Lords of the Sea TANAP Monographs on the History of Asian-European Interaction

Edited by Leonard Blussé

VOLUME 14

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.nl/tamo Lords of the Sea

The Ali Rajas of Cannanore and the Political Economy of Malabar (1663-1723)

By Binu John Mailaparambil

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2012 The TANAP programme is funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Mailaparambil, Binu John. Lords of the sea : the Ali Rajas of Cannanore and the political economy of Malabar (1663- 1723) / by Binu John Mailaparambil. p. cm. — (TANAP monographs on the history of Asian-European interaction, ISSN 1871- 6938 ; v. 14) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-18021-5 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Malabar (India)—Commerce—Europe—History. 2. Europe—Commerce—Malabar (India)—History. 3. Malabar (India)—Economic conditions. I. Title.

HF3789.M27M35 2012 382.0954’83—dc23 2011036930

ISSN 1871-6938 ISBN 978 90 04 18021 5

Copyright 2012 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

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To the loving memory of my father John Mailaparambil vi vii

SERIES EDITOR’S FOREWORD

Probably nowhere in the world have such profound changes in historiography been occurring as in the nation states of Monsoon Asia that gained independence after the conclusion of the Pacific War in 1945. These traditionally outward-looking countries on the rims of the Indian Ocean and the Eastern Seas have been interacting with each other through maritime transport and trade for more than two millennia, but the exi- gencies of modern nation-building have tended to produce state-centred historical narratives that emphasise a distinctive heritage and foster cultural pride and identity on the basis of such heroic themes as anti-colonial resistance. No one will deny the need for and utility of such ‘nation- building’ agendas, but an inward-directed national historiography does not necessarily prepare one’s citizens for our present age of regional co- operation and globalisation. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the coastal societies of Monsoon Asia witnessed the entry of European traders, the emergence of global maritime trading networks, and the laying of the foundations of colonial empires that reached their apogees in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The difficulties of studying this pre-colonial and early colonial past should not be underestimated. Local sources are often rare because of wars and the frequent changes of both indigenous and colonial regimes. The hot and humid tropical climate is also unkind to the preservation of manuscripts. The mass of western-language data preserved in the archives of the former East India Companies and those of the Spanish and Portuguese empires in Asia often have an undeniably Europe-centred character and bias. Thus we face not only a highly imbalanced supply of source material, but also the very complex problem of how to decode the hidden agendas that often colour these primary materials. Over the past fifty years there has been a pronounced effort in academic circles in North America, Australia, and the former European colonial nations to ‘decolonize’ historical writing on Asian-European interaction, albeit for reasons totally different from those in their Asian counterparts. Increasingly doubt has been cast on such longstanding paradigms as the superiority of the dynamic West over static Asian societies. Historians of international trade such as the late Holden Furber, whose description of this period as ‘The Age of Partnership’ inspired the name of the TANAP programme, have taken an interest in the various ways and means by which Asian-European interaction began in various kinds of competition, rivalry, collaboration, diplomacy, and military confrontation. This viii SERIES EDITOR’S FOREWORD approach has forced historians to return to the archival sources and the places where these events unfolded with the result that new frontiers of research have opened up in which close partnerships between Asian and European historians, with their specific cultural tool kits and linguistic backgrounds, are now starting to bear fruit. In anticipation of the four hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Dutch East India Company in 1602, members of the History Department of Leiden University proposed the establishment of an international research programme aimed at training a new generation of Asian historians of Asian–European interaction in the early modern period. It was taken for granted that any such drive towards international educational co-operation should be carried out in carefully planned collaboration with the National Archives in The Hague, the Arsip Nasional of the Republic of Indonesia in Jakarta, and the archives of Cape Town (South Africa), Colombo (Sri Lanka), and Chennai (India), which together hold several kilometres of archival records from the former Verenigde Oost- indische Compagnie. The TANAP—Towards a New Age of Partnership —educational and archival preservation programme was started in 2000 thanks to generous grants from the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands Organi- zation for Scientific Research (NWO), the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO), the Netherlands UNESCO Commission, and Leiden University. Twelve universities in Asia sent some thirty young lecturers to Leiden during 2001–2003. Under the auspices of the Research Institute for Asian-African and Amerindian Studies (CNWS), these historians participated in an advanced master’s programme that included intensive courses on historiography, palaeography, and the old Dutch written language. With additional funding from several Asian foundations, in 2002 seventeen of the TANAP graduates from Sri Lanka, India, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Japan, South Africa, and the Netherlands began working towards a Ph.D. degree at Leiden. Three others went on to pursue their doctorates at universities elsewhere in the world. The TANAP Monographs on the History of Asian-European Inter- action, which include two studies on early modern South African society, are the offspring of their doctoral theses defended at Leiden.

Leonard Blussé, Leiden University ix

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements xiii Glossary xv Notes on place and personal names xvii Notes on weights and currencies in Cannanore xviii Maps xix

Introduction 1 Kolathunadu, 1663–1723 2 Sources 3 Historiographical antecedents 4 Analytical framework 6

Chapter One: The Geo-Political Setting of Kolathunadu 9 Kolathunadu through the ages 9 Malabar: a regional perspective 11 Region within the region: the social world of Kolathunadu 16 Brahmanism in Kolathunadu 18 Nayars as local elites 18 Other social groups 19 Mercantile groups in Kolathunadu 21 Conclusion 22

Chapter Two: The Rajas of Kolathunadu 25 The ‘state’ in pre-colonial Kerala 25 The ‘little kingdom’ model 26 The swarupam polity 28 The concept of sakti 30 Houses by the sea 33 The co-sharers of Kolathunadu 37 Lords of the horses 41 The Arackal Ali Rajas 44 Legitimacy and sakti 47 Conclusion 50

Chapter Three: Lords of the Sea 53 The fifteenth century: decline or continuity? 53 The sixteenth century: changing port order in Malabar 54 The rise of the Mappila trading network in Cannanore 57 x CONTENTS

The Cannanore Bazaar 59 The Cannanore thalassocracy 63 Cannanore and the commercial world of the Indian Ocean 66 1. The Arabian Sea 67 2. Ceylon, Coromandel, Bengal, and South-East Asia 71 3. Asian traders in Cannanore 73 4. Cannanore exports 74 5. Cannanore imports 75 Conclusion 77

Chapter Four: Jan Company in Cannanore (1663–1723) 81 The Malabar commercial scenario on the eve of the Dutch conquests 81 The Dutch in Malabar 82 The Cannanore fort 83 The Dutch garrison in Cannanore 85 Jan Company and the local political elites 87 The Dutch and the local political practice of gift-giving 88 The Company and local communicators 89 Jan Company’s commercial policy in Cannanore 90 The Company and local commercial partners 91 Jan Company and its rivals in trade 94 The Mappila merchants of Cannanore 95 Maritime control system and its failure 96 The English and the French 99 Conclusion 102

Chapter Five: The VOC Trade in Cannanore (1663–1723) 105 The VOC trade in Cannanore: exports 105 1. Pepper 105 2. Cardamom 109 3. Timber 112 4. Ambergris, wild cinnamon, and coconut products 113 The VOC trade in Cannanore: imports 113 1. Opium 113 2. Japanese copper 115 3. Cotton 115 4. Horses and elephants 117 5. Spices and other small-quantity merchandise 117 Into the hinterland of Cannanore 118 Conclusion 125 CONTENTS xi

Chapter Six: Power Politics in Kolathunadu (1663–1697) 127 Drive towards centralization: Prince Ramathiri (1663–1673) 128 Ramathiri and the Company: early contact 129 For the sake of trade: the Ali Raja’s Mangalore mission and its failure 130 Growing tension: Ramathiri and the VOC 131 Changing commercial atmosphere and shifting strategies: the Ali Raja and the Company 132 Conflicting interests: Ramathiri versus the VOC 133 The fall of Ramathiri 134 Political restructuring in Kolaswarupam: the (re)invention of tradition 136 Unnithiri: the new contester for power 137 Competition for Kottakunnu: the Ali Raja and the VOC 138 An anti-Ali Raja alliance in the making 139 The Dutch ragiadoor-moor and the failure of the Cochin model 141 The Ali Raja’s political setback in Dharmapatanam 144 Changing attitude of the VOC towards the Ali Raja 145 Run to the coast: Prince Unnithiri 146 A miscarried attack: the Mappila attack on the VOC fort in Cannanore 147 Threat from the sea: the Maratha ‘pirates’ and Cannanore politics 148 The growing tension ‘within’: the Ali Raja and the princes 149 Changing balance of power in Kolathunadu 150 The death of the Kolathiri and the increasing political confusion in Kolathunadu 152 Conclusion 153

Chapter Seven: The Coast Adrift: The Ali Raja and the Rise of New Maritime Powers (1698–1723) 155 Close encounters along the coast 156 Trans-regional alliance against the Ikkeri Nayaka: resurgence of the border conflict 157 The Vazhunnavar of Vadakara versus the Ali Raj 159 The Ali Raja: strengthening the position 161 New regime and the continuing power conflict 164 Alienating from the Kolathiris 165 1. Unnithiri 165 2. The Ali Raja 167 Conclusion xii CONTENTS

Conclusion 173

Notes 179

Appendices 1. Factors of the VOC Settlement in Cannanore 229 2. The Kolathiris (1663-1723) and the Ali Rajas (1663–1723) 230 3. The Ships of the Ali Rajas to Bengal (1700–1724) 231 4. The First Treaty between the Ali Raja and the VOC, 11 February 1664 232 5. The Third Treaty signed between the Ali Raja and the VOC, 9 April 1680 234 6. The Treaty between the Ali Raja and the English, 1668 236 7. The VOC Commanders of Malabar (1663–1723) 238

Bibliography 239

Index 251

List of Maps 1. Seventeenth-Century Kerala xix 2. Cannanore and its Hinterland xx

List of Tables 1. The VOC’s Pepper Trade in Cannanore (1663–1706) 108 2. The VOC’s Cardamom Export from Malabar (1699/1700–1722/1723) 112

List of Figures 1. The VOC Trade in Cannanore Pepper (1663–1700) 106 2. The VOC’s Cardamom Export from Malabar (1699/1700–1722/1723) 110 3. Japanese Copper Import to Cannanore by the VOC (1702/1703–1722/1723) 116 4. The VOC in Cannanore: Income and Expenditure (1663–1723) 124 xiii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is the fruit of several years of laborious work in various archives and libraries around the world, greatly supported by the help and suggestions provided by various scholars and friends. During my research in the Netherlands and abroad, I have been fortunate to receive generous assistance from different quarters which has helped me to complete this book successfully. This would not have been possible without the assistance of the TANAP (Towards a New Age of Partnership) Programme and those people who are associated with it at the Leiden University. I remember with gratitude the staunch moral and academic support given by Prof. Leonard Blussé and Dr Jos Gommans without whom this book would not have been possible. I sincerely thank Dr Pius Malekandathil who stood by me all through these years of stress and strain and encouraged me whenever I was disheartened by my academic disappointments. I would also like to thank Dr Hendrik E. Niemeijer, the Programme co- ordinator, for his support in the initial stages of my research in the Netherlands. I am also grateful for the institutional and personal assistance given by the Programme secretary Marijke van Wissen-van Staden throughout the five years of my research at the University. I also would like to thank Prof. K. S. Mathew, Dr. Hugo K. s’Jacob, Prof. Om Prakash, Prof. Femme Gaastra, and Prof. Maurus Reinkowski for their support and scholarly advice. I am grateful to Prof. D. H. A. Kolff and Prof. J. C Heesterman for their critical comments and scholarly suggestions regarding my research. I also thank the members of the ENTRY (Entangled Histories) research group at Bielefeld University, especially Prof. Angelika Epple, for encouraging me to publish this book. I am greatly indebted to Dr Dinesan Vadakkiniyil, who has been an inspiration and a guide to me for the past many years. The facilities provided by the National Archives, The Hague, the British Library in London, the Tamilnadu State Archives in Chennai and the kind assistance of the staff of these institutions helped make sure I completed my archival research as smoothly as possible. I specially thank the staff in the National Archives, The Hague, for their assistance during the last few years. My research work would not have been possible without the facilities provided by the Leiden University Library, the Kern Institute Library, and the library of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde (Leiden). I thank the staff of these libraries for their help and support. I cannot but remember the names of my teachers who helped me xiv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS master the Dutch language and palaeography, without which it would have been literally impossible to complete my research, without the deepest gratitude. In this respect, the successful completion of this work owes a great debt to Yolande Spaans, René Wezel, Ton Harmsen, and Dr Hugo K. s’Jacob. My sincere thanks to Rosemary Robson for editing my English and for helping to tide me over the difficult times of research and writing. During my research in Leiden, Cynthia Viallé has been of great help in dealing with the intricacies of research in the Dutch archives. And also I owe a great deal to her for helping me out in the editorial work for this monograph. My sincere thanks to Anton Feddema for the jacket design and to Ria and Gerard de Graaff who did the typesetting of this book. The TANAP Programme gave me an opportunity to meet young scholars from different parts of the world. Their support was the spur which gave me enough inspiration to complete this work on time. I gratefully acknowledge the names of my TANAP friends Kwee Hui Kian, Ota Atsushi, Ryuto Shimada, Bhawan Ruangsilp, Liu Yong, Anjana Singh, Chiu Hsin Hui, Hoang Anh Tuan, Chris Nierstrasz, Filipa de Silva, and Alicia Schrikker. I also remember with gratitude the friendship I enjoyed with Bhaswati Bhattacharya, Gijs Kruijtzer, Lennart Bes, Mark de Lannoy, Roman Siebertz, Murari Kumar Jha, Manjusha Kuruppath, and Krishnamohan in Leiden. I am fully aware that a word of thanks is not enough to express my gratitude to Ghulam A. Nadri, Karuna Sharma, and Prasanna Kumar Patra who stood by me through these years of stress and strain and provided me with the warmth and happiness of an ‘Indian Home’ far away from my own home. During my stay in Leiden I was fortunate to enjoy the companionship and hospitality of Irma and the late Octaaf Roefs, Marianne Gommans, Saraju Rath, and Jan Houben. I thank them all. The sudden demise of Octaaf still remains as a painful remembrance of my life in the Netherlands. I also thank my friend Ole Husmann who prepared the maps of this book and my aunt Sister Maria Thomas Puthothu and my wife Beena whose companionship and care have unfailingly helped me to keep my spirit invigorated. The support of my mother and brother in India was the greatest inspiration throughout these years of hardship. xv

