@ ttre UnitedNations University, 1979 Printedin Japan tsBN92-808-0053.1 rssN0379-5764

HSDRGP ID.1/UNUP-53

ONTHE DECLINE AND FALLOF EMPIRES: THEROMAN EMPIRE AND WESTERN IMPERIALISMCOMPARED

JohanGaltung, Tore Heiestad, and Eric Ruge

'r$ E0 fZ-1.v, %#-VUN CONTENTS

t. Introduction

tl The Rise and Decline of the RomanEmpire: A Rough Characterization

ill The Rise and Decline of WesternDominance: A Short Characteri zat ion ì9

lV. Conclusion 39

Notes 43

Bi bl iography 66

Thispaper by JohanGaltung, Tore Heiestad,and Eric Rugewas first presentedat the GPID lll meeting, Geneva,2-8October 1978. lt canbe consideredas a contributionto the Expansionand Exploitation Processessub-project of the GPID Project.

Geneva,June 1979 JohanGaltung

Thispaper is beingcirculated in a pre-publicationform to elicitcomments from readersand generate dialogueon the subiectat this stageof the research' ". the decl ine of Romewas the naturar and inevitabre effect of immoderategreatness. prosperity ripened the principle of decay; the causesof destruction multipl ied with the extent of conquest; and, as soon as time or accident had removedthe art ificial supports, the stupendousfabric yielded to the pressure of its own weictht.,' Edward Gi bbon

"l think of what happenedto Greeceand Rome,and you see - what is left only the pi I lars. V/hathas happened,of course is that the great civilizations of the past, as they have becomeweaìthy, as they have rost their wiil to rive,' to improve, they have becomesubject to the decadencethat eventually destroys the civilization. The united states is now reaching that period. I am convinced, however, that we have the vitality, I berieve we have the courage, r be.|ieve we have the strength out through this heartland and across this Nation that will see to it that Americanot only is rich and strong, but that it is healthy in terms of moral and spiritual strEiilll-

RichardM. Nixon (t97t) I NTRODUCTI ON

The fall of the RomanEmpire has fascinated more social scientists than EdwardGibbon, who concludedhis major historical work in Lausanne just before the French Revolution. To draw parallels to the contempor- ary situation was not his major concern; he was concernedwith the fall of the RomanEmpire as such, but evidently also felt that there was muchto learn from it.1 However,for the history of the RomanEmpire to be useful as a heuristic there haveto be deepsimilarities.2 The other systemshould be an empire built in a not too dissimilar manner that evidently has passed its apogeeand may be facing a decl ine, even a fal l. The thesis of the present paper is, in short, that the Roman Empirepresents parallels with ths contemporarysituation in which the western worìd f inds itsel f so deep and _sodense that it is lvarranted to use it as a basis for specu_lation_about reguìarities in th.e I ifs cycle of empires.3 l/e shall only be drawing on the western experience. Cornparative stud ies of non-western empi res (tne I nc.asaird the Aztecs in America ; possibly the Mali empirein Africa; definitely the Egyptian,0ttoman, and Persian empÌres* thenrselves,perhaps, semi-western;the various Mongol/Mogulimperial constructions; someof the Chinesedynasties) should be extremely rewardinghere, both in revealing sÌmilarities and dissimilaríties. But we shall concentrateon the V/est. And two maior characteristics of the western empires, not necessariìy totaìly monopolized by the VJestbut at least not so clearly expressed in any other empire construction to our knowìedge,should be pointed out.

First, the Lq.k of I inritatíon,q pushingthe bordersof the empires beyondany limit, as far as (and even further than) technology and mil itary force can carry. Then, the tendencynot only to tax and

I exoloit barbarian lands and barbarians but also to westernize5and even incorporate at least part of them. These two pointswill be madeuse of in what follows; they are crucial for the reasoni ng, as a I ist of commondenominators for empires from the VJest . il. THERISE AND DECLINE OF THEROMAN EMPIRE: A ROUGH CHARACTERIZATION

Underlyingit all, at somestage, was- possibly- a vision of that tiny unit foundedon the seven hiìls of Romeas the centre of something muchbigger. Moreover,this vision must have been legitimated by an underlying culture or cosmology,and certainly reinforced by successful excursions and expansion. For, if somenotion of that kind had not been there in advance, the entity would have remainedvery limited and more geared towards defence against the external world - encapsulating- than towardsunfolding = Entwicklung. But it was centrifugal rather than centripetal. lmagesof that kind might have beena part of the heritage from the Etruscanor Helìenistic exercises. No doubt they were more successfully implementedunder the Romans, particularly under the Antonines, than under the possible predecessors as holders of such imaqes.

Against the knowledgeof what happenedin the various phases of the RomanEmpire and the western empiresof our times (although we have not seen the end of them yet) the story may no\^/even have a ring of the obvious. For the momentcentral ized expansion is decided upon, miI itar i ly, poli t ical ly, economicalI y, cul turaì ly, communicat ionswise, and socially, a numberof consequenceswilì follow.

First of all, it should be rememberedthat the expansionin territory is somefunction of the square of the distance from the centre; it is not a I inear function of that distance.6 There is not only an external border to be defendedagainst outer enemies;there is also an internal territory to be controlled against the inner foes of the regime. Even if there are no overt hostilities engagedin by outer or inner enemies, the control machinerystiìl has to be maintained,and it is costly.

5 A part of that controì machinery is the central bureaucracy,whích can be maintainedonry if sufficient surprus is channeìledupwards in society.T There are two main modelsfor obtaining this: taking away locaì assets through piracy and rcbbery (of rninerars, money,pieces of art, cattìe, people), somet ,,taxat imesunder the formula of ionr', and centraì contror over some kinds of production and trade in such a way that major fruits accrue to the centre. rt is assumedthat ar r ernpiresmake use of these methods,but in very different proportions, and that the corour and tone of an empire very muchdepend on which methodprevaiìs. Thus, local taxation is cornpatibìewith maintenance of the locaI systernof product iorr; i t nrayeven beccmea cont ractuaI obligation underv'hich sonethinghas to be paid in return for- I'protection."B central ized exproitation throughexpandíng economic and other cycles .|ocaì w!lr tend to erode the society, economicailv and also cult.uralìy. ,,coron!zationr, In either case there maybe in the sensethat the miì itary/pol itical commandis firnily in the hanos of (envoysfrom) the centre; f.r that reason, they may ìook ar ike. But in the latter type there r^rill be ìong-clistance cycles not onìv for nilitary and political decision-nrakingbut aìso for economicand cultural values. This wil l makeíor a muchdenser conìmunicative network radiatinE from the centre to the periphery, and for muchmore social transfornntion, includingaccuìturation.

Given the assumptionfrom the Introduction that western imperialism is characterizedby a decision and a desire to convert, not onry to dominate, the second type shouìd predominatein the evolution of westernempires. The first type is too i imited, too contractual. lt can be legitimated "l through the formuìa offer you protection against enemiesand others who want to treat you rike I do; you pay me for that in commodities and products, in cash, and/or in humancapítar (slaves, gìadiators, raw material for humansacrifice).,r But wesrern imperiaìism seemsto have asked for more, in fact for others to see _tf'*l_"*__"t_J . There has been some kind of wish that others shourd not onry be dorninatedand subjugated - but see and even want to see - themselves as dependenton a western centre for fresh supplies of superior goods I l 4 I I I and services, culture, etc. The legitimating formula might be soniething like this: r'l offer you protecticlnnot only against external enemies but also against dependencyon nature with al 1 its hazarrjsand hostiìities, in return for exchangereìations with nre." In short, dependencyon the centre rather than on the nature.

Obvious Iy, in the case of the lìornanErnp i re both methodswere used. The provinces had to contribi.rtetexes in orcier to maintairì an ever- increasingsuperstructure,9 o bureaucracyexercisìng pol itical-nriI itary tasks. At the sametime, exploitation cycìes v;ere set up wherebynet rraìueaccurnulated in the centre. In the case cf the RomanErnpire the first methodwas by far the most important one. The r-ight tei-m is probably "plunder." The most important ob-iects, it seens, r{ere peopìe, lvhowere conqueredand sold to plantation owners, and foodstuffs, grain. Ihe provinceshad to contribute iaxes in order to rnaintainan ever-increasíngsuperstructure, a bureaucracyand an army exercisinq poìitical-miì it,ary tasks. The net result, of course, was that the periphery, the pro,rinceE,were irnpoverishedand t-hecentre(s) enriched. llut the rrechanisnrwas i'iol, or onìy to a very littÌe extent, trade in our sense. The economiccycles were sirort; the g_l.k.=_ ("household'r)was to a large exient self*sufficient; the city'nrith its hinLerìand constituted a s.vstemcf gg!41Sqfa. Labourwas unfree.rnd at least in ìarge periods abundanteriough not to encourageany search for ìabour-extensive forns of production. Long-distarrcetrade was irr luxuries and, importantìy,in grain l'oi-big cities, irandìedby the state, for the centre. By "centrer'rthen, is not necessarily rneant Romebut also the many sub-centres" lhe nrajr:r reascrtr,viry the systerì functioned for such a ìong time was probably that so manyindíviduals were "romanized," having Latin as their langLrageand Ronranriores as their \^Jeltanschaur"rng,thenrselves being part, nrc-rreand rTrore,of'the vast superstructure,a cornbinationol'the centre in the centre arid the centre in the periphery,l0 that had to be maintainedby the system. Thus, whensurplus had to be transmitted to the centre, this also includes ìc;cal sub-centres: the centre was Rome.ll

VJithout slaves the system would not have workerl, for it was based on a

5 combinationof unfree labour producing goods local ly and free people thereby I iberated for less menial tasks. l2 There was an enormous empire to draw upon for taxes and raw factors of production,l3 and there must have been an overwhelmingsuperstructure, unproductive in material terms, that should be fed and kept loyal. A nrajor part of this supersEructure,then, in addition to the bureaucracymust have beenwhat today would have been called "el ite": major landowners, tradespeople,and an increasingsector of intel lectuals, entertainers, etc. , produci ng forms of understanding and I egi t imation for the ent i re enterprise.

The stabil ity of this empire construction must have dependedon some relatively complexbalances. 0n the one hand, the incometo the centres must have been sufficient to maintain the superstructures;on the other, the amountof value flowing out of the periphery must not have been so muchas to create impossibleconditions, either of apathy or of mutiny, that the superstructurecould no longer handle by its combinationof co-optation into brotherhoodsof ìoyalty, rewarding the individuals who performedwel I in the systerî (including occasionally freeing slaves and gladiators), and punishment,crude repression. lf we now assumethat the superstructure had a tendency to grovJ- if not much becauseof Parkinson's law, then becauseof the need to reward individuaìs - the economicvalue flowing into the centre would have to grow too. This either could be taken from the periphery of the Roman Empire, the periphery of the centre or the periphery of the oeriphery, by exhorting them to work harder and/or taxing them more heavily; or couìd be provided by expanding the empire, acquiring more barbarian soil for exploitation, in the double senseof that word. Either method works as far as it does: tilì peripheryor barbarian resistance in the form of mutiny, defence, and withdrawal becomemore than the super- structure can handle. lt is at that point that the outer I imits of the system are reached.

Thus, with this combinationof plunder and massiveuse of slaves, "proletarizationrr was the inevitable consequence:partly of smalI farmers/peasants,partly of artisans, and also of freed slaves without

6 belongingnessin someautarkic unit. As the land was too depleted and too much incorporated in the economiccycìes to carry additional burdensof people, they had to flock to the cities, partly as a cause' partly as a consequenceof the twirr institution knownas paneml4et c i rcenses,l 5 "br""d and c i rcus. " The bread was free, nobody should starve, and the expensesmust have been considerable. Although the costs of the entertainment may have been negìigible at the cruciaì point, the amphitheatreitself, it is hard to imaginethat this could have covered all the hidden expensesin getting the raw material for the entertainnrent- the humanbeings and the beasts - to the pìace, fed, and trained and prepared.

To this shouìd then be addedthe constraints set by nature.16 In an expandingempi re, with new soi I relatively easily available' care about the soil would seemwasted. VJhenthe soiì was exhausted, there was always the possibility of going farther out. But if the grains produced"farther outrrwere then exported to the centres - €.9., to Rome- the minerals in that soil would be exportedwith the grain. Consumedin Rome,they could theoretically be used to enrich soil around Rome,but there was no such mechanism:The manurewent straight into the sewersand was lost, and with it muchof the minerals, both at the place of productionand the place of consumption. This, in turn, producedconditions that addedmore people to the landless proietariat, maybenot becausethey did not have land but becauseof land madeuseless.lT

As a consequenceof all this it can be seen that there was a necessity for the RomanEmpire not only to have expandedbut to continue to expand. 0nly by that methodwas it possible to keep the system without changingany fundamentalaspect of it. lmportant in this connection must have been the secondbasic point mentionedin the Introduction: the notion of unlimited expansion. Expansionismhad no built-in inner stop signal. Therewere no brakes; only roadblocks could stop it - the barbarians.

It is now fairly easy to see what had to happenlater. There were

7 ì imited possibil ities for the systemto developfurther than it had al ready done in internal exploitation and lnternal markets,and externaì exploitation and external marl

\.ihat is left then is ihe centre in the Centre: \{hat shouìd they do? That the miìitary would gradually take over goeswithout saying: lf the problemswere defined as primarily rniI itary problems,stemming the invasionsfrom the barbarians,nilitary oeoplewould easiiy gain the upper henciin deciding who should be emperors,commandinE both the beginningand the end of a reign. But this must haveadded to the der"nandof an unproductive superstructure and hence st imulated the quest tor fr"rrtherexpensicn; the dilernrnaprecisely being that the RomanEmpire was overexpanded(and hence vuìnerable) and underexpanded (and hence unable to keep its own superstructure) at the sametime. flhat other pol icy opticns were open to them? They could try to reverse the agricultural policy by land reform, giving more soil back to small-scale farmers, by ecoloqically more raf-ional procedures,and in general by trying to keep people on the ìand rather than having to feed them in the cities. The trouble with such measures,which were all tried but urei-eusua lly seen as corning'!tcro lateril was that they were rrcrtintraparadiqmatic. ln a sense they uiere the beginningsof

x the next period, the MiddìeAges, basedon muchsmaller and reìatively seìf-sufficient units. A RomanEmpire based on such units would no longer be a RomanEmpire, and this point must have been feìt by the centre in the Centre.22

Onemight specuìate that they could have contracted voluntari ly, to moredefendable positions, both militarily and economicalìy.23But this does not seemto be a pol icy option that comeseasily. lf it r^reretaken at aì1, it would be as the result of effective mutiny and withdrawal (increasedself-sufficiency) of the periphery rather than as the result of autonomousdecisions by the centre. For one thing, the very process of romanizationurould be against it: The outlying provinces were increasingly Roman;they weí-eparts of the empire not to be abandoned. lf the empire were basedonly on taxation, it might have been easier, for sometax-collectors can more easily be recalled. But an empi re Llasedon the extensive and deep bui I d ing of br idgeheads with the samestandards and style of I ife as the centre in the Centre would be muchmore diff icult to disrnantle.2a

It is hard to escapethe feel ing that the centre in t-heCentre of the RomanEmpire tried practicalìy speakingeverything possible; al I attempts failed, and they gradually lost the faith in their own enterprise. ln this connecticncirceEBq should aìso be mentionetJ. Entertainment,highly emotionalìy loaded, no doubt emotionally exhausti ng, makeshuman bei ngs i nto observer-si nsiead of part i c i - pants.25 The local economiccosts maybe negligibleu the social costs considerabìe. it is not only a question of the time that could have been spent otherwise but also a question of the entire social and mental energy that could have gone into participation rather than observation. Energy that under another economicsystem cr:uld have been used to tiìl the soil productiveìyor for smalì-scaleartisanry rnust have been expendedon the tribunes of the Colosseun,and in vast quarìt! t ies. I n shcrt, the opportuni ty costs were considerabì e.

However,another factor must have been even more important: an alternative ethos. comingfrom primitive Christianity. Romehad done the only sensible thing to do with christianity: \^/henthey could not beat it, they madea concordatwith christianity, as state rel igion, with the usual promisethat the rel igion might be exercised freely, even to the point of proselytizing to the very periphery of the RomanEmpire and beyond,26under the protection of the Romanmachinery - in return for loyalty to the system. And yet original christianity must have been I ingering on 27 moretranscendental, less mundane; more inner-directed, less outer-directed; more bent on intensive devotion to God in smalI groups,2Beven self-sufficient ones (tr,e origin of the monasterialpractice), than on big hierarchies where the structure af ter somet ime commandsmr-rch more attent ion than the message.29

In short, there were good reasonsfor the "loss o'L faith" or a "ìoss of spirit'r: The techniques at tl'redisposaì of the system had beerrused and failed; muchpotentially constructive energyhad beendissipated into useless directions from the point of view of empire-building;and alternative conceptualizations of the world had been presented, and perverted, but perhapsnot entirely successfully. Hence, it is not so strange that they were still enjoying la dolce vita and circenses when the barbarians were poundingon the gates:30 They must simply have started losing faith in their ownenterprise. lf nothing succeedsìike success,then nothing fails like failure either - Decause either af fects the ent ire I^/eltanschauung,the conceptual pattern within which phenomenaare understood.

The year +476, the falì of the western RomanEmpire, is only one mile- stone in a process that started muchearl ier and ended sometime later. Evidently, the barbariansdid not want to destroy the RoiranEmpire,3t perhapsnot even to conquer it - but they definitely wanted to live in it, and not only to get the much-neededsoîl and refuge from the invading Huns. The barbarian form of social organization was muchmore basedon smaller self-sufficient units; so whenthey started settl ing on the grounds of the former RomanEmpire, a very important mutual exchangeof fundamentalcuìtures,/structures must have taken place. The centrifugal, expandingwave from the RomanEmpire must have been t0 roll ing on, and must increasingly have becomethe cosmologyof the barbarians. But as the barbarians settled in the RomanEmpi re, some fundamentalcompatibi I ity betweenthei r structure/cul ture and the inverted, centripetaì inward-looking,structure/cul ture that the Romanshad been more or ìess forced into becamethe basis of the Middle Ages as we know them.32

It is then assumedthat the centrifugal, expansionistethos must have hit the peripheries of the RomanEmpire, as a pattern, as an imageof how things can be done, to be implementedwhen conditions are ripe. Somecenturies after the fall of RomulusAugustulus, the western part had been relatively well divided betr^reenthe empire of Charlemagnein the north and the Arab empire in the south, with the Ebro as one dividlng ì ine. Later on (eastern Europeis always behind), the 0ttoman Empiredid a correspondingjob for the Eastern RomanEmpire - in fact as muchas one millenniumlater on. But neither of the three, nor the various German/Romanconstructions, had the samedeep structure as the RomanEmpire, basedon both methodsof extracting surplus at the sametime, heavily centralized, with firm control from the centre. The others were looser constructions, permitting, perhapseven fostering, a substantialamount of diversity within their ì imits as long as taxes were paid. Thus, they were al I entireìy compatible with the inward-lookingsmall r.rnitswith little trade amongthem that characterizedthe l'liddleAqes - at least til I the 14iddleAqes Renai ssance.

