional lines of activity as the plan develops towards the creation of peace and stability.
· In the immediate aftermath of a serious and prolonged conflict, as has occurred in the Sudan, the need to negotiate a cease-fire that sets in place the conditions for peace and stability, respect for human rights and the re-establishment of the Rule of Law (RoL) is paramount. Within the over-arching strategic plan, the security line of operation may need to develop concepts and mechanisms for disengagement and the separation of forces, demobilisation, reconstruction of the security forces (army, police etc), re-integration, re- education and training, de-mining, the re-establishment of the RoL and justice. Much work in these areas has already been conducted within the context of the ‘Nuba Cease- fire’ and the Joint Military Commission (JMC) will have developed concepts and procedures of their own. Clearly their efforts should be supported and used to underpin the development of any further mechanisms within a wider federal cease-fire.
· Generally the detail of a cease-fire will be negotiated as part of the initial peace process and now that the basic political structure of Sudan has been agreed, albeit only in outline and as an interim measure, it should be possible to start to contingency plan the security line of activity, starting with a cease-fire and cessation of hostilities. It is essential that this process is open, transparent, consensual and verifiable. It should also be linked to a series of rewards or benefits for compliance and agreed ‘punishments’ for non- compliance with the arrangements of the cease-fire agreement. These details should be widely transmitted and publicised so that there can be no subsequent misunderstandings and accusations of unfairness. Accountability can thus be placed in the public domain.
· The monitoring and supervision of a cease-fire is usually conducted by an impartial third party from the international community. However, in Sudan’s case, and in an agreed federal context, once separation of main forces has taken place a twin track process that relies upon self-regulation could be put in place. Monitoring mechanisms by the international monitoring mission will also need to be agreed that reinforces any self- regulatory processes and adds coherence to the overall plan. This may require that the GoS and SPLA establish special forces to ensure compliance with the cease-fire agreement from recalcitrant parties, even from within their own political grouping. Enforcement actions will require control at the highest level and close co-ordination between the GoS and SPLA to ensure enforcement actions are contained and do not spread and escalate.
AIM
The aim of this paper is to propose a series of military concepts and activities that may be involved in the mechanisms of a cease-fire in order to better inform any negotiations between the GoS and SPLA. Nature of a Cease-Fire.
No two cease-fires are the same unless they are total. However very few cease-fires involve the total cessation of all hostilities in all areas from a prescribed time. More usually cease- fires are staggered and incremental, yet even then there are likely to be marginalised, splinter and criminal groups who, for their own purposes, are unwilling to agree to the peace process and act as ‘spoilers’. There may be many graduations and increments to a cease-fire, a number of which are discussed below. Whatever the graduation the aim is to expand areas of compliance into areas of consent and finally areas of active support for the peace process and the national federal vision.
· Levels. While a cease-fire may be negotiated at the highest political level by the major parties to the conflict, time must be allowed for the detail of the agreement to reach all levels of command in all areas. In a country the size of Sudan this will not be easy. It may be necessary for the political level to accept that the peace process will have to accommodate a ‘minimum acceptable level of violence’ at the tactical level on the ground as an interim measure before the Rule of Law can be fully established.
· Time-lines. There will inevitably be timelines built into any cease-fire agreement. This allows the process to be taken forward incrementally and in a co-ordinated manner and tied to other confidence building measures. Timelines may be applied to any of the following increments.
· Geographical Areas. Geographical areas may be decided by tribal or ethnic region such as the Nuba Mountain region or in relation to current troop positions and garrisons. The aim being to create a cease-fire in a particular area or region, to increase the number of areas and to expand them until they cover the whole of Sudan. In other operations this has be called the ‘oil-slick’ technique. These geographical areas may take many forms and names; safe havens (Northern Iraq 1991-2), ‘protected areas’ (Croatia 1992) or ‘safe areas’ (Bosnia 1993-5). The lesson is that unless these areas are jointly agreed they are unlikely to be sustainable without the use of force and the possible destruction of the peace process.
· Zones of Separation. Geographical zones of separation may be tied to observation, i.e. out of line of sight, small arms or heavy weapon ranges. All agreed distances should be agreed on the ground and on marked maps that are signed by the relevant commanders on the spot.
· Weapon Systems. Cease-fires may be graduated by weapons types and systems that may be tied to time-lines and geographical areas. Attack aircraft, artillery and tanks may be controlled initially, leaving small arms for self defence only. Joint Rules of Engagement (ROE) may be agreed that specify certain common control mechanisms. For example small arms only and then only in self-defence and in specified conditions, i.e. fire in retaliation after warning.
· Target Designation. In certain peace processes it may be necessary to accept a level of restraint of target selection. For example, in Northern Ireland the cease-fire only limits the PIRA and loyalist paramilitaries from attacks against the security forces but not against one another. But as a consequence the on-going level of human rights abuses in Northern Ireland is now threatening the peace process.
· Functional Activity. Certain actions may be proscribed in a particular area for a particular time to allow for a particular activity to take place, such as the delivery of aid. Such agreements must allow for the detail to be transmitted down the chain of command to ensure compliance at the lowest level.
MILITARY RESTRAINT AND SUPPORT TO THE PEACE PROCESS
Introduction.
Military tasks are generally considered integral to and in support of political activities. In the critical 6-year interim period, political influences should have special primacy and permeate all military considerations and actions. All military actions should be viewed against their political consequences and within the context that every step taken towards reducing poverty and achieving broad based economic growth is a step towards a renewal of conflict. Long- term preventive strategies developed as part of any cease-fire and peace process must therefore work to promote human rights, to protect minority rights and institute political arrangements in which all groups are represented.
Conflict Prevention Tasks. Conflict prevention is primarily a diplomatic and development activity, however, preventative deployments and other military activities will play an essential role in supporting diplomatic and development activities to prevent, contain or control a resumption of conflict after a cease-fire. At the tactical level, and working on the principle that ‘prevention is better than cure’, activities to pre-empt conflict, or at least prevent its spread, should be a prime consideration in all military activities by the government forces and SPLA. There are generally considered to be six principal military tasks that may be included as part of a conflict prevention strategy. However, these tasks are not exclusive, and they may all overlap, and contribute to peacekeeping and peace-building.
· Early Warning. By identifying the threat of an outbreak of violence, early warning will buy time for a range of preventative diplomatic, humanitarian and military actions to be put into place. As a consequence, commanders at all levels should focus their intelligence and information gathering assets on any potential crisis within their areas of interest.
· Surveillance. The presence of widespread surveillance in an area of previous operations will help to deter breaches of the peace by any party. Surveillance can also provide the means for attribution of culpability. Effective surveillance is, therefore, a major conflict prevention technique.
· Fact Finding Missions. Fact finding missions conducted by multi-disciplinary groups of experts from the JMC or international monitoring group are an essential element in all conflict prevention strategies.
· Preventive Deployments in Support of Diplomacy. Enforcement forces may be positioned as a demonstration of resolve to deter or coerce a recalcitrant party from taking a particular course of action.
· Stabilising Measures. Stabilising and confidence building measures, supported by peace building activities, may contribute to the lowering of tension in an area and may represent the first step towards the restoration of law and order, and support for the peace process. They may take several forms:
o The establishment of an effective liaison and communication network between all parties.
o Mutual and balanced reductions in personnel and equipment.
o The separation of forces.
o Zonal restrictions on the deployment of weapons and military personnel, including the enforcement of no-fly zones.
o Advance reporting of military activities or exercises
o .Joint inspections of disputed areas.
· Training Programmes. Training efforts to reform the defence and security sector will be designed to enhance democratic accountability and transparency, and ensure security resources are used to support the legitimate aspirations of the country as a whole. Specifically, education and training programmes will be designed to enhance understanding of human rights issues and promote democratisation efforts within all elements of military and security forces. Training assistance may be part of a wider security sector reform programme that includes all a state’s security apparatus and those involved in its oversight.
· Criteria for Success. The overall criteria for success in a conflict prevention strategy will be defined by the political authority, which will not be the military. Military success will be measured against the specific conditions that their actions have been designed to achieve. These may relate to deterrence or coercion and the non-application of force or more specifically in a disarmament demobilisation and reintegration programme, for example, to the ‘right-sizing’ of the military and the successful re- integration of ex-combatants back into society. Success in preventive strategies will never be spectacular but relate to ‘quiet diplomacy’ and the diffusion of crisis.
PEACEKEEPING TASKS FOR THE GOS ARMED FORCES AND THE SPLA AND THE CRITICAL PATH TO SUCCESS
Introduction
· What follows is an extract of doctrine that the author has produced for other countries and organisations including the UN and NATO and which may be of relevance to the GoS and SPLA as they monitor and control their own cease-fire processes. Time precludes a major modification for the circumstances of Sudan
· Modern peacekeeping consists of traditional peacekeeping tasks and those more robust elements designed to deter and coerce, in order to ensure compliance with the terms of the peace agreement and cease-fire and the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and International Humanitarian Law. The control of those recalcitrant parties that refuse to react to any other measure than the use of force, what the Brahimi Panel refer to as ‘spoilers’ may well require the exercise of combat skills. Modern-day peacekeepers must be combat capable to be able to manage the hostile environment in which they might find themselves operating. However, first and foremost they must be a credible deterrent to acts of hostility, aggression and abuses to human rights. Combat skills are not discussed as it is assumed that all military forces will already be combat capable.
· The focus of any peacekeeping mission will be on the creation of a secure environment in which peace-building activities can flourish. This will inevitably require many different tasks will need to be conducted concurrently and sequentially, at different times, in different parts of the mission area. As a consequence it is extremely difficult to identify a generic critical path. The critical path will be area specific and need careful management as the operation progresses towards strategic goals. This places a great emphasis on flexibility and the delegation of responsibility to very low levels of command.
· The peacekeeping tasks in this section will be dealt with in ascending order of combat potential. That is that traditional peacekeeping tasks will be covered first before moving on to those that are more robust.
Observation and Monitoring
· In Peacekeeping, strategic and operational level observation and monitoring may be conducted by maritime and air assets, including satellites, but ultimately will rely heavily on the human factor, i.e. the observations of troops on the ground and in proximity to the parties and indigenous population.
· Traditionally, individual observer teams have acted as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the political authority and their presence has often been sufficient to deter breaches of cease-fires and peace agreements. Their up-to-date reports provide useful evidence to counter claims put forward by partisan interests.
· Observers may be employed individually or in small multinational joint teams to observe, monitor, verify, and report and, where possible, to use confidence building measures to defuse situations of potential conflict. Specific tasks may be to provide early warning to trigger political initiatives, to observe a withdrawal or to monitor the movement of refugees and other displaced persons. Subsidiary tasks could be to provide liaison, investigation and negotiation, although unarmed observers would normally take no executive action with regard to violations.
· Observers are generally unarmed and have traditionally relied on their impartial status for protection and personal security. However, in an intrastate conflict, involving irresponsible sub-state actors and warlords, the concept of impartiality may have little meaning and worth.
Supervision of Truces and Cease-Fires
Peacekeepers may be deployed to supervise any commitments agreed to by the parties as part of a truce, cease-fire or other peace plan. This may include operational level joint force deployments. Success will be measured in the extent to which the parties conform to any agreements that they have given. Tasks will generally be agreed and specified in the detail of the agreement or treaty. These might include the following: · The separation, containment, disarmament and demobilisation of forces.
· The execution of the details of the agreement, such as the exchange of prisoners and bodies, the conduct of elections and arms control agreements.
· Liaison between the parties and all elements of the force, both military and civilian.
· Negotiation and mediation on behalf of all parties to the dispute.
· The investigation of complaints and violations to the details of the agreement or treaty.
· The movement of refugees and displaced persons.
· Assistance to UN and other CIVPOL in those areas with mixed populations that may be located outside buffer zones and in areas of potential hostile territory.
Interposition
· Peacekeepers may be required to deploy as an inter-positional force, as a form of trip- wire either when consent exists or when consent is fragile, if supported by a credible external deterrent power or stand-off force.
· Troops involved in interposition operations are generally deployed to pre-empt conflict. As such, these operations take place in areas of recent or potential, rather than actual conflict, either between states or within a state where tension is rising between parties. Although there would be consent to the cease-fire, at least at the political level, local peace plans or local cease-fires may have to be negotiated and agreed..
· Interposition operations will generally take the form of the establishment of a buffer zone, or where the communities are intermingled, to establish areas of separation wherever the communities are physically mixed. Should one of the local parties not consent to the operation and it is judged that enforcement may become necessary, an enforcement force capable of escalation from the outset should conduct the operation.
Transition Assistance
Transition assistance refers to all forms of military assistance to a civil authority or community rendered as part of a wider UN diplomatic, humanitarian and economic strategy to support a return or transition to peace and stability. In the aftermath of an intra-state conflict, and in the absence of effective government, transition assistance may initially take the form of direct help to civil communities, before efforts can be made to rebuild a more effective government infrastructure. Transition assistance operations are generally a post conflict activity; however, their chance of success will be enhanced if reconstruction and peace building efforts are conducted as a concurrent activity throughout the duration of the peacekeeping phase of the operation. Success will be defined in terms of a return to ‘normalcy’ and the capacity of the indigenous infrastructure to assume responsibility for its own well-being. Military tasks in a transition assistance operation cover a broad range of activities, but for ease of definition, can be grouped under the following headings, reflecting the purpose for which such tasks might be undertaken.
· Supervision. Important supervisory tasks might include; a transition of authority; reforming local security forces, the relocation and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons.
· Administration. Tasks might range from liaison to support for the establishment of an interim government. In between tasks could include the supply of power, water, public transport, communications and hygiene services, i.e. all those public services that form an essential part of the daily life of a community.
· Protection. The creation of a secure environment may be extended to include the protection of basic human rights and the safeguarding of individuals, communities and installations. In areas where consent is fragile, and there is a measure of opposition to the operation as a whole, protective tasks are more effectively accomplished by a PE force.
· Response. The ability of military forces to respond to fresh incidents is essential to retain control and keep the initiative. In all military operations commanders should have reserves and contingency plans prepared for such situations. In PK, responses may consist of other techniques, other than the use of force.
· Control. In any transition assistance operation a commander may be called upon to support collective control measures. These may range from economic sanctions to local curfews. As with other dealings with the parties to the conflict, prohibitions and restrictions have to be proportionate, legal and applied impartially. Otherwise the PSF will risk losing local co-operation and consent.
· Co-ordination. In all larger scale and complex Peace Operations there will be a requirement to co-ordinate the activities of a large number of agencies, e.g. NGOs, Pros and other. Military forces are likely to be tasked to assist with this co-ordination.
· Law and Order and Support to Judicial Processes. Military assistance operations will contribute to the overall aim of maintaining law and order, a responsibility that rests ultimately with the police and civil authorities. If the situation is degenerating, military enforcement operations may be necessary to restore the peace and to provide direct support to the police. Military operations of this nature will tend to be a post conflict activity. · Support to the Electoral Process. The re-establishment of law and order and the creation of a secure environment are essential prerequisites to the successful conduct of elections. Without some guarantee of protection and security, individuals will not have the confidence to vote and the electoral process will lack credibility. Military support for the electoral process may take many forms but will generally consist of the establishment and protection of voting centres and the secure transportation of ballot boxes and electoral staff.
The Protection of Humanitarian Operations and Human Rights.
· Should the situation be such that humanitarian operations require widespread protection and human rights abuses are endemic, a robust peacekeeping operation will be necessary.
· The foremost task for the peacekeepers may be to restore the peace and create a stable and secure environment in which aid can run freely and human rights abuses are curtailed. Specific protection tasks may include Non-combatant Evacuation Operations, but will more normally apply to the protection of convoys, depots, equipment and those workers responsible for their operation. Conditions of widespread banditry and abuses may exist, and when aid operations are being consistently interrupted there may be a requirement to use force in large measure to provide protection and achieve the mission. Such activities will need the closest co-operation and co-ordination between military forces, aid agencies and human rights groups, not least to maintain the independent status of the aid agencies.
· When violations of human rights have occurred, or are still occurring, it is essential that all evidence, and, in particular, details of those involved, is systematically and accurately recorded for future war crime investigations. When military protection is not available, aid agencies may need to use local personnel or civilian firms for guards and protection. The use of such persons and companies for these duties is the responsibility of the agencies but may in itself a create a security problem that may need to be carefully managed. .
Explosive Ordnance (Mine) Clearance.
· The Hazards. Explosive ordnance, especially mines, pose a significant threat to all people, equipment and animals during, and after, the termination of a conflict, both at sea and on land. With the exception of mines in international waters, unexploded ordnance and minefields in combat zones are the responsibility of the party that laid them. In theory, they remain part of their obstacle plan should the PSF withdraw. If the PSF wishes to retain its impartial status it is obliged not to reveal the location of one party’s minefields to the other, although it should try and ensure that they are discreetly and adequately marked. Unless the mandate specifies otherwise, a PSF is not permitted to lift a party’s unexploded ordnance or minefields, except when those munitions that prevent the force from carrying out its mission, or that offer a hazard along tracks and sea-lanes in use by international shipping or other non-involved parties.
· Tasks. While unexploded ordnance and mine clearance operations are the responsibility of the party that laid them, the PSF can be employed to mark, isolate and clear mines and unexploded ordnance where they present a direct threat to life. They can also be employed to train local forces to do the same. They will generally seek to identify areas of hazard. This information will usually be produced on a master map which available for dissemination to all elements of the operation. Non-military personnel who consider that they may be about to venture into an area at risk from mines and unexploded ordnance would be advised to check with local military units first. Within the UN the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) is the focus for all mine related and mine clearance operations. There is a growing trend to employ civilian companies to mine clearance operations.
Conflict Containment.
Conflict containment operations are designed to intervene into areas of actual or potential conflict and to use or threaten force in order to prevent any further hostile acts and enforce a cessation of hostilities. The aim of conflict containment is to prevent the spread of the conflict to neighbouring areas and States. Consequently actions should be designed to stabilise the situation and create an environment in which means other than the use of force, such as negotiation, will be used to resolve differences. Conflict containment operations may require the forcible separation of belligerent parties.
The Forcible Separation of Belligerent Parties.
· Peoples and states have an inherent right to use force in self-defence and if they believe their primary interests are threatened. In such circumstances, international intervention may be considered imperious and inappropriate.
· Should political pressures fail to achieve separation and forcible military separation is the only option, the achievement of the mission may require the exercise of a large degree of force.
· In an intra-state conflict, the forcible separation of parties who are determined to continue fighting may require the deployment of overwhelming force. Peacekeeping commanders given a mission in which the desired end-state is not the defeat of any of the warring parties but to force their separation and disengagement, should conduct operations in an even handed and impartial manner. As a commander develops the situation, he should re- deploy his forces and adjust the tempo of activity so that the belligerent parties have an option to disengage and withdraw. If they do not do so then the alternative is to pursue a military operation more vigorously. However, diplomatic activities should continue to run in parallel with military operations and every pause in any enforcement campaign should be viewed as an opportunity for further diplomatic initiatives.
The Establishment and Supervision of Protected or Safe Areas.
· The Requirement. The requirement to establish and supervise a protected or safe area can arise when any community is at risk from persistent attack. However, unless those within the safe area are disarmed, it may be used as a base from which to sally out and conduct raids. Clear guidance should be given, therefore, as to what is demanded of any force that is tasked with establishing and supervising a protected or safe area. Inevitably, efforts will be needed to counter the accusations from those within and outside the safe area that the operation is designed to assist the other side. Having received guidance on the required nature of the operation, other tactical questions need to be resolved such as the nature of the threat from which the area is to be protected. Whether the threat is from small arms, artillery or other indirect weapons including air or sea launched weapons, it will have a significant effect on the force profile.
· Conduct. Areas to be protected or made safe may contain residents, refugees, displaced persons and substantial numbers of forces of one or more of the belligerent forces. Forces may be charged with the establishment and supervision of such areas and to provide support and assistance to other organisations within the safe area. The first stage in any Peace Operation designed to protect or make an area safe is to demilitarise that area and this in itself may require enforcement actions. Having accomplished that, and taken all necessary measures to defend the area, other specific military tasks may include;
· Establishing, monitoring and enforcing weapon exclusion zones.
· Establishing and maintaining cantonment areas and weapon holding areas and sites
· Holding ground.
· Dominating approaches
· Conducting patrols and searches.
· Manning checkpoints and other control measures.
· The development of reinforcement and extraction plans · Control of the air.
The Guarantee and Denial of Movement.
These operations guarantee or deny movement by air, land or sea and thus are joint and generally conducted at the operational level. Operations that guarantee or deny movement will not be credible if they rely for success on the consent of the parties to the conflict. Such operations will therefore need to be conducted by a peacekeeping force capable of escalation. Examples might include the enforcement of a maritime exclusion zone or no-fly zone to prevent the harassment of an unprotected population, or the creation of a safe corridor to allow for the free and unmolested movement of aid and refugees, and the protection of own forces.
The Enforcement of Sanctions.
The enforcement of sanctions may be synonymous with operations designed to deny movement. Sanctions concern the denial of supplies, diplomatic, economic and other trading privileges, and the freedom of movement of those living in the area of sanctions. Operations to enforce sanctions will be joint and conducted at the operational level. Sanctions may be conducted partially against a specific party or impartially over a wider area embracing all parties. Partial operations can compromise any subsequent Peace Operation.
MILITARY SUPPORT TO PEACE BUILDING
Restoration of Law and Order Operations.
· The provision of security and the restoration of law and order will generally be part of a wider Peace Operation. The restoration of law and order will generally involve police, border police or customs, judicial system and penal or correction services.
· The restoration of law and order will generally be a task for Civilian Police or local authorities. However, operations to restore the rule of law will inevitably be required in the circumstances of chaos associated with a complex crisis, and when there are no coherent parties, or the parties are ill disciplined and indistinguishable from the criminal elements of the local society. In such circumstances, military operations may be designed to counter insurgent, terrorist or criminal activities and enforce the terms specified in the mandate. · The successful re-imposition of the rule of law may be dependent upon separating and protecting the general population from the protagonists whilst gradually subverting or eliminating any who obstruct the restoration of the rule of law. The creation of a relatively secure environment will be necessary to allow the civilian agencies the freedom of movement necessary to conduct their operations. Specific tasks may relate to evidence handling, making arrests and detention, crowd control duties, counter-terrorist tasks and the arrest of designated war criminals. Criminal investigations should whenever possible be left to professional police forces.
Humanitarian Operations. Humanitarian operations, in the narrow sense of the provision of aid, are principally the preserve of humanitarian or aid agencies, whether UN, government, including host government where one exists, NGOs and the civil sector. In cases of dire emergency, military forces may be required to conduct relief operations; however, military relief operations should be co-ordinated with other ongoing and pending emergency aid and development programmes. More normally, military forces work to create the conditions in which these other agencies can operate more freely and effectively.
· Human Rights Issues. Humanitarian relief operations, in the wider sense, include the protection of human rights, the recording of violations, justice and the introduction of a self-sustaining improvement in the human rights situation throughout the theatre of operations. In the case of widespread violations this must be addressed in the mandate, the mission and the military tasks. While the monitoring and protection of human rights, and the recording of violations is the principal role of UNHCHR and organisations such as Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a Peacekeeping force has inherent human rights responsibilities under International Law and, in addition, may be called upon to fulfil a variety of supporting functions in close co- ordination with specialist agencies and civilian police. Close liaison with human rights officers and the civilian police will provide commanders with essential pre-deployment planning details and assist in the conduct of operations and the achievement of the political end-state. The prevention of systematic and widespread violations of human rights, and in particular the apprehension of the perpetrators of war crimes will generally require the deployment of robust Peacekeeping force, supported by specialist war crimes investigators, and other civilian enforcement agencies. However, the accurate recording of war crimes, such as the prevention of the delivery of aid or the indiscriminate shelling of civilians by all forces may be used to support subsequent investigations. · Strategic Co-ordination. Most humanitarian relief operations involve a large variety of international aid and development agencies, human rights groups and civil sector companies, and, when appropriate, military planners should seek their advice before military involvement. Strategic co-ordination and operational planning can be improved by contingency planning meetings and the harmonisation of doctrine and procedures. When many agencies are involved, the establishment of a lead aid agency can more easily achieve co-ordination.
· Subjects of Humanitarian Relief. The abuse of human rights and the forced migration of displaced persons (those forced to leave their homes) and refugees (those forced to leave their home states) are a common feature of crisis. The numbers of such people needing help can range from individuals to entire ethnic groups. In the first instance, support to displaced persons and refugees should be left to specialist agencies, such as the ICRC and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). However, the scale of the problem may be so huge as to require the assistance of military forces.
· The Conduct of Humanitarian Relief Operations. Military relief operations may be designed to provide emergency relief, the delivery of aid supplies, the prevention of human rights violations, or longer-term reconstruction assistance to aid agencies and the civil sector, including local communities. Relief operations should be conducted impartially. However, aid to one party, even when it is based on a perception of need, will invariably be seen as partial by other parties, and relief supplies will inevitably filter through to belligerent forces. In much the same way, the administration of justice against those responsible for violations of the mandate and international humanitarian law will be perceived as being partial by those in receipt of the enforcement actions. In neither case should this dissuade the PSF from taking the necessary enforcement actions. However, every effort should be made to explain what actions are and are not acceptable and their consequences, so as to demonstrate and reinforce the impartial status of the force and to support the independent and impartial position of the aid agencies.
· Emergency Relief. Emergency relief concerns the sustainment of the means to safeguard life. The protection of human life should be an inherent responsibility of a Peacekeeping force and should, when necessary, be specified in the mandate
Reconstruction Activities
· Longer-term assistance concerns the reconstruction of a life support infrastructure capable of providing such facilities as food, water, fuel and other means of self-support, sustainment and the guarantee of human rights. Typically, such operations could involve the digging of wells, the reconnection of water and electricity grid systems (where they exist) and the rebuilding of schools, hospitals and a communication network.
· A speedy and effective response to requests for assistance will enhance the credibility of the Peacekeeping force. In the conduct of reconstruction activities care must be taken to ensure that military activities do not create a dependency culture, which will hinder a return to normality. Irrespective of the success of other reconstruction activities without justice and an effective legal system that guarantees human rights, peace is unlikely to endure and be self-sustaining. The recreation of such a system is therefore vital to the long-term success of the mission and resources should be allocated accordingly.
· Specialist staff will help facilitate reconstruction activities and a dedicated budgetary officer will normally be needed to deal with the proportionally large nature of engineering expenditure. Longer term reconstruction activities will be the responsibility of civilian agencies
· So as to make best use of scarce resources, and to pre-empt potential sources of friction, it is essential that military and civilian agencies co-ordinate their activities and co-operate fully to achieve unity of effort. It is important, however, that the local population does not grow to rely on the military force to resolve all their problems. Civil Military Co- operation Centres should be established in which civil military co-operation can be facilitated. From the perspective of the local population civil military co-operation centres should be regarded as referral centres and ideally be located away from the main military force and in a position of maximum accessibility to the aid agencies and local population. When appropriate Civil Military Co-operation Centres may contain a media operations section.
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes.
· Disarmament and demobilisation operations will be only one phase of a wider and longer- term transition operation designed to reform the indigenous security sector and to (re) integrate those military personnel, considered surplus to military requirements, back into society. Without a rudimentary security framework, there is little or no chance of armed forces agreeing to disarm or demobilise. All such operations will invariably involve many civil and military agencies in a fully integrated plan.
· A process of de-criminalisation and concerns over women and child soldiers will be a major concern throughout. · Financial inducements and an offer of future employment may encourage disarmament and demobilisation. However, unless armed forces can see a sustainable future for themselves, their families and those they represent, development programmes and the creation of a self-sustaining peace will remain highly problematic. The tendency to revert to violence to achieve objectives will remain high until an alternate, guaranteed and economically viable form of employment can be provided.
· Forcible disarmament may be considered, but over a wide area would be very manpower intensive and in certain cultures impossible to accomplish. The final military phase of a demobilisation and disarmament operation may be the hand-over of security tasks to legally and trained constituted local forces.
· Disarming Former Warring Factions. Successful disarmament is dependent on the confidence that the parties have in the demobilisation process as a whole. Critically it hinges on their trust in the PSF to keep the peace. Disarmament may need to be mutually phased and encouraged by a series of rewards. Besides collecting weapons from former combatants, disarmament may include the collection of war supplies from any stockpiles and depots or even weapons in transit. The safe custody and accurate accounting for weapons and material is essential. The destruction of weapons and other warlike materials must be planned in an ecologically sound manner.
· Demobilisation. Having completed disarmament, the next step in the process is to select those individuals or units that are to be retained and trained and those considered surplus to military and other security (police) requirements and discharged. The future size and shape of any future defence and security force should be the result of a comprehensive review that balances requirements with resources. Military forces that wish to transfer to the police service will need comprehensive retraining and those being discharged educated and trained with a view to civilian employment.
· Reintegration of Former Warring Factions. Having selected those who can be trained for a future security force, support measures will need to be created for the dispersal and rehabilitation of the remainder of the parties. This stage is principally the responsibility of the civil authorities and will be carried out in conjunction with the reconstitution of the other means of government and state control, and the provision of alternate forms of employment. This will inevitably be an expensive and long-term aspiration that will be conditional upon the development of a viable state economy. In many cases, the military will include those who were responsible for the perpetration of many of the human rights abuses and war crimes, even against their own people. Issues of culpability and justice may need to be addressed as part of the reconciliation process and as a precursor to recreating trust in the security and defence sector.
· Sequence of Disarmament and Demobilisation. Disarmament and demobilisation operations may follow the sequence described below. § Securing Agreement. Agreement to any disarmament and demobilisation process should be voluntary, but could be secured through sheer exhaustion, truce, or as the result of a successful PE operation. Disarmament and demobilisation operations, which occur as a consequence of enforcement, will be difficult to manage. Details in the agreement should include arrangements for the separation of forces, procedures for the handing in, storage and destruction of weapons, and the cantonment, training and demobilisation of forces. § Establishing and Managing a Cease-fire. § Scope. Cease-fires normally depend on a clear geographical delineation and an agreed time-scale for their implementation. However, in more volatile circumstances, and when forces are intermingled, the best that may be achieved could be a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal to camp. § Delineated Cease-fires. In geographical terms a cease-fire may be delineated by:
· Cease-fire Line.
· Zone of Separation.
· Control Zone.
· Area Cease-fire. § Management of Cease-fires. The effective management of a cease-fire will require close supervision on both sides of the line, with radio communications between them, by observers and patrols on the ground and in the air, and possibly at sea. The cease- fire document should contain procedures and responsibilities for:
· Investigation.
· Arbitration.
· Attribution.
· Penalties and rewards. § Responses. A prompt and firm response to breaches of cease-fire agreements is essential. Delayed and inappropriate responses will prejudice the credibility of the cease-fire and risk a degeneration of the overall security situation.
· Withdrawal and Assembly of Former Warring Factions. Following a cease-fire or peace agreement, demobilisation operations may require the co-ordinated disengagement and withdrawal of forces into prescribed assembly areas or cantonment sites. For security reasons such actions are best conducted simultaneously and tied to specific times and dates, throughout the whole mission area. Suitable reception arrangements and efficient administrative and logistic support plans are essential for success. Should the local authorities be incapable of performing these tasks, they may fall to the Peacekeeping force. Summary of Discussion on A Security Sector Reform Guide for the Sudan: Including Potential Donor Support and the Reintegration of Former Combatants; and A Guide for the Armed Forces of the GOS and the SPLA on the Possible Military Mechanisms for Cease-Fire.
1. It was explained that we need a relatively small professional army – how can we have a professional army in the Sudan where political factors are dominating our behaviour?
1. Coup d’ètats have been very fashionable in Egypt. The order of our civil society needs to be able to stand up to the threats against it. Unless we improve the quality of life of the people then we will not be able to do this.
2. Dr Peter Kok’s third vision is worth considering very seriously. We may require another consultation. Security rightly should not be restricted. Development must come first. Security needs to be considered more broadly – bringing in broader understanding to our problems. I hope this could have a place in coming discussions.
3. In taking power the skill of the army was lost. Many professional soldiers are now roaming about the streets of Khartoum. There are many generals now doing nothing. In 1974 officers were given the opportunity to get a higher education. I was one of those 4. We had two and a half years education. Of the four I was the only lucky person to stay. I was pensioned at 50 in 1983. Coming from the course I gave nothing to the country. Others in Egypt continued to work and had high level positions.
4. Many officers have committed crimes of genocide. Are we going to move to make people account for the crimes they have committed? There is genocide now in the oil fields.
5. In the transitional period we need to build a new army. It links with a wider political question. Those of us from the geographical north will need to be representing us who oppose the government. The current army, in my perception, is aggressive and oppressive. They have never tried to defend borders, rather they are fighting in our villages. It has been exterminating people – I can give you over 1100 people who were killed by an army that were supposed to be protecting their borders. We must not glorify that army. In any security arrangements we must consider these points.
6. The people from the marginalised areas would like to see the formation of a new army and police forces. Our greatest efforts should be to find a ground on which to form these new forces.
7. What are the doctrinal guidelines for this army? The only way out of this impasse of problems of security is to find that political architecture for the whole country. Within this premise we can then find the doctrinal outlines and mission, which will determine the size of the army and the nature of the security organs required. Will they be able to establish a highly professional army? For the interim period, we shall need to manage a very delicate process. This is the period of us trying to build confidence. After that all the forces will then be prepared to surrender their powers to the government, not before. This is a delicate problem which cannot be rushed into.
8. It was noted that 62.5% of government expenditure goes to the army.
9. The issue of observation of new voices to be heard and not only that of the army.
10. On the question of accountability. We can not build a future by forgetting the past. The Sudanese will not throw out the need for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. There has not been any accountability about the way in which the Addis Ababa agreement was violated. How do we keep the memory of people alive? The military need to consider how to cope with the Juba and the Wau massacres. Officers of honour have taken place in the slaughter of civilians in cold blood.
11. But the resources do exist in the sense of starting to build the priorities. How do we deal with those forces needed in the new situation? How do we begin the process of thinking through the balance between demobilisation and the need to continue to preserve security?
Paper 9 The Magnitude of Recent Waves of Displacement in the Sudan and Their Effects by Dr Sharaf El Din Ibrahim Bannaga
Summary
Sudan, the vast country, coloured with a diversification of characteristics, overwhelmed with the unruffled nature of its people, whose malleable hearts have been torn by conflicts and wars giving birth to tragedies and atrocities, producing problems and obstacles, impoverishing and tormenting its people. Foremost of these problems is the crisis over the displaced, which has been a nightmare to the communities and their successive governments. Their predicament created a demographic and economic defect which called for an urgent intervention and action at a time when Sudan faced a serious economic depression and harsh social and political conditions prevailed. The nature of my assignment, my proximity to the problem and my hankering after a cure for the difficulties encountered by the IDPs in Khartoum State infused me with a yearning desire to conduct a study which was initiated in early 2000 to document experiences in tackling the problems of the IDPs in Sudan with a special reference to the Khartoum experiences. One of the objectives of the study is to produce a document reflecting the huge scale of the displacement problems and challenges facing Sudan and in particular Greater Khartoum. This is because Sudan is second to none with respect to the huge displaced population in continuous flight. The results of the study is presented in this paper which comprises of three parts, each part constitutes a paper by itself.
Part One: The Magnitude of Recent Waves of Displacement in Sudan and Their effects
Elaborates on the Sudanese perception of displacement, the difficulty of framing a definition for displacement and its process which is a natural activity in Sudan that continues to reshape it throughout the folds of history. Enumerates the causes of displacement, size of the problem and repercussions. It gives a detailed description of the displaced at the in caption of their eruption in Khartoum and the consequential degradation of the physical environment and the surgical operations needed to overcome the fearful difficulty of uncontrolled massive development. Part Two: The Status of the Displaced in Sudan and the Extent of Their Resettlement
Quantifies the needs of the displaced, the role of Sudanese governments and communities together with United Nations Organizations , the donor countries and NGOs in meeting their basic needs. Shows how the issues of the displaced were contained in Khartoum and centres on the activities of the Operation Lifeline, Sudan, besides the planning operations undertaken to reschedule the urban structure in Khartoum. It also exposes the details of comparisons conducted between the residential blocks and the camps of the displaced in relation to the supply of services, the economic and social conditions and also a comparison of the squatter settlements before and after physical planning. Gives a fair account of how the urban structure is restructured and the physical environment is improved and fruitful results of the spatial organization phans that have been implemented . It also illustrates how the displaced families affected by resettlement are in a better physical situation than they used to be under squatting conditions of uncertainty and apprehension. Identifies the challenges of resettlements of IDPs and gives the lessons learned from the resettlement process.
Part Three: The Process of Resettlement and Reintegration of the Displaced Population
Presents the nature of integration and urban adaptation which took place at the settlements of the displaced. Explains the features of social, cultural and political integration within the displaced communities. Elaborates on the channels which would lead to the consolidation of the bridges of national unity and demonstrates the opportunities and challenges of the reintegration process and how the exodus to the North can be exploited to generate many advantages. States in some parts of the conclusions that the solution of the problems of the displaced would substantially contribute to the resolution of the issue of peace and national unity and that the difficulties of Khartoum State will grow unless the displaced achieve a real addition to the economic base of the state and that no national unity would reign unless the social and cultural disparities between the Sudanese communities are diluted and reduced.
Dr. Sharaf Eldin Bannaga
1- INTRODUCTION
1.1- Sudan and Transfer Delivery Pain
The Sudan, the largest country in Africa, occupies an area of a million square miles, equivalent to more than 2.5 million square kilometres; almost the size of Western Europe. It is divided into two halves by the River Nile, whose White Nile tributary springs from the Great Lake Victoria in Uganda, and the Blue Nile tributary emerges from Lake Tana on the Ethiopian plateau. The two estuaries embrace each other in Khartoum at the confluence to form the River Nile. The geographical features of the country vary from thick equatorial forest, rich Savannah, poor Savannah, scrubland with stunted trees to a bare expansive desert. This sprawling giant of Africa slumbered in peace until the advent of the scramble for Africa when western powers focused imperial attention on the country. Kitchener, leading the British expedition, destroyed the Mahdya, the only independent state in Africa when the continent was a wilderness, with the exception of the Christian Kingdom, perched on top of the Ethiopian plateau. The British ruled supremely over the Sudan. It planned and implemented its policies, which were to prove the seeds of agitation in the Sudan after its departure. Since its independence in 1956, Sudan has been at variance in political ideology, confused by its social and administrative structure, and its varying climate, which have played a part in affecting traditions and cultures. It has suffered from a growing debility in utility structures, which led to all sorts of atrocities, disasters and human agonies. The suffering has been aggravated by successive natural calamities i.e. famine, drought, desertification, and a continuous devastating armed conflict resulting in the devouring of manpower, an economic drain, disintegration of the community, displacement, migration, political asylum, homelessness and poverty. These features arose before the country established the present administrative and political structuring and invigorated its economic position due to the flow of oil. The Sudan has been a theatre for foreign intervention and internal fighting of its own people, and a cradle for the displaced people that have filled the country in every direction. Its my view that once the Sudanese are properly guided, diversification in customs, cultures, languages, religions and nationalities will become a source of power in a unified frame. The diverse resources of Sudan’s regions helped by various geographical, climatic factors, in addition to the varied mineral resources buried in the layers of the earth could be a form of integration. Thus the Sudan will be able to face the challenge of transformation from the present living conditions of war into a new condition to satisfy the aspirations of unity, stability and sustainable development. This is the only way to lead the country into the havens of progress, promotion and peace.
1-2- Towards the Definition of Displacement:
The definition embodied in the special document “The Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement” defined the displaced as people compelled to escape, to leave their homes or their usual living places especially when trying to avoid the effects of armed conflicts or the result of the eruption of violence, wild armed robbery or cases involving the violation of human rights, or as a consequence of natural disasters, such as earthquakes famine or man-made disasters within the borders of the affected countries and without the displaced having to cross the borders to other countries. In fact this definition is quite lucid and defines a displaced person in most of the countries but if the same definition is applied in the case of the Sudan, it would be imprecise for the following reasons: The Sudan is a vast country with no natural barriers such as rivers, mountain ranges, no barriers to prevent individual or communal movement. It neighbours 9 countries where the shared tribes diffuse into one another, and the border communities intermingle without hindrance. Border people have no identity cards nor do they use documents in their dealings. For this reason the term “Displaced” in this paper covers both the internal and the external displaced. Population movement is always towards the Nile and thence to Khartoum as in diagram (1). The displaced groups were not content to move to nearby safe places away from their homes but have moved to places thousand of kilometres away. The rate of the incoming displaced people has led to vast increases in the population of the Northern states during the last decade. Khartoum’s population in particular has increased from 3,000,000 (three million) in 1990 to 6,000,000 (6 million) at the end of the last century, as shown on diagram (2).
1-3- Displacement as a Normal Process in Sudan
Modern Sudan is a result of waves of displacement. It remains a land of immigrants - the majority is Arab who arrived from the Arabian Peninsula. Others are from the Nuba tribes, a people of ancient Sudanese civilizations. Then, there are the Negroid tribes attracted by grazing grass, surface water, the vast plains and expands of the Sudan - the through passage of the pilgrimage route from West Africa to Saudi Arabia. Sudan is a fine example of a region enriched by ethnicity and ethnic integration. The origin of the Sudanese community springs from the continuous immigration of peoples, which has helped the mental, intellectual and psychological growth of the Sudanese character as well as its physical and structural composition. Despite numerous migrations and displacements, it is possible to identify three significant ones: -
1. The wave which saw the emergence of an Islamic Arab identity as a result of the successive immigrations - the accumulation of which led to the political revolution which produced the nucleus of the Islamic-allied kingdom of Sennar at the end of the 15th and the inception of the 16th centuries. 2. The wave which established and shaped the town of Omdurman - mainly composed of tribes of Western and Central Sudan. That wave petered out at the dawning of the condominium, the recapture of Khartoum, the annihilation of the Mahdya and the dominance of Anglo-Egyptian rule. 3. The third wave began in1983/84 and has continued - triggered by drought, desertification and the on-going civil war. The prominent feature of this period is that millions of the Sudanese skilled labour and professionals have crossed the waters to the Gulf oil-rich Arab countries, Egypt, Libya, Europe and the USA. This draining of experienced labour and professionals has occurred simultaneously with the waves of displacement from southern and western Sudan into the principal towns. In experiencing these waves of immigration and displacement, the Sudan evolved various successive civilizations (Napta, Kerma, Kush, Sennar,etc) . These human exoduses have endowed Sudanese with unique characteristics, the most prominent of which is forgiveness and the natural attitude of its people towards co-existence and peace. This attitude would have reshaped the whole Sudan except colonisation interrupted the trek of the Sudanese southwards by erecting an impregnable barrier which barred the diffusion of human movements of Northern Sudanese into the closed zones. At the same time the colonising power encouraged the passage of new arrivals from Europe to promote western culture and bar the Arab Islamic civilization and the extension of Northern Sudanese culture. The recent wave of displacement and its burgeoning population has brought about a drastic social change to the image of Khartoum, its identity and has transformed its former urban nature. The African-Sudanese element of the population of Khartoum has increased more than a hundred times, whereas the Sudanese-Arab element has increased five fold. If current trends continue this will mean a substantial change in the make-up of the city. Thus the process of internal and external displacement is a natural activity in Sudan and continues to reshape it as it has through out the folds of history.
1-4- The Sudanese Perception of displacement
The Sudanese communities are well acquainted with displacement and migration. Nomadic tribes have moved from the north to the south and from the east to the west in search of water and animal grazing. The ancient settlements took place along the banks and the length of the River Nile. Displacement and migration as far as the Sudanese model is concerned is a natural
process. Nomadic tribes continue to move up towards the River Nile and its tributaries in the dry season and other areas where there is pasture, surface or ground water. Consequently the Sudanese view displacement and migration as a legitimate course of action, which coincides with their culture, values, traditions and community customs. The principles and ideals of Islam, much of which coincides with the origins of Christianity - a creed pursued by a sizeable number- prevails throughout the Sudanese communities. This great religion, the religion of the greater bulk of the population, encourages migration in quest of fortune, education or to escape from places of suppression and humiliation and considers succour extended to the wayfarer and the weak is an indication of the wholesomeness of the society. “They were poor and crushed on earth”, the angels replied “was not the land of God, spacious enough for you to migrate…He who forsakes his home in the cause of Allah, finds in the earth many a refuge”. Surat El Nisa’a, verses 97 and 100 respectively. Much in the same way, Christianity shares the story of the oppressed followers of Moses who were forced to flee Egypt while being pursued by Pharaoh. “And the children of Israel journeyed … about six hundred thousand on foot that were men beside children.” Exodus 12v 37. Sudanese customs and traditions are synonymous with welcome and hospitality extended to visitors. They welcomed them even though the two parties met in conditions of poverty. There was no bad feeling about the provision that was given to the migrants. The migrant, in this case the displaced for the sake of their faith - as a wayfarer qualifies for the receipt of alms, known in Sudanese culture as Zakah, for his harsh living conditions and his need for assistance and aid. There is no difference in Sudanese perception between the displaced, the migrant and the refugees simply because religion places no barriers or obstacles among communities and because land is spacious and that there are no restrictions on anybody. Land, water, fire (i.e. energy), which are the three principal elements of nature are common grace among people. People are partners in three – water, pasture and fire. Accordingly, Sudanese written laws, over the years, have ensured the freedom of man in movement and settlement wherever he wishes, because his Creator honours man. Thus, human rights must be preserved and any violations of these rights shall be condemned. Therefore, the displaced are honoured and respected, and their protection is incumbent on all through the direct instructions of God. His blood, property and sanctity are protected. This is similar to the respect afforded by Christianity to all strata of society, ‘Rebuke not an elder but entreat him as a father, and the younger men as brethren, the elder women as mothers and the younger as sisters with purity.” 1 Timothy 5. Vs. 1-2. This is not only divine principles and literature but also it is the customs of the tribes of the people of the Sudan including the non-Muslim tribes. It is known that as far as the assistance that should be offered to the displaced, all Sudanese communities are based on solidarity. If this were not the case the economic constraints which
are afflicting the Sudanese communities would be sufficient to break up the cohesion of the country and to paralyze the limbs of the Sudanese nation. The Sudanese are reputed for their magnanimity to support the heart-broken, to offer hospitality to the guests, assist the weak and participate in sharing the expenses of social occasions. They contribute cash at weddings, family bereavements and support the orphans and widows generously. Dying of hunger in the Sudan, or throwing the old out on the street, or dying because of intentional negligence or through inability to pay the cost of medical treatment, or a child being left uncared for following the loss of his parents is unheard of. Despite the crushing conditions, the Sudan has been able to create voluntary organisations functioning in community development, assisting the poor families and supporting the displaced groups. The most valued virtues of the tribe and the focus of its pride are generosity and courage. Courage is needed to protect the weak; whereas the values of religion call for extending assistance to the poor, the displaced and the wayfarer as well as the protection of the oppressed. These qualities are not imposed by the sovereignty of the government but are inherent in a society, which aims to please God. The Sudanese folk poetry touches on the pride emanating from generosity, the warm welcoming and feeding of guests and the protection of the weak. There are folk tales, which talk about those who would happily slaughter their riding camels so the displaced person could eat. Other stories talk of those who slaughtered their only sheep for guests who arrived at their home. On many occasions the Sudanese community comes forward with proposals and efforts to find helpful solutions to the torments of their displaced brothers, motivated by the beliefs and customs of the nation.
Methodology and Objectives:
Information on other experiences pertaining to treatment of displaced and squatter settlements in different parts of the world are not adequate. They form articles in newspapers or statements made by government officials and NGOs personnel. No detailed comprehensive studies relating to other experiences are available for assessment and evaluation. This paper presents part of the study, which was initiated in early 2000 to document experiences in tackling the problems of the IDPs in Sudan with a special reference to the Khartoum experiences. One of the objectives of the study is to produce a document that exhibits detailed information on internal displacement reflecting the huge scale of the displacement problems and challenges facing the Sudan and in particular Greater Khartoum. This is because Sudan is second to none with respect to the huge displaced population in continuous flight. I have been involved primarily because I was the cognisant with the problems, the worries and necessary care need for the displaced, and the effect of the displaced on the community and the effect of the community upon them by virtue of the post I held for more than a decade.
The task of data collection was performed by a technical team formed of multi-disciplinary research workers including by social surveyors and physical planners. Each was appointed to gather information in the specified area of his speciality that represents part of the research programme e.g. social surveyors were responsible for providing the data on the socio-economic status of IDPs; social workers were requested to find detailed information on humanitarian aid; planners were asked to prepare the physical plans and site layouts of upgraded settlements; engineers produced data needed for physical infrastructure evaluation before and after treatment of settlements; government employees quantified the masses of IDPs and their localities in addition to the numbers of affected population and their settlements as a result of the implementation of the urban restructuring programmes which included treatment and upgrading of displaced settlements, extension of transportation and service lines, etc. An original socio- economic survey was carried out in conjunction with the humanitarian and Voluntary Work Commission, Khartoum State. A short period of assessment and evaluation of the status of the displaced population and their settlements followed the first stage of the research study, which was allocated for data collection and processing. It was found that Khartoum State accommodates more than 60% of the total population of IDPs and a sizeable percentage of the externally displaced persons. These proportions are on the increase as time passes because movement of the displaced out of the existing camps in the other states is also towards Khartoum State and not to the original localities of the displaced persons. For this reason it was found appropriate and meaningful to give a special reference to the Khartoum experience and in particular to focus on the displaced settlements, such as the displaced camps and the upgraded squatter settlements. The evaluation study endeavours to stress the most pressing humanitarian needs of the IDPs. This enables the authorities and donors to identify and priorities the humanitarian aid allocated for the Sudan. It also brings, into prominence, the positive aspects of the Southerners’ exodus to the North by highlighting the usefulness of their resettlement and reintegration in the northern community because these are expected to strengthen national unity and eventually bring peace. In this way this study provides a key resource for peace and nation building.
3. The Masses of the Displaced and their tragedy
3.1 Distribution of the Displaced Population (National Level)
Displacement is a tragic experience; the displaced encounters great hardships, risks, physical and social torments, and psychological agonies, besides the humiliation he is likely be subject to, though he is innocent and unable to withstand such harsh conditions. Displacement has a strong effect on the family because it scatters the family members, reduces their employment
opportunities, hinders their education, shakes their confidence, thrusts them into a state of instability, disunites the family members and plunges them into the various forms of violence. The main reason for the flow of the displaced is caused by the armed conflict. There are other causes related to human rights, insecurity, marauding and social disturbance. Besides this, the world has seen other sorts of displacement caused by natural disasters or repeated epidemics, expulsion, desertification or drought and their subsequent repercussions, such as famines, or human intervention which destroyed the living environment and habitat. As a result millions of people have been displaced from their home countries and encountered great hardships. Looking to the world in general, we find that the recognized number of the displaced has risen from 10 million to 25 million as shown in diagram (3). The number of the displaced in the Sudan is a sizeable figure representing more than 20% of the number of the displaced worldwide, distributed among some 35 to 40 countries according to the figures produced by the United State Committee for Refugees as shown on table (1). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs made an estimate of the number of IDPs in Khartoum, shown in their annual needs assessment (ANA) reports. The OLS document of Nov. 1999 states that 220000 of the displaced that arrived in Khartoum living in camps set aside for the displaced, whereas 1.8 million have found their way to squatter settlements and integrated into the community of the city. The ANA report for Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal of 2001 estimated the IDPs in Khartoum as 1.8 million of which 255,438 live in official camps. According to this report the number of the displaced in Khartoum is more than estimated due to the number of the unregistered displaced. The number of the displaced estimated by the Ministry of Housing in Khartoum State exceeds the UN estimated number by at least 25%, refer to table 2 and 2(a). Another example is the report compiled by the Operation Lifeline (Sudan) issued in November 1999, which stated that the programme covered 4.2 million displaced persons in its operations of providing relief to the Sudan civil community affected by the raging civil war in the south and fringes of the east. If that number is microcosm of the war affected civil community, it does not reflect the number of the displaced, since there are other causes of displacement inside the Sudan resulting from tribal conflicts, security disturbance in some zones, the desert creep and lack of drinking water during the dry seasons in Western Sudan. Accordingly the extrapolations given by some international organisations of the number of the displaced in the Sudan are below the level. More importantly is that the majority of the displaced is absorbed by Greater Khartoum. In fact the figures of the displaced in Sudan may appear sizeable in comparison with the number of the displaced persons in other countries. However, it is an established fact that the Sudan had been subject to considerable population movements because of the immense geographical size of the country, the arable land and its huge water resources. This is, in addition to the traditional
displacement practiced by the nomadic tribes in search of water and pasture, the continuous displacement, which is currently observed is because of the raging civil war in the South, the consecutive years of drought in the west and the crucial modifications in Sudan economy, particularly the introduction of economic liberation policies which called for the economic restructuring and adaptation of skeletal relocation policies, and the change of development modes and their reflections on the different regions of the Sudan, besides the social and cultural changes undergone by the war-torn communities. The massive external displacement recently was that of the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea on the eastern border of the Sudan. The exodus was to avoid the violence caused by the war between the two countries and the fighting which was going on before then. The externally displaced persons moved and resettled in a relatively short time in the extreme east of Sudan but a sizeable number found their way to Central Sudan and namely Khartoum. This exodus was the largest immigration to flee the war that broke. The number of the people crossed the border line was at first 50000 most of whom resettled at Kassala and Gadaref. Internally, scanty rains and relatively short wet seasons contributed to the recent Sudanese displacement during the last three decades. Pasture areas shrunk in size due to intensive cattle grazing and people excessively cut down trees. They sold charcoal to earn a living because they lost most of their cattle, sheep and goats. The trees were also cut for subsistence agriculture but the creeping sands covered the farms. Recent displacements started in 1983 when the dry seasons prolonged in the northern parts of Western Sudan, some tribes were compelled to move southwards. Other tribes such as the Hawaweer were obliged to move north towards the River Nile, while El Gariyat tribe moved up to the vicinity of el Geili and El Wadi El Abyiad, north of Khartoum. Shuwehat and Dar Hamid used to move up the countryside around Omdurman. The displaced that arrived with their families in Khartoum in 1983 were without a guide. They finally settled at El Muweleh and Sheikh Abu Zayd areas, near the current sites of the displaced, west of Dar El Salam of Umbadda Province. The total number of the displaced people from Western Sudan who arrived in Khartoum in 1983 fleeing from the famous famine that devastated Darfur State was estimated at a few hundred thousand people. The continuous displacement of the southern Sudanese and their arrival in large numbers in the North and particularly Khartoum has been primarily due to the raging civil war in the South and reflects the largest displacement ever witnessed by the country. The increasing displacement of the southern Sudanese also started in 1983 when the war pushed large bulks of the IDPs from the South towards the North. The torments of the war were not only confined to the South but lack of stability, insecurity and armed robbery filtered to the West because of the possession in large numbers of unlicensed arms flowing from the South, Zaire and Chad.
The Nuba Mountains is another theatre of the civil war. The belt of the conflict extends eastwards to cover the Ingessena Hills and Eastern Sudan. This chronicle started at the eve of independence in 1956 and nobody knows that the future holds. Displaced people are now flowing from the Red Sea States, namely Kassala, Gedaref and the Blue Nile when the towns of Gessan, Kurmuk and Hamashkoreb were subject to attacks by the SPLA. Some 35,000 people flooded into Rossseries and Damazeen and then filtered into Khartoum. Therefore, the number of the displaced is on the increase. Although the statistics of the government institutions and the voluntary organisations are still imprecise, these data could be viewed as an indicator to this torrential wave of the displaced set in motion by the war in the South and the East. Looking at the distribution of the displaced over the northern Sudan, it is observed that Khartoum accommodates more than 60% on the strength of registered figures with the institutions. A careful scrutiny of the total number of the registered displaced, bearing in mind those unregistered, indicates that the greater bulk of the displaced have taken refuge in Khartoum. And as time passes the displaced leave their transitional settlements and flee to Khartoum. Table 2 and 2(a) show the estimations figured out by the authorities mentioned and on the basis of the dates specified by the table. It is observed that every appropriate authority and organisation has a different estimation. This is simply because the statistics are built on the number of the displaced persons who approach those authorities asking for assistance and such being the case, these figures would remain as indicators representing a portion of the numbers of the displaced. As far as Khartoum is concerned, the number of the displaced resident in camps according to all reports represents 10% or so of the total number of the displaced who came across Khartoum and encircled it from every side. Statistics also show the estimated number of externally displaced population as a fraction of the total IDPs. Again this estimate represents only the refugees who report to UNHCR. One is puzzled by the attitude of the international community whose concern is geared to social care and relief, which should have been directed towards Khartoum; but instead Khartoum receives no more than criticisms from the international mass media; while the city groans under unbearable pressure caused by the presence of the displaced. The town has been over saturated and can not stretch her service utilities further.