GLOSSARY adiyalar agrestic slaves ankam dual of honour/justice ariyittuvazcha accession ritual of a Kerala raja bariga second quality of a commodity bhagavati goddess bhar a measure of weight commonly used in South Asia and South-East Asia, which varied according to commodity and region. cabesa first quality of a commodity cartaz shipping pass casados married Portuguese settlers in India changatam a paid protection system to travel across land cherikkal landed property of a swarupam chunkam toll cruzado a Portuguese coin, usually silver dagregister daily register dvibhashi local linguist ducat gold coin common in West Asia elamkuru younger member in the succession line of a swarupam fanum/panam a Malabar coin; powerful swarupams issued their own panams feitoria factory gramam village kaimal a political title kalari military training centre in pre-colonial Kerala karalar lease-holders of a temple property karanavar head of a taravadu karthavu a political title, lord kavu a non-Brahmanical worshipping centre kazcha gifts to rajas/gods khandil a measure of weight: 1 khandil = 500 Dutch pounds kolezhuttu an old Malayalam script kovilakam lineage segment of a swarupam kuruvazcha system of sharing political authority in a swarupam madampi a political title mahmudi a Persian silver coin makkathayam patrilineal system of inheritance marumakkathayam matrilineal system of inheritance maryada/margam/acharam a concept of moral order in a society mestiço a person born of a Portuguese man and an Indian women or vice versa moksha salvation mulaswarupam original swarupam muppu/muppumura order of seniority in a swarupam/taravadu muttakuru eldest member in the succession line of a swarupam nachoda captain of a ship nadu a politico-cultural division in pre-colonial Kerala naduvazhi/desavazhi the rulers of a nadu or desam onderkoopman assistant merchant/factor opperhoofd factor pagoda a South-Indian gold coin; a Carara pagoda = 120 stuivers xvi GLOSSARY paradesi foreigner, outsider paradevata god/goddess of a particular taravadu or swarupam pattam a form of land-leasing system pidarar sakteya priests in the swarupam temples of North Kerala pinnak coconut cake puja ritual performance in a temple purushantaram succession fees ragiadoor-moor chief minister rijksraad state council rupee a North Indian silver coin sambandam temporary marriage system in pre-colonial Kerala sanketam a temple-centred territorial unit claiming independent political existence sao tome a Portuguese coin saraaf a moneychanger/moneylender; a banker shah bandar port officer swarga heaven swarupam political houses in pre-colonial Kerala taivazhi mother’s lineage, lineage of a swarupam taluk an administrative division under the British tamburan god/member of social elite taram a Malabar silver coin taravadu a joint household teyyattam ritual dance in northern Kerala topaz a dark-skinned Malabar native, claimants to Portuguese descent who followed Roman Catholicism; usually employed by Europeans as soldier. tolk interpreter tottam ritual song related to teyyattam uralar managing group of a temple property velichappadu shaman in Kerala temples/kavus xvii

NOTES ON PLACE AND PERSONAL NAMES

Concerning place names, I preferred to be consistent by using the best-known forms which appear in the Dutch and English sources throughout the book. However, some- times I have used names which appear to me nearer to their original forms. For example, I have used ‘Dharmapatanam’ instead of its modern form ‘Dharmadam’, or ‘Dharma- patam’ which appears in Dutch and English sources. In general, I have reproduced the titles and personal names of the local people as they appear in Dutch manuscripts. But, occasionally I have favoured to use names and titles, about which I am certain, in their original forms. Instead of ‘Adersia’ or ‘Adji raja’ I have used ‘the Ali Raja’. Likewise, I preferred to use ‘Vazhunnavar’ instead of ‘Balnoor’.

Place names in the book Corresponding local names Cannanore Kannur Calicut Kozhikode Cochin Kochi Tellichery Thalasseri Dharmapatanam Dharmadam Baliapatanam Valarpatanam Quilon Kollam Mangalore Mangalapuram xviii

NOTES ON WEIGHTS AND CURRENCIES IN CANNANORE

Currencies 1 fanum/panam = 7½ stivers 1 rijckdalder/rix-dollar = 8 fanums/60 stivers 1 7 1 heavy Persian abacy = 3 /8 fanums/23 /16 stivers 5 1 light Persian abacy = 2½ fanums/18 /8 stivers 1 11 1 Surat rupee = 4 /16 fanums/30 /32 stivers

Weights 1 para = 40 Dutch pounds 75 para = 1 last/3,000 Dutch pounds 1 khandil/candy = 500 Dutch pounds Source: VOC 1418, Calculation of the value of coins, weights, and measures in the respective regions in India, c. 1686, fo. 552v. xix

Map 1 Seventeenth-Century Kerala

Cartography: Ole Husmann, Freiburg, Germany xx MAPS

Map 2 Cannanore and its Hinterland

Cartography: Ole Husmann, Freiburg, Germany 1

INTRODUCTION

Cultural apartheid was the dominant ideal in medieval Muslim India...1

Conceptualizing and defining the status of maritime merchants in the political order of pre-colonial India has often set historians an intricate and often perplexing challenge. Many took refuge in the ideology of caste, which emphasized functional and ritual differentiation between the political class (kshatriyas) and commercial groups (vaisyas), and which even perpetuated an abhorrence of maritime activity by emphasizing it as ritually impure, to explain the peripheral status of merchants in ‘Hindu Indian’ political system. The emergence of Indo-Islamic polities did not change this state of affairs in their eyes altogether. Although Islam has usually been credited with being inextricably linked to maritime trade and commerce, it has also often been pointed out that Indo-Islamic states remained by and large indifferent to the idea of controlling maritime space as this was deemed to be the domain of merchants.2 The statement, ‘wars at sea are merchant’s affairs and of no concern to the prestige of kings’, made by the Sultan Bahadur Shah of Gujarat is often quoted to exemplify this merchant-king dichotomy in South Asia, in which the concept of political power was often argued to be tied to control of territory and land.3 However, in this book the argument is that such a general postulation of an innate polarity between the concepts of political sovereignty and maritime power in early-modern India is rather problematic as it falls short of adequately expounding the complex pattern of state-merchant relationship engendered as a consequence of the longstanding interdependence between maritime trade and political formations especially along the coast.4 The political scenario on the early-modern Malabar Coast in which the concepts of power and status were significantly influenced by the ebb and flow of the Indian Ocean trade which, to a great extent, attenuated the borders which hypothetically distinguished the realms of the merchant and the king, is an important case in point. This monograph intends to bring out the unique role played by maritime trade in shaping the political landscape of the early-modern Malabar Coast by focusing on the Arackal Ali Rajas of Cannanore, the most prominent maritime merchants in pre-colonial Kerala, South India, and one of the very few early-modern Indian maritime mercantile families which succeeded in carving out a powerful political configuration of their own. The extensive maritime network of the Arackal House was based in the port-town of Cannanore. It was from this base that this 2 INTRODUCTION

Mappila Muslim family was able to dominate the commercial networks of various other Mappila families in that city as well as in its various satellite ports such as Maday, Baliapatanam, Dharmapatanam, and Nileswaram.5 On account of their incredible success in managing a trading system which connected Cannanore with various nodal points of maritime trade across the Indian Ocean for centuries, the Ali Rajas were also famed as ‘Aazhi Rajas’ or ‘Lords of the Seas’.6 Before setting out to expound the analytical starting point of this study, it is necessary to begin by giving a brief introduction to its spatial and temporal co-ordinates and to the sources and historiographical antecedents on which it is based.

Kolathunadu, 1663–1723

The ‘kingdom of Cannanore’ or Kolathunadu roughly constituted what is now called the Cannanore District of Kerala State in the Republic of India. Traditionally Kolathunadu is described as the land lying between Perumba River in the north and Putupatanam River in the south.7 The elite house of Kolathunadu, known as the Kolaswarupam, was one of the major political houses which had sprung up in Kerala after the disappearance of the Kulasekharas or Perumal rulers of Mahodayapuram by the twelfth century AD.8 Though the rulers of this house (popularly known as Kolathiris) were generally credited with a superior political authority over the geographical zone lying between the kingdoms of Canara and Calicut, their real political influence was more or less confined to Kolathunadu.9 In spite of its fluctuating political fortunes throughout its existence, the Kolaswarupam was considered one of the most prominent political houses in Kerala until the British occupation of the region at the end of the eighteenth century. At least from the second half of the fifteenth century, Cannanore qualified for the prestigious position of being the leading port town of Kolathunadu and, consequently, it was the core area of socio-economic and political dynamics of the region. The central theme of the present study is the multidimensional interaction between the main players in the realm, namely (i) the Arackal Ali Rajas, the most prominent maritime merchants in pre-colonial Kerala who dominated the Mappila Muslim traders in and around Cannanore, (ii) the Kolathiris, the traditional claimants to political power in Kolathunadu, and (iii) the European newcomers, especially the merchants of the Dutch East India Company. Although the Ali Rajas exercised crucial control over the people and the maritime trade activities in the port city of Cannanore and in other smaller Mappila ports along the coastal belt of Kolathunadu, the Kolathiris continued to exercise their influence in the interior of the region. The Dutch East India Company INTRODUCTION 3 came into close contact with the region after the Dutch conquest of the Portuguese fort of St Angelo in 1663 and they subsequently played a major role in the power struggle in the region. Hence, from 1663 these power groups began to interact closely with each other. As had been the case on the Malabar Coast in the preceding centuries, the socio-political situation in the region between 1663 and 1723 was shaped not only by ‘internal’ dynamics; it was also subjected to ‘external’ forces exerting pressure from the Arabian Sea. The Ali Rajas, the Kolathiris, and the Dutch Company were the main contenders for power in the port-city of Cannanore during this period under discussion. The terminal point of this study is 1723 when the evolution of the historical forces which were constantly structuring and restructuring the relations between these power groups in Cannanore reached a critical juncture.

Sources

Although I have used both archival and published sources from various archives and libraries of India and abroad, the main repository of my sources is the archival depot of the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) in the Nationaal Archief (National Archive) situated in The Hague in the Netherlands. The manuscripts of the VOC, which was incorporated between 1602 and 1799, are of a great value in reconstructing the history of Kerala in general and of the Malabar region in particular during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.10 The hitherto untapped information contained in these large, dusty bundles of commercial correspondence definitely surpasses, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the comparatively small number of English and French Company materials on Malabar during the period under study. I have relied mainly on the so- called Overgekomen brieven en papieren (OBP) (Letters and papers received) collection which gives an unbroken account of developments in Kolathunadu throughout the period under study. In spite of the formal character of the information provided by the VOC sources and a heavy emphasis on commercial details, the OBP collection offers valuable insights into the socio-political developments in Kolathunadu. In addition to these unique VOC sources, due attention has also been paid to local sources in order to construe a comprehensive and balanced view of the political economy of pre-colonial Kolathunadu. Although there is nothing in the way of ‘administrative’ records left by the Kolathiris or the Ali Rajas to counterbalance the information provided by the VOC records, the oral and written sources available are invaluable in building up an understanding of the socio-political system in Kolathunadu in the early-modern period. The Kolathunadu version of 4 INTRODUCTION the Keralolpathi (Origin of Kerala) legend gives information about the Brahmanical perceptions and interpretations of the regional social order, folk sources, especially the ritual songs (tottams) of the teyyattam (dance of God), are of considerable value in comprehending and conceptualizing the concept of ‘power’ in Kolathunadu.11 Thanks to such scholars as M. V. Vishnu Namboodiri, many of these oral traditions are available in published form. Unfortunately, so far these rich sources have hardly been tapped by historians.

