How Presidents' Personality Traits Lead To

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

How Presidents' Personality Traits Lead To THE QUEST FOR UNCONTESTED POWER: HOW PRESIDENTS’ PERSONALITY TRAITS LEAD TO CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE by Ignacio Arana Araya B.A. in Journalism and Mass Communication, Universidad Católica de Chile, 2002 M.A. in Political Science, Universidad de Chile, 2007 M.A. in Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2010 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Kenneth P. Dietrich School of Arts and Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2015 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH THE DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Ignacio Arana Araya It was defended on September 10, 2015 and approved by John Carey, Chair, Department of Government, Dartmouth College Silvia Borzutzky, Teaching Professor, Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University Kevin Morrison, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Pittsburgh Scott Morgenstern, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Pittsburgh Dissertation Advisor: Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Professor, Political Science, University of Pittsburgh ii Copyright © by Ignacio Arana Araya 2015 iii THE QUEST FOR UNCONTESTED POWER: HOW PRESIDENTS’ PERSONALITY TRAITS LEAD TO CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE Ignacio Arana Araya, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2015 Does it matter who the president is? If so, how does it matter? Most political science research that analyzes the presidency treats the individual differences of presidents as “residual variance.” I challenge this approach arguing that presidents’ decisions are shaped by their individual differences. I test the argument examining which presidents attempt to make constitutional changes to increase their powers or relax their term limits. Considering presidents who were governing by 1945, thirty eight leaders of the Western Hemisphere have made such attempts forty eight times. I hypothesize that presidents who are risk prone and have an assertive personality are more likely to try to change their country's legal charter. I answer the research question using a novel dataset of personality traits and background characteristics for 315 presidents who governed between 1945 and 2012. The dataset integrates information from a survey distributed to 911 experts from 26 nationalities, the coding of 13 individual characteristics of the leaders and semi-structured interviews conducted with 21 former presidents. The empirical analyses support the two hypotheses in the cases of presidents that try to change their powers, while the leaders’ assertiveness also proves to be a relevant cause of their attempts to relax their term limits. Interestingly, the individual differences of presidents have a stronger explanatory iv power than complementary explanations of constitutional reforms (i.e., institutional and contextual variables). This study makes important contributions. First, it advances the frontier of studies on the presidency by revealing how the uniqueness of presidents explain political outcomes. Second, it helps to integrate the current divide between quantitative and qualitative studies on the presidency. Third, its interdisciplinary approach provides a deeper understanding of institutional change. Current explanations of this foundational question in the social sciences remain incomplete because they have neglected the role of powerful individuals. Finally, this study proposes to make significant progress in understanding the relation between represented and their elected representatives, by helping to show how the citizens can use the individual differences of political candidates to anticipate how presidents will perform in office. v TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................. ………………………………………………..XI 1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 1.1 PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION ................................................................... 11 2.0 PERSONALIZING THE PRESIDENCY ................................................................ 15 2.1 THE DOWNFALL OF PRESIDENTIAL IDENTITY .................................. 18 2.1.1 The Quantitative Shift ................................................................................ 24 2.2 CHIEF EXECUTIVES IN THREE DOMINANT APPROACHES ............. 29 2.2.1 Quantitative Works .................................................................................... 29 2.2.2 Game Theoretic Accounts of the Presidency............................................. 32 2.2.3 Historical Institutionalism and American Political Development .......... 34 2.2.4 The Uniqueness of Presidents, an Uncomfortable Nexus ........................ 36 2.3 PRESIDENTS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY LITERATURE ............................ 37 2.4 WHAT PSYCHOLOGY CAN TEACH US ABOUT PRESIDENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE ........................................................................................... 43 3.0 PRESIDENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS: WHO CHANGES THE RULES?........................................................................................................................................ 46 3.1 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND PRESIDENTS .................................. 48 3.2 WHAT DO PRESIDENTS SAY? ..................................................................... 64 vi 3.2.1 Individual Differences and Governing ...................................................... 68 3.2.2 The Context ................................................................................................. 81 3.2.3 The Constitution.......................................................................................... 85 3.3 A PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ATTEMPTS ........................................................................................................................ 94 3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................................ 99 4.0 HOW TO STUDY THE PERSONALITY OF PRESIDENTS? .......................... 