Debt in Low Income Countries: Crisis Eases, Borrowers (Government, State-Owned En- Risks Remain Terprises)
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KFW ECONOMIC RESEARCH Focus on Economics th No. 31, 19 September 2013 rose from USD 5 billion in 1971 to USD 115 billion in 1995 (see chart 1). This was mainly attributable to public-sector Debt in Low Income Countries: crisis eases, borrowers (government, state-owned en- risks remain terprises). Private-sector debt (compa- nies, banks) only accounted for around Author: Dr Martin Raschen, phone +49 69 7431-2434, [email protected] 10 % of the total, which also reflects the low credit rating of the private sector as a world countries also performed well. Developing countries' foreign debt is whole throughout the period. This could However, a number of other developing not a feature of the current discus- have been a warning sign. sions on the state of the global econ- countries were less successful. The omy. This is in stark contrast to the si- global wealth gap widened. In the poor- Many indicators pointed to the mas- 2 tuation from the 1970s to 1990s, when est countries (low-income countries sive debt crisis – LICs)1, extreme poverty was wide- these countries' debt rose sharply, The absolute increase in foreign debt al- spread. There was no shortage of advice many were barely able to service their ready paints a clear picture. The crisis- on how to accelerate development. Until debts, and development-related in- plagued nature of the development up to the mid-1980s, the dominant develop- vestment suffered, cementing poverty. the mid-1990s is particularly clear if the ment policy paradigm was: LICs should Two factors have contributed to the weak economic growth at the time is also invest heavily in their economic infra- change for the better since then: debt taken into account. On average, growth structure and industrialisation, both of relief initiatives by creditors and a in the LICs was only half that of middle- which were the responsibility of the gov- marked economic upturn in the coun- income countries. LICs even saw their ernment. To achieve this big push amid tries concerned. The subject of foreign average GDP decline in some years. As the low savings ratio and limited public debt is by no means completely off a result, the ratio of foreign debt to gross budgets, the path of high budget and the table, and Low Income Countries domestic product in the LICs surged balance of current account deficits was still need to weigh up the opportunities from under 20 to more than 90 % (see chosen. Warnings that would be given and risks of external financing. figure 1). from a current perspective, namely that Development paradigm and rising given the institutional weakness, it could A comparison between economic growth debt be risky to base a debt strategy on future and the average interest rate for new growth, were few and far between. After the Second World War, industrial- loans in the relevant years is also telling. When financing an investment, individual ised nations experienced an economic Against this backdrop, the LICs took on investors should ensure that their income boom and the economies of many third more and more foreign debt. Total debt will cover the interest of the loan. The same applies at the level of the econ- Figure 1: Foreign debt of LICs (public and private borrowers), in absolute terms omy. The weak economic growth in the and in relation to economic output LICs meant that GDP growth was higher 140 100 than the average interest rate for new loans in just six of the 25 years we are 120 looking at. This is already very problem- 80 atic on its own, but was further exacer- 100 [Percent of GNI] bated by the fact that foreign loans were 60 80 taken out in foreign currencies, mainly the US dollar. Without exception, the cur- 60 40 rencies of the LICs depreciated against [Billion USD][Billion the US dollar during the period, in many 40 cases sharply. This made it much more 20 20 expensive to service the debt in local currency and was too much for many 0 0 borrowers. 3 9 5 1 7 9 7 77 79 83 85 91 9 97 0 03 0 971 9 9 9 9 9 98 9 9 0 00 1 1 1975 1 1 1981 1 1 1987 1 1 1993 19 1 1999 20 2 2005 20 2 2011 Lastly, the foreign trade situation also in- Public sector (left side) Private sector (right side) Total external debt (right side) dicated a mounting problem. The LICs' Source: World Bank, own calculations exports generally rose only moderately Please note: This paper contains the opinion of the authors and does not necessarily represent the position of the KfW. KFW ECONOMIC RESEARCH during the period, even declining in the would be able to solve themselves. But it As a prerequisite for all of this support, early 1980s. As a result, the LICs fell fur- gradually became clear that a large the developing country must define and ther and further behind the international number of