Having now someimage of the contradìctions that brought the empire down, we can perhapsfruitfully put one question: l^/howere the carriers of the new social order, the post-Romanorder? 0f course, after the i systemcollapsed, they were all moreor less forced to live in the new order, but somemust have done it with more enthusiasmthan others, even to the point of having built it. And it cannot have been the el ite barbarians, for someof them had already been co-opted, even to the rank of generals in the Romanarmies (one reasonwhy they did not fight so efficiently?). lt looks as if what they wanted,as already mentioned,was to enjoy the RomanEmpire, and not only its soiì but

ll what today we would refer to as its "civilizatlon.rr33 The best for themvlould probably have been to have its teeth extracted, full rights to I ive within its borcjerswithout being exploited, but still havethe whole rnachineryrun by Romanscapable enoughto keep its goods and services flowing so as to provide at least for el ite barbariansthe I ife of the Romanupper classes.

It cannot have been the internal proletariat in the RomanEmpire either, for they probablyhad very sirniìar visi,crrs:nothing basically wrong with the RomanEmpire except that they were at the bottom instead of at the top. Since the systemdid provide for someindividual mobility, what they might havewanted would have beenmobility channels iess clogged, nìoreopen to the individual underciog,perhaps aìso improvedcond it ions in general. (Weao not knor,vto what extent Ehere was a proletarian consciousness,a soì idarity - the histories of the Spartac.usrevolt are very ambiguouson this point).3a

That leaves us witlr the two extremes: the Romaneì ite on the one hand and the barbariarrrnasses on tlre other. The ìatter had already a patIern of life; there \,vereslaves arnongthem, and there lvere also serf's, very well knowrrf igures in northeastern Europeat that time. r5 The smalì, self.-sufficient unit was aiso part of real ity. And on the Rornanel ite s ide. what v.rould have been more natural when al I their ef for-ts failed, whenfatigue reaìly set in, than to pack up and leave, and build their big, today highly interestino, villas36 wayout in the countryside- e.g., of, Dalmatianislands? Theycould not ti I I the ground alone; they neededthe coloni for that, and that was already a pattern sufficiently compatibìewith the barbarianserf to fuse into one newstructure.3T

However, that rvasnot enough. The st ructu re becamentuch niore than a refuge during times of trouble, a place to hold out till times were normalagain and imperialist pursuits could be continueci. Something had also happenedto the cosmologyitself,3B and here it is tempting to drawon the monasticelement, the primitive ChrÌstianity that had survived the seeminglysuccessful efforts at co-optation into the

l2 Catholic Church. lt can probablybe maintainedthat the bifurcation of Christianity into the hierarchÍcal, centralized wing directed from Romeand the muchnrore egalitarian and decentraìized division into a numberof monastic orders was a projection onto the sceneof reìigious behaviourof the tlvo contrasting cosmologies:the centralizing and centrifugal, and decentralizing and centripetal. A modusvivendi would have to be found betweenthe two, and this is what nruchof church histol-y is about - in addit ion to the obvious fact that there had to be a rel igious I iberation from Romeccrresponding to the economic upsurge by the burghers of Transalpina- in other words the Protestant Reformation,with the predictable effort to reconquerreferred to as t-he Counter-reformation. Anyhow,highìy transcendentalmediaevaì ChristianiLy',vasneeded for the ìegitimation of the new form, and was availabìe nucltbefore that structure cameinto being, as originaì Christianity vrasolder than the decline of the RomanEmpire.

Hence,one tentative concìusionwouìd be that the carriers of the new form were located in the centre of the old form, probably for the simpìe reason that itwas for them more than for anybodyelse that the oìd form had becomeinpossibie. Others may choosealternative forms as a methodof fighting against perípherization,as a wayof gaining autononry- this does not meanthat they have truiy rejected imperialism as a form,becausethey have not yet tried running it. They have seen it operating; they have suffered from it, noi the Ieast by witnessing others enjoying the fruits of their own labour. ls it strange if they wouìdonce like to be in the sameposition, either by peripherizing the centre or by peripherizing somebodyelse?

ln concludingthis section, let us then try to addressourselves to a muchmore difficult question: VJhatwas the causeof the decline and faìl of the RomanEmpire? \./eshal I try to showthat this is not a very welI phrasedquestion, but not a rneaningìessone either.

ConsiderDiagram l, giving a hypothetical flow chart of causes and effects relating to the decline and fal I of the RomanEmpíre. lt is organized so as to refìect the text: There are two maior types of

r3 F F9 s !.! G Èu lFsól ru> >F ls;El F< lÉe:l G(9 83 l9E;l Ar\ li q9 ti

{) >-z co Éi >sJ>

r! Ld z. t _,., a tr 9 ts F a o_ o Lu éEr F z. à z <)

|rl - t'- tr Or j5 Éó oì z.\ <\r! !rd 3=;o -rz-n FvrHF .:ÉFg (J+ ==gì LrJ tr tr*9: Ei*àP aR F uv\ ul F< 6l

\7 expansion- territorial to exact value, and the use of slave-based production in order to get social surplus - both of themmaintaining an increasingel ite superstructurethat is materially unproductive. It is then assumedthat this superstructure feeds back on the two types of expansionand that these in turn lead to increasing barbarian protest and pressure, and to increasingproletarization with protest and revolt. To handle them, even more superstructure is needed: to administer mil itary campaignsin order to counteractthe barbarians, and to administer panemet circenses in order to counteract the Drotests and the revolts from the internaì proletariat. The miì itary campaignmay result in moreterritorial expansion,at least up to a certain point, and the quest for bread in an even further increase in the scale of economicactivity, again up to a certain point. Uìtimate- ly alì of this leads to such phenomenaas ecological breakdown,39lack of real participation in society, a general breakdownof spirit, increasingmi I itary control of society, and final ly to successful invasions by the barbarians.4o

"the So, looking at the chart, what is causeof the decìine and fall of the RomanEmpire"? lt cannot be one of the five items to the right since what they have taken Logethermight be said to be neither the cause nor the effect but simply a description of what is meant by ',breakdown.r'Then one can look at the points in the middle of the I'The diagram, and put forward such theses as cause was a too heavy superstructure for the economyto carryr" or'rThe causewas the "The practice of distributing free bread," or causewas alI the implications of the entertainment." But these are only relatively obvious consequencesof what happenswhen one starts exPandinganyhow - unless, that is, there is somekind of ability to feel and sense when"enough is enough." Hence, if one should be looking for something called the cause, it might be better to look further to the left in the diagram, to expansion itseìf - but in that case not so much expansionas a material manifestation, geographicalìy in territorial spaceand economicallywith expandedeconomic cycles, as expansionas a part of a cosmology- this term being understoodboth in its material and ideal senses.

l5 But that leads into another difficulty: That cosmologyis in a sense what the RomanEmpire was about. In other words, one is led towards the conclusion that the RomanEmpire was the cause of its own decline. and that decline maybe a part of empire-building; in other words, that contraction is the other side of a coin the first side of which is expansion.4l And this is the posîtion we would prefer to take: "family There is a of things" that constituted the RomanEmpîre; it had its own internal logíc; it was consistent; but it could not last forever becauseit had built into it its own conLradictionsto the point of destruction.

But imaginenow that this "coin" lookeddifferent in a very special sense: that ,the_decline was already incìuded in the cosmology- in other words, that the cosmologyhad built into it the idea "sometimes it goes up in this worìd; then it may remainstable; and sometimesit goes down- and all of this is perfectly natural, perfectly normaì." In that case, the rrdeclinerrwould no longer be a decline but a contraction, a phase in a pulsating empire, perhapsmore like a breathing organismthan one urhichconstantly inhaìes. lf contraction phases\^/ere already buiìt into the programme,there would, in theory, be no Frustration, no panic, no t'breakdownof spiri1.tt42 Eventhe elite in the superstructure,materialìy non-productive,would have beenprepared to sacrifice in what today is called living standard, be- lieving that the world is so madethat the lean years will follow upon the fat years, then to be followed by fat years again.43 The Roman elite did not seemto apply this view, commonin ancient history, to their own situation. But in that case, obviously, this would not have been the RomanEmpire! lt would have been somethingelse, possibly closer to the Egyptianand Chineseconstructions. Eventhe muchmore modest version of this, a cosmologywith a built-in stop signal, with a seìf-regulation in the big, not only in the small (the negative arrows in the chart)"was al ien to the cosmologyof the Roman Empire. Hence, decl ine and fall were built into it as a consequence of a lack of constraint, modesty,sense of proportion.44

0ur conclus ion then, is that to ask for the causeof the decline is a r6 little like asking for the causeof deathof old humanbeings. For bioìogical organismsit seennsuseful to think in terms of a generaì processof aging, weakeningthe bcdy; finally death is broughtabout by someaffì iction that in a young, healthy body rnight have been of minor significance. To list that affìiction as the causeof death is epistemologically mainly an expressionof howpoorly the processof aging is understood. CorrespondinglY,to I ift out of the florv chart one of the manyvariables, elevating it to the status of causeof the decl ine would tend to highì ight a part of the totaì process at the expenseof the systemic nature of what vrenton. Pragmatically it might also be dangerous; iI wotrld Iead to an overconcentrationon that perhaps factor, efforts to changethe systemat that particuìar point, prolonging its I ife as is done today with humanbodies, inserting artificial body parts, but not in any essential way changingthe Frasic programmeof the sYStem.

This is not the place to go into more detail about the successor system, the mediaevalsociety, except for one thing: lf the Roman Empirewas an exaggerationin one direction, perhapsmediaeval society least partìy, in the oPpositedirectÎoq' -@, at - Instead of total expansion, to-tal contraction with the exception of the overlayers from the RomanEmpire,45 the RomanChurch, and imitat ions such as the Carolingian Empire'

this Canthe RomanEmpire, or its decline, be said to be the causeof new formation? Perhaps, but it may not be very usefuì to introduce causation as a metaphor;that should better refer to less complex itself, entities and moreclear connections. A systemis born, unfolds is and goes dovrn;ancther system is born. Fromone to the other there "family another a transformation; insteadof one of things" there is ,,family of things." Onecan pick-out one phenomenonin the preceding settle formation - e.g., the tendencyof the Romanel ite to escapeand - in their villas - and one phenomenonin the succeedingformation connection €.g., the manorsystem - and establ ish sornekind of causal a good betweenthe two. lt is not our conviction that this leads to the historical understandingof what happenedsince it leaves out

l7 entire context and the cosmologythat gives legitimacy and meaningto the elements in the two formations. without that cosnrology,partly expressedas a material structure, partly as a col lectively shared senseof what is natural and normal, the formations would only be integrated in a mechanicalsense, as if they were popuìated by beings t^thowere no longer human,with no consciousnessand no conscience, merely robots. And that is perhapspreciseìy what happenedtowards the end: The cosmologywas undermined;it was stil I expressedmaterial ly in the structtire of things but not ideally in the structure of ideals - the two worlds were no longer sufficientìy isomorphic. And maybethat is the real meaningof what is metaphorically referred to by so many "breakdown historians as the of spirit" - the cosmologyno longer had a sol id grip on the humansoul. cosmoìogywithout implementation meansthat there is a job to be done; a structure no longer legitimated by deep ideoìogy may meanthat the job has been overdone. However, in the Romancase loss of control and loss of spirit probably went hand in hand, being the material and ideal sides of the decline respectively.

r8 ill THERISE AND DECLINE 0F \./ESTERNDOMINANCE: A SHORT CHARACTERIZATION

It goes almost without saying that the newwestern imperialismwould have to comeout of peripheries in spaceand time: from northern Europe, and manycenturies after the apocalyptic events in what was at that time the centre of the V/est, Rome. 0f course, there was aìso a short burst of imperialism in ltaly itself - the ltaì ian city-states, during a period roughly dating from the beginningof the "Middle Ages Renaissance"tiIl, Say, around 1550when the ltalian city-states were effectively destroyed in external and internal warfare.46 Perhaps they were also victims of their own perfection, or their imageas beinq perfect; perhapsexactly becauseat a certain stage they saw themselves as the renaissanceof the best of antiquity. Maybethey discovered too late the various tricks engagedin by the burghers farther to the "tricks" north, in Flanders, the Netherìands,England; such as making economicuse of the new territories openedthrough the Great Discoveries, consistently importing raw materials, consistently exporting processed goods, cashing in on the addedvalue.47 0f course, Spainwas also from early on in this period the centre of an enormousempire, but seemsto have madea very basic mistake: seeing the empire merely as a source of extraction of tribute, of taxation - not as a market. Spain becamerich, had others do its manufacturingand processing, proudly being able to buy from all corners of the world, not understandingthat through this process it was I iving on borrowedtime, systematically underdeveloping itsel f . aB

At any rate, it was in northern Europethat the capital accumulation took place that later on could be invested into the industrial revolution, thereby creating conditions of mass-manufacturing,a i tremendousmuìtipl ier of the international division of labour tg mechanismalready madeuse of for centuries. And thus it continueo till our days, with Franceessentialìy doing the samein the enipireof its creaticn, in jealous cornpetitionwith the British; with Germany desperately trying to do the sarÌle,piecinq together an empire before the First VJorldWar, then ìclsing it again, building up an enormous one under Hitler towardsthe East (0strnark), and losing it as rapidly as it rvasbuilt.

More interesting, ln a sense, was the entry of today's two superpowers on the scene: the United States of Americaand the Soviet Union.49 The United States ciearly reversedthe trade pattern aithough not completeiy: It stiì | exports someravr material and imports processedgcods, but someof the processed goocisit does export occupy such a cerrtraì position in the social and economicconstruction of "modern" societies (military hardware,cornputers, for a long period cars, etc.) that they have given to the United States considerabìeleverage. 0nce the formula had beendiscovered and usedas a basis for redirecting the recently independentcolonies, the size of the Americaneconomy becamean important factor', as weìì as its capacity for internal expansion,both in terms ot: territory and in terms of population, an expansion imparting a rncmentumto the total socio-econornicrrachinery that could then be transmittec to international operations. Something of the sanrehas no doubt been the case for the Soviet Union: They had and still have a Far East conceptjust as the Uníted States had a Far \^/estnot ion. 50 But the Soviet Union has not in any sense been successfuìin reversingits position in the inIernationaldivision of labour, still being essentially a commoditydealer on tfre internationaì market .

This is not the pìace to describe the various stages in the process of building western empires,5l .^cept to rrotethe following points: First, they satisfy the two conditions mentionecjin the Introduction- the tendencyto be world-enconrpassing,to expandtilì they are stopped (by road-blocks rather than by brakes, to use that metaphoragain), and the tendencyto convert the periphery, in the senseof imposing both new social structures and new attitudes and bel iefs, even

20 cosmologies. And then there is this fascinating phenomenonof howa country/people touched by imperialism in the senseof having been its periphery engagesin a ìiberation process in order to obtain autonomy. then itsel f launchesinto expansionistand exploitative ventures, emanatingwaves of dorninationthat ultimately may reach the old centre, even engulf and peripherize it. 0f course, Romeitself was once such a periphery. The Romanswere barbariansrelative to Hellenic and Hellenistic expansion,and they also had the Etruscanmodel to draw upon.52 Correspondinglyone may talk about Americanand Soviet imperialismas being reactive, and the EuropeanComrnunity as building on old structures in trying to pull together whatevermight remainof French,German, ltal ian, Beìgian,Dutch, British, and Danish imperialism into one co-ordinatedunit, partìy to counteract the US, partly to counteract the Soviet Union, definiteìy to dominatethe Third \lorld.53

Predictabìy, there are non-westernreactions of the sametype, Japan being the f irst case in time, its vlaveof economicimperial ism today flooding the old centreswith almosLall kinds of goods. lf this is a second-generationwave, I ike the waves from the US and the Soviet Union, then the wavesnov'/ emanating from "los quatro japoncitos" (SouthKorea, Taiwan,Hong Kong, Singapore - literally) will not fail to maketheir impact.54 And the New Internationaì EconomicOrder can be seen as a settinq for more such wave rnovementsand more qenerations.

To be discussed, however, is to what extent one can say that there is a high leveì of parallelism betweenthe decline and fall of the Roman Empireand the decline and possibìe fall of the westernenrpires, meaningfirst of all the countries in the EuropeanCommunity, second the United States, and third the Soviet Union. Here it should be noted immedíatelythat these three, although alì of themwestern in a civil izational sense,obviously are in different stagesof their I ife cycles as empires- possibìy with western Europe in a stage of senescence,the United States reaching old age, and the Soviet Union in its maturity (a less apocalyptic vision for western Europewould make the three somewhatyounger, stil I maintaining the order: the Soviet

2l union on its way up,55 the united States just about passing its apogee, western Europe in a state of decadence,but not yet senescence). Further, it should of course be rroted that there is a close relation- ship betureenthe United States and western Europeand a conflict with the Soviet union. Thus, the decl ine and even fall of the eastern part of the west may comesomewhat later - but certainly not as muchas ì,000 years later as was the case rvith the Eastern RomanErnpire - we only point this out in order to showonce more that the use of Rcman history might be useful in generatinghypotheses.56

Horv,then, should one envisagewestern imperialism, comparabìewith the RomanEmpire, yet with its distinct specificities? OneaDDroacn rvouldbe as indicated below.

The Renaissancewas a reactlvation of the old cosmoìogy,even more centrifugal, expansionist,inspiring both geopolitical and socio- economicexpans ion. The geopoli t icaì expansion i s usually knownas colonial ism, and the socio-economicexpansion as imperialism; the former is a spilì-over beyondnational bordersof the state built by bureaucrats,the ìatter a spi I l-over, also beyondnational borders, of the corporations bui I t by capi ta I i sts.