102 4.1 DIFFERENT APPROACHES ........................................................................ 103 4.2 WHY AN EXPERT SURVEY? ...................................................................... 107 4.3 EXPERT SURVEYS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE ........................................ 110 4.4 THE SURVEY ON PRESIDENTS ................................................................ 112 4.4.1 The Search and Selection of Experts ....................................................... 117 4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS .......................................................................... 121 5.0 THE QUEST TO CONSOLIDATE POWER: SAMPLE AND DATA .............. 122 5.1 WHO CHANGES THE CONSTITUTION? ................................................. 123 5.2 THE INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES ............................................................ 124 5.3 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE…………………………………………………………………………………129 5.4 PERSONALITY, INSTITUTIONS, AND CONTEXT REVISITED…..…135 5.5 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES: ENDOGENEITY AND SELECTION BIAS………………………………………………………………………………………138 5.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS .......................................................................... 142 6.0 THE INTIMATE RELATION WITH CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE ........... 143 vii 6.1 ACCOUNTING FOR RATER SELECTION ............................................... 145 6.2 PERSONALITY AND PRESIDENTIAL ATTEMPTS ............................... 147 6.3 ENDOGENEITY CONCERNS ...................................................................... 158 6.4 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES ................................................................. 160 6.4.1 Conditional Effects………………………………………........................ 160 6.4.2 Homogeneity Concerns ............................................................................. 164 6.5 ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS ........................................................... 170 6.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS .......................................................................... 175 7.0 PERSONALITY TRAITS IN ACTION ................................................................ 178 7.1 MANUEL ZELAYA AND THE COUP ........................................................ 182 7.2 HUGO CHÁVEZ AGAINST THE “OLD REGIME”….. ........................... 189 7.3 LUIS MONGE, THE POPULAR PRESIDENT ........................................... 195 7.4 ERNESTO PÉREZ, THE FAILED ATTEMPT........................................... 197 7.5 CONLUDING REMARKS ............................................................................ 201 8.0 PERSONALITY TRAITS IN ACTION ................................................................ 203 APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................................ 213 APPENDIX B ............................................................................................................................ 216 APPENDIX C ............................................................................................................................ 218 APPENDIX D ............................................................................................................................ 220 APPENDIX E ............................................................................................................................ 222 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 225 viii LIST OF TABLES
Recommended publications
  • U-M·I University Microfilms International a Bell & Howell Information Company 300 North Zeeb Road
    Castro's Cuba and Stroessner's Paraguay: A comparison of the totalitarian/authoritarian taxonomy. Item Type text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Sondrol, Paul Charles. Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 05/10/2021 11:08:31 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/185284 INFORMATION TO USERS The most advanced technology has been used to photogr2,pb and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted.. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this -reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is inciuded in reduced form at the back of the book.
    [Show full text]
  • Paraguay, 1954-2003*
    REVISTA DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA / VOLUMEN XXIV / Nº 2 / 2004 / 67 – 93 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLICYMAKING PROCESSES, AND POLICY OUTCOMES IN PARAGUAY, 1954-2003* JOSÉ MOLINAS INSTITUTO DESARROLLO, PARAGUAY ANÍBAL PÉREZ LIÑÁN UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH, ESTADOS UNIDOS SEBASTIÁN SAIEGH UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH, ESTADOS UNIDOS Resumen Este artículo caracteriza la evolución del proceso de elaboración de políticas (PMP) en Paraguay durante el período 1954–2003. El siguiente trabajo ofrece una perspectiva general del PMP durante la dictadura de Alfredo Stroessner (1954–89) y explora el contexto institucional resultante a partir de 1989. Tras analizar la fragmentación del partido Colorado, se describen los patrones característicos de la elabora- ción de políticas surgidas con la Constitución de 1992. Se sostiene como hipótesis que la presencia de un amplio número de jugadores con capacidad de veto ha dificultado el cambio y que los legisladores tienden a promover políticas particularistas. Para poner a prueba tal supuesto, utiliza una base de datos que contiene los proyectos de ley ingresados al Congreso desde abril de 1992. Las conclusiones sugie- ren que el proceso político paraguayo puede ser flexible para generar beneficios particularistas y rígido a la hora de realizar amplias transformaciones de tipo regulatorio o redistributivo. Abstract This paper characterizes the evolution of Paraguay’s policymaking process (PMP) between 1954 and 2003. We present an overview of the PMP under the rule of Alfredo Stroessner (1954–89) and explore the institutional setting emerging after 1989. We discuss how the Colorado Party progressively broke up into several factions and characterize the distinctive patterns of policymaking that emerged after the adoption of the 1992 Constitution.