3-2 The Displaced at the Inception of their Eruption in Khartoum -Distribution
Arriving in Khartoum at the peak of the exodus in the middle of the nineteen eighties, they came in large groups and settled on the nearest possible sites to the big city. They remained in open spaces for a long time begging at the adjacent neighborhood, utilizing the land in the worst possible way. When their numbers increased in 1990s, their groups configured in sporadic
squatter settlements scattered within the three districts of the national capital - the seat of the parliament, Omdurman, the national capital Khartoum centre and Khartoum North, the site for light industries. Their settlements downgraded the environmental quality as reflected by health hazards and land pollution and the deteriorating surroundings in addition to their harsh social conditions. Their sites were unsuitable for human settlement, they were left by others, but were chosen by the displaced for their closeness from the market places, such as the thorn enclosure settlement, east of the central market in Khartoum, in an industrial area, such as Zagalona in Omdurman, in other filthy places such as Omdurman garbage mound. These places are linked with roads and are served with public transport lines. They also lived in vacant areas among houses in first class residential areas, such as El Munshiyah, around sewerage stations such as Bantiu squatter settlement, around cemeteries such as Hamad El Neel, near the Nile, such as El Khuddair, inside sensitive government units such as Radio Omdurman, the wireless station, around the Islamic University, in and around dry water courses such as Khor Shambat, etc. They also settled around water tanks at El Gamayer, and sites under construction such as el Mamaora and el Fardus and even the public parks were subject to pressure by the displaced. They erected their homes made of wood, grass, cardboard and plastic sheets in every conceivable place. The displaced settlements were scattered throughout residential areas, around towns, besides markets, factories and schools etc. The number of large displaced settlements rose to more than 50. Table 3 shows some of them. Gradually, these squatter settlements started to seep among the old, unplanned and irregular physical blocks as well as among the old neighbourhoods. They were infested with new arrivals of the displaced. The displaced population then continued to pour in squatter settlements until their numbers increased to ten fold of the displaced living in the camps according to a 1999 OLS report. The conditions of these squatter settlements were aggravated due to congestion and poor use of the space, epidemic diseases became rampant because of the deteriorated environment, contagious diseases, malnutrition, fragility of immunity and lack of hygienic and public health awareness. This is the reason, which motivated the city of Khartoum administration to relocate the transitional displaced in four main camps. Khartoum has become a city of the displaced where the fringes of the city inflate and bulge with their presence. It has become the largest agglomeration of the displaced in the world. Comparison between Khartoum and other cities of the world in relation to accommodating the displaced is non-existent for the immense number of the displaced converging and swarming in Khartoum with ever increasing numbers, further aggravating various aspects of the city in all walks of life. Table No. 3 shows the numbers of the displaced as recorded by the Commission of the Displaced Khartoum at the specified year. However, they started flowing vigorously into Khartoum after 1990 when their number rose to more than one and a half million persons in that year. Continuous exodus towards Khartoum has accelerated so that now the numbers exceeded
two and half or three million displaced. Only 8 to 10% live in relevant camps but the rest have filtered in the sub-divisions and neighbourhoods of the three towns and their vicinities, (Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North), which compose the national capital. The displaced population concentration in recent years has been intensive in all of the localities of UmBadda Providence .The IDPs number in UmBadda now exceeds ten times that which was recorded by the Displaced Commission in 1991.The province of Kerrari has also received considerable numbers of the displaced. The majority of the inhabitants in El Thawra, west of El Harat and in Marzoug are displaced people newly arrived in Khartoum. The same applies to the area north of El Hajj Yousif, east of the Nile, north of Khartoum North, particularly in Taybat el Ahamdah, Ed Daroshab, el Samrab, Umderewah, and Um El Gurah so that the majority of the inhabitants of these areas are made up of the displaced who recently beleaguered Khartoum and its suburbs in a relatively short period of time. The fact that some of the aforementioned names do not feature in table 3 is due to the fact that the seepage of the displaced did not at the time percolate to such areas at the inception of their eruption and flow towards Khartoum. These areas are now teeming with hundred of thousands of the displaced who settled with the squatter settlers, in old villages, with agglomeration of the soldiers of the regular forces who took possession of unplanned areas near their military units sporadically sited around the national capital. -Status
The displaced have lost the following before arriving in Khartoum: - Lost his job in agriculture and herding to become untrained and unemployed in an urban community, where it is difficult to get employment without the acquisition of the relevant skills or trade. He lost his arable land, his cattle, sheep goats, camels and fishing tools, spear, net and canoe. He lost his means of subsistence in a rural area, particularly the displaced from southern Sudan. The status of the displaced was so miserable and desperate that they were unable to administer their life affairs. The displaced person arriving in Khartoum has often survived tragic conditions. The journey to his venue was a long one, where he had to cover, in some cases, a thousand of kilometres to arrive in war ravaged state, travel stained, tanned and perhaps with tattered clothes and shoes. The majority of those arriving were women, children and old men, and only a small minority were able youths. Some have lost their family members, others had their loved ones scattered. The majority were emaciated individuals wrapped in dark human skin, bones jutting, bellies sunken, intestines dormant from lack of food, eyes sunken, children dehydrated, their lips gummed, no cries but moans and groans from half opened mouths, twisted bodies, withering cheeks, vigourless, for life had been sucked by hunger, disease and over exhaustion.
Surprisingly, these crawling bodies are dragging along a train of orphan children, the toll of the pugnacious war in southern Sudan. The procession of the displaced in their incessant exodus to the promise land, safety, security and food is a procession of live carcasses whose hopes are shattered by the inability of Sudan’s Government to satisfy their immediate needs because the government itself is in need. They were at first disappointed by the lack of response from the international community, which closed its eyes. They are a stigma, for Africa in particular, produced by the political unrest, which could have been avoided, and the world in general. Mankind in deprived parts of the world would devour with relish the industrialized rich countries’ unwanted food. The death rate among the displaced is high, averaging to 10 persons per thousand, per day as reflected by some reports. The displaced have been uprooted from their native soil, their native environment, and had to face psychological inner turmoil compelling them to deviate from temperance to misconduct or to wade through the labyrinth of acclimatization with the new realities and the new environment for the following reasons:- The cultural disparity among the diversified communities of the displaced and the community of Khartoum; where adaptation requires some time. The displaced groups are dominated by the number of women, twice as much as the number of men - children were thrice the numbers, on the strength of the reports by SCOVA, the Sudanese Council for Voluntary Agencies. However, the report by the Operation Lifeline, Sudan, considers the number of children as the largest, while the number of women is thrice the number of men. The displaced, newly arriving at urban centres embark on employment for which they were neither trained nor were familiar with. The southerners are an example of a people who are familiar with herding, traditional subsistence agriculture, hunting, fishing and gathering of honey from their virgin forests. Children in those huge numbers required social care and absorption in different stages of education to prevent deviation, which inveigles them to join the homeless children. The sheer numbers of children throws a further burden on the shoulders of the competent educational authorities to provide seats at different levels of schooling. Since women and the elderly are a majority in the community of the displaced, this feature increases the proportion of the element of support among the displaced, coupled with relevant medical care and improved nutrition for the disabled and infants. A scrutiny of the social and economic conditions of the displaced, even after the preliminary transitional period of acclimatization and the agony of displacement, revealed that the displaced have undergone a drastic social change, which affected their behaviour. They had to co-exist with the urban community and shed off the characteristics of the individual and rural
community from the south where they lived an easy, carefree, spacious life and enjoyed abundant food. He has to lose corporate spirit to change into individualism and individual concern and to sense the domination of the city culture, which is alien to him and which now dominates the culture of the tribe. He was amazed to find that reverence was not accorded to the sultans, the chiefs of the native administration but is extended to the city tycoons with fiscal magnitude. The social composition of the tribes of the displaced has been shaken and the economic structure unbalanced. Children do not show respect to the elders and the tribal men any more. The weak are the women and children. The latter were unable to go to school because their families needed them as earning working hands. Going to school is a further financial burden, which is beyond the reach of the child family for obvious reasons. Those children who are lucky enough to go to school have to work after the school day to earn their living or help their families. The displaced female has many duties to dispense with such as: - A woman acts as a caretaker of the family because she is better able to acclimatize to the prevailing conditions, most trekked with their children without a breadwinner. However, there is no embarrassment for the employment of the southern Sudanese woman. Essentially, they were the working power at home while men are assigned for horsemanship and defense of the family and the land. This does not mean that as displaced people, men do not work but in general they take longer to adapt to the conditions. The traditions of the displaced communities call for the protection of women, children and the elderly, but the disconnection of the family from her native community makes the family prone to disintegration leading to a loss and shedding off of village habits. A housewife becomes exposed to the behaviors of her husband and the new community. There are complaints from women about being victims of aggression from their husbands and others. The social and economic conditions encountered by a lonely displaced woman, whether she is a divorcee, a widow or deserted by her husband, or whether she is unmarried, these extremely harsh unpleasant conditions compel a woman to commit illegal work, or immoral behavior. She may lead a life that would jeopardize the rest of her life. This is the real torment of the displaced woman. Despite these dominant conditions, which enshroud the weak families of the displaced communities, the presence of relatives and families, long established in Khartoum, would enable a displaced family to surmount their difficulties, particularly for families from western Sudan. These western Sudanese families have been residing in Khartoum for decades and still maintaining strong bonds with their roots in the west. Their children have gained higher education and have completely merged in Khartoum community; enjoy such social and economic status to help their close displaced relatives, particularly women, children and the elderly males.
The old men face greater social difficulties. Back at home they are the focus of reverence and attention, listened to and respected by the young and the old. They find themselves in a sea of strangers, like a pebble on a sea shore, neither recognized nor respected. It is a tragic situation requiring care and solicitude. Despite the gloomy image of the displaced and the critical circumstances mentioned, the displaced tries to crack the shell. He arranges happy occasions, participates in popular gatherings through dancing, playing and use of leisure time. They are still characterized with customs and traditions that are not thwarted by the demands of the social change relevant to diffusion into the new communities of Khartoum. The displaced who arrived from western Sudan have a better social and economic position than their counterparts because tribes from western Sudan are quicker to adapt to conditions for several reasons. Their culture does not greatly differ from Khartoum community culture. They are able to find domestic jobs or employment in markets. Women from Western Sudan also run some places, such as Suk el Naga (the she camel market). They work in restaurants and sell tea under trees and along the streets. Some times they are employed as watchwomen in houses under construction or messengers in offices etc. The status of the externally displaced people or refugees is far better than that of the internally displaced. This is primarily due to the fact that the refugees are well looked after by UNHCR. UNHCR usually provides the refugees by adequate supplies of humanitarian relief. The amounts made available for them are far more than other amounts given to the internally displaced persons in other parts of the Sudan. - Containment
Containing the tragic conditions of the displaced upon arrival in Khartoum was not really possible because as mentioned previously they were subject to a variety of torments throughout their long exodus. By the time they end their journeys they would loose most of their properties. Even the possessions they had brought with them would be sold in the long trek to enable them to complete the long journey. And even after some time alleviation of the harsh dilapidated conditions could not have been possible because the problems facing the displaced were diversified: (1) The dilution of moral values among young men and young women led to family disintegration and diminished the role played by each family member. (2) The family bonds slacken, the children go astray because they lack advice, guidance and the firmness provided by the parents. (3) The attitude of housewives to stay for long hours away from home and children, distancing themselves from their children and husbands.
Hence for a displaced to survive such conditions demands urgent relief and continuous care to bypass the critical preliminary stage. Accordingly, satisfying the requirements of large bulks of the displaced on first arrival would require large-scale mobilization and financial support that may not be available in a developing town such as Khartoum. The reality faced is that the city is neither able to provide the basic requirements of the displaced nor the cost of their relief whether in feeding, accommodation, clothing or medicine because these requirements are beyond the scope of the city’s budget. -Alienation
In facing these problems the estrangement of the displaced increases and such a feeling would not have been remedied even when the harsh exigent conditions disappear. Many of the children of the displaced families were outside the school circulation. Some were over school age; some joined schools but left for one reason or another, before completing basic education and joining the increasing education fallout, which increases every other day among the displaced. For these reasons, Dr. Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen assume that displacement is not a short- range process but a long-term phenomenon, which confuses the lifestyle of individuals and families. It does not end when the displaced returns to his home environment. The effect of displacement exceeds the individual and the family and disturbs the group or communities for the following: - The properties lost by the displaced in his home country are irretrievable and so are other public utilities that are deserted as a result of the evacuation of southern Sudan’s population because of the on-going conflict. The long absence and lack of maintenance would lead to the collapse of the public buildings because they are built of mud and would be eroded by torrential rains. The displaced would not benefit from it even if they return in bulks. The then existing services would have become a thing of the past. The long absence of the displaced from home would lead to the disintegration of the social, administrative and judicial structure of the community. Undoubtedly a large number of the traditional leaders have also been displaced with the bulk of their communities leaving behind a few of the inhabitants with few leaders thus missing the native administrative system, which administered the local affairs of the southern regions. Thus the original home of the displaced is devoid of the administrative system, which that community applied to settle local disputes. In addition the homeland of the displaced is now occupied and exploited by others. The new occupants might have made some modifications through additions and demolitions of buildings therein which further complicates the issue of property. The displaced must be aware that his property and his land are in the possession of other hands, and that justice system is non-existent and that the leadership and social structure have been changed too and that the principles of arguments, negotiations and settlements have also
changed. Thus the agony and torments of the displaced shall not end by his return to his native home and the saga and dilemma will continue indefinitely on the basis of the above factors.
4- The Effects of Displacement and the Consequential Degradation of the Physical Environment
4-1- The causes of Khartoum saturation with the displaced
Despite the long distance and the existence of towns on the roadside on the way to Khartoum, the aim of the displaced is to reach Khartoum and dwell there. The aim of taking refuge in Khartoum is therefore not only to escape the war and the tragic conditions survived by those people in their native land. They could have found peace, stability and security in other towns before reaching Khartoum, but their preference to Khartoum indicates that their principal reason is not only to escape the atrocities of the war and the harshness of life, but there are other reasons, which may be summarized in the following:- Other states apart from Khartoum would be unable to provide assistance to the displaced. Khartoum has some preferential aspects where the displaced could still share the prevailing services, though inadequate, with the population of Khartoum. Making use of the central information service of the government, and the information service of the voluntary organisations and the diplomatic missions, by creating pressure on the government to focus attention on the displaced and their needs. The presence of the displaced close to the executive authorities, MPs and the decision makers, makes a great difference, and brings to mind the Sudanese proverb, “Who disappears from your sight would disappear from your heart”. The displaced are there in sight and in heart. The government must act. The rate of the unemployed is fairly large in Khartoum but it is better than regional capitals and thus the displaced can find marginal jobs. The existence of all the organisations in Khartoum, particularly those engaged in relief. The tolerance of the government and the Sudanese community towards the squatter settlers which invites the displaced families to settle in the Capital. The presence of the diplomatic missions invites the displaced, and particularly the externally displaced, to seek refuge in foreign countries where they can find better living conditions and employment opportunities. This is well exemplified by what was known as Flasha exodus to Israel, the Jewish state which occupied Palestine in 1948.
4-2 The Agony of The Greater Khartoum
Whoever traces the demographic growth of Khartoum would observe with grief the influx of the displaced and the immigrants. Until the middle of the nineteenth seventies, the town enjoyed a lullaby of peace, stability and abundance of food. It was an exemplary town in cleanliness, lushness of green and ease of life precision and adequacy in the provision of services. Traffic was easy while the population density was the least in proportion among the cities of the world. The required residential reserve and housing stocks and the annual increase of families were balanced, to the extent that Khartoum provided employment opportunities to citizens from the neighboring countries and some from the Arab nation experienced in working abroad. Khartoum began to become crowded at the end of the nineteenth seventies. Its economic base weakened and became saturated with the displaced, the migrants and refugees without adopting any precautionary measures to alleviate the increasing intensity of the population density. Due to complete absence of the effort by the state in the sphere of urban planning, housing and in providing basic services, the burgeoning population of the town and squatter practices began aggressive encroaching on other people’s land, escalated by the existence of unprotected vacant lands. This resulted in the speedy construction and development in constricted irregular and unsuitable areas justified by the need for shelter. The meager services, the open spaces and the parks and void areas left for the protection of the environment against urban congestion were used by the displaced and services shared with the original people of Khartoum. This deteriorating condition could be visualized by looking at the structural plans suggested for Khartoum by consultants who conducted urban studies at the end of the 1950’s and the beginning of the 1970’s and who expected the increase in the physical stretch of Khartoum and its urban boundary in 1990, and to compare those plans with the prevailing realities in the very year, when drawing 4 was sketched. The expected increase in the number of the population could also be read by assessing the physical development abnormal extensions. The outlined urban planning was insufficient to accommodate the inflated urban extensions and satisfying their needs. Although the government plans did not include the provision of services to squatter areas, investors including the government and public corporations scrambled for the land reserved for public utilities in old sub-divisions and quarters and made rather poor use of it. Universities, schools, hospitals, main markets, factories and other public utilities were congested in the old planned residential areas. Thus the old quarters teem with commercial, economic, industrial and social activities. The extra additional population which is nearly equivalent to two thirds of the population of the national capital, were compelled to travel to the old residential areas for work, hospitals, marketing and education whether at the secondary or university levels. They cover long distances in their daily commuting.
The urban environment of the capital was seriously affected by the influx of the displaced, the quality of soil and water drastically deteriorated, and land was utilized without care. The narrow spaces were crowded with people irrespective of drainage, safe disposal of human excretions, whether solid or liquid. Family members were crowded in single rooms or two at the best while males and females shared beds. The water element was no better than that of the soil. It was inadequate for the immense number of human beings and its qualities were unhygienic because polluted water was used by many. The conditions of the old settlements were no more attractive or pleasing than the new. The supply of water from the water network of old settlements to the new without increasing the volume of water pumped into the old system decreased the quantities of water in the water mains and made it more difficult to obtain for the original old settlers due to the reduced water pressure in the system The drainage of rainwater was obstructed by the existence of the squatter settlements on the natural water courses and the illegal development of low lying land which used to serve as pools for the accumulation of the water. The choking of the natural water courses and low-lying land was a principal cause for the 1988 floods which devastated Khartoum and led to the caving in of tens of thousands of houses in the old planned settlements besides the washing off of the shanties and the squatter settlements. Khartoum city still suffers from natural drainage of rainwater because of the blockage of the natural and seasonal watercourses and valleys. The stagnation of rainwater led to the spread of many environmental diseases and the collapse of houses. The random excretion of human waste and its stench had become characteristic features of some of the displaced settlements established on the empty spaces among the old houses of the original inhabitants of the town. These nasty smells had become sporadic and were present in many places in Khartoum, particularly in the rainy season. The situation became unbearable, the laceration intolerable and many who were able to change residence have left Khartoum. Environment has been harmed by the practices of the displaced who went searching for fire wood for cooking and forage for their few animals besides cutting the scattered trees for building their shacks, using the grass for roofing, thus they disturb the compactness of the soil crust. The soil was consequently subjected to weathering beyond remedy. The agglomerations of the displaced are not only a threat to the environment but have also become an security nightmare and an imposing threat to public health. The displaced settlements have become a den for crime and a cradle for dealing in forbidden drugs and liquor. They have become refuges of criminals to hide in after committing crimes. It is not unreasonable to suggest that a displaced may be enticed by the criminals, particularly when he is in dire need of the basics for life. The most immediate impact of the misconduct, malpractice and ill behavior of the displaced was on public health, as far as the contagious and environmental diseases were concerned. Khartoum had been immune to epidemic diseases such as typhoid, acute dysentery and
infectious hepatitis and food poisoning; these diseases have resurfaced in Khartoum and have spread in unknown proportions. A sort of insidious malaria, hitherto unknown to the people of Khartoum has appeared, while chest and malnutrition diseases have returned to the levels at the beginning of the 20th Century. The atrocity survived by Khartoum at the inception of this decade was powerful enough to dampen any enthusiasm of reform, especially when taking into consideration the violent political and diplomatic external attack, which accompanied the beginning of the urban and environmental reform. Achieving any success in this regard is beyond belief because of the scale of the problems associated with displacement: 1. Desertion of land and collapse of rural life.
Displacement retards the national economy because land is deserted, particularly the fertile virgin land in the South. If well utilized, that land would feed men and animals throughout the whole of Sudan. In the majority of cases, the land is left fallow and the irrigation channels are destroyed through long misuse and lack of manpower to work the land. The result is a large population vacuum. The existence of these factors i.e. the migration of manpower and the dissertation of land are sufficient to destroy life in the country and rural agricultural economy on which the state relies to keep the wheel turning in the community. The collapse of life in the country leads to the death of thousands of livestock, simply because these animals are driven thousand of miles in scrub land, stunted trees, waterless stretches of desert and sand dunes, an entirely intolerable environment. 2. Change of attitude towards the environment
When people are displaced, leaving their original homeland where they lived in harmony with their environment and ecology to settle at a new and different environment, they are inclined to cut down the trees and destroy the forests in their quest for firewood as it is the simplest and easiest way of producing energy. They are also compelled to use the nearest unoccupied space to discharge their human wastes and other refuses. 3. Enviromental pollution
Some of the occupied sites were unsuitable for residential use and constitute a problem in themselves: fingers of the desert (Umbaddah, Haj Yousif); along water courses and depressions wich are exposed to seasonal flooding (Marzoog, Gamayer, Doroashab); in proximity to sewage treatment plants (Lamab) or industrial areas (Taybat El Ahamda Zagaloana); in refuse disposal sites (Kusha, Bahri), etc. Most of the unauthorised settlements lack safe water provision, sanitary and refuse collection facilities thus environmental pollution is seen everywhere. In view of the high degree of congestion and overcrowding, lack of awareness and lack of ability to tackle emergent large scale disasters these settlements were environmentally hazardous.
4. Deterioration of municipal services
Squatters shared with the established urban population the already deficient and meagre municipal service. They even constitute an obstacle to the appropriate planning and execution of the municipal service lines. In most cases they blocked the storm drainage system and obstructed the power transmission lines. 5. Illegal land speculation
Land traders and black market agents have found an appropriate atmosphere to cheat poor people by selling them land they do not own, thus making a lot of money illegally. By doing so they are destroying the economy of the country and giving bad examples for people who are supposed to earn their living in a legitimate manner. The illegal dealing of government owned land causes also a loss of revenue for the government and deprives the treasury of income. 6. Security problems
Being far from security check points and surveillance and in the absence of social controls, squatters living in shanty towns and slum areas commit all sorts of crimes and threaten the security of other citizens. In addition the tribal conflicts that occur frequently in some of the displaced and squatter settlements lead to physical disruption creating collisions. This is greatly aggravated by illegal arms and drug dealings associated with some of these shanty towns. The displaced groups from the South still retain their automatic firearms and revert to the use of these arms to settle old tribal disputes. They roam about with these arms and fire at their enemies when disputes grow hotter even in exposed areas and in public places such as markets and streets in residential areas. They formed armed bands and gangs strolling about in the state of Khartoum. They scared the burghers and created a feeling of uneasiness among the urban societies, particularly when such incidents have been repeated among the armed groups in markets, places of work and houses. This compelled the relevant authorities in Khartoum State to mount campaigns to collect the firearms, through the use of the Sudanese army. 7. Health problems
The living conditions prevailing in the squatter and displaced localities create an appropriate environment for most of the communicable diseases. These spread widely among the densely populated areas. Outbreaks of epidemics in such environment can not be ruled out. Also the diseases they carry have found their way into the neighbouring residential sub-divisions adjacent to the camps of the displaced and their agglomerations. 8. Socio-economic problems
A sizeable number of squatters are forced to lead a parasitic way of life and do marginal jobs which lead to idleness and low incomes. This affects especially the young generations and creates social disorder.
With the increase of the proportion of unemployment, the aggravation of the economic situation, the weakness of the economic base of the city and the dimensions of poverty have spread within the community. The embryo of poverty has exhaled the irritating and humiliating practice of begging everywhere, in streets, buses, embassies where travelers queue up for entry visas, in mosques where people attend communal prayers, except on cemeteries, where it is possible that the awe inspiring feeling of death and the inhospitable scene of the silent graves expel the parasitic beggars. 9. Agriculture damage
Construction on arable lands greatly harms agriculture and the local economy. 10. Legal problems
Illegal possession of private land as well as land allocated for others damages the interest of the owners and allottees. In this case the government is obliged to protect the right of the owners and thus treat all people with justice. 11. Depletion of city resources
The accelerated pace of unplanned urban expansions places serious strains on the already run down urban infrastructure, food shortage, inadequate transport facilities and stagnant urban economies. The provision of adequate housing and basic amenities to the rapidly growing population poses a serious challenge to the government. 12. Dealing with the phenomenon of displacement
The huge bulk of the displaced population in recent times made it imperative on the government of the State of Khartoum to rush to the creation of some institutions to look after the affairs of the displaced, in addition to the federal institutions. These have to cater for the influx which was taking place almost daily. The State of Khartoum embarked on their policy to contain the problem of displacement by creating a commission to provide the immediate basic services and other urgent needs. Hence, the state provided the land or access to accommodation, food and clothing for the displaced on the organised sites in Khartoum. When the affairs of the displaced ramified and acquired social, economic and cultural dimensions, there was an increase in the number of the voluntary service organisations and NGOs. The State of Khartoum created a special body termed the Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Commission founded under the umbrella of other functioning federal institutions such as The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, established in 1986. After the application of the federal rule on a large scale, the RRC was renamed the Commission of Voluntary Aid in 1993. (COVA). The duties of the commission further expanded and took humanitarian relief under its wing to become the Humanitarian Relief Commission (HAC), to undertake the assignments of voluntary service, and the duties of Relief and Rehabilitation
Commission and commenced its functions in 1995. In all respects the Commission was created on the strength of transitional resolutions or decrees. It is an established fact the voluntary work is one of the pillars of humanitarian relief, while the components of the humanitarian relief are considered effective mechanisms to accelerate the potentials of communities and activate their latent energies to deal with exigent humanitarian needs and to overcome the effects of calamitous difficulties encountered during mass displacement, natural disasters, hardships and severe drought. The growing concern on the side of the Sudanese Government towards humanitarian aid activated the United Nations organisations and agencies and the donor countries to keep pace with the Sudanese efforts and exceed them in many events. This was followed in wake by a growing voluntary activity by the foreign voluntary organisations and NGOs. The concern of the different levels of the government of the Sudan and their incessant movements to satisfy the training needs of the IDPs have motivated the effectiveness of the Sudanese communities and their various sectors to create civil voluntary and charitable organisations to accelerate and diversify the humanitarian work in all its aspects. Thus the Sudanese humanitarian work has been enhanced and its organizations grew in numbers as a result of the late excessive waves of displacement and the continuation of intensive migration and immigration. The efforts of the organizations progressed to cover all spheres related to displacement, disasters, homelessness, drought and floods. 13. Other aspects of displacement
One of the new changes introduced by the displaced, is the employment of women in the building trade, at the displaced residential areas, where women carry water for building purposes and carry building materials. The work of women has moved into the government offices, where they manned the domestic jobs such as cleaning offices and providing catering services. These jobs were until recently done by men. The work of women in public and popular restaurants such as at Suk El Nagah (the she camel market) which is founded by the displaced who came from Western Sudan at the beginning of the 1980s when they had been driven by drought and desertification in the provinces of Kordofan and Darfur. Suk El Nagah has become a prominent feature of Greater Omdurman, at Umbadda. It is attended by visitors and tourists where one can point to a skinned lamb and have the piece of mutton of his choice roasted in a couple of minutes and served him in the open air.
4-3- The Surgical Operations Needed to Overcome the Fearful Difficulty of Massive Development
The researchers and those concerned with the problems of the displaced are cognizant with the direct problems of the displaced and the negative effects produced by the displacement process as outlined above, and which are defined by a number of aspects such as meeting the cost of the needs of the displaced, the collapse of their life, the environmental deterioration, the family disintegration, the growth of crime rate and the hardship of children etc. These are real torments to hurt the displaced. They are not aware of the harms or negative effects of their movements across towns. Khartoum city may be taken as an example, where the growing exodus of the displaced through the last two decades has led to unplanned and unforeseen demographic and urban growth Owing to the absence of vision of the successive governments in that period and their inability to tackle the serious problems created by the presence of the displaced and their illegal encroachment upon lands resulting in environmental pollution and degradation. They uncontrollably built their shacks, shanties in open spaces inside towns. Many of the capital and its sub-divisions and urban extensions were occupied by the displaced and they indiscriminately developed the vacant lands. They were then filled with people. The situation further aggravated by the continual agglomeration of the displaced settlements and their massive development. The mud was further moistened by the excessive uncivilized behaviour of the displaced in urban environment. It has become a tool of destruction. The displaced never observe the values of the Sudanese nation, which call for the protection and preservation of the environment. In fact this nomadic nation has adopted a righteous mode to deal with the element of environment. Besides the torrents of the displaced, urban development in the national capital had been characterized with chaos and imprecision to the extent that more than half of the urban block had been developed into “squatter settlements”, which include IDPs camps, sporadic and irregular shanties, and scattered, unplanned and isolated villages on the peripheries of the National Capital. Since the squatter settlers have not obtained a license to build or to legalize their status, they did not bind themselves with the symmetry of urban building expansion. The squatter settlements had become places of unfinished buildings, below standard, in comparison with the traditional building style of the Sudanese, of limited incomes. The squatter settlements were subject to destruction or annihilation by the rains and floods. The wet season is a nightmare for the owners of those squatter settlements. The shanty dwellings are not connected with paved or half made roads. They did not have the will to make effective improvements of the dwelling units or to renew the building forms such as that used for planned urban extensions, because engineering infrastructure and municipal services in some of the squatter quarters or villages could not keep pace with the aspirations of the people. In addition the paved road nets to
connect these villages and settlements with the core of the urban fabric were lacking. A glance at table 4 shows the residential conditions of the inhabitants in 1990. Mr. Doxiadis, a consultant and a town planner, produced this diagram, in the report he presented for the approval of the sketch maps of Khartoum at that era. The table contains the housing stock and reserve and defines the needs of housing units in 1990 and in 1995-2000. The table shows the large number of houses to be substituted, and those houses, which require immediate maintenance. The table also defines the need for residential units based on 2000 assessment and according to the economic status of the citizens of the national capital. It is a requirement that could not be satisfied under the past policies. It is needless to elaborate on the shortage of safe drinking water for the people of the national capital at that period. All the squatter settlements obtain their water from the water supply network of the old residential areas. Children, women and animal drawn carts carry water. If that was the condition of domestic water supply which was, unpleasant, unsatisfactory and inadequate, the conditions of the drainage, the waste waters, the electric power supply are scarcely more pleasing, added to the fact that the government was against the supply of water to the squatter settlements, which occupied large urban stretches, a gesture of non recognition on the side of the government. Public transport system in 1990 was one of worse public utilities. It is sufficient to say that some people commuted in long vehicles provided by the EEC for the Sudanese Livestock and Meat Marketing Public Corporation for the transport of livestock from western Sudan to consumption areas and to Port Sudan for export trade. Some of the government employees and town folk were subject to that experience. They only missed the fodder in the long commute. The observation of Mr. Gibreel Gamar, a previous employee of the British Council in Khartoum made a mental vivid picture of the home-office-journeys as follows Gibreel compares himself with Sir Winston Spencer Churchill who ensconced himself among sacks of coal in his escape from Johannesburg, fearing to be discovered at the next train stop, but Gibreel mind was at ease because he was not advertised wanted. Those who detested the experience had to wait for long hours, under smiting rays of scorching sun, melting and sweltering in their own sweat to race, push and scramble into a groaning and snorting bus intended for human beings but not in human order, nor to sit in human seats, but to occupy the few seats, stand on the narrow passage, sticking into one another like bricks in a wall that if the first man or woman moves, the last man or woman moves too. Dispensing with the garbage was no better than public transport. It suffered in every respect. Garbage and refuse were not collected from houses but piled in open places and left to rot and feed the flies. Garbage that is collected though small is left in the open or near the River Nile, or on the vicinity of markets or in the outskirts of towns. The garbage collection vehicles were no
more than 20 vehicles in every province. These cars though insufficient need maintenance or overhauling. The incessant displacement, the continuous exodus towards Khartoum; and the excessive expansion of unplanned settlements and uncontrolled development produced a deteriorating urban environment in Khartoum; isolated physical blocks, a dilapidated ruined urban structure, deplorable public utilities and decaying municipal service lines. This situation created restlessness and provided great challenges to the city administration. Reform was not easy. It could only be done by dealing with or treating the squatter settlements, and the incorporation of the sporadic villages in the urban fabric, though these villages are numerous. The solution would not only be through the resettlement of the squatters and the displaced. The squatter style, the successive urbanization, which exceeded all expectation, had made it imperative to conduct surgical operations for the restructuring of the city urban, physical and administrative structures to overcome that tremendous and fearful difficulty. It required the following: - 1. The removal of settlements built on unsuitable locations, or in locations already ear-marked for other purposes, or on land forcibly possessed. 2. Reallocation of some urban functions which did not keep pace with the unforeseen urban development 3. Conducting urban renewal and innovation to emerge from the depressing and deteriorating condition. 4. Diluting the concentration in population and overcrowding to maintain a balance in the population density. 5. Creating new urban centres to effectively apply the decentralized system of governance to relieve the bottleneck in transportation and in the administrative structure. 6. Increasing the housing stock and urban extension reserve horizontally or/and vertically as well as improving the residential conditions of the citizens and promoting and enhancing the residential environment. 7. Strengthening the economic base of Greater Khartoum. 8. Continuous application of urban planning to produce approved master and site plans for urban extensions and to satisfy the needs of Khartoum Metropolis for services and public utilities and other infrastructure such as, educational, health, commercial, industrial or recreational, while allocating space for strategic sectors and thence promoting the mode of physical planning to accommodate the fast growth of physical development. This growth must be associated with a transportation network to direct the physical development to the outskirts of the city, distribute the population density and to facilitate the flow and mobility of the population.
Paper 10 The Status of the Displaced in the Sudan and the Extent of their Re-Settlement by Dr Sharaf El Din Ibrahim Bannaga
Meeting the Basic Needs of the Displaced:
1-1- The nature of humanitarian aid Meeting the demands of the displaced is becoming a controversial issue because it is politicized and misinterpreted. The controversial topic is related to the nature of “adequate” humanitarian aid sufficient to satisfy the needs of the displaced. Any responsible government would seek the welfare of its people through the provision of services, particularly for the displaced, because of their exceptional conditions and their dire need for assistance and aid. The focal zones of displacement are those poor countries where the proportions of displacement are on the increase. Accordingly the people of such countries, whether they are settled or displaced they are invariably in the greatest need of assistance and service. The provision of food, accommodation, security, education, health services and water are real predicaments facing the governments and their poor communities. It is therefore critically important when assessing these needs and services, for the assessors to bear in mind that the related governments are unable in most cases to provide those demands, despite of the presence of good will. This is because the resources of the countries concerned are still scanty and would not cover the demands of the displaced however they are overstretched. Reaching a balance of services accorded to the settled and the displaced population is never an easy task – it is difficult for governments and communities and it constitutes a continual worry and fear for the displaced particularly at first when he has lost everything and has no idea what the future may bring. This feeling of despair accompanies the displaced especially when he is unable to provide the basic needs related to water, food, clothing, accommodation, health, education or even how to dispense of his own human excretions.
1-2- Food Food is one of the most urgent needs of the displaced. To ensure that the displaced cook the foodstuff provided other necessities must be provided especially in the first stages of displacement. These requirements include fuel, wood or other sorts of energy, water and kitchen utensils. Foodstuffs must be provided in abundance at the beginning to replenish the hunger-exhausted people and due care and attention must be directed towards the weaker groups, such as school children, the handicapped and the elderly to allow them to regain their vigour. A great proportion of the food deficit is usually covered through general food distribution, income generation projects and school feeding though in recent times, providing food for work or for training is one way of motivating the fit and able among the displaced to add knowledge, receive training and upgrade vocational skills. Food security for IDPs was relatively well resourced and food continued to reach those vulnerable groups for which it was intended. Interventions were also made to improve the nutritional status of the displaced populations and reducing cases of malnutrition especially in food deficit areas. Annual needs assessment conducted in year 2000 and 2001 revealed that IDPs in some states which had food deficit faced serious food insecurity e.g. South Darfur had a food deficit of 30% in year 2001 whereas a food gap amounting to 40% was experienced in South, West and North Kordofan in the same year including the peace villages around Kadogli, and that of the White Nile reached 20%. Food deficit requiring food aid are estimated for this year as 50% for major townships in Easter Equatoria, Upper Nile and Jonglei whereas a surplus of food is expected in Western Equatoria in the area held by SPLA. However, the IDPs in Kassala require continued provision of relief food because food deficit in this state reached 80% or more. In spite this huge food deficit, food was flowing continuously as requested to keep malnutrition rates among IDPs in the neighbourhood of 10%. Reports indicate that high prevalence of acute malnutrition has been recorded in many location in Bahr Elghazal whereas the malnutrition rate in the neighbouring state, South Darfur, is reduced and it dropped from 20% in the year 1999 to 7.5% in the year 2000. Unity which is in the vicinity of the same region as Bahr Elghazal falls into a highest risk category. Its malnutrition rate is at 28%. This was reported in Bantiu in the year 2000 and expected to increase because of the high level of insecurity which is impeding the provision of humanitarian aid. After the intensification of national and UN efforts to ensure the availability of food, it is possible to say that the quality of food for the displaced, particularly for the targeted population is fair. There are no severe malnutrition cases that jeopardize the lives of the displaced. The Government is seeking at the moment provision of food through various competent organs, while the donor countries and foreign organizations provide food periodically. Although, the total amount of food that is distributed is inadequate, it is sufficient for needy people to survive. The Sudanese communities despite debilities and lack of resources still continue to provide food aid within certain limits. The Sudanese nation must appreciates the valiant effort of the World Food Programme (WFP). It is the main contributor of food and the largest contributor of humanitarian aid. The humanitarian aid provided by UN operations and the INGOs is shown on Table 5a, 5b and table
6 from which the Sudanese displaced benefited at a national scale, including the rebel-controlled areas. In the recent four years listing of humanitarian aid activities was recorded by sector, the northern sector and southern sector and no breakdown was given. In the year 2000 the needs estimated were $130, 917824 of which $95355693 were availed making a percentage of 72.8 while in the year 2001 only $154835862 was provided out of 251970846 as estimated needs making a percentage of 61.45. In fact the food situation at the camps of the displaced in Khartoum provided by (OLS) has considerably improved until mal-nutrition dropped to 6/8% with the exception of children, where the rate rises to twice as much. The food provided by the NGOs has now been limited to the targeted groups, the weaker groups or vulnerable groups i.e. pregnant women, breastfeeding mothers and other women without a breadwinner, homeless children, the geriatrics among men, the handicapped and the crippled etc. Food aid started to shrink since 1996, but before that date it was distributed to all the displaced. Accordingly the number of the displaced benefiting from the food programme withered each year, until the programme only covered as said before, the targeted group of the programme which include in addition to the mentioned above the elders, the sick, children struck with malnutrition, the widows, and school feeding. Distribution included the following: - Milk mixture, Lintels, Edible oil, Sorghum mixture, Milk, Sugar and their quantities were as detailed on the following: 1996 (35215 metric tons), 1997 (29114 metric tons), 1998 (27303 metric tons), 1999 (13228 metric tons). The second experiment adopted by the voluntary organizations and the World Food Programme is termed “Food for Work”. This successful system has been applied at the camps of the displaced. In case these experiments are expanded they would lead to a considerable success of a far-reaching effects in motivating the displaced to embark on revenue tapping activities.
1-3- Shelter Among other immediate necessities essential for the displaced is the provision of shelter to protect families from the changing weather conditions, especially the stifling heat characteristic of the Sudan climate. A dwelling, which keeps the privacy of a family and protects it from the scorching heat of the sun; becomes a necessity to ensure the safety of the displaced, keep him away from friction with others and preserve his property. Accordingly, providing access to shelter is an issue of crucial importance – as it provides a place to unify families and allows the agencies that provide care and humanitarian aid to monitor their movements and whereabouts. It is worth mentioning that a displaced Sudanese family does not find much difficulty in building a dwelling with the least possible cost using material available anywhere. They erect
several tree branches on the ground and bend them to meet. They tie the tops of the twigs together and wind them with other lithe twigs in circles starting from the base and rising up until the last circles reach the top. They then cover this arbour with cardboard, plastic sheets, canvas, and sacks of tattered cloth. Thus they form a shelter providing shade and staving off curious looks. Whenever the family moves off in search of better conditions, they dismantle the light and moveable shelter and rebuild the human nest in another location. They quickly acclimatize to new conditions. In a relatively short period, the shelter will include to a pit latrine surrounded with a skeleton of branches wrapped with sacks or black plastic sheets to provide some privacy from the prying eyes of passers by. It is to be noted that international community interventions is experienced only in emergency situations such as that situation which faced Raja IDPs in 2001. they were provided by emergency shelter items together with household utensils.
1-4- Water and healthcare: Despite the fact that the majority of hospitals in Sudan are public owned and provide traditional services to both the in -patients and out-patients, the scarcity of the medical staff and the increasing number of wounded in the civil war make the provision of medical services to the displaced in some circumstances extremely difficult. The onerous efforts exerted by the local relief committee and its coordination with the international medical, voluntary organisations and NGOs have provided a great deal of the essential medical services for the displaced and reduced the effect of the dangerous endemic diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea and acute bronchitis. The non-stop activities of the medical institutions have kept the average rate of the incidence of diseases at normal or below average rates, and have alleviated the waves of recurrent epidemic diseases. It is of note that the rate of disease related to the drinking water supply are still high in some places in less developed states due to the shortage of safe, pure water. IDPs who use unclean drinking water particularly in the southern states have suffered during 2001 as in pervious years from diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea and ARI (acute respiratory infection) . For the same reason guinea worm and river blindness remain rampant epidemic disease in southern sector. Malaria is endemic throughout the country. It is not possible under such circumstances to eradicate such diseases without safe, pure and adequate drinking water supplies in addition to the requirements of personal cleanliness. This is an established fact which is echoed by the WHO. The WHO considers that 80% of disease epidemics in the country are due to waterborne or water related diseases and up to 40% of deaths in under-five children are caused by diarrhoea. These are exemplified by high morbidity and mortality rates experienced in most of the states. This is aggravated by the very poor conditions of primary health facilities in rural areas in the southern sector which are even fewer in number and
rudimentary in structure often huts furnished with recycled packaging material. Health status in some of the states is:
· The major causes of morbidity in Bahr Elghazal were malaria, diarrhoea and ARI. Guinea worm and river blindness are also major problems.
· Malaria, diarrhoea and ARI account for more than 60% of the morbidity rate in Equatoria while sleeping sickness, river blindness and guinea remain epidemic in Western Equatoria as environmental conditions are favourable to vectors. HIV/AIDS continues to grow as a problem particularly due to proximity to Kenya and Uganda.
· Apart from the high incidence of malaria, diarrhoea and ARI diseases, tuberculosis, kalazar and guinea worm are a particular problem facing Upper Nile and Jonglei States.
· High morbidity rates of malaria diarrhoea and ARI are experienced in the rest of the states particularly Unity, White Nile and South and West Kordofan. In addition the overall health services in Unity are very poor compared to others and with ill-equipped and under staff facilities. And although health services are only marginally adequate in White Nile, they are provided at cost unaffordable by majority of the IDPs.
· In the year 2000 a geuinea worm eradication programme (GWEP) led by the Carter/Global 2000 which provides technical assistance to NGOs, reached a network of over 3000 villages volunteers throughout the southern sector. However, the required medical improvement would not be attained if the displaced and other settled people obtain their domestic water supply from water reservoirs such as (hafirs), swamps and water pools that are unprotected, liable to pollution and used by man and animals. Although the federal government as well as states governments have exerted continuous efforts in addition to the efforts exercised by UN organisation and donor countries in providing safe drinking water to the displaced communities distributed throughout the country water is still a priority need in nearly all localities accommodating the displaced with the exception of Khartoum and Malakal. Malakal now enjoys provisions of clean drinking water because of a recently completed water project. It is also known that the displaced communities residing in official camps in the northern sector generally have access to safe drinking water but potable water remains a critical issue in areas outside of the official camps. The rest of the displaced settlement established in other states suffer from intermittent supplies and inadequate quality of drinking water. These include - Red Sea areas as well as Eastern Equatoria (Torit, Kapoeta) experience chronic shortage of water in the dry season. Displaced communities in Western Equatoria appear to have access to drinking water from ground water aquifers because the process of hand dug well is firmly established.
- Upper Nile and Jonglei localities represent the poorest water services in the southern sector and thus they should be a prime area for water interventions. - The majority of IDPs have no access to safe drinking water in White Nile but on the contrary clean water is available to IDPs in South amd West Kordofan through water points / yards, the hand pumps and wells. Drinking water is also accessible to IDPs of south Darfur where potable water is made available by NGOs/UNICEF programmes implemented in Ed Da’ein and Alia region and supplied to all IDPs camps within the vicinity. This has produced significant impact on public health by reducing morbidity rates and promoting health and hygiene awareness. - Some drought prone areas, particularly North Darfur and North Kordofan are expected to be seriously affected and more displaced people could be forced to move to urban areas towards the Nile. In previous years and years to come WES (Water and Environmental Sanitation) projects were more widely spread and may be spread across the southern sector. This is because UN global analysis estimates that more than 2000 new boreholes need to be drilled to reach the minimum basic requirements of the unserved population in the southern sector. Only 30% of the population on average are served now. Thankfully, in Khartoum State this has not been the case. As a result of cooperation with the humanitarian voluntary organisations and NGOs, local, foreign and with the donor countries, the water supply at the camps of the displaced is invariably better than the water supply at the regular and suburban residential areas in the national capital. Piped water supply is available in some areas of the displaced camps, close to the dwellings of the displaced. They obtain water without using animal carts or water sellers. The distances from the water taps are close at hand, which reduces the number of hands used in conveying the water to those in need. There are no queues for obtaining water in the camps. However, the case is different where the displaced have merged with other squatter settlers where water supply facilities are inadequate. The foreign voluntary organisations and NGOs have not participated in promoting or improving the water supply services at such places ear-marked for Khartoum state and its affiliated components, except where regular settlements are adjacent to the camps of the displaced. In such case it is a gesture of good will be highly appreciated by both the recipient people and the local authorities of Khartoum State. The rate of water related diseases is higher in such regular settlements where water is transported by carts, men carriers, water vendors, women and children for long distances than it is at the camps of the displaced, where tap water is fairly accessible and requires little effort without the use of intermediaries whose presence lead to the pollution of water and the outbreak of diseases.
Reference must be made that (OLS) and a considerable number of the voluntary service organisations and NGOs operating in Khartoum have intensified their activities in assisting the displaced to build hygienic latrines known as (V.I.P.), ventilated, improved pit latrine. The organizations provided the displaced with prefabricated concrete platforms and ventilation pipes to use in pit latrines A programme for digging pit latrines started intensively in 1996 and continued to 1999 where 25250 latrines were dug by the end of March 2000. The latrine digging programme bore fruition at Jebel Aulia, Al Salam and El Beshir Camps, they did not affect Mayo El Mazarieh Camp, where half of the population are without such utilities and dispose of their human excretions in open spaces close to the settlements. Such practice jeopardises environmental health efforts at Mayo Camp, particularly during the wet season from July to the end of September. This is why environmental conditions are terribly deteriorating in this camp. Human excretions as well as decaying domestic animals dot the plain like scattered courgettes (kosa). When these carcasses are wetted they emit extremely unpleasant smells and are excellent paradise for the houseflies, which buzz defiantly and drop on food and eyes with resultant diarrhoea, dysentery and trachoma and other eye diseases. Happily, the V.I.P. latrine programme has been intensified recently in Mayo camp and the environmental conditions are improving. The camps are relatively well covered in terms of primary health care and supplementary feeding services. The quality of health services is generally acceptable based on the last report of ANA, ARI is the first cause of morbidity. Malaria comes second and diarrhoea is third but the rates are much lower compared to other states.
1-5- Education The greatest difficulty encountered by the displaced is the education of his children. Education, for its high cost is undertaken by the state through educational institutions equipped with trained manpower and financial facilities. The displaced children are the weakest layers of the community where their families and owing to their destitute poverty, are not able to meet the tuition fees, the cost of the text, exercise books, writing stationery and transport fee i.e. daily journeys to and from schools which in some cases are of considerable distances when they join school outside IDPs camps. These financial constraints are coupled with the limited number of schools and the vast colony of children of schooling age. In addition as the majority of them, lack documents, i.e. birth certificate, nationality, identity cards relevant to school admission, each of which require payment of fees beyond the financial ability of the displaced families, while some youngsters may grow up without education feeling embarrassed to join schools and queuing up with children almost half their age. They have to absorb unwelcoming looks, unpleasant remarks and complaints from younger children about bullying from older children, mostly the displaced. On the other hand, the educational services
have been deteriorating in nearly all the states absorbing the displaced population. This is due to congestion in classrooms, insufficient quantities of textbooks, school materials and desks, lack of trained teachers, rundown buildings and delayed payments of teachers. Despite these factors some improvements were made. For example, the report produced by the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OSL) states that the schools of IDPs administered by 20 voluntary organisations and NGOs throughout the Sudan, indicates that the number rose to 1400 schools in 1999, while it was only 720 schools in 1993, and only accommodated 30% of the children of the displaced at school age. The enrolment number of pupils increased from 166,000 to 260,000. The number of estimated children at school according to the Operation Lifeline in southern Sudan is about a million pupils. A sizeable number which families need them for help in agriculture or to embark on other jobs to increase the family income, should be deducted. The present status of the education system serving IDPs in the UN assessed states can be read from the values of the rates of children enrolled in the schools in the specified state. These are indicated in percentage as follows: Bahr ElGhazal (37-53%), Equatoria (40%), Bahr ElJebel (49%), Upper Nile and Jonglei (30-32%), White Nile (50%), South and West Kordofan (57%), South Darfur (very low) and the dropout is about 75%. It is becoming a fact that when school feeding is introduced the enrolment rate increases. This is experienced in Bahr ElGhazal when school feeding supported by WFP is made available in IDPs schools in Wau and Aweil. School-feeding also increase the retention rates among pupils. The dropout rate was reduced substantially in the southern region of Bahr ElGhazal which had the largest percentage of out of school children, with 80%. However, despite the efforts made by WFP in this regard the enrolment rates in the rural areas of Bahr ElGhazal are very low because of the unavailability of classrooms. The rate of children enrolled in IDPs schools in the state of Upper Nile and Jonglei are very low and the delivery of the education services was inconsistent in many parts of the two states throughout the previous years. This is because the two states continued to be theatres of war. It is therefore necessary to provide all the ingredients of the learning process to enabled a rapid efficient and effective recovery of the education system in any locality where the situation permits. IDPs pupils in South Darfur though in northern sector, have very low enrolment levels and high dropout rates. Dropout rate of pupils reached 75% which is beyond belief. This is primarily due to the fact that school calendar does not suit the children because of the seasonal mobility of displaced population and the limited coverage of the school feeding programme. In addition the teachers in these localities do not receive any incentive or community support and even their salaries are at stake.
The conditions of the education services in Unity state are much worse than expected. An estimated 90% of children of IDPs have never attended school and the education process covers only 46% of the selected population. Extremely low enrolment and high dropout rates of children in areas where fighting is continuous are expected because these areas are in state of insecurity and the displaced population is in continuous movement. However, the conditions of education services in the states of the southern sector are all alike. Better conditions exist in Equatoria. The work accomplished by UN and INGOs in the field of education was satisfactory. The number of schools in Equatoria had grown from 200 in 1993 to 700 in the previous year. The region has the highest number of upper primary schools and the majority of secondary schools in the southern sector, in addition WFP is very active in providing school feeding. Education services in Western Equatoria, under the control of SPLA are even better because parents of pupils according to UN assessment have higher income thus they are able to pay for education services than parents in other parts of Southern Sudan. The conditions of the education system in the northern states accommodating the IDPs is no better with the exception of Khartoum state. Similar to South Darfur, there are very few educational facilities in the IDPs camps in Kassala. This situation has forced many children to drop out. The same circumstances prevail in White Nile where more than 75% of school-age children are not enrolled in any type of education. Surprisingly , the situation is better in war affected regions of Kordofan i.e. South and West Kordofan. Children in these regions are enrolled in schools of IDPs as well as absorbed in those of the host community. This has increased the rate of enrolment to 57%. If school-feeding projects are initiated to support the pupils of the displaced population in South and West Kordofan the enrolment rate would increase to a much higher figure. Higher rates of enrolment are expected to be achieved this year under the umbrella of piece that reign in the Nuba Mountain regions. Despite this, the position in Khartoum remains better than in other towns in the South, because of the relative stability enjoyed by the southern displaced in Khartoum State. The voluntary and charitable organisations provide a meal during the school day, a motivation to continue education. There are now more than 250 basic schools in Khartoum for the displaced children. Despite the large number of schools and the meals provided by the voluntary and charitable organisations, it is expected that the number of the registered pupils would not exceed 50% of the targeted number of children at the displaced camps, but the enrolment level in treated displaced settlements is higher despite school deficiencies. Concern over education of displaced children and school attendance is a key to the future of the child and family. It is an auxiliary agent to promote communities and provide an effective mechanism to ensure stability and amalgamation into Khartoum’s urban society leading to the eventual normalization of life and living conditions. It is increasingly essential to urge the
displaced to accept the education of girls, because the number of boys in schools, although small, is twice the number of girls throughout the whole country. Though displaced children are given some assistance i.e. the waiving of school fees or its reduction; provision of meals once a day and other forms of incentives; still their performance is at extremely low levels when compared to the displaced children who have integrated into the settled communities in squatter settlements. The school results of the displaced children at the towns of Dar El Salam, established to accommodate the relocated squatter settlers, are far better than the school results of the displaced children living inside the displaced camps. This phenomenon could be attributed to the fact that the displaced children are unable to become familiar with classical Arabic, which is the medium of instruction throughout Sudanese education system. Children from the South and their families speak Juba Arabic, which is different from the native Arabic-speaking pupils joining schools in the North. They come into contact with classical Arabic without the need for intensive remedial Arabic to precede the basic school programme. A further obstacle to academic progress is that some children are engaged in work after school to help their families. Those whose results are better joined schools and lived in places occupied by northern Sudanese, hence the opportunity of incessant contact with native Arabic speaking children. But those who preferred the camps miss the opportunity in exchange for the security of receiving regular and systematic food rations.
1-6- The non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the provision of humanitarian Aid With such shortcomings, it was imperative to make an appeal for assistance from the international community and to enlist the help of mankind wherever he may be. It is a fact that humanitarian aid has become a basic right adapted by the international community and receiving recognition from individuals, groups, communities and states particularly those countries advocating celestial religions and philosophies. Heavenly religions played a vital part in motivating voluntary and charitable work in many countries including the Sudan. Red Crescent and Red Cross societies have come into being to express these principles and to emphasize the culture of humanitarian relief in missionary communities. We now see the formation of new voluntary organisations such as the Dawa Islamic Organisation, several church societies whose prime aim is the provision of humanitarian relief. In recent decades, the international community and the donor countries have deemed it appropriate to assign humanitarian aid responsibilities to non-governmental organisations and similar voluntary and charitable organisations to handle the humanitarian relief and aid to the displaced communities. The activities of the donor countries are not only confined to the NGOs and the like but are extended to United Nations agencies. The donor countries and the
international community preferred the non-governmental organisations for the job because of their flexibility, ease of manoeuvre, mobility and unflinching determination to demolish hurdles and obstacles, on their path. The NGOs work in harsh but they are more coordinating with others, since they have a free hand to manoeuvre, unlike the government corporations, institutions or United Nations agencies that are bound by the institutional framework. Some NGOs are specialized in humanitarian aid such as food, health services, water, disposal of the liquid and solid wastes and the organic human excretions. Others concentrate on the provision of shelters or accommodation and revenue earning activities and the provision of permanent jobs or in the field of productive families such as soap making, shows manufacturing, handcrafts, poultry breeding, sewing, etc. Others provide humanitarian relief to the weak sectors of the targeted communities, e.g. women, children the handicapped and the elderly. They cover all aspects of emergencies to the extent and provide consultancy service in training, early warning, environmental protection and medical specialties. The role of the NGOs has grown and expanded to cover all the areas of the Sudan in need of humanitarian relief. Their role has become complementary to the function of the principal participants; namely the Government of the Sudan, state governments and their communities, the donor countries and their communities, and the UN specialized agencies i.e. UNHCU, UNHCR and WFP and the UNICEF. The activities of the NGOs have become widespread in the Sudan in the last decade as it has embarked in multiple and diversified expansive activities. They increased in number; their objectives varied and changes were made to their organizational structure. Their roles and objectives multiplied particularly when the Sudan became subject to drought, desertification, famines and armed conflicts, which demanded an appeal for food, shelter and social care. It is worth mentioning that the voluntary organizations and NGOs have played a key role in meeting the needs of the displaced and providing protection, which begs the request for them to continue carrying these immense assignments whilst improving the behaviour of their staff towards the affected countries and their people to keep pace with the importance and seriousness of the missions they have been assigned to perform and to ensure the good reputation and continuity of their mission and to trigger further aid and contributions from charitable people all around the world.
