JOHN MORLEY’S RESIGNATION IN AUGUST 1914

This article supplements the account in Morley of Blackburn1 of John Morley’s resignation from Asquith’s cabinet on the outbreak of war in 1914. Writing such an article is not easy because of the unceasing flow of books and articles about the origins of the war, and the need to maintain a reasonable level of objectivity about an event that, even after a hundred years, arouses powerful emotions. In one of the last articles he wrote before his death, Patrick Jackson analyses the reasons for Morley’s resignation and challenges the views of those who ascribed it solely to his optimism about Germany and his pessimism about Russia.

26 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 JOHN MORLEY’S RESIGNATION IN AUGUST 1914

ome commentators have no his resounding denunciation of the monarchy’ of Austria-Hungary felt doubt that Britain was right Boer War fifteen years earlier were threatened by militant Slav nation- Sto join France in a war justi- disappointed if they hoped for a alism. Germany feared encircle- fied, despite an appalling cost in similar declaration in 1914. Instead ment by Russia and France. Behind human lives, by the need to safe- Morley opted out of his share of the strident nationalism there was guard Europe from German domi- responsibility for the war by retir- a deep-seated fatalism about the nation, just as it was right to resist ing quietly to the well-stocked inevitable decline of older regimes Nazi aggression twenty-five years library of his home in Wimbledon and their evolutionary replace- later. For those who take this view, Park. Nevertheless in private he ment by rising races, a struggle for Morley’s motives are of little sig- remained certain that he had been the survival of the fittest in which nificance. His inability to recognise right to resign, and that the lead- war played a natural part. Some self-evident truths must be attrib- ers of the Liberal government, par- of the European powers sought uted to declining powers, and he ticularly Asquith and Grey, bore a greater security in alliances that can be written off as ‘yesterday’s heavy responsibility for what had were regarded by the participants man’, an elderly icon of obsolete gone so disastrously wrong. As he as defensive but by opponents as Gladstonian morality who failed told Rosebery in November 1920, threatening. to understand the new realities of amid the clamour over German Britain had traditionally twentieth-century power poli- war-guilt, ‘I do not let go my obsti- favoured a policy of isolation, rely- tics. David Hamer writes almost nate conviction that the catastrophe ing on naval supremacy to avoid despairingly in the Oxford Dic- … was due to three blunderers, the entanglements in mainland Europe, tionary of National Biography that Kaiser and a couple of Englishmen but when the Liberals came to Morley ‘did not even [my italics] whom I’d as lief not name with the power in 1905 the foreign secre- find a casus belli in German aggres- proper adjectives.’2 tary, Edward Grey, inherited Brit- sion against Belgium.’ ish membership of a new entente On the other hand, for those designed to end the imperial rivalry of us who believe that more could The international background with France. Liberals were uneasy have been done in July 1914 to pre- Despite a general rise in economic about the implications of the alli- vent the Balkan crisis from escalat- prosperity during the early years ance between France and tsarist ing into a catastrophic world war of the twentieth century there was Russia, and feared that the strate- (regarded by all the participants as a widespread feeling of insecurity gic conversations between army defensive or preventive), and who as the great powers jostled for com- and naval officers would com- find the case for British involve- petitive advantage and prestige. mit Britain to a policy of hostility ment inconclusive, Morley’s resig- Britain’s vulnerability, as an over- towards Germany. In 1871, after nation raises significant questions. extended maritime empire, had the Franco-Prussian war, Morley Why did he fail to ensure that the been painfully exposed in the Boer had welcomed ‘the interposition cabinet explored the key issues War; and Russia, despite huge nat- in the heart of the European state adequately before reaching its pre- John Morley, 1st ural resources, had been similarly system, of a powerful, industrious, cipitate decision? Why did he refuse Viscount Morley humiliated by Japan. France still intelligent and progressive peo- to speak out publicly against the of Blackburn resented the loss of Alsace-Lorraine ple, between the Western nations war? Admirers who remembered (1838–1923) in 1871, and the ramshackle ‘dual and the half-barbarous Russian