    [Show full text]
  • In Bolivia: the Political Activities of Branko Marinković Rajković, Ana
    www.ssoar.info Opposing the policy of the twenty-first century socialism in Bolivia: the political activities of Branko Marinković Rajković, Ana Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Rajković, A. (2015). Opposing the policy of the twenty-first century socialism in Bolivia: the political activities of Branko Marinković. Südosteuropäische Hefte, 4(2), 37-47. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-454920 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur (Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden see: Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de Ana Rajković – Opposing the Policy of the Twenty-First Century Socialism in Bolivia Ana Rajković Opposing the Policy of the Twenty-First Century Socialism1 in Bolivia The Political Activities of Branko Marinković Abstract The Marinković family, which originated from the island of Brač, immigrated to the eastern Bolivian province of Santa Cruz in the mid-1950s. Thanks to a successful agricultural business, among other things, the family has become one of the richest and most influential families in Bolivia. Some analysts link Branko Marinković's origins with his oppositional activities in Bolivia. This is due to the fact that Marinković compares the contemporary “Twenty-first century socialism” policies of Bolivian president Evo Morales with the communist policies of Tito in Yugoslavia.
    [Show full text]
  • Amnesty International Newsletter
    amnesty international newsletter Vol. III No. 9 Se tember 1973 Founded 1961 OLIVE prisoner issue. Under the agreement 90,000 Pakistanis, mainly AI WELCOMES RELEASE OF PRISONERSmilitary prisoners of war, were to be released from Indian camps, 160,000 Bengalis were to be AND CALLS FOR PROBE INTO TORTUREallowed to leave Pakistan, and the possibility AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL welcomed President GE- was opened for about 260,000 Biharis from Bang- ORGE PAPADOPOULOS' announcement August 19 of an ladesh to go to Pakistan. amnesty for political prisoners in Greece but Some of the Bengalis and some Pakistani civi- expressed concern that those imprisoned before lians in India were adopted byAI groups. The the 1967 coup had not been included. International Secretariat said a further 260 AI Secretary General MARTIN ENNALS called for people arrested in Pakistan in May were about a tribunal of enquiry into allegations that ma- to be adopted when the accord was announced. ny of the released prisoners had been tortured. These cases were collected during a recent re- The Papadopoulos announcement, made on his search mission to the Indian sub-continent. accession to the presidency, resulted in free- Secretary General MARTIN ENNALS wrote last dom for about 350 prisoners, including many ad- January to Prime Minister INDIRA GANDHI of In- opted by AI groups. The president also ended dia and President ALI ZULFIKAR BHUTTO of Paki- martial law and pardoned his would-be assassin, stan urging the immediate release of all the ALEXANDROS PANAGOULIS, and the latter's broth- prisoners (FebruaryNewsletter). er, STATHIS PANAGOULIS (FebruaryNewsletter). Alexandros, although not adopted byAI because REPORT CONDEMNS BRUTAL TREATMENT he attempted to use violence, was known to have OF POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SPAIN suffered terrible torture in detention.
