Thursday, August 28 2003, 10.30 Am: Tony Blair, Prime Minister Gavyn Davies, Chairman of the BBC
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Thursday, August 28 2003, 10.30 am: Tony Blair, prime minister Gavyn Davies, chairman of the BBC MR ANTHONY CHARLES LYNTON BLAIR (called) Examined by MR DINGEMANS LORD HUTTON: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. Good morning Prime Minister. A. Good morning my Lord. MR DINGEMANS: I do not think we need an introduction. May I start with the dossiers? We have heard that a dossier was being produced in February 2002 which related to four countries, one of which was Iraq. Could you explain the background to that? A. After September 11th there was a renewed sense of urgency on the question of rogue states and weapons of mass destruction and the link with terrorism, and there was some thought given to trying to bring all that together, identifying the countries that were a particular source of concern to us, one of which was Iraq. Q. We have heard that the dossier was then pursued against Iraq alone in about February/March time. Why was the decision made to concentrate on Iraq alone? A. Again, as I say in my witness statement, I think given history Iraq was a special case. It was in breach of United Nations resolutions. It had a history of using weapons of mass destruction against its own people. So there was a sense that Iraq as it were fitted a special category. Q. We know that the dossier got at least in its earlier stages to a final state in early March time but was not published. A. Hmm. Q. What was the reason for that? A. We had a draft, but this thing was already beginning to build as a very major story. Frankly we were months away from deciding our strategy on this issue. I took the view in the end, and discussed it with the Foreign Secretary, and we both agreed that it would inflame the situation too much in order to publish it at this stage. Q. We have also heard that on 3rd September you do announce that dossier is going to be published. A. Yes. Q. What changed? A. What changed was really two things which came together. First of all, there was a tremendous amount of information and evidence coming across my desk as to the weapons of mass destruction and the programmes associated with it that Saddam had. There was also a renewed sense of urgency, again, in the way that this was being publicly debated. I recall throughout the August break last year literally every day there were stories appearing saying we were about to go and invade Iraq. Military action had been decided upon. President Bush and I had a telephone call towards the end of that break and we decided: look, we really had to confront this issue, devise our strategy and get on with it and I took the view, in the end, and said this at the press conference I gave in my constituency on 3rd September, that we really had to disclose what we knew or as much as we could of what we knew. That was because there was an enormous clamour. Here we were saying: this is a big problem, we have to deal with it. Why did we say it was a big problem? Because of the intelligence. And people were naturally saying: produce that intelligence then. Q. What was the aim of the dossier? A. The aim of the dossier was to disclose the reason for our concern and the reason why we believed this issue had to be confronted. Q. We have heard evidence that after your announcement on 3rd September, there was a meeting in Downing Street chaired by Alastair Campbell on 5th September, where the presentational sides of the dossier were discussed, and after that meeting an e-mail was exchanged. Can I take you to that? That is CAB/11/17. A. That is going to come up here, is it? Q. I hope so. What you can see is about 13.50 -- we understand the meeting was about noon -- Mr Powell e-mailed Mr Campbell: "What did you decide on dossiers?" "Re dossier, substantial rewrite, with JS [John Scarlett] and Julian Miller in charge, which JS will take to US next Friday, and be in shape Monday thereafter. Structure as per TB's discussion. Agreement that there has to be real intelligence material in their presentation as such." Had you at this stage discussed the structure of the dossier with Mr Campbell? A. I think I had discussed it in outline at least, that it was important that it dealt with Iraq and the question of weapons of mass destruction. We would obviously have to deal with the main elements of that because that after all was our case. Q. And had you been aware of the proposed role that Mr Campbell was going to take in assisting with the presentation? A. Well, I was in no doubt that he would assist with the presentation. I cannot recall exactly when but certainly around that time. However, I also knew that it had to be a document that was owned by the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Chairman, John Scarlett. That was obviously important because we could not produce this as evidence that came from anything other than an objective source. Q. We have heard that there was a draft of the dossier produced on 10th September, and we have seen that. I will not take you to that, if that is all right. What was the first draft of the dossier that you actually saw? A. As I say in my statement I believe I saw the 10th September draft and I commented on drafts of the 16th and 19th and I made certain comments on that. But obviously in the end, of course, it all had to be produced and done through the process of the JIC. Q. We have also seen some JIC assessments, redacted JIC assessments of 5th and 9th September which deal with the 45 minute issue. When did you see those? A. I have seen the JIC assessment on 9th September but other than that, I do not think I made a comment on the 45 minutes in respect of the dossier. Q. But you may have seen it as it went through in the draft of the 10th September? A. Yes, I suppose that -- if it was in the 10th September draft I would have seen it. Q. Can I take you to an e-mail dated 11th September which is CAB/23/15? This was an e-mail that Mr Scarlett produced. What this says is: "We have now received comments back from No. 10 on the first draft of the dossier. Unsurprisingly they have further questions and areas they would like expanded." Then the main comments are set out. A. Hmm, hmm. Q. They liked, for example, a specific personality. "Is there any intelligence that Iraq has actively sought to employ foreign experts ..." And 3 and 4, similar detailed comments. Then this is said at the bottom: "I appreciate everyone, us included, has been around at least some of these buoys before, particularly item 4. But No. 10 through the Chairman want the document to be as strong as possible within the bounds of available intelligence. This is therefore a last(!) call for any items of intelligence that agencies think can and should be included." Were you aware that this process was going on? A. Yes, of course, and it was important that it made the best case that we could make subject, obviously, to it being owned by the Joint Intelligence Committee and that the items of intelligence should be those that the agencies thought could and should be included. So if you like it was a process in which they were in charge of this, correctly, because it was so important to make sure that no-one could question the intelligence that was in it as coming from the genuine intelligence agencies, but obviously I mean I had to present this to Parliament. I was going to make a statement. Parliament was going to be recalled. We were concerned to make sure that we could produce, within the bounds of what was right and proper, the best case. LORD HUTTON: So you would agree, Prime Minister, that the wording that "No. 10 through the Chairman want the document to be as strong as possible within the bounds of available intelligence" is a fair way of putting your view and the view of your staff in No. 10? A. Provided that is clearly understood as meaning that it is only if the intelligence agencies thought both that the actual intelligence should be included and that there was not improper weight being given to any aspect of that intelligence. In other words, given that the process was that they had to decide what it was we could properly say, then obviously we wanted to -- we had to make this case because this was the case that we believed in and this was the evidence that we had, because all of this stuff was obviously stuff that had come across my desk. LORD HUTTON: And that is conveyed by the words "as strong as possible within the bounds of available intelligence"? A. Yes, and also the last sentence I draw attention to. I did not see this e-mail at the time, but you know any items -- LORD HUTTON: Quite. The last sentence: "This is therefore a last(!) call for any items of intelligence that agencies think can and should be included." A.