1-7- Efforts of the UN Operation Lifeline Sudan and the Sudanese Nation to Support the Displaced The United Nations, through her specialized agencies and the Operation Lifeline Sudan regulates the provision of humanitarian aid to the displaced Sudanese including the rebel- controlled areas that are outside the perimeter of the influence of the Sudan Government. Table No. 5 a shows the bulk of humanitarian foreign aid, presented to the Sudan through the United
Nations organisations and other non-governmental and voluntary organizations, it reveals that the level of aid is huge, far beyond the capability of the government of the Sudan, the relevant state governments and their respective communities. Although some of the aid is squandered, the displaced Sudanese receives the majority of aid. And although the cost of transporting relief and the security risks almost doubles the cost of the foodstuff, table No. 5a clearly shows that the organisations were able to transport the food to the conflict areas. Surprisingly, the average volumes of foodstuff supplied to the controlled areas of the government of the Sudan and the Sudan People Liberation Army are almost equal during the specified period. The amount of aid distributed was substantial despite the bad roads and security risks. We may revert to map 5 to acquaint ourselves with the network of transport that conveys the relief materials overland, by river and air to and from the local airports shown on the map. One of the reasons, which led to the success of the Operation Lifeline Sudan, programme is the cohesive coordination of its operations between the competent governments, the United Nations, the voluntary organisations, and the donor countries and its communities. Table No. 5a estimates the total aid provided by the Operation Lifeline Sudan at specified periods as shown in the table. These large sums were equally distributed between the government and rebel-controlled areas. The total humanitarian aid allocated to the Sudan between 1993 and 1997 is within the limits of seven hundred million dollars whereas the displaced in Khartoum received only one hundred and fifty million dollars between 1996-2000 as detailed below: -
Food services 128,841,940 $US Clinical health 006,000,000 $US Environmental health 001,850,000 $US Drainage excavations 000,250,000 $US Drinking water services 009,150,000 $US Educational services 001,514,786 $US
It is of note that humanitarian aid to both the northern and southern sectors was increasing in the last years and it was worth $95355693 and $154835862 in the years 2000 and 2001 respectively. The amounts of humanitarian aid reached 59558 metric tons in the year 2000 and increased to 135634 metric tons in the year 2001 . In spite of the huge amounts mentioned the displaced in Khartoum have been receiving less amounts by the United Nations and foreign voluntary organisations. Arguably, it is not justified. The statistics shown on the previous tables were derived from information collected by the Operation Lifeline and the Humanitarian Aid Commission. Therefore, these statistics did not include the direct effort that the government has made in meeting the needs of the displaced, nor
do they include the efforts of the charitable work adopted by the Sudanese national community, or the national voluntary organizations, which on many occasions are not included in the humanitarian aid programme, organized and coordinated by the United Nations. The Sudanese government and the national organisations should continue to provide support and aid successively and improve their performance. They were active until the year 1996 when the contribution of the international voluntary service organisations, the INGOs and the United Nations agencies have become markedly effective and of considerable value. A glance at table 11 would reveal the size of aid produced by the Sudanese community and that procured by the international community in 1996. The national organisations were providing food in 20 centres whereas the international voluntary organisations were providing food in 8 centres. The size of aid provided by the foreign organisations was greater in food and pumps that draw groundwater. At present the humanitarian aid supplied by the international community is much more than that provided by the Sudanese communities. What the state had presented though not enough but was appreciable. Besides the provision of security services, which are naturally governmental, the government has dropped customs, taxes and airport fees on every incoming aid material, although these taxes represent a considerable proportion of the public revenue, to steer public affairs. Among the services provided by the government are those services necessary to run schools. The state recruits the teachers, provides books, stationery and furniture and pays teacher salaries. It provides drugs for inoculation and undertakes the periodical and emergency inoculation campaigns at all health centres including centres run by voluntary organizations and NGOs, the besieging of the epidemic diseases in addition to the construction of groundwater stations which were drilled at the inception of the displaced arrival in Khartoum. These stations still provide the displaced with pure hygienic drinking water. Government administrations and institutions still contribute to direct aid for the displaced in camps and other sites. The Zakah Chamber offers fiscal assistance to the poor Zakah Chamber targeted families. The institutions of social affairs provide assistance in kind through a number of programmes by offering the poor families production facilities through the Social Development Institutions and Islamic Endowment and also through income increase programmes and income generating projects.
1-8- Activating the Role of the State and its Institutions to Deal with Displacement The recipient countries such as Sudan have an important principal role to play because they are concerned that its people are the beneficiaries of support and receivers of humanitarian aid. Given this to be the case, these countries should concentrate resources and facilities at all levels in an attempt to contribute in meeting the demands of the displaced and those affected by emergency conditions and in need of urgent relief and humanitarian aid.
The external aid is an additional operation to offset what governments are unable to provide. The government in Sudan must activate the local organisations to create homogeneity throughout all the organisations such as the Sudanese Council for Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA) and the relevant government institutions including the Ministry of Finance, the Solidarity Fund (takaful funds), Zakah Chambers, the State Support Fund and other organizations. Hence, the government has a duty to support and foster voluntary and humanitarian work wherever it may arise and to understand and appreciate its message and motivation and encourages it to provide the needs, contacting all the donor countries and voluntary international organisations and NGOs. To facilitate the work of these international organisations the government must harness laws and regulations, which govern voluntary work and allow it to meet the demands and requirements of these organisations to allow them to carry out their missions. The present situation implies the duplication of roles among several Sudan government organs, which results in a lack of coordination and organisation. This has led to disputes with the authorities, a mixing of roles and suspicion of the functioning organisations in the field of humanitarian aid. In turn, this has created a confused situation in dealing, thinking, guidance and leadership. This situation disrupted the working plans of the organisations and delayed its provision of further assistance and aid.
1-9- Rehabilitation and development The United Nations should be requested by the Sudanese government to intensify the activities of their specialised agencies in the field of humanitarian aid and welfare of the displaced. The United Nations in this regard could urge the donor countries to move from relief and immediate aid into a second phase of rehabilitation, resettlement and development. They could start with development projects that provide food, which meets the demands of the Sudan and the demands of the humanitarian aid for the neighboring countries. This would entail no difficulty in persuasion because the cost of transport from Port Sudan to the struck areas is equal to several folds of the cost of the food production in Sudan, which suffices the Sudanese displaced and the affected people in neighboring countries. I am not revealing a secret to say that the Sudan has extensive arable land, abundant irrigation water, whether sourced from rain or river to feed agriculture. The country lacks the finance (capital), advanced agricultural technology and marketing. The adaptation of this style would extract the Sudan from a recipient of external aid to a country, which contributes in relieving others. It would produce a comprehensive development of radical change, which rekindles the spirit of work and productivity among the displaced, the poor of the towns and invigorates the bonds of love and camaraderie among the nations and their international organisations. The donor countries should think of rehabilitation and peace in the Sudan more than they are worried about the provision of aid to the war stricken
population in the South, on the assumption that it is the root cause of the continuation of the civil war. More importantly, relief is not an alternative for peace. It is not an alternative to a political settlement. The donor countries could pull other governments to work with them, hand in hand to persuade the grass roots, and to support their programme for development and peace. The appropriate path is to work for the integration of the Sudan communities and assist them to develop the South and the other underdeveloped regions of the Sudan in the hope of removing social and economic disparities, which would alleviate the intensity of displacement.
2- Enhancing the Built Environment and Resettling the Displaced Population - Khartoum
2-1- Restructuring the Urban Structure and Implementing Spatial Organisation Plans Necessity has called for the restructuring of the Khartoum urban structure and the correction of the distortions of the physical environment thereof resulting from the intensive use of space by the displaced who practiced illegitimate possession of land and utilized it in an indiscriminate grotesque way to the effect that several mud-built squatter settlements, which do not conform with urban planning and development policies laid down by consultants and town planners who formulated Greater Khartoum master and structural plans and drafted the zoning regulations. .The plans of the physical growth of the capital are concerned with the best utilization of space, the balance of the population density and continuity of the prevailing direction of growth where the extension of urban development is along the banks of the Nile. Accordingly it was necessary to perform some surgical operations to reshape the urban structure, to graft the dilapidated and rickety urban fabric and to ameliorate the built environment so as to incorporate the sporadic physical blocks and to create new directions for urban growth and improve the city management by consolidating decentralisation and releasing the siege on construction. This would be an effective attempt to accommodate the amazing population increase and to reduce the pressure on the use of open public spaces in old urban centres, and old planned or regular urban residential sub-divisions. Accommodating the surplus population requires planning of new residential extensions, widening the base of the housing plan, the distribution of land to prevent illegal land speculation, to treat the phenomenon of squatting and squatter settlements, and to correct the illegal housing status of the city population. The surgical operations included the following: - 1. The treatment of squatter and unauthorized settlements and their integration into the urban fabric either through relocation, planning or incorporation as per drawing (6), which regularised more than 150 settlements including agglomerations of the displaced. Some of
these were demolished because they were built in areas unsuitable for settlement, while some were re-planned and others incorporated. Four camps were established for the IDPs, namely (Al Salam, El Beshir, Jebel Aulia and Mayo) to accommodate those whose squatter settlements were demolished in addition to new influxes of IDPs. All settlements treated were integrated into the urban knitting. To avoid any harm that affects the displaced and the settlers of the squatter settlements, the minimum area of a regularized plot was confined to 215-250 square metres in order to settle millions of the displaced and the occupants of the squatter settlements. The Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities have erected water stations, built schools, police stations, a number of health centres and introduced electric power in some blocks, thus the conditions of the greater bulk of the displaced and the inhabitants of the squatter settlements became stabilized, though services are still falling short of being adequate, please refer to drawing (7). 2. Organisation of villages as indicated in drawing (8) shows how the suburban villages were incorporated in the physical block of the Greater Khartoum area after planning the villages and improving their environmental conditions and linking them with the main transportation lines and other infrastructure networks. The squatter settlers and the arriving displaced who managed to live in old residential parts of the villages were all accommodated and absorbed and the surplus of the squatter settlers were relocated and resettled at Dar El Salam, while the excess numbers of the displaced were transferred to the camps of the displaced. It is known that those villages have some municipal services and public utilities and the endeavour is to link these villages and others in the pipeline with the lines of public transport, and to legalise the status of the villagers by registering their plots in the land registers to possess proper titles, improve the environmental quality through the opening of streets and the provision of open public places. This has been done to most of the villages within Khartoum Metropolis 3. The dilution of the concentration of population congestion and overcrowding, as a prime role to improve the environment, through the elimination of the squatter settlements, which were over spilled by dense human population. This included the foundation of new towns and the creation of new extensions to accommodate the relocated and transferred numbers. The extensions assimilated active and effective urban communities and a real addition to the physical block. They were a focus of human relegation. They also represented social and political challenges and injustice. Table No (10) exhibits the number of families, which benefited from squatter treatments and village reorganisation, covered 380000 families, 150000 of which settled at villages after planning and their integration into the urban block was completed
4. Urban renewal and renovation in urban centres and old residential neighborhoods to ameliorate their environment and to facilitate the provision of services and public utilities and to ease traffic flows. That had covered 16 residential neighborhoods in the National Capital. 5. The relocation of urban functions in the city centres to achieve compatibility such as the relocation of stables of horses, limestone factories, slaughter houses, Suk el Arabi, the zoological garden, and reallocation of refuse disposal sites and other inappropriate sites used for refuse and solid wastes dumping, etc. 6. The application of the decentralisation system by establishing urban centres and the redistribution of markets to make them closer to residential areas of dense population in order to alleviate the pressure of traffic and to ease people mobility. To consolidate local rule, new central markets have been built and administrative districts have been established (please refer to drawing (9)). 7. The extension of the public utilities, networks of roads and engineering infrastructures to serve the vast urban expansions through the re-planning of these utilities and networks and delineation of new lines and the addition of new physical services to satisfy the aspirations of the population explosion, particularly the completion of the Ingaz Bridge (the Salvation Bridge), which links Khartoum with Omdurman. This will serve the dense population concentrations of the displaced settling in Greater Omdurman as well as Umbadda. Passages were opened for electricity towers bearing high tension transmission lines in order to link the national grid with the new townships and residential extensions. To protect the urban sprawling the earthen embankments, were shifted and impregnated on the new limits of the prostrating urban extensions. 8. Lifting the blockade on urban development to keep pace with the burgeoning demographic explosion. As urban development and housing schemes were restricted, beleaguered and froze, it was necessary to apply prompt solutions to return things to normal and prevent citizens from acting on individual basis, which led to the rolling of squatter and unauthorized settlements in addition an ambitious housing plan has been implemented, More than 120000 families have benefited from the designated housing plans. That phase was followed by consideration of applications for industrial investment, cultural, religious and commercial services to provide employment opportunities. Thousands of plots were allocated to the investors, some are of strategic value. The urban expansion included the provision of vast stretches of land for more than 10 new universities. In order to control the growth of physical development and better the urban management, base maps were prepared and produced by the use of computers. Projections and plan layouts and sketch drawings were made available, which were followed by the completion of planning of unplanned sites as well
as the planning of empty spaces between sub-divisions, which were used for the dumping of garbage and a target for illegal encroachers upon the land. As a result the extension of services and public utilities was made easier. The processes of urban and physical planning also proved to be the effective instruments in development control and in environmental protection and amelioration. The expansion in urban development through application of sound physical plans and which is accompanied by corrections in land registers, the encouragement of investment, the treatment of residential settlements, the allocation of new residential plots, the foundation of new towns, has engendered a sound construction movement in Khartoum State, scarcely any sight is without a construction activity because popular construction was propagated. The upgrading of the squatter and displaced settlements has also produced a development revolution, which increased the housing stock, where many marginal families have settled down. Towns have cropped up, new residential sub-divisions have been rebuilt, and straddling modern settlements have come into existence. The developmental revolution in roads sector has pushed the popular construction movement. More than 500 kilometres of road have been constructed. The length of these roads exceeds the combined lengths of roads built since pre-independence times. Latitudinal roads to link distant residential areas have been constructed and absorbed the unauthorised terrific expansion, which preceded the developmental plan in the past. Popular and official development is not only confined to residential development and roads but it has also extended to promote and improve the piped drinking water systems because it is a principal target for environmental protection, and the prevention of environmental deterioration. Emergency and rush programmes have been implemented to provide a huger stride in drinking water supplies, accompanied by a rehabilitation programme to assuage the difficulties which people face. The production of fresh surface water increased from. 145000 cubic metres a day to 325000 cubic metres a day, with an increase of %125. Ground water production rose from 220000 cubic metres to 460000 cubic metres a day. The volume of production of water increased from 360000 cubic metres a day to 800000 cubic meters a day at the maximum i.e. with an average increase per day equivalent to 120%. This period has witnessed an increase of storing capacities exceeding 100% than it was before, whereas the length of the piped water mains has increased in length of 1200 kilometers. The area covered by the piped networks has expanded and the old water mains have been maintained or replaced for rather than improving bottlenecks for a little number of houses. However, the water network conveyance capacity has more than doubled. Contrary to old practices rainwater drainage lines have been extended to protect the majority of the urban extensions and new towns, where drainage channels of some thousand kilometers have been dug to drain rainwater to the natural watercourses leading to the Nile. This has been
followed by the construction of hundred of culverts and bridges to ensure that the rainwater drainage channels are open throughout the year. Earthen embankments have been built to protect the settlements from the annual Nile floods. These earthen embankments are annually impregnated to compensate the seasonal licking of the waves, which weakens them. The flat topography of the state, coupled with the extensive physical block, dictates the implementation of high cost protective works, against torrential rains and the floods of the Nile.
2-2- The State Policy of Absorption of the Displaced Population When Khartoum was first lashed with the incessant waves of the displaced, the government of the state was neither able to cope with their influxes nor prepared to give them friendly reception for lack of resources, experience and trained manpower who performed the task of humanitarian relief work. They were left to spread over the limits of the state and settle wherever they chose. They have selected many locations, such as where people gather, near the urban centres, market places, or along the main roads, inside the industrial areas and around the empty pockets of land inside the city sub-divisions, etc. Because of the unsuitability of the sites (pockets) in which the displaced perched at the beginning in their flight from the devouring flames of the civil war and man-made disasters, they were the first toll of their selected environment. The pockets were places left for the accumulation of water and subsequent drainage, dumping of garbage and similar refuses, sullage from the factories and industries, etc. The result is that each site became a home of contagious diseases, coupled with the harsh and tragic economic and social conditions the displaced passed through. The sites they settled in; were entirely unsuitable for neither human settlement nor do they conform to human dignity. They lacked the first rudiment of life i.e. no water, no hygienic facilities, no public places, they were under congestions and overcrowding in arbour and, shelters made of tin sheets, jute, plastic, and twigs of trees. The main occupants were the buzzing flies, the nasty smells, crimes, fright and terrors rampant everywhere. These were the dominant factors which overwhelmed the life, if any, of those living dying people, clad in torments, bitterness, desolate marooned life, through no direct faults of their making. Thus they were the victims of their selected habitats. Based on the above, it was imperative to resettle the displaced in environmentally safe settlements. This necessitated relocation of sites amounting to fifty or more, to news sites, and in safe camps, with available basic services ranging from drinking water to, health, education, and area spacious enough to reduce the intensity of the congestion, and ease aeration in dwelling units. Those displaced who mixed with people in settled villages, squatter settlemnts and parts of the town, were left to face urban planning which befell the communities they had mixed with. These represent almost 90%. The 10% left over and who lived in tragic conditions were relocated to four main camps to accommodate them. These are: -
1. Jebel Aulllia 2. El Salam 3. El Beshir 4. Mayo El Mararieh These camps are, in addition, receive and accommodate the new arrivals of the displaced. The displaced adopted themselves with their new environment and after some time built their rooms from local material, similar to popular buildings of the people of Khartoum state. At last lured the INGOs and UN agencies to proceed releasing their aid and humanitarian relief to the extent that these camps have become better furnished with services and public utilities than most of that enjoyed by many villages, residential areas and towns within Khartoum State. The services in the camps are provided free of charge to the displaced communities. They covered security, education, health, water, nutrition and income generating projects. The inclusion of these camps in Khartoum state structural map, reorganisation and planning to enhance their environment and to ease the legalisation of the plot possession by the displaced in order that they become the proprietors of their residential plots. This is because urban planning in Khartoum State acknowledges the dynamic nature of settlements and therefore has room for accommodating changes and future expansions. While using conventional land-use zoning to regulate and control development, Sudanese planners designate subdivisions in urban areas in accordance with the economic capabilities of the population. They recognise four different classes. Thus class three and four are characterised by traditional conventional and substandard building materials while class two residents use permanent and modern materials. Class one is meant for the highest level of development thus allotted the largest plot size. This system of classification permits urban migrants and displaced access to urban localities in such a way that it allowes them to make the transition from rural to urban life-styles. Other than laying the plots and allocating them the government does little for housing i.e. provides the site and later install the services needed if substantial contribution is made by the residents. This means that residential development and the provision of services must take place at levels which are affordable to residents. Thus implementing housing scheme on the basis of (SSS) is meant to benefit all applicants. Similar schemes targeted relocated squatters and displaced surplus population who move from their original locality after the planning and upgrading processes. They are given a permanent plot in designated squatter relocation sites. Newly displaced people are relocated to temporary camps that are provided with the necessary services.
Absorption and state shelter policies call for: 1. Treatment of irregular squatter and unauthorised settlements and correction of the status of all squatters and villagers with regard to land. 2. Criteria for treatment should treat all squatter people in a justified manner. 3. Adoption of three different approaches for the treatment process.
¨ Replanning: It is applied in areas which are more liable to improvement than relocation because their inhabitants constitute a permanent population to the city with strong attachment to the land they occupy.
¨ Relocation: Recent settlements and settlements on sites unsuitable for residential use are liable rather to relocation in new absorption sites, because they are not strongly attached to the land and their level of mobility is still high so it is easier to relocate them to new areas. The relocation policy is also extended to cases where squatter areas are serious impediment to the extension of urban functions or if they are environmentally hazardous.
¨ Incorporation: There are cases where the history of establishment of an existing settlements or a village goes back several decades and its inhabitants lead a normal way of life. In addition the spatial organisation of the settlements is acceptable and it is provided with the basic social services. 4. In case of replanning of villages and old sub-divisions, the operation should be carried out with minimal costs, i.e.
¨ Road width should be the minimum possible.
¨ Demolition of expansive buildings should be avoided.
¨ Preservation of public utility buildings and networks wherever possible
¨ Natural drainage line should be opened and any blockage should be removed. 5. Allocation of plots should be given to squatters and displaced persons who meet the following requirements:
¨ Should be a Sudanese.
¨ Should support a family.
¨ Should be resident in the settlements before 1992.
¨ Should earn his living.
¨ Has no residence elsewhere in Khartoum State. A squatter who is unable to provide documents or witnesses will be relocated and given a plot in one of the squatter relocation sites (Dar-Al-Salam) or in the camps of the displaced.
Class of Maximum Minimum Minimum Standard of Building Width of Residential Built-up Plot Size Materials Roads Plot Area
Permanent (red bricks, stone, 10 – 40 1st Class 500 m2 2/3 of plot cement, mortar) m
Red brick, cement, mortar 10 – 40 2nd Class 400 m2 “Gishra” (outer face permanent 2/3 of plot m materials, inner face mud bricks)
“Gishra”, “Galoose” (mud), mud 10 – 40 3rd Class 300 m2 2/3 of plot bricks m
4th Class 216 m2 “Galoose” (wood, carton, grass) 20 m
Classification of Residential Plots
3- The Prevailing Conditions of the Settlements of the Displaced and Their Social Status - Khartoum
3-1- Physical conditions: It is possible to acquaint oneself with the conditions of the camps of the displaced and the squatter settlements which embraced the displaced to observe the results of the relief and assistance extended, services provided, public utilities erected which enabled the displaced to bypass their harsh and tragic conditions. They could hardly survive on their first arrival in Khartoum. The present conditions at the mentioned settlements and in particular the camps are quite reassuring according to local standards. Although the camps lack some essential services but they are better served than many peripheral residential quarters in Khartoum, they are by far better than the new extensions. This is indicated by the availability of public utility services and the benefits of implementation of spatial organization plans. Table No.12 surveys the services and public utilities established in the four camps, which covers safe drinking water, education, health and security services, besides places for worshipping. There are other services with which the camps have been furnished but unmentioned on the table i.e. pit latrines and markets. Water Systems Water services are apparently available and satisfactory, taking into consideration the economic and social conditions of the displaced occupants of the camps and the standard need of an
individual for water per day as estimated by the W.H.O. and which varies between 15-20 litres a day. Taking el Salam Camp as an example, it is observed that the possible amount of water that can be produced by 7 wells is equivalent to 3,500,000 litres per day, but the current water production from the 7 wells is only 1700,000 litres a day because of the limitation of use by the displaced, though the water is reasonably accessible. The water is conveyed in extending pipes ending at dead ends as shown on diagram 11 . Wad el Beshir Camp receives water in the same method through water pipes ending at the centre of a cluster of houses. However, most of the upgraded squatter settlements do not have piped domestic water supply installed yet because of the high cost of the water pipes. If a comparison is made with Carton Kassala squatter settlement, which is inhabited by 80000 people, we find that there are only 4 wells intended to serve this population. The second favourable contrast for the family is the availability of water free of charge at the camps in return of the cost of carrying water home from considerable distances as the squatter settlement sprawls like the case of Carton Kassala .Nevertheless the provision of water at the upgraded squatter settlements of which Carton Kassala is an example could be considered reasonable compared to other deprived areas of Greater Khartoum
Schools Educational services in the settlements of the displaced of Khartoum depend on the efforts of the churches, particularly the Catholic Church and the voluntary service organizations and relevant NGOs. The rate of pupils outside the educational process is equivalent to 55%. Save the Children (UK) where was one of the NGOs and they spent more than $800000 American dollars to build more than 20 schools. The national voluntary organizations, despite the economic restraints have done quite well in building schools and furnishing them. The Sudan Council of Churches, spent about a hundred thousand dollars to furnish more than 200 schools, The Islamic Dawa furnished 17 schools. The Catholic Churches run 87 schools which provide services for some 44312 pupils the majority of whom are children of the displaced at the camps and in squatter settlements. Other church schools, which number 49 schools accommodating more than 24000 pupils. Owing to the expansion of the church schools, Khartoum State hoped to compete but it could not build more than a few number of schools at each of the displaced population localities. Local NGOs also contributed by building a sizable number of schools distributed among the settlements of the displaced. Schools at the upgraded squatter settlements are built and run through local people aid, and such being the case they impose nominal fees to pay for the teachers who are themselves quite destitute. Children are unable to pay even the nominal fees. As reported by the Operation
Lifeline, pupils at such schools sit on the bare ground and miss relevant services such as water and latrines. There were no schools at Carton Kassala Squatter settlement in the first years of its being. Education was both ignored by the government and the voluntary organisations, until Khartoum dioceses built two basic schools, namely diocese (a) and diocese (b). They were for both genders, besides the old Carton Kassala School. The Kuwaiti Africa Muslim Committee built four schools for basic education in 1987 The diocese then built an other School, The Kuwaiti African Muslim Committee then built El Safa shared Secondary School. The school operates in two shifts, a morning and an evening shift. The morning shift is reserved for girls, while boys study in the afternoon. During 1999, and with financial assistance from the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), Dawa Islamic Organisation and the Higher Council for Dawa ten more schools were built. Education continued at all these schools besides the private church schools. It is observed that the number of the schools increased during the previous year after a continuous suffering by the pupils and their relatives throughout a number of years. Lack of activity by the voluntary organisations to provide food to motivate the school children is clearly observed. Looking at the financial assistance given to schooling, it is gathered that the foreign organisations have a limited role in education and they may have no role in schooling of the displaced children resident at the squatter and unauthorized settlements. The cost of the educational services is relatively high for all displaced families, besides the displaced are unable due to their very low incomes to motivate the teachers, whose incomes are also very low, and irregularly received. A child going to school, means the loss of a bread winner for his family that is why children of the displaced must be enticed through a school meal to attend school and to ensure continuity of their regular attendance As far as school seats are concerned, a pupil at the camps of the displaced stands a better chance than his opposite number at the upgrade squatter settlements. There are thirty schools to serve the children of 196000 displaced persons at the camps whereas there is only one school to serve the children of more than 20000 displaced families at Souba el Aradi squatter settlement. However, pupils walk on foot to nearby localities though, the schools are scarce, they have very little furniture and their environment is scarcely pleasing, let alone to be attractive. They receive meagre financial aids from somewhere and children are unable to pay for the school uniforms imposed by some schools. This explains why a sizeable number of children do not find their way to schooling. It is of note to emphasise that in the last two years a great effort was exerted to improve the education services in the camps as well as in the less serviced upgraded settlements. Ten
schools were built in camps where five of them were added in Al-Salam to serve the concentrations of the displaced children. These are in addition to the number of the schools listed in table (12). Carton Kassala also benefited from this drive to a great deal and the number of schools in the settlements is increasing at a reasonable rate.
Health institutions
Health services met the approval of the Operation Lifeline and of other voluntary organisations and the relevant NGOs, both national and foreign, to the extent that no displaced, at a camp, have ever complained of the lack of such a service. The services at the camps are provided free of charge. The displaced are satisfied at the level of the health services they receive but others at squatter settlements bitterly complain of their lack and the lack of adequate health service offering institutions to serve them in emergency situations. The people mostly reverse to the use of the traditional medicinal herbs. The intensity of the health sufferings increase during the wet season because of the accumulation of rainwater in puddles and swamps and because of insufficient latrines Garbage collection service does not reach these places because the occupants are unable to pay the cost of garbage collection. The camps are infested with nutrition services and the provision of food for the vulnerable groups, where none of these services is provided at the upgraded squatter settlements. If a comparison is made on the number of the health service institutions at the camps and those available at the squatter settlements, we would observe that a squatter settlement such as El Shigllah in Omdurman has not even a single health centre, a clinic or an outpatient facility, whereas on the other hand there are 46 health institutions at the camps of the displaced, which provide medical care for 200000 displaced persons, and cater for environmental health. There are only 6 health centres at Carton Kassala squatter settlement. One can imagine the congestion when only 6 health centres serve 80000 displaced persons. It is imperative upon us to mention that the urban conditions of the camps and the squatter settlements have improved a great deal through urban planning, Above all we reiterate our appreciation and applaud of the humanitarian health relief and the immense assistance extended by the international community. Only very little assistance is required for more improvement to the existing conditions. The health institutions at the camps required further support, and the construction and equipment of the same at the upgraded squatter settlements. Health education is also essential for the upgrading of environmental health and public hygiene. Indirectly propagated through the extensive sanitary programme aimed at construction of VIP latrines in all of the camps dwelling units. Now more than 80% of these dwellings have sanitary facilities. Also the number of feeding and environmental protection centres was greatly increased.
The incidence of disease taking Carton Kassala as an example There are two old health centres providing services for the Al Baraka (Carton Kassala) people since 1987. The first centre was built by the International Council of Churches on the eastern side of the township or the sub-division. The second health centre was established in 1991 and is affiliated to the Islamic Dawa. Each of the two centres receives some 60-70 patients a day. Mowafaq Islamic Organisation built a further centre on the east side of El Baraka in 1993, which still functions. Tuberculosis, malaria, and diarrhoea are common diseases among the inhabitants at El Baraka. The diseases follow regarding morbidity are night blindness, especially among children for lack of vitamin (a) and malnutrition diseases. The health centres suffer from shortage of medical cadre and drugs and motor transport. A special unit for the treatment of tuberculosis was established in 1991 under the supervision of a medical auxiliary who had been able to treat 396 cases by the end of 1994. There are now some 74 tuberculosis disease cases whose treatment is in the pipeline. The work of the health centres ends in the afternoon. And the nearest government hospital is some five kilometres away, where patients could be directed when the health centres are closed. In conclusion we can say that the diseases caused by malnutrition and poverty are the most widespread in displaced settlements and it is worth mentioning that the national organizations are the principal helpers for displaced people in the field of medical services. The benefits of spatial organisation and urban upgrading are reflected in the improvement of the physical environment such as that of Al-Baraka Township (Carton Kassala), which are exemplified in the following: 1. Garbage collection facilities are now introduced to serve the residential blocks and the markets because roads are opened thus making easy access for garbage collection vehicles after physical planning. 2. The exceution of the drainage lines or channels to drain stormwater out of the locality and reduce the breeding of the mosquitoes. 3. Availability of open spaces after physical planning which gives way for natural aeration, sport and recreation as well as creating some moments as Leisure times. 4. Use of hygienic latrines in houses, because the ample space. 5. Encouragment trees plantation. 6. Dilution of population concentrations. 7. Facilitating the movemnet of people and vehicles.
Security conditions before and after physical planning: - Security is a most important element for human life and a backbone of stability for individuals and community. Since El Baraka (previously Carton Kassala) was a mass of shanties and, inhabited by heterogeneous groups of people, differing in traditions and habits and coming from far apart areas in the country, a combination of all these factors had contributed a great deal to the spread of crime in an extremely disturbing maner. There was a murder almost each week and particularly on Thursday nights and Friday mornings. Large groups of criminals filter into the area and drink themselves to unconsciousness and bicker over trifles. As is known liquor is the root of grievous sins and leads to the commitment of serious crimes. A misunderstanding begins with words of the mouth, develops into lashing of hands and finally clubbing or chopping with knives resulting in serious harm or killing. Dealing in stolen goods, drugs and narcotics, elopement of women with men resulting in tracing up by relatives, especially among Southern Sudanese lead to these serious clashes. The intermingling shanties, the narrow lanes, the darkness at night would encourage roaming thieves to rob the innocent and grasp property through the use of sheer force. Marauders keep waiting by the side of roads leading to the squatter settlement, beat their prey to unconsciousness and run away with money or whatever valuables they lay their hands on. Occasional tribal feuds flare up, if not controlled by the chiefs, sheikhs, and sultans from warring tribes, who managed with unusual skill and tact to burry the hatchet and parried the bloodshed, which seethed underneath. At the inception of the physical planning operation in 1992, the opening of roads, the formation of the popular police with representation in the residential blocks security measures were intensified. Every family had its own place and new arrivals were detected. Implementation of physical plans resulted in the presence of police all day and night, facilitated easy movement and quick arrest of culprits. Wide open streets help horse mounted police men to chase thieves at night and arrest them. Hence urban planning and spatial organisation had far reaching effects in reducing the bulk of crime. It is a positive achievement, which increased the amenities of life, foremost of which is peace in self and property.
Secondary effects of physical planning Physical planning operations have produced some effects, particularly the modification of the extended families in order to provide each family with its own residential plot. The number of plots produced by planning had been insufficient to satisfy the residential needs of the displaced families, the majority of which are young people, the hinges on which life turns and the potential energy which fuels the community for the latent power which lurks in them. They could be utilized for the promotion of the society. Some of the youth have become part of the
school fallout, or engaged themselves in marginal jobs, others married simultaneously as physical planning was taking place and formed a family. Although physical planning provided housing solutions for the old families, it did not produce solutions for the difficulties encountered by the youth. It did not provide projects to assimilate the energies of youth. One of the physical planning secondary effects is the opening of streets and the provision of public areas, which affect some people properties./ some planning operations require the complete demolition of people houses. It is a painful course of action particular for the poor people, let alone the displaced, who are groaned under financial constraints compared with their meagre income. Resettlement plans are exhaustive for the displaced who take longer to adapt to the new environment, particularly those who have school children, and those distanced from their places of work. They need all sorts of cash and in kind assistance to overcome their transitional difficulties. If the displaced are assisted in rebuilding their houses in the new areas to which they have been relocated, the effects of physical planning would be 100% wholesome process. The phenomenon of family disintegration has not been observed during and after urban planning as it is the case in the camps of the displaced, where children are turned loose, and the number of women who support their families is on the increase. There has neither been tribal conflicts nor individual disputes except on a very limited scale and commonplace. In fact the popular committees and the native leaders who participated in the physical planning process were quite homogeneous to the extent that friendships sprouted among them and continued ever since.
3-2- Socio-economic Status of the Displaced in the Camps The public services and utilities undertaken at the camps of the displaced have undoubtedly produced a revolutionary change in ameliorating the social and economic conditions because these services have provided the basic needs of the displaced which shed off the cost of water bills, the high education cost and the high cost of medical services. They have discovered that they are in a better position than many of Khartoum inhabitants who find themselves compelled to establish, through self aid, some services such as the building of schools, health centres, water pumping stations, the building of mosques and worship facilities and the collection of garbage, besides payment of housing taxes in return for the locality services. The provision of the basic services free of charge to the displaced have reduced the cost of the daily family bill. A considerable number of the vulnerable groups receive economic and social assistance, which improved the social conditions of their respective families. The following are some of the assistance hinted above: -
1. A considerable number of the vulnerable group families are offered direct cash by Zakah Chamber and various social affairs institutions varying from cash, in kind and income generating projects plus some, benevolent loans for women who Support families 2. Some of the vulnerable groups are offered food aid by the Operation Lifeline Sudan, some voluntary organizations and relevant NGOs and Food for Work Programme. 3. Some families receive some equipment for production, through what is termed the productive families programme. 4. Some families are offered arable land with irrigation systems and ploughing machinery. 5. Some actvities conducted by Mowafaq Charitable Organisation to promote some social activities of the displaced besides the social activities undertaken by the Peace and Unity Council and a number of localities concerned about the affairs of the displaced. 6. Extracted from a number of reports and studies and in particular those conducted, jointly with the Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Commission in the State of Khartoum and Save the Children –Denmark in the year 1999 – 2000 successively, it is possible to acquaint oneself with the status of the displaced, who preferred the camps for their residence:1- 22.1% of family heads are aged between 15 – 30 years 59.5% are aged between 31 – 45 15.3% are aged between 46 - 60 2.6% exceeds the age of 60 years. 2- 50% of the inhabitants of the camps arrived in Khartoum between1980-1990 48.9% of the inhabitants of the camps arrived in Khartoum between 1991-2000 1.1% whose date of arrival (I would not remember). 3- 38.4% settled at the camps since their arrival. 61.6% settled in other places on first arrival 4- The largest camp dwelling tribe is the Dinka tribe with a percentage of 33.7% and they relate to Bahr El Ghazal State. The Nuba tribes from southern Kordofan State represent 24.7%. The Shiluk, from Upper Nile State, represents 10%. En Nuer from Unity State represents 4.7% while the Fur tribe represents 3,7%.and they are from Darfur State. Other tribes from Equatoria such as the Barri Juba, Amadi, Zande, El Morro, Figilo, Abokaya, The Kuku and the Baka, besides some northern and western Sudanese tribes
such as Zagawa, Riziquat, Habaniyah, El Maslamyah and the Jaalis represent only very scanty percentages. 5- 37.9% families have family members varying from 1 – 5 53.2% have family member number varying from 6-10 6.8% have family member number varying from 11 – 15 2.1% have family members of more than16 6- 28.4% of the family children are less than 5 years of age. 2.5% are pregnant 7.1% are elders. 10.6% are breastfeeding mothers. 5% are the handicapped, which are the vulnerable groups of the study Thus the total percentage of the vulnerable (targeted) amounts to 53.6%. 47.4% are the groups, which are able to work. 7- 46.2% of the males are illiterate 77.9% of the females are illiterate. The rate in urban centres according to the 1990 manpower survey for the whole Sudan is 35% for the males and 46% for the females, adult and khalwa (quoranicteaching) for males is 8.4%, while 4.2% for females. Basic education for males is 26.9% and 15.8% for females. 12.6% secondary school education among males, and 1.6% among females. The study did not find family heads with university or higher education at the four camps. 8-
26% of a population specimen of 1140 individuals, graduates represent 1.52-% among families. 9- 8.4% males and 4.2% females are engaged in trading, 17% males and 3.2% females are workers, 24% males and 2.1% females are vocational workers, 18.4% males and 12.1% females are engaged in marginal jobs. 47.9% are female domestic workers (work as house servants). 29% males and 30% females are female unemployed. Accordingly the rate of employment is 30% whereas the average unemployment in the whole Sudan is equivalent to 16% on the strength of the manpower and migration survey 1990 conducted by the International Labour Organisation.
10- 93.9% of the family monthly income is less than SD10000 and that 5% of the family month income varies between SD10000 to SD20000 and that 1.1% of the family monthly income varies from SD20000 - SD30000. 11- 38.9% of the families take only one meal a day and that 55.3% of the families take two meals a day and 5.9% of the families receive three meals a day, hence the food gap represents 38.9% whereas there is a considerable proportion of the Sudanese families who receive only one meal a day but their number may be less than the rate prevailing at the camps of the displaced 12- 21% of the families receive food aid from the foreign and national organisations. 79% of the families receive no food aid from any organisation. 13- 62.5% of the food aid received from the organisations allocated for children, 15% for breast-feeding mothers, 17.5% for the pregnant and 5% for the elders. 14- 22.1% of the housewives brew wine as a source of income and that 62.3 of these women have a daily income of less than SD1000 and 26.7% of them enjoy a daily income of more than SD1000. The average daily income is SD1000 per day for a family. 15- 69.47% of the population of the displaced suffer from commonplace diseases such as colds and childhood diseases. 20% suffer from epidemic diseases such as cholera and calazar. 5.26% suffer from congenital diseases such as high blood pressure and diabetics. 5.26% did not define their diseases and while 8.33% do not suffer from any diseases. 16- The most crucial problems encountered by the families is food as a top Priority; medical treatment is a second priority and education as a third priority, employment is a fourth priority, public order a fifth worry, water is the sixth and final priority and consequently there is no water problem at the camps. 17- 66-70% of the heads of the families are males. 30% – 34% family heads are women.
It is observed from the figurative results thus obtained that the income of a displaced family is better than a resident family in the majority of cases and is better than an average public servant. The longer a displaced family lives in Khartoum the better become the family income. This is because the family becomes more acquainted with employment opportunities and gets access to work and therefore improves her status income wise. The number of meals taken by a displaced family per day is similar to the number of meals taken by a medium income resident family, except that a displaced family is subject to more onerous efforts to acquire the same income as a resident family. However, women represents 30% of the heads of the displaced families and that the employment of both parents and children has alienated the family members and contributed to children going astray. Domestic work compels a housewife to stay away from home, sometimes for a number of days from her husband. This applies to a displaced family from the South where southern culture allows women to work away from home. Southern women who make wine are subject to campaigns by the public order, which prohibits the brewing and selling of wine. For this reason some women find their way to prison with the consequent homelessness of their children. But the displaced families from the West, do not favour the employment of women, since men are the breadwinners socially, culturally and from a religious point of view. Since families coming from the regions and other states are coming from rural areas, it is observed that some social change has taken place despite the relatively short contact period with Khartoum community, a community of ethnic different composition particularly on the fringes, rotating between urban and rural culture. Hence the displaced families have found themselves in a transitional phase of social change from the country to the urban centres where the city has no diversified economic activities as practised in the South. City life is tinged with a material attitude where money controls the disposition of people. The village culture, tradition and customs and values characterised with solidarity and cooperation gradually withers and melts into the city culture. Children are the most affected with the social change. Men take longer to keep pace with that change, whereas the physiological role of women of delivery and multiplication continues unaffected by the new city norm of life. Scouring for food on the side of the husband, wife and children in the same family may leave the younger children under the care of relatives or neighbours. The difficulty in obtaining food compels children to go out looking for food. In so doing they become more independent at an early age while still on their childhood and thence find their way to homelessness and insurgence. The necessities of life in a city, the need to acclimatize, and the difficulty to earn a living brought further pressure on the displaced families, particularly pressure brought to bear on men who are liable to become drunkards to forget their cares. They became aggressive against their
wives and unruly to the tribal leaders, the sultans and would reverse to bickering with others, where the police interferes to keep order and leads away the drunkards. Children lose respect to their parents as a result of the family quarrels. Young girls aged between 10 to 20 years become young mothers, they become divorcees, their lives are further complicated and they become breadwinners for their children. The informal relations between young girls and boys produce serious social difficulties exotic to the village society with its unique morals and regulations. It is worth mentioning that some communities of the displaced in their native land, would organise rallies for ceremonial drinking of wine with certain rituals, where the elders and magnates of the tribe are respected. There is no recreation or solace left except through reversing to village practice and customs such as marriage ceremonies and traditions, dance and merriments, which continued unchanged at the camps. The disintegration of the displaced families is distinct. The growing number of divorces for economic and social reasons is alarming. There are yet further reasons connected with this social aspect. The harsh exodus on the way to urban centres, and particularly Khartoum has scattered some members of the family, such as the loss of a father during the journey through weakness or incurable diseases, or his loss to the rebels through recruitment as a fighter or carrier of ammunition and other provisions, his loss to the government army, or during the bombing, or through captivity, or that the family might have lost the father through his escape to discharge his paternal obligations. The disintegration might be caused by the mother elopement with another husband. The crucial and nightmarish social phenomena, which raked the minds of the voluntary organisations and infiltrated the social institutions of the federal government and the government of the State of Khartoum is the problem of the stray children. This phenomena has become pivotal to all those concerned with the humanitarian aid because it is coupled with displacement and the disintegration of the displaced families. The astray children are those slouching about in streets in permanence and those who return home late at night after a day of begging. There are also semi homeless children because they work on the streets and begging after the school day for long hours in the night. The following are examples of the stray children: -
¨ Child labour to support himself or his close relatives
¨ Loss of both parents or alienation of mother such as a result of imprisonment
¨ Harshness of families on their children
¨ Molestation of young girls and their debouch to streets
¨ Elopement of mother with a second husband leaving behind the young ones.
An astray child starts living on the food trays of others, or searching for food in the garbage. Then moves to learn theft or practises marginal jobs, or sells illegal drugs or be absorbed in immoral behaviours. To protect themselves; the astray children create a protective fund where they pay their subscriptions regularly and systematically. They engage themselves in illegal work and are subject to police campgains, when arrested they are taken to juvenile delinquencies. They may receive difficult treatment at the hands of the police when they struggle for freedom. They may assume that the police are taking them to fight in the civil war. Since it is a social stigma, indicating negligence on the side of the community, it is observed that the number of those concerned with the problems of the homeless children is growing. These are the foreign and national organizations and institutions of the federal and state governments. The ultimate goal is to rehabilitate these children, make them productive elements and to protect them from returning to the street life and the risks therein both for the children and community.
4- Experinces and Challenges of Resetllement of IDPs
4-1- The Challenges of Dealing with Unplanned Urban Growth: In the magnitude of the unplanned physical growth of the city was obviously beyond the limited financial and technical abilities of the concerned government bodies. Nobody was capable to deal with the problems and its negative socio-economic ramifications. Nevertheless, there had been numerous attempts in the past. 1. In June 1982, Ministerial decision No. 82/4 established a number of field committees composed of specialized administrative cadres. Their mission was the removal of unauthorized settlements. The attempt was not successful. 2. In 1983, the National Capital Act was passed and using the Building Regulation 1961, amended 1973, a programme was approved for removing all unauthorized settlements within a 25 kilometer radius area. In addition the land so cleared was soon invaded as the planned development failed to materialize quickly. 3. In October 1985, the Council of Ministers Decision No. 72 created an executive body to handle the problem of squatters, which called for the immediate demolition of unoccupied and incomplete buildings at some 20 sites. Again neither this nor the attempt to halt squatters expansion was successful. 4. In July 1987, the Council of Ministers established another committee for resolving the issue of squatter settlements. The committee also decided to take on board a group from the Military Police, and another from the Central Police Reserve. It equipped itself also with six
transport vehicles for the removing of squatters. On the other hand, it also established the right of migrants of ten years of occupancy or more to settle in Khartoum provided that they had integrated themselves into the city by virtue of having employment etc.. However, most of the decisions taken by the committee were not implemented and as a result the committee remained largely ineffectual in dealing with squatting issue. 5. The last of the Council of Ministers decisions were those under serial number 941 issued on 20th May 1990 to treat the squatter, displaced and unauthorized settlements. A number of decisions were taken. Those related to relocation included: a) relocating all settlements established on area allocated for the housing and agricultural schemes; b) cleaning land allocated for other uses and c) no land rights for 1990 squatters and afterwards. This was the first time that the Council of Ministers showed seriousness in dealing with unauthorized settlements. And because the government at the time was a government of action it faced the challenge. More encouraging was the fact that the Ministry of Housing demonstrated its will and determination to tackle the problems of unplanned urban expansion through a number of approaches. It discharged its total ability and thus returned people’s lost trust of government action.
4-2- Difficulties Encountered in the Squatter Treatment Process: a) Limited Resources: Disregarding its very limited resources and without a budgetary increase the Ministry of Housing launched numerous ambitious projects at the same time and it was apparent that in executing these schemes it became necessary to involve more of the technical staff. It also required continuous mobility of the staff and dispersion of the already scarce resources of the Ministry such as equipment and manpower. In case of mass transportation the Ministry in most cases resorted to the commandeering of vehicles to transport the evicted people. b) Squatters Representation: Squatter residents in settlements decide to be planned were usually very pleased when their popular committees informed them that their site would be replanned and incorporated into the adjacent physical block. They would definitely be displeased in case of relocation and they used to try to disassociate themselves from the committees, thus paving the way for rumours and for land speculators to step in and fill the gap. The land speculators then did all their best to unite the squatters against the Ministry decision. In addition the speculators mobilized all interested parties from other squatter settlements in an endeavour to stop relocation operations.
When relocation was completed and the squatters settled in their new sites they returned and associated themselves again with the old popular committees and then organized big ceremonies and declared that they were misinformed. The lack of communication between squatters and the Ministry always led at first to rejection of the Ministry’s policies without real evaluation. It was therefore very useful to make contacts with the people directly to answer all quarries and refute unfounded allegations. c) Bringing All Participates Together: A lot of preparation was done prior to any relocation and replanning operations, the least of which was to get all government agencies involved committed to the operation. If one of the participations was not present on site on the day of relocation or replanning then all efforts would be wasted despite the great amount of time and money spent. This was overcome by gathering all parties involved on site one day prior to relocation. d) Village Diversity: Unlike other Sudanese villages Khartoum villages are diverse in many aspects. They have different physical configuration, different demographic characteristics of residents, different culture and social backgrounds, different age of establishment, different aspiration of its residents, different links and ties to Khartoum Metropolitan. It was therefore inappropriate to treat all Khartoum villages in the same manner. e) Legal Disputes: Most of the land of villages is arable land privately owned or not recorded in the Land Register. Occupation of such land may be done without the permission of the land owner. In such cases a lot of transactions needed to be completed to transfer arable lands to residential use, in addition to the legal disputes. It was very difficult to resolve legal disputes without delaying the replanning organization programme. Court proceedings took very long time to go through. Some people knew this and made use of. f) Difficulties Related to Physical Integration Incorporation of villages into the urban fabric is not a simple job. A number of factors are considered: Reduction of physical damage, saving a minimum plot area of 200 m2, avoiding obstruction of natural drainage lines and availing public utility areas in appropriate locations, etc. g) International NGOs Hostile Attitude The attitude of NGOs was very aggressive at first and in certain circumustances for no apparent reasons. They spread unfounded allegations. They appear to be not aware of the peculiarity of the squatters of Khartoum, which are not like those of other developing countries.
4-3- The Challenge of the Relocation/Reallocation Process: Its the decision between relocation and reallocation is only semantic. Its final whether it is reallocation or relocation is an uprooting and replanting into a new, and almost always, alien and hostile environment. While it’s definitely more tolerable than eviction, it generates the same reaction, disregarding even if the allocated site is better. In terms of urban existence it means “back to square one” or a start from scratch. i.e conflicts can not be resolved in any other way than reallocation. Most problems arise when relocation decisions involve the disadvantaged, the poor and the underprivileged. Much resentment is precipitated if the relocation is carried out by force and in an atmosphere of government versus citizen. Reallocation/relocation is therefore a tough decision through and through. It is tough to make, to justify to explain, to implement and to carry out. It is controversial and especially unpopular for those government officials who have to carry out such action. They are pitched against the citizen from one side and their duty in implementing reform policies on the other side. They are torn between their sentiment and their duties. Experience has shown, as in the case of Ishash Fallata that patient grass roots action can produce miraculous results. Haste and highhanded approach especially if accompanied by hesitant action and indecision can produce irreversible damage and nasty unnecessary confrontation. The last thing any authority desires is the alienation of its own people. However, there is a number of points if considered could ease these courses of action: 1. The soundness of relocation/reallocation decisions from the technical point of view should clearly be established. Such decisions should be proceeded by elaborate studies. The first issue to be resolved is the support of the highest levels of government bodies. Once that is secured continuous efforts aimed at securing public approval and support should be set in motion. Most important at this stage is the dissemination of information and media monitoring. The second issue is the proper contact with the people involved. Popular communities were considered to be the best forum to float such action. 2. Since land has always been a political tool and a symbol of socio-economic advancement, popular committees may have conflicting interests at the local levels. 3. Relocation, at first generates strong discontent and destructive antis-social feeling because it is always seen as an action designed for the benefit of the affluent at the expense of the underprivileged. 4. Agitation is very easy at such moments and it serves no genuine productive purpose. 5. The key issue is therefore the title or the illusion of the entitlement. The strength of the genuine squatter lies in this persistence in holding on to the land he has acquired and the substandard structure therein. The squatters of Khartoum as anywhere else are aware of this fact and they make maximum use of it.
In this respect relocation cease to be a simple planning problem and turns into a hot political challenge. The proper course of action seems like a mixture of tough government resolve and active sympathetic compassion towards those affected.
4-4- Lesson Learned: a) Agreeing on the issue of Squatter Treatment and Land ownership: It is well understood that the phenomena of squatting and illegal acquisition of land is not due to a force of nature and not only because of the lack of a control performed by government institutions. It is one of the sign of social disorder. It is therfore understood that appropriate measures should be taken, such as distribution of land together with strict controls and painful punishments of land grabbers. This insures that people in need of shelter are served and illegal behaviours and land speculation are inhibited. Control of government land and use of force are only meaningful when access to shelter is made available to those of genuine cases. The ideal situation would be when the complexity of interrelationship between population factors and development are recognised and housing official begin to think ahead of squatter intentions. On the other side organization of traditional villages, replanning of old irregular subdivisions and reallocation of incompatible urban functions cannot be achieved without public approval and fair compensation of the affected citizens. This is because in old subdivisions and traditional villages, the citizens are recognized as owners of their plots. Villagers are not in need of correcting their status for they inherited the land they live in even if they don’t possess proper titles. This is complying with Islamic law (Shari’a) where precedence in utilization and exploitation of land is considered appropriate as private property (mulk) as per the Prophet (peace be upon him) saying: “People share three in common: water, pasture (land) and fire (energy) i.e. water, land and energy are communal properties in their natural state. In any case the right of thirst and the right of shelter is established. But when it comes to physical planning and environment protection it is the responsibility of the governing authority. The governor uses physical planning as a tool to protect the environment and to implement certain sets of fundamental rules and to protect private and public interest on the basis of the measure of fair dealings. Because the villagers own their plots through precedence in utilization it is only possible that the affected population approve the replanning/relocation processes. This can be done through tempting offers of compensation and installation of missed public utility services. b) Community Participation: Due to interference with the local politics successive governments failed to solve the problems of unauthorized settlements and to correct the status of the displaced settlers. It was therefore
very important that popular committee members and local leaders be involved in the treatment process. This helped in three aspects: 1. They had to convince the displaced that the treatment process was in their favour and that they were going to benefit from it by acquiring land rights as well as allocating spaces for the necessary services that they were lacking. 2. They had to contribute to the programme by raising money and mobilizing the community to construct the public utility buildings. 3. They had to stand up against land speculators and agitators. c) Leadership: The role of the political leader in the squatter treatment process is of vital importance. It was therefore imperative that the Minister assumed leadership in formulating the objectives, in preparing the organization plan and in mobilizing all political, government, popular and community supports. The Minister also assumed leadership in the implementation of the organization programme. He had long debates with the affected population. The Minister used to hear their remarks and exchanged views with them. He also looked into all appeals forwarded by individuals and groups of people and appropriate decisions were taken. d) Mobilization and Quick Actions: Reallocation/relocation requires a swift action maintained by great financial resources and manpower, surveyors, social scientists, planners, engineers as well as drivers and field workers. If the action is slow new settlers and / or more functions will appear where the old ones used to be. It requires mobilization of all concerned government and nongovernmental and organizations. All efforts should be concentrated. Indecisions and lack of coordination by any one of the institutions involved jeopardize the whole process. Any postponement of actions to be taken will not only delay the whole process but no future attempts can be made without use of very costive measures. At least some new initiatives and momentums have to be made. This is because the opposition will gain more strength while attaining public approval will be more difficult. Therefore, there is no way that reallocation/relocation process can be carried out in an atmosphere of indecisions, hesitation and slow actions. e) Office Versus Field / Planning: Both approaches were used in planning and each of the two options has some merits and some disadvantages. Field planning in villages and old settlements has the advantages of avoiding legal disputes and the advantages of making corrections when mistakes are made. This is
because the planning is done prior to legalization of plots. In case of office planning and the consequential legalization of the plots, because of the endorsement of the layout plans by the authorities, the disadvantage will be when residents resort to legal actions and court proceedings. f) Unavoided Realities: Voluntary relocation through mass movements of population and their resettlement in the new sites can be not attained in unfavorable conditions for several reasons:
¨ Relocation sites are usually distant from original irregular settlements.
¨ Whatever adequate notice is given to the squatters would not be enough because of their weakness.
¨ It was not possible to provide adequate municipal services and infrastructure in the new sites without the participation and contribution of the affected population.
¨ Due to lack of resources, establishment of administrative and government services in advance of the relocation/reallocation process cannot be completed but, however, some success can be attained through more involvement of the affected population and through adequate groundwork.
¨ Surprisingly, it was experienced that the new relocated population adapted themselves quickly in the new sites and they take very little time to resettle. g) Easing of: ¨ Mutual trust and understanding between the authorities and those involved would always ease actions involving involving relocation and resettlement.
¨ Justice attainment is very crucial. It is important to disassociate land mafias, who operate land speculation and corruption, from organization and replanning programmes and they should not appear in any activity.
¨ Patient grass roots action can produce miraculous results. Haste and high handed approach especially if accompanied by hesitant action and indecisions can produce serious damage and nasty unnecessary confrontation.
¨ The support of higher level of government bodies, opposition and local leaders and head of tribes of relocated settlements together with proper contact of people involved reduces agitation.
¨ Disappearance of politicians who lobby for elections through promises of land allocation is vital because it is the key issue for them rather than the service of the community.
¨ The cooperation of the judiciary especially the civil judges who sit as chair persons for committees helps in three ways. Their presence abates the fears of the citizens, moderates the squabbling and infighting in the local committees and adds respect and credibility to the committees actions.
4-5- Results Achieved: Although, neither indicators exist, nor quantitative and qualitative measures are used, the objectives of the displaced settlements treatment programme have been realized and recognized. And, however difficult the treatment process was there is now light and joy at the end of the tunnel. Proper titles were given to IDPS and villagers and provision of land through legal institutional means was propagated. This has contributed already to the enhancement of the physical environment and the availability of shelter and land. In addition, this also paved the way for public health improvement and eased man and motor mobility. The dignity of citizens is preserved and land acquisition is no longer the problem it used to be. If heavy-handed methods in some cases were applied, it was the exception rather than the norm and it was the result of agitation by speculators and land mafias rather than a genuine demonstration of opposition or discontent. After all, the families affected by resettlement are in a better situation than they used to be under squatting conditions (of uncertainty and apprehension). They are now secured in their own legal houses in well-planned and relatively better serviced areas. This is after all, what both sides the authorities and the citizens hoped for. And apart from the replanning and relocation objectives of the treatment programme are the spatial provisions for social, economic and engineering infrastructures. Because of this the IDPs can act in a manner that allows them to integrate into the physical fabric and the developmental process undergone by the upgraded settlement and community. Besides the physical results achieved, a number of social and political gains are accomplished and in particular that which provided the proper contact with the people. The treatment programmes and the implementation of local governance in a decentralized form created opportunities for change. The changes include: 1. Paving the way for legal dealings in land properties and reducing land speculations. It also reduced crimes since all residential quarters are now accessible to police and other security forces. 2. By appropriate siting of relocated urban functions together with decentralization of some economic activities from existing centres, a more even distribution of population and employment through the state was achieved.