LICs had fallen into a debt implement a programme to improve competition. The debt to export ratio trap that they would be unable to escape general economic conditions and fight climbed from less than 200 % to more without their creditors' help. In the 1980s, poverty, as well as to achieve the Millen- than 600 % in the period from 1971 to bilateral donors first granted debt relief in nium Development Goals (MDGs). The 1995, and the debt service ratio (interest the form of debt rescheduling. Since World Bank and IMF monitor and assess and principal repayments in relation to 1988, they have cancelled up to 90 % of external debt continuously through a sys- exports) rose from around 10 initially to the debt through the Paris Club. tematic Debt Sustainability Analysis and 30 % by the end of the 1980s. Although provide considerable debt management the subsequent decline in the LIC debt The World Bank, IMF and other multilat- support to the countries, which has had a service ratio to 17 % in 1995 at first eral institutions did not become involved very positive effect. glance seems to indicate an improve- in this type of initiative until 1996, al- Impressive economic upturn since the ment, quite the opposite is true: the debt though their loans accounted for a large mid-1990s service payments declined because the proportion of the LICs' foreign debt. Un- outstanding arrears climbed steeply to der pressure from both bilateral donors As already mentioned, the weak eco- USD 26 billion. and non-governmental organisations nomic growth up to the mid-1990s was a (NGOs), the World Bank and IMF major contributing factor to the debt cri- Varied causes of the debt crisis launched the Heavily Indebted Poor sis. Encouragingly, this has since im- Countries Initiative (HIPC)3 to help poor The crisis was triggered by controllable proved considerably. The LICs have cor- developing countries4 unable to service internal factors and uncontrollable exter- rected economic policy errors, such as their foreign debt5. To date, bilateral and nal factors. Among the internal factors, manipulated exchange rates, inflationary multilateral creditors have waived an av- the dubious nature of development para- monetary policy and excessive budget erage of two-thirds of the debt of digm from a regulatory perspective has deficits. They have also significantly im- 32 HIPCs under this initiative. The HIPC already been discussed. However, this proved the regulatory environment for debt relief granted amounts to USD 7 was also encouraged from outside, as sustainable growth. In a number of 76 billion (present value), which is split donors were prepared to mobilise large cases, this has been achieved through between bilateral and multilateral donors amounts to finance these projects. Ad- donor-backed Structural Adjustment at a ratio of 55:45. In addition to the ded to the flawed basic concept were Programmes. However, good govern- HIPC Initiative, the Multilateral Debt Re- weak project management, a misguided ance is still a long way off and central lief Initiative (MDRI) was created in 2005. sector policy and generally bad govern- macroeconomic indicators show that the The World Bank, IMF, African Develop- ance, including corruption. As a result, brightness is marred by shadows. Never- ment Fund and the Inter-American De- many such projects failed to generate theless, numerous problematic trends velopment Bank have waived USD the income needed to service the debt. have reversed. A comparison between 37 billion (present value) of the debt of The internal causes of the crisis also in- the periods before and after 1995 re- HIPCs under the MDRI. Bilateral credi- 8 cluded the underdeveloped local capital veals the following. tors have also granted debt relief of USD markets, which left the potential for mobi- 11.9 billion (present value) through the The growth trend is very positive. lising internal funding largely untapped. Paris Club.6 Economic growth has more than doubled Without this development deficit, de- (from an average of 2.1 % p. a. up to mand for foreign financing would likely have been reduced. Figure 2: Economic growth in country groups (actual, in percent) The line between internal and external 6 factors is blurred. In any case, wars/civil wars, droughts, floods and similar events 5 also led to a lack of investment. In the category of uncontrollable external 4 causes of the crisis, the two oil crises and the recession in industrialised na- 3 tions, protectionism in these countries and unfavourable price trends on the in- 2 ternational commodities markets hit the LICs hard. 1 Various initiatives eased the LICs' 0 debt situation Low income Middle income High income Initially, many considered the problem to Ø 1971–1995 Ø 1996–2012 be a temporary one, which the LICs Source: World Bank, own calculations 2 KFW ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1995 to 4.7 % since).