This distinction, however,is too sharp, for one major characteristic of western imperiaìism is the co-operation betweenstate and corporatlon, betweenbureaucrats and capital ists.57 capital ism supportedthe state with taxes, moreor ìess lvill ingly; the state in return provided miì ltary protection for expandingeconomic cycles both inside and outside the national territory, placed major orders (..g., for uniforms,arms, public buíldings), and servedas the uìtimate guaranteethat there would be somethingto fall back upon in case of 5B tota I bankruptcy. rogether they had a stake i n extract i ng surplus producedin the overseasterritories and through proletarization in general, at homeand abrr:ad. Thus, it is the co-operative rather than a competitive nature of relationship betweenstate and corporations that should be seenas a major characteristic of western imperialism, and in this perspectivethe politicaì conflicts as to the precise

22 rules of that gameappear as less significant. 0f course, to private corporations it makesa difference whether the state provides the three services mentionedabove, including building infrastructure in a muchbroader sense than just supplyingmilitarv protection, or in fact takes over corporations, starting doing businessitself. And to the state it matters whencorporations dictate pol icies: Borderlines betweenstate and capital becomemore blurred.

Twophases should be distinguished: from the building of governmental to the building of inter-governmentalorganizations at the state level, and from the building of national to the building of transnational corporations at the other ìevel. In either case co-operation between the levels takes place, regardless of whether the inter-governmental organi zat ion or the transnationa I corporation comesf i rst (probably usually the latter becauseof its muchhigher ievel of flexibility). And as this process grows and ihe size of the state and the corporation, nat ionally and internationaì ly, takes on more and more overwheìming proportions, there wi I I be an increasing need for intel lectuals who produce forms of understandingof these phenomena,who del iver, for example,laws and regulations to the bureaucrats,and naturaì and social science"laws" to the capital ists, "planning" for a more predictable world in which exoansioncan continue unabated.59 In conclusionthis adds up to a huge superstructureof bureaucrats,capital ists, and intellectuals, the nucleusof the vresternimperial ist formula, to be supported by the surplus extracted through geopolitical and socio- economicexpansion.

0f course, it led torrunrestr'- both the I'native" reaction to geo- pol itical expansionand the "proletarian" reaction to a socio-economic expansion,wîth world trade and machineindustry playing a dominant role, particularly after the industrial revolution. In either case, co-optation was used as a methodto contain the unrest, but the "trickìing upwards"in the form of individual sociaì mobility from native and proletarian layers of the total systemalways proved insufficient. Other methodshad to be used, predominantlymi I itary campaigns against the "natives," and against the proletarians a number

23 of tactics that deserve more expl icit mention.

someof these tactics were soft; someof them were tough. Amongthe latter were the police campaigns,the efforts to quell strikes and riots; arnongthe former, welfare-state measures(the panemof the RomanEmpire) and massentertainment (the circenses): sports, movies, radiolTV.

But there were also moresubtle measures,particularly a gradual buiìding of shared interest with the el ite in the superstructure.60 The formula increasingly developingwas the idea that'rwe in the \y'est, elite and masses,will after all go up together and go downtogether, so we can just as well fight for the commoncause.',61 The proìetariat wanted more of a share, and the welfare state was a rvayof meeting this demand. But the other party also wanted more; as a consequencethe cake had to grob/, which meansthat expansion had to continue.

All of this, then, becomesparticularly dramatic in the years after the second world \,/ar, when the process knownas decolonization set in. The process was important: There was a form of direct taxation in "protection' return for that no longer could be exercised. But the consequencewas also obvious: To compensatefor this loss there had to be a muchmore concentrated effort alonq the lines of socio- economicexpansion. consequently,as one might have predicted, the upsurgeof transnational corporations was the logical answer to decolonization, a concentration on the secondexpansion platform when the first was yielding.62 There is somethingdramatic in this, a system being amputatedon one leg, fortifying the second, vulnerable, but I imping forward with great enthusiasm.

Essentially this meansthat market relations becomeof predominant importanceand they involve ultimately a question of relations between supply and demand,between production and consumption. lt is no longer sufficient, as during the age of coloniaìism, to engagein territorial expansionin order to provide the necessarysurplus, partly to maintain the considerableel ite, partly to keep the restive

2\ proletariat at bay, even incorporating increasing numbersof them in the el ite. Economicexpansion is needed,which meansthat both consumptionand production have to expand, both demandand supply, and demandhas to expandso as to outstrip the supply; otherwise a crisis will ensue. To assumethat demandand supply can be in static equiI ibrium is to assumethat non-productivesuperstructures remain constant both in numbersand in averageconsumption demand, and that the costs of keeping the proletariat also remain constant (to mention only one factor: that salaries are kept constant, in real terms). But even the assumptionof a dynamicequilibrium mÍght not be enough: There has to be an imageof at least potential demandleading actual supply in order for the production of goodsand services to be steppedup with a reasonableprobabil ity that the marketwiìl function.

Given an expansionist cosmology,it should be possible to meet these conditions, at least for sometime. Not only will an increase in production output be considered normal, natural; the samewi I I apply to an increase in demand,in consumptionin general. Onemay ridicuìe the person who adds transistor radio number6, watch or clock number 5, TV set numberl, and car number2 to his householdequipment, but it nevertheless happensal l the time.63 Throughstimulation of the internal market and of the external market demandsmay build up, and as a result productionwill be stimulated, and vice versa. The profits from this will have to be increasingly sharedwith the external elite and be used to placate the external proletariat, thereby constituting patterns not too different from territorial, geopolitical expansion of yesteryear. Substi tut ing for the miI i tary campaigns at the end of the colonial period (tfre Viet-Namwar will probabìy stand out in history as the major case in mind)64wilì comean increasingtendency to bui ld the state-corporation al I iance in non-westerncountries around miI itary governments,one reason being the high level of compatibility betweenthe social logic of the modernmilitary as an institution and the moderncapital ist corporation.65

Givenall of this then, what, if anything, could threaten the stability of this arrangement? I^/hatcould, if possible, makethe demandlower

25 than the supply producedby the western-dominatedproduction centres? Fromthe simple logic used above there could be two sources of trtrguble,': decreaseddemand, and a decreasing supply of production factors to meet the demand. The possibil ity of decreasingdemand in the internal market is well knowntoday: A certain consumptionfatigue has set in in someparts of the population of the western centre, perhaps particularly amongupper/middle-class intellectual youths - but even though this might sound I ike a small group, they are important because they may be taste-setters for the future. In somecountries consumption fatigue has perhaps reachedmore general layers of the population; but to this it shouìdalso be addedthat although someparts of the population react to over-consumption,other parts rnayfeeì very strongly that they are under-consumers,and stil I other parts may constitute a potential internal market once they have been madeto conceive of themselvesas under-consumers(perhaps part icularly older people, chi ldren, marginal groups).

Given a western cosmology,almost all of the non-westernworld should and could also conceive of expansion in its consumptionas normaì and natural: Fewthings look as immoralto the standard western eye as the native who works till noon, declares that he has earned enoughmoney for his needs, and engagesin what to the V/est looks like "leisure" the rest of the day, uninterested in increasinghis purchasingpower in the market further. Thus, the major task of western corporations has probably beento stimulate demandby bringing into the communities,at a h îgh I evel , models of i ncreased consumption. 66

Howeventhis may be, it is obvious that the major threat to the western expansionis not so muchin the field of limited demandas in the field of competition from new centres of production. V/ith production facilities increasingly located outside the \n/esternnucleus, with technology increasingly transferred and understood (although much remainsin this field), with demandincreasingly stimulated (the rrrevolution famous of rising expectations"), and aboveal l with the el ites in the non-westerncountries increasinglyadapting to and accepting fully a western cosmology, it would be a miracle if these

26 elites should not increasingly get the idea of running the economic cycles themselves. This holds for their internal markets, and in the ìonger run (and the time has already come)for external markets, both in tlre old western periphery and in the westerncentre. Andwith this, second-generationimperi_al ism is brought into being, and we are in the situation describedin the beginningof this section. lt shouldonly be added that in order to run these economiccycles one of the first things these elites have to do is to get control over their own productionfactors, ,rìeaningtheir own rarvmateriaìs - particularly energy, capital , labour, and researcI capacity. The sum total of the instrumentsfor acquiring this control, often in a very graduaì manner, is today knownas the New Internatlonal Economic0rder. One I ittle remark shouìd perhapsbe added since it is not spelt out in those instruments: ìabour. ls it to be expectedthat in the long run the non-V/esturi ì I accept western interf erence with its labour rnarket? I^/iI I it accept western use of foreign labour at homeor abroad in order to nrakeí ts products more competi t i ve rel at i ve to non-western-made products? Wil ì it accept ',n/esternef forts to introduce standards such as minimumsalaries in the non-\./est,thereby increasing the costs and decreasing the competitivenessof the non-\,Jeston the world market? 0r wi I I it resort to automation, I ike the VJest.67

Again, howeverthat may be, the thesis is one of increased self- reìíance in the old western periphery, a decreasingflow of raw factors from non-VJestto VJest,and a decreaseof the external market availabìe to the llest, even with population growth (which is tapering off anyhow). And this is wherethe crisis comesin: The supply outstrips the demand,unless more demandcan be created. The possibility of expandingthe internaì market has aìready been mentioned,but there is the other major possibility: the use of destruction in order to create a more acceptable balance betweendemand and supply. Fromthe Great Depressionthe methodof destroying goods that already have been produced is weìl known,and actuaììy used by farmers quite often when the market i s depressed. From the Great Ì./ars (the Fi rst and Second \^/orldWars) in part icular the methodof going muchf urther, destroying not only goods but capital goods (or anything for that matter) so as

27 to produce at least a demandfor reconstruction if not for further consumptionexpansion, is equally welI known. Any rational analysis of the situation in which the westernworld finds itself today would include this in a scenario, which, of course in no way meansaccepting it.6B In view of the gravity of this possibility (certainly not only a logical one but also one that empirically has played a considerable role), an intensified search for other alternatives becomesa survival necessi ty.

Most of these alternatives will be in the direction of decreased supply: decreasingthe productionparticularìy of goods, by decreasing either the numberof workers, the numberof work hours, or productivity. The first possibiI ity is knownas unemployment,the secondas expansionof free time, and the third entails nothing less than a general shift of modeof production. 0f these six approacheswe would see the three that aim at increasingthe demandas intrinsic to western imperialism: expansionof the internal market, expansionof the external market, not to mentionwar itself, and not only for geopoliti- cal conquestbut also to stimulate socio-economicexpansion regardless of geopolitical conquestof other parts of the system. But the other three, aiming at decreasingsupply, are counter-paradigmatic;they are contracting rather than expandingapproaches. Consequently,we I ist both unemployment,leisurism, and decreasing productivity amongthe signs of decline, evenof the fall of western imperialism. lt should be noted that leisurism equals obl igatory non-work.

In Diagramll an effort has been madeto depict these processes, following the ìogic of the correspondingdiagram for the fall of the RomanEmp i re.

In the left-hand column, in a central position, is the expansionist, centrifugal cosmologythat is postulated for the whole period. I t is being eroded both from the outside and from the inside by ilnon- western cosmologies," with which the VJestalways had somecontact and always was, at least verbalìy, fascînated,69 and by what are here called rrsectariancosmologies,r' by which we meannot onìy the Christian

28 F F9 \) lf

I ru) ì; F< flt ,}A li ll ll ll HBBBBBBBBBHH

F d.7, u) P: z4 >-z q< ol(D F :>Éo<

=ú L!

\)F & zJr (Dt- o2 É QS U 2> a

X= ()q JZ 2.3 <-o <( LL E=i qra 3683^ àoì;; i z.o =2!a= FeSrÈ Z J- O+ g :3ePH H ò-$i3 Txdi 3 s Lrttr !!LuY ^'ì ;

H

g g S o

29 sects that have survived as carriers of a more fundamentalist christianity but also lay orientations in that direction - suchas somebrands of anarchism,of pacifism, not to mentionthe millions of people scattered around in the vast periphery of the western centre, rural communities,mountain villagesretc., not muchtouched by western expansionismeither materially or spiritually. They represent the soft side of the lJest, perhapsonly few of them awareof corresponding mentaI i t i es and structures i n other corners of the world. 70

In the middìeof the diagram,then, is a representationof the normal working of \^/esternimperial ism. In the centre is the expandingnon- productive superstructure,divided betweenthe three institutions/ el ites. lt has to be fed and kept. The natives comingunder its geopoìiticaì expansionhad to produceenough surplus to pay for the miI itary campaignsagainst them; the proletarians producedinternal ìy and externalìy through socio-economicexpansion simi larly had to produceenough surplus to pay for their own poì icing, and later on for welfare-state integration. (Theentertainment, presumably, the proletarianspay for directly.)

Then there is the third column, listing a total of lz types of forms or symptornsof decl ine and faìl - in other words indicators that the systenlas described in the middle has not attained either a static or a dynamícequil ibrium. In the centre of these l2 is what is here seen as the final sign of breakdown:the elite movingto the countryside, experimentingwith new I ife-styles. But first there are five indícators of a nìoregeopolitical nature: the decolonizationthat oy and large already has taken place; periphery socio-economicself- reliance, which brings to mind the l',lewinternational Economic0rder; rrnative invasions,'rwhich today bring to mind the foreign workers from overseas' particularly in the centres of the British and Frenchparts of generaì western imperiaìism; internal warfare in the West when there are no moreunconquered territories left, bringing to mind the First and Secondworld !,/arsand to someextent also the "cold,rwars; the fascist repressionneeded to mobiìize national energies in an imperialist direction, bringing particularly to mind the Germanexpansion eastwards

30 havi ng 0stomarkas its intendedperiphery, and a high I ikel ihood in coming years of authoritarian repression, re-emergingin the centre of weStern imperiaìism in an effort to counteractthe problemsin this col umn in the diaorarn.Tì

The probìemscontinue with more socio-economicreactions: general social disruption or anomie(increasing crime, normlessnessof various kinds, alcoholism, etc.); the various formsof al ienation,T2expressed as excessive"observerism" and possibly also taking the form of increasingmental disorder; increasingunemployment; "leisurism" as an enforcednew mode of I ife; and ultimateìy decreasingproductivity as a newway of handling decreasingproduction.T3 To this should then also be added the various symptomsof ecological breakdown,in spite of the abiìity of the systemto shift from one type of ecological balanceto another (e.g., from physicaì via chemicaìto thermic).

0f course, these two diagramsdo not constitute any kind of "proof'r that the two situations are identical or similar. After alì, they have beendrawn in such a way as to emphasizethe similarity, historical situations being so complexthat no inventoriesof "similaritiesrrand "dissimilaritiesil can be madewith any pretention of compìeteness. That, however, is not the major point. The major point is the high level of isomorphismof the total configurationsT4rather than an element-to-element correspondence. l/hat we have tried to emphasize is the simi larity in mechanisms,both the mechanismsthat keep the systemsstable for a long period and those that eventually destabilize them. Thus, in both cases there was the basic task of keeping a rapidly increasingand materiaìly non-productivesuperstructure, and that could only be done by having barbarians/natives,and internal and external proletariats, pay for it with their work and whateverelse was available in their vicinity. In neither casedid they like this very much; that posed the problem of how to placate them - there were hard ways and soft ways of doing this. The rest is a question of balance: ls enoughsurplus producedto maintain the el ite and to control the unrest, or are the sources of surplus eventualìy being over-squeezedso that they deliver only a dwindling trickle to support

3l an ever-expanding superstructure? And, does so muchof the surplus have to be diverted into placatíng the internaì and external proletariats and natives/barbarians that this al so puts the brakeson the superstructure? That modernwestern imperia ì i sm has more mechanisms at its disposal (or at least tries to makeit look I ike that), that it is more extended in space, does not affect the í somorphi - sm or the i somorphi sm hypothesi s, to be more correct. The basic mechanismsmay stiìl be similar.

? lf we should point to one, it would probably have to be the lack of unity in the western nucleus. It is rather as if the RomanEmpire should have beenadm!nístered by an ltaìy somewhatsímilar to the ltaly of the city-states of 1350-1550, in constant rivalry and competition, often in direct warfare with each other. Al so, someare early starters, others are late-comers, and someare even reactive imperialists, such as the soviet union, or Moscow, to be rnorepreciseT5 (one peculiarity of the Moscowimoerialism is that it has securedcontiguity for itserf; the periphery is geographical ly cont inuouswith the centre and for that reason looks less colonial since it does not correspondto the classical ,overseas,' modeì). This should be reflected in a better model of western imperialism, essentially using the samebasic point of departure,but one for spain' one for Portugaì, one for Eng'|and,one for France, one for Germany,etc. In using such a moderas this, however,it wourd be obvious that what one is ta.|king about would be the menbersano candidate membersof the Europeancommunity, and it wouìd not be too difficult to extend it to incìude the even more famouscase of reactive imperial ism: the united states. Moreover,capital ism as a world system has a unit the states do not (as yet) have- with the centre (so far) in the west, the significant Japanesevariety notwithstandinq.T6

Needless rrinternal to say, this meansthat the concept of warfare', as a symptom of decl ine needs someelaboration: \^/ehave preferred to regard it as internal urarfare in a tacit western imperialism rather than as external warfare betweenvarious national western imperialisms. The major defenceof that thesis would be basedon the hiqh level of

32 integration betweenwestern countries, particularly betweenthe el ite in thesecountries - economically,politically, militarily, culturaìly, etc. l-he integration may take the form of incorporation, but it is quite clear that lvestern countries have never in moderntimes treated each other as they treat, or at ìeast have treated, Third l/orìd countries. Evenfor Nazi Germanythis was cìear: The brutaìity exercisedeastwards was never matchedby anything similar in the Nazi Germanexcurs ion towards the west. The Europeancommun i ty i s i tsel f a clear exampleof the deeperunity of purpose,particuìarìy ín a period whenclearly markedterritorial division of the Third World into colonial empires is no longer possible and it mayas a compensationpay off to engagein joint socio-economicexpansion, particuìarly in inter- governmentalstate co-operation when it comesto bui lding infra- structures that wi I I faci I itate the expansionof transnational corporations. Nevertheless,it is quite clear that the famouswestern "unity in diversity" has its I imits, particularly whenthe conceptof the l^/estis extendedso as to include eastern Europeand Russia.77 With that inclusion a ìag hypothesismust be introduced:There is lack of unity, and eastern Eu:'opedepends ìess on Third World trade than does western Europe, hence is ìess vulnerabìe - but, as mentionedabove, the concept of eastern Europe as a latecomer was by no meansunknown to Romanhistory.

