87 Jackson Morley's Resignation in August 1914

JOHN MORLEY’S RESIGNATION IN AUGUST 1914 This article supplements the account in Morley of Blackburn1 of John Morley’s resignation from Asquith’s cabinet on the outbreak of war in 1914. Writing such an article is not easy because of the unceasing flow of books and articles about the origins of the war, and the need to maintain a reasonable level of objectivity about an event that, even after a hundred years, arouses powerful emotions. In one of the last articles he wrote before his death, Patrick Jackson analyses the reasons for Morley’s resignation and challenges the views of those who ascribed it solely to his optimism about Germany and his pessimism about Russia. 26 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 JOHN MORLEY’S RESIGNATION IN AUGUST 1914 ome commentators have no his resounding denunciation of the monarchy’ of Austria-Hungary felt doubt that Britain was right Boer War fifteen years earlier were threatened by militant Slav nation- Sto join France in a war justi- disappointed if they hoped for a alism. Germany feared encircle- fied, despite an appalling cost in similar declaration in 1914. Instead ment by Russia and France. Behind human lives, by the need to safe- Morley opted out of his share of the strident nationalism there was guard Europe from German domi- responsibility for the war by retir- a deep-seated fatalism about the nation, just as it was right to resist ing quietly to the well-stocked inevitable decline of older regimes Nazi aggression twenty-five years library of his home in Wimbledon and their evolutionary replace- later. For those who take this view, Park. Nevertheless in private he ment by rising races, a struggle for Morley’s motives are of little sig- remained certain that he had been the survival of the fittest in which nificance. His inability to recognise right to resign, and that the lead- war played a natural part. Some self-evident truths must be attrib- ers of the Liberal government, par- of the European powers sought uted to declining powers, and he ticularly Asquith and Grey, bore a greater security in alliances that can be written off as ‘yesterday’s heavy responsibility for what had were regarded by the participants man’, an elderly icon of obsolete gone so disastrously wrong. As he as defensive but by opponents as Gladstonian morality who failed told Rosebery in November 1920, threatening. to understand the new realities of amid the clamour over German Britain had traditionally twentieth-century power poli- war-guilt, ‘I do not let go my obsti- favoured a policy of isolation, rely- tics. David Hamer writes almost nate conviction that the catastrophe ing on naval supremacy to avoid despairingly in the Oxford Dic- … was due to three blunderers, the entanglements in mainland Europe, tionary of National Biography that Kaiser and a couple of Englishmen but when the Liberals came to Morley ‘did not even [my italics] whom I’d as lief not name with the power in 1905 the foreign secre- find a casus belli in German aggres- proper adjectives.’2 tary, Edward Grey, inherited Brit- sion against Belgium.’ ish membership of a new entente On the other hand, for those designed to end the imperial rivalry of us who believe that more could The international background with France. Liberals were uneasy have been done in July 1914 to pre- Despite a general rise in economic about the implications of the alli- vent the Balkan crisis from escalat- prosperity during the early years ance between France and tsarist ing into a catastrophic world war of the twentieth century there was Russia, and feared that the strate- (regarded by all the participants as a widespread feeling of insecurity gic conversations between army defensive or preventive), and who as the great powers jostled for com- and naval officers would com- find the case for British involve- petitive advantage and prestige. mit Britain to a policy of hostility ment inconclusive, Morley’s resig- Britain’s vulnerability, as an over- towards Germany. In 1871, after nation raises significant questions. extended maritime empire, had the Franco-Prussian war, Morley Why did he fail to ensure that the been painfully exposed in the Boer had welcomed ‘the interposition cabinet explored the key issues War; and Russia, despite huge nat- in the heart of the European state adequately before reaching its pre- John Morley, 1st ural resources, had been similarly system, of a powerful, industrious, cipitate decision? Why did he refuse Viscount Morley humiliated by Japan. France still intelligent and progressive peo- to speak out publicly against the of Blackburn resented the loss of Alsace-Lorraine ple, between the Western nations war? Admirers who remembered (1838–1923) in 1871, and the ramshackle ‘dual and the half-barbarous Russian Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 