Historiographical antecedents

The first attempt to compile a comprehensive history of the Malabar region was the result of the political and economic exigency of the British colonial government to understand the local history of the region in order to improve its administrative performance. William Logan, who was the collector of the British Malabar in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, should be credited with the first attempt to write a comprehensive history of the region. Though it suffers from many handicaps, his three- volume Malabar Manual, published in 1879, was the first scholarly attempt to compile a history of this region on the basis of both legendary and other available source materials.12 Unfortunately, after this magnum opus, no other serious attempts were made to study the pre-colonial history of this region for quite a long time. Although the first half of the twentieth century witnessed further progress in the field of historical research in Kerala, the focus was mainly on ‘court histories’.13 K. V. Krishna Ayyar’s The Zamorins of Calicut is a fine example of this trend, yet it falls short of being a history of the region.14 The growing influence of the Indian independence movement and the pervasion of Marxist- Socialist ideas in Malabar also exerted an influence on Kerala historiography. Keralam: Malayalikalude Matrubhumi [Kerala: The Motherland of Malayalees), a Malayalam work written by E. M. S. Nambootirippadu in 1948, is an endeavour to analyse the history of Kerala from a Marxist perspective.15 However, the author’s limited access to source materials compelled him to turn most of his attention to the history of modern Kerala. O. K. Nambiar’s Portuguese Pirates and Indian Seamen (1955) was obviously inspired by the spirit of Indian nationalism.16 K. M. Panikkar’s works on both the Portuguese and the Dutch powers in Kerala are inno- vative attempts to make use of European source materials other than the usual English ones to construct the pre-colonial history of the region. Panikkar’s studies should be considered pioneering works in this field in Kerala historiography.17 P. K. S. Raja’s Medieval Kerala (1953) is a unique attempt to write a comprehensive pre-colonial history of the region in a INTRODUCTION 5 single narrative framework, using both indigenous and European sources.18 The formation of a separate state of Kerala on a linguistic basis in 1956 gave a new impetus to historical research in Kerala. The works of Elamkulam P. N. Kunjan Pillai especially helped to make a breakthrough in understanding the pre-colonial history of the region.19 His conceptualization of a ‘second Chera Empire’ and the evolution of the ‘janmi system’ after the twelfth century AD, albeit with some shortcomings, have given a solid conceptual framework for later historians to expand on.20 In spite of its accomplishments in various fields of research, post- Independent Kerala historiography still falls short on the study of the early-modern period. This is particularly true in the case of the northern part of Kerala, including Kolathunadu. With one or two exceptions, this region still remains in the periphery of the early-modern historiography of Kerala. Among the scholarly works dealing with the early-modern history of North Malabar, the monographs of Geneviève Bouchon and, to an extent, Margaret Frenz deserve special attention. Bouchon’s ‘Mamale de Cananor: Un Adversaire de L’Inde Portugaise (1507–1528) can be considered the first major attempt to reconstruct the history of pre-colonial Cannanore based on European source materials.21 Bouchon’s expertise in Portuguese archival materials has enabled her to throw new light on the growth of Mappila Muslim merchant groups as decisive actors in the socio-political life of Kolathunadu. The monograph gives a well-docu- mented account of Mamale, a grand Muslim Merchant magnate of Cannanore, who was also the predecessor of the first Ali Raja of Cannanore. The monograph of Margaret Frenz, although mainly concerned with the early phase of British colonialism in the principality of Kottayam in North Malabar, presents the historical developments there as a significant break from the early-modern socio-political matrix in the region. Frenz’ discussion of the state structure in pre-colonial Kottayam is an attempt to analyse the local political culture within the general framework of discussions on the nature of state in pre-colonial South India.22 Dilip M. Menon’s seminal contribution, ‘Houses by the Sea’, also analyses the character of the ‘state’ in pre-colonial Kerala.23 Chirakkal T. Balakrishnan’s Malayalam work Teranjedutta Prabandangal and M. P. Kumaran’s Kolathupazhama throw light on some specific issues, mainly those pertaining to the pre-colonial history of this region but neither of them proposes a broader analytical structure for understanding the history of the Kolathunadu region.24 The Islamic community in Kolathunadu has also not been entirely neglected by scholars. The Ali Rajas of Cannanore, written by K. K. N. Kurup, is particularly important among those works dealing with the his- 6 INTRODUCTION tory of the regional Islamic communities.25 Yet, this short monograph describing the long history of the Ali Rajas rarely uses documents dating from the pre-colonial period and rarely takes the wider aspect of socio- political changes in the region into consideration. The article by Ruchira Banerjee, ‘A Wedding Feast or Political Arena?: Commercial Rivalry between the Ali Rajas and the English Factory in Northern Malabar in the 18th Century’, provides interesting information on the political interactions of the Ali Rajas of Cannanore in the latter half of the eighteenth century.26 Roland E. Miller’s Mappila Muslims of Kerala: A Study in Islamic Trends looks at the history of this community in Kerala during the colonial period.27 Stephen Frederic Dale’s attempt to write the history of this people also falls into the same category.28 Against Lord and State: Religion and Peasant Uprisings in Malabar (1836–1921)—an excellent study on the Mappila peasant resistance to the colonial regime by K. N. Panikkar— concentrates on a later period.29 All these three scholars have chosen the Mappila peasantry in the paddy-growing wet-lands in South Malabar as their main subject matter of study and overlook the exploits of the Mappila trading communities. The works dealing with the ‘Dutch period’ of Kerala history have also contributed to an understanding of the early-modern history of the region, but do not venture beyond the recital of the political narrative. Such monographs as The Dutch Power in Kerala by M. O. Koshy,30 The Dutch in Malabar by P. C Alexander31 and Malabar and the Dutch by K. M. Panikkar32 give descriptive accounts of the political developments in Kerala during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The two books by T. I. Poonen, A Survey of the Rise of the Dutch Power in Malabar (1603– 78)33 and Dutch Hegemony in Malabar and its Collapse (1663–1795), also deal with the political history of Cannanore as a part of this broader narrative.34 M. A. P. Roelofsz’ early work, De vestiging der Nederlanders ter kuste Malabar, gives a detailed description of the early relationship between the Dutch East India Company and the Kerala Coast and explains how the VOC gradually developed an interest in Malabar affairs.35 The more recent monographs by Hugo K. s’Jacob on Cochin and Mark de Lannoy on Travancore give an in-depth insight into the complex character of political formations in the central and southern parts of Kerala during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.36

Analytical framework

Among various scholarly works dealing with the Mappila Muslims of Kerala in South India, Dale’s monograph deserves particular attention on INTRODUCTION 7 account of its attempt to locate and analyse this regional Islamic community in the broader pan-Islamic framework of Asia.37 In a sweeping endeavour to summarize the dynamic history of the Mappilas from the sixteenth century to the second half of the twentieth century in a thematic narrative framework, Dale insists on defining the existence of Mappilas as that of a ‘frontier’ people, situated on the fringe of the local ‘Hindu’ social order throughout this period. His argument is that Islamic ideology perpetuated a distinct socio-political identity which invariably put the Mappilas in the position of a distinctive ‘religious community’, opposed to the ‘Christian’ Europeans and the ‘Hindu’ locals. He adduces ‘reli- giously defined militancy’ as one of the characteristic features of the Mappilas. His argument is that this was awakened by the Portuguese atrocities committed in their ruthless attempts to control the spice trade in the region and perpetuated by the subsequent European commercial competition in the region. Consequently, he perceives the Mappila rebel- lions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries merely as the culmination of events which commenced in the sixteenth century, regardless of the political and economic changes which have occurred in the region, especially after the establishment of the colonial rule. In a nutshell, he attempts to comprehend such developments in terms of a ‘clash of civilizations’.38 In line with this somewhat anachronistic perspective, other scholars have often one-sidedly stressed the importance of a particular ‘Hindu’ form of ritual kingship imbued by the Brahmin textual tradition. Too often, this pan-Indian perspective has been applied rather uncritical- ly to South India in general and to Kerala in particular. Considering the weak presence of Brahmins in Kolathunadu, the present study seeks to highlight a more regional perspective which nuances what seem to be highly essentializing approaches which stress the ‘great traditions’ of both Islam and Brahmanism exclusively. I shall not dismiss these voices for the pre-colonial period, but merely intend to restore the neglected and also often far more important regional agencies of the important phenomenon of royal power. As such, the present study has drawn considerable inspiration from comparable, ‘autonomous’ histories of Southeast Asia which have also successfully challenged such ‘greater’ Indian and/or Islamic viewpoints. Hence, it is my contention that any study of Islamic communities without a concomitant analysis of their regional context will offer only a flawed historical view of Islamic communities in South India.39 It is from this emphatically regional point of view that I propose to analyse the political status and social identity of the Mappila Muslim trading community in pre-colonial Cannanore. In this monograph, with the help of new, so far neglected sources, I intend to make an additional contribution to the body of knowledge already available about the Mappila Muslim trading community in pre- 8 INTRODUCTION colonial Kerala. Instead of following a simple chronological analysis, a thematic approach has been adopted. The work is divided into three main parts. The first part contains an attempt to analyse the formation of a distinct socio-political structure in Kolathunadu by paying due attention to the geographical setting (Chapter One). This provides the proper regional context in which the emergence and the operations of the Arackal Ali Rajas (Chapter Two) should be understood. Having established the crucial importance of maritime trade, the following section (Chapters Three, Four, and Five) examines the history of the most prominent rival maritime trading groups in Cannanore: the Mappila traders of Cannanore under the Arackal Ali Rajas and the Dutch East India Company. The last section (Chapters Six and Seven) demonstrates in more historical detail how both the regional conditions and extra-regional trade relationships affected the destinies of the various political co-sharers of the Kolathunadu realm. A balance of my research findings is presented in the concluding chapter. 9

CHAPTER ONE

THE GEO-POLITICAL SETTING OF KOLATHUNADU

Since every historical event occurs both in space as well as in time, history cannot, except in some of its more specialised branches, be dissociated from country or place…Since history must concern itself with the location of the events, which it investigates, it must continually raise, not only the familiar questions Why? and Why then? but also the questions Where and Why there?1

Regional history in early-modern Kerala is a rarely visited field of research.2 Two large stumbling blocks are the unavailability of and limited accessibility to source materials from which to construe comprehensive regional histories of this period. Moreover, the general postulation that pre-colonial Kerala followed an even pattern of historical development throughout the centuries seems to tempt the researcher to pass over any regional variations as minor ‘deviations’ from the general pattern of development. Furthermore, at first glance the region cannot boast of being the seat of an imposing political formation in comparison with those of the other regions of South India in general and Kerala in particular. The neglect of the northernmost part of Kerala in the general historiography of the region might perhaps be attributed to these reasons. Out of the numerous principalities (nadus) which emerged in Kerala during the medieval period, Kolathunadu stands out as a region of particular historical interest because of its unique pattern of socio-political development. The distinctive geographical features of the region had an important role in shaping the socio-political culture of Kolathunadu. For that reason, a proper understanding of the history of the region requires an analysis of its geography and the impact this had on the regional society and economy. However, before doing this, the long-term historical antecedents of the Kolathunadu polity should be briefly introduced.

Kolathunadu through the ages

In order to understand the historical situation of medieval Kolathunadu, it is necessary to place it in a longue durée perspective. There appears to have been a sequence of historical developments which coalesced to shape the political economy of Kolathunadu. Ezhimala (Mount Deli in European accounts) and its neighbouring regions were dynamic centres of socio-political activities even in the early centuries of the Christian era. 10 CHAPTER ONE

Tamil anthologies draw a brilliant picture of one Nannan who controlled the area in and around Ezhimala. These works describe his engagements with such neighbouring ruling elites as the Cheras.3 Though, it might be difficult to trace a direct historical link between the later Kolaswarupam which appeared by the end of the first millennium AD and the Nannan of Ezhimala, it is quite remarkable that, as a political entity, Ezhimala seems to have roots which go back almost two millennia.4 The political continuity of the region is more or less confirmed by other sources. According to the Mushikavamsam, a Sanskrit kavya composed by Athula in the first half of the eleventh century, a legendary figure, Ramaghada Mushakan, was the founder of the Kolaswarupam lineage.5 Whatever the authority for this story might have been, eighth- century inscriptional evidence seems to support the existence of this ruling dynasty. Moreover, an inscription dating from AD 929 mentions a certain Vikramaraman. M. G. S. Narayanan identifies him with the ruler Vikramaraman who appears in the Mushikavamsam.6 Another inscription from the tenth century mentions a man named Udayavarman who bore the title Ramaghata Muvar—an epithet used by the Mushika kings.7 Another rather interesting inscription from the Tiruvattur temple mentions an Eraman Chemani (Raman Jayamani). N. P. Unni argues that he is the king who appears as the 109th ruler on the list in the Mushika- vamsam.8 Consequently, there was a ruling lineage in this region whose origins could be traced back to at least the eighth century AD. As the evidence in the Mushikavamsam shows, the Mushika rulers maintained a separate political identity from that of the neighbouring ‘Kerala’ rajas—the Sanskritized name of the Cheras of Mahodayapuram.9 Foreign accounts also corroborate the distinct identity of this kingdom in later centuries. Marco Polo, who visited this coast in the twelfth century AD, noted the independent status of the king of this region.10 The fourteenth-century narrative written by Ibn Battuta states that the ruler of this region resided in Baliapatanam.11 This offers a clue which suggests that by this time the centre of the political authority had shifted from Ezhimala to a town located to the south of it, Baliapatanam. In the sixteenth century, a Portuguese official named Duarte Barbosa also mentions that Baliapatanam (Baliapatam in European records) was the residence of the ‘king of Cannanore’.12 Although it appears that there was a remarkable continuity in the political tradition of the Kolathunadu region from the early centuries of the Christian era, there would seem to be a high probability that the socio- economic background which supported the political and ideological order had undergone significant changes throughout this period. The Tamil anthologies, said to date to the early centuries of the Christian era, THE GEO-POLITICAL SETTING OF KOLATHUNADU 11 offer a picture of a tribal polity in which martial activities appear to have been the prime mode for accumulating and redistributing spoils among the ruling class in South India.13 However, by the eighth century, there are indications that the political climate in South India had changed rather dramatically as a new political culture based on settled agrarian exploitation took root in the region. As in other parts of the Subcontinent, Brahmanism provided the ideological support for these newly emerging regional, primarily agrarian, principalities as it linked them to a pan- Indian vedic-puranic tradition. The composition of the Mushikavamsam by the ‘court poet’ of the Mushika king, Srikanda, was a specifically regional reflection of what seems to have been a much wider, pan-Indian development. Although this ‘brahmanization’ of new regional regimes and societies did gain momentum throughout Kerala after the eighth century, it seems that this development was relatively weak in Kolathunadu. This might be an indication that the much of the old tradition, labelled ‘Dravidian’ by some scholars, still maintained its sway over the local populace. These apparently conflicting but also mutually overlapping traditions undoubtedly influenced the evolution of the specific socio- political system in Kolathunadu. Hence, the establishment and the gradual spread of Islamic communities along the coast of Kolathunadu and the socio-political consequences of this development have to be viewed and analysed against the background of a relatively enduring, regional ‘little’ tradition which was only superficially affected by ‘brahmanization’. Before attempting this analysis, the ecological and geographical context of this process must be explored as this is crucial to understanding these and other socio-political developments in this particular habitat within the larger Kerala region.