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 27 john morley’s resignation in august 1914 swarms.’3 The following decades the House of Commons that ‘the heard about the assassination. After saw a growing antagonism between two great Empires begin to realize nearly nine years at the Foreign Britain and Germany, but Morley, that the points of cooperation are Office, making him the most expe- like many Liberals, continued to greater and more numerous than rienced foreign minister in Europe, believe that German militarism was the points of possible controversy.’7 Grey was well aware of the precari- a temporary phase better dealt with ous balance of power in the Bal- by conciliation than by confronta- kans. He must have realised that the tion. The tensions reached a climax A wasted month: 28 June – 24 murder of the heir to the imperial in 1911, after a German infringe- July 1914 throne, with the suspected conniv- ment of French colonial pretensions Accounts of the events leading ance of Belgrade, would provoke a in Morocco. Morley urged caution to the outbreak of the war tend violent reaction in Vienna, and that on Asquith, ‘I utterly dislike and to underestimate the seriousness the Austrians would seek a pre- distrust the German methods … of the delay in responding to the liminary guarantee of support from But that is no reason why we should assassination at Sarajevo on 28 their German allies just as the Serbs give them the excuse of this provo- June. Nearly a month of inactiv- would appeal for help from Rus- cation.’4 He recognised the danger- ity followed, with no determined sia. When the crisis finally ended in ous instability of the kaiser, but diplomatic attempts to defuse the a world war, Grey claimed that he argued that ‘the way to treat a man dispute between Austria-Hungary had worked tirelessly for peace; but who has made a fool of himself is to and Serbia before the other major most of his initiatives took place in let him down as easily as possible’.5 European powers were dragged in. the final days of frantic activity that In August 1911, when it emerged In Britain, politicians and the press followed the Austrian ultimatum, that plans had been finalised to were preoccupied by the situation and by that stage they were all ‘too transport British troops to France in Ireland resulting from the mili- little, too late.’ in the event of war, Morley secured tant refusal of Ulster to accept sub- When Grey was warned on 6 a ruling that no firm commitment ordination to a home rule authority July by the German ambassador should be incurred without prior in Catholic Dublin. Lichnowsky that Germany would cabinet approval. During the next A conference of the conflicting support an Austrian attack on Bel- two years Grey encouraged a series parties at Buckingham Palace col- grade he seems to have remained of initiatives designed to relieve lapsed in failure on 24 July. On the complacently confident that the Anglo-German tensions. During following day, when news broke balance of power would work to Haldane’s mission to Berlin in Feb- of the harsh Austrian ultima- achieve a peaceful settlement. Ger- ruary 1912, it became clear that the tum to Serbia, nearly four weeks many could be relied on to restrain Germans would not renounce their after Sarajevo, The Times belat- Austria (rather than urging her to competitive programme of warship edly acknowledged the existence act quickly before Russia was ready building without a reciprocal Brit- of these wider problems: ‘Eng- to retaliate), and France would sim- ish undertaking to remain neutral land cannot suffer the failure of ilarly restrain Russia. Poincaré, the in a continental war. Discussions the Home Rule Conference … to French president, was due to pay a took place over colonial policy divert her attention from the grave crucially important state visit to St when Lewis Harcourt, negotiated Accounts of crisis that has arisen in Europe Petersburg from 20 to 23 July; but with his German opposite number within the last thirty-six hours.’ Grey had no idea whether Poin- an agreement for the partitioning the events John Morley had been particularly caré’s aim was to be conciliatory, or of Portugal’s African colonies in preoccupied by Ireland: the third whether he would be mainly con- the not unlikely event of financial leading to Home Rule Bill was the climax of cerned to stiffen Russian resolve.9 default. The agreement was ini- a political career that had begun A Times leading article on 23 July tialled in October 1913, but not the out- nearly thirty years earlier when expressed the hope that the state published. In June 1914 agreement he had acted as Gladstone’s deputy visit would ‘operate as a salutary was reached on the vexed question break of the in introducing the first home rule warning to the “war parties” in all of the Baghdad railway project: legislation. the great countries against the dan- the Germans agreed to terminate war tend to For many British people Sara- ger of playing with fire.’ the line at Basra and to consult the jevo, and Belgrade the Serbian capi- This reflected Grey’s wish- British government before any sub- underesti- tal, were distant places in which ful thinking. His over-optimism sequent extension. Scholars differ it was hard to detect any direct arose partly from his acknowledged about the significance of these ini- mate the national interest. Many would have success during the previous year, tiatives, but they show that Grey agreed with John Burns, the presi- when he had chaired an ambassa- did not regard Germany as an seriousness dent of the Board of Trade who dorial conference of the six major implacable aggressor with whom of the delay later resigned from the cabinet with European powers (France, Russia, improved diplomatic relations were Morley, when he robustly declared, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy not to be contemplated. Plans for in respond- ‘Why 4 great powers should fight and Great Britain) which achieved a secret mission to Berlin by his over Servia no fellow can under- a provisional settlement of the first private secretary Sir William Tyr- ing to the stand.’8 C. P. Scott’s Manchester Balkan War: the Treaty of London, rell were aborted by the outbreak Guardian took a similar view: Man- signed on 30 May 1913. However, of war,6 but in July 1914 relations assassination chester cared about Belgrade as this diplomatic coup makes it all the with Germany were better than little as Belgrade cared about Man- more surprising that Grey did not they had been for over a decade. On at Sarajevo chester. However none of this pro- reconvene the conference immedi- 23 July (less than a fortnight before vides any satisfactory explanation ately after Sarajevo, in an attempt war broke out) Lloyd George told on 28 June. for Grey’s failure to act as soon as he to secure international agreement