3. Through village organization, the housing stock is increased to meet the needs of new households. It also eased the removal of some of the obsolete dwelling units and encouraged residential development. 4. Incorporation of upgraded settlements in the physical fabric provided the residents with good access and ease of movement to major centers of activity by both public and private transport. They produced a balanced distribution of demand on the transport network compatible with the establishment of the necessary road hierarchy. Finally, the treatment process that led to physical incorporation of the IDPs settlements insures the integration of social economic and environmental elements of sustainability and it clearly introduces a balanced community on which appropriate shelter, infrastructure, and spatial development evolve in lieu of commonly practiced physical development.
Paper 11 The Process of Resettlement and Reintegration of the Displaced Population by Dr Sharaf El Din Ibrahim Bannaga
1. Urban Adaptation
1-1 Acquisition of urban culture
The IDPs have arrived in Khartoum with their rural behavior and culture of the wilderness and slashed across Khartoum to find shelter and abodes wherever they could and according to their mood. They built their shanties or arbours in the same way as they did in their remote localities, which environments are different from urban centres environments. The authorities at Khartoum State were unable, at the beginning, to dissuade or prevent the displaced from building homes where they wished because of the immense number of the displaced and because of lack of finance within the disposal of the State authorities. In such prevailing conditions there was no opportunity for improvement or betterment of the living environment except by relocating the surplus of the settlers to more spacious areas on the periphery or vicinities of Khartoum in order to control physical development, combat harmful intensive urbanisation and protect the environment and to contain the incessant floods of the displaced. Three sites (Dar Al-Salam) and four camps were chosen on the suburban stretches of the Three Towns, which form the Capital. Old IDPs or squatter settlers are relocated to Dar Al-Salam while new comers are absorped in the IDPs. These chosen sites are now submerged by the increasing rate of expansion of urban sub-divisions, which have sprawled beyond the specified areas ear-marked for the displaced new settlements although the areas are still preserved for use of the displaced influxes. At the beginning, the displaced were reluctant to move into these sites, but realizing the spaciousness of the areas allocated to each group of families of the same tribe and the existence of national organisation to serve them, they finally agreed and moved into the new sites and started rebuilding their plastic sheets and cardboard shelters. Services such as health, education, public-transport and clean drinking water have already found their way to the new areas as well as security services provided by police stations. Wide roads have been opened to relieve traffic flows and ease man and motor movement. They paved the way for the mobility of the administrative staff of the voluntary and humanitarian relief organizations as well as daily public transport, buses, taxis and carts. The IDPs have already acclimatised themselves to their new comparatively healthier environment and began to lead a better life as far as peace, security, stability and privacy resulting from ample space. Gradually the voluntary organizations have threaded their way into the four sites of the displaced camps and established a permanent existence among the people who needed them. The displaced have started to acquire new skills to earn a living in urban centres and have absorbed and utilized new cultures and experiences essential for the social change they have undergone. There was a time when the imagination of the displaced could not stride beyond their feet, but now they entertain and cherish plans for the present and future to develop their career, through vocational apprenticeship, basic education and aspiration to spring into higher education to keep abreast as much as possible with the developing community around them. They could achieve this because their children enjoy the same privileges of free basic education and could escalate into higher education as far as their talents could carry them. The IDPs have formed their social associations and presented the government with written notes requesting more services, such as physical planning, and that they should enjoy services as other components of the urban community and should be looked at and considered as ordinary Sudanese living in their home country, and such being the case should enjoy all the privileges bestowed on other Sudanese. Their thought have developed, they formed popular committees that include urban and physical planning committees. In this regard they arranged communal meetings and seminars to brief one another on the benefits of urban planning, to transfer from the rural culture to urban culture and demand the government to provide piped water for domestic use, the construction of paved roads, electricity services and grant land ownership. They even requested increasing the size of the plots to satisfy their families extending obligations. Accordingly, the IDPs have thrown behind their backs their old rural methods of life, which were characterised by their irregular and below standard irregularly built abodes, narrow passages meandering among arbours. They are now able to request urban planning, follow up and evaluate final results to promote their camps and settlements and upgrade them into urban neighbourhood which share with other sub-divisions the available urban services as far as provided by the government. They have asked for an increase of the areas allocated for public utilities, such as the widening of streets and appropriate spatial organisations of open areas, schools, health institutions, sport fields etc. They have acquired an advanced urban understanding and a sound environmental perception.
1-2 The Positive Aspect of Physical Integration
Physical planning has promoted the displaced viewpoints of urbanisation and has positively transferred them to a stage where an improvement of their previous condition becomes inevitable. It has brought about a better social behaviour. Some families entertained some unsocial practices, which have been disclosed because physical planning has smashed some social barriers and extended the range of vision, the families have to thwart these mal-practices and integrate within the new wholesome society. The planning process has defined the streets, identified house numbers and enabled the security forces to obtain relevant information and consequently they have control of law and social order over offenders in the settlements. It has also made possible the passage of cars, vehicles and trucks through the settlements, resulting in continual flow of traffic which reduced crimes against self and property, the promotion of individual understanding motivated the sense of duty in relation to crime prevention and illegal practices. This led to social elevation in morals, the creation of stability, maintenance of peace and prevalence of the solace of the souls and tranquility of minds. Drawings 13 and 14 show physical plans for parts of the towns of Kalaklas, south of Khartoum, along the eastern bank of the White Nile and Ed Doroshab, which stands on the eastern bank of the River Nile, some miles north of the confluence. The drawings show urban development of new townships after the re-planning of Kalaklas and Ed Doroshab villages respectively where the resident families owned their residential plots. New residential extensions at both Kalaklas and Doroshab have absorbed great numbers of IDPs including earlier displaced groups and new arrivals. These extensions are provided with public utilities and security services resulting in social peace. The process of planning has produced a positive perception where inhabitants developed their sense of belonging to their residential areas, blocks or neighborhoods and open areas and has produced people organisations, which care for such aspects such as social welfare. It also promoted their general sense of good citizenship, which is reflected in support of the public organizations they have set up to protect the open parks together with the areas reserved for public utilities from illegal urban encroachment, because they know that these parks would serve as lungs or reservoirs of fresh air and open spaces for social gatherings, celebrations of important events and the practice of sports i.e. (kick about), native dances and wrestling to maintain original roots which extend to the beloved native homes.
The native organisations formed by the displaced would form the nucleus of administrative districts or localities to lead the community to better organisation and further amenities of life by representing the community at higher governmental circles. Now that Sudan is on the threshold of democratic life, the displaced communities, which have acquired all the characteristics of sedentary society, will gather further momentum as an electoral power with immense significance, since the population density of Khartoum is the hinge of fate on which political power rotates. Urban planning has made it possible to create some sort of commercial and trade activities such as the opening of small shops (dukans) along the streets or the establishment of vocation areas, places to sell fresh drinks or people restaurants under portages (rakoubas). All these activities sprout along the streets, which are the mainstreams of the traffic and pedestrian flow. All the above mentioned is considered a positive urban development and an important social transfer of some sort to keep pace with the nature and characteristics of urban society, but the real crust of social change is the element produced by urban planning which brought about an expansion of services of potable drinking water, the establishment of health and educational services which were mentioned earlier when the subject touched on the conditions of the camps of the displaced and the services provided. In fact, the provision of any society with safe and adequate drinking water for domestic use would produce a social revolution because it is an immensely essential service. It is a service desired for the combat of epidemic, endemic and contagious diseases. It is a service relevant to personal cleanliness, for the promotion of a human being, it is a service that enters into all man vital activities, it is a service of a crucial economic returns. The social elevation thus produced by the provision of adequate safe water services could hardly be imagined, coupled with the fact that the majority of the displaced have drained from areas where water is a rare commodity, the thirsty sand dunes and the rolling plains of Kordofan and Darfur further west, where water is fetched through making daily strenuous journeys, from distant sources. It is an established fact that drinking water is a man- health-deteriorating element in the developing world. The current use of water by the displaced is two folds of their previous use and that is due to the availability and accessibility of piped water close at hand. This fact has motivated the displaced to request piped water services to be connected to their houses. Through self help enterprises, pipes, hoses, fittings and relevant accessories are bought, trenches are excavated for laying down the water pipes from the main water sources to radiate into the blocks of houses with their laterals penetrating the walls of houses. The implementation
of such a project would endow extra time for women to do other domestic duties and release children to go to school or revise their lessons. The attitude and culture of the displaced have undergone radical changes towards satisfying present needs and plans for future aspirations to coupe with the developing demands of an urban “modern” society. Water available, the displaced had exerted further efforts of planting trees in and outside their houses to provide cool shades to offset the temperature of the sultry heat of the days of the long dry season in northern Sudan. Besides, the planting of trees is a wholesome civilized step and refined behavior towards green peace, which has become a universal cry due to global heating produced by intensive chemical industries in the advanced world, which resulted in an ozone rupture on the upper atmospheric layers. The displaced have realized their blunder of over-cutting and over-grazing at their native homes, a practice from times immemorial, and a practice for which nature has drastically and violently rewarded them. They now take their first steps to redress their past and fatal mal-practices against mother nature. Excess water has been used for baking mud bricks, either for building their own houses or selling to whoever is interested, thus taping a new source of revenue. One of the services, which have positive effects, is education, in all its levels. Children of the displaced who attended schools would return home with new ideas and knowledge and would certainly convey them to their parents. One of the prominent phenomena is learning the Arabic language and spreading it as a means of communication. Foremost benefits incurred by children of the displaced is attending schools at the surrounding areas, which brought them into contact with children coming from other residential areas. A feeling of brotherhood and friendship has sprung up among the urban society and the new arrivals of the displaced community which smashed social barriers of fear, mistrust, apparent inequality and isolation through the practical exchanges of visits among school children from various residential blocks which vaccinated the society of the youngsters against social stratification which is felt by the elders because of lack of close social contact with their opposite numbers. They only come into contact in market places, which do not provide adequate fusion as school classes do. Children of the displaced who started their early life at schools in Khartoum have become Khartoum-oriented and know no other community apart from Khartoum’s. They have become gravitating elements to their relatives and effective factors to persuade their families to continue living in Khartoum and to co-exist with the prevailing Khartoum society as a prelude to becoming part and melt into or diffuse into it. The other benefits of education in Khartoum is that it is more stable, permanent and secure because of its
being within the enlightened community which live under the shade of the Federal Government, the availability of the textbook, the trained teacher and availability of places in school classes. The conditions enjoyed by the children of the displaced are far better than those prevailing at home because the war conditions oblige the children to stay at home for of the impending risk and compulsory military recruitment. Some of the students of the displaced have shown learning talents and won prizes by obtaining the highest marks. Certainly such generations would lead the process of a social change among their displaced communities. They have established active student unions in towns of peace (Dar El Salam) The existence of “satisfactory” other services in displaced camps, which are non-existent at their native homes, encourages the displaced to continue residing in Khartoum. The lack of balanced services in remote or far-flung regions of the Sudan are among the causes, which led to armed conflicts. These are prevailing injustices and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future for lack of funds to finance development programmes and the conditions of insecurity, which defeated the majority of reforms and retarded the execution of appropriate schemes and the implementation of further development projects. The improvement of education and health services was not only an attractive factor to the IDPs but also to other war and natural disaster unaffected people from other states to scramble to Khartoum in quest of these services for them and their families. It is worth mentioning that more than 70% of Sudanese students learn at institutions of higher education in Khartoum and most of them are from regions. Medical treatment of some diseases is also unavailable in some states but are available in health centres or institutions that are public or privately owned in Khartoum. The concentration of essential services in Khartoum is a main factor of the exodus towards Khartoum, otherwise, if the intention of the displaced is a safe haven, away from friction and war waging areas, he could have taken his family to other safe places, within hundred of miles away in Sudan, instead of coming to far off Khartoum. The availability of services to a satisfactory extent in the camps of the displaced have infused into the displaced a feeling of peace and security which spurred them to establish themselves in Khartoum State, defuse and fuse into its society and acquire the urban behaviour ‘when in Rome, do as the Romans do’. A more prominent feature of physical integration leading to social fusion is demonstrated by the fact that the displaced are acquiring building trade skills appropriate to traditional northern rural building forms. On first arrival in Khartoum, the displaced followed their habits and traditions to build small rooms or shelters in spherical shapes and thatched roofs due to lack of financial
ability, they built their arbours from elastic twigs of trees as structural frame or skeleton and cover these with industrial residues such as plastic sheets, jutes, cardboard etc. These shelters are easy to dissemble and reassemble as the displaced may move from one place to another. Based on the experience of the displaced from the Southern Region, they build their huts on a raised mud platform to protect the hut from torrential rains. Since the hut is very small with a low ceiling, there is no alternative but to make a very small low door. Back at home, the dinkas make very low doors to their dwellings units which they enter crouching. These doors are closed and could be protected with a man holding a spear whenever an encroaching beast of prey transgresses. This door protective feature repeats itself in an environment on the brink of the desert because of the learning programme, but it is soon dropped out. Whenever the displaced finds some money he starts improving his dwelling unit by building a larger elongated mudroom. The roof of such a room is bow- shaped called (the back of the bull). The main beam carrying the weight of the roof is a strong thick wooden beam. The roof is woven with strips of bamboos covered with sisal or straw mats made of water reeds. It is cemented with a light layer of mud and plastered with fermented cow, donkey or horse dung mixed with silt and sand to slip off the rainwater. The plastering has to be repeated once a year or in a couple of years according to the amount of rainfall in the locality. The displaced citizen from the South builds a wall in front of the door of his hut to shut off glances of passers by. Whole walling, or making a fence (hosh) from every side is not considered relevant to protect a room or a dwelling unit from the cultural viewpoint of a displaced from the South. In such matters disturbing the displaced family privacy is not of vital importance. Many displaced householders from the South have shaded off their traditions of buildings and adopted ways of northern Sudanese, especially the inhabitants of Khartoum. They now use either red bricks or uncooked mud bricks. They have realized that the bull-back shaped roof narrows the area of the room. They have adopted a box shaped room built with either red or uncooked mud bricks, with roofing as normally used in Khartoum people houses. The room would either be coated with cement plastering tenaciously held by mesh wire in between the bricks and the plaster layer, or failing that a fermented animal dung or manure mixed with silt and sand as it is the practice of third class residential areas of the population of Khartoum. Their building culture has developed to the extent of building a fence of an encircling external wall. Some of the displaced families had dug pit latrines outside the walls of their houses in order not to lose any area of their plots, in a clear violation of the building regulations. There is a considerable number of the displaced whose economic living conditions have improved remarkably
and managed to build their houses with red bricks and used corrugated iron sheets and plied wood. Such houses withstand the weather conditions and are rainwater proof. This group also managed to build surrounding walls and to fix iron gates. Iron beams were also used to support heavier roofing materials and to give the house extra cohesion and strength. The other civilised stride is the use of dry pit latrine. The latrines are ventilated and improved from the traditional types (v.i.p as they are commonly known). This practice of getting rid of human waste or excretions has shaded off the old native practice of answer a natural call, in open spaces and in the bush far from the places of dwelling. The development of the displaced urban attitudes and prompt adaptation had made it easier for them to deal with Khartoum community and spurred them on to follow the tracks of revenue earning and production to introduce into their homes essential domestic services and maintain such services to ensure an element of continuity. Their acquisition of the technical know-how of the flourishing building trade have provided them with further skills to cut their way through the labyrinth of life, introduce themselves to the new society and become a component part of it. There is neither a street nor a new site where there are no new houses being constructed or old ones undergoing an innovation process. These building activities are manned by the displaced from the South, who are well known for their patience and fortitude to achieve what they started. The building trade is considered a thriving economic activity, financially rewarding. Despite the discouraging policies in the sphere of urban development, the building sector is viewed as the most active, with a flourishing market. It is an established fact that the displaced citizens from the South are the stalwarts of the building trade in Khartoum. Apart from the essential services with which the camps of the displaced are equipped, these camps are witnessing the establishment of services such as electric supply, cooking gas and particularly in upgraded irregular or squatter settlements, which have been re-planned. It is certain that the change produced by the domestic electric power is a conspicuous one, which requires the provision of particular electric appliances which need extra sums of money to be improvised by the family to purchase by calling upon all family members to contribute. Consequently the working conditions and service relations of the displaced families have come closer and closer to societies classified urbanised. The introduction of electric illumination have tapped new markets for electric power through the growing of light industries such as making iron furniture, beds, chairs, tables, windows, doors, it is a source of apprenticeship, a trade in hand is security against poverty, as the Sudanese proverb runs. Electricity is sold at the rate of LS250 per day for a bulb illuminating from 6 pm to 12 mid-night at Kassala squatter settlement. Electric generators have grown numerable in small residential areas shops and at local markets.
1-3 Progression of Urbanisation
1- Play-grounds/recreation areas The allocation of playgrounds as parts of the residential sub-neighbourhoods has produced a coupling phenomenon among sporting groups where they contest against one another, furthermore the team composition is multi-tribal in its membership. A sense of belonging and affiliation has sprung among these members and made them a single social unit. Children play together in streets and open places; they know each other in such places and in schools. The open spaces (o.s.) as termed by the planners, which are reserved for recreation purposes have become a source of social cohesion and promoted sports to further horizons. They have become theatres for sports and cultural activities, where tribal music bands played and tribal folklore displayed besides providing gathering places in festivals and political rallies. People also come out to such places in the evenings when the heat of the day abates for chatting, and enjoying a breath of fresh air with their children frolicking about.
2- The Markets The creation of new markets, in immense areas, has generated work opportunities for many individuals through the exchange of commodities. An example is Sheikh Abu Zayd Market in Umbadda, established by the displaced and gained a far-flung reputation is attended by multitudes of tribal men and women from various parts of the Sudan and contains a great variety of goods. It has become a source of revenue for localities and administrative units that steer the market activities and allocate selling shades, and spray a number of policemen for security purposes. The newly created markets have become complementary to the progressing urbanization process and the backbone for local governments, in other words these markets have created factors of diffusion, infusion and social homogeneity in dealing and trading transactions. They have become urban features complementary to the urban development process and a forerunner of local government where every administrative unit has its own market to develop and look after. 3- Public Transport It is an established fact that the diversity of public transport is a characteristic of urban society, it is one of the properties of the urban communities and a classification indicator of urban settlement (town, metropolis, megapolis city, large city, capital etc.), the more diversified means of transport are, the names of the settlements widen. Some world- famous cities are known with their public transport nets such as the tubes or (underground), light railways (trams) electrically motored buses, double-decker trolley buses. This diversity in public transport is still primitive in Khartoum. The majority of people in greater Khartoum use buses of all kinds and makes.
Lorries and carts were used for mass transport in displaced settlements but these were later replaced by mini-buses, large buses, “dafars” and a sort of motor scooters called Ragshas, which accommodates three to four people and trembles as it taxes about. What finally matters is the increase in number and size and the spread of public transport to cover the extending wings of the three-town capital (Khartoum), resulting in the reduction of the commutation time and availability of seats. The traffic flow is now regularly flowing in different modes of transport and with accommodating capacity and an accelerated speed produced by the new bridge across the white Nile which spans the Nile between the Sudan University of Science and Technology on the eastern flank of the White Nile and Fetehab town which stands on the western bank of the White Nile. This new bridge has immensely relieved the traffic jam on both sides of the old Nile Bridge, which links Khartoum with Omdurman where the majority of the displaced people are settling. The increase in the capacity of public transport network as well as the increase in area coverage has linked the peripheries of the three towns with the main urban centres of the capital, making easier access to places of work and residence. It has made the displaced camps and other isolated displaced settlements inseparable parts of the main physical block of which the Capital is structured. 4- Building silhouettes One of the most important and remarkable features of urban adaptation of the settlement of the displaced after urban re-planning is the symmetrical beauty of the extension of the building lines along the streets where the displaced are continually building circling walls to reshape the urban style the town planners long for. All irregular settlements have now taken graceful shapes, building lines are connected, and streets are decorated with trees planted by those who have acquired urban adaptation and town culture. The scene of the trees standing in rows on the sides of the streets is a pleasant view of development and civilisation, clinging to the creation of Allah, who recalls the dead land into life. Residential areas, such as at El Haj Yousif and Umbadda teem with greenness and are studied with trees, after dryness and desolation. It is a change to a desired environment which is a grace bestowed by Allah. Whoever traces the wake of urban development in Khartoum State would feel an ecstasy when realizing the speed, with which the displaced acclimatise with the new urban conditions, sees their communities elevate, and their youth progress despite the delivery pains and hardships of the exodus – always more, always better. 5- Spatial Organisation as a Tool for Social Amalgamation: - The statistics shown on table (15) are estimations of the tribal groups filtered into Carton Kassala settlement. Every group formed their own residential cluster. They practised their
culture the same way as they did in their native land. They lived before physical planning like islands, isolated from each other. The planning operations resulted in the opening of streets, and allocation of lands for public utilities etc brought about considerable geographic changes groups who moved to intermingle with others not of their own kin. That diffusion, which paved the way for the amalgamation and interweaving of the communities, which resulted in a new social transfer necessitating adaptability with the new spatial organisation created environment. New social relations developed as neighbours have to participate in happy occasions such as marriages, or sad occasions such as family bereavement for the purpose of solidarity and sympathy whenever the need arises. Children and youth who were associated with one another at schools, playgrounds, ceremonies, public transport, communal prayers and political rallies strengthened the elements of attraction and weakened that of expulsion. The attraction that has come into being dictated a new mode of social behaviour more amicable, cooperative, friendly and urbane, a prelude for stronger cooperation, brotherhood and camaraderie. Individual intercourse, such as a neighbour with his neighbour would lead to cohesive bonds where a family would trace a new life with the neighbouring family outlined by physical planning. Relations would sprout among children, youth and housewives resulting in friendships and fusion of the community, the preliminary step of creating a civil society and a closely bound nation with mutual interest, mutual goals and reciprocated advantages. Tribal groups would still maintain their bonds through the exchange of visits, the creation of funds to help in family bereavement or association to push the government to embark on development projects back at home. Family acquaintance would expand due to the break of the isolation shell, which hampered social contact as was the case in former times. Occasions of merriments and dances are sufficient for further introduction of the urbanised communities, particularly the tribes, which settled at Carton Kassala Squatter Settlements have colourful cultural hues. The mixture of all these colours is a strength harnessed within a diversified luminous frame. A scrutinising glance reveals that every tribe has a special tinge of art, their special way of dealing and popular participation. Kassala Squatter Settlement has been unique in its popular dancing groups that are attractive to spectators. They compete with one another on the sound of drums and the tunes of music. The tribes at Carton Kassala Squatter settlement took great interest in their dancing and singing bands to the extent that every sultan would have his band with a steering committee, which administers its affairs and liaise with committees, which arrange festivals and ceremonies. The dancing groups contributed to public gatherings where
people were briefed on the advantages of physical planning and public rallies, that are required to support the urbanistion process. It is worth mentioning that Carton Kassala (Al Baraka Township) after spatial orgnization could only accommodate slightly more than 5000 families i.e. 5123 residential plots, besides the area allocated for parks, playgrounds, streets, public utility services etc. It was imperative upon the land authorities to find some land to accommodate the surplus of families. The selected area has been called “Dar el Salam el gadeed’’’2 (El Rubwa), which is adjacent to the new site suggested for the new Khartoum Airport, some five kilometres east of Carton Kassala and only one kilometre from Id Babikir villages. Extra families were transferred to Umbadda, block 48, near Wad el Beshir displaced people camp. For honesty’s sake, the people of Id Babikir welcomed the displaced, and their fears were expelled in a relatively short time. Milk sellers on donkey backs distributed milk freely for three consecutive days as a kind gesture of their warm reception to the displaced; that they expected to form a new consumption community for their dairy products. Their expectations were materialised and milk sellers are seen on the streets selling their milk for the new arrivals. A sort of social intercourse, which generated an income to the villagers, close at hand. Lorries and small cars were also engaged in transporting the new settlers all day and late at night, which created a further sort of social mixing and cooperation. The aboriginal people of Id Babikir (Babikir wells) were horrified by the candards and allegations in relations to the new arrivals, but the Babikirs soon found out the truth and embraced their displaced citizens. A plan is in the pipeline to build a large market where people from Dar el Salam and Id Babikir villages woud meet once a week. It is going to be a further bond of commercial interest. It is a fact established by practice that markets are symposiums or seminars to introduce large communities to one another for mutual interest.
2. The Cultural and Social Integration
2-1 Social mixture:
Before touching on the various types of diffusion, which have undergone the society of the displaced, it is necessary to recall the conditions of these communities before the reform that had taken place. Their conditions were deplorable in all walks of human life, the surrounding environment was filthy, human excretions everywhere drinking water was infested with myriads germs and worms, diseases were rampant, their social inter-
relations were at the lowest. They would quarrel in trifles, and these quarrels would flare into serious tribal fights with grievous results. The conditions were desperately filthy that reform or improvement was hopelessly remote. This state of affairs affected the health of the displaced and his morale. He had lost his affiliation to the community, a community of any sort, lost his identity and his future. In fact there could be no comparison between today and yesterday, between the squatter settlements of the past and the present day planned, possessed, regular buildings of symmetrical shape. The displaced themselves have participated in beautifying their new homes, improved their urban environment and have dispelled the look of suspicion and doubt mirrored against them by other burghers. The displaced have become a good citizen of the capital. The most important residue of the reform programme, the planned residential blocks or housing clusters is the phenomenon of social diffusion among the component individuals of the society. Many families have moved from old blocks to new ones or from old neighbourhoods to new ones and this process has led to intermingling of the families, their amalgamation and the diffusion of their habits and traditions and their adaptation towards their new environment and new conditions. New relations have sprouted, new dealings, new social links among all the members of the newly mixed society. Most important among these relations are intermarriages, which have resulted in a new socially knitted fabric of the society. There is other amalgamation opportunities, which have sprung up from among the people organisations such the popular committees and other brotherly dealings to complete or generate some essential public services and public utilities, which require teamwork and follow up with the official channels. People committees were formed for the provision of piped water into houses and the supply of electric power. The crying needs for such services have compelled people of the area to put their heads together and work collectively in a team spirit and enthusiasm, which brought the people together through their needs. Funds have to be collected to pay for the services they need and committees have either to call for a general rally or go from door to door to collect funds to pay for the designated services. Some of popular committees i.e. at El Baraka residential area have built their social and cultural clubs and furnished offices where people assemble and discuss their affairs. All these activities have paved the way for accelerating the cultural mixing and social integration.
2-2 Transfer from a village environment into a town environment:
The displaced were encountered with the attitude of the urban environment and the sort of the prevailing life, which depended a great deal on material gain, individual concern, and lack of communal spirit. The displaced, at their native villages were accustomed to a diversified and easy economies, coupled with the fact that the rural environment is more generous and kinder than an urban one, the sort of jobs they do, for example tilting the land, looking after cattle, sheep or goats are easier than that life-earning jobs in a town which requires punctuality in arrive and productivity and commutation fees. The displaced women had to accept whatever sort of work available such as house servants, sellers or cleaners in markets where they clean grain from husk or sand gravel’s. Women have become the principal breadwinners for their greater flexibility and adaptability. When the displaced have acclimatized themselves with urban conditions, they acquired jobs, learned skills and accordingly their living conditions have considerably improved. The longer they stayed in Khartoum, the better their conditions become. The displaced women has been able to keep pace with the urban woman community, acquired their customs and mode of life. She works outside her house, and within her house and is able to perform her home duties besides looking after her children and her husband and multiplying the number of her children through successive births. Displaced women, particularly from the Southern region are productive despite their harsh conditions. In fact the engagement of women in work outside their homesteads have consequently led to some children going astray and as a result has rent the social fabric of the displaced families. The intensity and cohesion of the village social structure has become weaker and weaker, leading to a gradual disappearance of the village culture whose relaxed grip has given way to urban culture, fostered by a new burgher environment. The displaced are moving in sure steps towards the culture, the virtues of Khartoum community and its traditions.
2-3 Employment Opprtunities:
Since the economic base of Khartoum is very, weak, working opportunities are very limited and accordingly a displaced person could not provide his needs from the revenue of a single job. Therefore, a displaced performs more than a job. A displaced woman for example, sells food in market places, washes clothes in houses of other families, brews local wine, a displaced man works in the public sector, sells water in barrels in carts where there is no piped water in some residential areas, or at times when there is a prolonged disconnection of electric power or mechanical faults in the village water
pumping stations. He would go to the market to do some trading jobs, loading or unloading goods in lorries, trucks or carts. As time passes, he gets to know more traders, merchants and his social connections increase and accordingly his employment opportunities, especially those displaced families who have extended families already resident in towns or cities in Khartoum Metropolis. Acquaintance of long established displaced families in Khartoum avails their incoming relatives from desolate, drought or war stricken areas greater opportunities of employment, and hence prompts resettlement. Displaced women who work in houses of other families are able to tap working opportunities for their husbands through their contact with the heads of families they serve. Displaced people who know some trades such as carpenters, blacksmiths, bed makers and cattle herders are enabled with their vocational knowledge to get work quicker than others. The cattle herders are employed in private mixed agriculture farms around Khartoum for the growing of fodder and milking of cows, and selling of milk on donkey backs. One of the deterrent factors, which hinder employment opportunities for the displaced in public sector, is loss of identity card or other relevant documents to confirm identification. Employment in private sectors or industry does not require such data and so is work in markets, agriculture or factories. These economic activities absorb the majority of the greater bulk of the displaced. The displaced keep moving from camp to camp, whichever camp is nearer to the place of work. It explains why they leave Jebel Aulia camp to join El Salam Camp or Wad El Beshir’s Camp west of Umbadda. It is worth mentioning that the training courses attended by the youth of the displaced have contributed to procure and increase the employment chances for the trained displaced labour force. Some financial institutions, which avail social and cooperative funds have extended some loans to the displaced women to start their own businesses .This activity has provided considerable employment opportunities for a sizeable number of the displaced women and created greater stability. The need to work, and to earn, has driven the displaced to accept some of the expellant jobs such as joining the police forces and the army. They have found some solace in the army for the feeling of strength and national affiliation. Employment in the regular forces has infused the displaced with a spirit of precision and punctuality, which replaced their careless and reckless ways. Employment of the displaced in the police forces has reduced the brunt of uncivil treatment the IDPs encountered at the hands of the police.
2-4 Marriage and the Influence of Urban Cultutre
It is certain that marriage as an institution is governed with certain rituals, and that in spite of polygamy the family still enjoys respect and prestige, but conditions in Khartoum have now changed. The displaced have adapted to their new surroundings and a man would not be able to pay a dowry in cows, as he used to do in order to take an additional wife. Instead of presenting his bride with a number of cows, he had to pay money, besides an undertaking that he would pay a number of cows when he returns to his native home, when peace and law reign. This is an acceptable mode, but the obligation or the undertaking to pay a number of cows when returning home, is very weak in practice, because the cows are non-existent, whether in their original home or anywhere else. One of the urban effects on family relations is that husbands have grown reluctant to practise polygamy while city conditions and their complications have increased divorces among married couples, a practice detested in village culture despite polygamy which is a characteristic of family structure in those communities. In fact town conditions necessitate the work of women away from home and their stay for long hours is principal causes of the growing rate of the numerable divorces. Long periods of absence of the displaced husbands away from their families, which have weakened the inherited virtues and traditions of the villagers have also led to the family dissemble. The inability of men to support their sizeable families has further worsened the situation, besides unemployment, which encouraged men to drink wine and become tipsy. Thus had also contributed to the rise of family disputes leading to aggression on wives, who no longer enjoy protection from relatives that are either left behind or sporadically scattered in remote and far flung parts of the town or protection from village community whose members would sally forward to burry the hatchet. In such circumstances the family is broken up because of lack of paternal guidance and young girls may embark on premature family relations, mostly illegitimate, which lead to the multiplication of further family disintegration. The outcome of this is the scene of young mothers, carrying their babies, in a poor destitute state, and such being the case, these young mothers may resort to practices prohibited by the ordinances of the states of Khartoum. This would bring more homelessness of astray children. Homelessness would drive children to deviate from the right track and slippage into crime, except a few of them who may seek self-respect and piety away from their quarrelsome parents. Some children have taken marginal jobs such as the polishing of shoes, or the sale of cigarettes or newspapers etc. All those children who benefited from the training programmes arranged by the non-governmental organisations, and the competent government administrations have taken to town culture, habits and customs especially those who came
very young or were borne in Khartoum, and have become children of the capital, acquired the relevant culture, customs and utterly integrated into the community of the capital city. They would not find it easy to return to their parental homes and adapt to a different new life away from the lustre of the glamourous cities.
2-5 The Change of Customs and Traditions
The presence of the displaced, particularly those from Southern Sudan, in large numbers, among northern societies has brought some change in traditional customs popular among the southern brethrens, of which we sum up the following: - The displaced from the South have taken to northern customs such as name giving ceremonies to the new born, marriages and family bereavement. They present El Shella (fine clothes, shoes, perfumes, edible commodities such as corn flower, rice, oil, sweets and jewellery) and they boast for having managed to bear the high cost of marriage at a northern style. These are northern Sudanese customs. Previously, a bridegroom, after the presentation of some cows, might get a single dress to put on and go to the church. Erecting a tent in a family bereavement and receiving sympathies, saying a grace on the spirit of the deceased and putting on a melancholy dress of grief, are approaches of the northern Muslim habits. On the delivery of a new baby into the family, southern brethren now undertake further expenses such as slaughtering a lamb and feasting as their northern brethren do. One of the encouraging indications among the youth of the Dinka is that they are inclined to converse in Arabic even among themselves, previously, they used Arabic only when they talked to the Northerners, but among themselves, they use Dinka language. It is a favourable unity factor of forming one nation. It is now a popular phenomenon that Dinka women use the (Tobe), which is a preferred and respectable northern Sudanese women dress, besides the use of traditional northern Sudanese women perfumes and “henna” to change the colour of the soles of feet, and drawing attractive patterns in the palms and top of hands. The use of the Jelabia or flappy northern Sudanese garments, the use of turbans (northern Sudanese male head-dress) appropriate to the hot and dry north Sudan weather by displaced men from the South is a further indicator of the national unity track. North-South Sudanese approaches in customs and traditions have become an ordinary practice. It is possible that such approaches may have reached complete integration, except that some Southern Sudanese organisations still throw the blame of their sufferings on Northern Sudanese. It is becoming imperative to brief the Southerners of their rights and obligations in order that the image of integration and adaptation would take shape
after demolishing the social barriers and allegations left by the colonisers for the purpose of tightening and invigorating the separation between North and South.
2-6 Acquisition of Northern Culture and Language
Culture is clues and reflections of experiments, experiences, arts, thoughts, values, tenets and civilisations of mankind. Language is deciphering factor about this culture, what is meant is the acquisition of the culture and the language of the North by the displaced Southern Sudanese, the Arabic language, and the culture derived from Islamic virtues. These virtues are the virtues of the Islamic Religion, preserved by Allah in his Holy Book, the Quoran. Expressions in Arabic, unlike other languages, are specific because Arabic is the language of Quoran. The spread of the Islamic culture is an aspiration of the Muslims who long for the conversion of others into the Islamic Faith in order to gain the consent of Allah. Muslims have gained other people through the good examples of exemplar good behaviour. Arabs have migrated from their Peninsula to remote parts of the world, carrying with them the mission of Islam to preach the true Religion. The migration of the Arabs is not surprising, because contact between African and Arab communities existed throughout history. Contact between the Arab Peninsula and Africa, particularly the East African coasts dates back to periods before the Birth of Christ. Such contact led to the debouch of a mixture of human race of mixed bloods, joint culture and the spirit of the same roots. The pervasion of Islamic culture was not through oppression or marginalisation of others. Islam had found a wholesome healthy environment in the African coast, which accepted and absorbed it without any further difficulties. Arab migrations to the African coast or the land of the Sudan was not motivated by colonising aims or domination of race, it was a migration for settlement and the exchange of interest. The Arab immigrants contributed to develop the land they arrived at, intermarried with the natives and fought wars to defend the land they have settled in and suffered all sorts of war atrocities. Whereas the colonizers selected certain sites in the land they controlled to build their houses, while the Arabs mixed with the aboriginal people of the land and lived among them, sharing their happiness and grief. They intermarried and produced a cross breeding of Arab and African texture as we can now see in the Sudan and countries of the African Horn. The Sudanese adopted the Arabic Language, whereas countries of the African Horn adopted a mixture of Arabic and other African languages to produce Swahili, which they wrote in Arabic alphabets. Because Islamic culture and its Arabic language is rich in roots, and deep struck in history, all attempts of churches established by the colonizers failed either to weaken or erase the Arabic language or its culture. Accordingly, churches established by the colonizers have stood as symbols to resist the Islamic culture, particularly the Catholic Church, which continued to kindle the spirit of
enmity, and support groups against Islamic thought. Despite all the attempts to blur Arabic language, Arabic had continued to be the lingua franca throughout Southern Sudan. An example is Juba Arabic. Our displaced brothers from the South have acquired their Arabic from their diffusion with Northerners, in festivals, political rallies and national celebrations. Because of this integration with a northern majority, it has become very difficult for the Southerners to retain their cultural traditions unaffected, especially in urban communities whence the Southerners lost the spirit of the group and have become saturated with spirit of individualism as other citizens of Khartoum. Owing to the prevalence of the monetary economy and its overwhelming influence over the community of the Capital, the sole worry of the family is hankering after material gain, thereby alienating themselves from spiritual principles in life. The Southern Sudan culture is gradually withering, what is present is the tribal Southern Sudan dances, but in many occasions artwork is viewed as folklore and tribal participation. These arts are still practised from time to time and got tribal associations and organisations concerned with its promotion and development. The gradual withering of the Southern culture within the communities of the displaced in the Capital, makes the Southerners to entertain a feeling that Arabic or Northern culture is dominant, and wrongfully assume that Islamic thought and its legislation is a degeneration of the prestige of the non-Muslims and that the flourishing of the Southern culture is preservation of their dignity. It is an established fact that culture dominates through the strength of its contents and influence, otherwise western civilization and culture would not be dominant at a universal scale. Western civilization, nowadays affects communities whose civilizations are struck deep in history, because of its economic strength, and it combines between education and vocation, and because its nations own an immense mechanism of mass media and because the communities of the Western civilization practice democracy with multi party institutions which not only respect the rules of the game but also accept the decision of the majority and abide by it, observe human rights and press for its observation worldwide. As Arab nations are affected by the vigorous influence of Western civilization, Arab civilisation also affects other nations, which came into contact with the Arabs; the effect would be proportionate as is seen in African and Asian states that are neighbouring some Arab countries. The radical change which place at the displaced communities is centred on children and the youth, since these generations were not adequately saturated with the Dinka and Shuluk culture because of the great distances that separate these generations from the native land of their forefathers, and because some of them have gone astray and because their families are totally engaged in improvising a livelihood, ensuring their future, their quest for stability and overcoming the hardships of displacement.
Certainly, displacement has led to a radical change among the displaced in as far as the use of Arabic language is concerned. The Arabic language has become dominant communicatively among the displaced and in all aspects of communication and conversation, even within a single family. The learning of Arabic language and its usage has incurred considerable benefits including stability, integration in urban communities and consequently national amalgamation and thwarting tribal bonds, the weakening of regional links in favour of the consolidation of a national feeling and sense. Attractive factors for the use of Arabic are listening to Arabic songs and Arabic music of the North and the repetition of the songs. In fact the effect of Northern music and songs is unequalled. Singing does not only affect the displaced communities, but it does so in their native homes where Omdurman radio is picked up in remote parts of the Sudan. Many regions of the Sudan are able to watch television. It has been observed that the majority of the displaced respond to songs from prominent Northern Sudanese singers. In a recent singing festival, presented at Buri Cultural and Sports Club, arranged by the Jieng youth to propagate the Southern culture, songs were sang by Hamad El Rayah who sang several Northern songs, which were applauded by the participants in the cultural festival. Consequently we find that even singing has acquired a Northern tinge in occasions where there is Southern Sudan tribal presence or representation. It is true that each tribe is inclined or attracted to singing and dancing to interpret their local culture, using their traditional dialect, but celebrations in big occasions which include considerable number of tribes the masses songs are performed in a dominant urbane Northern colouring as is the custom of the population of Khartoum. Southern communities through generations attribute the popularity of the Northern singing among the displaced, performed in Arabic to the increasing use of Arabic. That was what the two researchers, Dr Catherine Miller and Dr. El Amin Abu Munga, had concluded in their book entitled (Language Change and National Integration) which contains a number of sentences which indicate the use of Arabic language among the displaced as displayed by the research and studies conducted previous to the work carried out by the two respective authors. One of their statements reads “The progression of the use of Arabic is throughout different generations. Thus, our study confirms the hypothesis that urbanization and migrations lead to language change: the Vernacular languages are receding before Arabic” It is certain that the progression of the use of Arabic language among the different tribes, which compose the IDPs in Khartoum, has greatly facilitated the social communication among these tribes and paved the way for inter-tribal marriages. Inference from the research conducted by the two researchers cited above at El Takamul upgraded settlement at El Hag Yousif, it has been demonstrated according to table (17) that 30% of marriages,
which took place during the research span of time were mixed marriages, a bride and a bridegroom from different tribes but the rate of marriages among tribes which were neighbours in their native land are considerably large and grown up to 80% of the mixed marriages. It is worth mentioning that marriages are still performed after the agreement and blessing of the families concerned and their relatives, which is indicative that the village mentality still prevails and affects the choice of the consort. The change, which took place in the marriage process in relation to procedures and payment of dowries, and the celebrations is considerably immense and is associated with the continuous change in the social and economic conditions of the displaced. The study that had been conducted by Save the Children (Denmark) is considered a further support of the observation of the resulting change towards Arabic, the acquisition of the Northern culture according to Save the Children (Denmark) study which was conducted between September 1998 and April 1999 confirms that the displaced have completely, socially and culturally adapted to the conditions of Khartoum and that their culture has begun to melt into that of the Northern community through what is termed “culture dilution”. The study has pointed out the change that had taken place is due to the vigour of the town culture which depends on individual behaviour and the loss of the sense of the community, besides the importance of the influence of the material economy which the study termed (The Monetary Economy), where the displaced, as together with other citizens of the city are fully engaged to procure their daily needs and have no spare time for communal or spiritual work they were accustomed to. Despite that, the social bonds dependent on extended family obligations still exist and are linked, a fact that retards complete thwarting of the Southern Culture, at least for the time being, but these bonds have grown weak and dilapidated and is on its way to terminate on the wake of time.
2-7 Political and Administrative Participation
The sultans and leaders of the native administrations, heads of tribes, nazirs and omdahs are still the principal leaders in the Southern states. They still enjoy the respect of their people. Therefore any organisation of these characters directed towards ensuring national unity will bear fruition. It is worth emphasising that the sultans have a pioneering leading role in ensuring the national unity. Juba Conference convened in 1947 voted for national unity despite the element of heterogeneity planned by the colonizers in relation to their policies of closed zones. Our Southern brethren have endeavoured to consolidate the national unity and emphasised the significance of a one country. Southern electors were not attracted by the
lustre of Southern contestant candidates, who are considered natives of the constituency, as was the case in the North. They voted on national basis. That is why the MPs representing the Southern region constituencies in the national elected legislative councils were a mixture of Southern and Northern elements. Owing to the considerable and effective presence of Southern Displaced people in the North, it has now become possible to have Southern members of parliament who succeeded in Khartoum State as well as members from the South in regional or state assemblies in the north. This is an indicator of health and a forerunner sign of the integration and homogeneity of the Sudanese community. The heterogeneity of the regional legislative council structures enables the members of the councils to view the problems of the people with a national eye and a national interest. There are four members from the South in Khartoum State Legislative Council. There is no doubt that the performance of the M.Ps from the South in the legislative Council in Khartoum would certainly affect other M.Ps from the North and would constantly remind them with the sense of unity, peace and the developmental worries of the country which nationally colour the debates of the respectable members of these councils. The presence of Southern representatives together with representatives from the Nuba Mountains at Khartoum State Legislative Council has coated the Council with a new colour and a national perspective looks, which were non-existent in past decades. It has made the Council to give weight and discuss cases of national contents, and regional problems outside the framework of Khartoum State and to invite members of the foreign diplomatic missions to attend sessions of the Council so that the diplomats may read between the lines and make their own conclusions of allegations randomly and unfavourably pasted to Sudan in relation to unfair treatment to the population of the squatter settlements. These invitations of the diplomats are aimed to rectify the tarnished images created in the minds of the diplomatic missions by the prejudiced enemies of the country, and particularly the detractors of the State of Khartoum. The presence of parliament members from the South and the Nuba Mountains and their effective participation in policies and decision making refute all allegations and presents a concrete clue that the displaced participate to cast the political decision. The participation of citizens from the South in Northern Sudan State governments is a trend instituted by the present Government. There is no state government, in any of the regions of the Northern Sudan that does not contain some ministerial elements from the South, who participate in the moulding of a political and executive decision. Successive elements from the South and the Nuba Mountains succeeded one another in the governments of Khartoum state. Some were ministers, others were commissioners, and Mr. Jek Peter, an Equatorian was one of the commissioners of Khartoum.
The preferment of Southerners as members in Northern Sudan State Governments and the same process i.e. the preferment of Northerners in Southern Sudan State Governments produces a beneficial return in consolidated national unity. The diversification of the governments entails strength and cohesion of the governments, such as sound thinking and proper decision-making, and reduces the disputes, which characterized the governments since the eve of independence. Khartoum State has benefited a great deal from the participation of Southerners and Nuba mountaineers in the successive governments of the state in that these public figures are now propagating and preaching unity at national scale, they are receptive to the demands of the displaced, activating the roles played by the sultans. All these efforts are focused to ignite the feeling of unity, national integration, and the creation of a one nation, a happier abode for all the Sudanese to live in. The sultans who participate in local administration in the North are effective in the settlement of tribal disputes, the stability of peace and the promotion of the judicial procedures of the native administration. They have a prominent role in diffusing their communities into the community of Khartoum. They thus poise as national catalysts to ferment patriotic feelings and expedite national unity, promote peace and stability. They are able to facilitate the system of rule and administration in squatter settlements. Southern communities have a considerable store and experience in native administration, where they solve problems through the counsels of the elders, or referring more difficult cases to native courts, which they inherited from the foreign British rule. Sultans, Nazirs, Omdas and Sheiks chaired these native courts and were quite efficient and effective in administering justice. Most importantly they are acceptable to the people for their simple and quick procedures that are devoid of advocates. All is needed in a native court is evidence. The displaced communities have organized themselves under their sultans, the role of the sultans would then acquire importance and effectiveness to facilitate the measures of administering justice and the pervasion of peace through the camps of the displaced or their new planned residential settlements. Political, administrative, legislative and executive participation of the Southern Sudanese and Nuba mountaineers in competent institutions in Northern Sudan, shall strengthen the bonds of brotherhood among the citizens of one country, emphasises the opportunities of peace and national unity, narrows the gaps, expels the fears of estrangement, dispels mistrust, melts the ice in disputes of crucial problems of the country, which may have far reaching effects nationwide and fosters the creation of conformity of the Sudanese communities at all levels irrespective of their varied cultures, customs and traditions.
3. Opportunities and Challenges of the Reintegration Process
a. Diversification as a Source of Power and Richness
The Sudan had taken shape and came into being with its present component parts as a result of the Turkish-Egyptian conquest in the 19th Century B.C. All the regions and tribes of the Sudan, at that time, were not compulsory politically bound. It was some kingdoms and sheikhdoms, which cropped up sporadically and far apart. The present Composition of the country was not achieved by a complementary, expanding and growing national movement. It did not witness, in that date, any popular movements, which worked towards the unification of the country. Consequently, the present day Sudan, with its developing expansion has crystallised in a relatively short period. It had been founded by the Turkish Egyptian Administration. Since its inception, it carried inside contradictory elements, and wrangling and conflicting forces because it teems with diversification and contrast. It is multi-customs, multi- lingual, multi-traditional multi-cultural and multi-religious, bearing in mind that Islam is the religion of the majority of the country population. The administrative regions together with its known geographical limits enjoy different natural environments, varied climatical conditions, varied biological and ecological resources. It displays the hot dry and chilly desert climates, Savannah and tropical climates. It enjoys various natural and mineral resources. This challenge of contrast of varied colours should not be a source of difference and dispute. It could simultaneously be a source of power and richness when the elements are complete and homogeneous because the creative contrast conceives power, liveliness and activity.
b. Exploitation of the Exodus to the North
Although the compulsory demographic population motion generates many disadvantages, the current demographic exodus, accommodates many advantages, because it has opened the door for the diffusion of the Sudanese nationalities and their fusion with one another, it has also engendered a real political participation of the displaced in the North and acquainted them with their brothers in the North. Most advantageously has been the movement of the southern population towards the northern states which has led to the collapse of the separatist policy – closed zones policy, initiated by the colonizers. Northern Sudanese were forbidden to move south and the same was applied to southern Sudanese who were prohibited to travel north. One of the
desirable aspects in the recent exodus was that the Sudanese from the south contrary to practice in the past, chose to come north instead of seeking refuge in the neighbouring countries. The strength of this gesture confirms that the southern Sudanese found safety and stability in the North, a practice that invigorates unity and confirms that the people of the south are part of united Sudan. Regardless of where they first settle they have the right to move freely to any region of the Sudan without restriction, irritability or embarrassment. This cements the national fabric. The displaced in their quest for employment opportunities, exert themselves to acquire a trade or a profession in competition with the inhabitants. The acquisition of skills and experience is achieved through communication within the national bloc and incurs national gains in the foreseeable future. As far as the youth are concerned they relish the competition with a settled community to promote their skills, widen their social connections and pave the way to make it through the ups and downs of life, in areas where they posed to start a new life. And as such on the job training is not available to the displaced youth in their original localities because of the limitation of work. Those youth form the future manpower reserve of the Sudan, both north and south. The displaced that arrived in towns and cities become an effective manpower for the construction and development of the urban centers by providing cheap labour, which contribute to the productivity of the urban economy. They also make available their raw experience that in some case was refined to the benefit of the localities. The concentration of working opportunities among the displaced, away from being mere propaganda, will bring about positive effects. This could be further activated by the mobilization of the effort to boost latent energies by tapping on the cultural spirit and producing the relevant social change, dispelling the depressive dormant attitudes and slow motion approach. The polarization, liberation and communal activation of of the displaced are effective tools of community mobilization and motivation towards improving the displaced lives and attaining their refined social behaviour and maintaining cultural advancement. The educational and information messages received by the IDPs must lead to the kindling of the spirit of solidarity and sympathy among the individuals of the community and should demonstrate the social and cultural values, benign tribal and national customs and planting these in the spirits of the Sudanese communities as a prelude for the domination of virtuous and noble conducts where the fusion of these communities would be possible through their activation and effective participation. This is the basis for the creation of a cultural stride and the evolution of civilized resurrection to lead the development of the country and the building of a great nation.
As indicated above, the influx into towns and cities have promoted the significance of voluntary work and the end result is that charitable societies, tribal and regional associations have been established in the national capital. The purport of these associations and societies is the development of the sense of solidarity, which hovers over a village. The rural population resident in urban centres needs such a spirit to adapt to urban conditions and to help their relatives in the country. Accordingly these associations and societies have established venues for the collection of donations and contributions and follow up mechanisms to urge government departments to effect development in the various regions of the Sudan. The regional rooted communities in Khartoum urban centres are now competing in the creation of societies, tribal and regional associations to provide humanitarian aid and to develop the forgotten regions. The reception of the Southerners in the North, contrary to what the prejudiced enemies colour it, that they did not find social acceptance, but in reality they have found the social acceptance which they deserve in the North despite their increasing numbers. This good treatment is sufficient to flounder the intrigues of disturbance and assuage the intensity of animosity, which was confined in the innermost of the soul. The exodus to the North, in large numbers must pose a political, economic and administrative challenge. But once the Sudanese succeed to accommodate the accelerating numbers and socially and culturally digest them in the spacious and complacent body of the nation, they would manage to surmount the greater part of the political and ethnic obstacles, Any failure to assess the importance of the political role of the IDPs or neglecting them in public life will increase the psychological agonies and expedite the explosion of the political situation and creates atmospheres infested with organised growing Political unrest, violence, and vaulting social disturbances and disorders pertaining to IDPs One of the features of the present displacement pertaining to IDPs from the West and the South is that noted in the restructuring of the social composition of the Sudanese community. There is no residential neighbourhood in any of the towns in the North including western Sudan, which is devoid of a resident from the South. Once such displaced Southerners or westerners are absorbed in productive development projects or provided with life maintenance essentials, they would become an effective catalyst element to develop the community and become parts thereof. Accordingly, displacement becomes a national goal where Northern Sudanese migrating to the South would provide skilled labour essential for development projects, besides extending the feelers of social and cultural connections to link the various parts of the country with technical packages of sustainable development.
c. Promotion of co-existence
The Sudanese tribes co-existed with one another from time immemorial and created coalitions, signed charters for the sake of ensuring peace, lived in harmony with the prevailing communities of the time, which shared the pasture, water pools, lagoons, rivers and land. Despite the long periods of peaceful co-existence, occasional disruption of peace floated to the surface. Recently the flames of dispute flared and licked ferociously in Western Sudan and border zones with the Republic of Chad. In the majority of cases of the armed frictions among the tribes are caused by transhumant movement of the nomadic tribes in their quest for water and grazing grass. Thus moving, they would come in contact with the sedentary tribes, usually farming communities. The cattle, the camels, or the sheep may encroach on the farms. An exchange of abusing words, or reluctant to allow a passage to land beyond the farms, or permission to allow the nomads to water from an only water pool in the vicinity for a couple of days may ignite a bloody conflict. Some social writers describe nomadic/sedentary community fights as bickering over trifles, but in fact they are unable to diagnose the real causes. Otherwise how would we justify the long unruffled co-existence, which prevailed among the tribes as a result of the charters they concluded and the coalitions they made. Displacement in this regard brings people of different tribes together and acquaint them with one another and they have much to learn from each other. This paves the way for co-existence, strengthen solidarity and consolidate national unity.
d. Destruction of the Barriers of Estrangement
The conflict only erupted at the eve of independence, which is a concrete proof that it is a making of the foreign administration and after their departure they left this timely bomb, this is now triggered by the armed conflict and has left a gapping wound bleeding severely . It is worth mentioning that the UNDP in Sudan endeavoured to mount several joint seminars and meetings between the fighting parties, Government and the SPLA across the borders, the aims of which were to stop the causes of bleeding, propagating peace, and to narrow the points of views, so that the meetings would pollinate ideas with peace culture, the demolition of the barriers of estrangement between Southerners and Northerners, to dispel hating each other, to adopt programmes for the advertisement of the culture of peace. The Northern citizen has reacted positively when he sensed the sufferings and torments of his brothers from the South. Many Northern Sudanese extended their hands in assistance and hospitality as best as they could at the beginning of the influx but soon the situation
changed owing to the increasing waves of the displaced, which crashed against the population of Khartoum where the new arrivals shared in the services and the scarce employment opportunities, the brunt of supporting the rushing numbers fell on the government, despite the scarcity of the available facilities. The good treatment of the Southerners must continue to a national care and the states should not be left to deal with the Southern displaced unaided. What had been provided was insufficient in proportion to the big numbers. Good treatment and possible help to assuage the sufferings of the displaced during the interim period, which precedes reintegration, so that they would not find themselves between the hammer of the war and the anvil of displacement in the North. What is demanded is the generation of a popular revolution for cooperation and solidarity to improve the conditions of the displaced for a better life. The destruction of the barriers of estrangement would definitely be through kind treatment, which must be accorded the Southerners, is also a consolidation of the unity of the country and a criterion to decide the outcome of any plebiscite in the South for self-determination. It also extirpates the bitter social residues, the dust or fallout, the repercussions of the colonisation era, intended to distance the two regions from one another, continue the bleeding, and corroborate the feeling of suspicion and mistrust in which a Southerner views a Northerner.
e. The Completion of Basic Services in IDPs Settlements and Townships: -
It is time for the Sudan to display a physical strategy that achieve national unity and permanent peace. This necessitates the fusion of all the Sudanese layers of the community. It demands that we endeavour to resettle the displaced in different parts of the country to thwart disparities and to emphasise that the people of the Sudan are cohesively united. This helps in the promotion and development of the culture of the displaced and upgrading his abilities through integration, diffusion and education. However, the displaced may not diffuse into the new community unless they are resettled and the affairs of their families are managed and the practicing of their daily activities are resumed to discard loneliness and boredom. Complete settlement of the displaced would take place when they own their houses and enjoy their full rights as citizens of the state. This would not be effected before the provision of the basic services for their settlement and their involvement in all public affairs of the community and the state.
