Western University Scholarship@Western History Publications History Department Fall 2003 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Second Battle of Ypres: The aC ses of 1st and 4th Infantry Battalions, 23 April 1915 Andrew Iarocci The University of Western Ontario Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/historypub Part of the History Commons Citation of this paper: Iarocci, Andrew (2003) "1st Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Second Battle of prY es: The asC e of 1st and 4th Canadian Infantry Battalions, 23 April 1915," Canadian Military History: Vol. 12 : Iss. 4 , Article 2. Available at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol12/ iss4/2 Iarocci: Second Battle of Ypres 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Second Battle of Ypres The Case of 1st and 4th Canadian Infantry Battalions, 23 April 1915 Andrew Iarocci he Great War began in August 1914 as a war perspectives, Second Ypres was a difficult fight Tof movement, but after three months of not only due to the presence of chemical agents maneuver battles the conflict assumed a different on the battlefield, but because British, French form on the Western Front. As flanks were closed and Canadian troops were reacting to a German during the “race” to the sea, opposing lines of initiative. Such circumstances must have made armies began to solidify into static positions. those April days especially chaotic for Canada’s The quick resolution that many contemporary largely untested soldiers. It is now recognized observers had imagined would settle the war that the Germans lacked the local resources before Christmas was nowhere in sight, and necessary to sustain a breakthrough at Ypres with the onset of winter, there was little activity in the wake of their 22 April attack, but Allied in the west. In the meantime the Germans won commanders operating without the benefits of significant victories on the Eastern Front, but hindsight interpreted the enemy’s advance as with the return of campaigning weather in the a palpable threat to the security of the Salient. spring of 1915, their attention returned to the The first German gas cloud was directed against situation in France and Belgium. In order to French troops who occupied the northeastern divert attention away from troop movements edge of the Salient. The defenders, who were not to the east, the German command decided to equipped with respirators, fell into disorder as launch a limited offensive to reduce the Ypres choking men attempted to escape the greenish- Salient in April 1915. This was not intended as yellow gas cloud. To the immediate right of the a war-winning attack, but it presented a double French, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigades opportunity to test new chemical weapons fought desperately to prevent the Germans from and keep the Allies on the defensive. While the encircling the Allied line. Meanwhile, a polyglot Germans were eager to reduce the Salient, the of Allied units rushed forward to close the gap Allies were equally determined to defend it. Ypres left by French troops who were driven back by was one of few Belgian towns that remained the initial gas attack. Many of the fresh British unoccupied and it had become an important and Dominion formations thrown into a series symbol of Allied resistance since the First Battle of counterattacks during the following few days of Ypres in 1914. It was also a gateway to the would suffer appalling casualties, not from the channel ports and the British were not prepared gas itself, but from conventional small-arms and to let these fall into German hands. artillery fire.1 The Second Battle of Ypres is widely remembered During the night of 22-23 April, 1st Canadian as the debut for chlorine gas on the Western Front, Infantry Brigade marched out of its reserve billets but it was also the introduction to pitched battle to help deal with the crisis at the front. In the for the officers and men of the First Canadian dawn hours of 23 April a counterattack by 1st Contingent. From the Allied and Canadian and 4th Infantry Battalions was launched against © Canadian Military History, Volume 12, Number 4, Autumn 2003, pp.5-16. 