28 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 john morley’s resignation in august 1914 about the terms that it would be Colonel House had described the Grey was strong supporter of Grey’s policies reasonable to impose upon Ser- European situation to him as ‘jin- and was regularly briefed by Tyr- bia. Instead he waited until 27 July, goism run stark mad.’ Unless some- respected rell. On 29 July a leader (‘Close the when the Austrians were about to one acting for the president could Ranks’) insisted that there could be attack Belgrade (after an ultima- ‘bring about a different under- for the hon- no question of a change in politi- tum that shocked him by its sever- standing there is bound some day to cal control involving the replace- ity) before proposing a four-power be an awful cataclysm.’10 esty of his ment of Grey. This same article ambassadorial conference. Aus- Grey was respected for the hon- emphasised the need to be faithful tria-Hungary and Russia, the two esty of his motives, but he lacked motives, but to allies: ‘England will be found as major powers involved directly the imagination to seek new ways ready to stand by her friends today in the dispute, would be excluded of filling the gaps in the interna- he lacked as ever she was aiding Europe [to] from the conference and thus in tional negotiating machinery. fling off the despotism of Napo- effect subjected to arbitration. Grey Instead he pursued a policy that the imagina- leon.’ However the article reit- explained to the House of Com- seemed sometimes to consist of lit- tion to seek erated that Britain had no direct mons that, as long as the dispute tle more than drifting, hoping for interest in the Balkans, and there had involved only Austria-Hun- the best of both worlds by enjoy- new ways of was as yet no suggestion that Ger- gary and Serbia, ‘we had no title to ing the security of the entente many was the only threat, even interfere.’ When it became obvi- while avoiding its aggressive com- filling the though powerful pressures were ous that Russia would intervene, mitments and seeking to remain being brought to bear to overcome the short time available had forced friendly with Germany. During the gaps in the the ‘pacific leanings’ of the kaiser. him to take the risk of ‘making a final days of July it became increas- By 31 July any remaining balance in proposal without the usual prelimi- ingly clear that the two aims were international the assessment of the situation had nary steps of trying to ascertain incompatible. However, if Grey disappeared: whether it would be well received.’ failed to seize the diplomatic initia- negotiating Unsurprisingly the extraordinary tive during the crucial weeks after We must make instant prepara- proposal was rejected, although Sarajevo, it has to be said that Mor- machinery. tions to back our friends, if they The Times applauded the way in ley and those who were to oppose are made the subject of unjust which Grey had taken such prompt British involvement in the conflict attack. … The days of ‘splendid action, ‘with characteristic indiffer- showed little greater awareness isolation’ … are no more. We ence to considerations of personal of the urgency of the situation. In cannot stand alone in a Europe and national amour propre’. 1911 Morley had spoken out about dominated by any single Power. Of course the powers might the dangerous implications of the have similarly rejected a much entente, but in 1914 he waited until On Saturday 1 August the tone of earlier initiative to recall the full 24 July for Grey to raise the cri- self-righteous emotional conviction six-power conference, but at that sis in the cabinet. The delay was persisted: for Britain this would stage Grey would have had time disastrous. not be a war of national hatred, to consider alternative initiatives. since we had ‘nothing to avenge Perhaps the king might have been and nothing to acquire.’ Our only persuaded to suggest to the kaiser The final days motives were ‘the duty we owe to a conference in Berlin, attended by During the days after 28 July when our friends and the instinct of self- the tsar and the Austrian emperor Austria declared war on Serbia preservation.’ There was no serious with all their senior advisers. and Russia embarked on partial examination of essential questions Although notoriously unpredict- mobilisation, the focus of the crisis such as the exact nature of the sup- able, the kaiser was susceptible shifted with dramatic suddenness posed threat to British interests, to flattery and ambivalent about to the prospect of an impending and the arguments for and against Britain, his mother’s country. As it continental war in which none of British involvement in a continen- was, no attempt was made to take the European powers could avoid tal land war rather than relying advantage of the imperial family entanglement. upon traditional naval power. The relationships until 1 August, when In Britain the shift was espe- absence of any rational discussion the king was awakened by Asquith cially remarkable: by the bank of the case against British participa- in the early hours of the morn- holiday weekend of 1–2 August, tion was