Hence the formulation of strategies, plans, public policies, detailed programmes, the allocation of budgets, the improvising of funding, to complete services and public utilities for the displaced are foremost tasks for the state and its communities if the displaced are to settle and become tools of development. Consequently negligence of the living and social conditions of the displaced would widen the social chasm and material disparity and would explode to vent molten and burning lava to scorch the cities, which have accommodated them. A pause with oneself to sense the national responsibility at such a particular time, is highly important. It is becoming imperative to mobilize all the efforts to complete the basic services and the public utilities at settlements of the displaced, together with an urgent need to provide child provisions and support especially those at school age and encourage them for regular school attendance. Exceptional care must be given to the homeless children. They are the hope and the safety valve of the stability of this country. Looking at table 18, which displays the needs of the displaced for the basic services, one feels the enormous challenge that encounters the State of Khartoum. One is also bound to feel the sufferings of the people of Khartoum State who have to share their food with their displaced brothers despite the increasing pressure of life. Khartoum State would not be able to provide the immense scale of services without federal support and public mobilization. There are many positive examples which confirm the possibility of tapping the enthusiasm of this nation at all official and public levels, while it is possible to get support of friends across the borders.
f. The Extension of Communication Bridges Between the North and the South
There is no doubt that the isolation of the South from the North is a result of the closed zones policy, which led to the deterioration and aggravation of the security conditions in the Sudan in addition to the instigation practised by colonisation and its institutions to widen the chasm between the North and the South. Any reform to recover the missing trust between the north and the South, to correct the erroneous understandings, which still cling to the minds of the lay Southerners, would bear no fruition except through the abrogation of the poisonous ideas fostered. Staying long enough in the North, the Southerners are bound to discover sooner or later that they have been misled for apparent reasons and would inevitably discover the sterling qualities of their brothers in the North If they voluntarily return to the South, they would narrate their experiences in the North, which would be in the interest of national unity. The humane treatment they have received in the North would be a seedling of good
deeds, germinating in a blessed soil and would bloom and bear the fruits of brotherhood and dedication. These are favourable features of migration to the North. To break the yoke erected around the South, transport and communications must be made easy between the two halves of the country. This would necessitate the extension of the railway line as far as Juba and Malakal and the rehabilitation of the railway stations already in existence and which were neglected throughout the years of the civil strife. The establishment of new railway stations and railway headquarters in the three principal towns of the South, as well as building overland tarmac roads to penetrate into the South. It is crucially important to extend El Jebelen Peace Road to Malakal, Juba and Torit as well as extending the roads along the areas of the oil wells to sprawl southwards until they exceed the depths of the South. It is essential to rehabilitate the inner streets of the towns and state roads in the South as well as building the new airports at Kapoeta, Yambio, Nasir and Bantu etc. River transport shall remain most important to link the Southern states with the North because it is the cheapest and serves many of the rural and urban centres, which sprouted along the banks of the White Nile and the ramifying estuaries. This would require the recalling of life to the River Transport Corporation through the rehabilitation of river containers, vessels, barges, new boats gyass (large, flat- bottomed sea going barges) in order that the corporation becomes effective, active and productive The coupling of the Southern States with their sisters in the North with a net of air, river, railway and overland net of road transport is a real security chain which facilitate the movement of Southerners and Northerners to diffuse through like the molecules of liquids. Besides, such a net would activate investment, internal and external trade at a regional and international scale. Public transport networks is the key of investment, not only in the fields of agriculture, industry, forest resources, fresh water and marine fish and livestock, but also in the diversities of mineral wealth scarcely found in any other country. Deposits of all minerals exist in Sudan besides the oil wealth, which exists in large fields and rapidly increasing. Communication between the North and the South, through the availability of public transport within reach of the rich and the poor is the strongest pillar of the structure of national unity, and the backbone of the Sudan economic growth and political stability. The lines of public transport, which must be extended, are the veins and arteries through which the sap of life, nourishment and vigour seeps into the component parts of the country. Colonisation had succeeded in severing those veins and arteries particularly those feeding peripheral regions and consequently paralysed the country, through lack of communication and contact with the other limbs and organs of the country. Any organ
devoid of the blood circulation is dead. Thus the South was lost through lack of physical communication and popular contacts on its early days. The blood pumping heart of the Sudan has ailed and is pumping blood into chocked veins and conveyance arteries. It is hardly imaginable that the country managed to survive through beleaguering conditions, trundling under the pressure of a heavy national discord. Allah had endowed the Sudanese with patience and toleration, lest they would not have kept a country intact, in such an exhausted condition for a long time Elaborating on extending communication bridges, we must benefit from the population exodus, which roamed the varied parts and regions of the Sudan. The effect of this human movement would result in the reconstruction of the demographic composition in every region of the Sudan because the size of the moving bulk of the population is immensely huge and, it is yet on the increase i.e. the effective reaction with the stagnant masses of the population in the North, which remain in their original habitat, would expedite the new netting of the demographic, cultural, social and behavioural fabric of the nation. It is a fact that half of the population of the South has moved North. If we intend to benefit from this situation and utilize it in favour of the national diffusion and break the intensity of tribal cohesion and bigotry as a prelude of casting a nation, we must lure some of the North Sudanese to migrate south to preserve the balance and engender further fusion through intermarriage and social co-existence. Migration of North Sudanese to the South would reduce the rates of the tribal population density in every state and produces homogeneity of the tribal diversity in each state as well. Displaced tribes with culture, skills and experience would certainly affect other communities with which they come into contact, particularly if the incoming tribes are in early development stages.
g. Establishment of Development Centres in Khartoum State for Employment of IDPs
The establishment of development centres in Khartoum for the attraction of labour from the multitudes of the displaced is highly important. There are great numbers of the unemployed wondering about in the streets of Khartoum waiting for an employer. Finding work for the displaced has several advantages, besides earning a living for families, it increases the economic base in Khartoum State, particularly the three towns, which compose the national capital. Many of the misbehaviour practices are a result of unemployment, congestions on the streets and slouching about. A feature of unemployment is the practice of women of standing jobs, such as the sale of unhygienic food and drinks. They move from one place to another to avoid the
campaigns of public order and public health officers. These marginal jobs then expanded and included the sale of narcotic drugs and liquor. The use of public order forces and staff is incompatible with the phenomena because it is of social origin associated with different understandings and social disparities and would certainly require treatment of a more professional nature, besides the alleviation of the intensity of poverty and beggary. It requires the implementation of cultural programmes ear-marked for the displaced community to promote their understanding. Arrogance to solve social problems would lead to adverse effects, which increase the suffering of the displaced and harms the programmes of amalgamation with the new urban community we are aiming at. The intention is not the creation of resented, isolated, socially aggressive communities antagonistic to the old established community of Khartoum. Since women constitute a higher rate in the displaced Southern communities as mentioned in previous paragraphs, it is essential to give more concern to woman employment to earn a living in her new surroundings. It is necessary to establish woman development centres where she can find care and protection to enable her as head of a household instead of deviation and slippage from the righteous track. Women could be trained to acquire skills in revenue tapping vocations to bring up her children in a respectable way and become good members of the community. Care must also be accorded to the homeless children, otherwise they would find care at the hands of the enemies of the society and become a springboard for the disturbance of social peace and tarnishing the face of their nation. They would be timely bombs full of resentment; hatred and animosity, which when released would crack the wall of social peace.
Conclusion
No doubt that the war that had been raging since the eve of independence and now with extending licking flames in the east had shattered the country’s hope of progress and development. The effects of this devastating war would not be effaced in the near future even if the war came to an end. The most pugnacious and insidious atrocities of this war is its ejection of millions of displaced, mostly southerns whose roots have been shattered and are sporadically scattered. Those who came north proofed to be wise. Despite the care and attention they have received in the North and nowhere else, their huge numbers incapacitated the northern communities from satisfying their needs because of the weakness of the base of the national economy besides the high cost of the war, which devoured the greater bulk of the resources of the country. Through the narration we have given in this report it is revealed that the displaced have problems and difficulties that
require immediate attention. Because of our cognisance we are convinced that the government is unable to meet the needs of the displaced while simultaneously covering the cost of the war. There is no solution but to cease this damned war, and for the Sudan to find someone to assist it to cover the cost of the requirements of the displaced, the cost which has exhausted the people and shattered their hopes. The solution of the problems of the displaced, their basic needs, the alleviation of their sufferings their resettlement and reintegration in the new communities must enjoy top priority of the government service and public expenditure programmes. It is the topic, which would resolve the issue of peace and national unity. The youth and children of the displaced, wondering aimlessly are the future and aspirations of the Sudan. Hence the topic of the displaced is firmly connected with the integrated Sudan. It has been revealed that the tragic conditions of the displaced would not be cleared only through satisfying their material needs, it overflows into the moral harms closely linked with their future destinies. The requirements of the IDPs integration into the new society, dictates a change of their behaviour, their ambitions and the mode of life they were familiar with. No peace would reign, nor any national unity between the North and the South would prevail, unless the social and cultural disparities between the Northern and Southern communities are effaced or at least reduced. In this case the timely bomb planted by the colonizer who prevented communication between the North and the South is made ineffective. Sustainable peace would only come into being through the integration of the displaced into the northern communities as step toward fusion of all Sudanese communities, the pollination of their civilisations, while retaining the characteristics of their cultural and various ethnic components within a unified framework. The start would be by investing the peace opportunities availed us through displacement and the exodus of the southern population to the north. This is the challenge, the defiance and the pain of delivery, which requires the raking of the mind, enriching of dialogue, giving exemplar model, the presentation of peace culture, the pervasion of love among the community members, north and south, and the tackling of the problems of the displaced through the investment of these principles and values . Thus displacement and the demographic exodus to the north would bear the fruits and benefits leading to the reform of the community and its cohesion. The congestion of the displaced in Khartoum could be benevolent tools if well utilised. They are a striking production force whenever employment opportunities are provided. The government must provide respectable means of earning a living to sound the strength of their will and to ensure a future for their children. The difficulties of Khartoum State
will grow unless the displaced achieve a real addition to the economic base of the state. Without invigorating the economic base of the national capital, the city would not be able to build her urban structures and; her localities and would not manage strengthening their institutions, and her fabric, whether physical or social would not be closely knitted. Urban development and social elevation are bound with the promotion of the community culture, values and traditions, not only through the effort of the government. If Khartoum Capital is intended to stride along the path of urban development, that would not materialise except through the activation of the culture, values, and principles of the community, which requires further efforts to promote the culture, the behaviour and the system of the life of our displaced brothers.
Dr. Sharaf Eldin Ibrahim Bannaga.
References
1. Dr. Sharaf El Din I. Bannaga 1996. MAWA: Unauthorised and Squatter Settlements in Khartoum. Habitat Group, School of Architecture/ETH Zurich 2. Dr. Sharaf El Din I Bannaga. 2000..– Al Shorouk: The Organisation of Villages in the State of Khartoum. Habitat Group, School of Architecture ETH/Zurich.
3. Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng. 1998. Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement, Washington D.C. Brooking Institution.
4. Francis M. Deng 1995. Internally Displaced Persons. Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms. UN Doc. E/CN. 4/1996/52/Ad2. 5. Walter Kalin. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement Annotation. Studies in trans-national Legal Policy. No 32. ASIL and the Brooking Institution. 6. Jeremy Loveless 1998. Displaced Populations in Khartoum: A Study of Social and Economic Conditions for Save the Children, Denmark, Channel Research Ltd.
7. Dr. Catherine Miller and Dr. Al Amin Abu Manga 1992. Language Change and National Integration. Rural Migrants in Khartoum. URA 1235 – LLAOR-CNRS, University of Nice – France and IAAS, University of Khartoum, Sudan.
8. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. United Nations.
9. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Manual Field Practice in Internal Displacement. Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group 1999. 10. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. United Nations Consolidated Inter- Agency Appeal for the Sudan. January-December 2000 UN Geneva Switzerland.
11. United Nations, Operation Lifeline Sudan: Annual Needs Assessment, November 1999. 12. ILO, Regional Office for Arab States 1991. A Survey of Migration and Labour Power in Sudan (Source – Ministry of Labour, Republic of the Sudan). 13. United Nations, Humanitarian Operation in Sudan: Annual Needs Assessments, December 2000
14. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2001.
15. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2002.
12 - List of Tables and Drawings Background Information for Papers 9 to 11 by Dr Sharaf El Din Ibrahim Bannaga
TABLES 1. Estimates of Internally Displaced Persons, 1995 and 1996 2. Estimates of Displaced Population in Sudan 3. Number of Displaced Persons in Settlements in Khartoum Capital in 1991 4. Housing Demand, 1990-2000 5. (a) Humanitarian Aid for Sudan During the Period (1989-April 1997) (b) The Percentage of Relief Distributed between Government and SPLA Zones 6. The Cost of Procurement and Transport of Food Relief During the Period 1995-1997 (As Per Mode of Transport) 7. NGOs Operating in Sudan In 1999 8. Voluntary Repatriation Convoys During (92/93/94/95/96) 9. Percentage of Displaced Families Agreed on Voluntary Repatriation 10. The Legalised Number of Families as per Programme Until the End of 1999 11. Summary of Services Available in the Displaced Camps (Health, Education and Others in 1996) 12. Public Utility Services (Year 2000) 13. Albaraka Township 14. Albaraka Township – Public Utility Services 15. Displaced Tribes Settled in Khartoum and Kassala as Percentage of its Population 16. NGOs Operating in Khartoum State 17. Marriage According to Ethnicity 18. The Demand for Basic and Public Services
DRAWINGS 1. Direction of Population Movement in Arab Countries 2. Khartoum Population (1955-2000) 3. Reported Estimates of Global Displaced Populations from World Refugee Survey, 1985-1996) 4. Boundaries of the Previous Master Plans for Khartoum 5. Operation Lifeline Sudan 6. Treatment of Settlements 7. Relocation Sites 8. Incorporation of Villages in Urban Fabrics 9. Market Locations in the Seven Provinces 10. Road Network Extended Inside the Capital 11. Khartoum State Location 12. Block 5 of Takamul 13. Alkalakla Township 14. Aldroushab Township Table (1) Estimates of Internally Displaced Persons, 1995 and 1996
Country 1995 Country 1996
Sudan 4,000,000 Sudan 4,000,000 Turkey 2,000,000 Turkey 500,000-2,000,000 Angola 1,500,000 Afghanistan 1,200,000 Bosnia & Herzegovina 1,300,000 Angola 1,200,000 Iraq 1,000,000 Bosnia & Herzegovina 1,000,000 Liberia 1,000,000 Myanmar (Burma) 500,000-2,000,000 Sierra Leone 1,000,000 Liberia 1,000,000 Myanmar (Burma) 500,000-1,000,000 Iraq 900,000 Sri Lanka 850,000 Sri Lanka 900,000 Azerbaijan 670,000 Sierra Leone 800,000 Colombia 600,000 Colombia 600,000 Afghanistan 500,000 Azerbaijan 550,000 Mozambique 500,000 South Africa 500,000 Rwanda 500,000 Lebanon 450,000 South Africa 500,000 Peru 420,000 Peru 480,000 Burundi 400,000 Lebanon 400,000 Russian Federation 400,000 Burundi 300,000 Zaire (Congo) 400,000 Somalia 300,000 Georgia 285,000 Syria 300,00 Cyprus 265,00 Georgia 280,000 India 250,000 Cyprus 265,000 Somalia 250,000 India 250,000 Guatemala 200,000 Russian Federation 250,000 Croatia 185,000 Croatia 240,000 Syria 125,000 Zaire 225,000 Kenya 100,000 Kenya 210,000 Philippines 93,000 Guatemala 200,000 Papua New Guinea 70,000 Ghana 150,000 Uganda 70,000 Armenia 70,000 Armenia 50,000 Philippines 60,000 Tajikistan 50,000 Cambodia 55,000 Cambodia 32,000 Tajikistan 17,000 Nigeria 30,000 Mali 10,000 Djibouti 25,000 Algeria n.a.)) Ghana 20,000 Nigeria n.a.)) Algeria 10,000 Uganda n.a.)) Mozambique n.a.)) Rwanda n.a.))
Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees. World Refugee Survey. 1996and 1997.
Table No (2) Estimates of Displaced Population in Sudan
Numbers are in thousands Khartoum State OLS (SCOVA) HAC Squatter Nov. 1999 1989 1999 Department East and West
Equatoria and Bahr El 264 180 Jebel Upper Nile and 60 180 Jongley Unity 50 170 Bahr El Gahazal 15.4 White Nile 53.5 170 53 South Darfour
6.16 Red Sea States 48.5 3000and only 2000and only Family 250 are living 220 are living in 1580 Khartoum 331.5 official Camps official Camps Camps 30 175 Kasala and Gadaref South and West 175 300 118.7 Kordofan Blue Nile and 170 Gezeera 165 Northern and R. Nile Total Number of 4200 3090 457.6 IDPs
Table (3) Number of Displaced Persons in Settlements in Khartoum Capital in 1991
Settlement Number of Displaced Person New shouk 20.000 Dar El Salam 15.000 K. Industrial Area 5.000 Wad Ajeeb 500 Abu Adam and Azoazab 33.000 Wad El Basheir 7.000 Gama’ar and Khuddeir 55.000 El Sheikh Abu Zeid 30.000 El Muweilih 10.000 Wad Omarah 11.000 Id Husein 5.000 Soba Numoozagia 10.000 Zagaloana and Industrial Omdurman 175.000 El Shoak Bantio 175.000 El Izbah Bahri 175.000 Karton Kasala, Baroana, Takamul 350.000 Mayo El Hizam 25.000 Bahri Industrial Area 45.000 El Shiglah El Hag Yousif 10.000 El Shiglah Omdurman 25.000 El Dikheinat 20.000 El Gireif East 25.000 El Gireif West 75.000 Kalakla and Kurmuta 150.000 Lamab Bahr Abiad 12.000 Umbaddah 17 5.000 Umbaddah 21 5.000 Jabrah 15.000 Al Thuwrah 14 2.000 Al Hag Yousif 25.000 Maygoama 10.000 Abu Seid 10.000 New Dar Al Salam 15.000 El Sugganah 3.000 El Goz 3.000 El Rimeilah 3.000 Arkaweit 10.000 Marzoog 5.000 Total Number of IDPs 1.570.000
source :Displaced Persons Commissonerate
Table ( 4 ) HOUSING DEMAND 1990-2000 1990 1995 2000 No. of Households 388000 525000 736000 Households per dwelling 1.15 1.10 1.00 Total Housing Demand 337400 477300 736000 Available Houses 337400(1) 202400(2) 135000(3) Demand for Replacement (4) 135000(5) 202400(6) New Housing Demand 139900 398600 Average Plot Size in New Areas (m2) 300 250 Needs In New Residential Land (ha) (7) 8400 20000 1. Existing housing stock (total 1990) regardless of condition. 2. 60% of the existing (1990) housing stock, remaining considered obsolete or dilapidated. 3. 40% of the existing (1990) housing stock, remaining considered dilapidated. 4. Replacement due to deteriorated condition. 5. 40%of existing stock to be replaced. 6. 60% of existing housing stock to be replaced. 7. The number of new houses, multiplied by the average plot size, assuming that plot area equals 50% of the gross area. Source: Consultants, estimates (Doxiadis and Associates)
Table No (5a) Humanitarian Aids for Sudan During the Period (1989-April1997)
Percentage of Actually Availed by Donors Needs estimated by needs provided ($Million) Year UN $Million by Donors Total NGOs UN 53% 219 117 102 195 1993 100% 215 195 185 186 1994 50% 132 81 51 101 1995 51% 111 56 55 108 1996 5% 10 4 6 121 1997 46% 687 315 399 711 Total
Table No (5b) The Percentage of Relief Distributed between Government and SPLA Zones Quantity SPLA Zones Government Zones Year in Ton Quantity Number of Quantity Number of Percentage Percentage in Tons beneficiaries in Tons beneficiaries 34% 34.516 _ 66% 66.252 600.000 90.768 1989 23% 19.607 900.000 77% 66.517 1.100.000 86.124 1990 71% 36.421 _ 29% 14.975 _ 51.396 1991 47% 21.785 700.000 53% 24.688 900.000 46.473 1992 63% 33.310 700.000 37% 19.749 900.000 53.059 1993 70% 44.225 _ 30% 17.944 _ 75.169 1994 50% 44.234 500.000 50% 43.719 600.000 87.953 1995 52% 32.318 1.290.000 48% 30.603 649.000 63.222 1996 44% 2.584 950.000 56% 3.294 190.000 5.878 1997 47% 254.301 5.040.000 53% 287.741 4.939.000 542.042 Total
Table No (6 ) The Cost of Procurement and Transport of Food Relief During the period (1995- 1997) (As Per mode of Transport)
Cost
% of Cost of Cost relief Transport % Total USD Transport items USD Value USD
265% 36.7% 16.650.600 12.087.900 4.562.700 Air Lift 1995
316% 15% 6.852.608 5.206.376 1.646.232 Air Lift 1996 Mode of Transport 316% 67% 3.371.008 2.561.176 809.832 Air Lift 1997 125% 3.7% 1.615.950 897.750 718.200 River Transport 1995 10% 44% 20.481.768 1.889.500 18.592.368 River Transport 1996 - - - - - River Transport 1997 62% 59.7% 27.095.113 10.325.438 16.769.575 Road Transport 1995
61% 41% 19.392.912 7.345.800 12.047.112 Road Transport 1996 61% 23% 1.023.660 387.750 635.910 Road Transport 1997
Table (7) NGOs Operating in Sudan in 1999
HEALTH LIVESTOCK WATER EDUCATION AGRICULTURE RELIEF SOCIAL DEVT. NUTRITION VETERINARY SANITATION ACF AAH ACROSS Muslim Aid Muslim Aid ACF ACORD ACROSS ACORD BIO ACF ACF ACORD ADRA African Society for ADRA ACROSS ACF ADRA Protection of Women and Ana ELSUDAN ADRA ECS/SUDRA ACROSS ACORD ASHAD Childern Appeal ASHAD FAR ADRA ADRA BIO ASHAD International Human Appeal BIO ASHAD BIO CARE CARE CARE Inter, CARE BIO IARA GAA COSV FAR DAWA CMA CARE ACF HeathNet DAWA GHF DIMARSI Human Appeal COSV CCM ADRA FAR GOAL GHF International DAWA CMA IFRC IARA GHF Human Appeal GOAL HelpAge ECS/SUDRA COSV SCC IFRC HeathNet inter. International Sudan Human Appeal FAR DAWA SCF(UK) OXFAM IAS IARA International GHF DIMARSI SCF(S) OXFAM(UK&I) IFRC IIRO IARA Global 2000 ECS/SUDRA SCF OXFAM(UK) IIRO Islamic Relief IFRC GOAL GHF SIDO SCC IRC Worldwide IIRO HealthNet GOAL Human SRC SCF(UK) Islamic Reilf Muslim Aid IRC HelpAge HealthNet SRC SCF(USA) MEDAIR NCA Muslim Aid International Sudan Programme IARA Sudan Aid SRC MSF-B SCC NCA Human Appeal IAS VSF-CH VSB MSF-H SCF(USA) OXFAM(UK&I) International IFRC OXFAM(UK&I) VSF-CH MSF(F) SIDO SCC IARA IIRO DAWA MSF(H) Sudan Aid SCF(S) IFRC IRC OXFAM NCA WOTAP SCF(USA) IIRO Isamic Relief WVI OXFAM YMCA SIDO IRC MEDAIR ACORD OXFAM(UK&I) SRC SLPO Islamic Relief MEDAIR CRS SCF(S) IFRC SNCTP Worldwide MDM MSF-B GAA SCF(UK) MEDAIR Sudan Aid MEDAIR MSF-H GHF SCF(USA) DAWA WOTAP MEDAIR Muslim Aid SRC ECS/SUDRA YMCA MSF-B NCA Sudan Aid OXFAM SRC MSF-H NCA Worldwide SCF(UK) IFRC MSF(F) OXFAM(UK&I) WVI IAS SRC MSF(H) SCC SCC MSF-B HeathNet Muslim Aid SCF(S) SCC MEDAIR NCA SCF(UK) WVI BIO SIDO CRS ECS/SUDRA SCF(UK) SLPO HeathNet FAR SIDO SNCTP IMC Islamic Relief SLPO SRC SCF(S) Worldwide SRC Sudan Aid OXFAM(UK&I) SCF(UK) Sudan Aid VSB CCM VSF-CH VSF-CH IIRO(NN) YMCA Worldwide OXFAM CCM WOTAP SCC IAS YMCA WVI WVI AAH CRS GAA IMC SCF(S) ACF IFRC(NN) SRC(NN)
Table No(8) Voluntary Repatriation Convoys during (92/93/94/95/96)
Number of Date State Families Convoy Name Item Returned Home 6.3.1992 Kordofan 150 Abuei (1) 1 26.3.1992 Upper Nile 380 Mayoom 2 14.7.1992 Darfor 673 Darfor 3 11.10.1992 Kordofan 162 Nuba, Keeta, Kadogli 4 26.4.1993 Upper Nile 300 Renk 5 17.5.1993 Kordofan 726 Mayram 6 17.6.1993 Kordofan 337 Abyei (2) 7 20.11.1992 Darfor 220 Samaha 8 27.6.1992 Kordofan 25 Nuba, Rashad 9 25.11.1992 Upper Nile 1053 Bantio, Unity 10 17.8.1993 Equatoria 775 Juba 11 25.6.1993 Kordofan 73 Lagawa 12 20.5.1993 Kordofan 1000 Abyei (3) 13 8.2.1994 Kordofan 178 Nuba, Meerei, Kadogli 14 15.5.1994 Bahr El Gazal 175 Raja, Waw 15 15.5.1995 Upper Nile 750 South Blue Nile, South Upper Nile 16 South 6.1996 500 Deling, Kadogli 17 Kordofan South 7.1996 150 Kadogli, Um Doarein 18 Kordofan
§ Total Number of Families Returned Home =7627 § Number Of People Returned Home =38515 persons Returnees Left Displaced Persons Camps (May , Al salam . Jebel Aulia)
Table No (9) Percentage of Displaced Families Agreed on Voluntary Repatriation
Al salam Jebel Aulia May No of No of No of Region % % % Families Families Families 3.9 1237 7.6 2431 3.2 1040 Southern Region 0.7 237 1.2 394 0.4 97 Western Region 0.4 138 0.2 101 0.3 115 Northern Region 0.0 3 0.0 3 0.0 3 Eastern Region 0.0 6 0.0 4 0.0 3 Others
Table No (10) The Legalized number of families as per programme until the end of 1999
No. Programme Number of Families
1 Village Organization Programme 150000 2 Squatter Treatment Programme 2.1 In New Township 11000 2.2 In Original Neighborhoods 70000 2.3 In Housing Schemes (S&S) 30000 2.4 Not Eligible 20000 Sub Total 23000 3 Internal Displacement Programme (camps) 80000 (immediately after relocation) 4 Housing Schemes (Land Distribution) based on site and service schemes 4.1 General List 50000 4.2 Government Employees 30000 4.3 Expatriates 10000 4.4 Compensation for land acquisition 10000 4.5 Village New sub-divisions 20000 Sub Total 125000 General Total 585000
Table No (11) SUMMARY OF THE SERVICES AVAILABLE IN THE DISPLACED CAMPS (HEALTH – EDUCATION- AND OTHERS) (IN1996)
EDUCATION DRUGS HEALTH SERVICES HEALTH SERVICES FOOD SERVICES SERVICES SERVICES NGOs INGOs NGOs INGOs NGOs INGOs NGOs INGOs 36 (Schools) for both 8 Health 20 Nutrition 8 Nutrition 23 Health Centres 20% 60% 10% 70% NGOs & INGOs Centres Centres Centres
SOCIAL SERVICES REVOLVING RELIGIONS SECURITY WATER SERVICES (WID) SERVICES SERVICES SERVICES BORE HOLES HAND PUMPS ORGANIZATIONS ORGANIZATIONS INGO NGOs INGOs NGOs NGOs INGOs NGOs INGOs Churches Mosques s 100% 3 2 10 95 11 3 3 - 25 15 Government
Note: Number of families in each camp was as follows 1. Al Salam 28000 2. Jebel Aulia 16000 3. Wad AlBasheir 13000 4. Mayo Farms 10000
Table No (12) Public Utility Services (Year 2000)
Water Services Educational Health Service Worship Place Security Services Services Camp Bore Hand Primary Kinder- Curative ENV Feeding Mosques Churches Police Security As per Population Holes Pumps Schools gartens year Estimates Alsalam 1995 65500 7 11 7 8 3 8 27 5 3 1997 36000 1998 88500 2000 114000 Wad 1995 35000 4 4 6 1 2 4 2 1 ElBasheir 1998 51000 2000 43000 Jebel Aulia 1995 56000 1 115 8 10 7 7 7 8 1 1997 445000 1998 240000 2000 21000 Mayo 1995 28000 65 7 5 7 3 2 2 4 1 Farms 1997 36500 2000 18000 Total 1995 185000 12 180 30 22 28 4 14 21 41 6 5 2000 196000
Table No (13) ALBARAKA TOWNSHIP
Clarifications Number of families Results Assessment No These are old squatters not defected by the 4985 Accommodated at Al
planning process Baraka This is the location site adjacent to Al Baraka 3274 Relocated to Dar El
Settlement Salam Id Babikir They are relocated to Omdurman because of 463 Relocated to
unavailability of lands with Al Haj Yousif area Omdurman Not eligible are usually those who do not hold 608 Not eligible
sudanese nationalities or those who are of hacheler status Means assessment depends on witness interview 198 To see witness
Means a decision has not been taken as yet 43 To take decision
Means 25% of Baraka settlers are previously 25 Accommodated at El
accommodated in El Takamul Settlement Takamul 9 Documents are
required Total 9605 Total number of families Pending 375 Number of forms distributed 10.000 Forms not completed as yet by settlers 395
Table No (14) ALBARAKA TOWNSHIP Public Utility Services
Health Markets Open Vacant Boreholes Kinder Schools Plot Block No Centres Spaces Areas garten s - 18 32 1 1 4 4 1616 1 1 2 1 23 1 1 1 2 1404 2 2 - 1 20 1 1 - 2 682 3 3 6 - 25 - - - - 1442 4 4 - 1 - 1 1 - 4 - 5 5 8 21 100 4 4 5 12 5134 Total
Table No (15) Displaced Tribes Settled in Karton Kasala As Percentage of its Population Dinka 25% For 21% Shuluk 12% Nuba 6% Baria 6% Salhab 3% Joor 3% Nueir 3% Burgo 3% Kuru 2.5% Moro 2.5% Tabousa 2.5% Banda 2.5% Dajo 1.5% Manaseer 1.5% Arab 1.5% Non-Sudanese 2% Others 1.5% Note: These figures are extracted from number of unpublished reports.
Table (16) NGOs Operating in Khartoum State
HEALTH LIVESTOCK WATER SOCIAL EDUCATION RELIEF NUTRITION VETERINARY SANITATION DEVELOPMENT ACF ACORD MUSLIM AID ACF ACF ACORD ADRA ADRA AUMAN APPEAL ACORD ACORD ADRA Ana ELS INTERNATIONA UDAN ASHAD L ADRA ADRA African Society ASHAD CARE CARE ASHAD for Protection of Women and ECS/SUDRA DAWA DAWA BIO Childern FAR DIMARSI FAR CARE ASHAD GHF ECS/SUDRA IFRC FAR CARE GOAL GHF IIRO GHF DAWA HelpAge International GOAL MSF(F) GOAL DIMARSI Sudan Programme Human Appeal MSF(H) Human GHF Human Appeal International Appeal GOAL HelpAgeInternatio International IARA inter. nal IARA IFRC IARA Sudan IFRC IRC IIRO Human Appeal Islamic IRC Islamic Relief Relief International Muslim Islamic Relief Worldwide Aid IARA Worldwide Muslim Aid NCA IFRC MSF(H) NCA SCC IIRO OXFAM(UK Muslim Aid &I) SCF(UK) IRC NCA SCC SIDO Muslim Aid SCC SCF(S) SRC NCA SCF(UK) SCF(UK) Sudan Aid OXFAM(UK&I) SIDO SIDO Worldwide SCC SLPO SLPO WOTAP SCF(S) SRC SNCTP YMCA SCF(UK) Sudan Aid SRC SIDO YMCA Sudan Aid SLPO WOTAP SNCTP YMCA SRC Sudan Aid WOTAP YMCA
Table No (17) Marriage according to ethnicity
Types of Marriage Ethnicity Total Bachelor Same. tr. Neighb.tr. Foreign Unknown Arab - 12 3 3 1 17 Darfurian 3 5 - - 1 19 Nuba 3 19 2 1 25 Bor 5 7 8 2 2 24 Adamawa 4 5 9 2 - 20 Bongo- Bag 1 2 5 1 - 9 Moro- Madi - 5 2 - - 7 Nilotic 3 3 1 - - 7 E.Nilotic - 5 2 - - 7 Total 19 (15%) 63 (50%) 30 (24%) 8 (6%) 5 (5%) 125
Source: Dr. Catherine Miller and Dr. AL-Amin Abu-Manga in their Book entittled “ Language Change and National Integration”
Table No (18) The Demand for Basic and Public Services
Province
Total North Karari East Nile Khartoum Omdurman Jabal Aulia UmBaddah 55 5 5 10 10 15 10 Primary Schools 23 3 3 3 4 6 4 Secondary Schools 14 2 2 2 2 3 3 Public Health Centres 45 4 5 6 8 15 7 Water Stations 13 1 1 2 3 4 2 Police Stations
Women Development Type of Service 20 2 2 3 4 5 4 Centres 6 - 1 2 1 2 - Tribe Leader Offices 27 2 3 4 6 8 4 Youth Centres and Clubs 9 1 1 1 2 3 1 Ministry of Housing Offices 80 10 10 15 15 20 10 Paved Regional Roads
5600 500 500 800 1000 2000 800 Pipd Water Networks 600 50 50 100 100 200 100 Main Drainage Lines 3500 250 250 500 500 1500 500 Public Latrines 33 2 3 3 5 15 5 Brick Manufacturing Yards 200 25 25 25 25 25 25 Gas Distribution Centres 13 1 1 2 2 5 2 Tent Manufacturing Yards 19 1 1 2 2 10 3 Vocational Training Centres
Drawing No. 2 Khartoum Population (1955 – 2000)
d½ŽÃ§µ£@@nº@@HTI@ boundaries@of@the@previous@master@plans@for@khartoum
r @ e @ v @ i @ r @ @ @ l @ i @ n
t u t i b @l@u@e
n
@ i @ l @ e
e
@ l
@ i
@
n
e
@
t
@
i
@
h
@ w
bºÁµŸŽ½Å@º¢@dºÄ§ŽŸ§¿@mŽ¿À¡½@p°Žµ@HQYUYIM
bºÁµŸŽ½Å@º¢@m¡¢§À@mŽ¿À¡½@p°Žµ@HQYWWIM
ažÀÁŽ°@QYYP@u½šŽµ@bºÁµŸŽ½Å@
Figure No 5 Operation Lifeline Sudan
(Transportation Lines)
Drawing No.6 Treatment of Settlement
r @ e @ v @ i @ r @ @ @ l @ i @ n
t u t i b@l@u@e
n
@
i @
l
@
e
e @ l @ i @
n
e
@
t
@
i
@
h
@ w greater@khartoum structure@plan
squatter@areas proposed treatment
legend
r¡ºŽ±±§±£
i±žµ¼ºµ¼Ž¿§µ±
r¡µžŽ¿§µ±
p¡±Ÿ§±£ d¼ŽÂ§±£@nµW
map@shows@@relocation@sites
VQ um al@ka m@ dro al @g U hr T a jN@brkat a TV l @ UR US t h h
TX N
w @ a
d w T e SX P r a r e ir a e e T s T TU SW s TY al SV al@e @sa t zairgab lma TQ e e
TS r t w s S a
TR T @ d @
SY i @
d a
S a l
U P @ U Y w W @ b Q l mrzo W a og a UP S k
a R y
a e
l l t UQ Q QP @ X @ f d QY r UV t i o h QV Y U R V s o U P h y Y h w T a a Q a l Q R Q R f b n al@hitan RY a a RT QR QT RP y S e
t QP a
Q l S U @ X X RV Q RW m QT RX V u W QU RS QS Y QP W l Y u
k Q V R RP QY RR al@nil U QR W S X X l d RQ a a a y i l r own i r t @
a e s
T d g QX a
g @ RU R RS a @ T T U V @ m @ l QQ kh l l u d r i se a a t ir v t Q lN a UMa QP Q b S W Q R QU @ X W QU ai Q r R QR @ V p Q M o QS r a t QQ e QW g d industrial a ar ST l QU l o QP Y area c QT Q Q R Q T V V R M S U c a p R l R V R a i @ r W k s m ab o S a u i g p t a QR g b S o e U s T r a al@s y l QQ alam QR T U V RX W RY S P SU U b Y a X i t af ro a b@ al u U l a @as V kan@al@s m m QP habei a m l @ a W s RR b V l baitalmal ham s @ bat a R ug a V s l@s S RT afi d h a V a W s u
M ug Q ab h S U QV u c d l RY Q R a ia W Q X o str v shabiya a du e l@m in a zaid SW r azad QW Q Y al@engaz S l SQ SR SS X T @ i s m RP QY Y SQ a QR b al QQ R b @d a QX R a iyum a l@sa al@mazad l ba bi ea i d S a ar V W U U SV g SW SX a QT al@tka Q r o S QU QV mul Q hillat T @ a m QX l@d QW al@g an a odes@u RV agl X niv aa a N QT@ kho l l M@d ban gali k Y at h s QT@ a M t a @b QTMa m R QP QY h i RP i a l ll h a l RX R SP a t R Q Y m Q R a SP T a QQ Q d m RW MT RM e T n a S g l@wehda SS R in W Y e Y S T U V e al@wab X f r urat U al QX o s RX r i RX c dd@ e b w a Q Q atan b Y W ya ikr m R hil h W lat Y a QP S l QY QV V i R S U U a X k tR QU o Y@ RR Y ab Q k Q R SQ a u o V RQ Q s bu b T ae r kar u d ri ton@k SU assala @ R s Q R X S a S W S V ie T RX Q SR d S V Q SS Q SW SX R MS na YM um ss T TS kharto er P TU R Q RT TT air@port RS al@s higla S indusN ex SP tN T a rea R a l @ RU a g a a l RV ic l e e am @ l @ al a s a r R as l @ r j T a s a N@ @ g a tor h i t ia g y f i a m a l n l a a a l a a TY y d l sit g r g er a @ iv a z un d a a tawedat t e i f e l i@ d a @ ker a f s kog t o r a u e T l@ e g X g n t oz a d a ST n p @ UP v u e l m g US N a p l @ @ a a a l ozh m h @n e s @ al t s t s e d t t c a a a r
g e l d w e h h a e a rk t a a a e l a @ r @ushar a al a e l m v @f e g er g a do l h os e
a g s N @
@ l a ab v ad ham UY e al@ l QP R g QR T osh ash N X u mm @ @ m V d T o m m u QQ U ahafa u al@s m mm@ e dom S d a n QT V i a QU @ l s Y t QR @ m r i QS f a r e r a gMr e a k t t e h wed S t z N e Q v ag a i W h Q eeb n V u X a QU RT l QY RP a a QX b l z t oza d o QT alaz z Q b a W o a b z s QW a al@anga e l w m a n QY @ Q farms light@industrial a z n illat c b h R h e X h m R a a e l QQ r S t @ u S Q t R s e s P QR i o a k a b t a a r ra l o w @lsemr a s y a r l h e m a @ e d r k l m f @ S g ga s a a QP U T d l a o l a t in T y s a R i r RR Q a n r QS Y i l RQ a e m a s i i o l l a t h a f t o t a Y o o s d l k oba e g QX a QP m w m n a t gMr r g a c S QT a V ho s a g R T sipt y al o t b r a U o o QV @ a m o l QR r R @ c s U RT QW h V o y ket e W m mar l la Q p N all ota a R Y X n l @hessa T ed W @ U T S k QS a lU a l@ V V b l me a d @ ns vl o n o g QU T r ra N k Q e al@ s zn X ar s ka Y a l W e QP Y l@ Q n r T l a z cemet eh ery aQQ e Q e P Q n QR QQ S U a g QR r R S i N awedat @ Q t s T c QV QU QS h e m e al@nesser QU a QW QX S l V W @ a soba alaskan RP n RQ X Y a a d eri l ehw @ al@m g a a a d l e QP QQ @ s l n schem n i e w y QT e to a QR u s s e s r
fetah QU alagelieen
p o l ic T a e QV lgser
al@heraz
umm@ hraz S U
alherag
geriba
a l z h r a t o w n
al @t er t um@awana aa iba
es@samra tureia@et@beja
salh arak@ alledia
eeb alkat arak@ al@shakh bid al@a s umm@rabah o d@balaol d we n e al@segala so m umm@grager e h al@mas ara erab abu@d c s wed@alfager alsalmania a
al@shlikab eria al@am
ia @aul al al@hella jN @m ro eda o al@gad g ast ser@e al@ko m a l ial a @se s al l a @ r a d
VQ um al@ka m@ dro al @g U hr T a jN@brkat a TV l @ UR US t h h
TX N
w @ a
d w T e SX P r a r e ir a e e T s T TU SW s TY al SV al@e @sa t zairgab lma TQ e e
TS r t w s S a
TR T @ d @
SY i @
d a
S a l
U P @ U Y w W @ b Q l mrzo W a og a UP S k
a R y
a e
l l t UQ Q QP @ X @ f d QY r UV t i o h QV Y U R V s o U P h y Y h w T a a Q a l Q R Q R f b n al@hitan RY a a RT QR QT RP y S e
t QP a
Q l S U @ X X RV Q RW m QT RX V u W QU RS QS Y QP W l Y u
k Q V R RP QY RR al@nil U QR W X X l d S RQ a a a y i l r own i r t @
a e s
T d g QX a
g @ RU R RS a @ T T U V @ m @ l QQ kh l l u d r i se a a t ir v t Q lN a UMa QP Q b S W Q R QU X W QU Q R QR V Q M QS a QQ e QW g d industrial a ar ST l QU l o QP Y area c QT Q Q R Q V V t T S RU M R c al R V R a i @ r W k S s m ab u i ag Q t ab S o R g e r U T al@ y p QQ sala m T QR U @ V RX W r RY S P SU U b Y i a X i f t a a ro a b@ a U l a l l u @as V @ k m an@al@sh m QP abei a a m l @ a V W s s RR b l baitalmal ham s @ bat a R ug a V s l@s S RT afia o d h V a W s u
M ug p Q ab h S U Q u c d l RY V a ia o Q R W Q X o str v shabiya a du l n a r e @m i zaid SW r azad QW Q Y al@engaz l p S SQ SR SS X T @ i s m RP QY Y SQ a QR b al QQ R b @d a QX R a iyum a l@sa al@mazad l ba bi ea i d S a ar V W U U SV g SW SX a QT al@tka Q r o S QU QV mul Q hillat T @ a m QX l@d QW al@g an a odes@u RV agl X niv aa a N QT@ kho l l M@d ban gali k Y at h s QT@ a M t a @b QTMa m R QP QY h i RP i a l ll h a l RX R SP a t R Q Y m Q R a SP T a QQ Q d m RW MT RM e T n a S g l@wehda SS RY in S T V W e al Y U e @wabura U X al Q f r t i X o s dd@b R a X r bikr RX c e QY QW watanya m R hil h W lat Y a QP S l QY QV V i R S U U a X k tR QU o Y@ RR Y ab Q k Q R SQ a u o V RQ Q s bu b T ae r kar u d ri ton@k SU assala @ R s Q R X S a S W S V ie T RX Q SR d S V Q SS Q SW SX R MS na YM um ss T TS kharto er P TU R Q RT TT air@port RS al@s higla S indusN ex SP tN T a rea R a l @ RU a g a a l RV ic l e e am @ l @ al a s a r R as l @ r j T a s a N@ @ g a tor h i t ia g y f i a m a l n l a a a l a a TY y d l sit g r g er a @ iv a z un d a a tawedat t e i f e l i@ d a @ ker a f s kog t o r a u e T l@ e g X g n t oz a d a ST n p @ UP v u e l m g US N a p l @ @ a a a l ozh m h @n e s @ al t s t s e d t t c a a a r
g e l d w e h h a e a rk t a a a e l a @ r @ushar a al a e l m v @f e g er g a do l h os e
a g s N @
@ l a ab v ad ham UY e al@ l QP R g QR T osh ash N X @ VT umm QQ U ahafa u al@s m mm@ e dom S d a n QT V i a QU @ l s Y t QR @ m r i QS f a r e r a gMr e a k t t e h wed S t z N e Q v ag a i W h Q eeb n V u X a QU RT l QY RP a a QX b l z t oza d o QT alaz z Q b a W o a b z s QW a al@anga e l w a n QY @ Q farms light@industrial a z n illat c b h R h e X R m a a e l QQ r S t @ u S Q t RP i e s QR k t a a ra r l o w alsemr y a r e l @ e m d k @ s m f a a QP U S T l o l T a y t s a R i r r RR QS QY a n l RQ a e m a s i o l l i t h a f t o t a Y o o s d l k oba e g QX a QP m w m n a gMr r g a c S QT a V ho s a g R T sipt y al o t b r a U o o QV @ a m o l QR r R @ c s U RT QW h V o y ket e W m mar l la Q p N all ota a R Y X n l @hessa T ed W @ U T S k QS a lU a l@ V V b l me a d @ ns vl o n o g QU T r ra N k Q e X s Y a s l W e QP Y l@ Q n r T l a z cemet eh ery aQQ e Q e P Q n QR QQ S U a g QR r R S i N awedat @ Q t s T c QV QU QS h e m e al@nesser QU a QW QX S l V W @ a soba alaskan RP n RQ X Y a a d eri l ehw @ al@m g a a a d l e QP QQ @ s l n schem n i e w y QT e to a QR u s s e s r
fetah QU alagelieen
p o l ic T a e QV lgser
al@heraz
umm@ hraz S U
alherag
geriba
a l z h r a t o w n
al @t er t um@awana aa iba
es@samra
salh arak@ alledia
eeb alkat arak@ al@shakh s umm@rabah o d@balaol d we n e al@segala so m umm@grager e h al@mas ara erab abu@d c s wed@alfager alsalmania a
al@shlikab eria al@am
ia @aul al al@hella jN @m ro eda o al@gad g ast ser@e al@ko m a l ial a @se s al l a @ r a d
a
l
o g
n sisting@@roads V ex Q um
al@k m o a @ dro al @g U hr
T jN@brkat a d a TV l
@ @ U ed@ R propos US t h h
TX N
@
@ w a
d w T e SX P r a
r e i o r a e e T s T TU SW s
t TY al SV al@e @sa t zairgab lma TQ e e
TS r t w s S a
TR T @ d @
SY i @
d a
S a l
U P @ U Y w W @ b Q l mrzo W a og a UP S k
a R y
a e
l l t UQ Q QP @ X @ f d QY r UV t i o h QV Y U R V s o U P h y Y h w T a a Q a l Q R Q R f b n al@hitan RY a a RT QR QT RP y S e
t QP a
Q l S U @ X X RV Q RW m QT RX V u W QU RS QS Y QP W l Y u
k Q V R RP QY RR al@nil U QR W S X X l d RQ a a a y i l r own i r t @
a e s
T d g QX a
g @ RU RT RS a @ @ T U V @ m @ l QQ kh l l u a d r i se a a t ir v t a i Q lN r UMa QP Q b S W @ Q Q R p U X W QU o Q R QR V r Q M QS
a t QQ e QW g d industrial a S Q p ar T l U l Q Y o r P area c QT Q Q R Q T V V o S RU M R c al R V R a i @ p W k S s m ab u i ag t o a QR g b S e U r T s al@s y a QQ ala m T QR U l V R X RY W SP SU U Y b X a af i ro t b@ al u U a a @ask V an@al@s m l QP habei m m a @ l a W s RR b V l baitalmal ham s @ bat a R ug a V s l@s S RT afi d h a V a W s u
M ug Q ab h S U QV u c d l RY Q R a ia W Q X o str v shabiya a du e l@m in a zaid SW r azad QW Q Y al@engaz S l SQ SR SS X T @ i s m RP QY Y SQ a QR b al QQ R b @d a QX R a iyum a l@sa al@mazad l ba bi ea i d S a ar V W U U SV g SW SX a QT al@tka Q r o S QU QV mul Q hillat T @ a m QX l@d QW al@g an a odes@u RV agl X niv aa a N QT@ kho l l M@d ban gali k Y at h s QT@ a M t a @b QTMa m R QP QY h i RP i a l ll h a l RX R SP a t R Q Y m Q R a SP T a QQ Q d m RW MT RM e T n a S g l@wehda SS R in W Y e Y S T U V e al@wab X f r urat U al QX o s RX r i RX c dd@ e b w a Q Q atan b Y W ya ikr R hil W lat Y QP S QY QV V R S U U X k R QU o Y RR Y ab Q k Q R SQ u o V RQ Q s bu T ae r kar d ri ton@k SU assala R Q R X S S W S V T RX Q SR S V Q SS Q SW SX R MS na YM um ss T TS kharto er P TU R Q RT TT air@port RS al@s higla S indusN ex SP tN T a rea R a l @ RU a g a a l RV ic l e e am @ l @ al a s a r R as l @ r j T a s a N@ @ g a tor h i t ia g y f i a m a l n l a a a l a a TY y d l sit g r g er a @ iv a z un d a a tawedat t e i f e l i@ d a @ ker a f s kog t o r a u e T l@ e g X g n t oz a d a ST n p @ UP v u e l m g US N a p l @ @ a a a l ozh m h @n e s @ al t s t s e d t t c a a a r
g e l d w e h h a e a rk t a a a e l a @ r @ushar a al a e l m v @f e g er g a do l h os e
a g s N @
@ l a ab v ad ham UY e al@ l QP R g QR T osh ash N X u mm @ @ m V d T o m m u QQ U ahafa u al@s m mm@ e dom S d a n QT V i a QU @ l s Y t QR @ m r i QS f a r e r a gMr e a k t t e h wed S t z N e Q v ag a i W h Q eeb n V u X a QU RT l QY RP a a QX b l z t oza d o QT alaz z Q b a W o a b z s QW a al@anga e l w m a n QY @ Q farms light@industrial a z n illat c b h R h e X h m R a a e l QQ r S t @ u S Q t R s e s P QR i o a k a b t a a r ra l o w @lsemr a s y a r l h e m a @ e d r k l m f @ S g ga s a a QP U T d l a o l a t in T y s a R i r RR Q a n r QS Y i l RQ a e m a s i i o l l a t h a f t o t a Y o o s d l k oba e g QX a QP m w m n a t gMr r g a c S QT a V ho s a g R T sipt y al o t b r a U o o QV @ a m o l QR r R @ c s U RT QW h V o y ket e W m mar l la Q p N all ota a R Y X n l @hessa T ed W @ U T S k QS a lU a l@ V V b l me a d @ ns vl o n o g QU T r ra N k Q e al@ s zn X ar s ka Y a l W e QP Y l@ Q n r T l a z cemet eh ery aQQ e Q e P Q n QR QQ S U a g QR r R S i N awedat @ Q t s T c QV QU QS h e m e al@nesser QU a QW QX S l V W @ a soba alaskan RP n RQ X Y a a d eri l ehw @ al@m g a a a d l e QP QQ @ s l n schem n i e w y QT e to a QR u s s e s r
fetah QU alagelieen
p o l ic T a e QV lgser
al@heraz
umm@ hraz S U
alherag
geriba
a l z h r a t o w n
al @t er t um@awana aa iba
es@samra tureia@et@beja
salh arak@ alledia
eeb alkat arak@ al@shakh id l@ab a s t ah umm@rab o o d @ wed@balaol @ n @ o e @ al@segala s m m umm@grager e e d h a al@masar a derab n abu@ c s i wed@alfager alsalmania a
al@shlikab eria al@am
ia @aul al al@hella jN @m ro eda o al@gad g ast ser@e al@ko m a l ial a @se s al l a @ map@scale@@QZ@QXPLPPP r a d DRAWING 11.
SXV SXP SWU YRV SYP SXU SXQ@ SWV SWQ
SP@@m@@@@@@@@@@r@@@@@@@@@@@d@@
Q X Y QX QY RR
TT SW SV RW RV RS
TU TY UP UT UV VS
XQ WW WV WR WQ VT
QPT XR XY YP YY QPP
QRW QRP QQY QQP QPY QPU
QRX QSU QSV QTU QTV QUQ
QWU QVX QVW QUX QUW QUR
QWV QXP QXQ QXU QXW QYQ QYR QYV QXV
RQV RQR RQQ RPW RPV RPR RPQ QYW
RQW RRT RRU RST RSU RTR
RVX RVQ RVP RUQ RUP RTS
RXU RXV RXW RWQ RWW RWX RXT RXX RYP
RYT RYS RYR
RYQ SPT SPU SPV RYY SPP SPQ SPR SQQ SQP SPY SQU SQT SQS SQR SPW SPX SRU SRV SRW SRQ SRR SRS SRT SRX SSR SSQ SSP SRY SSV SSU SST SSS
STV STW SUP SUQ SSY STU STX STY SUR SUS SUT SVP SVQ SVW
SYU SXX SXW SXQ SXP SWS SWR TVX
SYV TPS TPT TQP TQQ TQX TQY TRS
TRY TTT TTS TSY TRT TTX TSX TSW TSP
TUT TUU TWR TTY TUS TUY TVV TVW
TWW UPR TYU TYT TXU TXT TWV TWS
URX UPS UQP UQQ TRQ@ URY URP USS
UVT UUW UUV UTW UTV USY USX UST
UVU UWR UWS UXR UXS UYP UYQ UYU
VRS VQX VQT VQR VQY VQS VPU VPT UYV
VRT VRX VRY VSS VST VTQ VTR VUP
VWU VXS VVV VUX VWV VVU VUW VUQ
WPW WQV VXT VYQ VYR WPQ WPR WQP
Drawing No12 Block 5 of Al Takamul khartoum@state ministry@of@engineering@affairs
gvp lkh p g h h g v g l I
d f s l k
h
a y r e v t r o u u s m
state
planning@F@physical@@ development@department survey@@department
name@@ AL MENAWORA VILLAGE map
location klaklla@township@ scale Q@Z@QUPP scale Q@@Z@@SWPP
MOSQUE date R@M@R@M@RPPP
north
SCHOOL n G.R SCHOOL
SCHOOL
HEALTH C.
O.S
represent@the@exsisting represent@planned khartoum@state ministry@of@engineering@affairs gvp lkh p g h h g v g l I
d f s l k h a y block@W r e t v o r u u m s
core state planning@F@physical@@ exsisting@farms development@department survey@@department
name@@ block@Y map
location doroashab@township@ scale Q@Z@QUPP gNr scale Q@@Z@@SWPP
date R@M@R@M@RPPP
mosque north
n
playing@field@ garden local market school
exsisting@farms
represent@the@exsisting represent@planned school
oNs
exsisting@farms school Summary of Discussion on The Magnitude of Recent Waves of Displacement in the Sudan and Their Effects; and The Status of the Displaced in the Sudan and the Extent of their Re-Settlement; and The Process of Resettlement and Reintegration of the Displaced Population.
1. It was noted that the paper does not indicate who is an IDP, who is a refugee and who is a migrant.
2. The term ‘townships’ is an offensive name, as is the term ‘mixed marriages’. Southerners can not marry without being Islamised. Assumptions are being made at a cultural basis that are questionable. The mix of cultures needs to be voluntary. Many will have to provide a labour force. (as in South Africa where people were only allowed to go into Johannesburg with passes, and then had to go out) For the first time in history they do not know where they belong. If you are talking about the unity of the country, you need to be clear about what it is for.
3. There has been a movement of migrants from the West, South and East to the golden triangle. Later there was migration to the East where there were mechanised development schemes. People run away from the disadvantaged area to the advantaged area. Internal displacement is involuntary.
4. It has been assumed that the diverse cultures need to be "properly guided" - this involves a level of arrogance which needs to be avoided. It has been assumed that building an urban block was guided by the principles of Sharia.
5. The paper stated that Khartoum saw three waves of movement: Arabs from the North; Westerners during the Mahdiyya; and Southerners after the district ordinance act after independence. People have been moving from the South and from the West. To whom does the land in Khartoum belong? People should have the right to move to their capital. They should not be considered as squatters.
6. The paper does not mention those who were brought during the Turkish- Egyptian slavery campaign. The name of Khartoum means the confluence of two rivers. These names were not Arabic, but were the names of those who lived there before. The writer forgets the dens of slaves in Khartoum North - all Southerners. Southerners and Westerners were there before. Omdurman was a shanty town in origin.
7. Who were the indigenous in Khartoum? This is the programme of assimilation started by Nimeiri after the announcement of oil in Sudan. He felt that the oil field needed to be protected for the Arabs. He persuaded Chevron to arm the Arabs. The policy of eviction from indigenous areas made this displacement. Sadiq al Mahdi did the same,
the NIF implemented this programme much more to deprive them of their wealth than to migrate, which will open them to Islamisation and Arabisation. People endangered in their homes. The Dinka have never left their place. Since the people arrived in Khartoum, they have been moved from place to place. People have been evicted from Khartoum South and North.
8. What is the number of years for somebody to be given land rights? If there is a law that people can be evicted, is it applicable to Arabs, or only to Southerners and Africans? These questions are very important. It is undeclared discrimination in the Sudan.
9. This problem of displacement has been dealt with by the problem of urbanisation. Are things going to change in the future? Are these people going to go back, or are they going to stay in Khartoum? Suppose that things do not change for the next ten years. The likelihood is that we are not going to see dramatic changes. One of our friends says that this is going to be the New Sudan, but interactions are now only just beginning. Most of the Southerners who live in Khartoum still maintain their communal ties, but it is not going to remain like that. Something different will come out of the mixing.
10. During the first conflict, the majority of people from Easter Equatoria and Bahr El-Ghazal went to neighbouring African countries. The north experienced little conflict and as a result there was little movement of people within the North. The new conflict is different because of the war conduct and the locations where it is being fought. In terms of intensity and magnitude the current conflict has given rise to a greater conflict which has produced massive displacement of people. The movement of people to Khartoum is because of the current conflict. People are not moving within the South owing to the war and the acrimonies which have developed within the south as a result of the conflict. The people have also moved because there is more support from the international community there and also media which could give attention to their plight. The casualties of southern intellectuals and leaders is also less within Khartoum than in the south.