Then there is a seconddissimilarity: The mechanismfor impoverishing the periphery and enriching the centres differs. The distinction has been madebetween two types of mechanisms:roughìy speaking, one based on territorial, geopoìitical control that can serve as a basis for pl under (ad hoc) and taxat ion ( i nst i tut ionaI i zed); the other basedon central control of the socio-economicconstruct ion. The RomanEmoi re and western imperialism both makeuse of the first approach,and one of the most important objects of plunder is humanbeings to be used as slaves. The centre is enriched, partly by material objects and materials taken from elsewhere, partìy by meansof unfree labour to carry out the dirty, heavy, boring, and degradingwork - sìaves, serfs, and aìl the varieties up to therrguest worker" of our days. But in saying so, we are al ready touching on the socio-economicconstruction,

33 the whole systemof division of labour. The Romansdid not use trade to an extent comparablewith our period in the history of western imperialism (but probablycomparable with earl ier periods, such as right after the discoveries). But division of labour there was: By moving humanbeings from the periphery to the centre, exploiting them on the plantations of ltaly, including forcing themto die for the sake of entertaining free citizens, the Romanswere aìso exploiting the periphery - somewhatin the sameway as when raw material is taken from the periphery and used for centre purposes in the centre. capital lsm and capital ist imperialism add a tremendousefficiency, both in extensionand in depth, to this. lt beìongsto the picture that wíth the loss of territorial control over the overseas peripher;r the vJesthad to compensateby stepping up capital ist penetration - that is the present phase (aiternative approach:territoriaì exploita- tion of the internal periphery). Thus there are differences in the nature and relative weight given to the mechanisrnsof centre-periphery formation, otherwise the similarities wouìd have beentrivial ! The basic features from our perspective remain the same:a system that has to expandto solve its major problems, that of defence against i nternaI and externaI prol eta r i ats and that of feedi ng an expandi ng, ,îaterial ly non-productive superstructure" The latter can only happen at the expenseof nature, external proìetariat, and internal proletar- iat - or by increasingproductivity. Romefell on the first three and was unable to engaqein the fourth - western imperialism runs into difficulties on al I four counts.

Somethingshould be said about the time perspectiveof all this, of particular interest to the present generation. Tlvohypotheses might "Quick be ìaunched: up, quick downr"andr "slow up, slow down.', The first brings to mind such phenomenaas Attila the Hunand Hitler the Teuton, and the theory might be relatively simpìe: lt takes time, much patient work, and muchmore then sheer expansionismand brutality if one r^/antsto build an empire. An empirehas to be built with a certain finesse. The military and the police should be kept in the background;they shouìd not dominatethe picture as they diC or may be

3\ said to have done in the two exanples given.

The other thesis, I'Slowup, sìow down," is moreprobìematic. lt is probably reasonableto think in terms of a multiplying effect due to the communicationand transportation revolution. 0f course, one can argue both ways where this factor is concerned. 0n the one hand it facil itates the control of the periphery: Signals of unrest, even revolt in internal and external proletariats, can be recorded immediately,analysed, and transìated into quick action of the soft or hard variety as the case may be. 0ther factors being constant, this would work in the direction of increasedcommunication and transporta- tion faciì ities prolongingempires rather than shorteningtheir I ife span.

But then.there are all the other factors. The signals of unrest and revolt are also transmitted to other parts of interrral and externaì proìetariats, serving to raise consciousness,to stimulate mobiI ization, even as a learning modelof confrontation activity. Most important in this connection is the reaì izatiorr of having the samemaster, the same dominantclass. This wouìdwork not only in geographicalspace but also in social space:Women may start understandingthat their situation is not so very different from that of the industrial proletariat or, even more clearìy, from the serfs of feudalism. Very youngpeople and very oìd people start understandingthat their situation is not too different from that of women,and so on and so forth. Thus, the communicationand transportation revolutions have as a consequencethat the centre rnayat times be confronted with sol idary unrest not only in geographicalspace but also eventually in social space, so that farmers, workers, ethnic minorities, women,the young, the old, the less educatedall revolt at the sametime - to use categories from modernindustrial societies (and one could add the handicapped,the ill, the mentally ill). Althoughthis maybe said not to have happenedso far, it is definitely a possibiìity for the future. Thus, in the f4oscowempire one may perhaps identify isolated points of unrest labeiled 'rethnicminorities," "peasantsr"and "intel I igentsia,rrscattered around in geographicaland sociaì space.

35 It is hard to see howa regimecould survive a crystaìj ization into joint, welì mobiì ized confrontation with al I three. Knowingthis, regimeswiìl see to it that the controls over communicationand transportation facil ities are maintained,thus proving their importance.

But the communication,/transportationrevolution not onìy changes conditions in the periphery; it also modifies the centre. lt makes centre I ife not only morevisible but also moreaccessible, at least for spectators. lt is ìess shroudedin mystery, moreavai lable for everybodyto see in massmedia and on close inspection through traveì: The life of the rich in 14iamiBeach hotels is morevisible and to a higher percentageof the population- it is assumed- than the ì ife of the rich irr the chàteaux de Loire in earl ier aqes. Geoqraphical mobility almosthas to imply social rnobility; otherwisesocial unrest would increase even further. There has to be evidence that it is possible to pass through the gate, or at least to scale the wall, into the rich man'sgarden, and as an equal, not as a servant or a thief. And this aìso works in the centre: lncreasedvisibiì ity stimulatesthe appetite for centre I ife, but aìso for super-centreI ives inside the centre - at least as long as a cosmologyof expansionisnrprevails.

Thus, the net baìanceof this analysis wouìdbe that the communication/ transportation revoìution wotLldshorten the ì ife spanof empires:78lt multiplies the speedand faciì ity of controì, but it also multiplies the processesof consciousnessformation and mobilization, and in addition acceleratescentre demandfor increasingsurplus that has to be produced somewhere- that ilsomewhere"ultimately becomingthe sourcesof revoìt. Just as there are internaì and external proletariats, there are internal and external burgeoisies, scattered aroundthe world, comparingl ife-styles, equalizing upwardsrather than downwards.

However,à9àin the point should be madetha"c the strength of western imperialism, in spite of al I this, I ies Ìn its multi-centredstructure. There has beenmuch taìk of the triage rnodel,79of letting periphery countries that cannot take oFf economicaI ly s i nk, putt i ng the others into the I ifeboat, presumablytowed by a sol id western ship. But this

36 nrodelcould also apply to the centre: Letting the centre countries that no ìonger are able to producesufficient surpìus for their elite - €.9., becausethe proletariat has exactedsuch salaries that the productionof the country no ìonger is competitiveabroad - simply sink becausethey are bankrupt,while other parts of western imperialism go on as long as they can. In this process one could then imagine, ultimately, that the outwardexpansionist wave of western imperialism generatesa multipl icity of centres aì ì around its former periphery, ìeaving a big sink-hole in the middle, the tomb in which the centre of the first waveis buried.Bo

So, what is the causeof the decline of western imperialism? The answerwill have to be exactìy the sameas for the case of the Roman Empire: I t is not a very welI formulated question. The effects are already to a large extent there for manyto see, but they are effects, not causes. Correspondingly,it is hard to put one's finger on any particular reìationship in the flow chart in the middleof DiagramI l: Theyare all interwoven,alì a part of the samelogic. At one point in time there may be an imbaìancehere, at another point in time an imbalancethere - but these are the minor circumstances. The major "circumstance"is that logic itself: the cosmology. And that cosmoìogyis in itself challenged by both internal and external sources - the famoushippie trail to Nepalat the end of the 1960sand early 1970sbeing a historical encounterof a newand an old culture spun around the samebasic theme.BI That the recruitment into the new cuìture in the Westwas from the upper classes and the upper middle classes, from youth predestined to becomemembers of the centre, even the super-centre, should surprise only the very naive: They were exactly the ones who had seen therrbreakdownof the spirit" in the eyes of their parents, who had tasted their life-style and found it wanting.82 In searchingfor a newbase, it was to the ThÌrd Worìd they had to go, but not to the new Third Vlorld touched by the imperialist waveand wanting itself to becomea centre, but to the old Thi rd \^/orld (if that term makesany sense at a I I ) . And what they were iooking for was, of course, not only a cuìture but a complete cosmology,a'rscheme of things" that would be more inner-directed,

37 more centripetal, even more transcendental.B3 That they tende

Hence' we are left with the sameconcìusion: The cause of the decl ine and fal ì of western imperiaìismis r^resternimpelialism itself , oÍ, in other words, its ever-expanding or at least never-contractinq cosmology. Onewould even expect that an imperialism of this kind would step up its economicexpansion and exploitation so as to more than compensatefor geopolitical Iosses, and that it r,rouldfaìl into deep pessimismand frustration if these efforts are thwarted (tne t973 oil shockdepression?). And the carriers of a nervsocial formation are' of course, found in the centre of the centre - not in any other group not yet through with the patterns set by western imperiaìism, onìy aching to get into better positions or to do it themselves. The routines of a cosmoìogyhave to be run through - to express it in - cornputerlanguage they have to be tried out before one is through and starts looking for a newprogramme, a new',wayof doing things.', Revolts may be madeby the masses; transformations are macleby the elite who understandhow to nake use of the revolts. Together tney constitute revoìutions, rare - for they presupposea general fatigue "problems'at and accumuìationof a level so high that the systernis simply given up, ultirnately even by its most aggressivesocial carriers. I,rthich does not meanthat th is wi I ì happentomorrow cr nexr year - after all, the RomanEmpire also took a long time in dying and perhaps never Lrecamequ i te dead. The d i rect ion i s unmistakabì e, perhaps even - the why and the how but not the when and the where.84 l,/hich is not the sameas saying that capitaì ism or imperialism, evenof the wesrern type, will disappearfrom the worìd - only that the control positions will no longer be in the \/est.

3B tv. CONCLUS I ON

l/hat we have tried to show in the preceding pages is that the Roman Empireof nearìy two miìlennia ago and western imperiaìismof the last five centuries are two species of the samegenus. As such one would expecttheir I ife patterns to exhibit similarities. Onesuch similarity wouldbe that iF one decìinedand fell, so presumabìvwill the other also. The questionthen often arises: ls this a pessimistic view? Obviousìy the answerdepends on for whom. Since few in the former British colonies seemtodav to be lamentinqthe decìine and fall of Pax Britannica, and the sameseems to apply to the Communauté franeais, it can probabìybe predicted that the samewill apply, by and large, to western imperialism as a whole. Fewwill be crying for i ts return.

However,the curious thing is that not so manypeople seemto be nostalgic about the imperial past inside Britairr or inside France either. Fromthe point of view of the proletariat this is not strange: They actualìy havea materially muchbetter life now than during the heydayof imperialism, in spite of the circumstancethat imperialism was not Britain or Franceexploiting the colonies, but elite centres of Britain and France(nelped by certain centres overseas)exploiting all the rest. In fact, what happenedwas probabìy an exampleof what has been mentionedabove: Liberation processesare contagious; decolonizat ion st imulated further steps in the d i rect ion of welfare states85 (which hatJas an immediateconsequence a shared worker interest in the maintenanceof socio-economicexpansion abroad), ultimately also touchingoff the manyrevolts of the national minorities inside the V/est.

39 But even the centre in the centre, apèrt from somevery special groups, does not seemto have been so badly touchedby the events. After all, it must also have been to someextent liberating no longer to have the burdenof running one fourth or one fifth of the world on one,s shoulders,certainly reaping the harvests, but at the price of S6 terrible concernsand troubles. The point may, therefore, be made that humanbeings perhapsare not madefor the exigencesof western expansionism:always higher up, aìways more, never resting contented. Somemight see this as an argumentin favour of leisurism, but it does not work that way either: Leisurismdoes not give, in the long run, the samesatisfaction as work (as distinct f rom having a ',job"y.87 vJe mention all this for the obvious reason that in a successorsocíety to - western imperialism more basedon smaller, self-sufficient units, more centripetal cosmologies- there rnight be considerable psychological liberation for the western elite - which, of course, is one reasonwhy their sons and daughtersinitiate such experimentsin alternative ì ife- styles.

Doesthat meanthat we are entering the Dark t4iddle Ages? And would that not be a pessimistíc view? The problemis, of course, whether the Dark Middle Ageswere that dark, or onìy appeardark in the light of generations (historians amongthem) to whomexpansionist, centri- fugal cosmologyis taken for granted, defining I ife in that period as highly abnormal,highly unnatural. The metaphorsthat are used nave ,rrise" to do with this: Onetalks about the and ,'fall'r of imperialisnr rrrise" ',fal|r but not about the and the of the Middle Ages- they are seen as an interlude betweennormal states of affairs. Generations trying to think differentìy might reverse this and talk about the decline of the Middle Ages into the Renaissanceand the rise of humanityafter uJesternirnperial ism. BB second, the argumentoften raised that "if there is no materially non-productive el i te beyonda crit ical size, the masterpiecesof civilization would not be produced"could also be seen in the same I ight. There is of course the nroral aspect: l^/hatis the value of the monumentsof the past in architecture, in I iterature and the fine arts,

40 in music, if the price paid had to be expìoitationof millions of small people bendingtheir backs in the fieìds, in the mines, in the sweat-shopsof the factories?89 ls it worth the price? Perhapsa better way of putting the question wouìd be: Are there other ways in which cultural products are producedthat are not basedon èxpìoitation? And this opens up an enormousrange of answers, where one cue might be the degreeof division of labour betweenculture producersand culture consumers,intimately ì inked to the materially non-productivesuper- structure to someextent rnonopolizing the production of culturaì products, turning others into consumers. In short, there are many other modelsfusing other types of work with art, manyof them known also from the I'darkest" part of the Middle Ages, different from the el itist civil ization modelthat is a concomitantof western expansionismand division of ìabour in general.

For these and other reasons it is difficult to conceive of the image given in the precedingsections as a pessimistic one. Rather, one might be temptedto think in the opposite direction: Somethingin centrifugal western cosmologyìs to the world communityof humanbeings somewhatlike cancer is to the humanbody - uncontrolled growth. This is not the sameas to say 0ccident = Accident.g0 As we have emphasized,the centrifugal cosmologyis only one side of the total western cosmology,9lthe problembeing that two parts are not harmoniouslybalanced inside personsor societies or epoch. ln the next period the West might play a more equitable part in the total world community- unless, that is, other parts of the world then play the western roìe, subjugating the VJestas she has subjugated them. And this is probably the problemthat is going to worry the West more than anything else, even more than the various aspects of the economic crises.92 t^JilI they treat us as badly as we treated them?

Final ly, one re.flection on the question I'Canone learn f rom history?rr: "western The argumentemerging from these pages is certainly that imperialismhas had its time'ì; to that point there is an elementof determinism in what has been said. But a conclusion of that type I eaves open a respectable range of act ion a I ternat i ves.93 To use

4t languagebased on the organismanalogy, if the patient is very, very old quíte and ilì, shalì we prolongI ife artif icialìy by inserting synthetic body pieces? shall we let nature run her course and opt for a dealh in beauty? Shaìl we perhapsspeed up the process througn euthanasia? 0r - sharr we focus on the chiìdren, seeing to it ttrat they becomehealthy, thriving, and strong, autonomous,neither flattering the bíg nor trampling on the small? 0ur personal incl 'rdeath ,'focus ination would be in beauty" and on the children,,, and we think, incidentarìy, that suchorganism analogies may be quite useful ' Neither unempìoyment,/warin cycl icaì interchangeas a response to economiccrises nor the moderncounterparts of internal market stimulation with leisurismwou.|d add up to morethan artif icial life prolongation. And to learn from history should meannot onìy to.l earn how to preserve somethingold but also how to give easier birth to something - new otherwise the entire exercise would be of very I imited vaI ue.94

42 NOTES

The present paper is an outcomeof the Trends in \y'esternCivil ization Programat the Chair in Conflict and PeaceResearch, University of 0slo, and an input to the Project on Goaìs, Processes,and Indicators of Developmentof the United Nations University. lt grewout of a lecture series given by JohanGaltung during the winter term 1977/78at the Institut universitaire drEtudesdu Développenrent,Geneva, ofl 'rMacro- histoire et la civilisation occidentale.'r lt has beenpresented in seminarsat the universities of Turin, Basel, Zurich, Bologna,Mannheim, Berìin, and Penang;at conferences in Stockholm,the Hague,and Gummersbach;and in its present shapeat the Nordic conferenceon Methodsof Hi stor ica ì Research, Lei kanger 2.2-21+May 1978 Max , '|978,, the Planck Institut Conferencein Starnberg,7-9 August and the Third GPIDResearch Meeting, Geneva,2-B October 1978. lle are indebtedto discussantsat al ì these pìaces- particularly Bjorn Qviller, 0slo, and uffe 0stergSrd,Àrhus/Firenze. The r.rponri.bilitv for the views expressedrests with the authors.

trsometimes, l. As Herbert Butterfield says, when the humanrace has gone through one of its colossal chapters of experience, men in the aFterperiod have been so appalled by the catastrophe, so " obsessedby the menroryof it . (The Newyork Review of Books. 20 Apri ì 1978). For recent bookson ffi "awfuì revolutionr' see Lynn \^/hiteJr., ed., The Transformation oftheRomanVdorld:Gibbon|sProblemaftertw@ley ion: The ?ecline of the RomanEmpire in the West l Grant, The FalI of the RomanEmpi re: A Reappraisal(Radnor, p3., 1976); and the Decline and Fall of the RomanEmpire (Carnbri

2. Such similarities have been observedalso by performersof poì itics. A remarkablecase is that of former US President Richard f4. Nixon, whosefamous Kansas City speechof 6 Luly 1971, from which the title pagequote is taken (from weekly compilation of Presidential Documents,l2 July l)Jl, p. 103@ f foresight and insight - perhaps involuntary. Vlatergatestruck two years later.