partly offset by the pub- ing to send a message to his cousin, when the decision to go to war was lication on the same day of a long the tsar, in a belated and predict- reached, the issue was widely seen letter from Norman Angell (whose ably futile attempt to delay Rus- in terms of Britain’s moral obliga- The Great Illusion11 had strongly sian mobilisation. Another possible tion to support France (and inciden- influenced the international peace initiative during the period imme- tally Belgium) against unprovoked movement) and of a pro-German diately after Sarajevo might have military aggression. The fact that manifesto signed by a group of been to invoke the good offices of France had knowingly placed her- academics. Angell repudiated the the United States President Wood- self at risk by the alliance with suggestion that neutrality would row Wilson, who was to play a key Russia no longer seemed relevant result in dangerous isolation: on role in the setting up of the League except to Morley and a minority the contrary it would mean that, of Nations after the war. When he who still thought in these terms. while other nations were torn and offered to mediate, on 2 August, it The changing perspective can weakened by war, Britain ‘might was far too late, but he might have be seen in successive leading arti- conceivably for a long time be the responded to an earlier approach. cles in The Times. Although nomi- strongest Power in Europe.’ Con- On 25 May 1914, his representative nally Conservative, the paper was a versely British involvement would

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 29 john morley’s resignation in august 1914 ensure the supremacy of Russia to their own positions and the dis- Morley’s and after the 29 July meeting Burns (‘two hundred million autocrati- cussions were patchy and perfunc- reported that when the situation cally governed people, with a very tory, with neither Grey nor Morley account of had been ‘seriously reviewed from rudimentary civilization, but heav- making any serious attempt to win all points of view’ it was ‘decided ily equipped for military aggres- the overall argument. Eventually the cabinet not to decide.’ Grey was instructed sion’), rather than a Germany cabinet agreement, of sorts, was to tell the French and German ‘highly civilized and mainly given reached on the peripheral questions meetings, ambassadors, Cambon and Lich- to the arts of trade and commerce.’ of Belgian territorial integrity and nowsky (both increasingly frus- Behind the scenes, in a series the security of the Channel coast, in his Memo- trated by Britain’s indecision) that of seven cabinet meetings on the rather than on the major questions we were unable to pledge ourselves ten days between 24 July and 2 that had gone unaddressed. randum on in advance ‘either under all condi- August, ministers stumbled con- Morley’s account of the cabinet Resignation, tions to stand aside or in any con- fusedly from the consideration of a meetings, in his Memorandum on ditions to join in.’ However Grey distant crisis that no one regarded Resignation,12 is an essential source is an essen- warned Lichnowsky, without cabi- as calling for British participation, for anyone seeking to understand net authorisation, that if Germany to the prospect of an unprovoked his role; but it is a flawed and frus- tial source and France went to war Britain attack on France about which it was trating record that reads at times might be forced to intervene. difficult for anyone to remain indif- like a later reminiscence. However for anyone It seems to have been at the ferent. By the end of the series of the text was written within a few 29 July meeting that the possible meetings only Morley and Burns, weeks of the events, and cleared seeking to infringement of Belgian neutrality out of a much larger original num- with John Burns, who confirmed was first raised, but Morley insisted ber of dissenters, remained com- its essential accuracy and added a understand that the issue remained secondary mitted to British neutrality. It is passage clarifying his own stand- to that of support for France. In the not easy to follow the process by point. In August 1928, Guy Mor- his role; but final days before the declaration of which this shift occurred, but no ley, who had inherited his uncle’s war, Belgium provided a highly one reading the surviving accounts papers, decided that the work ought it is a flawed emotional pretext for those previ- (there were no formal minutes of to be published. The Memorandum ously opposed to British participa- cabinet proceedings) can fail to be plunges straight into an account of and frustrat- tion, but it remained a peripheral appalled by the inadequacy of the the cabinet meeting on 24 July, the issue. Belgium had not always been discussions. This was supposed to first since Sarajevo at which foreign ing record a popular subject for radical sym- be a mature parliamentary democ- affairs had been discussed. Grey pathies, outraged by Morel’s con- racy facing one of the most critical startled his colleagues by disclosing that reads demnation of colonial atrocities in moments in its history and the fail- the contents of a telegram from the at times the Congo. Moreover no one knew ure to address many of the major ambassador in St Petersburg who whether the German army would questions was lamentable. Asquith reported that Russia and France like a later need to cross more than a corner and Grey must bear the main bur- were determined to react strongly of Belgian territory, and whether den of responsibility, but Morley, to the Austrian ultimatum