5 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2003 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 2 Left: Lieutenant-Colonel A.P. Birchall, commanding officer of the 4th Battalion from 29 January 1915 until his death on 23 April. Inset: A cap badge of the 4th Canadian Infantry Battalion (Central Ontario). Below: Birchall’s training manual, Rapid Training of a Company for War. This is the third edition, printed in March 1915. accuracy. A careful examination of the evidence suggests that, notwithstanding the unfavourable circumstances referred to by Morton, the officers and men of the 1st Canadian Contingent learned a great deal about warfare during the months they spent training in England and France between October 1914 and March 1915. Upon arriving in England in late October 1914 a standard training syllabus was prepared for Canadians to follow.4 This training was supplemented in France when Canadian companies and battalions were paired off with more experienced British units during rotations through quiet sectors of the front. Special attention was devoted to the preparation of defensive positions in the dark, the crossing of wire obstacles, cooperation of all arms in the attack, and resupply in the field.5 Prior to leaving England for France, 1st Brigade participated in several days of brigade-level maneuvers that involved scenarios not dissimilar to the real-life situation that 1st and 4th Battalions would find themselves in on 23 April.6 Overall, the training undertaken by the Canadians prior to their new German positions established along the east- first major battle was quite sophisticated and west line of Mauser Ridge. The attack, designed to not simply a matter of squad drill and bayonet stabilize the front, lasted for most of the daylight practice. hours of 23 April. Upon first examination it seems to conform to the stereotype of “unprepared” Beyond routine Canadians being thrown haphazardly into drill and exercises, hopeless battle that is so often associated Canadians were with the earlier war years. Standard historical privy to the latest interpretations of the Canadians’ participation at lessons from the the Second Battle of Ypres argue that inadequate front through the and incomplete training were chiefly responsible pamphlets and for high Canadian casualties and loss of ground. manuals that were Military historian Desmond Morton has noted being produced that “serious training” for the Canadians by Captain S.G. prior to Second Ypres was limited by weather, Partridge’s leave, sickness and a shortage of instructors.2 British Army Historian Bill Rawling, in his landmark study of Printing and trench warfare, contends that in early 1915 “the Stationary Canadians were not yet ready for the kind of war Depot in that had been thrust upon them.”3 There is some ever greater truth to these statements, but they do not sum numbers.7 up the first few months of the war with complete 6 http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol12/iss4/2 2 Iarocci: Second Battle of Ypres Visiting British officers also arrived in the Canadian Brigade was in reserve at Vlamertinghe, Canadian camp to give lectures and answer about five miles to the west of Ypres. During the questions about the situation in France and night of 22-23 April, Generals H.C.O. Plumer, (5th Belgium.8 Some of these officers stayed on British Corps) and E.A.H. Alderson (Canadian permanently with the Canadians. One of them Division) decided that 1st Canadian Brigade, was Captain A.P. Birchall, a veteran officer specifically 1st and 4th Canadian Battalions, with 14 years in the British Army’s 7th Royal would participate in an Allied counterattack Fusiliers.9 Birchall was subsequently promoted against the newly-established German line along and assigned to command 4th Canadian Battalion Mauser Ridge, which ran roughly west to east as of 29 January 1915.10 He was not only an on the northern edge of the shrinking Salient. experienced officer, but also the author of Rapid Both battalions were warned for action during Training of Company for War, an instructional the evening of 22 April. As a result of the initial manual reprinted three times during 1915.11 German attack, French troops suffering the effects of chlorine gas were falling back on Vlamertinghe There is no question that the counterattack of itself, along the very roads upon which 1st and 23 April was extremely costly for 1st and 4th 4th Battalions would march in order to reach Battalions; 1st Battalion suffered more than 400 their starting lines for the counterattack.13 The casualties and 4th Battalion lost approximately battalions moved out of reserve after midnight 500 men.12 Although neither unit was able to and crossed over the Yser Canal on the Brielen capture its terrain objective on 23 April, the Bridge sometime between 0315 and 0410 counterattack was successful in the sense that it hours.14 Good route march discipline probably helped to prevent the Germans from advancing saved the Canadians from becoming hopelessly on Ypres and cutting off the Salient. Contrary entangled with retreating French soldiers and to the standard interpretation, there is little various other bodies of troops heading one way evidence to suggest that insufficient training or another. Shortly after crossing the canal the caused high numbers of casualties or unduly commanding officers of 1st and 4th Battalions influenced the outcome of the counterattack. Contemporary sources clearly show that 1st and 4th Canadian battalions displayed a great deal of skill in their first major battle.