11. Displacement is positively related to violence. When there is greater violence people move to a place of lesser violence. When this hypothesis is carried out under non biased conditions the response by the people might be different. Another reason is that most of the national resources are based in the capital. The concentration of services is also found in the Golden Triangle. When these are well shared among all parts of Sudan then the results might be different and people will remain wherever they are. This meeting is generating a lot of heat but this is not the case. We have to be careful what we present to the audience and say.
12. People come to Khartoum and find themselves in miserable circumstances. The names of the places they give reflects their anger. We need to have something right in the middle of the constitution to take the displaced persons questions as a matter of concern. People are going to Northern cities to get food, but the state does not care for them. There is no accommodation except for the ruling class.
13. Archeologically, Khartoum was the property of black people. The first Arabs came in 200 BCE, and settled in the Sudan. They pushed on to Chad and beyond. Arabs mixed with the local population, especially with the Nubians. That extent of inter-mixture is not just biological but cultural. Whoever speaks Arabic, is an Arab. This process was a voluntary one. There is no evidence of forced conversion.
14. If you go back to the sixties, the government went to Kordofan and Darfur to get labour for the Gezirah. It was only seasonal labour. These people are now displaced by banditry and war in the West. The government knows this and does nothing. Some refugees are in neighbouring countries and Khartoum. The solution is for the government to find an answer to the security problem. The problem is not simply a technical problem.
15. The country is on the brink of disintegration. The number of people displaced has now reached 4 million because of the war. There are so many Sudanese who have left the country, many highly educated.
Paper 13 The Return of the Displaced: A Challenge to the Country and the International Community by Professor Francis Mading Deng, presented in Professor Deng’s absence by Marv Koop.
FRANCIS M. DENG Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons and Research Professor of International Politics, Law and Society of the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
Whether people are forced into refuge abroad or are displaced internally by armed conflict, communal violence, or egregious violation of human rights, they are nearly always confronted with the challenges of return, resettlement, reintegration and reconstruction. These are challenges that face both the affected populations and the national authorities as well as the international community. They pose critical questions about the will of the people concerned, the related issues of the environment, and the requisite resources and capacities for their implementation. These require addressing the causes of refuge or displacement, the psychological insecurities involved, and the rising expectations for social services and economic development.
Before elaborating on these conditions, it might be useful to explain what these challenges mean. `Return’, is of course, self-explanatory and, for a refugee, means repatriation to the country of origin and for an internally displaced person, means going back to one’s home area. Resettlement may imply resuming one’s place in one’s original area of residence, but it usually means resettling in an alternative area, where security and better opportunities are more guaranteed. Reintegration may also have the double meaning of being re-integrated in one’s own original community or in the society of alternative resettlement. And, of course, whether one is in an area of origin or in an area of alternative resettlement, reconstruction is an all- embracing challenge for countries or regions that have suffered from the devastation of armed conflict.
This paper will outline the general principles of international law that govern or guide the response to these challenges, building on experience with refugees and more recently, with internally displaced persons and their application to the context in the various phases of the ongoing Sudanese conflict,- as well as under the projected conditions of peace, partial or comprehensive. 1
I. Relevant Principles of Refugee Law
Displacement may involve refugees who have crossed international borders or persons who are uprooted within their own countries. There are however, causal similarities between the two categories, the crucial difference being crossing international borders. And yet, while there is a well-established legal and institutional framework for refugees, the international community is still grappling with how to respond to the global crisis of internal displacement, which affects far more people than refugees. While the global refugee population is estimated at around 17 million people, there are between 25 and 30 million people displaced by internal conflicts in over 40 countries, on virtually all continents of the world. Although the crisis is global, Africa is the worst hit, with half the population of the world’s refugees and internally displaced persons. The normative standards applicable to refugees do not strictly apply to the internally displaced, but the obvious causal similarities make them applicable to internal displacement. Relevant to the issue of return is the question of when refugee status ends. The 1951 Refugee Convention stipulates six conditions under which a person would no longer require or receive refugee status and the international protection associated with it. Four of these are “cessation clauses”, which relate to actions taken by the individual concerned, primarily through voluntary repatriation or the adoption of another nationality. The other clauses concern changes that have occurred in the refugee’s country of origin, and which have removed the causes of the flight out of the country. A series of guidelines by UNHCR and its Executive Committee expound on how the “ceased circumstances” provisions by the Convention are to be interpreted. According to these guidelines, improvements in the country of origin must constitute a “fundamental”, “stable”, “durable” and “effective” change in
1 The discussion of these principles builds on a paper prepared by Erin Mooney, titled “An IDP No More? Exploring the Issue of When Internal Displacement Ends”, for the brainstorming session on “When Internal Displacement Ends”, co-sponsored by the Brookings-Cuny Project on Internal Displacement and the Institute for the Study of Forced Migration (Georgetown University, Washington DC, 22 April 2002.
circumstances, so that the fear that had triggered refugee flight abroad is removed. Among the changed circumstances that have influenced UNHCR’s decision on “ceased circumstances” are (I) the country of origin having gained independence; (ii) a successful transition to democracy; and (iii) the resolution of a civil conflict.2 But even when a civil conflict is supposedly resolved, refugees may hesitate to go back to their country of origin and internally displaced persons may adopt a wait-and-see attitude, because of a lack of confidence in the durability of peace, sometimes combined with apprehensions about returning to the area in which they had experienced terror in the first place. Even simple considerations, such as the lack of transport to the areas of return, may be pivotal to the decision on repatriation or return.
II The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement
According to the definition adopted in the Guiding Principles on internal displacement, prepared by an international team of legal experts under the supervision of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons and presented to the Commission on Human Rights in 1998, internally displaced persons are those uprooted by armed conflicts, communal violence, egregious violation of human rights and other human-made or natural disasters.3 Had they crossed international borders, they would be refugees for whom the international community has well established legal and institutional frameworks and mechanisms for their protection and assistance. And yet, the internally displaced, by virtue of remaining within a country in conflict, are exposed to severe threats of physical and psychological insecurity, gross violations of human rights, denial of such basic needs as shelter, food, medicine, sanitation, potable water, education, occupation, community and resource base. Because they remain within their borders, they are ironically assumed to be the responsibility of their governments, even though those same governments, being parties to the conflicts from which the displaced flee, often identify them with the enemy, and not only neglect them, but perhaps even persecute them. In most countries affected by armed conflict, there are often severe racial, ethnic, cultural or religious cleavages that are both cause and effect of acute crises of national identity. These
2 Rafael Bonoan, “When is International Protection No Longer Necessary?” The `Ceased Circumstances Provisions of the Cessation Clauses; Principles and UNCHR Practice, 1973-1999. Working Paper # 8 (June 2001).
3 See the definition of internally displaced persons in `The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’, UN Document E/CN. 4/1998/53/Add.2, Introduction: Scope and Purpose, para. 2.
cleavages determine who enjoys the dignity of full citizenship and who is marginalized and perhaps excluded from such dignity and denied a sense of belonging on an equal footing in the national identity framework. In 1992, as a result of pressures, primarily from the international non-governmental organizations and like-minded governments, the Commission on Human Rights decided to place the issue of internal displacement on its agenda and requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, initially to study the problem and recommend ways in which the United Nations system and the international community in general, might respond to the needs of the internally displaced. I was honoured to have been appointed to the position. Since the appointment, my activities have crystallised in five principal areas. The first and over-arching area has been to act as a catalyst in raising international awareness about the crisis and advocating the cause of the internally displaced among all pertinent actors: inter- governmental and non-governmental organisations, individual governments and non-state actors. The second area has been the development of an appropriate legal framework for the internally displaced and the promotion of its adoption and implementation. The third has been a commensurate development of appropriate institutional arrangements at various levels, from national, through regional to international. The fourth has entailed country missions, which offer the opportunity to dialogue with governments and other actors, pertinent to the situation within the country. Fifth and last has been continuing research into various aspects of internal displacement. While advocacy and the research agenda operate within a broad and open-ended scope, the other three areas of activity have been relatively specific, with tangible results. In the legal area, we worked in close collaboration with a team of international legal experts and within a broad-based process of consultation, involving representatives of relevant U.N. agencies, regional organisations, and non-governmental organisations, to develop the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. These principles re-state the relevant standards in existing human rights law, humanitarian law, and analogous refugee law. Since the Guiding Principles were presented to the Commission on Human Rights in 1995 and taken note of by the Commission, they have been very well received by the agencies of the U.N., regional organisations, individual governments and non-governmental organisations. The dissemination and application of the Guiding Principles has also been pursued through a series of national and regional workshops and seminars that have been remarkably effective. With respect to institutional arrangements, we have also recommended various options, ranging from the creation of a specialised agency for the internally displaced, to the designation of an existing agency to assume full responsibility for them, to a collaborative approach that utilises the capacities of existing agencies. The last option proved to be the preferred one. The co-
ordination needed for the collaborative approach to be effective has evolved significantly. The 1997 reform agendas of the Secretary-General designated the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and the head of the Office of the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as the Emergency Relief Co-ordinator to function as the focal point in the system, charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the displaced are protected and assisted. A series of other measures included initially, the establishment of an Inter-agency Working Group on Internally Displaced Persons, later succeeded by the more high-profile Senior Inter-Agency Network and, more recently, by an IDP Unit at OCHA to facilitate the role of the Emergency Relief Co-ordinator toward a more effective collaboration among the operational agencies in the field. Country missions have been a particularly significant pillar of the mandate, as it offers an opportunity to see in-country situations, the conditions of the affected populations, and dialogue with all concerned on their behalf. Thus far, I have undertaken 24 missions to affected countries in different parts of the world. The essence of my dialogue with governments is to recognise that internal displacement, being by definition internal, falls under state sovereignty, but to re- conceptualise sovereignty, not as a barricade against international solidarity with the affected populations, but as a positive concept of state responsibility for protecting and assisting citizens in need, and where necessary, with international co-operation. When governments lack the requisite capacity or the political will to discharge their responsibility, whether singly or in co-operation with the international community, and masses of their people are faced with severe hardship and even the threat of death, they cannot expect to barricade themselves against international scrutiny and involvement. Such involvement can range from diplomatic intercession, to various forms and degrees of intervention, the extreme version of which may be military.
III The Normative Framework for the Return of the Internally Displaced.
While the repatriation of refugees is governed by the principles of refugee law, as embodied in the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the return of the internally displaced to their areas of origin can be said to be regulated by the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which, though not legally binding, incorporate the relevant standards of human rights law, humanitarian law and analogous refugee law. The Guiding Principles, which spell out the rights and guarantees pertaining to internally displaced persons in all phase of displacement, do not contain a cessation clause similar to those of the Refugee Convention, since the definition of internally displaced persons used in the Principles is descriptive, denoting the factual situation of being displaced within one’s country,
rather than conferring a special legal status to be granted and eventually revokeable 4 Because being an internally displaced person depends upon the existence of objective facts, and not a process of legal recognition, this classification in principle continues to apply to people so long as the factual situation of internal displacement continues to exist. Cessation of the identification of an individual or group of individuals as “internally displaced” would therefore be contingent upon a change in the factual situation of displacement that the term denotes. For instance, if an internally displaced person flees his or her country, is forced to leave the country, or migrates to another country, he or she ceases, by definition, to be in a situation of internal displacement and, instead becomes a refugee, migrant, or national of another country, as the case may be. For displaced persons who remain within their country of origin, the Guiding Principles in effect envisage three possible solutions to their situation of internal displacement: return “to their homes or places of habitual residence”, integration where they currently reside, or re- settlement in another part of the country. Guiding Principle 28 specifies that return or resettlement must occur voluntarily and that, in accordance with international principles, return must also occur in “safety and dignity”. Principle 29 specifies that internally displaced persons who have returned or re-settled shall be protected against discrimination as a result of having been displaced, shall have the right to participate fully and equally in public affairs, and have equal access to public services. Furthermore, competent authorities have a duty and responsibility to assist returned or resettled internally displaced persons recover or receive compensation for property and possessions left behind or of which they were dispossessed upon displacement. This suggests that return or resettlement is more than the actual fact of returning or resettling, but presumes the existence of conditions to support the durability of return and resettlement. The issue of when one ceases to be classified as internally displaced is quite independent of whether one does in fact return to one’s area of origin. Whether one returns may also be independent of whether or not the causes generating displacement in the first place are removed. Although the removal of such causes is often a condition for return, that may not always be the case. Even when the conflict does in fact cease, that may not necessarily mean that all displaced populations would return. The experience of exile and detachment from one’s homeland generates a mix of deep emotions resulting from advantages such as having found safety and
4 See Walter Kälin, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations (Washington, D.C.: American Society of International Law and the Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement, 2000), p.3, see also p. 8.
freedom from persecution, medical services, education and better economic opportunities, and disadvantages, such as detachment from home, community and place of origin which the situation entails. It is therefore often the case that displaced persons, refugees, migrants, and other persons who have been forced to flee their homeland, will hold on to the dream of returning home for many years, if not throughout their lives.5 Factors that favour or militate against return may be complex and varied. In some cases, even before the conflict is resolved, governments may want people to return for a variety of reasons and the people themselves may also become tired of their alienation from their home area and wish to return, despite the insecurity of the conflict situation. Conversely, again for a variety of reasons, governments may not want the displaced to return and the people themselves may not want to return either because of the insecurity of the situation or because they have become too attached to the new opportunities offered by the areas of their displacement residence. This means that return is hardly ever a function of going back to the conditions as they used to be and that a certain amount of improvement of social services and development activities becomes imperative, if people are to be attracted back in a sustainable way.
IV The Case of the Sudan
The Sudan has suffered two civil wars engendering what appears to be contrasting experiences with displacement, external and internal, repatriation and return. This background may help in predicting what is likely to be the situation following the resolution of the current conflict. During the first civil war (1955 – 1972), most displaced Southern Sudanese crossed international borders into neighbouring countries. Presumably the flight out of the country was at least in part encouraged by the separatist objective of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement and its military wing, the Anyanya. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fled into neighbouring countries of the Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and the Central African Republic. Their experiences as refugees have been documented in part by songs of lamentation, some of which I recorded in the mid-1960s and reproduced in some of my publications. For a people who had grown up thinking of themselves and their country as second to none, the indignities of refugee life brought deep feelings of isolation and indignation. These lines are from a song composed by a young Dinka who had fled to the Congo:
5 Erin Mooney “An IDP No More? Exploring the Issue of When Displacement Ends”, pp. 7-8.
Gentlemen grind grain in the Congo6 The Dongolawi, the Arab, has remained at home. He has remained in our land, We left our cattle tethered in the camps And followed Deng Nhial Gentlemen beg in the land of the Congo; The Dongolawi, the Arab, has remained at home. We left our cattle tethered in the camps And followed Deng Nhial. When we reached the land of the Congo, The Congolese said, “Dinkas are matata” I turned and asked Ngor Maker, “What does matata mean?:” Ngor Maker answered, “They say we are bad” My heart fell apart with grief And I thought of Anger, the daughter of Wol I wish I could be back to see her.7 Following the achievement of peace in 1972 through the Addis Ababa Agreement, most Southern Sudanese refugees returned., Even those who had gone into exile in the affluent countries of Europe and the Americas, initially as students, returned in large numbers. For the most part, only those in the government employment were in the North and they too went back to the South to resume responsibility in the new regional government. A major repatriation programme was undertaken by the Government with the assistance of the international community, co-ordinated by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). With the resumption of hostilities in 1983, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and its military wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/ SPLA) declared the creation of a united New Sudan as the objective of the struggle. In contrast to the experience of the first war, most of the displaced Southern Sudanese remained within the borders of their country. About half of the estimated 4.5 million internally displaced persons moved to the North, where they
6 In Dinka Society, it is the women and not the men who grind the grain.
7 Revised version of the translation in Francis Mading Deng The Dinka of the Sudan, first published by Holt, Rinehart & Winston in 1972, reproduced by the Waveland Press in 1984, p. 139; also in Francis Mading Deng, The Dinka and Their Songs, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1973, pp. 157-158.
are spread over the country, most of them concentrated around Khartoum. Only an estimated half a million people crossed into the neighbouring countries to the South as refugees, while additional scores of thousands have gone to Cairo hoping to move on to Australia, Canada and the United States, where considerable numbers of Southerners have been resettled. It should be noted that internal displacement in the Sudan has more causes than the civil war between the North and the South. The drought of 1983 – 85 in the Western and Eastern Sudan and the resulting famine cost many lives and triggered massive dislocations of people in those regions. Although the government was reluctant to invite international relief operations, diplomatic pressures eventually succeeded in getting it to change its position and an unprecedented international emergency operation arrested the crisis, which enabled most of the displaced from these regions to return to their areas of origin. Although the first great wave of displaced persons arrived in Khartoum from the Arabised and Islamised western regions of Kordofan and Darfur in 1984 as a result of the drought, by the late 1980s the greatest number were members of southern pastoral ethnic groups – Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer – from the districts of Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile who were fleeing the increasingly brutal war in the South. Their influx coincided with a deliberate government policy of heavily arming Arab tribes in the border regions to help fight the war against the SPLA. Africa Watch reported that tribal militia, in a thinly disguised counter-insurgency campaign promoted by the “democratically elected” government of the time, had by the late 1980s massacred hundreds of civilians8. This campaign, in combination with a famine of unprecedented severity, devastated the South. Although the objectives of both the government and the SPLA were ostensibly related, the tribal militias charged with perpetrating atrocities were motivated by long-held hostilities and the chance to loot livestock and expropriate additional pastoral lands by forcing out indigenous groups. With religious tensions aggravating inter-tribal hostilities, the brutalities of the Arab- Muslim militia against the so-called kufar (the infidels, or southern animists) increased. Two Khartoum University lecturers documented the massacre of more than a thousand Dinka men, women and children in the Western town of Dhein on March 27-28, 1987.9
8 Africa Watch, Denying “the Honour of Living”: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster (Washington: Human Rights Watch, 1990).
9 Ushari Ahmed Mahmud and Suleyman Ali Baldo, The Dhein Massacre: Slavery in the Sudan (London: Sudan Relief and Rehabiliatation Association, 1987). The book is also an account of the practice of slavery by the Arab tribes of western Sudan. Burning the
Three years after the international relief operations that alleviated the famine in the North, the conflict in the South had caused unprecedented numbers of deaths from starvation. In 1988 alone an estimated 250,000 people, almost all civilians, lost their lives in the conflict-related famine. The international community responded in 1989 by launching a massive assistance programme, Operation Lifeline Sudan, involving government and non-governmental organisations, co-ordinated by the United Nations. The programme was widely credited with averting a repetition of the 1988 tragedy. Lifeline has been re-negotiated several times and has been acclaimed a model of success in humanitarianism, one that has been emulated in other crisis situations.10 But the masses of Southern Sudanese continue to be victims of the civil war. Indeed, Sudan represents the worst case of internal displacement in the world, comprising, as noted earlier, an estimated 4.5 million people. Following my appointment as Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons and as I was planning my missions to affected countries, I felt ambivalent about whether I should include the Sudan on my schedule or not. Given my background as a Sudanese national and considering that the Sudan is one of the countries in which war-generated displacement is most acute, I was aware of the precariousness of my role, which raised the question of whether I should exclude the country from the list of those I was to visit. I chose to visit it, although my mission there was bound to be inherently more difficult than would be the case elsewhere. Even more than I had expected, the programme organised for me was, in comparison to those of other countries, extensive, intensive, and, indeed, challenging to me in addressing the problems of internal displacement. In line with the approach I had adopted for the mandate, the objective of my visit to the Sudan was not to monitor human rights violations, but to consult with the government with a view to fostering international co-operation on behalf of the internally displaced. In preparing for the visit I asked to see the two camps for the displaced near Khartoum – Dar-es- Salaam, West of Omdurman, and Jebel Awlia. South of Khartoum – and to visit other centres in Kordofan, including Abyei on the North-South border, where people fleeing from the war in the South and those returning from the North converged. The government granted both requests. I was enthusiastically welcomed by the displaced people in the camps, not only as a Sudanese national, but also as a symbol of the international concern for their plight. Sudanese officials villages, destroying the crops, and looting livestock were among the methods used by the Arab militia to decimate Dinka sources of livelihood. 10 See Francis M Deng and Larry Minear, The Challenges of Famine Relief: Emergency Operations in the Sudan (Brookings, 1992).
who accompanied me, seeing a public relations advantage in the demonstrations, proudly described the services provided for the displaced by the government and non-governmental organisations, including Christian and Islamic relief agencies. The aid covered maternity care, early child care, immunization, meals programmes for small children, general medical care, education and food distribution. Considering that the Sudan is a poor country in which such services are not easily available to many communities under normal conditions, what was being done seemed impressive, and I said so. The dwellings, which were built by the displaced themselves from local materials, did not differ from those often found in the shantytowns in which they had lived in Khartoum, although they were spread out more. The officials defended the relocation policy by pointing to the contrast between the conditions under which the displaced now lived and what they described as the dehumanising conditions in the squalid areas of the industrial periphery of Khartoum-North under which they had lived. People at the camps, however, far away from home and evicted from the city, revealed an unmistakeable resentment at the inherently degrading conditions of their displacement. Behind the superficially happy faces was a sense of rejection, uprootedness, alienation and anxiety, a suspension between despair and hope, all of which they communicated by various means. One person spoke as the crowd watched approvingly: “We will not tell you anything; you watch with your own eyes, then go and think for yourself.” In Abyei, on the North-South border, where the people were either indigenous or were close to their original homes further south, conditions contrasted sharply with those in the camps around Khartoum. Because I come from the Dinka of Abyei, I had felt the same trepidation about visiting the area that I had felt about including the Sudan on my international mission. But I had chosen to visit Abyei for the same reasons I had chosen to visit the Sudan and with the same awareness of the risks involved to the integrity of my mission and my responsibility for even- handedness toward all concerned. Although relief supplies had not arrived because Abyei is isolated from the rest of the country during the rainy season, the local population had managed to survive by cultivating land (within the territorial restrictions imposed by their security concerns) or by gathering seeds from the roots of water lilies and other wild food. They were unequivocal in their welcome, in expressing their appreciation to the secretary-general for the concern demonstrated by the international community, and in their gratitude to the government for facilitating my visit. The contrast with the camps was not so much that the people in Abyei were better provided for but that in comparison they enjoyed at least some security, dignity and autonomy, although many wondered how long all that would last in view of the war dangers looming nearby. Abyei has indeed had a long history of being a link between the North and the South – often a bridge for peaceful interaction, sometimes a point of confrontation. The area had been among
those hardest hit by tribal militias and the mass starvation of the late 1980s. Relations had, however, improved significantly as the Arab tribes, from which militias had been recruited by the previous Governments, considered themselves more on an equal footing with the Dinka under the military rule and also feared reprisals by the SPLA. Furthermore, the military regime adopted policies that were restoring confidence in traditional leaders who were assuming a greater role in preserving security. Under their respective traditional leaderships, the Dinka and the Arabs of southern Kordofan once again saw mutual advantage in resorting to their tribal diplomacy and the long-tested principles of good-neighbourliness. Several conclusions emerged from the contrast between the displacement camps around Khartoum and the situation in Abyei, which I presented to the government for policy considerations and which were, on the whole, well received. First, whatever services were being rendered, the location of the displaced just outside Khartoum, where they were neither part of the urban community nor in their own natural setting, was inherently degrading, especially since it was popularly believed that they had been removed to cleanse the city of undesirable non-Muslim elements. Second, the fact that their shanty dwellings in the camps were not better than those they lived in before, except for more open barren space, did not adequately compensate for their removal from the city. I recommended that as much as possible people be given the choice and assisted to go back to their areas of origin or to settlements close to them. They should also be accorded the protection and assistance necessary to resume normal, self-sustaining rural life. Those who chose not to go back should be assisted to move freely anywhere in the country, including into urban centres, and given the necessary assistance to become ordinary integrated citizens. Those who chose to remain in the camps should not only be given the services of the kind described to me but should be assisted with materials to build more comfortable and healthier accommodations to help compensate for their isolation. Organizations that rendered services to the displaced had erected for themselves facilities that were attractive, even though they were inexpensively built from local materials. Extending such expertise to the displaced and helping them help themselves would seem a feasible and inexpensive way to achieve a humanitarian objective. An over-arching reality of the situation in the Sudan, however, is that the matters discussed covered only minor aspects of a much larger crisis of displacement affecting millions of people in the war-ravaged zones, especially in the South. The quest for peace was nearly always spotlighted as the core issue. One of the school-children’s songs at Dar-es-Salaam camp included the words: “Give us peace”. With an exaggeration of what people expected my mission to accomplish, one elder at the Jebel Awlia camp said: “The best relief assistance you can give us is peace”.
V Conflict Transformation and Return to Abyei Area
In September 2001, I paid a follow-up visit that was initially intended to be combined with a workshop on displacement in the country in general and the application of the Guiding Principles in particular. The workshop was to be attended by U.N. agencies, donor representatives, and non-governmental organizations, to foster international co-operation in responding to the challenge of internal displacement in the country. It turned out that elements in the leadership had concerns about the planned workshop, but I was invited to visit the country to discuss the situation with the authorities. That visit turned out to involve more than discussions with the authorities and took the form of a fully fledged follow-up mission. I was able to visit displacement camps around Khartoum and in other regions. I was also able to visit Abyei. While the situation of the displaced had improved, especially in view of the fact that significant numbers of displaced persons around Khartoum had been allocated land to resettle and those in the rural North had also been granted agricultural land to farm, the challenges of displacement for the most part remained as they had been almost a decade earlier and the options I had recommended were still valid. Attention was partially focused on a proposed project for return to the Abyei area. As outlined by the Office of the Resident/ Humanitarian Co-ordinator of the United Nations system in the Sudan in the document titled “Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation in Abyei” (PACTA), of June 1, 2002, the project is based on a multi-agency co-ordinated approach to support return of the Dinka IDPs to Abyei area, “as a bridge between North and South Sudan, to support the search for peace for the Sudanese people”. Accordingly, the return programme was to be implemented in a framework of co-operative humanitarianism, social and development activities that would include the neighbouring Missiriya Arabs to the North and the Twich Dinka to the South. The U.N. agencies formed a Task Force to work in a collaborative approach to develop an appropriate project design and implementation strategy. The focus of the project was to support conflict transformation in the region, building on a local peace agreement which had recently been concluded between the Arabs and the Dinka , both the Ngok and the Twich, which would facilitate the return of the Dinka IDPs to their rural villages and resume sustainable livelihoods. In implementation of the project, by January 2002, an initial step had been taken by moving Dinka IDPs in the Abyei town to four “peace” villages at a time when the Missiriya nomads were on their summer season migration into the Abyei area. Some of the nomads were invited into these villages to create mixed communities that shared the resettlement services, in particular the Food for Work resources provided by the World Food Programme in building the
villages, as well as the water, health and education services planned to be provided by the Task Force. In May, 2002, I paid a third visit to the country on a joint mission with the Deputy Administrator for USAID, Roger Winter, to review the situation and the prospects for US support for the return programme. In addition to discussions in Khartoum, we visited Abyei, Kadugli, Rumbek and other districts in Bahr el Ghazal. In Abyei, we visited the resettlement villages and Missiriya Arab camp sites. We drove through a large stretch of Ngok Dinka territory which had previously been dotted with villages of well constructed huts and cattle- byres, and a thriving population of cattle-herders and subsistence farmers, but which was now totally depopulated and desolate, except for the Missiriya Arab nomads with their herds of cattle and sheep. There was hardly a trace that the Dinka had occupied the land for a stretch of at least 60 miles from Abyei toward Muglad to the North. It was a painful scene to witness. The Ngok Dinka passion for return was overwhelming. In the area itself, we held public meetings with the Dinka and Arab residents, all of whom were enthusiastic about the local peace agreements that had been concluded and the prospects for support from the international community. They called for applying to their area the Nuba Mountain agreement between the government and the SPLM/ SPLA which had led to the disengagement of forces, delivery of international humanitarian relief assistance, the return of the displaced population, and new programmes of socio-economic integration and development in the region. Among the areas they highlighted for support were potable water, health services, education, and local infrastructure. Both in response to the local demands and to meet identifiable needs, the Task Force programme planned humanitarian and development interventions in the areas of human rights and peace building, health and nutrition, education, agriculture and food security, water and environmental sanitation, and livelihoods rehabilitation. Discussions with the displaced Dinka in the North, specifically in Khartoum and during a brief stop at El Obeid, revealed a striking yearning for return. Many of them were prepared to return even under uncertain security conditions. While that might be an expression of nostalgia for home or frustration with the situation of alienation away from the home area, there was also a significant element of seriousness in their yearning. An issue which will continue to pose a serious challenge for the peace and stability in the area is the problem of land and who is to return or be resettled where. Traditionally, the Arab nomads moved into the area during the dry season in search of grazing and sources of water. During the rainy season, Southern Dinkas and Nuer also moved into the area to avoid floods. The movements of both the nomadic Arabs and the Southern tribes were well regulated through conventions and co-operation among their respective leaders. Certain routes, grazing areas, water sources and camping sites were designated for the respective groups. Over the last two
decades, the Dinka have been forced out of their land. The Arabs too have not been entirely secure in their use of the land as the Dinka have endeavoured to arm themselves and strike back. In our discussions with the Arabs in the area, there was a remarkable admission of the fact that they had been responsible for the attacks against the Dinka, but that they had also been devastated by the war and had decided to turn their back on violence and commit themselves to peaceful co-existence with their Dinka neighbours. The history of amicable ties between the Ngok Dinka and the Missiriya Arabs under their respective leaders was invoked as a model to go back to and build upon. The joint re-settlement of the Arabs and Dinka in the traditional Dinka villages was viewed with mixed feelings by many. On the one hand, it symbolised the two groups coming together in the context of peace agreements. It was also seen as a pragmatic way of giving the resident Arabs access to the humanitarian assistance which was being provided by the international community to the Dinka in the area. On the other hand, it appeared to the Dinka as representing Arab encroachment into their land, a first step which would likely encourage their occupation of Dinka land. To ameliorate Dinka fears, it was explained that the numbers of the Arabs involved in the resettlement were relatively small, and covered only those who were already resident in Abyei town, and that the pattern would not be repeated in the traditional homes of the Dinka, to which the preponderance of the IDPs would return. Although the Nuba Mountains agreement might not be replicable, it is quite obvious that a viable return programme will require co-operation of the State and Federal Governments and an agreement between the Government and the SPLM/ SPLA. The involvement of the United States and the international community would provide both the guarantees and the resources needed to ensure the success of the programme, but the will must be first and foremost national. This is why such an arrangement should not be seen in isolation, but as part of a comprehensive approach to peace. And indeed, if the arrangement of the kind that was achieved in the Nuba Mountains is extended in some form to other border areas between the North and the South, and if, in addition to the humanitarian dimensions, political solutions for local governance were also agreed upon, a situation of de facto peace understanding based on recognising the ethnic, cultural and religious pluralism of the country might be established as a foundation for an interim framework of “one country, two systems” recommended by the Task Force of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on U.S. policy for promoting peace in the Sudan.
VI The Prospects for Post-War Return to the South
Whether people have been forced into refuge across international; borders or have been displaced internally by conflict, once the conflict ends or subsides, serious problems relating to
return arise. It is particularly important that people are not forced to return to areas that are not safe or to conditions where basic services are lacking and their essential needs not met. For that reason, return must be voluntary.11 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which re-state existing norms of human rights law, humanitarian law and analogous refugee law, stipulate the voluntariness of return. This means ensuring the right of the displaced to decide freely whether or not they wish to return to their areas of origin, remain where they have moved, or be resettled in alternative areas. It also means providing the people with adequate information on the conditions to which they would return so that they can make an informed decision on the matter. Even when people choose to return, unless their physical and psychological security and their survival needs are adequately met, as long as they enjoy freedom of movement, such return cannot be viable and the people are likely to move from the area again. Applying these principles to the situation in the Sudan and the changing dynamics of displacement and the prospects for return, it should be reiterated that the two phases of the conflict in the Sudan reflect two contrasting patterns. The first war (1955 – 1972), generated massive refuge into neighbouring African countries. And when the war ended, the refugees returned overwhelmingly to the South. Even the few who had migrated as students to Europe and North America, returned home after completing their studies. The on-going conflict, which erupted in 1983, appears to be generating mostly internal displacement, relatively smaller numbers of refugees in neighbouring countries, and migration for resettlement elsewhere, mostly in Australia, North America and the United Kingdom. Whether those displaced internally or resettled abroad would want to return home is a matter of conjecture, but it would almost certainly depend on the outcome of the war, in particular whether the country will remain united or be partitioned. The Government and Northern Sudanese in general tend to see the move by Southerners to the North as a vote of confidence in the system and for the unity of the country. The obvious fact is that it is a search for security. On the other hand, although the displaced populations yearn to return and may even favour a separatist agenda for the South, it is not easy to tell whether they would live up to the rhetoric of return, should the situation permit. The prospects of return therefore raise a number of critical questions: Do the displaced populations seriously want to return? And if so, would they rather wait for peace to be achieved or would they want to return, even before the war ends? And assuming they do return, whether during the conflict or when
11 Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng. Masses in Flight: the Global Crisis of Internal Displacement (The Brookings Institution, 1998), pp. 285-289.
the peace is achieved, are the existing socio-economic conditions likely to sustain their remaining in their areas of origin or will they once again move northwards in search of better opportunities? And what would be the mid to long-term implications of this interconnectedness with the North? Assuming that the large numbers of Southerners who now reside in and around the capital city become integrated there, what would be the demographic implications for the state and the province, not only in terms of the social and cultural dynamics, but also in terms of the local government? What if the South were to exercise the right of self-determination in favour of full independence, would the Southerners now living in the North choose or be forced to return? In assessing the national identity crisis in the Sudan, I have argued that a formula which might balance the divisive self-perceptions with the yet unrecognised commonalities is to have a short- term framework of co-existence, while laying the ground for a longer-term evolution toward a more integrated unity within a newly defined national identity, unless, of course, the right of self-determination led to the independence of the South. The same may be true of the demographic implications of the population movements. Despite the rhetoric of differences, if unity is a mutually desired goal, the interaction of the peoples from various regions of the country is likely to expose both the distinctive and the shared elements and may in the end prove to be a significant force for long-term national integration, even though short-term arrangements for accommodating the differences will be necessary for ending the violence and forging peaceful coexistence.
Paper 14 Reintegration of Women and Children in Post-War Situations by Dr Priscilla Joseph Koug
Summary Sudan has the highest rate of urbanisation amongst the African countries. Khartoum, the biggest urban centre in Sudan, contains 73% of industry, 75% of the labour force and monopolises the administrative and political functions, social services, and educational establishments. The ministry of health reported that 75% of health services facilities in Sudan are in Khartoum and Geziera States and almost 50% are in Khartoum alone (AL Ayam 1st November 2000). The current population of Khartoum State (greater Khartoum) is reported to be 7,000,000. Out of these 4,000,000 are rural migrants including the IDP (internally displaced persons). It could be observed that the IDPs plus the squatter settlers constitute 57% of Khartoum’s population. Table Showing the IDPs Scattered by state State SCOVA (1989) OLS (1999) HAC (1999) Equatoria 180 000 264 000 n.a. Bahr El Gazal 170 000 60 000 n.a. Southern Darfur 53 000 170 000 53 000 Khartoum 1 580 000 2 000 000 27 400 (family) Blue Nile, Senar & South 170 000 n.a. n.a. West Kordofan River Nile & Northern States 165 000 n.a. n.a. Totals 3 090 000 4 200 000 Source Ministry of Engineering affairs –Khartoum State
Public Utilities services for the four camps Facility Alsalama Wad Bashir Jebel Awlia Mayo Farm Total Sanitary Health - 1 - 3 4 Curative Health 8 6 7 7 28 Feeding Centre 3 2 7 2 14 Schools 11 4 8 7 30 Water hand pumps - - 115 65 180 Security Police 8 1 1 1 11 Churches 27 2 8 3 40
There are not enough schools for the IDPs children and many are having no education. Women head 78% of families therefore they must earn money to support their families. Fur, Borgo Nuba women brew and sell alcohol freely while the Dinka women are some how restricted. Dinka women cannot sell food in the market place so most of them work in farms or do washing clothing in homes. In early 1991 after the redefinition of the IDPs, general food distribution was stopped. The IDPs like all the other Sudanese now have to buy their food from the market place. The purchasing capacity of the IDPs is very low. This situation has resulted in very high malnutrition rates amongst the IDPs: 45% amongst the under-fives with a mortality rate of 360/1000. The displaced are dying in numbers especially in Khartoum. In Khartoum where there the bulk of IDPs were, only 60 000 were recognised and relocated to three big camps at Jebel Awleia in Khartoum and, Wad el Bashir and al Salam in Omduman. There are two sets of chiefs in all the IDPs Camps, the Government chiefs and the people/community chiefs. IDP women can be grouped broadly into Christians, Muslims and others. Majority of IDPs are not aware of the laws that govern their lives. However, amongst the southern IDPs and the Nuba ethnic cultures and traditions over ride the religious cultures and laws. The age of marriage is very low amongst the IDPs (14-16). By the time the IDP women is 24-26 she has been married for ten years and has three to four children. Many IDP women head of households have not seen their husbands for the last 2-5 years. In 1988, the percentage of women working in the alcohol industry was less than 5%. By 1991 brewing was practised by 135 of IDP women. By 2000, the number had risen to 355 women brewing alcohol. Current rate of women headed house hold is 78%, National Figure is 23%. The majority of women imprisoned in Omdurman are IDPS convicted because of brewing alcohol The children of the displaced that were born during the displacement have never gone back to the village. All the children speak arabic; the girls need to because they work for Arab families. At home children speak different languages. Many women and children are abducted and kept against their will. The majority of abductions take place across the northern Bahr el Gazal, South and West Kordofan and South Darfur. According to the Dinka chiefs committee (DCC), more than 25000 women and children are still in captivity. The abducted women and children are taken from the southern villages and transferred to the north and kept against their will.
Reintegration of Women and Children Providing extension training to women will ensure that women and their children will have food. Reintroduction of boarding schools will address the cost issues and reduce the establishment of too many schools rapidly. There should be training of women in masonry, carpentry, mechanical works etc. It should be noted that post-war Sudan will be a Sudan of women and children. Provision of counselling to the women and children will be of prime importance and will help in the integration of the traumatised women and children. Extensive paralegal training and education must be done to create awareness amongst women and children about their rights and duties. How to develop women and children centred integration programs, knowing that both groups do not participate in the decision making process will be the major challenge during the integration period.
Introduction This paper will discuss the integration of women and children in post-war situations under the following subheadings: · Current status of women and children · How could women and children be repatriated, resettled, and integration in the post war conflict Sudan · What are the main challenges, opportunities and priorities to the process of repatriation, resettlement and integration Sudan is the largest African country bordering nine countries. It is currently divided into twenty- six (26) states. It has an estimated population of thirty- one (31) millions. Two civil wars have been fought in Sudan, one just before the independence in1955, which ended in 1972, and the current war started in 1983. To date it has generated more than five million displaced persons, resulted in death of 2.5 million people, created half a million disabled, left more than two generations without education and caused psychological trauma to many people especially women and children
Characteristics of the conflict: · There are different types of conflicts; these are ethno- nationalism conflicts, inter- communal contention for power and related to class and ideological issues · These conflicts are at different stages of the common conflict life cycle. Key characteristics are: · People against the state · Protracted – in some there has been a long period of covert violence · Internal but with effects on and from neighbouring states · Extensive, they have come to involve large collectives · Inextricable – the adversaries cannot realistically end the conflict by complete separation. They will have to go on living together after termination of the conflict.
Sudan’s population Sudan has the highest rate of urbanisation amongst African countries. The 1993 census states that the total population is 25 587 000 persons. Out of these, 35% reside in Khartoum and the central parts of the country. The annual population growth is 2.6% The urbanisation rate is reported to have increased from 11% in 1956, 24%(1983) to 32% (1993). This growth rate is not accompanied by positive change in the economy. A paper by a doctor in the ministry of health showed that Khartoum receives 1000 IDPs daily, thus the annual growth rate of Khartoum is 7% according to Al Ayam 1st November (2000,). Migration and displacement lie in a continuum. However the distinction between the two is made on the spatial and socio-economic connotations for the IDPs. The movement from one area to the other is characterised loss of objects, values, norms, means of subsistence on which they formerly use to survive and that were central to their existence and identities. Displacement is traumatic, painful and causes hopelessness and helplessness while migration is well prepared and is based on hopeful thinking for the better. Khartoum, the biggest urban centre in Sudan, contains 73% of industry, 75% of the labour force and monopolises the administrative and political functions, social services, and educational establishments. The Ministry of Health in a conference on the Public Health improvement said that 75% of Health services facilities in Sudan are in Khartoum and Geziera States and almost 50% are in Khartoum alone (AL Ayam 1st November 2000). These act as pull factors, attracting
the rural migrants and the displaced. The profile of Khartoum as obtain from the national census is summarised as following: Year Population % increase 1955 400 000 1973 900 000 125 1983 1 800 000 100 (influx due to drought and war) 1993 5 900 000 227 (peak displacement due to war) 2 000 7 000 000 18 (possibility of depopulation or stability)
It is observed from the above information that the highest increase in population of Greater Khartoum was in 1983-1993. This coincides with the climax of on going war and the Sahelian drought, both of which are major causes of displacement. Current population of Khartoum State (greater Khartoum) population is reported to be 7 000 000 out of which 4 000 000 are rural migrants who are further classified into: · IDPs numbering 1 800 000 of which 60,000 are in camps at various locations and the rest had been redefine as squatter settlers. · Ordinary rural urban migrants, who live in squatters and in unfinished buildings all over the Khartoum. These constitute 2 000 000. It could be observed that the IDPS plus the squatter settlers constitute 57% 0f Khartoum population.
Time Line of displacement 1984: First drought related displacement from Northern Kordofan and Darfur. These arrived in Khartoum and settle at Mowelh west of Omdurman. 1984: Wave of Displaced from Northern Bahr El Gazala and Bentiue areas. This coincided with the escalation of war in Northern Bahr El Gazal and an outbreak of a Leshmeniasis epidemic in the Bentiue Area. The displaced followed the route Meram, El Nahoud, Umruaba, Kosti, El duaim to Khartoum. From Bentueu to Kadogli 1986/87: Escalation of war in the Nuba Mountains. Route of displacement from Kadogli to Khartoum. War in Northern Bahr El Gazal - maurahelen invaded the causing displacement and abduction of women and children 1998: Intensification of war around Abyie town, displacement, Muglad, Khartoum 1998: First Displacement from Southern Blue Nile, War escalated as SPLA take Kurmuk 1991/92: SPLA invades Juba; there was an evacuation of women and children to Khartoum, many were unaccompanied minors. 1994/95: There was voluntary repatriation of Nuer from Khartoum to Bennie 1996: Major displacement from Bennie. Oil companies started to explorations, Government army and Militia fighting with SPLA over the control of Oil fields 1998: More drilling around Aliny (Heglig) and Allony (El Tor) Oct 2000. More people were displaced into the marshes. The government of Sudan and militia intensify military activities. 1999/2000: More intensification of war around Gumriak, total displace numbered 32 000
Population of IDPs Table Showing the IDPs Scattered by state State SCOVA (1989) OLS (1999) HAC (1999) Equatoria 180 000 264 000 n.a. Upper Nile and Jonglei 180 000 60 000 n.a. Bahr El Gazal 170 000 60 000 n.a. While Nile n.a. n.a. 15 000 Southern Dafur 53 000 170 000 53 000 Red Sea 6 000 n.a. Khartoum 1 580 000 2 000 000 274 000(family) Gadarif & Kassala 175 000 30 000 n.a. Blue Nile, Senar & Geziera 170 000 n.a. n.a. South West Kordofan 300 000 175 000 118 700 River Nile & Northern States 165 000 n.a. n.a. Total 3 090 000 4 200 000 Source Ministry of Engineering affairs –Khartoum State
History of the Displaced In 1988 there were a total of 200 000 displaced families scattered at 23 different camps and locations. The most famous of these camps were Hilat Shook, Jebel Awelia and Thawra el Hara 23.Acording to SCC survey conducted in Feb. 1987, the geographical origin of the displaced were: Upper Nile 29% Kordofan 26% Bahr El Gazal 25% Equatoria 8% Others 12% This survey showed at this point that a total of 62% of IDPs were from the Southern region. Another SCC survey in 1989 showed that the 67% of Displaced were from Bahr el Gazal, 22% from Upper Nile. The socio- demographic information showed that 56% of the displaced had come from the rural areas. 87% of women were married and of these 275 were not living with their husbands (husbands dead or displaced further into the south). 42 % of the displaced persons were 20-35 years old (in the productive age group). Most of the elderly could not survive the more than 600km journey The same survey showed an illiteracy rate of 87% amongst the IDPs. In 2000 literacy rates were 55- 87% in some in Mayo Farm and Jebel Awelia camps. At the time of survey in 1989 75 of IDPs (Dinka and Nuba) owned goats. There was goat distribution program at Souqe el Markazi camp. In 1988 males were encouraged by the authorities to go and work in the agriculture areas. Chiefs were paid to convince some of their subjects to go and working the agriculture areas. In 1991, 65% of the total population of IDPs were women, of these 70% were not supported by men. 41% were engage in petty trade selling tea, dried fish and handcrafts. This survey showed that the Sudan accounts for the largest number of uprooted people, more than 4.3 millions, one in eight refugees and displaced persons in the world is a Sudanese (US committee for refuges, USC world refuge survey Sep 9th 1999 www.refuges.org)
Table 2 IDPs by camps Camp 1995 1998 2000 Alsalam 65 000 36 000 11 400 Wad Bashir 35 000 n.a. 43 000 Jebe Awlia 56 000 44 000 21 000 Mayo Farm 28 000 36 500 18 000 Totals 185 000 200 000 196 000 Source; HAD& Ministry of Engineering Affairs Khartoum State
Table 3 Public Utilities services for the four camps in Khartoum Facility Alsalama Wad Bashir Jebel Awlia Mayo Farm Total Sanitary Health - 1 - 3 4 Curative Health 8 6 7 7 28 Feeding Centre 3 2 7 2 14 Kindergarden 7 - 10 5 20 Schools 11 4 8 7 30 Water bole holes 7 4 1 - 12 Water hand pumps - - 115 65 180 Security Police 8 1 1 1 11 Mosques 8 4 7 2 21 Churches 27 2 8 3 40
It can be seen from this table that the IDPs do not have adequate services. There are not enough schools for the IDPs children.
Changing Social Responsibilities Women head 78% of families therefore they must earn money to support their families. The type of work the IDP woman does is governed by her ethnic, cultural and social background or taboos. Fur, Borgo Nuba women brew and sell alcohol freely while the Dinka women are some how restricted. Dinka women cannot sell food in the market place and most of the most work in farms or clothes washing in homes.
Exploitation Cheap Labor In Khartoum women from the Dinka and Nuba tribes work in agricultural areas in Silite, Soba. These women have acquired skills such as harvesting and packing for exports. The women are underpaid and they lack the capacity to negotiate better pay.
Food Security For more than a decade IDPs have depended on the relief food. In early 1991, after the redefinition of the IDPs, general food distribution was stopped. The IDPs, like all other Sudanese, have to buy their food from the market place. It has to be noted that the Government has adopted the free market economy. Thus food is available to those who can afford it. The purchasing capacity of the IDPs is very low. Many are nor sure when they will have the next meal. The majority of families have one meal a day. A few others have a meal every other day.
This situation has resulted in very high malnutrition rates amongst the IDPs, 45% amongst the under-fives with a mortality rate is 360/1000.
Health status of the IDPs Sudan has the highest record of IDPs worldwide. Infant Mortality rate is 115/1000 in the north and 180/1000 in the South. The malnutrition rate amongst under-fives is 10.5% in the North and 43% in the South. The prevalence of TB is very high amongst the IDPs because of the housing conditions.
Social services to the IDPs Social services provided to the displaced are inadequate and IDPs have to travel out of their camp in cases of medical emergency.
IDPs coping strategies Strategies aimed at increasing the family income: · Women engaging in illegal activities such as brewing alcohol · Some family members working for long hours, i.e. working in two places · Children working · Reduction of expenditure by eating less meals e.g. one meal a day · Changing composition of food ,eating less nutritious cheap foods such as dried okra and beans · Selling family assets such as beds , clothing , chairs · Move to other camps so as to benefit from food distribution · Reduce expenditure by buying used clothing · Cultivate shared cropping( South Kordofan & South Darfur) · Borrowing money or in kind from friends and relatives
Strategies adopted to address emergency needs Revolving loan funds. These are associations were money is collected and used by any of the member participants. This includes bailing oneself out when sentenced for brewing alcohol.
Social Interactions These are fostered through community projects that call for mobilisation to perform mutual community work such as the building of a school, health centres, environmental campaigns. These are facilitated through: ¨ Popular committees ¨ Development committees ¨ Women committees ¨ Collective reciprocal labour Nafirs
Resistance to some of the Government’s polices IDPs have many times resisted the relocations that were carried out by the Government. In fact they have physically fought the police
Integration of IDPs into the host community Since 1983, the Government reaction to displacement has been that of rejection. When it was finally accepted as a phenomenon with various reasons for its existence, many successive administrations were set up: · Khartoum State Relief Committee (KSRC) history · Department of Displace (DOD) history · Relief and Rehabilitation Commission(RRC) history
Current Administrative structures · Ministry of Health (MOH) · Khartoum State Ministry engineering Affairs · National Population Centre · Commission of voluntary Agencies (COVA) · Humanitarian Assistance Commission All these Government departments do not provide social services to the displaced. They are mostly engaged in the regulation of the services and supervision of the INGOs and NNGOs
Government Polices towards IDPs The Government of Sudan have adopted a number of polices to deal with the issue of displacement.
Redefinition of Internally Displace Persons By 1991, there were 1.8 million recognised IDPs scattered all over Khartoum, and some in other big urban centres such as Wad Medeni, and in the Sugar Production areas of Kennana, Asalaya and Gadaref. In Khartoum, where there the bulk of IDPs were, only 60 000 were recognised and relocated to three big camps at Jebel Awleia in Khartoum and, Wad el Bashir and Salama in Omdurman The result of this policy is a: · Reduction in number of officially recognised IDPs leaving more than two millions without assistance · General Food distribution was banned and only feeding centres for malnourished children and pregnant and lactating mothers are operational · Displaced in 1992 went into ration cards and today, because of free market polices , they buy their food from the market
Integration Policy Closure of IDPs Southern State Governments sponsored schools In 1984-91, there were total of 60 displaced primary, junior and senior secondary schools that were sponsored by the State Governments of Bahr el Gazal and Equatoria. In 1991 all these schools were closed and pupils and teachers distributed to government schools. Only Sheik Luffi secondary school at Ruffa is left. Result of this policy was that many displaced pupils were rejected in the government schools because of their age. (Normal pupils enter school at age five while the IDPs enter school at age ten and eleven). Teachers who were trained to use English as media of instruction lost their jobs.
Closure of church schools Between 1992-99 many Church based schools were systematically closed down. There are now only sixty schools left.
Land allocation The redefined IDPs have received a plot of land 240 sq meters on which to build their homes.
Appointment of chiefs for the IDPs (Government controlled areas) The chiefs are paid SD 3000 to 6000. Their main job is to settled disputes amongst the IDPs. There are two sets of chiefs in all the IDPs Camps, the Government chiefs and the people chiefs.
IDPs support to the Government policies IDPs (men and women) through their appointed chiefs are encouraged by the government to express their support to polices through organised demonstrations that are facilitated and chiefs are given incentives for mobilisation. IDPs women are registered in the women union and they are encourage to vote for a non-displaced person to represent them in local councils such as the case of Hya el Nasr in Mayo.
Cultural sensitisation There are video clubs scattered in the IDPs settlement such as Mayo Farm, where youth are encourage to watch materials that are showing cultures that are not that of the IDPs.
Relocation and Land Allocation Polices Under Sudanese law, unregistered land is a state owned property. Eviction of those who have settled on this land can be effected using force when necessary. Removal, relocation, and preplanning polices are common. 1990 decree no 941 is one of these. Following this decree 300 000 families were relocated during the last few years (UNCHU). The rationale behind the relocation of the IDPs is to provide them with a plot of land on which to build, and to re- organise the civilised capital city in case of Khartoum. Another undeclared reason is that some IDPs occupy valuable farm land or land not far from the city centre which, when sold, could add to the State financial resources and public appearance e.g. cultural, gender and the potential security threats.
Education Education is part and parcel of the general Islamization of the State ensured in articles 4, 16, 18 etc. of the Sudan Constitution of 1998. Art. 4 is key to the establishment of the Islamic state. Art 16 prescribes that the State shall enforce morals on the Sudanese society by using in theory the Islamic and Christian Morals. In practice, only the Islamic moral are enforced. This is showed in the prescribed code of dressing in schools and the work place i.e. long baggy dresses with long sleeves and headscarves. Violation of this code of dressing is punishable. When women are arrested for breaking the code of dressing flogging is immediate and in public Art. 18 imperatively requires that public officials dedicate their time to worshipping Allah. They must maintain religious (Islamic) motivation and provide guidance due to such spirit in (public) plans, laws, polices and the official business in political, social and cultural fields in order to promote public life towards this objective. This article states also that ‘…It is the divine duty of the educational authorities to develop students in schools towards Islam and Islamic Cultures.’
Status regulating basic education General education is regulated in Sudan by the ‘Law Regulating General Education” (Act. No. 24 of 1992) The General education Act consists of
Basic Education (6 years) Secondary Education (3 years) The objectives of the Law are set out in Chapter 2 of the act (Art 4 a-f). They include: “ To form the mind and morality of the youth by instructing them in the teaching of the religion (Islam) culture, traditions (Sunna) to imbue them with social values good motivations and fear of Allah” “To purify their souls by setting before them examples of good traditions and morals. To teach them how to think and act and practice good manners” Religion and Arabic language are compulsory subjects (art16 (3)). It is to be noted here that the Christian religion is not taught in classroom like the Islamic religion. Pupils have to go to churches or centres during their private time to receive teaching in Christianity. Art 29 of the Act stipulates that non-governmental schools must be licensed before they function. However the government reserves the right/ power for the withdrawal of the license for reasons such as: The presence of such school is in contradiction with public policy or if the building is used for non-educational purposes. (It is to be noted that the IDPs church schools are based in multipurpose buildings and prayers are held in those schools on Sundays). Chapter 12 of the Act imposes penalties on the school or the NGO if continuation of the non- governmental school is against the public welfare. A church school (many IDPs schools are) breaks the law if designs the uniform especially for girls without the approval of the government (Art.12) Chapter 4 (Art.90) states three stages of approval for opening a Non -Governmental school: 1. Provisional approval (valid for 2years period (Chapter 4 Art 9) license may not be approved if expired 2. Approval for accepting pupils and starting teaching 3. The final approval
Access to Education The church schools were open to address the problems of access by the IDPs children. For a child to attend school, she/he must have attended pre-school for two years (at age of three to five years) by the time they enter first year basic school they are six years old. (IDPs children enter school aged 9-10 years). They must have a birth certificate. To acquire this, the mother must have delivered her baby at a health facility or be assisted by a licensed midwife and a mother pays (10-30$). The displaced cannot afford this. They must also have an immunisation certificate indicating that they had been immunised against six childhood diseases. All these requirements make it difficult for IDP children to go to school.
The dilemma of the IDPs women IDP women can be grouped broadly into Christians, Muslims and others. The majority of IDPs are not aware of laws that govern their lives. However amongst the southern IDPs and the Nuba ethnic cultures and traditions over rides the religious cultures and laws. Concept of marriage amongst the Sudanese is for propagation of mankind and keeping of family lineage. The age of marriage is very low amongst the IDPs (14-16) by the time the IDP women is 24-26 she has been married for ten years and has three to four children. It is at this time that the IDPs husbands start to migrate out to look for better paying jobs, i.e. they travel to agricultural areas. Many IDPs women, who are heading up their families, have not seen their husbands for the last 2-5 years. Almost all the IDP women do not have a marriage certificate as most get married traditionally. Marriages are family agreements that are socially recognise and respected. These IDP women have the added psycho-social stress of being single mothers.
Alcohol Brewing Alcohol brewing is the main source of income for significant numbers of Nubas and Southerners. In 1988, the percentage of women working in alcohol was less than 5%. By 1991, brewing was practiced by 135 of the IDPs women. By 2000, 355 women brew alcohol. Current rate of women-headed households is 78%. The national figure is 23%. Section 78(1) of criminal Law of 1991 prohibits Muslims from possessing, and manufacturing alcoholic drinks in the North. However non Muslims can be convicted under Section 78(2) which states, “…Without prejudice to provision of sub section (1) whoever drinks alcohol and thereby provokes the feelings of others or causes annoyance or nuisances there to or drinks the same in public place or comes to such place in state of drunkenness, shall be punished with imprisonment for term not exceeding one month or with whipping not exceeding forty lashes and may also be punished with fine”. Another section under which the IDPs brewing alcohol can be convicted is section 79 of Sudan Criminal Law of1991 which states, “…Whoever deals in alcohol by storing, selling, purchasing, transporting or in possessing it with intention of dealing there in with others or mixing the same with food, drink or in any substance use by public, or advertise or promote it in any way, shall be punished with imprisonment for term not exceeding one year or with a time or both in all cases, alcohol which is the subject shall be destroyed”.