against reminiscence. the Belgian government would too, failed to ensure that the cabinet Serbia, and that the Russian for- actively resist the invasion rather considered the crucial issues ade- eign minister was calling for Brit- than accepting a German offer to quately. What would be the prob- ain’s support. According to Morley, respect Belgian territorial integrity able outcome if Britain remained Grey announced ‘in his own quiet after the war. neutral? How serious would Ger- way’ that the time had come for the Morley’s account of the cabinet man supremacy in Europe actually cabinet to ‘make up its mind plainly discussions during the last week be? Would it be possible to confine whether we were to take an active of July is spasmodic, and the tone British participation to naval action part with the other two Powers of of his interventions is sometimes rather than sending land forces to the Entente, or to stand aside … casual, almost as if he was tak- the continent? What would be the and preserve an absolute neutrality.’ ing part in an academic debate. He costs of involvement, in financial Morley was relaxed about the cabi- was clearly over-confident about and human terms? Was it right to net’s likely response, and Asquith’s the strength of support for a policy dismiss without further explora- account of the meeting (in a letter of neutrality, and seems to have tion the offers made by Germany to his inamorata Venetia Stanley) had no expectation that the case in an attempt to secure British reported that although Europe was for war would soon prove irresist- neutrality? ‘within measurable … distance of ible. When, on one occasion, Grey It became obvious at an early a real Armageddon … Happily ‘rather suddenly let fall his view stage that the cabinet was dead- there seems to be no reason why … that German policy was that locked. Grey, inhibited by his assur- we should be anything more than of a great European aggressor, as ance that the military discussions spectators.’13 bad as Napoleon’, Morley merely with France had not involved any During the next two meet- replied that although ‘I have no firm commitment, failed to con- ings the impasse remained unre- German partialities … you do not vince a majority of his colleagues solved. After the 27 July meeting, give us evidence.’ This was surely that there was a valid case for Brit- Lloyd George told C. P. Scott that the crucial question upon which ish participation in the forthcom- there could be ‘no question of our Grey should have been challenged. ing war. But he threatened to resign taking part in any war in the first On another occasion Lloyd George rather than concede the demand instance.’14 However Grey contin- ‘furthered the good cause’ by for a declaration of unconditional ued to resist calls for a declaration reporting that leading figures in the neutrality. The two sides held firm that Britain would remain neutral, City and major manufacturers were

30 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 john morley’s resignation in august 1914

‘aghast at the bare idea of our plung- of the day Morley and Burns had shld be wiped out as a Great Power’, ing into the European conflict.’ resigned, but the way in which the as it was for Germany to be allowed However when Morley sought to final decision swung against them ‘to use the Channel as a hostile raise this important question at a seems almost casual with none of base.’ But the employment on the later meeting, Lloyd George replied the critical issues debated. continent of a British expedition- ‘rather tartly’ that he had never said At the morning session Grey ary force was seen by Asquith ‘at he believed it all. At another session conceded that the entente entailed this moment’ as being ‘out of the Morley found his colleagues ‘rather no formal commitment to sup- question.’17 surprised at the stress I laid on the port France, and that Britain was In the Memorandum Morley Russian side of things’: not ‘bound by the same obliga- described a lunchtime meeting tions of honour’ as those that bound of eight or nine cabinet ministers If Germany is beaten … it is not France to Russia. However he who opposed British participation England and France who will reminded his colleagues that, under in the war. These included Lewis emerge pre-eminent in Europe. the terms of the Anglo-French Harcourt, who had organised the It will be Russia … [and people] naval agreement, the French fleet lobby with his usual diligence and will rub their eyes when they had been deployed in the Medi- deviousness, and Lloyd George realise that Cossacks are their terranean, leaving the Channel who was still sitting on the fence. victorious fellow champions coast undefended. After a long Morley offered the waverers a way for freedom, justice, equality of and difficult discussion Grey was to opt out: man … and respect for treaties. authorised to assure an increas- ingly agitated Cambon that the Personally my days were dwin- This little speech has a rather ‘set British navy would provide pro- dling. I was a notorious peace- piece’ flavour, like the riposte when tection in the event of German man and little Englander. My Grey extolled the contribution to aggression in the Channel. At this disappearance would be totally peace of the balance of power. For point Burns resigned (a blow that different from theirs … with Morley this was a euphemism for Asquith took ‘a trifle too coolly’), their lives before them and ‘two giant groups armed to the since he regarded the decision as long issues committed to their teeth, each in mortal terror of the tantamount to a declaration of war. charge. other, both of them passing year Morley was readier to accept it, and after year in an incurable fever of Morley similarly he reported in an oddly Morley left the meeting doubting jealousy and suspicion!’ relaxed way how the cabinet acqui- whether ‘the fervid tone’ of these In contrast the Memorandum doubted esced in Grey’s request to warn colleagues would last: ‘I saw no records John Burns’s uncompromis- Lichnowsky that ‘it would be hard standard bearer.’ But he had few ing stand against British interven- what to restrain English feeling on any doubts about his own position, and tion. Burns saw himself as a trustee violation of Belgian neutrality by during a period of quiet reflection for the working classes, and as such grounds either combatant.’ In fact, a minute at the Athenaeum he cleared his it was his ‘especial duty to dissoci- there were reproduced at the end of the pub- mind before returning for the even- ate myself … from such a crime as lished Memorandum reveals that this ing cabinet. Morley doubted what the contemplated war would be.’ ‘for expect- warning had been given to the Ger- grounds there were ‘for expect- After the 29 July meeting, Burns man ambassador on the previous ing that the ruinous waste and told Morley ‘with violent empha- ing that day, when Lichnowsky attempted havoc of war would be repaid by sis’ that ‘we look to you to stand to draw Grey into formulating peace on better terms than were firm’; but after a similar appeal on the ruin- the assurances, relating to French already within reach of reason and 31 July, Morley ‘was not keen in or Belgian territory, that would persistent patience.’ He compared response as to my taking any lead.’ ous waste secure British neutrality. Grey had the gains of war ‘against the fero- On 1 August there was no real pro- refused to consider any such bar- cious hatred that would burn with gress and the cabinet remained and havoc of gain, and Asquith dismissed this inextinguishable fire, for a whole deadlocked. In Asquith’s account ‘rather shameless attempt … to buy generation at least, between two they came ‘near to the parting of war would our neutrality’ as an example of communities better fitted to under- the ways,’ with Morley still on ‘the ‘something very crude and almost stand one another than any other Manchester Guardian tack’ of declar- be repaid childlike about German diplo- pair in Europe?’ ing that ‘in no circumstances will macy.’16 However Morley noted his we take a hand. This no doubt is the by peace view that it was a pity not to ‘take With a fleet of overwhelm- view for the moment of the bulk of advantage of the occasion for more ing power … when the smoke the party.’ Lloyd George, although on better talk and negotiation … instead of of battlefields had cleared … ‘all for peace’ was ‘more sensible terms than this wooden non possumus.’ England might have exerted an and statesmanlike, for keeping the In his account of the morn- influence not to be acquired by position still open.’ Grey contin- were already ing cabinet, Asquith reckoned that a hundred of her little Expedi- ued to insist that ‘if an out & out Lloyd George, Morley and Har- tionary Forces. … policy of non- intervention … within reach court were still opposed to inter- is adopted he will go.’15 The cru- vention, as were three-quarters This was a powerful message and cial decisions that led to war were of reason and of the Liberal Party in the House if delivered in parliament, or even reached on 2 August – the Sunday of Commons. Asquith listed the in cabinet, it might have provided of a hot Bank Holiday weekend – persistent points on which he was quite clear the leadership which the opponents when unprecedentedly there were what was right and wrong: it was of British participation so con- two cabinet meetings. By the end patience.’ ‘against British interests that France spicuously lacked. But Morley no

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 31 john morley’s resignation in august 1914 longer had the mental or physical playing a last tactical card, rely- failure to explore the German stamina to face the emotional tur- ing on Morley’s vulnerability to offers to negotiate terms for Brit- moil. Instead he returned for the flattery and emotional blackmail to ish neutrality. Many of the speakers evening cabinet and told Asquith of ensure that he did nothing to rock saw Germany as a less serious long- his decision to resign with Burns. the boat. If that was the aim it was term threat than Russia, and they He agreed to remain until after the very successful. were unconvinced by the need to meeting on the following morning, safeguard the territorial integrity Monday 3 August. of Belgium. The underlying cause Morley was anxious not to spoil The closing of the ranks of the war was ‘a deep animosity the occasion of this last cabinet, On the afternoon of 3 August against German ambitions … [a] twenty-eight years after he joined Morley did not go to hear Grey’s mad desire to keep up an impossi- Gladstone’s third government in House of Commons speech in bility in Europe.’ It was not a peo- l886. Asquith paid tribute to Morley which the decision to go to war was ple’s war, but one brought about ‘by as ‘the senior of us all, the one who Morley announced. He would have found men in high places … working in is the greatest source of the moral the cheers from the Conservative secret … [to preserve] the remnant authority of the government.’ He included in benches depressing; but he might of an older evil civilisation which recognised that other members of have been heartened to hear the is disappearing by gradual and the cabinet and many government the Memo- strong case made by some of the peaceful methods.’ The Conserva- supporters in the House of Com- Liberal dissenters, which showed tive Balfour finally wound up the mons shared Morley’s views, and in randum an that Morley’s views on the war proceedings, contemptuously dis- normal circumstances this would were not a personal eccentricity. missing the arguments as ‘the very impose on a prime minister the extraordi- Much of Grey’s speech was devoted dregs and lees of debate.’ Asquith duty to resign. However Asquith to an insistence that he had worked had secured majority support in the said that in the present national nary final untiringly for peace and that, House of Commons, but at a heavy emergency ‘I cannot persuade although Britain was not formally price. myself that the other party is led by exchange of committed by the entente to pro- On the following day, 4 August, men … capable of dealing with it.’ vide armed support to France, there The Times report of the debate was This speech is a reminder that party correspond- was a moral obligation: euphoric. The House of Commons politics remained an important had been ‘at its best’ in its recep- consideration for many members ence with If … we run away from those tion of a speech ‘destined to remain of a Liberal government who were obligations of honour and inter- memorable in the history of the proud of its achievements. On the Asquith, est … I doubt whether, what- world’, and the half-hearted voice previous day Bonar Law had writ- ever material force we might of dissent ‘served but as a foil to the ten to Asquith undertaking to pro- who wrote have at the end, it would be of general unanimity.’ On 6 August, vide Conservative backing for any at midnight very much value in face of the The Times reported that the House measures the government decided respect we should have lost. … of Commons was ‘maintaining its to take ‘in support of France and on 3 August [We should be unable to prevent united front superbly’: when the Russia.’ This could be seen as a the whole of the West of Europe] prime minister announced the res- threat, as well as a promise. begging Mor- falling under the domination of ignations of Morley, Burns, and Morley included in the Memo- a single Power. Trevelyan, ‘nobody showed the randum an extraordinary final ley ‘with all slightest concern.’ Even the Man- exchange of correspondence with Bonar Law assured the govern- chester Guardian, which had cam- Asquith, who wrote at midnight my heart’ ment of Conservative support, and paigned for British neutrality, was on 3 August begging Morley ‘with the only immediate note of dis- muted, although in one of the let- all my heart’ to rethink his posi- to rethink sent came in a brief speech by the ters congratulating Morley on his tion before taking a step ‘which Labour leader Ramsay MacDonald. resignation C. P. Scott said that it impoverishes the Government, his posi- He dismissed the appeal to honour: would have been dreadful if we had and leaves me stranded and almost throughout history statesmen had been ‘dragged into a war for the alone.’ Morley was touched by this tion before similarly justified their crimes. As balance of power without a single uncharacteristically emotional for the special relationship with resignation from those who stand appeal but reiterated the ‘cardinal taking a France, ‘no such friendship … for the older Liberalism.’19 One of difference’ on foreign policy which between one nation and another the most moving of the letters was made his resignation necessary. It step ‘which could ever justify one of those one from Grey: would be easy to judge Asquith’s nations entering into war on behalf final approach cynically. The claim impoverishes of the other.’ My heart is too full of all the that he was being left ‘stranded and the Govern- An attempt by backbenchers misery of the time to let me almost alone’ came oddly from a to extend the discussion was frus- write what I feel. I am choked leader who had maintained party ment, and trated by Asquith’s vague promise with it. But I think of you unity by isolating all those who of a full debate on some later date, with much tender feeling & opposed him, and who could rely leaves me but eventually they secured a two- affection.20 on cross-party support in parlia- hour adjournment debate at the end ment. On 1 August 1914 he had told stranded of the day’s sitting. Many accounts The absence of any trace of trium- Venetia Stanley that ‘we may have pay insufficient attention to this phalism in this letter reinforced to contemplate with such equa- and almost debate, in which about twenty Morley’s resolve not to make things nimity as we can command the loss Liberals spoke forcefully against harder for those left to bear the of Morley.’18 Perhaps Asquith was alone.’ what they saw as Grey’s precipitate brunt of the war. He told Haldane

