The Hesitant Hand: Mill, Sidgwick, and the Evolution of the Theory of Market Failure Steven G. Medema The theory of market failure brought analytical refi nement to a centuries- old concern with the impact of self-interested behavior on economic activity.1 The preclassical commentators looked for a means to coordi- nate or restrain the base effects of self-interested behavior and saw no means other than government regulation and religious control—both rather centralized, authoritarian, and pessimistic regarding the effects of self-interested behavior. The idea that self-interest could somehow pro- mote the general welfare was essentially absent.2 Adam Smith and the nineteenth-century classical economists saw the system of natural liberty harmonizing, to a greater or lesser extent, self-interest and social interest, allowing the market to function with a minimum of direct control by gov- ernment. However, the 1870s and the several decades afterward—which brought us the marginal revolution and the subsequent development of Correspondence may be addressed to Steven G. Medema, Department of Economics, CB 181, University of Colorado at Denver, PO Box 173364, Denver, CO 80217-3364; e-mail: steven.
[email protected]. The author thanks Roger Backhouse, Neel Chamilall, Pierre Garello, Philippe Fontaine, Deirdre McCloskey, Richard A. Musgrave, D. P. O’Brien, Tiziano Raffaelli, Warren Samuels, Donald Winch, seminar participants at the University of Aix-Marseille III and the École normale supérieure de Cachan, and two anonymous referees for very instruc- tive comments on earlier drafts of this material. The fi nancial support of the Earhart Founda- tion is gratefully acknowledged.