3. tr/ehave been very much inspired by the article by EdwardGoldsmith, "The Fall of the RomanEmpire," The Ecologist, July 1975, pp. 196-

\3 206, and, after our article was written, by L. Stavrianos,The Promise of th" [email protected] _Ag"_(San Francisco, 1976). But tl're of the history of the RomanEmpire is and remainsGibbon - even to the poÌnt that his works may carry somecausaì weight, as seìf-fuìfilling prophecies.

lr Cf. Gibbonon "immoderategreatnessrr:rrThe rise of a city, which swelled into an empire, maydeserve, as a singular prodigy, the reflection of a philosophicmind. But the decline of Romewas a natural and inevitable effect of immoderategreatness. Prosperity ripened the principle of decay; the causesof destruction multiplied with the extent of conquest;and as soonas time or accident had removedthe artificiaì supports, the stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure of its own weight. The story of its ruin is simpleand obvious;and insteadof inquiring why the Romanempire was destroyed, we should rather be surprised that it had subsisted so long." (A History of the Decline and Fall of the RomanErnpire, ed. J. B

5. Characterized by a lack of I imitat ion, notwithstand ing the Mongols and the Japanese,who are commonlyinvoked as exagpìes to the contrary. As for the Mongols,cf. HSkonStang, "Cinggis Hànand the Roìe of a Legend:Rise of the Central Asian ldea of \^/orld Domination,"Papers, Chair in Conflict and PeaceResearch, University of 0slo (1979). As for the Japanesethey did not Iack limitations in earl ier periods - cf . GeorgeB. Sansom,The l,/estern Erld and Japan (London l95O), and A History of Japan, IfiFT8-f,- G;Aon-tt64f-and in recent tinres J satisfy both criteria at the sametime: lt is worìd-wide,but then onìy economic; it serves to I'Japanize," but then only in East Asia. A typical case of imposingaì ien structures on conquered territories is the processof "romanization'rnorth of the Alps: ln the north the Romansstuck to their traditional food at great expenseto themselves. Romanagricul ture in the north exploi ted mainly the dry (and poor) soil that gave conditions resembling the f,lediterraneancountries. Therebythey avoided developing heavier agricul tural machineryI i ke the heavy plough. Cf. Lynn l./hite, JF., "Conclusion:The Templeof Jupiter Revisited,r'Lynn \^/hite,Jr., ed., The Transformationof the RomanVJorld, (Berkeley and Los Angeìes, in" in TenneyFrank, ed., An EconomicSurvey of Ancient Rome(gattimore, ì 933), vol . l; n. C. i n and the English Settlement, Oxford English History ffi; C.S. Stevens,"Agriculture and Rural Life ín the Later Roman Empire,r'in 14.M.Postan and E.E. Rich, eds., -The Cambridge EconomicHistory, vol. I (1952),pp. 89-tt7. As GeorgeDuby says, "For we should be wrong in thinking that a humansociety feeds on what the surrounding land is best suited to produce. Society is a prisoner of practices passedon from generationto generationand altered only with difficulty.

44 Corrsequentlyi t endeavoursto overcomethe I imitations of soi I and climate in order to produceat all costs foodstuffs that its custornsand rites ordain." (tne farìy Grovlthof the European Economy,trans. H.B. Clarte Wll-p:ì7]-- nccordingto Duby,the Romano-Germanicencounter in history wasa ,'coìlision betweent\^ro strikingìy dif ferent dietary traditions," and it was only the br-eakdolnof the vrestern Romanempire which madereal synthesis betweenthe two traditions possible. Cf. also rrFclrtunateìy EdwarCHyams's succinct conclusion, for the soil, the RomanEmpire rvas fallirrg to pieces" (Soiì and Civilization ILondon, 19521,p.248), arrdhis discussiongeneraliy on the inappropriate- ness of Romanfarming methodsin l'lorthernEurope (pp. 2\\-2\9). Toclay,westernization of Thii-d Wor-ldcountries in the form of the "green revolution' offers paralleì cases. The Romanìanguage also penetrated Europe. The notabìe cases are not only those languagesthat vanishedbut also those that survived, About Weìsh i t can be said that, had not Ceìt ic ìanguagespersisted elsei^rhere,it would have been conceivedof as "Celt a Romanresidue - cf. Jeffrey B. RusselI and Teuton," in Lynn White, Jr., .d., flltflgltlorriìation of the RomanWorld: Gibbon's Problern af ter Twc Centur'ie;-fÉFG'ìey-and- L6l-nngETes,

6. "The questionof the size of pol iticaì units seemsnever to attract arnonghistorians anC sociologists the attention rvhichit cleserves',(ttÀrt< Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese_PastILondon, 'Ihe 19731,p. ì7) . best Ìntroduction to the question is probably Leopold Kohr's remarkably unknownbook The Brealcdownof l'lati-ons (London,1957). For an econonnicperspective, see E.A.G. Robinson, EconomicConseouences of t[e Size of Nations ([-ondon,1960). Th-eBias of (Toronto, I l3-ll!, and in his !o*!""f-gg!ion l95l), PP. ll-'15 and EnrpiTeand Communic-ation(Oxford, 1950).

of the Romanflmpire' see A"H.M.Jones, 7. For the firrancial situation 'l964), The Later RomanEmpire (0xfcrd, p. 466, and A. Bernardi, ffi of the RornanEmpire at the Tinreof lcs (London, Decline," in C. Cipolla, ed., The Declirreof Empires -, ì970), pp. l6-83. Financial re.sourCescoulC be raîsed internally or externally. Internalìy by taxes or by excises on trade, externalìy by excises or by the spoils of conquests. Actually, choices were far more ìimited. Not orrly did the economic conditions in the ernpirealìow only a lirnited amountof trade and thereby excises; also sociaì conditions workedagainst taxes as a solution. This left the tr-aditionaland flexible solutiorrof conquest,which in itself involved somedel icate baìances. 0n the one hand, conquestwas expensiveand incurred further outlays on jefence; on the other, the empire obtained booty and various resources for exploitat ion. ". inelastic marketsand traditional methodsof technolclgyand agricul tural organization blockedany signif icant growth irr productivity, in what we could caìI the gross national product,

45 and therefore any steady increase in the yield from indirect taxes. When,for whatever reason, the demandson the available food, on the public treasury and on the conti-ibutionsof the wealthy outran public resources too far, the ancient world had only two possible responses:one was to reduce the population by sending it out; the other was to bring in additionaì means from outside, in the form of booty and tribute. Both, as I have al ready said, were stop-gaps,not solutions." (Finley, The Ancient Economyllondon, 1973], p. 175.) The areas conqueredin turn, required imperial defence. And this defencewas the main channel into which resourceswere al located. And here the stopgap solutions had to conreto an end:rrFromthe middìeof the third century, the numerical inadequacyof the armies who had to resist continuing and growingGermanic and Persian incursionscould not long have escapedthe notice of those responsible for the empire. Nothi ng could be done: nei ther the avai I abl e manpowernor food production nor transport could bear a burdengreater than the one imposedby Diocletian, whenhe doubledthe armyrs strength, at least on paper. . But nothing could be done to raise the productivity of the empireas a whole or to redistribute the load. For that a completestructural transformation would have been required.r'(lbid., pp. ì48-49.)

R The logic of protection is interesting. lt is the nrafialogic from The Godfather of the offer that cannot be rejected since the alteriEllve toEepting protection, against a fee, is to suffer at the handsof the would-be protector. In more refined protection markets there rnight be a club of the strong, co- operating accordingto the principle,'l attack those who have rejected your protect ion on the condi t ion that you do the same whenI havedifficulties with mine."

q rrThe stavrianos writes, Romansexploited thei r subjugated lands by outright confiscation of bulì ion and art objects, siphoningoff of raw materials and foodstuffs, and wholesaìeenslavement of conqueredpeoples, who were sold in multitudes to plantation ownersin ltaly. cicero warnedhis compatriotsof the bitter alienation of the provincials in languagethat soundsuncomfort- ably familiar today: '\y'ordscannot express, gentlemen,how bitterly hated we are amongforeign nations becauseof the wanton and outrageous conduct of the menwhom in recent years we have sent to govern them. They look about for rich and flourishing cities that they mayfind an occasionfor a war against themto satisfy thei r lust for plunder. . . r" (Op. cit., pp. 7-8.) And Max\,Jeber writes, rtThemuch-praised Roman roads were not used for anything resembling moderntrade, nor was the Romanpostaì system. To be near a Romanroad was considereda misfortune rather than an advantage,for it brought bi I leting and vermin. In short: Romanroads served the army, not commercer'-our comment:and to transport the fruits of plunder. (The Agrarian Sociology of Ancie]rt civil izations [ltewLeft Books, London, 1976J, p. 392.) The whole chapter rrTheSocial Causesof the Declineof AncientCivil izations,',pp. 389-411,is very instruct ive.

\6 As to the destination of the value accumulatedthrough these mechanismsthe quantitatively dominantelement in the super- structure was of course the army - 650,000men including the navy for the period after Diocletian. This must have been in the vicinity of I per cent of the total popuìation in the empire (cf. note l2). For information about the size of the superstructure, see A.H.M.Jones (op. cit.), chapters12, 15, 16, 17, 22, and2J, and by the sameauthor, Augu$us (London, 1970). An assessment of the size of the superstructure might be constructed along the ì ines devised in Jones, "The EconomicBasis of the Athenian Democracy,"in Past and Present, | (1952), PP. l3-3!- (also appearing in .lo@ lOxford, 1964], pP. 3-20), and "The Athens of O , PP. 23-38. ,,Military requirementsand rnilitary expenditure thus becamethe permanent,dominant concern of the emperors,and the I imit to their mil itary activity was set by the maximumamount they could squeezein taxation and compuìsorylabour or compulsory deì iveries. ." (Mosesl. Firrley, The Ancient EconomyILondon, "ever-increasing" 19731,pp. 90-91.) A further recipient was the bureaucracy:'rTheincreasing requirements can be attributed in the f i rst i nstance to that i ron I aw of absolut i st bureaucracy that it grows both in numberand in the expensivenessof its I ife-style. Fromthe imperiaì court downthere were, decadeby decade,more mento support from public funds, and a steadily growingrate of ìuxur-y."(tuia., p. 90.) The character of the surplus acquired deservessome mention. Although the RomanEmpire was a unique structure amongancient societies, the economicconditions of the ordinary city was not without relevance to the empire. As for the sources of surplus, "To the accent is on the non-commerciaìSources. Finley states, sumup: essentialìy the ability of ancient cities to pay for their food, metals, slaves and other necessities rested on four variables: the amountof local agricuìtural production, that is, of the produceof the city's o\^/nrural area; the presenceor absenceof special resources,silver aboveal l, but aìso other metalsor particularìy desirablewines or oi l-bearing plants; the invisible exports of trade and tourism; and fourth, the income from land ownershipand empire, rents, taxes, tribute, gifts from cl ients and subjects. The contribution of manufactureswere negìigible; it is only a false modelthat drives historians in seàrch of themwhere they are unattested, and did not exist." (tbid., p. 139.)

10. For an application of centre-periphery thinking to the Roman Empire,with critical evaluation of that type of perspective, see Patrick Bruun, "Eróvring och kontrolI av periferi frSn centrum: Det romerskeimperiet," in Studier i historisk metode 10, Periferi og sentrumi historien t urat TheorYof lmPerialism," Journal of PeaceResearch, vol. 8 (1971)' pp. 8l-1.|7. lt. In A.H.M.Jones's words, rrThebasic economicweaknessof the emoire was that too few producers supported too many idle mouths.rl

47 (lfre tater RomanEmpire, p. 1045.) fhe primit ive neansof transport and of production increasedthis burden. And in Finìey's summaryof the socio-economicdevelopment durinq the emoire: rr. Itr'e1 Ronranconquest and the creat ion of the vast Roman empire . was a fundamentalp,clitical changein the f irst instance. In the fiscal field the greater share of tne fiscal burdenpassed from the wealthier sector of the population to the poorer, with an accompanying depression in trre status of the latter. l,/ecan not trace the process decadeby decade, but in the th i rd century A.D. it had v is ibìy happenecl.l4eant ime the possibiìities of further external soìutions, of sti | ì more conquestsfol ìowedby colonization, gradually cameto an end: the availabìe resourcessimply did not permit any more, as Trajan's disastrous Parthian expeditionsdemonstrated, if demonstrations were_required."(Moses l. Finìey, The Ancient EconomyILondon, 1973), pp. 175-176.) "Free 12. laboui'in the cities coexistedwith unfree rabour in the country; there was free division of labour producing goods for exchangeon the urban market, and there was aìso unfree labour organized to producegoods on and for rural estates, as in the Middle Ages," says Maxh/eber (op. cit., pp. 392-3931. lt should be noted that slavery may not even have paid: rnostauthors see it as an explanation of why technologydid not develop muchduring the history of the RomanEmpire. But slavery has an obvious social conseguence,at least potential ly: becausesome people are freed from materia I production, they may, possi bì y, become nonrnateriallyproductive - in arts and statecraft, in science and rel i g ion, and so on. The numberof slaves is uncertain, as two sources of information, taxes and mil itary service, have I ittle relevanceto sraves. lt appears to have been one third to one fourth of the population in communitieslvith a denseslave popuìation, such as Athens, corinth, and Pergamonat their respective peaksof prosperity. FromAsia l4inor and Greeceslavery as a modeof production spread to ltaly and North Africa. The proportion of slaves can hardly have beenvery hígh in the empireat large. Slavery in agri- culture \.vasabove aìl an ltalian phenomenon,apart f rom overseers. slaves were never muchemployed in the great eastern provinces. slaves dominatedthe domestic services; they were prominent in administration and management,and were employedto someextent in crafts and trade. But the importanceof slavery in the economy and as a social phenomenoncannot be expressed by sheer proportion of a total population, in the RomanEmpire any more than in the USAin the lB5Os. 0n slavery, cf . A.H.M.Jones, ',Slavery in the Ancientìilorld," in M.l. Finley, "c|., l@ Antiquity_ (NewYork, l968) , and trre otnffi book. The opportunity costs of slavery must have been considerable. Apart from the social st igmaslavery placed upon "its' economic sectors, it pressedwages towards the ìevel of subsistence, destroying a part of the market for processedgoods ( incidental ly increasing the economicsignif icance of the arr,ry), and probabìy

48 madesmall-scale industrial establishrnents more prof itable. cf . F.\^/.I/aì lbank, The Arvful Revolution: The Decìine of the Roman Empi re in the l^/ 11 seemsto have had a lihrerating effect. see for instance Robert- llenri Bautier, The EconomÌc - Developmentin Medievaì Europe (London,l97l) for the relatively rapid technoìogicaìdevelopment in the early MiddleAges. t? For informationabout the size of the populationof the empire, see Josiah C. Russell, rrLateAncient and t4edievalPopulation,rl in Transactionsfrom the AmericanPhi losophical Societv (prr hichte der lr1_gchischrómisc!9nW (Leipzig, l886 Belochapply cautious, low estimates; higher numbersrvî I I appear in booksof other authors. "The lrl . regular importsof foreign grain were a life-l ine without which the capital could not exist,'r F.W.t/allbank, ,,Trade anC Industry under the Later RomanEmpire in the l./est," chap. 2 in M.M.Postan and E.E. Rich, eds., The CambridgeEconomic History, vol. 2, Trade and lndustry in the@JE-TGl-ìF. ft:85.-Trrg- i mports (approxi mately 400,000tons, dependenton type), which should be enoughfor one mill ion inhabitants. Seealso ,rsociaìPol icy," in A.H.l,î.Jones, Augustus(London, 1970), pp. l3l ff., and Jones, The Later Roman @foxford, 1964), pp. lo45 ff . tt appears.thàT74T-,0Tó--- personswere entítled to free bread in Romeduring the reign of Augustus. Constantineinstituted free issue for 80,000 in Constantinople. In addition Antíoch,Alexandria, and possibly Carthagewere kept at peaceby similar issues.

15. Almost haìf the popuìation of Romecould be accommodatedin the 'rj_History circuses and theatres; cf . Lewis Mumford,lhe City (Harmondsworth,ì96l),p.27|;SeealsoJ._ffiire in Ancient Rome(London, l94l). !,/ecan comparethis with tIE- Aenffi;f-mmrn c inemas. 0nly teì evis ion has created somethinq equal on so large a scale,

16. For a general discussion, see Krzyztof Pornian, r'Les limites écologiquesdes civi I isations," Social ScienceInformation, vol. l5 0976), no. l.

See EdwardGoldsmith, r'TheFall of the RomanEmpire,,' pp. 202-203, on rrSoiìdeterioration." "quadrupled" tB. \,/henDiocl et ian the army and administrat ion, he must have addedconsiderably to the burden. And it is evident f rom A.H.l'1. Jones, The Later RomanEmpire, that he was not far off this mark. Reaffirs, but the burden must have doubled comparedwith the 100s. under Justinian the empire drew one third of the gross product as revenLie,in addition came then local landownersand expensesfor seed. 0r, in Finlay's summaryof the process, rl before the end of the second

49 century, externaì pressures began, which could not be resisted forever. The arrnycould not be enlarged beyondan inadequate limit becausethe land could not stand further depletion of man- power: the situation on the land had deteriorated becausetaxes and I iturgies were too high, burdenswere too great chiefly becausethe mil itary demandswere increasing. A vicious circie of evils was in full swing. The ancient world was hastenedto its end by its social and poìitical structure, its deeply embedded and institutional ized value system,and, underpinningthe whoìe, the organization and exploitation of its productive forces. There, if one wishes, is an economicexplanation of the end of the ancient world.', (Mosesl. Finley, The Ancient EcorrsrnlILondon, 19731,p. 176.)

19. Not only were pol itical I inks disrupted; the economicties might have weakenedas weì1. There was a tendency towards reduction of inter-provincial trade and towardsthe creation of large anC rather self-sufficient trading areaswithin the I imits of which the bulk of trade took place. During the early empirethe various parts developedtheir production, the counterpart to which was the decline of ltaìy. Uhenold needswere f ilìed, ne\^/needs did not arise. The major factor in the economiccirculation urasthe huge amountof products drawn towards the frontiers to satisfy military needs. As the frontier provincesdeveloped production to sust-aintheir occupation army, even this stream slowed down. cf . F.vJ.I,/allbank, "Trade and Industry under the Later Roman Empirein the West," chap. 2 in M.M.Postan and E.E. Rich, eds', The cambridgeEconomlc History, vol. 2,.Trade.and_lndus!rY.i! tlle ColIingwood, 'rRoman Britain," -i-n-EiFGnney, rge ed., An EconomicSurvey of Ancient R , voì. l (aatt imore, 1936).

2ù. For a strategic analysis of decline andfal l, see E.N. Luttwak, The GrandStrategy of ttre RomanEmpire (JohnsHopkins University , l0 rrLuttwak February 1978, pP. 154-155,by P.A. Brunt, who says' remarksthat it sacrificed provincial security for the security as a whole" and that "the provincials can be excusedfor their failure to accept the logic of the system."