Malabar: a regional perspective

The northern part of Malabar is, as its name immediately indicates, a predominantly hilly region.14 Geo-physically North Malabar can be divided into three distinct units: the mountainous highlands; the lowlands; and the coastal plain. The Western Ghats, popularly known as ‘Sahya Parvatam’, stretch along the eastern boundary at heights ranging from 100 to 2,060 metres above mean sea level in the Cannanore region. They provide a seemingly an impenetrable boundary, whereas the Arabian Sea offers a more open natural boundary on the western side of the region. The coastal plain stretches along as a narrow belt parallel to the coast. It is traversed by a host of rivers and streams, which are mostly tidal in their lower reaches and backwaters. In between lies the midland which presents a geo-morphological 12 CHAPTER ONE picture of plains dotted with small hills. In the case of North Malabar, the Western Ghats run almost parallel to the coast at a distance of no more than about twenty miles, so that the midland area is reduced to a very narrow strip.15 Importantly, laterite formations dominate the landmass of this region in the midlands, which means that is fairly unproductive, except for areas which happen to be interspersed between the laterite terraces.16 This topography explains the absence of extensive paddy cultivation there, distinguishing it agriculturally from the neighbouring Canara and Tamil regions.17 Though rice is the staple diet of the local people, throughout its history the area has suffered from a scarcity of rice. Consequently, this grain had to be imported into Kolathunadu, the bulk of it from the neighbouring Canara region.18 The area also suffered from the fact that no radical changes in agricultural technology which might have improved the situation were ever introduced there.19 With the exception of the small area at Ezhimala, an imposing mountainous region right on the seashore, the coastal area is sandy and mainly suitable to the cultivation of coconuts. This long coastal belt was the area which gave rise to a number of small-scale port towns in Kolathunadu and these functioned as the centres of socio-economic life of the local Mappila Muslims. The Western Ghats, covered with thick forest, were the habitat of a wealth of very divergent flora and fauna and of such tribal people as the Vettuvans and the Mavilans.20 This was the area which supplied the local markets with wood and other forest products. The inhabitants of this hill tract practised slash-and-burn cultivation on a large scale and by the end of the nineteenth century this form of agriculture had exhausted the forest resources of the region.21 Pepper and other spices were cultivated mainly on tracts on the lower slopes of the high ranges. Therefore, a significant part of the high quality pepper, ginger, and cardamom exported from the port of Cannanore was not actually produced in Kolathunadu territory but had been imported from the inland regions of Kottayam (in North Kerala) and Wynadu. Considering the ecological features of Malabar and Kerala in general, many scholars who have focused their studies on this area have highlight- ed the peculiar social and political pattern in the region as a whole. As Rich Freeman has pointed out, the geographical isolation created by the Western Ghats on the eastern side and the Arabian Sea on the western border gave rise to an environmentally distinctive subsistence and settlement pattern in Kerala.22 These physical factors greatly influenced the unique settlement pattern in Kerala, which diverged from that of its neighbours in South India. As picturesquely portrayed by C. A. Innes writing about British Malabar, Along the narrow strip of sand near the coast, the green of palm and jack tree contrasts vividly with the red of the roads that run beneath them. Beneath THE GEO-POLITICAL SETTING OF KOLATHUNADU 13

the shade of the trees nestle the houses of the natives, not huddled together as in an East Coast village, but each in its own compound surrounded by a stout fence, and full of giant plantains with their broad leaves and of the many coloured flowers of the hibiscus. A mile or two inland the scene changes, and the country begins to swell towards the barrier of the Ghats, at first in range after range of low red laterite hills with paddy flats fringed with cocoanut gardens winding in and out of their recesses, and later in the long spurs, deep ravines and thick jungles that mark the rise of the hills. Towering over all, their slopes clad in dense forests, the majestic mountains of the Western Ghats keep watch over the favoured land at their feet.23 Indeed, the unbroken distribution of human settlements imbued the entire Kerala region the character of a gigantic, extended village in which the demarcation between villages and communities had a tendency to become blurred.24 This settlement pattern must not have been much different from that of the early-modern period as described by François Pyrard of Laval, who visited coastal Malabar at the beginning of the seventeenth century. …and by the road-side are houses and buildings always in sight, and towns every league or half league, the most distant being two short leagues apart. The whole country is well peopled….Moreover, all along the roads one meets with great numbers of people, Nairs and Malabars, men and women…25 The monsoon factor was one of the main pillars which supported this discrepancy in settlement pattern with the neighbouring territories. As a consequence of this meteorological phenomenon it registers an annual average rainfall of 300 cm. About eighty per cent of the rainfall is from the South-West Monsoon, from June to September. The North-East Monsoon contributes only eleven per cent. Apart from facilitating very dense settlement patterns, the monsoon climate also replenishes the numerous rivers and other water sources which support the well-dispersed habitats of the Malayalees.26 This was all the more crucial in North Malabar since no big roads penetrated into the hinterlands until the Mysorean invasion in the second half of the eighteenth century. Mencher argues that, although wheeled vehicles were known and occasionally used in Kerala, they were not very useful in the local terrain. He points out that even today, apart from modern motorized vehicles, a man on foot can usually reach his destination expending far less effort and in about half the time as a man in a cart.27 Even if an attempt is made to turn the clock back to earlier centuries, the result would have been almost the same. Ibn Battuta, who visited the Malabar Coast in the fourteenth century, also stresses the pedestrian character of Malabar commerce faced with the option of traversing the difficult terrain which interspersed the settlement pattern in the region.28 14 CHAPTER ONE

Every man has his own orchard with his house in the middle and a wooden palisade all round it. The road runs through the orchards, and when it comes to a palisade there are wooden steps to go up by and another flight of steps down into the next orchard. No one travels on an animal in that country. …The principal vehicle of the inhabitants is a palanquin carried on the shoulders of slaves or hired porters; those who do not travel on palanquins go on foot, be they who they may. Baggage and merchandise is transported by hired carriers, and a single merchant may have a hundred such or there- abouts carrying his goods.29 The poor condition of the road system which existed in early British Malabar is also attested to in the reports of the British Government.30 Most of the land routes were more suitable to peddlers carrying their loads on their backs than to the transportation of bulk goods. Given this situation, the riverine system of the Kolathunadu was of special importance to the movement of bulk commodities into the interior parts of the kingdom. Although Malabar is rich in its rivers, the number of those which are navigable is limited. Only seasonal navigation was possible along many of them. Usually they dry up during the high summer. The hilly character of the land also limits the access of the river boats to the deep interior. The most important riverine systems which were used for commercial purposes in North Malabar were the Nileswaram, the Ezhimala, the Taliparamba, the Valarpatanam, the Anjarakandi, and the Tellichery Rivers.31 Among them, the most important were the Taliparamba, Valarpattanam, and Anjarakandi, all three of which provided access almost to the foot of the Western Ghats and played an important role in the cross-Ghat trade with the Mysore region. Hence, there was an unbroken network of trade which connected the maritime sphere with the inland markets in which the Mappila Muslims of the region acted as the linking force through their coastal and inland settlements. Many scholars have emphasized the significance of the isolation imposed by the natural conditions in the evolution of a unique socio-cultural and political setting in Kerala, which makes it remarkably different from other, neighbouring political economies in southern India.32 Never- theless, it is important to note that this socio-cultural uniqueness was not as apparent during the early centuries of the Christian era. It only became more distinctive after the eclipse of the Kulasekharas of Mahodayapuram in the early twelfth century AD.33 During what is known as the ‘Sangam’ period, the early centuries of the Christian era, in spite of being distinct political entities both the Kerala and the Tamil regions were considered part of a common cultural realm and were thought to belong to a common geographical settlement pattern.34 More specifically, Tamil anthologies of the early Christian era make no sharp cultural or social distinction between the muvarasar of Tamizhakam or the Cheras, the Cholas, and the THE GEO-POLITICAL SETTING OF KOLATHUNADU 15

Pandyas; all of whom were operating in a common cultural and geographical milieu. Even later, the temples of malainadu or Kerala were included in the sacred geography of the Tamil bhakti movement and were lavishly praised by the alwars and nayanars, the main proponents of the movement, in their verses.35 These early perspectives are an indication that the Western Ghats can hardly be thought of as an ‘impregnable wall’ which safeguarded the unique identity of the region. The existence of passes and established routes across the Ghats provided important lines of communication between Kerala and the Kannada and Tamil regions.36 The contact region, which offered such tempting economic opportunities, attracted various merchant communities from the interior, among them the Tamil Pattar Brahmins, who had a significant presence in the eastern frontier regions before the arrival of the European powers in Indian waters and they also continued to maintain their strong presence there during the era of the European commercial enterprises on the Malabar Coast.37 Owing to the limited access European powers had to the hinterland of Kerala, only a few superficial accounts exist about the importance of the mountain passes in the Ghats during the pre-colonial period to the economy of Kerala. While the Portuguese were certainly aware of the flow of pepper via the land routes,38 the evidence suggests that the Dutch Company servants had more grasp of both the existence of these outlets and of the important role these routes played by in the distribution of spices to the other side of the Ghats.39 As early as 1677, Commander Van Reede mentions about twenty-four of these routes across the Ghats.40 Among these passes, the most important was the Palghat Gap which connects the Malabar Coast with the Coimbatore region. Two important Ghat routes which connected the port town of Cannanore with the Mysore region passed through Kolathunadu: the Perambadi Ghat road which connected it to Mysore and Srirangapatanam via Coorg and the Periah Ghat road running through north Wynad to Mysore.41 These roads were an indispensable link between the port town and the Mysore kingdoms, long before the coming of the Portuguese. These overland connections attained great importance as major supply routes for the new horse-based principalities which emerged in the Deccan and Carnatic regions after the first millennium AD.42 During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, there was regular commercial traffic between the state of Vijayanagara and the port of Cannanore, especially maintained to facilitate the trade in horses. The Vijayanagara cavalry was heavily dependant on the supply of horses from the West Asian ports which passed through the Malabar ports, particularly Cannanore. When the Portuguese appeared on the scene, the harbour was already an important port of disembarkation for the West Asian horses which were trans- 16 CHAPTER ONE ported through the passes in the Ghats to Vijayanagara territory.43 Although this horse trade from the coast to the interior declined after the eclipse of the Vijayanagara, it continued into the time of the Wodeyar rulers of Mysore.44