27 john moRley’S ResignAtion in AUGUst 1914 swarms.’3 The following decades the House of Commons that ‘the heard about the assassination. After saw a growing antagonism between two great Empires begin to realize nearly nine years at the Foreign Britain and Germany, but Morley, that the points of cooperation are Office, making him the most expe- like many Liberals, continued to greater and more numerous than rienced foreign minister in Europe, believe that German militarism was the points of possible controversy.’7 Grey was well aware of the precari- a temporary phase better dealt with ous balance of power in the Bal- by conciliation than by confronta- kans. He must have realised that the tion. The tensions reached a climax A wasted month: 28 June – 24 murder of the heir to the imperial in 1911, after a German infringe- July 1914 throne, with the suspected conniv- ment of French colonial pretensions Accounts of the events leading ance of Belgrade, would provoke a in Morocco. Morley urged caution to the outbreak of the war tend violent reaction in Vienna, and that on Asquith, ‘I utterly dislike and to underestimate the seriousness the Austrians would seek a pre- distrust the German methods … of the delay in responding to the liminary guarantee of support from But that is no reason why we should assassination at Sarajevo on 28 their German allies just as the Serbs give them the excuse of this provo- June. Nearly a month of inactiv- would appeal for help from Rus- cation.’4 He recognised the danger- ity followed, with no determined sia. When the crisis finally ended in ous instability of the kaiser, but diplomatic attempts to defuse the a world war, Grey claimed that he argued that ‘the way to treat a man dispute between Austria-Hungary had worked tirelessly for peace; but who has made a fool of himself is to and Serbia before the other major most of his initiatives took place in let him down as easily as possible’.5 European powers were dragged in. the final days of frantic activity that In August 1911, when it emerged In Britain, politicians and the press followed the Austrian ultimatum, that plans had been finalised to were preoccupied by the situation and by that stage they were all ‘too transport British troops to France in Ireland resulting from the mili- little, too late.’ in the event of war, Morley secured tant refusal of Ulster to accept sub- When Grey was warned on 6 a ruling that no firm commitment ordination to a home rule authority July by the German ambassador should be incurred without prior in Catholic Dublin. Lichnowsky that Germany would cabinet approval. During the next A conference of the conflicting support an Austrian attack on Bel- two years Grey encouraged a series parties at Buckingham Palace col- grade he seems to have remained of initiatives designed to relieve lapsed in failure on 24 July. On the complacently confident that the Anglo-German tensions. During following day, when news broke balance of power would work to Haldane’s mission to Berlin in Feb- of the harsh Austrian ultima- achieve a peaceful settlement. Ger- ruary 1912, it became clear that the tum to Serbia, nearly four weeks many could be relied on to restrain Germans would not renounce their after Sarajevo, The Times belat- Austria (rather than urging her to competitive programme of warship edly acknowledged the existence act quickly before Russia was ready building without a reciprocal Brit- of these wider problems: ‘Eng- to retaliate), and France would sim- ish undertaking to remain neutral land cannot suffer the failure of ilarly restrain Russia. Poincaré, the in a continental war. Discussions the Home Rule Conference … to French president, was due to pay a took place over colonial policy divert her attention from the grave crucially important state visit to St when Lewis Harcourt, negotiated Accounts of crisis that has arisen in Europe Petersburg from 20 to 23 July; but with his German opposite number within the last thirty-six hours.’ Grey had no idea whether Poin- an agreement for the partitioning the events John Morley had been particularly caré’s aim was to be conciliatory, or of Portugal’s African colonies in preoccupied by Ireland: the third whether he would be mainly con- the not unlikely event of financial leading to Home Rule Bill was the climax of cerned to stiffen Russian resolve.9 default. The agreement was ini- a political career that had begun A Times leading article on 23 July tialled in October 1913, but not the out- nearly thirty years earlier when expressed the hope that the state published. In June 1914 agreement he had acted as Gladstone’s deputy visit would ‘operate as a salutary was reached on the vexed question break of the in introducing the first home rule warning to the “war parties” in all of the Baghdad railway project: legislation.

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