32 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 john morley’s resignation in august 1914 that ‘I part from my colleagues in Britain’s involvement in the war in There was Morley (Fairleigh Dickinson Univer- more sorrow than I expected. The 1914 was partly personal: he was sity Press, 2012). pang is sharp.’21 Morley’s stance was old and tired and reluctant to speak no adequate 2 NLS MS 10048 1222. not a heroic one. He had always out against ministerial colleagues 3 Jackson, Morley of Blackburn, p. 49. lacked the last degree of ruthless- of whom he had become fond. But debate, in 4 AP MS Asquith 13, fo. 39. ness necessary for a political career, the failure was also more general. 5 BL, Hirtzel Diary, 5 Nov. 1908. and by 1914 he was too old and tired There was no adequate debate, in the cabinet 6 T. G. Otte, ‘Détente 1914: Sir Wil- to lead a crusade for peace. Even for the cabinet or in parliament, about liam Tyrrell’s Secret Mission to Ger- a younger man it was not easy to the reasons for going to war (par- or in parlia- many’, Historical Journal (March 2013). stand out against the popular war ticularly the case for sending an 7 A. J. P. Taylor, The Troublemakers: fever. On 18 August 1914, Morley army to France rather than relying ment, about Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1792–1939 wrote to Rosebery, after reading a on naval power). Opponents of the the reasons (1957), p. 126. ‘screed’ in The Times about the war war failed to face up clearly to the 8 Keith Robbins, Sir Edward Grey: A being ‘long and very long’, that ‘the implications of neutrality. It was for going to Biography of Lord Grey of Fallodon (Lit- insanity of the hour would have uncomfortable to argue that France tlehampton Book Services, 1971), p. seemed incredible a month ago.’22 should be ‘left in the lurch’ against war (particu- 287. Lloyd George, who up to the elev- a German attack, and those tak- 9 Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalk- enth hour had been doubtful about ing such a line needed to make it larly the case ers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 British participation, was soon pro- clear whether they believed that the (Harper, 2013), p. 446. ducing speeches full of stomach- consequences of a German victory for sending 10 Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (Allen turning rhetoric: on 19 September were not as serious as suggested. Lane, 1998), p. 153. he professed to envy young people Looking back after a century (much an army to 11 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A their opportunity to share in ‘the of which has been devoted to the Study of the Relation of Military Power glow and thrill of a great move- struggle against Russian domina- France rather to National Advantage (G. P. Putnam’s ment for liberty.’23 Almost para- tion that Morley foretold), it is eas- Sons, 1910). doxically, the appalling level of ier to accept Germany’s leadership than rely- 12 J. V. Morley, Memorandum on Resigna- casualties, instead of raising doubts of Europe as natural and inevitable. tion (Macmillan, 1928). about whether the corresponding But at the time few were willing or ing on naval 13 Michael and Eleanor Brock (eds.), benefits were proportionate, merely able to spell this out, and Morley’s H. H. Asquith – Letters to Venetia Stan- made it harder to admit that the critics were able to portray his opti- power). ley (Oxford University Press, 1988), slaughter might initially have been mism about Germany and his pessi- letter 103. avoided. mism about Russia (although these Opponents 14 Robbins, Grey, pp. 291–2. It is only through occasional ref- views were widely shared) as being of the war 15 Brock (eds.), Asquith Letters, letter erences in the letters written dur- based upon emotional prejudice. 112. ing the war that Morley revealed There is still no clear consensus. failed to face 16 Ibid., letter 110. his feelings. The comradeship 17 Ibid., letter 113. that he had established with John Patrick Jackson was the author of Mor- up clearly to 18 Ibid., letter 112. Burns in the stressful time of their ley of Blackburn, a biography of John 19 MP MS Eng d 3585, fo. l42 resignations was reinforced over Morley published in 2012. This article the impli- 20 MP MS Eng d 3585, fo. 146 the years. On 9 July 1916, Morley was one of the last he wrote before his 21 NLS MS 5910, fo. 253 wrote that he would not soon ‘for- death in November 2014 (see obituary, cations of 22 NLS MS 10048, fo. 70 get your visit here tonight … the Journal of Liberal History 86 (winter 23 John Grigg, Lloyd George: From Peace angry vision of this hideous war 2014–15)). neutrality. to War 1912–16 (Methuen, 1985), p. … makes me proud that I hold the 165. hand of such a comrade in a great 1 Patrick Jackson, Morley of Blackburn: 24 Morley, Memorandum, p. xi. piece of history.’24 Morley enjoyed A Literary and Political Biography of John 25 NLS MS 5910, fo. 291 being entertained in one or another of Rosebery’s great houses, and he kept in touch with some of his for- mer ministerial colleagues. Some- Liberal Democrat History Group online times he argued with them, but as Website he put it to Haldane in November See www.liberalhistory.org.uk for details of our activities and publications, guides to archive sources, 1914, the issues were ‘too momen- research resources, and a growing number of pages on the history of the party. (Please note that we are tous … to reduce them to mere cut ciurrently upgrading our website, and there may be some delay in making all content available.) and thrust. It is as if some blasting and desolating curse had fallen over Email 25 the world.’ He wondered ‘whether Join our email mailing list for news of History Group meetings and publications – the fastest and earliest any war has not been too heavy a way to find out what we’re doing. Fill in the form at: http://bit.ly/LDHGemail. price for its gain – excepting per- haps the American Civil War’ Facebook page which had ended slavery. 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Conclusion Twitter Morley’s failure to explain more A daily posting of Liberal events on this day in history. Follow us at: LibHistoryToday. clearly his motives for opposing

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 33