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Cyprus Negotiations Thwarted by Issues on Security and Guarantees WP S How Can the Peace Process Be Revived? Ioannis N

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Cyprus Negotiations Thwarted by Issues on Security and Guarantees WP S How Can the Peace Process Be Revived? Ioannis N Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments Cyprus Negotiations Thwarted by Issues on Security and Guarantees WP S How Can the Peace Process Be Revived? Ioannis N. Grigoriadis The failure of the latest round of negotiations at Crans-Montana has disenchanted those who saw them as a historic opportunity for the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Issues regarding security and guarantees proved to be insurmountable obstacles to a solution. Although mutual recriminations, upcoming hydrocarbon drillings, and presi- dential elections in Cyprus will not help restore the negotiations in the immediate future, there is no better alternative to the continuation of the UN-led negotiations process, with the aim of achieving a federal solution. Despite significant progress, the latest 60-year-long partition of the island. Never- round of Cyprus conflict-resolution theless, both failed to meet expectations. negotiations at Crans-Montana, Switzer- Trust between the two leaders suffered land, has again failed to deliver a break- a heavy blow in the Mont Pèlerin negotia- through. The leaders of the two Cypriot tions of December 2016 and the Geneva communities and the foreign ministers of Conference of January 2017 and never re- Cyprus’ three guarantor states – Greece, covered. Although the two leaders should Turkey, and the United Kingdom – could have acted together and represented the not reach common ground, with security interests of the Cypriot people as a team – and guarantees being considered the both against their respective communities most important obstacles. The moderate and the guarantor states – they acted sepa- credentials of both leaders – the President rately and each began questioning the true of the Republic of Cyprus and Greek Cy- intentions of the other. Incidents such as priot leader, Nicos Anastasiades, and the the February 2017 decision of the Cypriot President of the internationally unrecog- Parliament to approve the commemoration nized “Turkish Republic of Northern in public schools of the 1950 Greek Cypriot Cyprus (TRNC)” and Turkish Cypriot leader, referendum about union with Greece (enosis) Mustafa Akıncı – had inspired the hopes led Mr. Akıncı to assume that Mr. Anasta- of all Cypriots who desire an end to the siades was not truly committed to the peace process, and that he was more interested Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, an Associate Professor at Bilkent University, SWP Comments 28 is in the academic year 2016–2017 IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at SWP. July 2017 The Mercator IPC Fellowship Programme at SWP is funded by Stiftung Mercator. 1 in his expected candidacy for the February a more flexible attitude on the property 2018 presidential elections in the Republic issue, only as a part of their package-deal of Cyprus. On his side, Mr. Anastasiades proposal and under the condition that expected a more courageous stance from Morphou would be returned, the guarantee Mr. Akıncı when it came to spelling out regime would be abolished, and a “sunset the dissociation of Turkish Cypriot from clause” would be set for the presence of Turkish interests on issues such as security Turkish troops in Cyprus. and guarantees. This allowed Turkey to state its own views and face no significant pressure when it came to the question of What Next for Cyprus? compromise. Crucial time was wasted in The failure of the latest round of negotia- the first months of 2017. Efforts by the UN tions is undoubtedly a big setback in efforts Secretary-General Special Advisor Espen to reunify the island. It has disheartened Barth Eide to bring the sides closer led to peace activists and relieved hardliners on the reconvening of the Conference on Cy- both sides of the “Green Line.” Many have prus at Crans-Montana, but he could not argued that this was the last chance for secure a compromise agreement. A last- a federal solution in Cyprus and that if ditch package-deal proposal put forward Anastasiades and Akıncı could not reach by Mr. Anastasiades on 5 July failed to a deal, nobody can. Others have pointed out change the course of events. that, although time was working against UN Secretary-General António Guterres the viability of a federal solution in Cyprus, refused in his statement to identify one low points have been overcome in the re- particular issue as the reason for the failure cent history of the Cyprus question and at Crans-Montana. Nonetheless, security negotiations were resumed. In any case, any and guarantees appeared to be the thorniest alternative scenario would probably gener- issues. The presence of Turkish troops and ate more tension and acrimony. the future of the guarantee system were heavily debated. Turkey demanded the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee Potential Conflict Points Looming and the permanent presence of Turkish In the near future, the conditions for a troops. The Republic of Cyprus and Greece potential resumption of the talks are demanded the abolition of the Treaty of unlikely to improve. The hydrocarbon Guarantee and the full withdrawal of all drillings of the Total–ENI consortium in troops. Then efforts were made to bridge Plot No. 11 of the Exclusive Economic Zone the two opposing positions through a pro- of the Republic of Cyprus could harm posal that allowed for the presence of a relations between the parties. Turkey has small number of Greek and Turkish forces disputed the right of the Republic of Cyprus as part of an international security force. to conduct such operations and has con- Whether their departure from Cyprus ducted its own research on seismic activity would take place at a certain future date in the region. The Republic of Cyprus has (sunset clause) or simply be reconsidered considered such operations to be its sover- (review clause) at a certain future date were eign right and has been supported in this the subjects of the final negotiation, which issue by the international community. A did not bear fruit. Meanwhile, Turkish Turkish reaction to the operation, which Cypriots appeared willing to return only began in July 2017, would further deterio- part of the town of Morphou (Güzelyurt) rate the already tense climate. The launch- to Greek Cypriot administration, whereas ing of the campaign for the Cypriot presi- Greek Cypriots conceded to a single-ticket dential elections in February 2018 is also rotating presidency between Greek Cypriots likely to have a detrimental effect on the and Turkish Cypriots. They also conceded to prospects for a resumption of negotiations. SWP Comments 28 July 2017 2 The common understanding between the come and a new framework can be set. Any two biggest Greek Cypriot parties – the alternative solution will face fierce opposi- center-right Democratic Rally (DISY) and tion from either of the two communities the left Progressive Party of Working People or the guarantor powers, and it would be (AKEL) – that has been instrumental in even more difficult to sway public opinion, keeping the negotiation process stable will regardless of side, about the wisdom of that inevitably dissipate, and mutual recrimina- choice. The proposal to abandon the federal tions will abound. model and to work toward a negotiated partition with both states becoming mem- bers of the European Union – a “velvet What about a New Negotiation divorce” – has been presented as an alter- Framework? native to a federal solution. Turkish Cy- Would this mean that there are no pros- priots would gain their sovereignty and pects for restarting the peace process? On EU membership. What the Greek Cypriots the one hand, the Republic of Cyprus and would gain by supporting Turkish Cypriot Greece have pledged for the continuation of sovereignty would be minor territorial the UN “good offices” mission in Cyprus. gains and the prevention of a Turkish President Anastasiades stated that he would takeover of northern Cyprus. Nevertheless, remain available to negotiate on the basis this underestimates not only the unpopu- of his proposal. On the other hand, Turkey larity of such an idea within Greek Cypriot has declared its discontent with the current public opinion, but also the very viability negotiations framework. President Recep of the “TRNC.” Turkish Cypriots have not Tayyip Erdo an stated that the failure of been able to develop their own state capaci- the talks at Crans-Montana pointed at the ty and have remained dependent on the ğ impossibility of finding a solution within financial aid and security apparatus of the set framework of the United Nations Turkey. This also means that, even if the mission. In other words, seeking a confed- “TRNC” were internationally recognized, it eral solution, or even a negotiated parti- would not meet the Copenhagen Criteria tion, would be Turkey’s desirable outcome. for EU membership. Cutting the umbilical The statements of the Turkish Cypriot cord connecting Turkish Cypriots to Turkey leader, Mustafa Akıncı, also reflect dis- without the resolution of the Cyprus issue illusionment – up to the point of disbelief – is a project more difficult than achieving a about the feasibility of achieving a federal federal solution in Cyprus. In other words, solution in Cyprus. On his side, the UN Turkish Cypriot sovereignty is a goal that Secretary-General linked the continuation Turkish Cypriots alone could not achieve, of the UN mission to the will of the parties. and neither Turkey nor the Republic of For the convergences achieved in the recent Cyprus would be willing to endorse it, let negotiations not to be wasted and for the alone fund it. Notwithstanding the poten- better planning of any upcoming confi- tial veto of member states, the European dence-building measures, it would be neces- Union would find it contradictory to its sary that both sides request the continua- own record of reconciliation and integra- tion of the UN mission.
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