Where are the women who brew alcohol Section 6 of the Criminal procedures ACT 1991 provides that criminal courts in Sudan consist of: · Supreme Court · Courts of Appeal · General Criminal Court · First Grade Criminal Court · Second Grade Criminal Court · Peoples Criminal Court · Any other Criminal Court established by a warrant issue It is to be mentioned here that the Locality Criminal Courts (Public Order Courts) are not part of the hierarchy of criminal courts provided for in the procedures Act 1991. However they fall within the category of courts which may be established from time to time by Chief Justices under section 6(h) of same Act. These courts have been established to try public order offenders promptly, thus they are conducted summarily, usually by a single judge of 2nd grade. Appeals from the Localities Criminal Courts go to Special Courts of Appeal known as the Public Order Panels, which consist of three Judges delivering their decision by majority. Most of the decisions confirm the convictions and fines that have been passed by the Public Order courts. These courts do not have jurisdiction making it difficult to follow up a particular accused; an accused arrested in Khartoum North could be tried in a Public Order Court in Khartoum. The Public Order Courts and Police operate round the clock
Omdurman Prison for Women This prison was built in 19th century during the Mahdist State as a public treasury. It was later on turned into a prison with a capacity of 600 men and women. Since the introduction of Public Order Courts it is always over crowded. Sanitation in this prison is poor, there is over crowding and children are in prison with their mothers. Some die of malnutrition. Outbreaks of diarrhoea are frequent due to the poor sanitation. The majority of women imprisoned in Omdurman prison are IDPs convicted of brewing alcohol.
IDPS imprison with children in 1998 Month No. of Women No. of Children January 1 089 259 February 1 801 517 March 1 552 541 April 2 333 731 May 1 723 353 June 469 47 July 2 185 486 August 4 701 946 September 4 301 981 October 4 578 1 070 November 2 736 610 December 2 487 541 Source: Sudan Council of Churches
Issue of Identity and Culture; Peoples’ identities evolve around names, food, what is worn, songs and dances. Most of the IDPs are of Southern and Nuba origin and dancing means mixed dancing which is punishable under Khartoum state Public Order Laws. Public Order Laws for Khartoum State states in Article (5) “ no private musical party shall be conducted except after obtaining an approval from the locality within the place of organisation. Art. (7-1) States that “ Any person who has obtain an approval for conducting a musical party must observe the Following (1) Stoppage of party within a period not exceeding eleven ‘o clock at night. (2) Mixed dances between men and women are not allow and the dance of women in front of men, no performance of immoral songs.” Art. (2) states: “In case of violation of the rules contain in paragraph (1) above the police may take suitable procedures to remove the violation, this may extend to the stoppage of the party”. Art (8): ‘It is not allow to conduct any musical party, film show, drama, exhibition or continue show during the period from 12 o’clock to 2 o’clock every Friday.
What has happened to the IDPs given all these integration policies and the sustained pressures on those who have not left their villages especially in areas where there is oil?
Story of Panru The Panru map made in 1954 prior to the Sudanese independence showed that Ruweng Province occupied an area westward of Aliny (Higlig) and on South towards Rubkon and Bahr el Gazal River was home to the Dinka Panru and Dinka Alor. West and South of Dinka Panru were the Leek Nuer centered on town of Bentiue. East were the Shiluk and Dinka Ngok. South of the River was Bul or Jigany Nuer, west of Bul were mostly Dinka Ngok and Dinka Tuec centered on town of Abyei. These groups of Dinaks and Nuer are cattle headers Traditionally, before the South-North conflict, the Arab nomads drove their cattle south for grassing and water during the dry seasons. As the South –North Conflict intensified the Arabs armed themselves with machine guns and mounted sustained pressure on the Dinkas forcing them to abandon their land and villages,
Panru people started to arrive to Khartoum as displaced in 1984 and settled in Baron, then Hhilat shook. They were relocated to Jebel awlia and then to Mayo Farm were they are currently. The following conversation were carried out in July 2002 at Mayo farm ‘My name is Nyandong Biem Monywak Deng. I arrived Khartoum in 1984, Numeiri was still the President. I had come from Pariang. I left the village because all the cows had been looted by the Marhalen, the two shops in the village were empty and there was no food any where in the village. I left, taking along my three children, leaving my husband behind. He was too old to walk the distance. I walked fron Pariang to Bul- Baloth - Walky, - Umruaba and then rode a bus to Khartoum. On arriving Khartoum we first settled at Barona, then came to Hilat shook. The Government then relocated us to Jebel Awlia in 1991. And we were than relocated to Mayo Farm. We have been here for the last five years My husband did not join me. He died three years after I had arrived Khartoum. It has been difficult bring up the children when we were in Barona Haj Yousif and Hilat shook. We were given food and clothing and children were going to schools in the camps. This changed when we were relocated to Jebel Aulia and Mayo Farm. My daughter Abob is now married and is living with her husband. Nyantul went to school she progressed to sixth grade. She got pregnant. She is now living with me. I look after her three-year-old daughter while she works as a maid. She comes back by end of every day with $1.2 we then buy food. Angela Nyanyiitk is in one of the Universities doing applied sciences she is in fifth year. She will graduate next year. She is living in the camp with me. Koor was born in 1989. He is in fifth year basic school The children have never gone back to the village. Two years back I visited Pariang. The war is still on. Some people are still there. These are those who had never left the village. There are also other people- I think they are government people. They have built on a separate location from the villagers. I came back to Khartoum. I don’t think it is safe to be there. I have never learned to speak Arabic. My children do speak Arabic. The girls need that because they are working for Arab families. The others need it because they go to school. At home we speak Dinka. The children sing and dance Dinka dances”
“William wen I am a teacher. I have been working as a volunteer teacher since we arrived in Khartoum in 1986.I had work in the School in hilat shook. Then we moved to Jebel Awlia and to Mayo Farm. We have a community school that is supported by the Catholic Church in the camp here. This year 2002, twenty- nine pupils sat for junior certificate, and twenty- seven passed and have been accepted in the various secondary schools in Khartoum. To date there are forty children who started school in Hilat shook in the Universities, majority of these are boys. Girls are kept at home to look after their siblings. When they grow older they work as house-girls to support their families. There are problems with this issue of making girls work in homes. Some of them have become social misfits, and most of the women are now rethinking that strategy. We have benefited from the war. If we were still in Panring, none of these kids would have been to school.’
Abduction of women and children For centuries Northerners and Turko- Egyptian traders raided along the Nile deep into Upper Nile and Equatoria. Villagers were caught, roped together and sold as domestic servants or
concubines in Northern Sudan. In mid 1800s, foreign traders encouraged the hostile tribal groups to raid each other for booty including ivory and slaves. Influenced by the European driven campaign to abolish slave trade, Mohamed Ali, the Kheiwe of Egypt closed public slave markets in Khartoum. The current war has lead to insurgence of slavery. Many women and children are abducted and kept against their will. The majority of abductions take place across the northern Bahr el Gazal, South and West Kordofan and South Darfur. According to the Dinka chiefs committee (DCC), more than 25000 women and children are still in captivity. The abducted women and children are taken from the southern villages and transferred to the north and kept against their will. Some of them work as domestic servants and others herd the cattle without payment.
Abductee story “My name is Nyannut. The name given to me by the abductor is Zarha. One day I woke up because was a lot of noise in the village. There was screaming all over the place. When I got out of the hut the whole village was burning, people were running in all directions. I caught the hands of my two children and carried the youngest one; he was about three years old. We ran. We crossed the Kiir Rier .We sat down to rest. I met some of other the families. While we were resting some Arab men come on their horses and approached us telling us that we should not be afraid because they were going to help us. By the time we reach Abu matariq, we were distributed amongst the Arabs. All my children had been distributed to other families. I was taken by Ibrahim to his house and worked as a maid for his wife, fetching water and collecting firewood. One day Ibrahim came back to his house. His wife was not there. He raped me. After sometime I realised that I was pregnant. His wife was very angry, however she helped me to escape. I have been looking for my children since I come out, it is now two years and I am carrying Ibrahim’s child. There is nothing that I can do after all this child has my blood also”.
Abductee story” My name is Ahmed Abdalla Ii remember that we were running with my mother, a brother and a sister. We had crossed the river and sat under a tree to rest. My mother started a fire and was boiling porridge for us. Out of nowhere men on horses appeared. They assured us that we were safe. They took us and we left the pot on the fire. So we joined a group of women and children. We were taken to an Arab village, which I later came to know as Abu Matarig. There out side the village we were divided up amongst the men. I was given to Abdalla and also my sister. I had not seen my mother but my brother was given to another Arab man .My sister and I stayed for many years with Abdalla. One night my sister told me that she will escape and that I should continue to live with Abdalla because she intends to come back and get me. My sister was fetching water, collecting firewood and grinding for the family. I was looking after goats. As I grew older I spent most of the times away from the house herding the cattle. My sister told me that Abdalla had killed our mother, that I should not mention this to anyone because it is dangerous. My sister ran away. It is many years since my sister escaped. Early this year (2002) CEAWC people identified me. They have now located my sister. I don’t remember my Dinka name or my mother’s, but I know my sister’s name, She is Asha Abdalla, her Dinka name is Abuk’
What is being done about abduction of children and Women In May 1999, the Government of Sudan recognised the problem of abduction and the Ministry of Justices set up a Committee for the Eradication of Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWC), whose mandate is: · To facilitate safe return of the abducted women and children · Investigate and report on the abduction of women and children and bring to trial those who have been engage in the abduction of children and women Investigate the causes of abduction of women and children, forced labour or similar practices and recommend ways of and means of eradication of such practices
Reintegration of Women and Children The discussion about integration assumes that there is peace and peace means different things to different people. For women, peace means having and producing their own food, taking children to school of their own choice, being able to move without hindrance, being able to ask questions on issues that they do not understand, being able to participate in decisions that affects their lives. · The characteristics of many women and children are that they have: · Have acquired new cultures · Have lost some of their ethnic group cultures and tradition · Have no skills to use in the new settings · Are traumatised · Have been urbanised and had access to social services and water, schools and source of energy such as gas. · There are child soldiers · Have acquire skills that are not relevant or can’t be use if integrated into the original villages
How are these women and children going to be integrated In post-war Sudan, there will be villages without any infrastructure or inadequate structures and water sources. There are those who have never left the villages and therefore they are keeping most of the traditions and cultures. The urban centres that will be too small to receive the high number of urbanised IDP returning to their original areas.
Issues that need to be address during the integration are as follows:
Food security Providing extension training to women will ensure this. Credit and skills training will have to be accessible to the women. There has to be the creation of markets where women can sell and buy. Food processing facilities such as grinding mills will reduce the time taken to prepare meals thus freeing the women to engage in production of surplus that can be sold and bring in additional income to the family.
Social Services Schools are a priority. These must be relevant to the cultures and aspirations of the communities. There should be mobile schools to address the educational needs of the pastoral people. The cost of such services especially the basic education should be borne by the state. Reintroduction of boarding schools will address the cost issues and reduce the establishment of too many schools too rapidly. There should be training of women in masonry, carpentry, mechanical works etc. Water provision will be a priority; access to clean water will reduce the
prevalence of water borne diseases and improve the quality of live of the people. Health services need to be accessible and affordable. Women should be trained as primary health care workers. Training of the human resource for this could start now, so that by the time the time for integration comes there are people to able provide the services.
Commercial Services Commercial services will have to expand to include new areas such as information management and women must have access to credit. It should be noted that post-war Sudan will be a Sudan of women and children. This means that for development to take place women must engage in activities that were previously reserved for men. Provision of counselling to the women and children will be of prime importance and will help in the integration of the traumatised women and children Workshops to produce limbs for the disabled have to be established. Retraining and rehabilitation will have to be under taken. Restocking of animals will have to be done for those who have loss all their animals; this is particularly important to the pastoralists. Extensive paralegal training and education must be done to create awareness amongst women and children about their rights and duties. Demobilisation and rehabilitation of the child soldiers will have to be under taken. Counselling will be important. Those who are not able to go to school because of their age should be given vocational training to acquire skills that will assist them in their lives. Special centres and homes should be established to accommodate the orphans and those who were abducted and have loss their identities.
The challenges are: Ø How to develop women and children centred integration programs, knowing that both groups do not participate in the decision making process. Ø How to sustain a social reconstruction that accommodates the acquired traditions and cultures. Ø How to increase the opportunity to create people centred sustainable development
Conclusion Post-war Sudan will be a country of women and their children. They constitute more than 75% of the population and therefore all the activities must take this in to account. The other phenomenon that will have to be addressed is the expected rapid urbanisation; current urban centres in the war-affected areas will not be enough to absorb the incoming people. There will have to be clustering of homes in villages so that shared social services facilities will be access able to all.
Bibliography Legislative supplement to gazette no.1561, dated 05 March 1992
El Nagar, Samia, 1996. Displaced in Khartoum Problem; analysis and recommendations for action; Report for WFP Khartoum
Partners in Development, 2000. Cooping Strategies and Livelihood Intervention of the Internally Displaced persons in Northern Sudan
Sudan Council of Churches, 1987. Baseline Survey on the Health Status of the IDPs in Camps; Khartoum
Sudan Council of Churches, 1989. Follow up Survey on the Health of Internally Displaced persons in the Camps
Word Vision, 1996. Effects of Armed conflict on Girls; a Discussion Paper for the UN Study on Impact of the Armed Conflict on Children
Authors interviews with · Displaced persons from Panru · Abductees that had been retrieved
15 - Response The Sudanese Refugees and the Hope for Peace by Mrs Khadija Hussein Dafaala
I would like at first to thank the African Renaissance Institute (ARI) and the Relationships Foundation International (RFI) for their kind invitation to us to participate in this noble effort to help to build peace in Sudan.
Introduction
Sudan is the largest country in the heart of Africa- 1 million square miles- inhabited by approx. 40 million people, who are mostly peasants, farmers or pasturealists and are from multi – religious, multi –ethnic, and multiculteral backgrounds. It is a rich country with many natural resources and the second longest river in the world- The Nile. Now, with the huge oil deposits discovered and more beneath, the Sudan has even more potential to be a happy and prosperous country if it is blessed with peace underpinned with political stability. Except for the brief period following the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement Sudan had been embroiled in a civil war that has created millions of refugees and internally displaced peoples. As you would know the 3 solutions to the problem of the refugees are: 1 Naturalisation This is to give refugees the opportunity to be nationals, that is, fully-fledged citizens of the host country. However as the constitutions of many countries do not allow naturalisation of refugees this does not work, e.g. The Sudan will only naturalise a child born there. 2. Resettlement This option would help to solve the problem of the refugees by allowing them to leave the host country and settle in a third country that is willing to accept them and eventually welcome them as citizens of their country. 3.Voluntary Repatriation This of course implies that political religious or other crisis that necessitated exile or has pushed people to become refugees return home willingly to pick up their lives from where they left them and hopefully resume life without fear of any further persecution. Understandably, the best and most viable solution is the last one i.e. Voluntary Repatriation of refugees to their origin, their relatives and their culture, their history and identity. We have learnt that on July the 20th 2002 the Sudanese, the SPLM and SPLA have reached a peace agreement, and we are looking forward to the final signing of the said agreement on the 21st October 2002. It is exactly thirty years to the month since the Addis Ababa agreement was signed Agreements are in the end by human beings and we hope that there will not be a second Numeri’s situation along the line that will change the letter and spirit of agreement. Thus, if the ageement becomes final and trust is restored, we hope to see the inevitable voluntary repatriation of the estimated 3 million refugees and 5 million internally displaced peoples. I believe that the refugees have been playing a significant role, during the problem and should have a part in the solution. 8 million, out for a population of 40 million (20%) is significantly large enough as not to be neglected. I believe that once the peace programme is ratified serious commitment will be needed by the national government of Sudan to welcome and rehabilitate the returning refugees. The international community led and advised by the United Nations, High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in co - operation with all the countries that have so generously hosted the refugees (UK. Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Libya, U.S.A, Kenya, Egypt, South Africa, etc), should be called to kindly assist the new government of Sudan to appropriately accommodate, find employment, and assist in the rehabilitation of the returning refugees, whether they have the host country’s citizenship, refugee status or are asylum seekers. Certain programmes of support for each category can be suggested. The case of the internally displaced people should not be left to the new government only. Although they have not crossed any international borders, their needs are no different from those of the refugees. I therefore hope that the UN agencies such as UNICEF, WFP, etc the European Union and the world of NGO’s (non-governmental) organisations) will help the Sudanese government in rehabilitating the Sudanese Peoples. The most important issue in peace-building in my view, is trust building and reconciliation. Practical, transparent, accountable, serious and honest projects will be needed to attract refugees to return home. One of the most important priorities must be geared towards the return of qualified nationals who could help in the rebuilding of the country. With this in mind women must be empowered and trained to play vigorous role in the area of peace-building.
Summary of Discussion on The Return of the Displaced: A Challenge to the Country and the International Community; and Reintegration of Women and Children in Post-War Situations; and The Sudanese Refugees and the Hope for Peace.
1. There are guiding principles which govern the treatment of IDPs. The authorities are obliged to allocate appropriate resources.
2. The above papers have shown the vulnerability of women and children in the Sudan. Women need equal opportunities to be involved in all processes.
3. The Sudan Supreme Court punishes by law all involved in kidnap. But there is an established practice between thirteen tribes. At first it was decided not to apply this law to this practice, but it involved the tribal chiefs in dealing with this practice. It needs time to teach people to make them aware of the negative effect of such practices.
4. The question of the Nuba. It took a long time for the mechanisms of the monitoring to be put into place. The JMC is a very expensive mechanism. There is the need for a real opportunity. In practical terms there are three areas being addressed: Nuba groups involved in those who want to return. There are plans to discuss how these things can be managed by the Nuba people themselves.
Paper 16 The Role of the Private Sector, Civil Society and Local NGOs in Rebuilding Social and Human Capital and Ensuring Respect for Human Rights by Dr Ahmed Abdel Rahman Saeed
Executive Summary:
This paper reviews the roles that different civil society organisations (CSOs) can play in rebuilding the social and human capital and ensuring respect for human rights. The first section gives a general overview of the definitions of the terms currently in use within the development circles and ends with adopting a working definition for the purpose of this paper. The second section deals with the impact of violent conflicts on the local civil society institutions and explains the main processes affecting civil society during war. The third section discusses a strategy advanced by Harvey (1998) that is characterised as a civil society rebuilding approach to rehabilitation. The fourth section identified the potential sources of social capital. The fifth section deals with the role and responsibilities of the private sector in rebuilding capital (social and economic). The last section is the concluding remarks, which summarises the main findings of the each section. In addition, the conclusion also argued that the civil society organisations have an increasing responsibility to ensure respect for human rights by monitoring and enforcing.
1. Civil Society: Definition and Classification
Civil society is a concept that has become fashionable across the political spectrum. It re- emerged in political discourse in the mid-1980s.1 There are many definitions of the term ‘civil society’, none of which commands universal assent. In both neo-liberal and neo-populist development paradigms, civil society, and recently social capital, play key roles in promoting democratic values and participation and serve as a counterbalance to the power of the state.2 Promoting and strengthening civil society is advocated as a key role of development assistance. For neo-liberals, civil society provides a check on the state and is indispensable in fostering a vibrant market economy. In the good government agenda, civil society provides channels of communication and promotes accountability between the state and its citizens.3 Neo-populists have embraced civil society as a way of reaching the grass roots, encouraging bottom-up development and generation participation from the poor and dis-empowered.4 Civil society in development theory, therefore, is assumed to be independent from the state and a fundamental positive force. The competing interpretations of civil society have their roots in the various currents of western philosophy. In the liberal tradition, civil society is portrayed as a plurality of civil associations which serve to counterbalance the power of the state, advocate popular demands and promote democratic values. The Marxist tradition portrayed civil society as an arena of conflict where civic institutions reproduce and disseminate the hegemonic values of the dominant classes but this hegemony can be contested by social movements representing alternative norms. In this tradition, civil society is seen in terms of conflict, with the state attempting to penetrate and control civil society. All these competing interpretations use civil society as a tool for promotion of democracy, the market economy or capitalism. This tends to result in restrictive definitions of civil society with some sectors of civil society being selected as truly ‘civil’ and others dismissed as authoritarian, traditional or pre-capitalist, depending on the political and intellectual tradition of the writer. However, what is important about the civil society debate in not that we agree who is “in” and who is “out” in some abstract sense, but that we agree a working definition that help us to make appropriate decisions about who to involve in different tasks. At its simplest, civil society is the arena in which people come together to pursue the interest they hold in common- not for profit or the exercise of political power, but because they care enough about something to take collective action. In this sense, all organisations and associations between family and state are part of the civil society, except firms: religious and professional organisations, labour unions, the media, grass roots associations, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) of different kinds, and many others. For the purpose of this paper the need is for a definition of civil society that aims to come to terms with the breadth of concepts rather than restricting it to a more narrow set of phenomena. Civil society will therefore be defined as “an associational realm between state and family, populated by organisations enjoying some autonomy in relation to the state and formed voluntarily by members of society to protect their interests or values”.5 This sociological approach to civil society means that it embraces a wide range of social forces. These might be modern or traditional; foster or hinder democracy; and be involved, or outside, politics. It could be distinctly ‘uncivil’ entities such as the Mafia. This definition does not assume that civil society is always a positive force for development. As Fatton (1992) argues, the emergence of civil society is contradictory; it can be repressive as well as liberating, inegalitarian as well as equalising and obstructionist as well as forward looking.6
Because civil society is a very broad arena, it contains a huge array of different interests, types of association, and expression of values, some of which will conflict with others. The profile of the civil society, therefore, is different in every context. Against this background, there are many ways one could classify the different organisations of civil society: by sector, focus, scale, level of formality, values-base and different theoretical perspectives. Civil society organisations (CSOs) can be differentiated according to the following five functions. representation (organisations which aggregate citizen voice), advocacy and technical inputs (organisations that provide information and advice, and lobby on particular issues), capacity building (organisations that provide support to other CSOs, including funding), service delivery (organisations that implement development projects or provide services), and Social functions (organisations that foster collective recreational activities). Table 1 shows some of the different types of CSOs that exist in each of the above categories.
Table 1: Types of Civil Society Organisations
Representation Technical Capacity Service Social functions expertise Building Delivery
Membership Professional and Foundations Implementing Mosque or organisations, business (local and NGOs (Local prayer groups e.g. labour associations international) and unions International.) NGOs Advocacy Credit and Sports clubs Federations and NGOs NGO support mutual aid Networks organisations societies Churches and faith-based organisations Organisations of Think-tanks and Informal, Migrants’ indigenous research groups Training grass roots and associations people organisations community- based organisations News media Choral societies groups
Many CSOs are active in more than one of these functions. The relationship between NGOs, civil society and democratisation, from the liberal perspective to say the least, is often assumed to be as follow: while NGOs are part of the civil society, they also strengthen it through their activities, which in turn supports the democratic process.7
2. The Impact of Conflict on Civil Society
Violent conflict is known to be a major constraint to development. Conflict decreases living standards by destroying human, social and economic capital and negating decades of development. Moreover, conflict diverts international attention and scarce resources from social and economic problems. However, conflicts have always been an inherent part of political, social and economic change. Conflict can also present an opportunity to develop new social, political and economic systems that can better serve the needs of a changing society. Promoting growth, equity and inclusion to manage conflict before it erupts into violence is therefore a vital development approach. Conflict is also destructive to the civil society. Some writers about complex political emergencies (CPEs) have noted that ‘many contemporary conflicts are synonymous with breakdown of civil society’.8 However, little is known about the civil society breakdown process during conflicts. Conflict also result in the collapse, or at least weakening of state power. State collapse affects civil society in a number of ways. Harvey (1998) traced three main processes of what he calls disengagement that clearly apply to CPEs:9
There is retreat into parallel economy (subsistence and/or black market) Traditional structures and authority regain force as familiar bases in which people seek protection from instability and arbitrariness of state channels Narrower bases of communal solidarity (village, family, ethnic, religious) are reinforced. The collapse of a centralised state does not mean that these three processes of disengagement are complete and that civil society can be seen as completely independent. Even in the most extreme cases of state collapse, such as in Somalia, local authorities still perform some of the functions of the state, albeit in a limited form. It was found that power devolved to armed groups, which to a degree performed some of the functions of states in the localities where they had military predominance. These local authorities simultaneously attack civil society, as part of their military strategies, and contest processes of disengagement in attempts to use civil society to mobilise support and resources. The broad definition of civil society adopted for this paper could include militia groups but by necessity exclude the warring parties since they continue to provide some state functions. The obvious point to note about civil society is that war undermines civil society. War affect civil society in three main ways. First, displacement splits up families and communities and takes individuals away from a context in which they can draw on reciprocal networks. Second, the looting of assets result in overall lack of resources within communities, which undermines exchange networks. If even the wealthier members of the community have been subject to looting, they are less likely to be able to assist the weaker and poorer members. Third, military strategies of exemplary terror, such as dehumanising acts of torture and mutilation targeted families and communities, results in destruction of the social fabric that is the basis for civil society.10 As de Waal argues, destabilisation through acts of violence can ‘create a climate of mistrust and turn a community against itself’ and undermine the citizen’s sense of security.11 The aim is destabilise the communities that are seen as opposed to the faction carrying out the violence. Civil society is further undermined by the manipulation of ethnic identities by warring parties. This process of manipulation hardens differences between ethnic groups and destroys long-standing reciprocal relations.12
Attempts to disengage from the state by retreating into a parallel economy are clearly contested by the warring parties. Milita leaders need the profits generated from engagement in the parallel economy to sustain their military efforts. Clearly if the informal economy as a whole is seen as part of the civil society this make the concept too broad. However, the way in which civil society institutions interact with the informal economy is an important part of the response of civil society to war and state collapse. Although civil society is undermined and contested during war, civil society institutions and organisations continue to exist and indeed to thrive at a local level. It was found that ‘authority structure around elders, traditional conflict management procedures, active trading networks and inventive community operations grow up to fill local vacuums.’ This is reflected in the continuing strength of traditional institutions that, despite being weakened, continue to provide a degree of social stability. Religion is another institution that provides some stability and societies turning towards, as witnessed by the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and fundamentalist Islamic organisations in Somalia. The rise of these religious organisations reinforces the point that emergent civil society groups can be civil or uncivil, depending on your perspective, and are often a complex mixture of the modern and the traditional. The resilience of the civil society is also reflected in the continued strength of the parallel economy. The discussion above illustrates that in an ongoing conflict situation, civil society is simultaneously emerging, being undermined and contested. It can be concluded that there are five inter-linked processes affecting civil society during war.
· An extreme process of disengagement of civil society from state · A fallback on primary grouping within civil society. Kinship, ethnic and traditional political structures serve as coping strategies of people in response to state collapse.
· Military strategies, extreme scarcity and displacement to undermine civil society.
· Predatory local authorities continue to contest the space of civil society, moving into the parallel economy and attempting to create support by drawing on neo-patrimonial ties based on ethnicity.
· The continued strength of civil society at a local level, both in the parallel economy and in traditional institutions.
These processes have some important implications for an approach to rehabilitation that focuses on civil society. Civil society emerges as a contested arena that is not as independent from the state as suggested in the development literature. Therefore, the hope that building civil society will marginalise the warlords is likely to be difficult and one must examine the accommodations civil society organisations have to make with local authorities. The weakness of civil society during and after conflict is likely to affect the capability and absorptive capacity of the remaining civil society institutions. This suggests the need to move slowly in capacity building initiatives to avoid any danger of overwhelming institutions by providing too many resources too quickly.
3. Rehabilitation and the Civil Society
This section outlines the main features of civil society rebuilding approach to rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is a crucial component of the transition from relief to development, which involves strengthening of local institutional capacity. The European Union has stated that: “Rehabilitation must be conceived and implemented as a strategy encompassing institutional reform and strengthening … People– both victims and participants- must be reintegrated into civil society.”13 Local institutions are a key part of providing more sustainable assistance and moving away from relief. This forms a part of recent discourse linking relief and development. Traditional relief was portrayed as top-down, standardised and frequently resulting in the loss of local capacity. The answer was for relief intervention to pay more attention to enhancing local capacity; of government where that was possible, but also of NGOs and local communities. Following on from this, rehabilitation was seen as a crucial but neglected link that could ease that could ease the transition from relief to development. It should incorporate developmental principles: ‘working with and through local institutions and consulting with local people about their perceptions and needs’.14 In countries where there is no effective national governments, the question of who to work with become problematic. Yet despite these problems there is a desire on the part of donors to move beyond relief and begin rehabilitation, even in situations of ongoing conflict. The reasons for this desire to start the rehabilitation process as soon as possible can be summarised below: The situation in part of the country or for periods of time is perceived as peaceful enough to begin rehabilitation. In the context of donor pressure to improve the efficiency of aid delivery and donor fatigue at prolonged provision of relief, rehabilitation programming is seen as more efficient and cost effective than relief. It is hope that rehabilitation may provide an impetus towards peace building and conflict resolution and be able to address the root causes of conflict. There are concerns that continued provision of relief may serve to prolong the conflict and attract further violence. Starting rehabilitation process does not suggest that the emergency is over, or that it is likely to be a straightforward transition to development, despite the fact that the boundaries between relief, rehabilitation and development are blurred and overlapping. Rehabilitation, therefore, is not a separate sphere of activities but one of a range of programming options for providing assistance that meet basic needs and contributes to peace building objectives. A strong civil society is crucial in development. In prolonged war situations, civil society and social capital are seriously affected. Given that there is no government to work with, governance capacity needs to be built from the bottom-up, together with civil society and social capital. It is hoped that strengthening civil society or non-military interests will marginalise existing predatory authorities and thus create a platform for peace by allowing space and voice for civil society to express its desire for peace. The term ‘social capital’ has recently been adopted by development practitioners to mean, ‘features of social organisations, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions’. It is argued that civic engagement, measured in terms of membership in horizontal networks, enhances social trust. These horizontal networks produce a social environment that breeds and facilitates responsive government. Civic communities demand better government, as they are more likely to stand up for the common good. The emphasis on the importance of trust in social networks and relationships is particularly important for our purpose since trust tends to be broken down during violent conflict and need to be rebuilt in any process of rehabilitation. As strengthening civil society and peace building activities becomes increasingly acceptable and attractive to donors, the civil society approach to rehabilitation is reflected in most agency policy on the ground. Hence, the Operation Lifeline Sudan becomes involved in capacity building through supporting local NGOs and the rebel humanitarian wing.15 Table 2 summarises how this approach is being applied in a number of countries. This approach fits with the current enthusiasm for a bottom up, participatory and empowering development and incorporates three currently fashionable development concepts: civil society, social capital and capacity building. It allows international agencies to claim that by working with civil society institutions, they are engaging with the current enthusiasm for conflict resolution and peace building. Training for local NGOs (LNGOs) has largely focused on their internal effectiveness and organisational development, which enhances upward accountability to the donors. Without greater down ward accountability, however, LNGOs may develop the ability to spend aid money, but will not empower the communities to demand better governance. A central challenge for LNGOs in developing more genuine participation will be to focus more on creation and strengthening of local institutions and capacity building at the local level. Sustainability is a key issue. At the moment LNGOs are largely dependent on continued external funding and the sustainability of both their projects and the LNGOs is questionable. A strategy for sustainability of the LNGOs project is crucial. This could be through, for example, inclusion of cost recovery or profit components in project or may be training LNGOs in on fund-raising strategies and encouraging LNGOs and local authorities to raise a certain proportion of funds from local sources in future projects.
Table 2: Examples of civil society rebuilding approach to rehabilitation16
Country International Local Projects Approach/claims agency organisation
Afghanistan UNDP Shuras (council Small scale rural Sustainable grass of elders), Local rehabilitation, roots programmes NGOs e.g. irrigation, create an roads. environment for peace
Somalia CARE Local NGOs Agriculure, Partnership and water, health institutional and income capacity building generation of LNGOs Country International Local Projects Approach/claims agency organisation
South Sudan USAID/UN/OL Civil authorities, Roads, health, Creation of local S chiefs, churches, local barter, capacity, more village shops, seeds and cost effective, committees tools improved accountability
Somaliland ActionAid Elders, Peace INGOs less community- conferences, vulnerable to based development conflict, peace organisations projects building (CBO)
Liberia UN Block Food Emerging committees, distribution, strengths in civil community community society, welfare teams reconstruction countervailing needs force to militia
Angola ACORD CBO Resettlement of Participation and displaced community communities ownership
Sierra Leone None Citizen vigilante Defence against Coping with war groups rebels and depends on government resourcefulness in troops civil society
4. How can we increase the stock of social capital?
States can both do some positive things to create social capital and refrain from doing others that deplete a society’s stock. Fukuyama (2001) made the following three observations.17 First, states do not have many obvious levers for creating many forms of social capitals. Social capital is frequently a by-product of religion, tradition, shared historical experience, and other factors that lie outside the control of any government. Second, the area where governments probably have the greatest direct ability to generate the social capital is education. Educational institutions do not transmit human capital, they also pass on social capital in the form of social rules and norms. Third, states indirectly foster creation of social capital by efficiently providing necessary public goods, particularly property rights and public safety. Fourth, a state can have a serious negative impact on social capital when they start to undertake activities that are better left to the private sector or civil society. If we look beyond the role of the state, there are potential sources of social capital. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is difficult for outsiders to foster civil society in countries where it has no social roots. Foundations and government aid agencies seeking to promote voluntary associations have often simply managed to create a stratum of local elites who become skilled at writing grant proposals; the organisations they found tend to have little durability once the outside source of funds dries up. The two other potential external sources of social capital that may be more effective in promoting civil society are religion and globalisation. Obviously not all forms of religion are positive from the standpoint of social capital; sectarianism can breed intolerance, hatred and violence. But religion has also historically been one of the most important sources of culture, and is likely to remain so in the future. Globalisation has been the bearer of not just of capital but of ideas and culture as well. Golobalisation, therefore, injures indigenous cultures and threatens long-standing traditions. But it also leaves behind new ideas, habits and practices in its wake, from accounting standards to management practices to NGO activities.
5. The role of the private sector in conflict prevention and resolution and ensuring respect for human rights:
The private sector (domestic and multinationals) has an increasingly important role to play in conflict prevention and resolution. In today’s global economy they private sector has a growing commercial rationale for playing this role, in order to avoid direct or indirect business costs of conflict and reap the business benefits of peace. The private sector also has a moral imperative and leadership responsibility, given the increasingly central position of the private sector as decision-makers and influencers at national and international level. Almost all companies, in any industry sector, have an interest in helping to build a peaceful and prosperous societies and a role to play by contributing to: equitable economic development; human development, especially education and health; environmental sustainability; good governance; social cohesion; and respect for human rights. The private sector, however, have the potential to play a negative role by creating and exacerbating a violent conflict, and a positive role by helping to prevent it or resolve it when it occurs. Certain companies and industry sectors, such defence, natural resource and infrastructure, have particularly important responsibility to understand and address their direct roles as potential causes of conflict.
There is a business case for private sector engagement in conflict prevention and resolution. In most situations of existing conflict most businesses, other than those directly benefiting from the war economies, pay heavy cost and struggle to carry out their operations under unstable and dangerous conditions where employees, assets and routes to markets are under constant risks. Furthermore, there are potential reputation cost and the threat of international litigation and lawsuits for companies that are accused of complicity with either state or non-state actors that are perpetrating the violence. On the longer-term, the private sector has so much to lose as other sectors of the civil society if economic and social development is seriously jeopardised, which it undoubtedly is when faced by violent conflict. Apart from the cost and benefits and a growing ‘bottom-line’ imperatives for business to play a more proactive role in conflict prevention and resolution, there is a strong moral case for greater leadership in today’s world where the private sector is an increasingly prominent actor. As sir Geoffrey Chandler, chair of Amnesty International, UK Business group argues: “… to fail to do good when it is in one’s legitimate power to do so is rightly condemned by the world.”18
There a main framework in which the private sector can make a positive contribution to the host countries and communities for developing peaceful and prosperous societies and for preventing and resolving conflict. The five areas of the framework are as follows:
· Strengthening economies
· Building human capital
· Promoting good governance (both at corporate and national level)
· Protecting environment
· Assisting social cohesion and respect for human rights Therefore, the private sector may play a more dynamic role in addressing the most critical problems of poverty, job creation, improved social services, environmental protection and disaster assistance and preparedness.
6. Conclusion
The most striking feature of the civil society organisations is the diversity of the NGO sectors and their contribution to the civil society and democracy. Rebuilding civil society does hold the promise of giving the civic interests a stronger voice. By amplifying the voice of civil society, it can begin to a process of making political leaders more accountable and contribute to a demand of better governance. However, rebuilding civil society is not a convenient substitute for the complicated task of rebuilding the state tackling the problems of governance.
There are great opportunities for international NGOs (INGOs) to develop successful partnerships with local NGOS (LNGOs) and engage in rebuilding human and social capital, even during violent conflict situations where the capacity of local institutions are extremely weak. But that establishing partnership requires a major investment in time and resources and a comprehensive capacity building strategy. However, the INGOs need to ensure that LNGOs enhance their downward accountability as well as the upward accountability by enhancing closer linkages with their respective communities and involving them, not only in implementation, but also in the design and monitoring of the projects. This is the surest way to starting a process of changing the aid delivery culture to development, making the provision of assistance more sustainable and less dependent on outside agencies There is a strong case for private sector to play a significant role in rebuilding social and economic capital in order to create a sustainable peaceful and prosperous society and at the same time ensuring respect for human rights. Although the broad definition of civil society adopted for the purpose of this paper may invariably include some civil society organisations that may not respect human rights, however, but the overwhelming majority of the NGO community have a direct interest in respecting, promoting and appropriate development of human rights. Whether these CSOs are human rights organisations or whether they are development NGOs, they cannot extricate themselves from the struggles for political, civil or economic rights by the disadvantaged groups or the wider population. As such, the NGOs have an increasingly important role to play in ensuring respect for human rights by monitoring, enforcing and establishing human rights.19 It is a fundamental premise of people-centred development that the people have rights of two types: (i) those that related to basic well being such as the right to food, shelter, and security (family and in person) and freedom of movement, religion, and thought; and (ii) those that people must have to protect their right to security and well being against misuse of the state’s coercive powers, such as: the right to freedom of expression and association, the right of redress of grievance, and due process. Both sets of rights are fundamental to people-centred development. It is, however, the second set of rights that is of most fundamental concern when dealing with the rights and responsibilities of NGOs.
References: 1 Harvey, P. (1998) Rehabilitation in Complex Political Emergencies: Is Rebuilding Civil Society the Answer?, …..: 200-217. 2 Robinson, M. (1995) Strengthening Civil Society in Africa: The role of foreign political Aid, IDS Bulletin 26(2): 1-8. 3 Diamond, L. (1994) Towards Democratic Consolidation, Journal of Democracy, 5(3): 4-17. 4 Chambers, R. (1997) Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last. Intermediate Technology, London 5 White, G. (1994) Civil Society, Democratisation and Development. Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, 6. 6 Fatton, R. (1992) Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa. Lynne Rienner, Boulder and London 7 Mercer, C. (2002), NGOs, civil society and democratisation: a critical review of literature, Progress in Development 2(1): 5-22. 8 Macrae, J and A. Zwi (eds.) (1994) War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Political Emergencies. Zed with Save the Children (UK), London. 9 Harvey, P. (1998), op. cit. 10 Swift, J. (1996) War and Rural development in Africa, Introduction. IDS Bulletin 27(3): 1-6. 11 De Waal, A. (1994) Dangerous precedents? Famine Relief in Somalia 1993. In J. Macrae and A. Zwi (eds.) War and Hunger. Zed and Save the Children (UK), London. 12 Adams, M and M Bradbury (1995) Conflict and Development: Organisational Adaptation in Conflict Situations. Oxfam Discussion Paper 4, Oxfam (UK and Ireland), Oxford. 13 European Union (1995) Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. Commission of the European Communities, Brussels.
14 Buchannan-Smith, M. and S. Maxwell, (1994) Linking Relief and Development: An Introduction and Overview. IDS Bulletin 25(4): 2-17 15 Karim, A., et al. (1996) OLS: Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Review. Birmingham University and Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Edgbaston and Geneva. 16 Harvey, P. (1998), op cit. P.204 17 Fukuyama, F. (2001), Social Capital, Civil Society and Development. Third World Quarterly, 22(1): 7-20. 18 The Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, International Alert, Council of Economic Priorities [Report] (2000), The Business of Peace: The Private Sector as a Partner in Conflict Prevention and Resolution. 19 Nicholas, H, C. Firoz and E. Molahleli (n.d.), Civil society and fundamental freedoms: An enabling framework for civil society in Southern Africa, the Development Resource Centre. Summary of Discussion on The Role of the Private Sector, Civil Society and Local NGOs in Rebuilding Social and Human Capital and Ensuring Respect for Human Rights.
1. In the South, there is an amazing growth of civil society, which has the liberation movement as the core value. It is one of the functions of the civil society movement is the protection of civil society from despotism and dictatorship. It is crucial that human rights prevail. This is what they have to protect, even if they do not mention it in their constitutions. All civil societies are committed to protecting civil society and themselves from the violation of human rights.
2. Civil society organisations which are engaged in the liberation process, should also reflect liberation. We must try to build up a more humane society. An individual cannot liberate him or herself without liberating their society. One cannot have a liberation movement without liberating their society. It is the civil society which bears the brunt of liberation. Instead of inquiring whether a civil society organisation fits in, we need to ask where it stands on the issue of liberation.
3. The real crisis is with respect to civil society in the Sudan. We have fallen into the danger of local organisations becoming mouthpieces of their international organisations. They select people who more or less become their agents. If they do not co-operate, they turn off the funds.
4. An efficient civil society can be a dynamo for everything else. It has developed in the North, but not the South. The danger is that as a new thing, everybody rushes to form organisations, but are they are set up on the wrong basis. The danger is that they might themselves be organs of exploitation. Properly understood, they can be means of popular expression and empowerment and protection from victimisation.
5. We are looking at the transition from a warfare economy to a peace economy. In a war situation, markets are distorted and those in charge of society are taken up in the prosecution of the war. We need to look at the behaviour of war-lords and peace-lords. Warlords would like the war to continue.
6. In the Sudan, the coups have had no justification. The first coups were masterminded by the largest parties. The other two coups were masterminded by civilians wanting to promote their own careers. The people in power are living in fear. We need to see that no other coup happens in the Sudan.
7. The officers can also suffer. They are retired off and given other jobs. As we are working for peace, we should not be disturbed by groups of colonels and majors - the sort of officers who make a coup.
8. This possibility of a coup is real – the opportunity now is to make a comprehensive settlement to make peace. What is needed today is not only to finish the way in the South, but to finish the question of instability in the Sudan. There is no government in the West - villages are being burned down –
there is a break down of law and order. We need to bring a comprehensive settlement for the whole of Sudan. Coups don't come from nowhere. Money goes into protection of Governments themselves. If we want to have proper sharing of power, we need to ensure that the rights of all citizens are to be taken care of.
9. Whenever a military coup takes place in the Sudan, it is always well received by the people. We always take place in a depressing situation - people breath a sigh of relief that something new may come. The South remained a problem - the political parties have always tried to reach the South to promise them a lot of things to strengthen their position, but it fails. The political parties have failed to provide a comprehensive solution to the problem of the South. What happened in Kenya is definitely progress - the most important thing is that it has approached the question of Self-Determination in a strong way. We need to bring forward programmes which address the problems in the South. We also have economic problems - including the difficulty of instability. We should concentrate on solving problems, rather than trying to deal with the problem of political parties. We should concentrate on people rather then parties.
10. The private sector: We have seen Africa failing to develop because most of the aid has come through governments. Why shouldn’t the private sector play a role?
Paper 17 The Impact of a Peace Agreement on OLS and Long-Term Development of Sudan Under Alternative Constitutional Frameworks by Dr Salafeldin Salih Mohamed and Dr Al-Haj Hamed M. K.
Summary
Sudan is Africa in miniture. Most of the population depend on agriculture (73%). The country suffers from a protracted complex emergency that has crippled its development. Recurrent drought and civil war have made the country a haven for humanitarian and relief assistance. This local process is augmented by a surplus food dilemma from USA and EU. The marketing of this surplus, if not responsible for the national civil war, there is strong evidence that it is fueling its continuity. Thus the search for peace in Sudan, especially a durable one, must be seen within the context of drastic policy shift in the unprecedented surplus that needs to be distributed, through export channels, to ensure the sustainability of the agrarian sector in the countries of surplus and preserving the purchasing power of the Sudanese people. The authors of this presentation tried to substantiate the validity of the above illustrated policy frame in the linkage between the drive for peace in Sudan and the global causative elements. This paper provides a highlight for marketing approaches of the surplus food produced by USA and EU by direct and indirect methods during two types of regimes in Sudan; during the military rules in Sudan 1958, 69 – 85 and 89 to date; and multi party rule 1965-69, 85-89 the role of bilateral, multilateral agencies, the INGOs and church are exposed. If development is to take off, a new concept it must be tailored to ensure compatibility with globalization. It is claimed here that improving the purchasing power of consumers in Sudan is a benefit for major markets and products. This means leaving raw agricultural products to be the specialization of poor countries and food security in the developed countries is to continue to deliver agro-industrial technology and sophisticated agricultural products. The Japanese policy importing 80% of its food needs from its partners, helps to improve European and American marketing practices. The example of OLS, moving from an adhoc humanitarian aid to permanent food marketing utility that may be used as a leverage for peace as well as a developmental frame is seen plausible. The food surplus distribution is already a fuel to the conflict; with more petty producers losing their market they tend to join war activities. Oil production is an added value for peace, locally or internationally. Introduction
Sudan has been the major recipient of humanitarian aid in the sub- Saharan Africa from as early as 1978. The main donor was the United States of America which was very conscious about the strategic position of Sudan in the cold war against the Soviet block .and its use as an exit of the filashas (Ethiopian Jews) who were transferred under secret deals between the government of Ethiopia and Sudan in 1984 at a cost of about 300 million US dollars paid by the US government and Jewish charities. This humanitarian / eco-political operation continued up to date under different agendas i.e. against Islamic extremism/ against advancement of Arab culture, support to Christian/ African minorities etc. This interest is further developed when economic potential of the country was tapped by other competing countries (i.e.Canada,. China, Malaysia, Russia etc.). Under such circumstances of huge economic potential and a high percentage of poverty, due to natural disasters and conflicts, humanitarian aid will continue to be the carrot to drive the Sudanese cart, as well as other African and developing countries, into the den of the big economic and political powers of the day. This economic and political interest has and will determine the shape and size of this "humanitarian in disguise" operation. This situation is expected to prevail for a long time to come even under the forth coming peace agreement.
Hypothesis
Since the EU and USA started, in the mid 20th century, to gain the technical capacity to produce more surplus food than their optimum consumption, they got the dilemma of marketing the surplus. With the humanistic, legal and ethical methods proved not enough or expensive, to absorb this surplus, these economies, aware or unaware, started to create a situation of war or keep fueling situation of war to ensure demand for dumping markets with needed and unneeded items. Thus the authors of this presentation argue that, and attempt to validate this process by evidence from marketing policies, in the case of Sudan, by showing the inter links between global policy and local polity and body pollute changes. The dynamic one is the external sector and the sluggish is the local one. As this trend continues, signs of change are not available yet.
The Sociology of Mediation:
Another level of the argument is based on the very correct observation of S. Toben (1998) that the mediators in a conflict are also representatives to ideological differences rooted in the mediators fundamental beliefs about people and conflict and that these ideological differences have consequences for practice and policy. He states that "the key ….is to articulate our differences openly and precisely, so that we can educate consumers (or producers - our addition) to make informed choices and so that we can help policy makers achieve the best result”. In this context the authors argue that the IGAD process, unnecessarily prolonged, has worked as a freezing zone for peace mediation to ensure that relief operations, as one marketing tool for the stocks of surplus food in the hand of American and European producers. The general feeling of the consumers/ beneficiaries that new mediators coming in line, means the atmosphere is ripe for change.
These are Max Planck Institute initiative, ICG, Pan African movement, Justice Africa, ARI and RFI to name a few is an expression of what Toben concluded and quoted above.
Types of marketing food surplus
The Direct Aid Method
Since the sixties of the last century, the US and Europe have been facing the reality of pamper cereal and food commodities. The 1961 USAID law No. 460 offered wheat and other cereal as a donation for third world countries to keep their meager resources away from buying the cheap agricultural Soviet block equipment. The policy was, and still is, tailored from the Neokyneithian, neoliberal theory of managed demand and managed supply. So in the case of Sudan US Aid food aid is a success story for such managed demand policy. During the first phase (1960-70) the urban population responded positively to the freely distributed flour. Bread started to take the taste from the Dhura cakes (kisra). The vastly growing school population, health centers and working women households were the leaders for this taste change. By then the policy shifted from free donation to long term loans. This has contributed a lot to the staggering 21 billion commulative debt of the country. Currently, 1.4 million tons are imported annually; thus taken from local producers. This marketing drive coupled with refugees influx, because of drought and famine, especially from the Abysinian plateau; during the great 7 years famine (1976-1983) coupled with floods, other channels of food distribution were opened under the humanitarian needs of this complex disaster situation. At this crucial juncture the rebellion in the south flared and quickly became under the Ethiopian Soviet system response to the outright countra activities by western powers among the refugees in the eastern border of the country. The May regime era (1969-1985) have dreamt of a bread basket Sudan, not only for the Arab region but the whole world. This became an empty claim that lead to the downfall of the regime. Sudan is an agricultural country with 73% of the population working in agriculture and as a rule whenever it dwindles, by natural or man made elements, the state apparatus will suffer popular pressure to the point of radical change. OLS is the response to the 1983 renewal of the civil war. The theoretical developmental model that claimed that developing agricultural export oriented economy, that will provide enough foreign resources, will allow the country be secured from hangover its food security to foreign markets ended up in creating dependency and backwardness. This became a fallacy because as long as the corporate system continues to subsidise food products in the EU and the USA, it will be able" to go where it wants, to make much money as it can, and damn the costs …" Okumo: 2001:10
The OLS: From humanitarian aid to food surplus distribution
The OLS was developed between the government of Sadig Elmahdi and the SPLM in 1989 with the offices of the UN. The process was very much influenced by an aggressive political competition between the Ummah party and the Democratic Unionist party. Both parties approached and signed political agreement with the SPLM including articles on humanitarian aid. In the 16 Nov. 1986 agreement between the DUP and SPLM the press conference that followed the Accord included an appeal for relief to "help save the lives of millions of people threatened with famine and disease in the Sudan" News about famine in Sudan was coming out in international media and through NGOs. A pressure was then created externally, added to the internal pressure due to competition between political parties, bringing immediate results for the prospects of relief. On 8-9 March 1989 a Sudan- UN high level meeting on emergency relief operation was convened in Khartoum and the government and the UN agreed to an ambitious relief program. it was left to the UN to get the approval from the SPLM, which Mr. James Grant, the personal envoy to the secretary general of the UN with Dr. Lam Akol of the SPLM (now a minister in the government) agreed on a working framework on April 1989. This framework was named as Operation lifeline Sudan, OLS. The OLS has been born under quite odd circumstances of internal shortage of food and political rivalries and external pressure from the UN and international community. The government had to concede its sovereignty and the UN had to accept a new type of relationship by engaging with a rebel armed group at an almost equal partner to the government .The SPLM was also under pressure looking to feed it's starving population. This abnormal delivery of the OLS put it under real risk of failure. But to the contrary, it proved to be the longest active humanitarian operation with such magnitude in the area. The strength of this operation is in its ability to serve the people of Sudan ,who both the conflicting parties claim to represent. Another reason for its' strength is the international presence and leverage exerted by the donor and INGO communities as well as the UN who happen to be the guardian and observer of the game interfering when ever necessary.
Indirect methods
Operation life- line Sudan Pre - OLS Sudan came under focus from 1983 when the drought and famine hit western and eastern Sudan. On 31st July 1984 president Numeiri declared Darfur as a disaster area. That was at a time when information and photographs of starving persons and animals appeared in international media. This drought and famine hit the whole of the horn of Africa. It witnessed massive movement of refugees. The Sudan opened for humanitarian aid and NGOs. The Sudan received a total aid of one billion US dollars for the period 1984 – 1985 (350 million US$ from the US government alone) and 250,000 meteric tons of grains was distributed during this time.
Although this dumping of food saved the lives of millions of people, it continued to a time when the people started harvesting their good crop in 1985 – 1986 which affected the farmers negatively and developed a dependency syndrome since then. With the onset of war again in the south in 1983, the isolated areas started experiencing shortage of food as from 1984. That was the time when focus was on the famine of western and Eastern Sudan as well as the other countries of the horn of Africa. In 1986, the UN programs started reporting the effect of insecurity in the area and denial of access by the SPLM on delivery of food. The first UN report by UNDRO, (Sudan, Drought, Insecurity, Pest Infestation, Situation report no.1, UNDRO 86/2086, 22 August 1986) indicated that two million people are affected by shortage of food in the three southern states of Sudan. Thousands of them started moving to Juba and other cities. The SPLM mined the roads between cities and refused access for relief. On June 1986 the SPLM attacked a relief convoy and in August 1986 shot down a civilian aircraft on Malakal city. The GOS also responded by denying access of relief to SPLM areas. The last relief convoy of 204 trucks unloaded in Juba was to keep it for three weeks only. In Malakal the malnutrition rate was at 25% and 35% among the IDPS of Wau. In July 1988 the Sudanese relief and rehabilitation commissioner faxed the UN and donor community to respond urgently to the humanitarian needs of the people in the south. The GOS and the UN developed a program called rainbow operation. On 12th October 1986 the rainbow operation started airlifting food from Khartoum and Zaire. This was supported by 11 donor countries. This operation could only make eleven rounds as the SPLM threatened to attack the aircrafts. The rainbow operation succeeded in developing a model for a UN operation supported by the donor community to access food from inside and outside Sudan to affected people. The rainbow operation was the transitional module for the OLS. It was estimated that 400 – 500 thousand persons lost their lives due to this situation between 1986 and 1988. Cross border programmes started developing gradually by NGOs like Lutheran World Federation (air drop to Juba from Kenya), Church world service (by road from Kenya), and Catholic Relief services (airdrop from Uganda). The US government forwarded aid through the Norwegian Peoples Aid and World Vision International by air and road from Kenya to SPLM controlled area.
The ICRC initiated a programe of aid with approval from the GOS & SPLM on March 1988. On December 1988 ICRC planes moved food aid to isolated civilian population. All these sporadic interventions were very limited in effect. 1988 was a hard year where the death rate due to lack of food shot high up to 1% a day of total population. In response to the GOS request the UN sent an investigation mission. A UN resolution was passed in October 1988 urging support and coordination of humanitarian assistance to southern Sudan. In December 1988 the UN assembly called an urgent meeting to avert the expected disaster in southern Sudan. This position laid the foundation for OLS where the module of the operation was developed and the international commitment already secured.
The OLS Plan of Action
The first document was prepared by the Government of Sudan and the UN with intensive consultations with the donors and the INGOS and was approved by both parties in Khartoum on 9th of March 1989. It is interesting to note that the Government of Sudan team was lead by the prime minister Mr. Elsadig Elmahdi and Dr. Hassan Alturabi, the minister of foreign Affairs, Mr. Aldo Ajo Deng and Mr. Ahmed Abdul Rahman, minister of social Welfare, Zakat and displaced. The first plan of action was developed as a limited operation with a one month period of tranquility in April 1989. During this month adequate aid was to be moved by road, rail, river and air. Due to SPLM position, a system of corridors of tranquillity was implemented. The following points need to be highlighted:-
1- The operation was designed and to be supervised by the highest authority in the country. i.e. The prime Minister and eight other cabinet ministers.
2- The GOS accepted that the UN get the approval for the program from the SPLM (by proxy).
3- The GOS accepted that the UN supervise and implement the program in SPLM controlled areas (conceded its sovereignty) 4- That the UN/ INGOS donors are going to support the relevant Government department (the relief and rehabilitation commission- RRC). 5- A commitment was made to support returnees (early development program). 6- Food and non food aid was then planned to meet the need of the people till the end of the year 1989 (relief operation). 7- Food is to be provided from inside and outside Sudan as well.
OLS II
The partners agreed that they need to proceed with the aid program and an OLS II decumbent was produced in March 1990. It was to cover this period up to December 1990. The following could be pointed out : 1- The OLS II was a continuation of OLS I.
2- It laid the out the following principles.
(i) Neutrality of Humanitarain Aid.
(ii) Transparency of relief operations.
(iii) Participation of all partners. (partnership).
3- Both the GOS and SPLM were operating in isolation with the good offices of the UN.
The GOS demanded that NGOs be registered and monitored from Khartoum. This last point was the seed of the big tree of distrust and shadowed operations which the GOS threw on the OLS. It was very easy to blame the weakest partner, the INGO, but definitely it was somebody else to be blamed, that is the DONOR countries who have their economic, political and religious agenda, they were strong enough to redirect the operation into their own route.
OLS III
The differences between the GOS and the UN over the OLS reached its peak by the claims raised by the government that the UN is not keeping up its obligation of implementing a purely humanitarian operation where the SPLM could not use it as a shadow (covert) operation and that all the NGOS to pass through its accountable channel. No new plan was passed that year, and hardly a statement was issued by the GOS in February 1991 that the government is abiding by the principles of the OLS. The relief operation for this year continued on this basis. So since December 1990 OLS was more or less an agreed concept or principles applied in specified geographical areas. September 1992:
For the second consecutive year the undersecretary general of the UN came to Sudan and to get the approval from the president Omer Elbashir for the OLS to continue. So it was USG James Jonah on Feb. 1991 and USG Jan Eliasson Sept. 1992 the GOS approving the operation, and designating the UN to coordinate the activities in the SPLM area.