    [Show full text]
  • NORTHMUNC II OPERATION CONDOR, 1976 Chair: Ryan Zhang
    NORTHMUNC II OPERATION CONDOR, 1976 Chair: Ryan Zhang 1 Letter from the Chair: Dear Delegates, My name is Ryan Zhang, and I will be serving as the Chair of the “Operation Condor” crisis committee. I am currently a Senior at West Windsor-Plainsboro High School North and have been travelling with the North MUN team since my Freshman year. I currently serve as the Under- Secretary-General of Communications and have the pleasure of training our many passionate delegates. It is my distinct honor to lead the dedicated team that will make up your Dais and Crisis Staff. They are all exceptionally talented delegates in their own right, and we look forward to making your day one of exciting debate, thrilling crises, and ultimately a great learning opportunity. We can’t wait to see you! Sincerely Ryan Zhang Chair, “Operación Cóndor” 2 Letter from the Moderator: Dear Delegates, My name is Albert Sebastian, and as Crisis Director, it is my pleasure to welcome you to Operation Condor! I am a junior at WW-P High School North and have been involved with Model United Nations for the past two years. Throughout my career as a delegate, I have been involved in a diverse array of committees - from General Assemblies to corporate boards and crisis cabinets. I hope to bring this varied perspective to NORTHMUNC II when creating and implementing multitudes of crisis updates. When I’m not working to bring the best possible conference to you this October, you can find me watching a range of television programs, from documentaries to House of Cards, or scouting for new additions to my numismatic (coin and bill) collection, which I have been working on since the age of 9.
    [Show full text]
  • GUERRA SUCIA DE ARGENTINA (1976) Chaired by Donghyun (Paul) Jeong
    GUERRA SUCIA DE ARGENTINA (1976) Chaired by Donghyun (Paul) Jeong Session XXIII Guerra Sucia de Argentina (1976) Topic A: End of Peronismo in Argentina Topic B: Operation Condor Committee Overview government, have gathered in your first cabinet meeting to discuss the fate of La Guerra Sucia, which translates to Argentina as it navigates through the most “The Dirty War,” was a period of state- tumultuous period of its history. sponsored terrorism against perceived Throughout the committee, you will be dissidents and left-wing (“izquierdista”) faced with various crises, such as foreign activists that started in 1974 under President interference, economic failures, domestic Juan Perón and lasted until the fall of the uprising, and internal conflicts. military junta in 1983. Amidst economic failures and politically-incompetent leaders, far-right Parliamentary Procedure (“derechista”) military leaders were able to Parliamentary procedure for gain control of the nation after overthrowing specialized committees will be more relaxed the democratically-elected civilian with a focus on more moderated caucuses. government. The military junta now faces Delegates will represent influential problems from within and abroad. Will individuals during la Guerra Sucia with all Argentina revive itself from the worst portfolio powers that come with it. For more economic and political crisis in its history, or information on JHUMUNC parliamentary will the military junta collapse upon itself procedure, please note the last few pages of and push Argentina into destitution? the Conference guide or consult “Model UN It is now March 29, 1976, and the new Resources” under the “Resources” tab on military junta is the sole executor of our website, jhumunc.org.
    [Show full text]
  • @CHAPTER = PARAGUAY General Alfredo Stroessner Was Overthrown on February 3, 1989, in a Violent Coup That Abruptly Ended His 34-Year Rule
