HARNESSING SELF-INTEREST: MILL, SIDGWICK, AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE Steven G. Medema* Revised Draft May 2006 *Professor of Economics, University of Colorado at Denver. Contact information: Department of Economics, CB 181, University of Colorado at Denver, PO Box 173364, Denver, CO 80217- 3364 USA (email:
[email protected]). The author thanks Roger Backhouse, Neel Chamilall, Pierre Garello, Deirdre McCloskey, Richard A. Musgrave, D.P. O’Brien, Warren Samuels, Donald Winch, seminar participants at the University of Aix-Marseille III, and those attending the 2004 UK History of Economic Thought Conference for very instructive comments on earlier drafts of this material, as well as Roger Backhouse for stimulating conversations on this subject. The financial support of the Earhart Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. HARNESSING SELF-INTEREST: MILL, SIDGWICK, AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE Introduction The theory of market failure brought analytical refinement to a centuries-old concern with the impact of self-interested behavior on economic activity.1 The preclassical commentators looked for a means to coordinate or restrain the base effects of self- interested behavior and saw no means other than government regulation and religious control—both rather centralized, authoritarian, and pessimistic regarding the effects of self-interested behavior. The idea that self-interest could somehow work to the general welfare was essentially absent.2 Adam Smith and the nineteenth-century classical economists saw the system of natural liberty harmonizing, to a greater or lesser extent, self-interest and social interest, allowing the market to function with a minimum of direct control by government.