Region within the region: the social world of Kolathunadu

Despite its geographical similarities to the rest of Kerala, an understanding of the specific geographical characteristics of Kolathunadu is essential; especially the realization that the space between the sea and the Ghats in this northern part of Kerala is much narrower than it is in the central and southern regions. Hence, although many of the geographical features of the region as a whole are still valid for this area, their significance tends to fade in Kolathunadu and their lack of dominance could account for a sub-regional sonderweg which gave rise to its different socio-economic and political set-up. The dynamics which characterized pre-colonial South Indian society have not been overlooked by scholars. Migrations and emigrations, agrarian expansions and commercial growth have greatly influenced the vertical and horizontal movements of social groups in the South Indian socio-political order.45 As David Ludden has remarked, there were sharp contrasts between those caste societies which emerged in the riverine, rice-growing areas and those which took root in the mixed and dry areas in the Tamil regions of pre-colonial South India. While the Vellalas and the Brahmins dominated the riverine social hierarchy, Maravas, Kallars and migrant Telugu-speaking ‘Vadugas’ (that is, people from the North) gradually succeeded in imposing their superior socio-political status in the latter ecological zone.46 Consequently, the sort of caste system which evolved in South India has been a product of various historical forces which have shaped and reshaped the social order through centuries. Kerala presents another regional variety in the caste system which in many aspects is quite different from the system prevalent in the rest of South India. Despite the regular communication between coast and interior across the Ghats, large-scale migration and new forms of state-formation have never affected Kerala as dramatically as they did the Deccan, the Carnatic, and Tamil regions from the thirteenth-fourteenth century. Within Kerala as a whole, Kolathunadu stands out as an area that has been particularly isolated from the ‘medieval’ developments in the interi- or and, consequently, has remained the area most susceptible to maritime influences. Throughout this study it will emerge that the major influence on Kolathunadu was invariably maritime in character. Therefore, it is THE GEO-POLITICAL SETTING OF KOLATHUNADU 17 from this perspective that the distinctive social relations which developed in the region in medieval times will be analysed. Eric J. Miller’s study on caste in British Malabar points towards the territorial segmentation of caste system in Kerala. He argues that a distinctive set of caste relations developed in the north as opposed to the south of Malabar. He indicates that the river Korappuzha was a particularly sharp cultural and political frontier between the North and South.47 Historically, in their customs and manners Kolathunadu people certainly did present deviations from their fellow communities in other parts of Kerala. This divergence was most conspicuous in the system of inheritance. When all other Nambutiri Brahmins of Kerala strictly adhered to the makkathayam (patrilineal) system of inheritance, the Brahmins of Payyanur gramam (village) followed the marumakkathayam (matrilineal) system.48 Although the Tiyyas of Kolathunadu followed the marumakkathayam system, their counterparts in nearby Kadathanadu and South Malabar opted to be makkathayis.49 Although the Nayars in both regions were matrilineal, in the North their marriage was virilocal. The Mappila Muslims of North Malabar adhered to a matrilineal system of inheritance but their counterparts in the South were patrilineal. Affinal relations between the communities in North and South Malabar were not permitted by orthodoxy as late as the early twentieth century. While Miller stresses the importance of politics in the regulation of caste relations in Malabar, Ravindran Gopinath has also pointed to the influence of geographical factors and the consequent differences in the dominant agricultural production regimes as decisive factors in determining the differences in the social relations in southern and northern Malabar.50 Garden crops dominated in northern Malabar and southern regions in which paddy cultivation prevailed gave rise to fairly different political systems and social orders. His hypothesis is that the extremely labour-intensive paddy cultivation required a large servile labour force and concomitantly an economically exploitative system of control. In turn such a set-up required an ideological system which justified and preserved extremely unequal social relations between the dominant surplus- appropriating groups and actual producers. This exigency paved the way for the evolution of a more intricate, rigid social system and hence a comparatively more centralized political order in South Malabar, in contrast to the North,51 where the upshot of territorial segmentation was predominantly micro-level caste relations, which inhibited the emergence of broader caste identities until the establishment of the British rule in Malabar.52 This geographical influence on the evolution of Kerala society is also clearly perceptible in the discrepancy in the settlement pattern of Brahmanical villages which began to emerge in the region from at least the eighth century AD. 18 CHAPTER ONE

Brahmanism in Kolathunadu

As mentioned above, the period between the eighth and the fifteenth centuries witnessed the growing influence of Brahmanism in Kerala. But it should be stressed that it was in the wet-land regions of central Kerala, most suitable to paddy cultivation, it put down its deepest roots. The Nambutiri Brahmins, who accentuated their higher status in the social order as both landlords and religious leaders, claimed to be in a position to exert great influence in the society. As the uralar of the temples, they owned extensive landed properties.53 This period also saw them emerging as the karalar of the temple properties.54 In Brahmin villages, temples were the centre of socio-economic activities. The possession of extensive landed properties, no matter by which methods they had been acquired although the bulk of them were donations from the ruling authorities and rich devotees, made temples one of the most important landholders of the medieval period.55 Some Brahmins claimed political status too.56 There are hints which suggest that the Brahmins were not exclusively religious in the profession they chose to follow. According to Pyrard de Laval, some Brahmins also joined the Nayars in service, ‘performing the same duties and wearing the same dress as the latter’.57 The evidence available shows that the concentration of the Nambutiri Brahmin villages in North Malabar was very thin in comparison with those of their counterparts in South Malabar and the central Kerala. The tradition recounts that Lord Parasurama established sixty-four Brahmin settlements in bhargavakshetram (Kerala).58 Thirty-two of them were located in modern Kerala state. Among these thirty-two original gramams, only two happen to be in North Malabar, namely Payyannur and Chellur or Perinchellur (Taliparamba).59 It is conspicuous that the locations of these Brahmin gramams are predominantly found in and around the paddy-cultivable wet-lands in Kerala. By extension, this fact probably also explains their scarcity in North Malabar as the geographical circumstances there limited the scope of wet-land paddy cultivation. Taking this factor into account, the social and, to an extent, the ideological influences these two gramams would have been able to exert over the entire Kolathunadu realm was rather limited. Besides the Nambutiri Brahmins, Tamil Brahmins, known as Pattar Brahmins and Canara Brahmins, also settled in some parts of Kerala but neither of these groups ever seems to have constituted influential sections of medieval Kolathunadu society.60

Nayars as local elites Neither the Kshatriyas nor the Vaisyas, who were regarded as important caste groups in the Brahmanical varna order, figured prominently in THE GEO-POLITICAL SETTING OF KOLATHUNADU 19

Kerala society. The dominant Nayars, who were attributed only a low status in the Brahmanical varna order, carried out the military duties usually assigned to the Kshatriyas.61 There were also Nayar households which controlled extensive landed properties. Their high status was generally attributed to their role as the landed aristocrats and consequently politically powerful social elites in Kerala as well as to their ‘ritual’ relationship with Brahmins maintained through the custom of sambandam.62 However, this ritual relation with the Brahmins should not be assumed to be as the sole factor in determining their social status in North Malabar. It is likely that the direct ritual relationship between the Brahmins and the Nayars was more or less confined to the areas situated in and around Brahmin settlements of which there were only two in North Malabar. As a consequence, it should not be thought that the success enjoyed by the Nayars in North Malabar in legitimizing their superior social status should be associated with any links they might have had to Brahmins but should instead be traced to the much more local cosmological concept of power, known as sakti which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. The Nayars were the military class, although not exclusively, of the society.63 The rulers and naduvazhis of medieval Kerala employed them as their bodyguards. Because of their martial credentials, Barbosa commented ‘all Nairs are mighty warriors’.64 He also states that the Nayars of Cannanore were ‘knighted’ directly by the raja himself.65 The Nayars were drilled in military training from childhood at training centres known as kalaris. Reports of foreign travellers indicate that Nayars sold their military skill in the local job market and earned their livelihood from doing so. Writing of them, Barbosa also refers to a tradition called changatam which was prevalent in medieval Kerala. It was a system in which, ‘if any is in dread, he takes one or two of these nayres, or as many as are daring to maintain, to these he gives a certain small fee to protect him and for love of them none dares do him any hurt, for they and all their kindred will take vengeance for any injury done to such an one’.66 Besides the Nayars, there were some other caste groups which enjoyed comparatively high status in the Malabar social order. Duarte Barbosa notes the names of some of them as biabares (Vyaparis),67 cuivem (Kusavan),68 maintos (Vannattan),69 and caletis (Chaliens).70

Other social groups In fact, the majority of the regional population did not belong to the varna order envisaged by the Brahmins which meant they were treated as outcastes and untouchables. Barbosa refers to these people in this way; ‘[with] whom the others do not associate, nor do they touch them under 20 CHAPTER ONE pain of death and there are great distinctions between one and another of them, preserving them from mixture with one another’.71 Caution is advisable here as it should be borne in mind the picture Barbosa was painting was more or less an ideal state of caste relations in Malabar, fairly remote from the actual day-to-day functioning of the society. The information provided by Pyrard de Laval testifies to the fact that, rather than being practised as Barbosa describes it, the concept of untouchabil- ity was much more honoured in its breach than its observance.72 Among these outcastes such people as the tuias (Tiyyan), manen (Mannan), canaquas (Kaniyan), ageres (Asari), and the like were regarded as the higher classes. Barbosa also provides a list of people who belonged to this category, including mogeres (Moosari?), monquer (Mukkuvas or fishermen), betunes (Vettuvan), paneens (sorcerers), and revoleens (Eravallars), who earned a living by carrying firewood and grass to the towns. In Kolathunadu, the Tiyya community formed an influential social category. There is no unanimous opinion about the origin of the Tiyyas.73 Barbosa described them as people engaging in such various activities as tending the palm-groves, quarrying, working as agricultural labourers and being men-at-arms; in short those who, ‘earn their living by work of all kinds’.74 Numerically they maintained a strong position in the social world of North Malabar.75 It is also remarkable that, without any hesitation about working with their hands to make their livelihood, they were gradually able to carve out a strong position in Kolathunadu, at least by the eighteenth century.76 Owing to their higher economic and ritual status, in contrast to their counterparts (Izhavas) in South Kerala the Tiyyas in the North claimed a non-polluting status.77 This shows that the conceptual stratification of society in a hierarchical order according to the Brahmanical social theory of varna, by excluding a large section of population from its structure, did not really correspond to the economic or social status of these ‘outcastes’ throughout Malabar. Pulayan, Parayan, Cheruman, and other such people occupied the lowest position in this predominantly agrarian social order, where they were mainly treated as agrestic slaves. Pulayas were the actual tillers of the soil. Even the lower class people treated them as untouchables. The Parayas were held to be worse than devils. ‘Even to see them is to be unclean and out caste’.78 The British census of 1857 shows that the concentration of agrestic slaves in Chirakkal taluk—the core region of old Kolathunadu— was thinner than in the neighbouring tracts; with the exception of Kottayam—a hilly area.79 Buchanan also remarked on a few members of this ‘slave’ population in North Malabar.80 As noted earlier, the differences in the crop cultivation regimes between the North and the South Malabar could have influenced this discrepancy in population pattern. The more labour-intensive paddy cultivation demanded a concentration of these THE GEO-POLITICAL SETTING OF KOLATHUNADU 21 tillers of the soil in the South rather than in the garden-crop dominant North Malabar. Moreover, the shortage of agrestic slaves in the region meant that the hired labour of Nayars, Tiyyas, and Mappilas was more expensive.81 This situation could have guaranteed the regional agricultural labourers greater social and occupational mobility. Perceptible regional differences in caste structures and social relations denote the flexibility which characterized the social scene of pre-colonial Kerala. This observation also raises the question of how far these groups of people, generally referred to as communities, did actually function in the sense of strictly structured ‘communities’ in pre-colonial Kerala. It is also true that these social groups depended largely on an agrarian surplus to make their living and as a consequence of the tardiness of change in the agricultural sector, the scope for mobility on the socio-political ladder seems to have been rather slow. In contrast, the coastal society of Kolathunadu, which depended on trade and related activities, was far more vibrant and lively than that of the inland agrarian social groups.

Mercantile groups in Kolathunadu The ports of Kolathunadu attracted very diverse and complex merchant groups from different parts of the Indian Ocean world. During the pre- European period, traders such as Chettys, Jews, and Christians frequented these ports. The Geniza papers which date from the twelfth century mention the brass factory of the West Asian Jewish merchant Abraham Yuju at Dharmapatanam.82 The existence of a pond near Madayi known as the ‘Jewish pond’ is another piece of evidence which supports their presence in the region in an early period.83 The references to Anchuvannam and Manigramam merchant guilds in the Payyanur Pattu [Payyanur Song] also offer a clue to the strong presence of merchant communities from various parts of the Indian Ocean along the coastal tract of Kolathunadu in the pre-Portuguese period.84 In the course of time, in this cosmopolitan mercantile world Mappila Muslim traders gradually emerged as the predominant merchant group in Kolathunadu. The account of Ibn Battuta, who visited the Malabar Coast in the fourteenth century, gives indications of the increasing influence of Muslim traders in Kolathunadu.85 Although it would be wrong to assume that this signalled the complete disappearance of other trading groups from the commercial sphere of the region, the Mappila traders indisputably enjoyed supremacy in the coastal and the trans-oceanic trade of Kolathunadu by the beginning of the seventeenth century.86 Duarte Barbosa mentions the vyapari Nayars of Calicut, who might also have occupied a position in the inland trading activities of Kolathunadu.87 It is also possible that it never entered the minds of the 22 CHAPTER ONE large section of the people there who did not belong to the varna order to cultivate an aversion to trade as a means to earn their livelihood. If they did indeed choose to ignore such prejudices, it seems that their first choice would have been to engage in a sort of peddling trade as their resource base was too limited to engage in extensive commercial activities. The collective memory of the local people preserved in the folklore tradition of the region also supports this assumption. The tottam of the katuvanoor veeran teyyam of the Tiyya community in North Malabar recounts the peddling trade of the god Katuvanoor Veeran and his friends with the Kudagu region in Canara.88 Quite clearly, the strong resource base of the Mappila traders and their connection with the Indian Ocean Islamic trading networks put them ahead of other local traders in controlling the trade of Kolathunadu. Although it is difficult to present a clear-cut picture of the inland migrations and settlements of Mappila traders before the nineteenth century, it might be safe to assume that such hinterland Mappila bazaars in such places as Srikandapuram, Irukkur, Talipparamba, and Kottayam were brisk trading centres even before the coming of the Portuguese.89 It is particularly important to remember that the most sought-after commodities for international trade such as pepper, ginger and cardamom were acquired from deep in the hinterlands of the port of Cannanore.90 Of more local commercial interest were the different types of woods—an important forest product which were in high demand for shipbuilding— which were brought from the Western Ghats via the rivers of Kolathunadu.91 More practically, commodities for local consumption such as rice, cotton, salt, and opium which also had to be imported from outlying regions also boosted the emergence of these inland-trading centres. However, in contrast to the situation in the neighbouring territories under the control of the Zamorins of Calicut, the Mappila population in the interior of Kolathunadu still remained negligible even in the nineteenth century.92 Besides these local trading groups, Malabar society also hosted a number of paradesi (foreign) traders. Among them, Chetty traders from the Coromandel Coast and Gujarathi Banias were the most important.93 However, their commercial presence in Kolathunadu during the seventeenth century seems to have been inconsequential owing to the increasing power of the local Mappila merchants.94