Zl. The population rioted and al I ied themselveswith the barbarians. obviously the discontent was widespread. See E.A. Thompson' rrPeasantsRevolts in Late RomanGaul and Spain," in M.|. Finley' €d., Studies in Ancient Society (Londonand Boston, 197\), pp. f art from endemicdissatisfaction, the revolts were, precipitated by pìague and barbarian attacks, and started in the 180s. Rural slaves and sei-fs tended to merge in their resistance, and were joined by deserters and ruined farmers. Bacaudaerisings are reported from the 210s and during the general crisis in the 260s and 280s. By effectively isolating the parts of Gaul from each other, the Romangenerals quelled the r"uoìt, but there were renewedactivities during the 360s and 370s, and from the Germanic inroad 407 trre Bacaudaebecame

50 actively endemicand formedthe basis for a state in their strong- hold on the lower Loire. For their relations with Attila, see J.F.C. Fuller, The Decisive Battìes of the \lesternWorld, ed. John Terraine (

22 Like the mental encapsulation there was an economic;cf. Aurelio Bernardi, op. cit., especially the conclusion: rrThebankruptcy of the enormousState at the sametime as small privileged groups, while they evade taxation, heap up riches and create around their villas economicand social microcosrns,completely cut of f f rorn the central authority. lt was the end of the RomanUorld. lt was the beginningof the Middle Ages" (pp. 82-83).

23. The financial situation of the RomanEmpire was hardly ever "sound." The main economicprobìem was, if not the relation betweenresources and external/internaì challenges, at least the relation betweenthe resources at the hands of the governmentfor defence purposesand these challenges. In someperiods, mainly under AntoninusPius and in Byzantiumin the late 400s, the governmentsucceeded in building up a reserve in bullion, but when war started it was rapidly squandered. Cf. A"H.M.Jones, The Later RomanEmpire, chap. l. Revenuewas regularly supplied by ffi Although other aims can be attributed to the earl iest "adjustments," this seemsa fair evaluation of what took place. The effects of the debasementmight be overstated. As an item possessingmetaì value besidesbeing symbolic money,oìd coin retained its vaìue. 0nìy those forced to accept bad coin for their products were at a loss. Cf. F.\,J.V/allbank, "Trade and Industry under the Later RomanEmpire in the llest," chap. 2 in M.M.Postan and E.E. Rich, eds., The CambrLdgeEconomic History, vol. 2, Tra

24 SeeJ. Galtung,op. cit., r'0nf'lechanisms for Maintaining lmperial Construct ions."

25. See E. Goìdsmith,op. cit., pp. 200-20ì, on "Pubìic Games." A basic point here would be the extent to which watching others do somethingbecomes more real than doing it oneself, becauseit is better staged and managed,more densely packedwith emotion, etc. As for the watching, see also Michael Grant, The_Gìa{iatolg (Harmondsworth,l97l), pp. ì02-108, on "The RIìJEETT-nulers and Spectators." Lewis Mumfordobserves, "RomanIife, for all its claims of peace, centred more and more on the imposingrituaìs

5l of extermination, In the pursuit of sensationssufficiently sharp to cover momentariìy the emptinessanci rneaninglessness of thei r parasitic existence, the Rcmanstook to staginq chariot races, , naval battles, theatrical pantominesin nrhich the strip tease and letvdersexual acts were performed in public. . The whole effort reachesa pinnac.|ein the glactiatoriaì spectacleswhere ihe agentsof this regimeappl ied a diabcl ic inventiveness to humantorture and humanextermination.r, (rne CitI in Hist_ory IHarmondsworth,]96ì I , p. 266.)

26. Proselytizing was v i ta I for the surviva I of the pre-Constantine church, given the bad relation betweenthe christians and tne poprrlationat large. By proselytizing in the countrysideafter the persecution in the 250s the town-basedchurch got a less exposedbasis in the countryside. In fact, christianity becanre 3!S- r"t iEion of the rural rnassesin a few, but importarrtprovinces. "The cf. \'l.H.c. Freund, Faiìure of persecution in the Rornan presenr, Empire," in Past and no. l6 (1959),' and in i.4.!. Finìey ed. , Stucliel@ty (London "no Borton , lglt+), pp. 26t fT:m'analysis of the attractiveness of christianíty, see E.R. Dodds,pagan and christran in an Aqeof A,nxiety (Cambridge,1965), pp.-tl2-138-l--

27. Evenofficial Christianity retainedseveraì ariti-state features, suchas oppositionto mil itary service. As ìate as jl3 the Council of Arles decidedto e,rciudepoì iticians f rom communion. l4ost important vJasthe general orientation, the consciousnessof having separaie loyalties anC f irst priorities r,vhichtranscended the Rorrranstate. Public attent ion was d istracte,l f rom the political demandsof Empire. Thus,',noreal christian historio- graphy foundedon the poi itical experienceoF i-ierodotus, lhucydides, Lívy and Tacitus vrastransmitted to the llidCle Ages.,, (4. Momigliano,ed., The Conflict betweenFegsnl{Lancl Christianity in the FourtI Century

28. And this was in line with the encapsuratirrgtendencies, with more impor.tantconsequences in ìocal life than monasticism:,'. the christian church of the fcurth centui-ymay wel ì have contrîbuted to the decl ine of the Romanempire by encouraqingthat tendency of manysrnall men tc I íve in yet srnallerworlds whictr is, perhaps, more dangerousfor a society tharr the desertation cf the world bv the few." (Peter Brown, Religign an4 Socj€ly in the Age of saint Augustine ILondon, 19lZ], p.-T46îJ

29. The alternative eihos of Christianity was regardedas atheisrn,an affront to decency. After the ii rst persecuiion d i rected by the government,249-260, Christianity becamea part of the establ ish- rnent260-303. The misery in this period led the peopleto despise their olci gods; paganismsurvived, in manyprovinces amonq the town-aristocracy. The social antaqonismevident in these changes ìed to sectarian activities as urell as to apocalyptic rìovements. cf. l^/.H.c.Freud,'rThe Failure of persecution in the Roman present, .l6 Empire," in Past and ro. (.l959), also in f,i.r. Finley,

52 ed., Studies in Ancient Socie_ty(London and Boston, 197\), pp. 2

"The 30. cases in point: residents at carthagewere taken by surprise on the amphitheatrewhen the Vandalsattacked. The patricians of Colognewere sitting at a banquetwhen the barbarians were already near their walls." (Carlo|4. Cipoììa, ed., The Economic Decli ne of Empi res ILondon, ì 970], p. Ì 2. ) "The 31. aim of the invaders was not to destroy the RomanEmpire, but to occupy and enjoy it. By and large what they preserved far exceededwhat they destroyed or what they brought that was new.,, (Henri Pirenne, lledieval Cities [Princeton, 1952f, p. 8. ) This can be seen against the following b'ackground:"By the fourth century the frontier provinces of the Danubeh,ere as muchpart of RomaniaIi..., the RomanEmpire] as any other, and so the only rbarbaríanr was the one across the nriI i tary front ier. faced directly, for the first time, with a society whosehigher standard of I iving and intoìerance oF his way of I ife must have seenedto increaserryith every developmentof the third and fourth centuries. 'Envy,r not the aimless motionof tribes, drew the barbariansto a land wherethe bait - the great viì ìas and lmperial residences of Pannoniaand the Rhineiand- dangledprovocatively close.', (Peter Brown,op. cit., pp. 60-6.|).

32. See SolomonKatz, The Decline oF Romeand the Rise of Medieval Europe ( lthaca, 195fl-, ope in Transition," pp. 8S-lll . l-'ora striking comparisonwith China see P. Anderson,Passages from Antiquity to Feudalisnr (London, l97\), p. 225, no't" 1H

33. SoìomonKatz, op. cit., pp. ì01-101.

3t+. See Joseph Vogt, Ancient Sìavery and the ldqal "l__Igl (0xforcl, rr -rr l97l+), chap. l, As for the official vengeanceafter the Spartacusrevol t: "Six thousand prisoners were crucif ied along the Appian \{ay, f rom Romeall the way to Capua,where the outbreak had begun." (l'1.Grant, The Gladiators IHarmondsworth,l97l] , p. 24.)

35. SolomonKatz gives a description of the "0rigins and Society of the Barbarians" (op. c i t. , pp. 98-ì 0l ) , basedon Taci tus' famous Gerqqnia,describing the I'tall, redhaired, blue-eyedGermans."

36. The greatest prosperity ín tsritain camè in the 300s and was baseci on the vilìas - forerunners amongc;ther things of the woollen industrial establishments in the l"liddleAges. Equippedwith furnaces, foundries, and faciìities for bronze-working,enamel*, harness-, ìeather-, and pottery-making, they spread over the western port of the empire and the upper Danubeterritories, but apparently not into the sor.rthernBaìkans. Cf. NormanJ.G. Pounds, An Historic (Cambridge,

53 37. solomonKatz expressesit this way: "The large estates or vi I las of the Later Empire,which were cultivated by half-free coloni, continued into the lliddle AEes, and by a fusion of Roman-EnZ- Germanelements became the manorial systemof that period.,, "The (Op. cit., p. ì44.) And, systemof large estates ownedby nobles and worked by coloni was adopted by the irrvaders,who ìargeìy replacedthe R<;r,ù-llas landowners.', (tnia., p. 107.) 0n the one hand, slaves were freed; on the other, substantial parts of the ruraì population nrovedtowards serf status, the ìate rrcoìonate.'r inperial Cf. A.H.M.Jonesr',The Roman Coìonate,, in !g:t_g_d_lfes_gÈ, oo. l3 (tgfA), also in M.t. Fintey, ed., Studies in Ancient Society, pp. 2BB ff. This process was producing-i;-- ffircompatiblewiththebarbarianserf.Thelarge estates accountedfor a substantial part of the agricultural area, and the coloni formeda predominant,but not exclusive, modeof production, especialìy in the west. The pì ight of the government and the landownersrvorked to5;ether in the struggle for securing greater control over the coloni, in particuìar tying them to the soiì. Designedas a fiscaì measureconnected with Diocretian,s tax reform, the systemnet the landowners'need for better control over the agricul tural ivorkerswhen they faced the generaì shortage of ìabour. And the rrobility retreated to the villas: The measLtresof Diocletianrrentailednot only a heavyburden on the lowercìasses but aìso a reduction in the economicpoterrtial of the rvealthy class just beìowthe political and social él ite. And the éì ite finaìly respondedby retiring to iheir estates into a condit ion of rnaxiniumseì f*suff íciency, withdralvingthei r customs from the incustrial producersin the city and adding to the damageaìready wreakedby the qovernment.' (rinìey, The Ancient EccnomyILondon, 1973], pLr. 160-.l61.)

38. Comparefor instance the ancierrt interest iir the world beyonclits bcrders with the meciiaevalindifference to exoticaì during the first crusade; cf. JosephR. Levenson,t'lntroduction,', in l-everrson, ed., EuropeanExpansion and the counter-Exampìeof Asia, 1300- 1 600 (enst

39.. Oneaspect of ecologicai breakdownis disease. Epidemicsentered the RornanEnrp i re f rom abroad as every c iv i I izat ioir seenrsto "ownr" support its distinct',population',oF diseases. Besides, micro-organisrnsmight have their whole ìife-cycles in human beings, but also partly in animalsand nature. so ecoìogicar changesmight induce a f.orrnernon-human nicro-organ ism to I ive on humanorganisms, whol ly or partly. Malaria is here a case. 0ther ecoìogical changesrnight alter the track of micro-organismswithin the body, or' give opportunities to newvariants. ci=.!rirì ianr McNeilì, Plaguesand Peoples (tiewyork, 19"i6). Thus, late Rcrnandisease-history is also a resúlt of parasites interacting with theír changingenvironment: "The long land frontiers were mannedby garrisons scattered at strategic points; f rom tlrese f rontier garrisons stretched bacl

r l, )'1 the spider's web, the sea routes from Africa and Egypt, the straight, legionary-rnaderoads, aìl of which led to Rome. "Herein lay the makingsof disaster. A vast hinterland hiding runknownsecrets, amongthem the microlorganismsof toreign disease; trc,opswho at[acked into that hinterland and were attacked by the inhaoitants; free transit by ship or aìong roads specifÎcaììy built for speedytravel, at the centre a concentratedpopuìation living a highly civilized life yet lackingthe most rudimentary meansof combatinginfection. Givena conjunctionof circum- stancessuch as tlris, it is I ittle wonderthat the story of the last centuries of Romanpo\^/er is a long tale of plague." (FrederickCartwright, Disease and History ILondon,i972), p. ì l.) Romancivil ization seemsmore af fected by d isease in tfre later ernpirethan ear'lier. Cf. Mcfleill, op. cit. After a major out- breakof epidemicsin A.D. 65, a newcaìamity occrrrredin A.D. 79, perhapsmalaria and anthrax, bovine-humansícknesses, that, while preferring cattle. can prey on the humanpopulation as well if once estabìished and the ecological conditions are altered. After tlre A. D. 125 epidemicscame the very serious ones of 163- '|89, perhaps small-poX, another cattìe disease adapting to human beings. After the widespreadravages of this epidenric,a new one struck the empire in 251, recurring at I east unti I 266. The pìaguecoincided with the greatest crìsis in the history of the empire. After the epidemicsof 455, \67 , and 4BO, carlea plague that, ì ike those of 165 and 251, recurred several times. This can be identified with the Black Death. lt reacheciConstantinople rrLate in 5\3, recurring for decades. Cf. Josiah Cox Russell, Ancient and MediaevalPopulation," in Transactionsfrorn the AmericanPhi losophicaì society (pnitaaffi "The Thereafter conditions apparently changed: medievalworld experiencedno further pandemicsof pìague foi- manycenturies. This is astonishing becausethere were frequent outbreaks in the Near East." Cf. Henry F. Sigerist, Civilizat!pn-:n!-Lll€e:g, 3rd ed. (lthaca,N.Y., 1945),p. I 15.

40. Barbarian invasions are normally precededby transfer of technoìogyand general know-howto the barbarians and transfer of barbariansas soldiers, coìonists, and generals into the empire. An assimilation had to take place before the decline "The and fall of the empire. In Braudel's phrase, barbarians "Europe had to knock ten times." 0r, as Gibbonassunred, is secure from any future irruption of barbarians, since, before they can conquer, they must cease to be bar"barous"- cited in A..D.Momigl iano, "GíbbonrsContribution to l.|istoricaì Method," in his Studies in Historiography(London, 1969), pp. \0-55, citatio The ChineseEmpire faced muchthe samesort of challenge, and " scholars recognize somesort of "technological proì i ferat ion. Over time teclrnologyvrould diffuse to the barbarians and shift the balance in their favour, placing intoìerable strain upon the defencesof the empire. Cf. Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the

rr chinese PasL (Lr:ndon, 1973). Obvious r y, the RomanEnrp i re worked un?er;J6Tl6r conditions. Cf. also Tore Heiestad, ,,Nomad l"ligrationin EurasianHistory," paper no. 4!, Trends in western civil ization Pi-oject, no" 13, chair in confI ict and peace Research Uni vers i ty of 0sI o (1977).

4i. The developmentof the cities offers examplesof very material expansion/contract ion phases. In Hadrianrs t ime for the founda- tions of newcities in the Po vaìley 1,500km2 territory was allowedto eachcity, 1,000knr2 in the plain, in Baetica in "urbanized" southernspaín, a densely area,600 km2to each city, and 300 km2 in the Guadalquivir Valley. smarr ci ties oF about 2,000 inhabitants predominated. Cf. NormanG. pounds,An -R. ilj:!? r ica I 99o_gt?phy of Eurqpe , 450 s. c . o. I 330 (camE?idse, ly/3), pp. I lb tt. Later cities contractedto a fraction of these sizes. To give someexamples:

Area in decares SecondCentury FourthCentury Autun 2,000 t00-il0 i\,1imes 2,200 80 Bordeaux I '5oo 320

cf. Kirsten Kóllmann Buchholz, Raumund Bevólkerunqin der Weltgeschichren(\^li:rzburg, 1968 166 f f . "The 42. In A.H.M.Jones'words: most depressingfeature of the later empire is the apparentabsence of public spirit.r' (The Later ,,Even RomanEErire, p. 1058.) more str-iking evÍdencE-ófiîfìack of public spirit is the inertia of the civil population,high and lour, in the face of the barbarian invasions. The loyaìty of the upper classes was, however,of a very passive character.tl ,'More (lbid., p. 1059.) usually thosewho could, f led to safer places'rrather than resist. (lbla., p. 1059.)

\3. 0ff icial christianity did not contribute to a morereaì istic cosmologyin this respect. Fromthe beginrringof our era, the propheciesof the apocalypticwing of the persecutedchristian movernentmade the decline of Romea central issue as a precursor to the covetedmillennium. Accusedof actually bringing about the the downfall of the empireby its hostil ity and disruptive activity, the churchgave its doctrines an entireìy new twist after its recoqnition. The preservation of the empire was now as instrumentalto christ ian purposesas i ts decline had earl ier "Quando heen. cadet Roma,cadet et mundus.rrso formidable was the optimismaround A.D. 400 that the 'JFalr" of the empirewent unnoticed:How insignificant wasnot, in 0rigen's eyes, Alaricrs three days'occupation of a Romewhich had beenoccupied for six monthsby the Gauls 800 years earl ier! cf. F.w. f/alI bank, The Awful Revolution: The Deciine of the RomanEmpire in the west-

56 "What 44. This applied to architecture as welì: was lacking in the Romanscheme was a built-in systemof control, appl ied at the centre no less than in the new colonial tourns. In the repeateddecay and breakdownof one civil ization after another, after it has achieved powerand centralized control, one may read the failure to reachan organic soìution to the probìemof quantity." (Lewis Mumford,The City in Hjsrqcl)l[Harmondsworth, l96ll, p. 277.)