    @CHAPTER = PARAGUAY General Alfredo Stroessner was overthrown on February 3, 1989, in a violent coup that abruptly ended his 34-year rule. He was replaced by General Andrés Rodríguez. It is notable that in Paraguay, a long-time U.S. ally governed until the coup by a right-wing dictatorship, the Reagan administration had a strong record of criticizing Stroessner's abysmal human rights practices. In 1989, a year that saw a dramatic improvement in the human rights situation in Paraguay, the Bush administration showed continued interest in human rights in that country. Gen. Rodríguez launched his government with an inaugural speech pledging to restore human rights and democracy. He stated, "I believe that for human rights to be a reality and not simply wishful thinking, an authentic democracy must exist -- not just a facade or simply laws -- in which a strong and independent judiciary exists, in which the right to express opinions is respected, as is the right to organize peacefully, so that all Paraguayans have the same opportunities, without privileges of any kind." Rodríguez promptly announced that elections would be held on May 1, and then was easily elected president. The Bush administration deserves credit for pressing Rodríguez from the start to respect human rights. On the day of the coup, a Bush administration official told Reuters, "We are watching it carefully and note that General Rodríguez has indicated a desire to move toward democracy. We hope he carries through." State Department spokesman Charles Redman said, "We would welcome any genuine movement toward a more democratic form of government in that country." A week later, when the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The United States and Paraguay in the Cold
    Chapter 1 “TIES OF CIVILIZED SOCIETY” Inter-American Security and Stability Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, . may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. THEODORE ROOSEVELT (1904) The United States has historically pursued security in the Western Hemisphere with singular purpose. For more than a century, policymakers have worked to construct a sphere of influence in the region through which U.S. officials could enforce internal political stability and preempt external meddling by European powers, actions designed to advance the nation’s security interests. The United States has done so through the accumulation and projection of overwhelming economic, military, and political power—hegemony—relative to individual states in the region. To be sure, ideology, domestic politics, and the actions of Latin American governments have all influenced and shaped U.S. policies and outcomes—in certain cases decisively so. Yet the only consistently reliable guide to understanding the contours of inter-American state-to-state relations remains security. As political scientist Lars Schoultz argues: “If one wants to understand the core of United States policy toward Latin America, one studies security.”1 In this chapter, I explore the salience of that factor, focusing in particular on the Cold War and the attendant pursuit of it in Paraguay. For reasons rooted in that nation’s history, however, officials in Washington feared that the attainment of security would founder in the face of chronic political instability in Asunción.
    [Show full text]
  • Presidents of Latin American States Since 1900
    Presidents of Latin American States since 1900 ARGENTINA IX9X-1904 Gen Julio Argentino Roca Elite co-option (PN) IlJ04-06 Manuel A. Quintana (PN) do. IlJ06-1O Jose Figueroa Alcorta (PN) Vice-President 1910-14 Roque Saenz Pena (PN) Elite co-option 1914--16 Victorino de la Plaza (PN) Vice-President 1916-22 Hipolito Yrigoyen (UCR) Election 1922-28 Marcelo Torcuato de Alv~ar Radical co-option: election (UCR) 1928--30 Hipolito Yrigoyen (UCR) Election 1930-32 Jose Felix Uriburu Military coup 1932-38 Agustin P. Justo (Can) Elite co-option 1938-40 Roberto M. Ortiz (Con) Elite co-option 1940-43 Ramon F. Castillo (Con) Vice-President: acting 1940- 42; then succeeded on resignation of President lune5-71943 Gen. Arturo P. Rawson Military coup 1943-44 Gen. Pedro P. Ramirez Military co-option 1944-46 Gen. Edelmiro J. Farrell Military co-option 1946-55 Col. Juan D. Peron Election 1955 Gen. Eduardo Lonardi Military coup 1955-58 Gen. Pedro Eugenio Military co-option Aramburu 1958--62 Arturo Frondizi (UCR-I) Election 1962--63 Jose Marfa Guido Military coup: President of Senate 1963--66 Dr Arturo IIIia (UCRP) Election 1966-70 Gen. Juan Carlos Onganfa Military coup June 8--14 1970 Adm. Pedro Gnavi Military coup 1970--71 Brig-Gen. Roberto M. Military co-option Levingston Mar22-241971 Junta Military co-option 1971-73 Gen. Alejandro Lanusse Military co-option 1973 Hector Campora (PJ) Election 1973-74 Lt-Gen. Juan D. Peron (PJ) Peronist co-option and election 1974--76 Marfa Estela (Isabel) Martinez Vice-President; death of de Peron (PJ) President Mar24--291976 Junta Military coup 1976-81 Gen.