Conclusion

Although the aim of this thesis is not to champion the idea of ‘geographical determinism’, the significance of geography in the shaping of the history of Kolathunadu as a particular micro-region within both South THE GEO-POLITICAL SETTING OF KOLATHUNADU 23

India and Kerala can scarcely be overrated. Local geography more or less determined the quantitative and qualitative aspects of agricultural output and obviously influenced the pattern of settlement and the agrarian relations in the region. The sought-after spices produced in the hinterland coupled with the limited possibility for paddy cultivation stimulated the emergence of a prominent maritime commercial sector which dominated a comparatively less flexible inland agrarian social order. As it possessed only a very narrow stretch of agricultural land, Kolathunadu as a whole had remained relatively detached from earlier processes of Brahmani- zation and agricultural expansion and instead responded enthusiastically to maritime commercial influences. This was particularly true in the early-modern period when the Indian Ocean trade enjoyed an increasing stimulation in the wake of the arrival of European entrepreneurs. Maritime trade provided a fine opportunity for improving the economic status for the social groups in Kolathunadu where the agricultural surplus was limited. Naturally, under such circumstances the port towns of Kolathunadu, Cannanore especially, flourished grew into the centres of socio-political dynamics in the region. INTRODUCTION 25

CHAPTER TWO

THE RAJAS OF KOLATHUNADU

The ‘state’ in pre-colonial Kerala

The ‘state’ in pre-colonial Kerala is not a well-developed field of research. Although K. V. Krishna Ayyar, the author of The Zamorins of Calicut, traced similarities between the naduvazhi system of Kerala and the feudal order in Europe long before D. D. Kosambi, who introduced a ‘feudal’ model into Indian historiography as an analytical concept, he did not develop it as an analytical tool with which to study the pre-colonial Kerala states.1 His argument was that the naduvazhis of Kerala ‘were similar to the tenants-in-chief of feudal England having more or less the same rights and obligations’.2 O. K. Nambiar also attributed ‘feudal’ status to the Kunjalis of Calicut, thereby sharing a common platform with Krishna Ayyar.3 Later, borrowing from the study of medieval Ceylon by Edmund Leach, Kathleen Gough proposed the concept of ‘hydraulic feudalism’ to describe the political system in the region.4 M. G. S. Narayanan’s doctoral dissertation on the Cheras of Maho- dayapuram can be considered a breakthrough in Kerala historiography in terms of analysing the state structure in the early-medieval period.5 His attempt to postulate a kingdom with a centre at Mahodayapuram (Kodungalloor) exercising control over the nadus across the region tallies well with the feudal perception of medieval Indian states. Similarly, although perceiving differences with the contemporaneous Chola-Pandya state organizations, Kesavan Veluthat has also tried to highlight the feudal aspect of state in early-medieval Kerala under the Chera rulers of Mahodayapuram.6 One fact which seems indisputable is that the political formation in post-Chera Kerala was in many ways different from that in other parts of South India. The rise of an array of petty principalities in the region after the twelfth century has made it difficult for scholars to conceive and hence schematize the development within a broader theoretical framework. For many, medieval Kerala represents a singular case which is therefore more often neglected than tackled in the general historiography of India.7 Dick Kooiman suggests that this negligence is attributable to ‘the bewildering variety of numerous coastal kingdoms [which] does not seem to offer the historian a solid base for the construction of more enduring frameworks’.8 The easiest way to escape from such an academic predica- 26 CHAPTER TWO ment, which failed to encompass medieval Kerala in a pan-Indian, ‘enduring’ theoretical framework, was simply to omit it from historical discourse altogether. Notwithstanding this apparently insurmountable impasse, recently some attempts have been made to look at the pre-colonial Kerala polities from new theoretical perspectives which diverge from that of the ‘feudal’ approach. Burton Stein’s ‘segmentary state’ model has found some reflection in Kerala historiography, though not some sceptical notes being struck.9 Dick Kooiman argues that the ‘segmentary state’ appears to be an appropriate model to use to study the character of the ‘state’ on the Malabar Coast.10 He says that, while religious grants were a major source of power in the region, fiscality does not seem to have loomed large internal relations. However, when he tried to apply the segmentary state model in Malabar Kooiman was confronted by the problem that the numerous states in the region did not have one, single dominating centre. In order to overcome this problem, he suggested that perhaps the sacred memory of a former kingship under the Cheras served the same purpose in Kerala as did the ritual deference paid to a living ruler in the Chola Empire did in Tamil Nadu.11 Hugo K. s’Jacob has also suggested using the ‘segmentary state’ model to analyse the political structure in early-modern Kerala, but he has not gone on to develop this argument.12 It is noteworthy that both these Dutch scholars were dealing principally with the political formations in the southern parts of Kerala—Venadu (Travancore) and Cochin. Their area of study obviously influenced their perception that ‘ritual’ and ‘religious grants’ were necessary prerequisites to the acquisition of political power in Kerala.

The ‘little kingdom’ model

Adopting the concept of the ‘little kingdom’, mainly from Nicholas B. Dirks,13 Margaret Frenz, has modified it to suit the Malabar situation and made an attempt to give theoretical coherence to the analysis of pre-colonial Kerala polities.14 Although, in 1997 another Dutch scholar, Mark de Lannoy, had already suggested using the ‘little kingdom’ model as a tool to analyse the state forms in early modern Kerala, Margaret Frenz was the scholar who presented it to Kerala historiography as a full-fledged model.15 Frenz summarizes the ‘little kingdom’ model devised by Dirks as follows. The State structure is depicted as pyramidal, with the great king positioned at the very top. His political and ritual might enables him to exercise supreme power over the little kings. The great king’s range of power, however, continually decreases at the periphery of this ‘catchment area’; there, it THE RAJAS OF KOLATHUNADU 27

is the little kings who are more important, since they are actually on site. The little king legitimises and manifests his rule through political and ritual actions, which express the extent of his participation in power. This pattern is repeated on a smaller scale in the lower levels, right down to the foot of the pyramid to individual person’s relations and family relationship.16 Although this description bears a close resemblance to Stein’s ‘segmentary state’ model, in contrast to him Dirks considers ‘ritual and political forms were fundamentally the same’, rather than being separate entities.17 Dirks also recognizes military power as an important constituent of authority in a ‘little kingdom’, although the military system was ‘organised around subordinate chieftains, connubial connections, and privileged landhold- ing rather than on centralized or bureaucratically organized revenue collection and military rule’.18 The relationship between the ‘great king’ and the ‘little king’ is mutually beneficial, but the military might of the former did not play a decisive role. The ‘great king’ had to depend on loyal ‘little kings’ when he had conflicts to settle with other ‘great kings’ or rebellious little kings. Under these conditions, the ‘little king’ enjoyed complete freedom within his domain. In brief, the relationship between ‘little king’ and the ‘great king’ remained largely ‘symbolic’. Despite her acceptance of the ‘little kingdom’ model as a useful tool with which to analyse the pre-colonial Malabar polity, Frenz does have some misgivings, criticizing Dirks’ model as being too rigid and lacking any scope which would allow further development.19 Therefore, she has tried to develop it to suit the situation found in medieval Kerala. She states that, A little king is a ruler who has, within his territory, essential instruments of rule such as financial and military means at his disposal, and who legitimises his rule through political and ritual acts. Outwardly the little king must accept the rule of a great king who is superior to him in a ritual and political sense, and who can demonstrate this by military means if necessary. The little king also relies on the great king, since he can legitimise his rule inter- nally over the great king by the system of ritual redistribution, thereby gaining a share of the great king’s power. Conversely, the great king cannot, in the long term, assert his rule over the little kings by military means, since he requires the political and ritual support of the little kings for the legitimation of his rule.20 In his model Dirks proposes a two-tier system, in which the ‘great king’ and ‘little kings’ occupy the first and second positions. Rejecting this, Frenz suggests the existence of a more flexible arrangement in Malabar and tries to insert a stratum of ‘little kings’ between the ‘great king’ and such minor chieftains as naduvazhis or desavazhis. She strengthens her argument by arguing that ‘in this way the little king is left with a far greater scope for political, ritual and military action, the struggle for power is more pronounced and the order of precedence is continually 28 CHAPTER TWO being rearranged’.21 However, her attempt to form a three-tier political hierarchy which would permit the introduction of ‘little kings’ in Kerala forced Frenz to postulate the existence of a ‘great king’ who was actually not present in the political context of the region. In the absence of this ‘great king’; the concept of ‘little kings’ is simply nullified. As Dirks himself argues, ‘little kingship could not be attained without great kings’.22 In her effort to solve this problem, Frenz introduces a ‘virtual’ ‘great king’— the legendary ‘Cheraman Perumal’—who occupies the apex in the ritual hierarchy of Kerala. It appears that in her attempts to construct a theoretical context, Frenz has tried to ‘fit’ the ‘little kingdom’ model into the medieval Kerala political situation rather than attempting to find a model to suit the polity with which she was dealing. It is true that most of the Kerala rajas putatively traced their authority and concomitantly their legitimacy to rule over their respective territories to the legendary ruler Cheraman Perumal. In doing so, they did not diverge from a common process found throughout India in which almost all the ruling dynasties tried to trace their origin to puranic figures or such dynastic lines as surya vamsa, chandra vamsa and the like. Their purpose remained the same—to legitimize and to enhance the prestige of their authority to rule over a society—whether this is organized matrilineally or patrilineally. Hence, introducing Cheraman Perumal as a ‘great king’ automatically presupposes ‘little kings’. Neat though it is, as a model it fails to explain the social dynamics in response to socio-economic changes in pre-colonial Kerala and even fails to explain the different levels of power relations among the ‘little kings’ or between the ‘little kings’ and the naduvazhis or desavazhis of Kerala. Instead of finding a place for a functionally inactive ‘virtual’ ‘great king’ in the pre-colonial Malabar political system, perhaps it would be better to look at the ruling houses of Kerala in their historical contexts. It would seem to be more feasible to examine those known as rajas of Kerala as ‘rajas’ in their own right, whatever the term meant in the political context of pre-colonial Kerala.

The swarupam polity

After the Perumals or the Cheras of Mahodayapuram disappeared from the scene in the twelfth century, the political formation in Kerala followed a divergent path to that in the other parts of South India. The emergence of the institution known as the ‘swarupam’ as the focus of political power after the twelfth century was a significant development in the history of Kerala. So far, in spite of its importance in the political economy of pre- colonial Kerala, only a limited number of studies about the swarupam polity are available.23 The literal meaning of the term swarupam—‘self- THE RAJAS OF KOLATHUNADU 29 figure or self-form’—does not seem to have any explicit political conno- tation and an analysis of the root of the word is no help in expounding this unique political system satisfactorily. Historically, it is known that the epithet swarupam was attributed to such major political houses in Kerala as the Kolaswarupam (Cannanore), the Nediyirippu Swarupam (Calicut), the Perumpadappu Swarupam (Cochin), and the Venadu Swarupam (Travancore).24 It is plausible to assume that some of these houses had already attained political prominence during the Chera period. Evidence from Chera inscriptions reveals the existence of the ‘governors’ (utaiyavar or vazhunnavar) of such nadus as Kolathunadu, Venadu (Travancore) and Eralanadu (Calicut).25 Gradually, after the disappearance of the Cheras of Mahodayapuram, the houses of these nadu utaiyavars began to emerge as independent political houses or swarupams. In a nutshell, some of the swarupams of Kerala had enjoyed a long history of political standing, which could have strengthened their claim to political supremacy over the other minor swarupams after the twelfth century. It might also be an indication that that the term ‘swarupam’ was coined for these houses only after the end of Chera period. Whatever, the case might have been, besides those prominent swarupams which can trace their histories back to the Perumal period, new swarupams also assumed shape in Kerala in the course of time.26 In spite of the differences in the period of their origins, all of these swarupams shared one specific common trait. They were powerful matrilineal joint families which claimed hereditary political authority. In this respect a swarupam closely resembled a taravadu. A taravadu was also a matrilineal joint family headed by a karanavar, who was usually its eldest male member and who had succeeded to the position through the matrilineal line of succession. Property owned jointly by the family members under the supervision of the karanavar. Even though proprietary rights were traced through the female line, as in most matrilineal societies, it does not seem that the women members enjoyed any crucial control over the actual use of the property.27 Bigger taravadus controlled extensive landed properties, a system which was of enormous help to them in gaining political and judicial control over their vicinities. It is noteworthy that a taravadu which had succeeded in establishing its dominance in a region could eventually claim the status of a swarupam. For instance, as revealed in a Mackenzie manuscript, the prominent land-owning Kudali Taravadu in North Kerala claimed the status of a swarupam.28 This intimates that the political structure in pre-colonial Malabar was essentially flexible and that the demarcation between of what constituted the status of a swarupam and a taravadu was very narrow. It seems that the role of Brahmanism was crucial to delineating the superior political status of the swarupams in comparison to that of the 30 CHAPTER TWO other powerful taravadus in Kerala.29 The heads of the swarupams were generally honoured as ‘rajas’, mainly in Brahmanical narratives. It is also true that the consecration ceremonies of many of these ‘rajas’ of the Kerala swarupams were presided over by Brahmin ‘priests’. Although, these factors indicate that Brahmanism influenced the conceptualization of swarupam kingship in Kerala, it has to be argued that the conceptualization of the state form in pre-colonial Kolathunadu cannot rely solely from the Brahmanical concept of ‘ritual kingship’.30 The regional idea of cosmic power or sakti was tremendously important and cannot be overlooked.