45. For the survival of the EasternEmpire, see SperosVryonis, Jf., ,'Helias Resurgent," in Lynn white, Jr. , The Transfor[e_][!pn_gt_tlrg "Autonomy RomanVlorld, pp. 92-llB; Miriam Lichtheim, versus Unity 'rn fhe-ChristianEast," also in LynnVJhite, Jr., PP. ll9-ì46; and (London, l'.lormanH. Baynes, f l'tg By="nt i n. Etp i r" I 958) "Then \6. carlo M. cipol la gives this summarycharacteristic: suddenly, between 1494 and 1538, the Horsernenof the Apocalypse descendedupon I taly. The country becamethe battlefield for an i nternat ional confI i ct whi ch i nvoìved Spai n, France and what we rvouldtoday cal I Germany. V/ith the war camefamines, ePidemics, destruction of capital and disruption of trade." (Before the and Economy,1000-_17!9 lndustrial Revoìution: Europea!lociety

"The 47. SeeCipolla, oP. cit., pp. 221+-273,for an analysis of Rise I'The of the Northern LovrCountries'r and Rise of England'" "The 48. SeeCipolla, oP. cit., pp. 233-236,for an analysis of Decìineof spain,,- a section that could profitably be read by leadersof today's Third l,/orldcountries spendingtheir resources on the importation of manufacturedgoods instead of bui I d i ng up the capaci ty to make such goods themselves. Spani sh affluence cameto reìy on bullion, not on productive power. The schemesto establ ish a national textile industry were wreckedby the Mesta. As for a major export item, foodstuffs (which the colonGf; could not do without), the inelasticity in Spanish agriculturaì production drew foreigners into the market' lndustrial ly processedgoods were mainly supplied by foreigners, and spain took a middìeman'sprofit. Spain's abi I ity to purchase, rather than produce, drew - or forced - workers into tertiary "The sectors. cf. especially Pierre vi lar, Ageof DonQuixote," in Peter Earle, ed., Essays in EuropeanEqgnomic His!ofy, 1500- 1800 (oxford, l97t+), pp:-T-00:TLZtJ.H. Eì I iot, lmperial SpaiL' T[5-g-tZtg (Harmondsworrh,1976), €sp. pp. 308-320and 291-300; lafirefffiens Vives, 'rThe Decline of Spain in the Seventeenth Century,',in Carlo Cipolla, €d., Th" EconoticD.cl in" of E*pir* -l ( London, I 970), pP. l2l 67.

49. A successful case of futuroìogy: The global rise of the US and Russia was, according to Denis de Rougemont(The ldea of Europe [Londonand NewYork 1966], p. 258), predicted by.Napoleonand several others, such as Johannesvon MUller (1797), Abbé de Pradt (.1823),Tocquevi I le (1335), Sainte-Beuve(1847), C. Cattaneo

57 (t848), n. von Lasauxl (1856), J.R. Seeley (1883), HenryAdams ( t gOO). GeneraI I y, these authors presented the European predicament as the choice betweenthe "mass democracy"of American preponderanceand the "servitude" of Russianhegemony.

50. Onebasic difference betweenthe USand the USSRis precisely that the Soviet rrfrcntierrr is still largely an "open" one fo. settlementand investment1,cf. Violet Conolly, Siberìa Todayand Tomorrow:A Study of EconomícResources, Problemsand Achievements ffiffi perspective on vJesternhistory, see Erik Rudeng,rrPatterns of WesternHistory: Unity in Diversity," Trendsin WesternCivi l iz- at ion Programme,flo. B, Chai r in ConflÌct and PeaceResearch, University of 0slo (1975), pp. 5t+-56.

5'|. Suffice it to mention only one fundamentaldi Fference between traditional empiresof the Romantype and capital ism: ". the secret of capitalismwas in the establishmentof the division of ìabour within the frameworkof a worìd-economythat was not an empire. . ." (lmmanuel\^/aìlerstein, The l4odern\.lorld-System [NewYork, 1974], p. 127, cf. p. 34S.)

52. For an account of the interface betweenthe Etruscans and the Romans,see R.M. 0gilvie, Early Romeand the Etruscans(London, 1975).

53. For an analysis of tlris, see JohanGaìtung, The EuropeanCommun i ty: A Superpowerin the MakiAg (Rtten 6 Unwin, London, 1973 "sub- 5\. And there are, of course, Írore on the way: the formerìy imperial" supportersof the US in particular, and the Westrnore generally- Brazil, Nigeria, lran/SaudiArabia, possibly India, al ì countries that increasingly are developingthei r own independentpol icies.

55. This is the Chineseperspective on the Soviet Union. \^/ehave our doubts, but it maybe true stiìl for sometime. The fruits of economicgrowth have not yet turned into the bitterness of over- development- but that cannot be far auray- at the sametime as the inner contradictions are build ing up.

56, For this to happen,eastern Europewould probably have to re- organize itself into a pattern that is muchless centralized and Moscow-dependent,economícal ly, political ly, ri I itari ly.

57. For a general account of the process of bureaucratization, see Henry Jacoby, Die Búrokratisierung der VJeìt (Neuvliedand Berl in, 1969). Exampt any connectionsare the chartered East India companiesin several Europeancountries. An interesting case study is K.N. Chanduri,The English East lndia Company:The Study of an Early Joint-Stock Company,I 600-l640 ory (London, 1976), pp. 5l-52.

58 58. For an exceI ler-rtd iscussion of the roì e clf the state as ,'an essentiaì componentof the developmentof moderncapital isnr," see lmmanuelWal lerstein, The Modern\^/orld-System (New York, 1974),pp. 133-62.cf. miffi pp. U9,58, 64-65,68-69, 8t, etc.

59. The quest for a nrorepredictable world, and hencethe special role of inteì lectuaìs, goes to the core of lvesterndevelopment. For the tradition of Stoic logic and Romanlav,r, see JosephC. Smith, 'rThe Theoreticaì Constructs of t/estern Contractual Law," in Northropand Livingston, eds., Cross-Cul-iffitural Understanding: Epistenrologyjn Anthropoìogy (tlewvort<, rrl,Jesterncontractual legal science is future oriented and a law of movementconcerned with the creation, transfer, and extinction of legal relations and predictionof this future movemen t . rl It was preciseìy these interrelateC thernesof western law - rationaìity, predictabiìity, pìanning, investment,bureaucracy, inteìlectuals - which were combinedin Maxtr^/eber's analysis of westerncivi I ization; cf. G. Abrahamowski,Das Geschichtsbi ld Max Webers:Universalqeschichte am Leitfaden des okzidentalen €iionaTlGlbrung sp rozes ses ou. Cf. .J. Galcung,"Limits to Growthand Class Consciousness," Journal of PeaceResearch vol. ì0 (1973),pp. l0l-ì I4.

6r. JohanGaltung, rrAStructural Theoryof lmperialism," Jor.rrnalof PeaceResearch, vol. 3 (ì971), pp. Bl-l 17, introductionon harmonyand d i sharmonybetween the various groups const i tuted by the structure of imperialism. The basic harmonyis betweenthe centre in the Centreand the centre in the Periphery, with the periphery in the Centre fol lowing them, at somedistance. The basic disharmonyís betweenalì these three and the bottom of the system, the peripherluin the Periphery according to the model.

62. !n The Economist,4 February 1978, pp. 78-79, a report is given of l6'rreof tf'e Find ings of the Comparative Multinationaì Enter- prise Project (HarvarclBusiness School and Centreof Educationin International Managementin Geneva)on the numberof foreign manufacturingsubsiciiaries set up or acquired per year by lB/ .|99 Americanmultinationals and non*Arnerican(meaning British, continental European,and Japanese). Froma low beloutì00 till the mid-fifties both curves shoot up quickly and are above500 at the end of the 1960s,with the non-Americanscontinuing to grow and the Americansto Crop - non-Americansfor various reasons probablybecoming more acceptable, seen as ìess imperiaìist.

63. VancePackard, The Wastel4akers (New York, ì960), sets forth the programmefor this development.

64. An interesting outcorneof post-Viet-NamUS strategic thinking is the recent wiCely accla imed book by Edlvard N. Luttwak- himself a specialist in contemporaryinternational rel at ions - The Grand

59 Strategy of the RomanEmpire (naltimore, 1977). In the preface of this book Luttwakstates his dissatisfaction with the Clausewitzianprlmacy of offensive warfare, which irnpìies "a sharp distinction betweenthe state of peaceand the state of \n/ar." According to Luttwak, "f/e, Iike the Romans,face the prospect not of decisive confl ict, but of a permanentstate of war, aìbeit ìimited. [,e, like the Romans,must activeìy protect an advancedsociety against a variety of threats rather than concentrate on destroying the forces of our enemiesin battle.rl This meansavoiding application of direct military force, building up a variety of threats and "fìexible responses,"and blurring the l ines between"mi l itaryil and "civi l" means,between rrconventional" and nuclear weapons. 0f course, the logic of such thinking is to subordinatesocletal planning to miI itary strategy and strategists. It remains to be seen whether the modernmagnates of multi- national enterprises will, in the end, prove as obstructive to such a grand strategy as were their Romanpredecessors.

65. For moredetails on this, see JohanGaltung, "Mil itary Formationsand Social Formations:A Structural Analysis," Paper no. 66, Chair in Confìict and PeaceResearch, University of 0slo ('|978). The modernmiìitary regimesare supremeexampìes of the truth in Burckhardt'sdictum to the effect that I'the new tyrannies wilì be in the handsof military commandoswho will call themseìvesrepublican." (Quotedby R. Nisbet, Twilight of Authori ty [NewYork , 1975], p. 7.)

66. For an interesting study of infrastructure designedto westernize and increase consumptíonin Third l./orldcountries, see Karl T. Sauvant,rrl4ultinational Enterprises and the Transmissionof Culture: The International Suppìyof Advertising Servicesand " Busi ness Education, JournaI of PeaceResearch, vol . 13 0976) , pp.49-65.

67. For an exceìlent discussionof the significance of mobile labour in the present world system,see Folker FrÒbeì,JUrgen Heinrichs, and 0tto Kreye, Die neue internationale Arbeitsleitung (Hamburg, 1977).

68. As the SIPRI Yearbooksremínd us, the exponential arms race and transfer of arms to Third World countries makescenarios of major wars highly probable. In this respect the present global system of superpowersis very dissimiìar from what confronted the Roman Empire. But in the end the result maybe similar - the consum- mation of western miI itary technologyon western (including USSR) soil, the third chapter of western self-destruction after two world wars. For discussionsof scenarios, see C.F. von VJeizsàcker, l'/egein der Gefahr (l4unich , 1976).

69. Cf., for exampI e, l1. L. \./est, Early GreekPhi losophy and the 0rient (Oxford, l97l), andD. Sinar, 0rientalism and History (Cambridge, I 954).

60 70. Theseupsurges of Eastern rel igion and mysticism,of interest in parapsychoìogyand astrology, of fascination with the submerged occultist traditions of the !/est, etc. are not factors to be lunrpedtogether at random, but they can nevertheless be seen as various reactions against the dominantcosmology and I ife-style. The degree to which the new sub-cultures have pervadedwestern societies is generally totalìy underrated,precisely becausethey often are matters of "private I ife." The turning towardsthe soul f i nds i ts most str i ki ng expressions i n the new preoccupation wi th death, the so-called 'rdeath-awarenessmovement.r' Since 1964 the numberof pubìications on death has jumpedfrom 400 to more than I{,000. Courseson death arrddying are taught at more than 1,000 '|978.) US coì leges and schools. (Robert Rulton in Newsweek,I May In our view, the widespreadpreoccupation with death and the rise of "thanatology"wi l ì onìy intensify the soul-seekingneed for "meaning,"and we share Franz Borkenausrsidea that "changesin the popuìarattitude tolvardsdeath mark great epochsof historicaì evolution." ("The Conceptof Deathr" in Robert Fulton, ed., Death and ldentity [NewYork, 19651, p. 42.) For a particularly Ft;restlng cr it ique of modernwestern concepts of death, see Jean Ziegler, Les vivants et la nrort (Paris, 1975).

71. Inefficient bureaucratizationto solve problemsof social fragmentationcannot go on indefiniteìy; cf. D.S. Eìgin and R.A. Bushnell, "The Linrits to Compìexity:Are BureaucraciesBecorning Unmanageabìe?",The Futurist, vol. ì I (t977), no. 6. In circumstancesof bureaucraticdysfunctional ity charismatic- authoritariarì soìutions wi I I easily assert themselves,and the exponerrtialascendancy of the mil itary and pol ice sectors of western (andother) countries onìy increasesthe parallel ism with that most miì itarized society - the RomanEmpire. In the USpoll after poìì has revealedthe military to possessnnre public confidencethan any other class or sector. In RobertNisbetrs anaìysis,"the recipefor rniìitarismin a society is basicaìly twiì ight of authority in the civil sphere." (twit ignt of Authority, p. ì46, and more generally the impoitant sé-t'ronsof "\.Jarand Western Val ues" and ilThe Romanizat inn of tl're \,/est.")

72. A conspicuousaspect of alienation in our time is the Ioss of confidencein governmentsand poìiticians. For analysesof US oplnion polls, see Sissela Bok, Lying: MoralChoice in Public and Private Life (NewYork, 1978). Robert NTsb-A@ óT-lnstltutlonaìized lying in governmentas a simple functíon of the expansionof bureaucracy:r'. the vastly greater numberof opportunities for embarrassinqmistakes bound to occur put a premiumupon conceaìment. . ." And parì iamentarydemocracy, with its stress on pubìic accountabiìity, "carries a larger potential for deceptionthan is I ikeìy in other forms of government. ." (fwitight of Authoritv [NewYork, 1975), p. t7.) Typical of the ìate Rornanaì ienation f rom the body poi it ic was not onìy the withdrawalof the rich to the countrysidebut also to the attending to their own property and private I ife; cf. Michael

ol Grant, The FalI of the RomanEmpire: A Reappraisal(Radnor, p€r., 1976), @ìinaris:',Do not bring a slur on the nobil ity by staying so constantly in the country!rris today dramaticallyechoed in R. sennett, The Fall of Pjbì ic Man (cambridge, 1977), and A. Brirtan, The privElJEd'J6?ld (London,1977).SenatorAdlaiStevenson|||,m, has recentìy expressedserious doubts whether the us senate and other representativeinstitutions "are equaì to the demandsof Governmentin the late 20th century. It is getting harder than ever to get anyonewi th sense to run for off ice." (Time, 8 may I 978.)

73. The perspectiveof mentalités is onìy too easily omitted frorr analyses of politico-ecoJ6fi? changes. For a short presentation by one of the Annaìeshistorians, see JacqueLe Goff, "Mentalities: A NewField foFrJl6rians," social science lnformation, vor. 13 /r^-l \ \19/4), pp. u1-97. Froma somewhatcomparabìe angle Kib Fowles has tried to predict changesof mentality on the basis of advertising patterns: MassAdvertisinq as Sociaì Forecast:A Method for Future Rese

7\. Obviously, we do not adhere to Lord Brycers famousdictun that "the chief practical use of history is to deìiver us from plausible historical analogies.', But analogiesare not pretensions of exact repeti t ions of events or structures. They mèy, however,give suggestionsof a certain scale of events, a certain complexityor constelìation of forces. Thus, the ìack of relevant analogies goes to the very core of the Romans'predica- ment. The false anaìogies inrpliedin the inaneoptimism of Ammianus,Ausonius, Symmachus, Cìaudian, and several others "a revealed sluggish insensitivity to current deveìopnents- which Gibbonnoted and found highly significant.,, (t,tichaelGrant The Fall of the RomanEmpire: A Reappraisaì pa., p.-zm-.1- [Radnor, 1976],

"social 75. SeeJ. Galtung, lmperialism and Sub-lmperialism: continr.ritiesin the structural Theoryof lmperialism,"papers no. 22, chair in conflict and PeaceResearch, university of 0sìo (1e75). "Japan 76. SeeJ. Galtung, and Future\^/orld politics,' Journal of Peace Research, vol . t0 (1913), pp. Bt-ì ì7, for an ETlt?t-E-point out someof me specif ic i t ies of the Japanesevers ion of imperialism,and capitalism for that matter. \,/hatthe Japanese exampìeshows, however, is that capitaì ism is adaptabìe to other cultures and structures, perhapsnot to all, but at least to some.

77. The position of Russiaand eastern Europein relation to the "western concept of c i vì i zat ion. has a lways been ambi guous, both to East Europeansand to vJestEuropeans. The deep historical, structural differences betweenthe two parts of Europeare clearly brought out in Perry Anderson,Lineages of the Absolut ist State (London, 1974). For studies on t

62 East/\^/estEuropean I inks, see 0. Halecki, The Limits and Divisions of EuropeanHistory (London,l95l), and G. Eastern and l^/esternEurope in the lliddle Ages (London,1970) . As Europe, see Denis de Rougemont,The ldea o_FEureE3 (NewYork and London, 1966). For discussionsof related I iterature and the question of t'The reality of the traditional westernself-image," see Erik Rudeng, rrPatternsof I,JesternHistory: Unity in Diversity," Trends in \^/esternC ivil izat ion Proqram,flo. B, Chair in ConfI ict and Peace Research,University of 0slo (1975).

78. Cf. note 40 above. 0f course the global systemof superpowers (competingfor all iancewith and inf luence in Thircl\^/orld countries) and the sheer cornmercialization of advancedtechnoìogy throughmultinational corporations' arms saìe wil I onìy speeoup the communicat ion/transportation processes.

79. For a critical examinationof the triage model, see SusanGeorge, Howthe Other Half Dies (London, 1977).

80. lt should be pointed out that the system is madein such a way that workersare laid off first, particularly the women,the old and the young; bureaucrats,capital ists, and intel lectuals may not get new jobs but rarely lose the jobs they have. But this does not meanthat they should feel totally safe: The state, or the corporation, may go bankrupt; the paychecksmay comeat irregular and ever-increasingintervals; and so on.

Bl. The "hippie trailrr is also knownas the Asian Highway,from lstambul via Tehran and Kabul downto the Indus and Gangesplains.

82. lt is now commonlyacknowledged that the social backgroundof the terrorists, for instance, whosechal lenge of the VJesternsociety is totaì (at least as long as they are in opposition) tends towards"upper middle class."

83. A classical description of the breakdownof moral order and the searchfor the values of "inner l ife" is given by Sir Gilbert Murray in h is Five Stages of Greek Relij ion (London, 1935), especia l l y cfra According to Si r Gilbert, the end of the Hellenistic Agewas "a period basedon the consciousnessof manifold faiìure. lt not only had behind it the failure of the 0lympiantheology and of the free city-state it I ived through the gradual real ization of two other failures - the failure of humangovernment, even when backed by the power of Romeor the wealth of Egypt, to achieve a good life for man; and lastly the failure of the great propaganda of Helìenism. This senseof failure, this progressiveìoss of hope in the world, in sober calculation, and in organizedhuman effort, threw the ìater Greekback upon his own soul, upon the pursuit of personal hol iness, upon emotions, mysteries and revelations, uponthe comparativeneglect of this transitory and imperfect world. " (Pp. 3-4.)