    [Show full text]
  • Background- Paraguay1 Paraguay Is a Landlocked Country with A
    Background- Paraguay1 Paraguay is a landlocked country with a population of 6 million wedged between Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia, whose territory includes large swaths of swampland, subtropical forest, and “Chaco wilderness” made of savanna and scrubland. Much of the land is in the hands of a tiny elite and successive governments have been slow to implement land reform. It remains one of the region’s poorest countries, with over 40% of its people living in poverty. Political unrest, corruption and chronic economic problems have plagued the country’s fragile democracy since it emerged from the 35-year dictatorship of the late General Alfredo Stroessner in 1989. Mistreatment of prisoners and the dispossession of indigenous peoples continues to be a problem. Before independence, Paraguay was the subject of territorial struggles among indigenous and Spanish groups. Originally, Paraguay was the home of the Guaraní people, who defended their independent villages from incursions by the Inca Empire. In the 1530s, Spanish settlers arrived searching for gold, touching off power struggles between urban Spanish settlers, rural Jesuit missionaries, the Spanish kingdom, and neighboring countries. In the early 1810s, Paraguay rejected competing territorial bids by Argentina and Brazil and declared its independence from Spain. Following independence, Paraguay was ruled by a series of dictators who drove the country into the devastating War of the Triple Alliance against three of its neighbors. Paraguay’s first dictator, José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia (“El Supremo”) isolated the country and brutally repressed potential rivals, stripping Spanish elites of wealth and power and executing over 68 Guaraní elites suspected of participating in a coup attempt.
    [Show full text]
  • Paraguay, October 2005
    Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Country Profile: Paraguay, October 2005 COUNTRY PROFILE: PARAGUAY October 2005 COUNTRY Formal Name: Republic of Paraguay (República del Paraguay). Short Form: Paraguay. Term for Citizen(s): Paraguayan(s). Capital: Asunción. Click to Enlarge Image Major Cities: Asunción (508,000 inhabitants), Ciudad del Este (261,000), San Lorenzo (228,000), Luque (210,000), Capiatá (199,000), Lambaré (126,000), and Fernando de la Mora (120,000) rank as Paraguay’s most populous cities⎯the country’s only cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Independence: Paraguay led the South American charge for independence, securing its freedom from Spain on May 17, 1811, after several days of fighting. Independence day is observed on May 15. Public Holidays: New Year’s Day (January 1); Day of Heroes (March 1); Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, and Easter (variable dates in March or April); Labor Day (May 1); Independence Day (May 15); Chaco’s Peace (June 12); Founding of Asunción (August 15); Battle of Boquerón (September 29); Virgin of Caacupé (December 8); and Christmas Day (December 25). Flag: The Paraguayan flag has three equal, horizontal bands of red (top), white, and blue and is one of the few national flags with different emblems on each side. The national coat of arms is centered in the middle white band on the hoist side. The reverse side bears the seal of the treasury. Click to Enlarge Image HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Pre-Columbian Paraguay and Spanish Imperialism: Long before Spanish conquistadors discovered Paraguay for King Charles V in 1524, semi-nomadic Chaco Indian tribes populated Paraguay’s rugged landscape.
    [Show full text]
  • EXTENSIONS of REMARKS February 29, 1984 EXTENSIONS of REMARKS a TRIBUTE to SHELDON W
    3942 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS February 29, 1984 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS A TRIBUTE TO SHELDON W. "And all those years, years that were lost "I remember when the mortgage rate went ANDELSON not only to me but to those I could have up to 6 percent, how mad I got. Now you'd contributed them to, to my city, my religion, need $250,000 for the same piece of proper­ my community." ty. HON. MEL LEVINE It has been an impressive statement. "I love real estate. It gives you such a OF CALIFORNIA It also seems to have been a calming one. great sense of roots. It means commitment IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Andelson-a compact, wiry man of 53, to Los Angeles. It means you believe in Los Wednesday, February 29, 1984 with a short-cropped brush of white hair, Angeles." trim and impeccable in a business suit and Andelson's entry into the restaurant busi­ e Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. tie, though he's at home-pauses, relaxes a ness came about by accident. Two young Speaker, I rise today to acquaint my little in the oversized white chair in his mo­ men planning to open a restaurant came to colleagues with some of the accom­ dernly furnished living room. see him, wanted to rent a building, and plishments of a distinguished citizen He has already said he would have liked to needed a partner in the financial end. and a close personal friend of mine, be a U.S. senator. Now the question arises. He had never liked the restaurant busi­ If he hadn't been gay, would he have tried ness.
    [Show full text]