Nairobi Agreement December 1992:
With the good offices of the Kenyan Government, the GOS, SPLM and the UN held a technical meeting and an agreement was signed on December 1992 affirming commitment for activating rail, river and road corridors. This was the first directly negotiated and signed agreement between GOS and SPLM. The Ground Rules: Following the killing of four expatriates in SPLM controlled area in late 1992, the UN brought the SPLM to abide by a code of practice to protect humanitarian workers in SPLM control areas. An agreement was signed in April 1993 to this effect. This was further expanded during 1994 and 1995 to include articles on human rights. The documents of this agreement was not handed to the government side but only in 1998, indicating the dual system developing within the UN.
The 1994 Agreement:
The Jan 21st 1994 agreement is considered as the first comprehensive collectively signed agreement. The IGAD countries acted as witness to this agreement. The agreement stressed: 1) Access of aid to beneficiaries where they are. 2) Aid should be directed to civilians only. 3) Transparency of operation by an implementation agreement approving extra corridors and implementation of children vaccination programs.
The Protocols:
Since then the trend was for signing of tripartied protocols, which are: 18/11/1998 Security Protocol (Rome) 18/11/1998 Minimum Operational Standards for rail corridors and cross line road corridors. (Rome). 15/12/1999 Principles Governing the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance to the War affected Civilian Population (Geneva). The protocols did not bring a new agenda or modalities of operation but rather to put the previous OLS agreements into legal more binding framework.
The memorandum of Understanding
The National Liberation Council of the SPLM authorized the SRRA to draft an agreement, a memorandum of understanding, as an agreement between the SPLM and INGOS. This was faced with strong rejection from the INGOS, the UN and the Donors as well as the GOS. Early in 2000, NGOS withdrew from the area. Some of them were large enough ie. Care, to cause real shortage of food and services in the Bahr el Ghazal region.
The OLS 2000 – 2001 and 2002:
During these three years the OLS was run on the same designed rules and procedures, no attempt was made from any partner to change it dramatically. Each side kept pushing on his concerns using diplomatic channels and procedures. Table I. The OLS Financing (in USD) 1994-2000
% Total 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 Year sector 72 672,750,345 69,931,718 145,132,676 265,136,567 7217,411,59 224,835,24 323,768.13 678,2204.13 Emergencyfood AID(include transport & management cost 12 107,935,173 10,697,713 325,234,26 175,268,21 803,95,8 368,078,16 344,885,10 445,575,14 Health nutriton water & food security 4 37,305,523 4,017,965 994,376,8 882,825,5 642,173,1 275,991,1 355,956,10 410,963,4 Other Emergency Activities 4 35,160,274 911,261,9 780,286,1 240,417,1 275,121,4 853,102,10 856,133,8 359,836 Refugees & Returns 7 64,940,351 9,366,326 041,217,17 310,446,18 852,707,13 263,643,1 613,918,3 938,641 Programs & Logistic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Rehaditation 2 15,348,503 0 0 332,730,1 0 680,272 760,993,2 139,944,9 Uniceef Support 0 3,978,930 3,978,930 0 0 0 0 0 0 Noba Mt 100 937,419,099 107,254,563 198,247,824 313,824,506 48,939,731 55,331,255 50,656,251 163,164,969 Totals 415,899,301 14,379,250 31,282,700 127,604,126 41,227,916 55766307 82,500,935 63,138,067 Out side OLS 1,353,318,400 120,779,527 229,530,524 441,428,632 90,167,647 111,097,562 133,157,186 226,303,036 Grand Total
Table II. Donor Support to OLS (1994-2000) in USD
No. Country Donations (millions USD)
1 USA 392 (41.8%)
2 Eropean Union 141
3 The Netherlands 84
4 UK 59
5 Sweden 24
6 Canada 23
7 Italy 15
8 Norway 14
9 Switerland 11
10 Others 178
Table III. The US Support to OLS (in Millions USD, 1994-2000)
Type of Aid Total Amount USD Percentage
Non Food Aid 38.98 10
Food Aid 353.08 90
Total 392.08 100
Figure 1. Donor Response to Appeal
160 140 120 100 80 60 40
Percent Response 20 0 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 Year
Comments
1) The main donor is the US Government (41.8%) 2) Donor response to appeal varies between 41-152% (This year up to end of July it amounts to 20% only). 3) 72% of aid is for emergency food aid. 4) 90% of US Aid is for food.
The Nuba Mountains Agreement
Althought his is not an OLS operation, the donor response was the same. About 4,800 metric tonnes of food was delivered to SPLM/Nuba area and 4,070 metric tonnes to GOS area (GOS area is 90% of total area of Nuba Mountain) although a ceasefire agreement is signed. The authors expectthis trend to continue even if peace is agreed upon. It is in theinterest of the Sudanese people to put it as an agreed policy towards aid that it should be to help us to depend on oursleves rather than a market for foreign surplus.
Concerns of the government of Sudan over the OLS
1) Consolidation and unification of the OLS 2) Delivery of Aid from inside Sudan 3) OLS is used as a shadow (covert) operation for non- humanitarian activities (military) 4) OLS is an imbalanced operation (more aid to SPLM areas with lesser population) 5) The principles of transparency and sovereignty are to be implemented
Concerns of the government of Sudan on the donor
1) Donors are directing aid regardless of the OLS system 2) Donors (especially USAID) opting to operate outside OLS 3) Donors support SPLM directly or through NGOs 4) Relief aid destabilise situation
Modern crusade serving Relief Distribution
Graham's church will earn 600,000 US$ from each video show produced from the war zone, Declan Walsh Writes for the Independent (UK) April 14, 2001"The Reverend Franklin Graham’s executive plane was cruising at 23,000ft above the war zone. The Jesus preacher was at the controls and keeping an eagle eye out for government bombers. “I’m always looking for somewhere to hide in case there’s troubles. These clouds look like a good place. I sure hope they don’t have radar,” he said in a soft Southern drawl. He pushed on the controls and the plane plunged through the bank of cloud towards a rough air striphacked from the bush far below. Two days earlier, Mr. Graham, son of the legendary TV evangelist Billy and intimate of President George Bush, had taken off in his personal jet from his home in North Carolina. Now he was touching down in the torrid heat of Sudan for a modern-day crusade. The fundamentalist Islamic regime in Khartoum was bombing, murdering and forcing into slavery the people of the south, he said. He was bringing them medicine, Bibles and the pledge that American Christians would help them fight back. “This country has declared a jihad on its own people, “he declared. “It’s wrong. It’s wicked. And it’s evil.” Mr. Graham is spearheading a powerful American lobby group, merging forces as diverse as a Jewish rabbi, a Watergate ex-convict, the archconservative Jesse Helms and Martin Luther King’s widow, aiming to push Sudan to the top of the American foreign policy agenda. They say President Omar El-Bashir is leading a corrupt and evil regime that persecutes Christians and encourages barbaric slave taking. But human rights atrocities are old news in Sudan and the US has traditionally shown little interest. In 1998, President Bill Clinton ordered air strikes on a Khartoum “chemical weapons plant”, an attack now thought to have been a mistake. President Bush was also expected to view Sudan as another obscure African country with little strategic interest for America. Until now, that is. European oil companies, including some British, are controversially helping the Bashir government exploit Sudan’s vast oil reserves. Chevron was one of the first companies to tap the oil in the Seventies but later pulled out. Now America finds itself excluded from the new oil rush by its own trade embargo. And then there is the Holy War. For conservative Christians such as Mr. Graham, the war is more than a humanitarian crisis. It is the front line of global war between Muslim fundamentalists allied with terrorists such as Osama bin Laden and Christians soul friendly to God and America. Analysis and aid workers deride this view as a shallow overview of a complex conflict. But it is a portrayal that sells well in the States. With an ice-chest full of cold sodas and Snickers bars, Mr. Graham’s Mitsubishiplane landed in Lui, a dusty
town 25 miles from the front lines where his evangelical aid agency Samaritan’s Purse runs one of the best hospitals in southern Sudan. Equipped with the only ultrasound machine within 1,000 miles, it is staffed by highly motivated Christians, mainly American, who cure illness by day and show Jesus videos by night. Samaritan’s Purse is one of the fastest growing charities in the US, with a budget of $150m this year. It owns eight aircraft, including a jet and a helicopter used by Mr. Graham to visit projects in 99countries.Lui was occupied by government troops until 1997,Samaritan’s Purse moved in 11 days after they were routed and during times of fighting has treated wounded rebel soldiers in hospital. Last year the town was bombed seven times by the government Antonovs. Mr. Graham is convinced his organization was deliberately attacked. Selling the charity’s work to wealthy American Christians is a sophisticated job. A four-man camera crew with studio-quality equipment trailed Mr. Graham on a swift tour of the hospital. The silver-haired Southerner rarely stopped to speak to the bare-breasted women or wounded men in the wards, but every move was coordinated for the camera. On the way out he carefully washed his hands, advising that “there’s more disease here per square inch here than anywhere else”. Still on camera, Mr. Graham picked his way through the rubble of the Anglican Church badly damaged by a bomb. “So nobody died here? Amen,” he said. Mr. Graham turned to the lens and spoke to a pair of Texan evangelists whose television show raised $600,000 for Samaritan’s Purse last year. “James and Betty, I’m in this little area called Lui. Since you were here, we were able to get that old hospital de-mined. But on December 29 the Khartoum government bombed this area. One landed by this church. I want to take a few minutes to show what God is doing in the southern Sudan.” The producer suggested a “generic”. Mr. Graham effortlessly obliged like a CNN professional. “Hi, I’m Franklin Graham. I’m in this little area called…”
The preacher recently took control of a massive evangelistic organization from his 82-year-old father ,who is suffering from Parkinson’s disease. As a youth, he mildly rebelled against his famous father but by 22, his press biography says: “Franklin committed his life to Jesus Christ while alone in a hotel room in Jerusalem.” He is vital to the Sudan lobby because of his unique influence on the famously foreign policy-shy President Bush. Their parents holiday together at the Bush summer retreat in Maine; Mr. Graham read the prayers at the last January’s Presidential inauguration. And this weekend he is leading a service at the Pentagon. Will he mention Sudan? “I’m going to shout it from the rooftops,” he said, “I talked to George about Sudan before the election. And as soon as I get back I’m going to share what I’ve seen here.” Khartoum should be hit with the full force of American military strikes, he said. “Why not?” he said. “These people are just as evil as Saddam Hussein, even more so.” The lobby is making major inroads on the corridors of Capitol Hill. Several foreign policy heavyweights have lent their support, not least the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who last month described the 18- year war as “perhaps the greatest tragedy on the face of the Earth today”. Other evangelical organizations, including Voice of the Martyrs, Safe Harbor, and Frontline Fellowship, have also made recent trips to Sudan. So has a group of American Catholic bishops. “They can smell the money
coming,” said one aid worker based in Lokichoggio, the Kenyan border town from where the massive UN humanitarian operation is run. But Africa activists say their portrayal of are religious war is dangerously over-simplified. Some southern people fight on the government army, many Muslims live in the south, and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army has been accused of committing atrocities of its own, Selah Booker of the Washington think-tank Africa Action said. “This is not Christian versus Arab, but a struggle for self- determination against a fundamentalist dictatorship. ”But the campaigners say any attention for the world’s longest-running war is welcome. And Mr. Graham says his fight to wake up America to Sudan is only starting. “There’s a big bleed in this country.” He declared before boarding his plane to pilot his way back to Boone, North Carolina. “And I just want to be a Band-aid on that wound.”
INGOs approach
About 130 working in the distribution, initiation and lobbying for displaceds. If the standard philanthropic claim, under its cover all these operations are under taken, the jobs creation activity must be targeting the poor people who went from the most backward area of the world to urban center. The right to movement is a natural right. In the early stage of the civil war 1955-1973 most of the people had chosen to become refugees. Thus they moved outside Sudan. The second phase, 1983- todate the majority of people chosen to move into the country. Ever since that time a multi-stage move caused that displaced communities are covering all parts of the country. Including Khartoum. This have provided the spread of INGOs in the country. These are the distribution network of their respective donors funds, services and commodities .In itself an act of segregation that shows how the food producers, donors are not ready to compromise even in the distribution, by creating local mechanisms. In the case of Darfur, which is not in the traditional civil war, Oxfam and SC/ UK were among the earliest to go to help in the drought/ famine of 1983. Since then, both are considered among the developmental NGOs, never established local structure as was made clear by the food gap of 2001. A one million pounds front is divided, 3/4 to WFP and 1/4 for SC/UK. This happened after SC/UK claimed empowering people when they first entered 8 years ago. The relations between local staff and international staff is quite unfair which means that humanitarian assistance (HA) is used to create labor market. Transport of HA is fully for the benefit of transport industry in the donor countries. In the war zone the rebels were many times fed up with the hegmonistic approach of NGOs as representatives of food surplus marketing. They are adamant and quite stubborn to change the rigid policy of relief distribution. The SRRA discovered, though very late, (see the news release by Associated Press March 10, 2000 at 12:38:46 ) that these INGOs are not providing any thing for development. Thus they were ordered to sign a memo of understanding. It was immediately signed by 24 organizations and eleven insisted to pullout, as a tactic to pressurize. Those who signed consistent
with their mission, expressed astonishment about the eleven who pulled out. The Catholic Relief Services (CRS), is the relief and development arm of the U.S. catholic conference, has a head quarters in Baltimore, Marylands at a cost of twenty four million US$ a year, the Sudan operation is the agency's largest emergency program. The zeal of the missionary is an added value to the marketing drive.
The Way Ahead
It is clearly stated that without a major policy shift in the food surplus marketing of the western countries it is very difficult to achieve peace, especially a durable one. These market forces, though not responsible to the ignition of the strife, yet the continuation is obviously their responsibility. The Japanese food security policy is a best practice that may be adopted, in the long term, by the EU and USA, thus raising subsides especially for export market as a first and urgent stage to stop competing with the African and Sudanese petty farmers. This will revive land use in Sudan and peasants will resume their work as the distribution of relief has given them no other choice but to work as soldiers. Development, for a century to come, means agricultural development in Sudan. 68% is rain fed and holdings are family business utilization. To integrate local Sudanese producers, by improving their purchasing power, through development of their agricultural capacities (73% of Sudanese population) to make the exchange process humanistic. The highly needed Agro- industrial technological package, if EU and USA based, should be exchanged for raw products of the local population. The existing policy setting not only sustains uneven distribution of state subsides between production sectors within the USA and the EU but also prolongs the stagnant underdevelopment system of Sudan by using "war" as a tool for marketing food surplus. This situation is expected to become even worse if the USA approved policy of 130 Billion USD subsidy for the next decade is adopted. What is immediately needed is a cease-fire in southern Sudan, as in the Nuba Mountains and a tailored system of governance that will help peaceful participation partners, whether agrarian or energy. The peaceful mediation between these, old food producers and new energy producers will bring peace to Sudan and a better marketing atmosphere for all producers as consumers have a coping purchasing power. In a nutshell we need to see no boundaries for human exchange of benefits with due consideration to humanism without borders. This is the essence of Islam, Christianity and all good governance practices must reflect the essence of humanism not an ideological claim that cover marketing interests. The government in Sudan, in the north, and the SPLM held south seems to be fighting, by different means, conscious or uncensorious to survive, have to protect its taxpayers (producers) and affirm regulatory consumption. Thus if this element is to be balanced towards more equitable measure, it goes without saying that without the total process (between USA/ EU and other global players), move to the equitable adjustment, peace in Sudan may be short lived or relatively taking the burden from one group to the others.
Pulling the threads of the above salient points the authors hope that OLS will be transformed to become a humanistic development frame.
List of references
1- African Rights, May (1997) food and power in Sudan, 2- Doornbos, M, etal Feb. 1997 ed Beyond conflict in Horn of Africa, USA 3- OLS: Annual Needs Assessment from 1989- 2002 4- Buch, R.A.B. and Folger, J.P., (1994) the promise of Meditation: Responding to conflict through empowerment and recognition 5- Peace. W.B. and Lillejohn, S.W. (1997) Moral conflict: when social worlds Collide, thousand oaks (A: Sage 6- Durthy J. Della Noce, (2002) Mediation policy: Theory matters http://www.hofstra.edu/law/isct/ddpol.html 7- Okumu, W, 2001:10 "the changing structure and role of the state in Africa"
Paper 18 Potential Donor Support for the Reintegration of War Affected Population Following the Signing of a Peace Agreement by Mr Elijah Malok Aleng
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
SALIENT POINTS.
The present war between the SPLM / A and GOS is no longer being fought on the basis of South- North divide or Christian versus Muslim as it was the case in the first war 1955-1972. It has engulfed other marginalized peoples in the North. It is therefore a war by underdeveloped and disadvantaged regions against the oppressive, undemocratic and oligarchic successive regimes in Khartoum. Though the Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordofan and Ingessena Hills in Southern Blue Nile used to be referred to as parts of the North, they have now joined the South against the repressive regime in Khartoum. The Nuba Mountains, Ingessena and the three Regions of the south, constitute the New Sudan, which advocates qualified unity, democracy, equality, secularism and social justice for all Sudanese.
CAUSES OF THE WAR
The chronic conflict in the Sudan could be attributed to about four main reasons: -
1. Historical and colonial policy of divide and rule, that institutionalized the separate development within the country. The impact of this policy has been two fold; first, socio-economic development was confined to the North leaving other regions impoverished; second, there has not been any socio-political interaction between the North and the South prior to independence. This has created mutual mistrust and lack of understanding between the two regions, because there are no shared values in terms of cultural and political orientation. Northern Sudanese define the Sudan as an Arab Islamic state, while Southerners, the Nuba and Blue Nile peoples define Sudan as an African black state. This argument is true if one refers to the 1956 national census, which counts the black people to be 61% the Arabs 31% of the population at that material time.
2. Unequal sharing of power and economic resources The Northern elites in Khartoum would like always to control power and resources to the neglect and exclusion of other marginalized areas. This has been the source of resentment from marginalized and underdeveloped regions in the country. 3. Third, religious intolerance The Islamists define the state as Islamic and Arab and thus Muslim adherents have no regards for other religions and confessions. 4. Fourth, racial, ethnic and cultural prejudices The Arab race feels superior to the black Africans. This hurts and segregates non-Arabs who are numerically the majority population of Sudan.
IMPACT OF THE WAR
The current war has brought nothing but human misery to the people of the Sudan in general and the New Sudan in particular. The political, economic and social consequences have been grave. Out of the total projected population of 12,388,049 in the New Sudan, 4,715,114 (38%) have been displaced internally and externally. There has been remarkable decline of economic growth in the south and other marginalized areas as a result of the GoS shifting economic development resources to military spending; shortage of basic social services; loss of sustainable livelihoods; and social disintegration of families and communities are the order of the day in those areas.
REQUIRED INTENATIONAL ASSISTANCE
In the immediate and medium term, Sudan would require external resources to the tune of USD900, 426,655 in words, (United States dollars nine hundred millions, four hundred and twenty six thousand six hundred and fifty five) this is to cover basic needs and services such as (transport, food, health, housing, food security, education of 4,715,114 returnees during the repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and reintegration stages. This amount excludes the expected costs of physical infrastructures, (roads) institutional capacity building and other economic development activities. It has been hard to estimate such costs without any credible assessments.
LESSONS LEARNT FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
· That for repatriation, resettlement and reintegration to succeed, it should be voluntary.
· That the problem that initially caused the people to flee their original homes should be resolved before repatriating them. There should be surety and guarantees for the returnees.
· Social services should be available in the home areas.
· There should be repatriation and reintegration policy that should cover four years
· Involvement and participation of returnees in reintegration programs that affect them.
· Need to involve UN Agencies, INGOS, local authority and civil society groups in the reintegration programs.
OPPORTUNITIES
· Presence of UN Agencies, INGOS and SINGOS that are already providing some basic social services.
· Availability of arable lands for settlement and cultivation.
· Proximity to countries that are hosting the refugees.
· Availability of national institutions and qualified human resources.
· Lessons from the 1972 reintegration process can easily be readapted for, the planning of RRRR at the end of this war.
PRIORITIES
· Establishing special autonomous repatriation, resettlement rehabilitation, reconstruction and reintegration authority.
· Developing repatriation and reintegration policy.
· Identification of potential returnees and assessment of their needs.
· Assessment of social services in areas where returnees will settle.
CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS
· Lack of central legitimate, political and administrative authority that commands national public respect, trust and confidence in the present Sudan of NIF.
· Presence of widespread landmines on farmlands, roads and towns.
· Difficulty in transiting from relief to self-sufficiency – dependency syndrome
· Inadequate financial and material resources.
· Issue of identification and establishment of accurate statistics of IDPS and refugees inside and outside the Sudan.
· Lack of unified education curriculum: we assume that there will be some form of political Union during the interim period between the present government of the Sudan (GoS) and Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). How will educational curriculum be drawn for
some of the union academic institutions? The returnees children who do not know Arabic cannot be expected to cope with syllabi that are tailored in Arabic language, especially those adolescents who are in Universities and Secondary schools.
· Inaccessibility of some areas due to poor road conditions.
· Problems relating to trust building, peace and reconciliation among the former enemies.
· Social problems pertaining to widows, disabled, widowers, orphans and ex-combatants.
· Disarmament: there are many armed groups in the Sudan of today. On the one hand, the GOS and their militias are armed to the teeth. On the other hand, the SPLA with various Southern militias are very much alive in New Sudan. There has therefore to be an agreed policy as to how to disengage, who and when to disarm, who monitors the disarmament?
CONCLUSION
· As a general note, the success of the expected repatriation, resettlement and reintegration program will largely depend on the type and nature of the political settlement reached. The amount of financial and material resources provided by the international community, the level of commitment by both state and non-state actors to the process of peace; the nature of laid down plan and policy of repatriation and how the process will be managed. However let us retain the following six points:
· There are at least in Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile about forty five (45) counties or provinces. In terms of population, each province by average is.300,000. This gives us the total figure of 300,000 X 45 = 13,500,000. 38% of this population requires RRRR. Because they are either displaced internally or staying abroad as refugees.
· The RRRR exercise will have a demonstration and linkages effect on the normal resident population, which preserved and never left the country/location of origin. These normal non- displaced residents will have to have services also. They will need medical and educational services, while we are discussing the services for the new comers who have immigrated because of war, they (who stayed foot) need services too. They are just in dire need as those who are returning from abroad or from other parts of the Sudan. In fact, the new attitude of the returning population will affect them either negatively or positively. There is therefore going to be both linkage and demonstration effect on the resident population.
· If the interim period is four years, then the yearly expenditure of USD that has been roughly calculated, some where in this paper is equal to 9,000,000 / 4 = USD 2,250,000. The national Union government of the Sudan will have to pay about half of this yearly cost from the oil reserves for the activities of RRRR.
· RRRR can possibly become long-term process and this requires investment in services during the interim period. Attention should be focused on capacity building and technical know how. Development of the cadres is important for future administration. This is very important because knowledge directs both the spirit and the intellect in the sense that those who “know “ take correct critical and crucial decisions because they will always base their decision in confidence and foresight.
· Generally, reconstruction also requires investment in the war-affected areas, so that those who are or have returned to the country find job opportunities. The Union Government must therefore finance socio-economic development, so that people have reason not to go back to war. Those who have economic stake will cherish peace so that their benefits are not affected, thus becoming the "peace guards”. This present war is essentially and to some extent an economic “war of exclusion”. Those carrying arms today are from the marginilized Sudan, where socio-economic development, as a matter of state policy, has been largely absent. Hungry people cannot seat idly by while their neighbors and compatriots are celebrating and feasting on the resources that could have been shared equitably. The state of the Sudan must therefore invest resources in the war torn Sudan so those “guns are exchanged for bread”.
· Finally, a political honorable just peace must find a permanent place in the hearts of those classes and elites who have been ruling the Sudan since independence. Sudan has been fighting and quarreling with its self since 1956. No amount of force can quell dissatisfaction of the citizens whose rights are trampled upon. It does not matter what amounts of external assistance are ploughed into the Sudanese economy on account of RRRR, if there is no durable peace that is achieved on “the negotiation table”. The causes of war must therefore be eliminated so that the RRRRR, become springboards for sustainable human development for war affected areas. Mutual political accommodation based on the free will of the constituent parts of the Sudan must therefore be negotiated. At the end of the first war in 1972, external assistance was solicited for the RRRR for Southern Sudanese who were affected and displaced by war, but what ever was constructed then in 1972, is now destroyed by this twenty-year war (1983-2002). There will be no point in investing in this same human scheme if the conflict is not resolved permanently. Sudan must sign a contract with justice amongst its peoples first before looking for financial and humanitarian assistance from abroad.
1. INTRODUCTION
Sudan has been disappointingly plunged into spiral of civil wars with herself since the independence in 1956. Sudan witnessed relative peace and stability only during the Addis Ababa Agreement that was signed in 1972 and lasted for ten years (1972 – 1983). The current protracted war between the SPLM/A and GOS has devastated the people and the economy of the fighting Sudan. Tens of thousands have perished from direct war and war-related effects; unprecedented massive displacement internally and externally, especially, emigration of the qualified personnel (Brain drain) has had a negative effect on the human capital development. Social services are in great demand; and the general decline and / or stagnation of the economy is very much in evidence in Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile. The scale and level of unabated suffering of the people in the Sudan has raised serious concern and provoked regional and international outcry to end this bloody war. Several peace initiatives have been initiated to en the war by a number of governments and organizations but all proved unsuccessful. But of recent, the USA administration and some European Union member countries have fully backed and reinforced the IGAD peace efforts. This stance seems to have given a renewed hope of peace being at the corner. As a result, ideas are being sought as to what would happen to the displaced persons if peace were to be achieved in the Sudan. It is in this context that I have been requested by the African Renaissance Institute (ARI) and Relationships Foundation International (RFI) to present this paper on what the Sudan would need from the International Community during the post-war period. The purpose for this paper is to highlight the expected needs of IDPS and refugees during repatriation, resettlement and reintegration process. The structure of this paper consists of a number of sections. Section two deals with short background about causes of the impact of the war; population and population movements. Section three covers the needs of IDPS and refugees during repatriation, resettlement and re-integration. Section four deals with opportunities, priorities, challenges and problems. Section five, lesson learnt from the international experience. Section six, conclusion on the actual assistance required from the international community. Information used in this document has been obtained through various secondary sources including SPLM, SRRA, NRRDO, ROOF, UN Agencies and etc. Information has been scanty and the focus has been on South Sudan instead of effective coverage of the New Sudan.
2. BACKGROUND
ROOT CAUSES OF THE WAR . Successive northern dominated governments that had come and gone in Khartoum, have been in armed conflict with Southern Sudanese people for 36 of 46 years of Sudan independence. The root causes of the civil wars in the Sudan are due to historical, political, socio-economic, religious, racial and ethnic differences. During the colonial period, south Sudan was administered separately from the North as closed districts, and Northerners were therefore restricted to come to the South to prevent any infiltration of Islamization and Arabization southward. But Christian missionaries were encouraged and permitted to proselytize Christian faith in the south. Education was also entrusted to the missionaries in the south while education in the North was Arab and Islamic-oriented by the then colonial establishment. Socio-economic development in the North was undertaken by the colonial administration to the neglect and exclusion of the South. That created a big economic disparity between the two parts. The South became more impoverished and economically backward. In 1947 the colonial government imposed political union of the South-North. While the afore-mentioned differences were ignored. The North remains Arab and Islamic while the South, African and Christian in outlook and orientation. Favored by the colonial administration, the Northern Oligarchs emerged politically and economically powerful. The greed and excessive lust for control of power and resources by the Northern elites in Khartoum, provoked the first civil war in (1955 – 1972). Sudan got her independence formally on 01.01.1956. Unlike the first war, the current war (1983 – 2002) though mainly being fought in the South has gone beyond the confines of South Sudan into other marginalized areas in what used to be geographically referred to as Northern Sudan. Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan and Ingessena Hills in South Blue Nile have joined hands with the South against the oppressive regimes in Khartoum. The fighting Nuba Mountains, Ingessena Hills together with south Sudan constitute what is now called “The New Sudan”. The people of Nuba Mountains and Ingessena Hills though culturally Islamised and Arabised, they are distinctively ethnically Africans and share many things in common with the south. Further, they are economically backward as much as the South despite being parts of the relatively advanced North. Because of their marginalisation, they are interested in the establishment of The New Sudan that will accord them a measure of self-determination and equitable share of power and resources, dignity and equal citizenship. They are Sudanese, therefore they have the right to share in the national opportunities especially in the sphere of wealth and political power sharing.
IMPACT OF THE WAR The war has devastated the fighting New Sudan in general and South Sudan in particular. Whatever little socio-economic gains achieved following the conclusion of Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 – 1983 have been completely eroded. Even in the North now the economic growth has drastically declined or stagnated due to government shift of development resources to military spending. The general economy of the country is currently in shamble despite the windfalls of oil revenues, which is being piped out to the North from South Sudan and which is now financing the war efforts of the NIF government. There has been unimaginable loss of human lives. The burden of the war has been disproportionately borne by the people of the south. About 18% (2 million) of the projected total population in South Sudan is estimated to have perished through direct war or war-related causes. Tens of thousands have been displaced internally and externally into the neighboring countries and beyond. Some have already emigrated to U.S.A., Western Europe and Australia in pursuit of safe havens or better life. Loss of sustainable livelihood; dependence on relief aid; social disintegration of families and communities; proliferation of widows, orphans; general lack and / or limited social services – education, health, and water; loss of individual basic human rights, to mention only a few. Because of the systematic and deliberate policy of GOS to displace its own citizens and target them as its legitimate enemies, the level of displacement of civil population in the war active zones is estimated at 85% of the total population. At any given point in time, the people have been involuntarily forced to flee their residences of origin. The displacement of citizens of Western Upper Nile region on oil fields and the forceful reallocation of the Nuba people from their homes to what the GOS called “peace camps” are cases in point.
POPULATION AND POPULATION MOVEMENTS WITHIN AND WITHOUT SUDAN
The war factor coupled with the recurrent natural disasters have greatly contributed to the enormous suffering of the civilian population in the war zones. There has been unparallel displacement both internally and externally; tens of thousands of human lives perished; thousands of innocent children and women abducted and enslaved or sold by the GOS armed backed Arab militias and are now in absolute bondage. Under such environment, it is hard to establish reliable population figures. This could be attributed to lack of existing accurate population figures in the Sudan against which realistic estimate could be based. Apart from 1956 census, whatever population surveys conducted in the Sudan have been incomprehensive and any conclusions drawn from them would be unreliable. Second, constant population movements due to insecurity posed by upsurge of fighting or deliberate acts by the GOS to depopulate certain areas.
Oilfields in Western Upper Nile is a case in point. Third, factionalisation of the conflict, thus, creating a number of inaccessible “Enclaves”. Four, tendency of warring parties and humanitarian agencies to manipulate population numbers for various reasons and interests. In consequence, surveys carried out by individual experts, organizations and institutions emerged with different statistics as illustrated below. The GOS and UN population fund estimate IDPS in the Sudan at 4 million of which about 3.5 million are Southern Sudanese residing in and around Northern towns. UNHCR puts the refugees at about 0.4 million in the neighboring countries. Sudanese political observers and the UN Agencies believe that two million people have been killed in the war and war-related effects. The combined estimate of Southern Sudanese killed and displacement stands roughly at 5.9 million. This study puts the projected population of South Sudan at about 7.8 million in 2002, basing the projection on 1983 population census, which estimated the population of the South at 5.1 million and at population growth rate of 2.6%. According to this source, the population residing in the Southern Sudan is estimated at 1.9 million. In my opinion, both the population estimates of 1983 (5.1 million) and the alleged current resident population in southern Sudan are mere gross under estimations and not the objective realities. This doubt is evidently reinforced by multiple indicator cluster survey (MICS) (UNICEF / OLS 2001) which estimated the resident population in SPLM/A controlled areas in Southern Sudan alone at 5.1 million. If one adds the IDPS in the North 3.5 million refugees 0.4 million, war fatalities 2 million and the unestimated IDPS in GOS held-towns in southern Sudan, the projected population of southern Sudan should have been over 11 million in 2002 as opposed to 7.8 million mentioned above. The analysis above is intended to establish some working figures for the repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of displaced population. We have estimated the total population of the New Sudan (Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile) at 12,388,049 (see Annex 1), total displaced population 4,715,114, [refugees 492,271 (see Annex 2), IDPS 4,222,843 (see Annex 3)]. This means that about 38% of the total population in the New Sudan has been internally and externally displaced from their original homes; and this implies the immensity of the task awaiting repatriation and reintegration. In view of this massive displacement, the task of repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and reintegration appears challenging and formidable, given the usual resource constraints.
3. REPATRIATION AND RE-INTERGRATION BASIC NEEDS AND SERVICES
The magnitude of repatriation and reintegration needs cannot be appreciated without making a list of possible needs and rough estimates of the costs involved. Repatriation, resettlement and re- integration of about 5 million IDPS and refugees from the new Sudan will obviously pose several problems and challenges when the warring parties sign peace agreement. The returnees would require some basic needs and services at the repatriation and re-integration stages. Repatriation needs at transit centers would include: - Transportation - 4, 715, 114 IDPS / refugees at an estimated cost of USD 141,453,000; Food - 7 days at USD 33,005,798; Survival kits - 785,852 households at USD.23,575560; and Medical kits - USD.2,357 557.
(See table 1 for details)
TABLE 1 COSTS ESTIMATE OF SOME BASIC NEEDS FOR IDPS AND REFUGEES ON TRANSIT (SOUTH SUDAN / SOUTH KORDOFAN / SOUTH BLUE NILE)
S/NO ITEMS NO/POPULATION COST/UNIT TOTAL US$ COSTS US$
1 Food 4,715,114 1 x 7 days 33,005,798
2 Transport 47,151 trucks 3,000 141,453,000 100 persons / truck
3 Survival Kits 785,852 households 30 23,575,560
4 Medical Kits 4,715,114 0.5 2,357,557
TOTAL COSTS ESTIMATE 200,391,915
The prices are based on the OLS/UNICEF calculation that has been operational since the establishment of the OLS Southern sector in 1989.
REINTERGRATION STAGE
· Food - 4, 715,114 returnees for 3 months at USD.424,360,260
· Agricultural seeds and tools - 785,852 households at USD.31,434,080
· Health services
· Primary health care - 45 Counties at annual estimate cost of USD.13,500,000
· Water - 2,357 boreholes at USD.23,570,000.
· Education - Schools (primary) 10,000 schools at USD50,000,000
· Housing - 785,852 households at USD.157,170,400
(see table 2 for details)
TABLE 2 NEEDS / SERVICES AT REINTEGRATION STAGE
S/NO ITEMS NO/POPULATION COST/UNIT US$ TOTAL COST US$
1 Food 4,715,114 30 x 3 months 424,360,260
2 Agricultural Seeds and tools 785,852 households 40 31,434,080
3 Health Service 45Counties 300,000 13,500,000
4 Boreholes 2,357 boreholes 10,000 23,570,000
5 Schools: Primary, Secondary 10,000 schools 5,000 50,000,000 and vocational 400 children / school
6 Housing 785,852 households 200 157,170,400
TOTAL COSTS ESTIMATE 700,034,740
NB. One household by average consists of five (5) people of which three are children at school age. The total estimate costs of some basic needs and services at the transit and reintegration stages is USD.900,426,655. However, there are other essential basic needs and services, which have not been embodied in the above calculations. These include: -
· Communication and transport infrastructures: Roads and bridges
· De-mining of farmlands, roads, and towns.
· Grassroots peace and reconciliation
· Good governance and institutional building: Efficient states structures
· Promotion of trade and business: Initial capital is required to get businesses going
· HIV / AIDS awareness programs
· Psychosocial services for the traumatized war victims.
· Environmental protection and conservation of forests and wildlife.
· Gender awareness programs and empowerment of women etc.
· Key projects to jumpstart socio-economic development most of those projects that were on the national list before the out break of the war e.g. Melut and Mongalla Sugar schemes, Aweil Rice and Penykou (Bor) plain rice projects, etc.
4. OPPURTUNITIES, PRIORITIES, CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS
OPPORTUNITIES While the task appears formidable, there are several existing favourable factors that if effectively co-ordinated and well utilized could possibly facilitate the process of repatriation and re- integration. Key among these factors are: -
· Presence of humanitarian agencies (UN Agencies – UNICEF, WHO, FAO, WFP, OCHA, International NGOs, ICRC and National NGOs) in the Sudan. They know the need situation fairly well and they can be of great assistance if the exercise of repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and reintegration begins. Though presently engaged in promoting life-saving and life-sustaining activities, the agencies have already been involved in some rehabilitation and development programs in the fields of: - food security, education, human rights protection, health and nutrition, water and environmental sanitation and de- mining. Availability of such services could motivate the returnees. Further, these agencies are already familiar with the local environment and possess basic data and information readily available for immediate future planning.
· Present commitment and willingness by some foreign governments to support rehabilitation and development programs despite the on-going war. U.S.A. government for instance, has now pledged over 40 million US dollars in aid for rehabilitation and development for education and agriculture in relatively stable SPLM held areas.
· Availability of ample arable lands, especially in South Sudan. The bulk of displaced population is from the rural areas and returning them to their original places of residence would not create any conflicts between them and receiving communities. The recent voluntary repatriation of displaced persons within South Sudan, tend to testify the point. Some returnees (17,000) from Equatoria to Upper Nile (Bor County) in year 2000 – 2001 were accorded a huge and a head-of – state- like reception.
· Presence of most IDPS within the national boundaries and proximity of countries hosting the refugees. Most refugees are in the six neighboring countries of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia,
Central Africa republic, Eritrea and Egypt and their transport home could be easy, because it will be essentially land transport.
· Availability of national qualified human resources
· Presence of formal public and civil society structures.
· Presence of some physical facilities, e.g., railway, barges, roads etc especially in the North. The IDP from Northern Sudan will use those facilities.
· Wealth of experience from 1972 repatriation and reintegration, following the abortive Addis Ababa agreement between Nimeri regime and South Sudan Liberation Movement and the current voluntary repatriation. Management of the repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction (RRRR) will drawn from the experiences that were developed at the end of the first war in 1972. Institutions such as Special Fund and the RRRR Commission can be re-commission and baptize into active service.
PRIORITIES
Repatriation, reintegration and reconstruction process would entail setting priorities in the following order:-
· Establishment of a competent, effective, efficient and accountable national administrative institution that will plan, co-ordinate and manage the process of repatriation and reintegration.
· Development of repatriation and reintegration policy that will address issues such as: -
· Provision of basic amenities to restore normal life, human rights of the returnees, duration of food assistance, compensation for the loss and damage of property, to mention only a few.
· Identification of potential returnees that should provide a detailed demographic characteristics of the returnees.
· Assessment of needs in the short and medium term.
· Assessment of social services in areas where returnees will settle.
· Mobilize resources internally and externally.
· Mobilize and sensitize potential returnees for eventual repatriation and reintegration.
· Adoption of clear policies of self-reliance.
CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS Implementing such a major, complex and huge unprecedented undertaking in a highly underdeveloped economy like South Sudan Nuba, Mountains and Southern Blue Nile, one has to anticipate many challenges and obstacles. In this particular process, the expected challenges and problems include but not limited to: -
Lack of central, legitimate, political and administrative authority that enjoys the national public respect, trust and confidence. At present, the sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Sudan are being contested by GOS and different opposition groups that are making up the NDA. Possible reluctance of refugees to promptly return home due to either inadequate social services (pull factors) at the settling areas, or doubts about the truthfulness of peace itself, given the experience of 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. The displaced persons may therefore adopt first, the wait-and-see attitude. Transition from relief dependency to self- sufficiency may not be an easy process due to the fact that displaced persons have been accustomed to receiving handouts and free services for the last 14 years. Identification and establishing accurate statistics of IDPS and refugees. Limited opportunities of employment for the returnees. Inadequate financial resources. Lack of common currency and banking facilities in the war-affected areas. Issues relating to trust building, peace and reconciliation among the various opposing political, community and civil society groupings. Lack of unified education curriculum. Sudan has already two curricula, one for GOS and SPLM and this will be compounded more by coming of refugee school children with different educational systems. Inadequate housing facilities in towns and villages. Houses in GOS held-towns in South Sudan have been intentionally destroyed by GOS forces and transformed into bomb shelters and military barracks. Inaccessibility of some areas due to poor road networks. Presence of many land mines and unexploded ordinance on farmlands and in and around towns. Any effective settlement will be contingent upon removal of land mines. Social problems relating to widows, disabled, orphans, and ex-combatants, etc. these vulnerable groups will pose a challenge both in short and long terms. They will therefore need special handling and care. The nature of the state during the interim period. The Union government is the most critical factor during the interim period because it will be the one to handle national resources and the way the IDPs and returnees will be treated will go a long way to convince the people that the central authority means good for them. It will be a period that will show whether the political North has changed her attitude toward the marginalized peoples and whether their repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and re-integration (RRRR) will proceed smoothly in terms of the availability of resources from the Union Treasury. Actions speak louder than words,
therefore the way fundamental issues are handled during this period will be both crucial and critical to the final outcome of the RRRR exercise.
5. LESSONS LEARNT FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN REPATRIATING, RESETTLING AND REINTEGRATING DISPLACED PERSONS.
It is significantly necessary to appreciate and relate the international experience to the local situation in terms of socio-economic reintegration of the displaced population. Some of the useful lessons learnt from international experience include: -
· That any type of repatriation, resettlement and reintegration should be voluntary.
· Displaced persons should have the option of settling in the areas of current displacement or return to traditional homes. Their choices of alternative areas of settlement should be respected. Any form of coercion can endanger the process.
· Security: The security of the returnees has to be guaranteed. Reliable information about the security in receiving communities should be provided to those desiring to return home.
· Availability of social services in the return areas: Lack of schools health services and clean drinking water in the receiving communities, is regarded as a critical disincentive to return this is because IDPs and refugees have some facilities where they are presently residing. No one wants to take her/his child were there are no schools.
· Need to put in place a well planned, co-ordinated and managed plan of action
· It is essential that the government, UN agencies, INGOS and local civil society groups co- ordinate and collaborate in the repatriation and reintegration process.
· Need for the government to develop an elaborate repatriation and reintegration policy to address issues such as: - duration of relief assistance; compensation, capacity building, housing, social services, instituting mechanisms for conflict resolution and management, especially between the returnees and receiving communities.
· Need to involve the returnees in reintegration programs that directly affect them.
· Most of the above issues were not given due consideration by the Sudan Government during 1972 repatriation and reintegration. The program was poorly planned and as result it was a complete failure. The ex-combatants were dissatisfied and decided to return to the bush, where they went and formed the nucleus of the SPLM / A in 1983. In reality, the success of any repatriation and reintegration program will depend largely upon the following factors: -
· The nature and type of peace agreement reached.
· The political will and commitment of the government to change its attitude towards the displaced population and to commit its resources for their well-being.
· Ability and competence of the local administration and grass-root organizations to effectively participate in the reintegration programs.
· Positive international community response, this bill of over nine hundred million of United States dollars is large, but so that a permanent, just and durable peace in the Sudan prevails, we appeal to the world community to foot the bill. A peaceful Sudan will contribute to the global economy in terms of sharing her resources with other nations through trade, commerce and cultural exchanges. The world therefore has a duty and obligation in financing peace for Sudan during the interim period.
6. CONCLUSION
For the repatriation, resettlement and reintegration, Sudan would expect from the international community the sum of USD900, 426,655 to cover transport, food, health, education, and housing services in the immediate, medium and long term, some projects will take two years to complete, others four years and still other will take six years. The success of the expected repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration program in the Sudan will largely depend on: -
The type and nature of peace agreement that would be reached among the warring actors Government in Khartoum is notorious of violating its own agreements and there is always sceptisism and reservation about their sincerity. So their political will and commitment will be vital. The level of international commitment and support to the process It is observed that the international community tends to be more inclined to supporting refugees than IDPS and this can affect the process since we have more IDPS than refugees. The government should develop well-documented plan and policy of repatriation, resettlement and reintegration and an effective, efficient and accountable institution to implement the program. However, the implementing Union government, International and non-governmental agencies should take the following points into consideration:
· Population movements will be politically sensitive, not least because of the demographic implications on, for example, labour relations, possible voting entitlements or proximity to areas of strategic interest (such as petroleum fields, etc.)
· Uprooted communities will make their own assessment and generally exercise caution before deciding whether to move to new areas or not. They will respond to public ‘signals’ as well as informal information gathering, as to when or whether they will move. Not everyone is
expected to return immediately, but refugees might be more inclined to move more readily than some displaced communities. Others again may initially move to their areas of origin, but possibly return back and indefinitely delay any decision to relocate.
· Returnees will take into account the availability of services and other forms of assistance when reviewing their options (to either stay, move or dispatch members of their clan or household in advance). Lack of essential services, for example, especially in health and education, may discourage returnees and cause some to either leave after a short time or stay away. Many will expect a minimum level of services, social administration and respect for law and order. They will automatically compare what is available in their present locations with what will be available in the areas of return.
· Returning communities will return ‘different people’ from when they originally were forced to flee. They will have been exposed to different cultures and in may cases be more exposed to wider range of issues than their host communities. For example, they may have acquired value systems that clash with the values current among host communities. In addition, they may have lost some of the practical skills required to sustain themselves in their previous areas of habitual dwelling.
· Returning communities will face a mixed reaction from those they left behind. Misunderstandings and lack of integration between returning and host communities can give rise to conflict, whether over the reclamation of property or access to productive land, etc, though some returnees are likely to be better qualified and ready to assume positions of authority, they may not be automatically offered nor instantly accepted in public offices. Tensions therefore are likely to ensure. Reintegration will take time to succeed.
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
SRRA Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association IDPS Internally Displaced Persons SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army WFP World Food and Agriculture Organization NGOS Non-governmental Organizations INGOS International Non-governmental Organizations SINGOS Sudanese Indigenous Non-governmental GOS Government of Sudan UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund FAO Food and Agriculture Organization WHO World Health Organization OCHA Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance ICRC International Committee of Red Cross IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority for Development ARI Relationships Foundation International MICS Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey OLS Operation Life Line Sudan USAID United States Agency for International Development ROOF Relief organization of Fazugili NRRDO Nuba Relief Rehabilitation and Development Organization. USA United States of America RRRRR Repatriation, Resettlement, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reintegration
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Results (UNICEF / OLS 2000) 2. SPLM vision, Program and Constitution, March 1998 3. SPLM Secretariat of Education: Master Plan 2002 – 2006 and Action Plan 2002 – 2003 4. Inside Sudan: by Donald Petterson. 5. Luka Biong Deng: Famine in the Sudan: Causes, Preparedness and Response a Political, social and Economic analysis of the 1998 Bahr El Ghazal. 6. Sudan Charter: National Unity and Diversity, Issued by National Islamic Front, January 1987. Khartoum Sudan. 7. Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng (Ed): The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced. 8. First outline, presentation to Nairobi members of IPF working group. 04.02.2002, Nairobi 9. Repatriation and Reintegration Needs Assessment Report August 1999, compiled by a team led by Joseph K. Ndolo of Strategic Dimensions.
ANNEX 1: POPULATION OF THE NEW SUDAN
S/NO SOUTH SUDAN SOUTH SOUTH BLUE TOTAL KORDOFAN NILE POPULATION
1 Refugees 460,024 - 75,000 535,024
2 Resettlers (foreign 150,000 - - 150,000 countries)
3 IDPS and Residents in 5,100,000 489,325 197,000 5,786,325 SPLA areas
4 IDPS and Residents in 3,500,000 1,198,540 1,218,160 5,916,700 GOS areas including Khartoum and other areas
TOTAL 9,210,024 1,687,865 1,490,160 12,388,049 POPULATION
Sources: SRRA Data Base / NRRDO / ROOF / GOS / UNHCR, 2002
ANNEX 2: SUDANESE REFUGEES IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES (SOUTH SUDAN / SOUTH KORDOFAN / SOUTH BLUE NILE)
S/NO COUNTRY CAMP POPULATION
1 Kenya Dadaab 906
Kakuma 67,301
Other towns 20,000
Sub-Total 88,207
2 Uganda Arua District 42,463
Moyo District 97,917
Kitgum District 22,843
Masindi District 13,594
Other towns 50,000
Sub-Total 226,817
3 Ethiopia Pinyudo / Bongo
Dima / Asosa 132,247
4 Central Africa 35,000
5 Egypt 10,000
TOTAL 492,271
Sources: SRRA Data Base / GOS / NRRDO / ROOF
ANNEX 3: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS)
S/N REGION CAMP POPULATION O
1 Equatoria Bamurye 6,745
Mangalatoria 8,564
Kerwa 2,430
Augutua 17,073
Lobone 26,321
Ikotos 1,372
Natinga 3,384
Narus 2,463
New Cush 4,252
Mogali 21,069
Masindi 5,252
Nimule 11,564
Tambura 22,000
Sub-Total 132,493
2 Bahr-El-Ghazal Yirol 15,000
Tonj 40,000
Gogrial / Twic 5,000
Sub-Total 60,000
3 North Sudan (South Sudanese) Khartoum & other towns 3,500,000
Sub-Total 3,692,493
4. Southern Kordofan Baram / West Kadugi / 84,500 Lagawa
Sub-total 84,500
5 Southern Blue Nile Yabus / others 45,850
6 North Sudan / South Kordofan Khartoum & other towns 400,000 / South Blue Nile
TOTAL POPULATION 4,222,843
Sources: UNHCR – KENYA, UGANDA / SRRA / ROOF
MAIN POINTS
1. War Constituency/Theatre: Mostly in the underdeveloped areas of the Sudan. 2. CAUSES OF THE WAR I. Historical: Separate colonial administration between the North and the South resulting in no shared cultural and religious values. That situation prevailed until 1947; when the two colonial administrative identities were lumped together by the colonialists. II. The identity of the Sudanese State: The Arabized establishment define the Sudan as Arab and Islamic. But this is resented by non Arabs because as per the only legitimate census of 1956, Africans were 61%, Arabs 30% and others 9% of the then Sudan population.
III. However: the Northern Arabized Minority Elite took political, security and economic power at the dawn of independence in 1956. But that was to the exclusion of the majority population of 61%. The resources of the state and political power are in their hands to date (year 2002). 3. IMPACT OF WAR I. Impoverishment of the marginilized peoples of the Sudan. All resources are now being ploughed into war effort by GOS.
II. Destruction of lives and property, over two (2) million Sudanese have died of war/war related conditions since 1983.
III. Displacement and refuge: Around five (5) million Sudanese are now dependant destitutes in refuge and IDP Camps inside the Country. 4. POPULATION UNDER SCRUTINY
See tables on Pages 27, 28 and 29 i. The population in fighting Sudan/New Sudan is roughly 12 to 13 million of which the refugees are 492,271 and the IDPS are 4,222,843. The total is therefore 4,22,843 + 492,271 = 4,715,114 which is roughly 5,000,000 (round figure). This is roughly 38% of the total population of the New Sudan shown above. 5. REQUIRED INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
See tables in pages 14 AND 15 I. Immediate basic needs for transport and transiting refugees and IDPS from Refuge and Displaced Camps to their areas of origin/destinations is roughly calculated as USD 200,391,915. This is only for transport, food, water etc. on the way. II. The cost of basic services for repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and reintegration (RRRRR) is USD 700,034,740.
III. Total financial support required is roughly USD 700,034,740 + 200,391,915 = USD.900, 426,655 Roughly in round figure = USD 900,000,000. IV. If the RRRRR takes four (4) years to accomplish, then the yearly financial requirements is USD 900,000,000/ 4 = USD 225,000,000 per annum. V. If the Interim Period is six (6) years then USD 900,000,000/6 = USD 150,000,000. VI. If the returning population is about 5,000,000 then one person costs 900,000,000 ¸5,000,000 = USD. 180.
6. SOURCES OF FUNDS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD I. Union GoS during the interim period II. International community III. Southern Sudan state government 7. WHEN TO OPERATIONALIZE FUNDING I. Now the international agencies such as UN, INGOs etc. are assisting especially in humanitarian assistance. We take this opportunity to register our appreciation for timely efforts and pay tribute to them for the positive intervention in the 1998 famine in Bhar El Ghazel Region. We also salute and appreciate them for their present brave positive efforts in Western Upper Nile (WUN). However meaningful investment can only take place at the end of this war. At this juncture I would like to pay tribute in special recognition of the leadership of Dr. Sharad Sapra, the outgoing head of the OLS Southern Sector, for his excellent leadership in dealing with humanitarian crises since he took office in 1999. We wish him well and prosperous future in his new assignment in the UN/UNICEF system. II. The investment of 1972 is now wasted by this war. There will be no point in investing in permanent housing, if such capital assets will get destroyed by war. For now. I appeal to our strategic partners to continue in investing in services pending the advent of peace in the Sudan. III. Sudan must sign contract with justice amongst its people before large efforts for investments are made. 8. Opportunities Are some of the following: I. Availability of information from which to draw, example, SRRA Data Base, UN/INGOS Agencies etc.
II. Presence of fairly structured national institutions in the SPLM Administered areas e.g. County - Regional Administration, civil authority and civil society. This can guide in the conception and implementation of IDPs/Refugees projects. III. Presence of UN/INGOS/SINGOS on the ground. IV. Drawing from past experiences so that pitfalls can be avoided e.g. the lessons learnt from 1972 RRRRR. V. In case of peace, there will be willingness by the International community to contribute generously to the reconstruction and reintegration efforts in war affected areas. VI. IDPs/Refugees will return a "changed" people. They will assist the authorities in the determination of their priority needs within the context of available resources. 9. CHALLENGES I. This is a very huge task. About 38% to 40% of the total population is involved. It will be a nightmare to satisfy the returnees because both the human and material resources can be out flanked by the simultaneous competing pressing needs. II. A serious complication can arise between linkage and demonstration effects. The resident local population will want to have services that they will be seeing being given to their returning kith and kin (this will be a demonstration effect). The returning population will want to continue to receive the "care" that they were getting while in refuge/IDPs camps, but these "education and health services" will not be readily available. There will therefore be negative agitation on their part (this will be a linkage effect). III. Returnees will return a "changed" people there will therefore be a clash between the old and the new cultures. IV. There can be insecurity if the RRRRR is not well handled. Information about the state of the resources, the possibilities and difficulties must always be available to both the implementing Agencies and the various populations, whether resident or returning. V. War has affected everybody, therefore all citizens need services but resources may not be sufficient to go round. This in turn will create conflict in the society. VI. Reintegration will be complete if socio-economic projects can start at once. Under development has been playing a major role in the two Sudan wars (1955-1972) and (1983-2002). Economic benefits must be seen to be developing. Permanent peace is therefore a tangent on the equitable distribution of the national cake. This will be a great challenge on the Interim Union government of the Sudan and her institutions during the Interim Period.
Summary of Discussion on The Impact of a Peace Agreement on OLS and Long- Term Development of Sudan Under Alternative Constitutional Frameworks; and Potential Donor Support for the Reintegration of War Affected Population Following the Signing of a Peace Agreement.
1. A pre-requisite for unity in the Sudan is the repatriation and resettlement of 5 million people and provision of the services they require. They are very modest estimates.
2. I like Dr Sulafeldein’s idea that we need to consider our dependency on the west. It is very foolish of us not to depend on our own food – we need to aspire to convince people that wheat is better. We need to develop our habits. Look at the example of India which has moved from import to export. The Sudan is definitely capable of feeding itself, the FAO stated this recently. They consider the Sudan as the breadbasket of the Middle East countries. There must be freedom from the donors and the dependencies of the donor food.
3. The OLS does not come as a development agent – it came as a relief agent. When the people were displaced by war then they needed food. As long as there are displaced people then they require food. It is hard to concentrate on development when they require peace.
4. We need to hold some training courses for some organisations themselves to help them to work well – to have fluent work, which will be easy for the donors to monitor. I was frightened to hear that there will always be security people. It is right to make sure that the aid coming in is being spent correctly – but there is always a security man there. It could be done but not directly.
5. If the war stopped tomorrow the Government of the Sudan would not be able to provide for the displaced. The incidence of diaphoretic infections is near to endemic. School meals are being offered to attract the children to attend the classes – otherwise they become child labour or street children.
6. The cost of air lifting food to the conflict zone is more than three times the cost of procuring the food itself.
7. Food relief over a long time will create dependency, I agree – it could lead to aid addiction. But, there is conspiracy theory hypothesis that there is a surplus in the West so you create OLS or IGAD to dump it. The implication of that assumption is two-fold. First, it strengthens our tendency to explain away realities. Secondly, the implication that it says there is nothing wrong in Sudan except for the dumping of surplus food. This is not a kind of shortcoming of this regime in power in Sudan. But if this is so then there is now these people trying to twist our arms to come to peace. We must accept the realities.
8. Your paper suggests that Darfur is not part of the civil war, then what is it? For the last 20 years there has been a state of turmoil in the Darfur. Darfur started with the Fur tribe – there was displacement of at least 6000 people. Then there was a war – between the Muslim and Arab groups. There are now IDPs and refugees. Recently planes were bombing Darfur – apparently they were confronting armed robbery.
9. The term food gap is synonymous with famine.
10. During the famine of 1998 – the international community only came to south Sudan on two conditions: (1) the number of people dead, (2) being able to count the ribs of people. Therefore there has not been so much food coming to us as you suggest. Three quarters of the grain that was received stays only in the north.
11. Agriculture has always been relegated. It has been receiving little finance from the government. Therefore many Sudanese have abandoned farming.
12. Resettlement was done by taking people in trucks and putting them in their home places. It must not be done like this and in a hurry. We must consider their conditions prior to repatriation, otherwise they will perish. The people themselves should assist to see that these people have decent homes to go to.