63 84. This theme is developedfurther in the section "A theory of structural fat îguer" Galtung, Heiestad,and Rudeng, r'0n the Last 2500 Years of VJesternH istory,'r in the New Cambridge l4odern History, CompanionVolume, chap. 13, in DTESS. .l978, Rc Before the 1978 election in France Le Figaro (6 Narch p. 2) published a survey of how the I iving standard had increased in France i n the per iod I 960-1977 .

86. A case in point is the reìative relief with which the British ìost lndia - "the diademof TIEElTre." ThÌs relief was prepared aìready bV 1925,when E.M. Forster issuedA Passageto lndia, wherethe'.twilightofthedoublevision,'@layed. A similar, aìrnosttherapeutic function was fulf illed by the Beatìeswhen they repìacedI'Rule Britannia, Britannia Rule the !,/aves"with "Love ls Al I You l'Jeed." For an interest ing analysis .|970s, of the state of Britain in the see TomNairn, The Break- Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Ìlationalism(London, 1977T;- particularìychap. ì, "TheTwiiight of the British State."

87. For the joblwork distinction, see J. Gaìtung,"Alternative Lifestyles in Rich Countries,'rDevelopment Dialogue, vol. ì (1976),pp.83-98. Modernleisurism is also different from those "blessings of leisure - unknownto the VJest,which either vrorks or idles'rwhich are hinted at in A Passageto lndia.

88. The nessagealready contained in a book title: L. Stavrianos,The Promiseof the ComingDark Age (San Francisco, 1976). According ffiienTI' century the f./estern Europeans serf was enjoying a level of I iving significantly better than that of the proletarian during the height of AugustanRome." Professor Stavrianos's book can be read as a sorl of counter-catalogueto Rostovtzeffrs pessimistic idea that the main phenomenonwhich underlies the process of decl ine is gradual absorption of the educatedclasses by the massesand the consequentsimpl ification of aì I the functions of pol itical, social, economic,and intellectual I ife, whichwe call the barbarizationof the ancient world. (N. Rostovtzeff, Social and EconomicHistcry of the Roman Empire [Oxford, 1926], p.

89. The Chinesehave made a practice of organizing very instructive exhibits next to all major memorials(such as the Ming tombs), demonstratingexactly what the opportunity costs were: With these materials and this anrountof labour so manyhouses could have been constructed for so and so manv.

90. The titìe of the secondchapter in RogerGaraudy's Pour une dialoguedes g'vil isations (Paris, 1977);also the ìubtitle of the book is L'Occidentest un accident.

9ì For an elaborationof this theme,see Galtung, Heiestad,and Rudeng,op. cit.

6\ 92. lt is difficult to havea firm opinion on this. The ultimate protect ion for the \^/estmay not be its miì itary strength - the Westmay not be abìe to maintaîn it, nor may it want to - but the sacred character of the f,/est from the point of view of those who want to copy the VJest. To Gibbonrspoint (op. cit., pp. 164 and 167,\that I'the savagenat ions of the globe are the commonenemies of civil ized society," and "Europeis now securefrom any future i rruption of Barbarians; s ince, before they can conquer, they rnustcease to be barbarous," we could add: Before the Third \,/orld can conquer, they must becornewestern in general and capital ist in particuìar - and then it does not really matter very much. \,/hat it adds up to is mainly that the__ge_!tresmove - to the Sào Paulos, Lagoses,Tehrans, Singapores, Hong Kongs, Taipeis, and Seouìs in addition to the Tokyos- and that the oìd \./estbecomes a respected periphery, a museumpiece, much ì ike the ch6teauxde Loire, somethÌngto esteemand venerate.

93. The industrial istsr typical alternative is welì expressedby Yves Lauìan: "Our best bet, it seems,is to hope that a whoìe series of discoveriesin the'BOs will transformthe world as the first tvJoindustrial revolutions transformedEurope and America. The timing is urgent. For the ìast 50 years, we have been relying on the sametechnological sources for our continued economic growth. ." ("Of Machines and Men," !',1-.l19IF=!,8 t'tay I 978.)

9\. Onesort of history which is presently very muchneeded is the history of social experiments,cultural alternatives, and restructuringof communityì ife in times of crisis. ln a period whenthe cities of the lJest, especially in the US, seemto be dramatically decaying, the vital task of restoring real communities also requires historical perspective. But the practical consequencesfor research do not comeeasy to us' because- as Robert l{isbet very correctly observes- "one of the most grievous casuaìties ,of moderntimes is the true utopian rnentality. . ." (TwiI ight of Authority, p. 234.)

65 BIBLIOGRAPHY

(l ) Abrahamowski,G. 1966. Das Geschichtsbiìd Maxv/ebers: tJnlu"rrulg"r.hi.t. "r_ Luí l- is ierungsproièl

(z) Anderson, P. 1971+. passagesf rornAnt iqu it./ to FeudaI ism. London .

(3) Anderson,P. 1974. Lineagesof the Absolutist state. London. (4) Barraclough,G., ed. 197a, Easternand WesternEuroDe in the Middle Ages. London

\)/ Bautier, Robert-l-ienri. l97l . The EconomicDevelopment in Medi evaI Europe. London (6) Baynes, l"lormanH. I 958. The Byzant i ne Ernpi re. London. Beloch, K.J. 1886. BgvÒlkerungsgeschichte 0) . der gri.echisch- rómischen\^/elt. Leipzig. "The (8) Bernardi , A. 1970. Economicprobl ems of the RomanEmpi re at the Timeof lts Decllne.rr In C. Cipoììa,ed., The Decline of Empi res_, pp. I 6- B3. London .|978. (9) Bok, sissela. Lying: public Moral choice in and trivate L i f e. NervYo rk. 'The (l 0) Borkanau, Franz. I 965. concept of Death.'r I n Robert Fulton, ed., Deathan{ ldentity. Newyork. (l I ) Bowersock,Glen, et al., eds. 1977. EdwardGibbon and the Decline of the RolranEmpire. Cambridgó;-l'Gss. (12) Britton, A. 1977. The privatised t/orld. London. ( ì 3) Brown, Peter. lg7T. Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augusti ne. London. rrEróvring (t4) Bruun, Patrick. 1975. och kontrolr av periferi frSn centrum:Det romerskeimperiet.' ln studier i historisk metode 10, Periferi og sentrumihistorien. 0;E: (Ì5) Carcopino,J. 194ì. Daily Life in Ancient Rome. London. (16) cartwright, Frederick. 1972, Diseaseand History. London. ,'Crisis (17) Chambers,Mortimer. 1966. of the Third Century." ln Lynn ln/hite, J r. , ed. , Tfre Transformat ion of the Roman\,/orl d, pp. 30-58.)ó Berkelev and-LoJ-RnGTil

66 (l 8) Chanduri , K.N . 1965. I!" _eqt i tn E"st t "a ia c. of an Ea;ly Joint-stock (19) Cipolla, Carlo M., ed. 1970. The EconomicDecì ine of- Empires. London. (ZO) Cipolla, Carìo M. 1976. Before the Industrial Revolution: EursrpeanSociety and Economy,ì000-'|700. London. "Roman (zt ) col I ingwood,George. 1936. Brita in." In Frank Tenney, ed., An Economiclurveyof Ancient Rome,vol. lll. Baltimore. (22) Collirrgwood,R.G., and l'lyers. 1931. RomanBritain and the English SettlemenL. 0xford Engìish History, vol. ì Oxford . (23) Conolly, Violet . 1974. Siberia Todayand Tomorrow:A Study of EconomicResources, Probìems and Achievements. London. (24) Dodds,E.R . 1965. Pasa!and the Christian in an Age of Anxiety. Cambridge. (zs) Duby, Georges. 1974. The Early Growthof the Eulqpeal Econgmy: \^/arriors and Peasants f rom the Seveltfr to the Twelfth Centuries.

"The (26) Elgin, D.S., and R.A. Bushnell' 1977- Limits to Cornpl ex- i ty: Are Bureaucraci es Becomi ng Unmanageab l e?" Th_eFuturist vol. Xl, no. 6. (27) Elt iot, J.H" 1976. lmperial Spain, ì469-ì7j6. Harmondsworth. (28) Elvin, flark. 1913. The Pattern of the ChinesePast. London. (29) Finley, M.I . , ed. 1968. ila',rery in Classical AntiquitJ. l'lew York. (lO) Finìey, M.l. 1973. TJreAncignli-Egl-oty-. Lorrdon' (lt) Forster, E.M. 192\. A Passageto l-ndia. London. sZ) Fowles, Kib. 197(). MassAdvertising as Socigl Forecast: A Methodfor Future Research. Viestport, Conn. "The Failr,rreof Persecution in the Roman (ll) Freund,VJ.H.C. 1959. .|6. Empire." In Past and Present, fto. (34) Fróbel, Folker, JijrgenHeinrichs, and 0tto Kreye. 1977' Die neue internationale Arbeitsleitung. Hamburg" (is) Fuì ler, J.F.C. 1970. Tl1g_leqllive Battles of the velt.l!_l/c!Lg' ed. JohnTerraine, vol. l, London. "A (36) Galtung, Johan. l97l, Structural Theoryof lmperialisrn." Journai of PeaceResearch, vol. 3, pp. Bl-l 17. 0slo' in $l) Gaì tung, Johan. 1973. The European Comnruni ty : A StrPerpower the Making. Al len t Unwin,London. "Japan (38) Galtung,Johan. 1973. and Future\lorld Poìitics." Journai of PeaceResearch, vol. 10, pp. Bl-l l7' 0slo' rrI (39) Galtung, Johan. 1973. Limits to Growth' una Class Conscious- ness." Journal of PeaceResearch, voì. 10, pp. ì01-l 14. 0slo.

67 (40) Galtung,Johan. 1915. "social lmperialism and Sub-lmperialism: Continuities ín the Sti'uctural Theoryof lmperialisn,rr Paper no. 22, Chair in Conflict and PeaceResearch, University of 0slo. (4ì) Galtung,Johan. \976. "Alternative Lifestyles in Rich Countr ies .r' Developnrent D ia I pSr.re,ffo. I , pp. 83-98. (\21 Galtung, Johan. 1978. "Mil ltary Formationsand Social Forrnations:A Structural Analysis." Paperno. 66, Chair in ConfI i ct and Peace Research , Uni vers i ty of 0sI o. (43) Galtung, J., T. Heiestad,and E. Rudeng. 1979" "0n the Last 2500 Years of f,/esternH istory.rr In the NewCambr idge Modern '|3" History, CompanionVolun'e, chap. Cambridge. (44) Garaudy,Roger. 1977. Pour un dialoguedes civilisations: L'Occidentest un accident. Paris. (45) George,Susan. 1977. Howthe Other Half Dies. London. (46) Gibbon, Edward. l90l " A History of the Decìine and Fall ql the RorrranEmp ire, ed. J. Bury. London. "Mental \4/) Goff, JacqueLe. 1974. ities: A NewField for Histor- ians." Social Sciencelnformatìon, vol . 13, pp. Bl-97. (48) Goìdsmith,Edward . 19t-5. I'TheFalì of the RomanEmpire." The Ecoìog i st (July) , pp. 196-206. (49) Grant, Michaeì. 1971. The Gìadiators. Harrnondsworth. (50) Grant, Michael. 1976. The FalI of the RomanEmpi re. Radnor, pa.

(St1 Halecki, 0. 1951. The Limits and Division of EuropeanHistory. London. (52) Heiestad, Tore. 1977. "Nomad14igration in EurasianHistory." Paperno. 13, Chair in Confìict and PeaceResearch, University of 0slo. (53) Howard , 14i chae I . 1976. War in EuropeanHis-tory, pp. 5l-52. London. l),+l Hyanrs,Edward. 1952. Soil and Civi ì ization. London. I L( I Inn i s, H.A. I 950. Empi re and Communi cat ion. Oxford. .|95t. (>bl Innis, H.A. The Bias of Cornmunication.Toronto. '|969. \>/) Jacoby, Henry. Die Bijrokratisierung der V/elt. Neuwied and Berlin. (lS) Jones, A.H.M. 1952. "The EcononricBasis of tfre Athenian Democracy."In Past and Present,vo1. l, pp. l3-31. Also appearingin Lon@, pp. 3-2A. 0xford, 1964. (59) Jones, A.H.M. ì958. "The RomanColonate.r' In Past and Present, îo. 13. Also in M.l. Finley, ed., StuaJE--l-nRncient Society,pp.28B ff. (60) Jones, A.H.M. l96l{. "The Athens of Demosthenes." In Athenian Democracy,pp. 23-38. Oxford.

68 (61) Jones, A.H.M. 1964. The Later RomanEmpire. Oxforcl. (62) Jones, A.H.M. 1968. 'rslavery in the Ancient V/orìd.,' In M.I Finìey, ed., Slavery in Classica!Antiquity. l'lewYork. (63) Jones, A.H.M. 1970. Augustus. London. (64) Katz, Solomon. 1955. The Decìine of Romeand the Rise of Medieval Europe. Ithaca, N.Y. (65) Buchholz, Kirsten, KÒlI rnann. 1968. Raumund BevÒlkerungin der l'/eltgeschichte. V/ijrzburg.

\ oo/ Kohr, Leopolo. 1957. The Breakdownof Nations. London. "0f \o// Laulan, Yves. ì978. Machinesand l4en." Newsweek,g May. (68) Levenson,Joseph R. 1967. I'lntroduction." ln J.R. Levenson, .l300- ed., EuropeanExpansion and the Counter-Examplecf Asia, ì600. EnqlewoodCl iffs. N.J. (6g) Lichtheim, l'1iriam. 1966. 'rAutonomyversus Unity in the Christian East.r' In LynnVJhite, Jr., ed., The Transformationof th_e_RomanVJorld, pp. ll9-ì46. Berkeley and Los Angeles. (70) Luttwak, E.N. 1977. Th. " Johns Hopki ns Uni versi ty er"ss . (71) Momigliano,A., ed. 1963. The ConfI ict betweenPaganism an

Aa (86) Rougemont, Deni s de. 1966. The ldea of Europe. Newyork and London. (8i) "Pattern Rudens,Erik. t975. of \y'esternH istory: Unity in Di ', versi ty . Trends i n WesternCiviì izat ion program,no. B, Chair in Conflict andPeaceResea rch, Uni versi ty of 0s pp. 54-se' I o, (88) Russell, "Cel Jeffrey B. 1966. t and Teuton.'l I n Lynn VJhi te, Jr., ed., The Transformation of the Romanl/orld. Berkeì ey anC Los Angeles. (89) ,,Late Russeì1,Josiah cox. 1958. Ancient and fledieval Population.r' In Transactionsfrom the Americanphilosophical Society. Rf,ilaa" (e0) sansom,George B. 1950. The vJesternI,/orìd and Japan. London. (gt) Sansom,George B. 1952. Japan in trrorìdHistory. London. (gz) Sansom, GeorgeB. 1964. History of Japan, l6ì5_1g67. London. (e3 Sauvant, "Mul ) Karl T. 1976. t inational Enterprises and the Transmissionof culture: The International supply of Advertising Servicesand BusinessEducation." Journ"ì of'Feace Research, voì. 13, pp. \9-65. 0sto. (e4 ) Sennett, R. 1977. The Falì of the public Man. cambridge. (gs) Sinar, D. 1954. 0rientalismand History. Cambridge. (go) r'The smith, Josephc. 1964. Theoretical constructs of western contractual Law-rr In fiorthropand Livingston, eds., cross- cul turaì understanding:Epistemology in Anthropologí.-G-york. $t) stang, HSkon. 1979. ^ iinggis HaL:nd the Rol" of_=__l"g"!d, Rise of the Central As n. papers, Chair in Confliè 0sìo. óslo. (ga) stavrianos, L.S. rg76. The promiseof the cominqDark Aoe. San Franci sco. (99) Stevens, "Agriculture c.S. 1952. and Ruraì Life in the Larer RomanEmpire.,, In l,l.ti. postan and E. Rich, eds., flg_qegqllgg EconomicHistory, voì. l, pp. Bg-tt7. Camúridge. (100) stevenson,Adrai, il r. rg7}. In Time, 9 May. r,rewyork. (l0l Thompson, 'peasants ) E.A. 197t+. Revolt in Late RomanGaul and spain." ln M.l. Finrey,ed., studies in AncientSocietv. - --t DD. 304 ff. Londonand Boston. (toz) vi "The lar Pierre. 1914. Ageof DonQuixote.' In peter Earle, ed. ' Essaysin EuropeanEconomic History, 1500-r800,pp. 100-lr2. 0xford. (103) Vives, ,'The Jaime Vicens. lg7O. Decline of Spain in the SeventeenthCentury.'r ln Carlo Cipolla, ed., The Economic Decline of Empires, pp. lZl-167. London. ( I 04) Vryoni peros, ,'Hellas " s, S Jr. 1966. Resurgent. In Lynn f,/hi te, Jr., ed., The Transformation of the Romanf'/orld, pp. 92- il 8. Berkeley andTol-Aiffi

70 ( I 05) Vogt, Joseph. 1974. Ancient Slavery and the ldeal of Man. 0xfo rd . "Trade (106) wallbank,. F.|./. 1952. and Industry under the Later Roman Empirein the l,lest,"chap. 2 in M.M.postand and E.E. Rich, eds., The cambridqe EconomicHislslr, uo!. 2, -Trade and Industry in mbri dge. (107) \,r,allbank,F.w. 1969. The Awfuì Revolution: The Decline of the RomanEmpire in the \y'est. Liverpool.

(toa; !/allterstein, tmmanuel. l9i\. The Modern\^/orld-system. Ì'lew York. "The (109) I^/eber,Max. 1976. Social causesof the Decline of Ancient Civil izations." In The AgrarianSociology of Ancient Civi I izat ions, pp. 3EgTTTl- loi-aon. (t to) \^/eizsàcker,c. F. von. 1976, llege in der Gefahr. Munich. (lll) \,/est,M.L. 1971. Early Greekphiìosophy and the 0rient. 0xfo nd.

(il2) White, Lynn, Jr., ed. 1966. The Transformationof the Roman I^/orld:Gibbon's Problem after AngeI es. "Conclusion: (l I 3) l/hi te, Lynn, J r. 1966. The Templeof Jupiter Revisited." ln White, ed., The Transformationof the Roman VJorld. Berkeleyand Los Anqeles. (l l4) Ziegler, Jean. 1975. Les vivants et la mort. Paris.

7l