The concept of sakti

When analysing the indigenous cultural matrix of northern Malabar in his in-depth study on teyyam worship in this region, J. R. Freeman noticed the existence of three distinct value-systems co-existing in the local cultural matrix. The first of these was the Brahmanical strand: enshrined in its purity-impurity dichotomy. The second in rank was the political or ‘royal’ system which was founded on martial and material power. The third system was the strand which drew its prowess from magical powers. All these three streams coalesced in or were absorbed into the regional cosmos of sakti (sacred power) embedded in the local Dravidian culture and consequently forming an integral and indissoluble part of the regional cultural matrix.31 In his analysis, Freeman remarks on the spatial factor which limited the ideological influence of Brahmanism over Dravidian ritual centres (temple/kavu). Those local worship centres located closer to Brahmin temples tended to be more heavily influenced by the ‘purity-impurity’ concept, whereas understandably this influence tended to diminish in proportion to the increasing spatial distance between the two.32 Although there are indications of a compromise between these streams, Brahmanism never succeeded in dominating or even substantially transforming the indigenous world of beliefs and practices.33 Instead, the outcome of this coalescence was a complex process in which various cosmological concepts interpenetrated each other to form a complex social ideology. It can be hypothesized that, instead of succeeding completely in altering the existing systems to suit their perceptions, the Nambutiri Brahmins in Kolathunadu gradually found themselves forced to ‘internal- ize’ the local Dravidian sakti cults if they were to continue co-exist in the local social structure. Even among the political elites of the region, the influence of Brahmanism and its emphasis on ritual purity were limited. This absence THE RAJAS OF KOLATHUNADU 31 is conspicuous in the ritual practices which were observed in the royal temples of the Kolaswarupam. For example, until recently the Maday Kavu, the oldest ritual seat of the Kolaswarupam, continued to perform blood sacrifices.34 The same situation prevailed in cases of such bhagavati (goddess) worshipping centres as the Nileswaram Kavu (Mannanpurathu Kavu) and the Kalarivatukkal Temple, linked to the royal houses of the Alladam Swarupam (Nileswaram) and the Kolaswarupam respectively. Here animal sacrifices were regularly carried out as a part of sakti worship. Historically, there seem to have been attempts on the part of the Kolaswarupam to create a ‘royal’ priesthood, by reproducing the equiva- lent of the priestly class in Brahmin temples to serve in these temples. The pidarar who served in these temples adhered to the same ritual life as the Brahmins, but they were regarded as sakteya Brahmins, who practised blood sacrifices and drank toddy as a part of their daily puja. As in the Brahmin temples but in contrast to the common local kavus, daily pujas were performed in these swarupam temples. There is good reason to believe that the Kolaswarupam was trying to create its own ritual system rooted in the local concept of sakti by the simple method of appropriating some of the features in the functioning of Brahmanical temples. This evidence suggests that assuming ‘ritual’ authority as a separate entity is not enough to do full justice to the conceptualization of political power in Kolathunadu.35 In another sense, there was no real segregation of power into ‘ritual’ and ‘political’ realms. Both spheres were the con- stituents of the concept of sakti. As Shelly Errington has commented, the presence of invisible cosmic power was inferred by people through the witnessing of such visible signs of its possession as wealth, status, influence and the like.36 The Zamorins, rulers of neighbouring Calicut, carried pallimaradi 37 at the head of their army when they marched against Vellattiri, the rival ruler, because this ritual palladium visualized the presence of goddess ‘Tirumandhamkunnu Bhagavati’, which would assure them victory over the enemy.38 Hence, the army column on the march resembled a ritual procession in honour of the glory of their goddess and the victory of the king over his enemy was the manifestation of the sakti of the goddess. A raja who controlled material wealth and won military victories would implicitly send out the signal that he was endowed with sakti or cosmic power. He emitted the invisible sakti through his material achieve- ments. Accordingly, physical power and material affluence intimated the presence of the invisible cosmic power which consequently legitimized political power. Loyalty was gained and sustained through dispensing material means. Consequently, the material prosperity of a taravadu or a swarupam was an expression of its cosmic power or sakti. There was no fundamental difference between the sakti emanating from a raja or that from a god/goddess. Both were expressed through 32 CHAPTER TWO actions in the real world. Vanquishing the enemy and attaining material benefit were the two ‘blessings’ which a devotee expected from his/her tamburan—a term used to denote both gods and members of the local elite. Therefore such goals as attaining swarga (heaven) or escaping from the cycle of births and attaining moksha (salvation) did not figure largely in the spiritual tradition of Kolathunadu. The sakti inherent in a man/woman was visible through earthly deeds; before and after death. After their death, such people could be transformed into teyyam (a corrupted form of the Sanskrit daivam, which means ‘god’) and manifest their sakti through material means and express their visions and blessings through the intervention of a human medium (velichappadu). In this sense, ritual legitimization of political power in Kolathunadu and in Kerala generally was not very different from the legitimization attained through material power. Nevertheless, the Nambutiri Brahmins did make attempts to exalt the political dignity of the rajas of Kerala. The Kolathiris were praised as ‘Vadakkan Perumals’ (Perumals of the North) by the author of the Keralolpathi.39 However, unlike the neighbouring Chola kings who were able to manipulate the Brahmanical ideology to construct a royal cult in which the king, replicating such puranic deities as Shiva, were transformed into the embodiment of power and the centre of authority, the creation of a royal cult in Malabar, particularly in Kolathunadu, achieved only limited success.40 Unsurprisingly, there appears to have been a significant discrepancy between the ideal type of polity presented in Brahmanical texts such as the Keralolpathi, in which the Kolathiri ‘raja’ is presented as the custodian of legitimized political power, and the actual working of power relations in the region. However, there does not seem to have been a sharp distinction between the various power levels in Kolathunadu. The ‘kingly’ status attributed to the Kolathiris was never really more than nominal. Kolathunadu society did not seem to have considered that the position of the Kolathiris was a fundamentally different from that of other ‘men of prowess’ in the region.41 In local folklore the Kolathiri was usually referred to as a tamburan—a common term used to designate both local gods and members of the regional elite, including the Ali Rajas. This seems to indicate that they were thought to belong to the same cosmic category in the regional cosmos.42 An examination of the state-formation process in medieval Kerala reveals that it does not present a picture of a homogeneous development throughout the region.43 The historical forces which shaped the fortunes of swarupams varied considerably in time and space. Although Calicut does present the features of an ‘early state’ with perceptible centralization impulses and successfully developed control mechanisms embedded in THE RAJAS OF KOLATHUNADU 33 ritual practices, it was only by the middle of the eighteenth century that a kingdom (Travancore under Marthanda Varma) succeeded in organiz- ing a state with a powerful centre and elaborate administrative and ideological apparatuses.44 In contrast, Kolathunadu presented a loosely knit political structure, in which the concept of ‘rajaship’ retained more of the nature of a ritual façade. Although there were attempts by the Brahmins to construct an ideological framework in which the political systems in medieval Kerala could function hypothetically, in fact the region witnessed the development of state forms which were distinct from each other in many respects.

Houses by the sea

The interpretation of pre-colonial Malabar political organization by Dilip M. Menon as ‘houses by the sea’ seems to bear a close resemblance to the reality of the situation in Kolathunadu.45 Menon envisages a politically and economically decentralized state structure in pre-colonial Malabar; one which seems to have been far more loosely organized than the ‘segmentary state’ model of Burton Stein. Whereas in Stein’s concept there was at least a royal court at the ‘core’ to symbolize the ‘ritual’ function of the state, Menon argues that the taravadus or large households in the interior of Malabar functioned as independent politico-economic units without any ‘ritual core’. This is the reason Menon does not make any distinction between the swarupams and taravadus in Malabar. Probably he does not assume such a distinction would have been significant to the actual functioning of political relations in the region. This assumption trans- forms his rendering of the Malabar polity as ‘houses by the sea’ into a model which is useful for analysing the political relations in Kolathunadu. He postulates that the concept of kingship in Malabar actually developed around large household formations on the coast, such as that of the Zamorins, which depended entirely on the ‘flows of trade from the interior to the coast and beyond’.46 Menon pursues his thesis by arguing that in Kerala ‘monarchy was the story of an ever-shifting coalition of merchants, naval powers and the emergent courts’ and assumes the existence of a political equilibrium in the region during the pre-Portuguese period. He states that, ‘based on access to a wide frontier such as the ocean, centralizing impulses had never arisen’ and the logical consequence is that the impulse for a drive towards political centralization arrived late in medieval Kerala, only becoming visible in the wake of the European impact. The Zamorins of Calicut and the Travancore kingship were the products of conflicts with the Portuguese, Dutch, and English commercial powers. In a nutshell, a full-fledged concept of kingship never devel- 34 CHAPTER TWO oped in medieval Kerala and ‘in northern Kerala kingship remained a failed experiment’.47 Although in agreement with Menon it has to be acknowledged that the state structure in pre-colonial Malabar was far more fluid than it was in other parts of the Subcontinent, it should not be assumed that there were no centralizing forces at work before the arrival of the Europeans.48 Nevertheless, undeniably the possibilities opened up by maritime trade did play an increasing role in shaping the process of state formation in the region. This is particularly true in the case of the political system as it developed in early modern Kolathunadu. As discussed elsewhere, the geographical features of Kolathunadu did not guarantee a large-scale agricultural surplus.49 Hindered by the limited agrarian economy offered by the area, any possibility of the emergence of a centralized political structure was remote. The restricted opportunity to exploit the limited agricultural surplus obviously reined in the chances of the Kolathiris to exercise far-reaching influence over the people of the region. Instead, a situation developed in which a fluctuating field of powerful taravadus emerged; each exercising control over the resources from its landed properties and the dependent labour-service classes. The inadequacy of the rice production might also have assisted the evolution of ‘communities of subsistence’,50 under the command of influential taravadus which controlled the limited area of wet-land paddy-fields in the region during the pre-colonial period.51 Inevitably, the peculiar state structure in Kolathunadu in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries must be analysed against this background of the economic and concomitant social relations in Kolathunadu. Indisputably, the maintenance of political dignity through the orches- tration of ritual practices and commanding obedience and loyalty by the exercise of force required control over substantial economic resources. An examination shows that the income of the Kerala rajas was extremely diversified. It was drawn from various sources including income from royal estates, tolls and taxes on trade, kazcha (gifts), ankam (duel of honour/justice), purushantaram (succession fees), changatam (charge for special protection), fee for the conferring titles and other covert ‘taxes’.52 The landed property of the swarupam was called cherikkal. These cherikkal lands were divided among the different lineages (taivazhis or mother’s lineages) and the lineage segments (kovilakams) of each swarupam. The income from a particular cherikkal was assigned to a person occupying a particular position (stanam) in the swarupam. This stanam was decided according to that person’s muppu (seniority) in the swarupam, encompassing all of its various lineages and lineage segments. Therefore, the order of seniority (muppumura) was crucial not only to determining a person’s stanam in the power hierarchy of the swarupam THE RAJAS OF KOLATHUNADU 35 but also by extension to controlling the income from a particular cherikkal. The ‘right’ of a stani (one who occupied a stanam) in a particular cherikkal was limited to collecting a share of the produce of the land. The cherikkal lands were usually leased out to cultivators (pattam).53 The actual cultivators of the land were known as adiyalar. In this system, the right to collect a share of the produce, at least among the higher ranks, was usually awarded to ‘officials’ appointed by the raja, who were entitled to a monthly allowance supplemented by a certain amount for their personal expenses.54 A share of the income from cherikkal was also spent for religious purposes. Consequently, the income from the cherikkal was distributed at different levels of production relations and the ruling members enjoyed only a limited share of this income. This distribution is particularly important considering the fact that there was no systematic, centralized system of land revenue in Malabar until the last quarter of the eighteenth century, when this region came under Mysorean control.55 Kerala rajas did not enjoy any kind of ideological support in promoting themselves as the supreme owner of the land (bhupati).56 From point of view of the Nambutiri Brahmins, it was the Brahmins, not the rajas, who were the ultimate authority in the land. In the swarupam system of kingship, the raja was not assumed to be the supreme head of a land system under which the land derived its political value from the amount the state could systematically extract as revenue. Instead, he was an embodiment of the authority which bound various power centres through such accoutrements of sovereignty as receiving gifts, conferring titles on influential personalities and nobles, punishing violations of customary practices and the like. The raja exercised control over a network of power relations, operating through various people of stature, by juggling a combined strategy composed of ritual and authoritative instruments.57 Obviously, in this construction the raja derived only a limited income from the agrarian surplus. Likewise, the other sources of income to which he was entitled—ankam, gifts, purushantaram and suchlike—, albeit of crucial importance to the realm of political and ritual relations, were invariably inconsistent and unreliable. In this context that income from trade and commerce acquired paramount importance for the rajas. In the culmination of all these circumstances, it is natural that the swarupams in pre-colonial Kerala assume the guise of ‘houses by the sea’, as many of them depended on maritime trade for an important slice of their income and such maritime centres as Maday and later Cannanore, emerged as the political centres of the Kolaswarupam. However, the Kolathiris and the other kingships of Kerala never succeeded in establishing decisive control over the commodity movements within their realm.58 Tolls (chunkam) levied on commercial goods were collected by ‘men of 36 CHAPTER TWO prowess’ sitting at different nodes on the inland trade routes.59 The evidence available indicates that swarupam lineages also participated in this sharing of the commercial income derived from inland commodity movements.60 The upshot was that the rajas mostly had to make do with the tolls derived from the maritime trade centres. Inevitably, fluctuations in maritime income had a significant influence on the political fortunes of maritime trade-oriented swarupams. The rather straitened economic resources of the rajas of Kerala did not permit them to maintain a regular standing army of their own. Employing the Nayars in military service placed a heavy economic burden on the shoulders of the rajas. During military operations which demanded large-scale deployment of the Nayars, these people were paid on a daily basis.61 It was not an unusual occurrence for Nayars whose employers had been tardy in their payments to take service under other lords.62 Circumstances seem to suggest that there was a lively military labour market in Malabar, consisting mainly of the traditional Nayar militia plus such other armed groups as Tiyyas and Mappilas. This easy availability of armed service and the inability of the Kolathiris to monopolize the use of force in the realm on account of their weak economic position meant that the outward appearance of regal authority remained more or less nominal. The swarupam polity in Kolathunadu exhibited the character of a political authority with limited access to economic resources which it had to share with different echelons of the political elites of the society. The Kolathiris had to sustain their political dignity within the constraints set by the limits of their economic resource base. The logical consequence of this was a limitation in the scope of political power in Kolathunadu which diminished chances of developing a centralized state form in the region. Compounding the inadequate resource base, the organization of political power within a swarupam also weakened the possibility of the growth of a strong centralized power. Political power in a swarupam was diffuse in nature. As mentioned earlier, the swarupams of Kerala branched into lineages and lineage segments. Theoretically, each of these small political units of a swarupam was qualified to make a claim to the ‘raja-ship’ on the basis of a claim to muppumura or seniority.63 The eldest male member of the various lineages/lineage segments of a swarupam could assume the ‘raja-ship’, but even in such a position he did not enjoy full command of political authority in a swarupam. In a swarupam, the authority was divided into and conferred on different members according to muppu, that is, in a descending order. This division of power was known as kuruvazcha. Usually the eldest member of the reigning house (muttakuru) assumed the ‘raja-ship’, and the next junior, the elamkuru, was designated as his immediate successor or heir apparent to the ‘raja-ship’.64 In short, the entire line THE RAJAS OF KOLATHUNADU 37 of succession was organized in a swarupam according to the rules of muppumura. The politico-economic powers within the lineages and lineage segments of a swarupam were similarly divided. When the segmentation of a swarupam into lineages and lineage segments grew more complex, the determination of muppu concomitantly increased in complexity. The almost inevitable consequence was the power struggles among various lineages and lineage segments. Therefore, kingship in pre-colonial Kerala never emerged as the ultimate, single source of power. Instead, political authority remained a collective entity and was unevenly distributed within the swarupam. This fragmented character of political authority in the region in general and in Kolathunadu in particular was the main obstacle to the emergence of a powerful king.

