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Palestinian Public Perceptions on Their Living Conditions

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Palestinian Public Perceptions on Their Living Conditions Palestinian Public Perceptions on Their Living Conditions Report VI, October 2003 Written by: Riccardo BOCCO Matthias BRUNNER Isabelle DANEELS Jalal HUSSEINI Frederic LAPEYRE Jamil RABAH IUED – Graduate Institute of Development Studies, University of Geneva A Study funded by SDC (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation), UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA and the UN World Food Program THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL AID DURING THE SECOND INTIFADA Report VI An Analysis of Palestinian Public Opinion in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on their Living Conditions (January - July 2003) The poll for this study has been conducted in cooperation with the JMCC (Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre) Geneva, October 2003 Cover photo: Palestinian child sitting along the security fence dividing the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Abu Dis Source: AFP in http://www.palestinercs.org Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VI _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................6 LIST OF ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................7 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY .................................................................................8 OBJECTIVES........................................................................................................................8 METHODOLOGY.................................................................................................................10 DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES.................................................................10 PART 1. MOBILITY AND SECURITY CONDITIONS.........................................................14 1.1. THE IMPACT OF CLOSURES AND MOBILITY RESTRICTIONS ON LIVELIHOOD......................14 1.1.1. The socio-economic impact of closure .............................................................17 1.1.2. The humanitarian impact of closure..................................................................19 Relief and health emergency aid .............................................................................19 Access to Water ......................................................................................................20 Education.................................................................................................................20 1.2. SECURITY ASSESSMENT .............................................................................................21 1.2.1. Casualties: Hard data .......................................................................................22 Deaths .....................................................................................................................22 Injuries .....................................................................................................................24 1.2.2. Damage to property and land confiscation .......................................................25 Public infrastructure.................................................................................................25 Land and houses: damages and confiscation .........................................................26 PART 2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS .....................................................................28 2.1. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................28 2.2. THE NATURE AND EVOLUTION OF POVERTY .................................................................30 2.2.1. Households’ income evolution ..........................................................................30 2.2.2. Material deprivation ..........................................................................................32 2.2.3. Subjective financial satisfaction poverty line.....................................................35 2.2.4. Households’ perception of their financial situation and poverty evolution ..................................................................................................................38 2.3. POVERTY AND COPING STRATEGIES ............................................................................40 2.3.1. Ability to cope financially...................................................................................40 2.3.2. Strategies for managing the hardship...............................................................41 2.3.3. Expectations about the future and the best way for improving the socio-economic situation .........................................................................................46 PART 3. LABOR MARKET ................................................................................................50 3.1. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LABOR MARKET ......................................................................50 3.2 THE EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE LABOR FORCE ..........................51 3.3. WORK OCCUPATION AND TYPE OF EMPLOYER..............................................................55 3.4 EMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY RISK ..............................................................................57 PART 4. ASSISTANCE DELIVERED IN GENERAL..........................................................62 4.1. DISTRIBUTION OF ASSISTANCE....................................................................................62 4.2. MOST IMPORTANT TYPES OF ASSISTANCE....................................................................67 4.3. VALUE OF THE ASSISTANCE ........................................................................................71 4.4. EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE .........................................................................................73 4.5. SOURCE OF THE ASSISTANCE......................................................................................78 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ © Palestine Research Unit: iuéd, Geneva www.unige.ch/iued/palestine 3 Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VI _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ PART 5. THE IMPACT OF AID AND PALESTINIANS’ PERCEPTIONS......................................................................................80 5.1. INDIVIDUAL NEEDS FOR ASSISTANCE............................................................................80 5.2. PALESTINIANS’ PRIORITIES FOR THEIR HOUSEHOLD......................................................84 5.3. PALESTINIANS’ PRIORITIES FOR THE COMMUNITY .........................................................89 5.3.1. General assistance needed by the community.................................................89 5.3.2. Infrastructure assistance needed by the community ........................................92 5.4. SATISFACTION WITH THE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED .........................................................94 5.5. SATISFACTION WITH EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE...........................................................99 PART 6. FOOD ...................................................................................................102 6.1. NEED FOR FOOD.......................................................................................................102 6.2. CHANGE IN HOUSEHOLD FOOD CONSUMPTION ...........................................................103 6.3. THE MOST NEEDED FOOD ITEMS IN THE HOUSEHOLD ..................................................105 6.4. SOURCE OF FOOD ....................................................................................................106 6.5. FOOD DISTRIBUTION .................................................................................................107 6.6. SOURCE OF FOOD ASSISTANCE .................................................................................109 6.7. FREQUENCY OF FOOD ASSISTANCE ...........................................................................112 6.8. ATTITUDE TOWARDS FOOD ASSISTANCE ....................................................................113 6.9. LEVEL OF SATISFACTION WITH FOOD ASSISTANCE......................................................115 6.10. VALUE OF ASSISTANCE ...........................................................................................117 PART 7. HEALTH AND EDUCATION..............................................................................120 7.1. HEALTH AND EDUCATION IN GENERAL........................................................................120 7.2. HEALTH....................................................................................................................121 7.2.1. Medical care ...................................................................................................124 Need for medical care ...........................................................................................124 Restrictions on the delivery of medical care ..........................................................125 7.2.2. Health coverage..............................................................................................131 Health coverage and income.................................................................................133 Health coverage and poverty.................................................................................134 7.3. EDUCATION..............................................................................................................135
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