The co-sharers of Kolathunadu

In the seventeenth century, the Kolaswarupam had to share its political authority with two other lineages in North Kerala. The Nileswaram (Alladam) Swarupam and the Arackal Swarupam both claimed an independent political identity. Furthermore, political power within the Kolaswarupam had also been dispersed among different kovilakams. Hence, in the Keralolpathi there were four kovilakams sharing the political authority of the Kolaswarupam namely: the Talora Kovilakam; the Arathil Kovilakam; the Muttathil Kovilakam; and the Karipathu Kovilakam.65 According to the Kolathunadu tradition of Keralolpathi, the Karipathu Kovilakam claimed some sort of superiority over the others. But, as is apparent from the Dutch records, the Palli Kovilakam and the Udayamangalam Kovilakam actually dominated the political scene in Kolathunadu.66 By the time the Dutch arrived, both these kovilakams had again branched into various kovilakams, thereby creating a network of ‘political houses’ within the Kolaswarupam.67 This is another piece of evidence that the Kolaswarupam was not an exception to the general situation prevailing among the other ruling houses of Kerala. Consequently power was not embodied in the raja, but was manifested in its collective form—the swarupam. The basic unit of political and economic life in Kolathunadu was the taravadu. Quite apart from its spatial existence as a household with control over landed property, the taravadu was a ritually significant unit.68 Each taravadu had its own family deity or paradevata and ancestor worship was also an integral part of its ritual life. These arrangements show that each taravadu was a micro-reflection of the cosmic power, sakti, and exhibited its own unique identity in the social order. In Kolathunadu 38 CHAPTER TWO these dynamic, autonomous taravadus were not organized hierarchically on the basis of any systematized, holistic socio-political ideology.69 Although the Kolaswarupam managed to maintain a distinguished status among these taravadus, political power was not confined to it exclusively. The powerful taravadus, which shared cosmic energy with the Kolaswarupam enjoyed political power in the respective territories under their control. On analysis, the Kolaswarupam appears to have been nothing more than a complex form of taravadu, exercising greater control over landed property and other sources of affluence. It seems that Kolathunadu was consisted of numerous taravadus sharing different levels of political power in the realm and the differences between them lay only in the dimension of power or sakti expressed through their social relations. Consequently, the nature of the relationship between the Kolaswarupam and the taravadus in Kolathunadu and their relationship between each other were determined by the degree of sakti or power they possessed. To some extent, the political picture of Kolathunadu during both the seventeenth and the eighteenth century resembled the South-East Asian polity described by Shelly Errington as a form of an unevenly distributed energy field punctuated by various nodes of concentration. The energy exists everywhere in the field, but it is unevenly distributed: in some places it is quite thin; in others, densely concentrated. The energy is continuous—here are no boundaries and no empty spaces, but only thinner and thicker concentrations. The energy in this field is distributed not only unevenly, but unstably. It is continually moving, waxing and waning from particular locations. Its flux is usually, though not always, gradual. In addition to currents of energy, numerous visible objects occupy this field. One of the differences between the objects and the currents of energy is that the objects are discrete: they have boundaries and surfaces. Thus houses have walls, and humans have skin. But if we could see the energy, or if we were in the habit of thinking of the world in this way, we would understand that the boundaries or surfaces of these objects are the least important things about them. The objects provide locations and nodal points at which the energy collects, though in differing degrees of concentration.70 In this model, a boundary-oriented conceptualization of the state is replaced by a disseminated political structure in which the concept of ‘space’ or ‘territory’ is relatively unimportant.71 This model has the capac- ity to contain individuals, institutions, houses and palaces as a part of this power field and also to accommodate variations in the concentration of power. The potency of the individuals and institutions is invisible and, as seen earlier, it is manifested through signs indicating its presence in the form of material wealth and the numerical strength of the people under its command.72 Neither the raja nor the Brahmins had a monopoly on this unequally distributed potency. Nevertheless, the rajas, powerful house- THE RAJAS OF KOLATHUNADU 39 holds, and Brahmin gramams certainly all did manifest their potency through their wealth and large entourages which set them apart from the less potential majority of society.73 The concentration of power was not fixed but was in a constant state of flux, harbouring the inherent possibility of the emergence or expansion of new nodes of power and the waning or contraction of others.74 None the less, the total disappearance of any of the power nodes does not appear to have been a common phenomenon in the swarupam polities of Kerala, since the prevalent practice of adoption actually helped save the swarupams and taravadus—at least nominally—from total extinction on many occasions.75 Moreover, establishing ‘territorial’ authority by conquest was not the ideal of political power in Kerala.76 Instead of total anni- hilation, it was considered fair just to reduce the sakti of the opponent.77 The Kolaswarupam attained a special power status in the realm through a gradual process of transformation over centuries, which was accompanied by considerable fluctuations in its fortunes. It appears that the Kolathiris never exercised a monopoly of authority in the realm. Authority was a decentralized, shared, and pluralistic entity. Although Brahmanism envisaged a highly structured idea of political power, this ideology never figured prominently in the swarupam polity of Kolathunadu. In all probability, crucial political decisions affecting the realm were not taken by the Kolathiri alone, but were decided in a ‘council’ of influential persons. Later such people even played a significant role in succession issues in the swarupam.78 Judicial and political decisions at the micro-level were taken independently by local ‘men of prowess’. The Kolaswarupam claimed what might be described as a kind of titular sovereignty over Kolathunadu. The Kolathiri was the primus inter pares among the members of his own swarupam. Similarly, the Kolaswarupam enjoyed a prime status among the other taravadus in Kolathunadu. Under such a system concentration of power within a single entity was out of the question. Instead, power continued to be fragmented and dispersed throughout the realm. These micro politico-economic units in the form of religious institutions, powerful taravadus, royal lineages and suchlike performed under a loosely knit umbrella composed of personal loyalties. These power centres survived as floating entities either recognizing the Kolathiri or some other ruler as their titular sovereign, while maintaining varying degree of relations, or claiming independent political status. Actual power resided with them in their respective territories. In other words, Kolathunadu and the Kolaswarupam were neither identical nor interchangeable identities. Kolathunadu remained a geo-cultural zone with loose, open borders of identity, consisting of numerous power centres. It was not unusual that at any given time more than one swarupam claimed authority over Kolathunadu, ineluctably consigning the concept 40 CHAPTER TWO of a ‘kingdom’ with fixed political borders and a central authority in Kolathunadu to the realms of perpetual doubt.79 During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when new power centres claiming political clout began to emerge, the Kolaswarupam was reduced to a more or less impotent but authoritative symbol. Canter Visscher portrayed the eighteenth-century Kolaswarupam as follows. The royal family consists of four branches, of which the present representatives, both male and female, are so numerous that they live in great poverty for the most part, though it is true that the State is well managed and that it possesses a good army.80 At first glance, this statement in which the rulers of a well-organized state are described as poor and underprivileged does appear paradoxical but a moment’s pause for reflection shows that it certainly contains a nucleus of truth. In spite of its growth and segmentation into various kovilakams through the course of centuries, the resource base of the Kolaswarupam did not expand proportionately which would have enabled it to enable it to sustain the growth of the house. Very likely its landed property (cherikkal) did not expand on a considerable scale either. The economic position of the Swarupam grew precarious because it did not exercise any sort of control over the resources of Kolathunadu. Importantly, the new venues of resource accumulation provided by the Indian Ocean trade were appropriated by the newly emerging Mappila trading communities and other ‘men of prowess’ along the coast. Gradually, by the end of the seventeenth century, the Kolathiri had been transformed into a muted symbol of authority, reduced to virtual impotence in Kolathunadu. The scope for applying a centre-periphery concept on the political order in Kolathunadu seems fairly limited. As has already been made clear, the authority of the Kolaswarupam was diffused throughout its lineages. Even if the Chirakkal Kovilakam is regarded as a sort of ‘centre’, the influence exercised by this ‘centre’ on the peripheral area was not directly proportionate to the distance between them. The Arackal Swarupam, though spatially very close to the ‘centre’, enjoyed independent political status. Nor were ritual relationships between different political nuclei determined by spatial factors. The Alladam Swarupam, which was politically closer to the Kolathiris, maintained ritual relations with the spatially more distant Zamorins of Calicut.81 In spite of this, what seems a ‘chaotic’ political situation from a modern perspective, Kerala society appears to have developed its own system of balance based on some ‘codes of conduct’ known by different titles such as maryada, margam,or acharam. These codes of social ethics determined the social behaviour of the people in the group, including its political elites. Dutch observers interpreted this phenomenon in their own terms. In 1743, Commander Stein van Gollenesse commented, THE RAJAS OF KOLATHUNADU 41

…although the kings and princes exercise great authority over their subjects, affairs are so regulated by the laws of Cheruman Perumal that their rule can in no way be called despotic; subjects obey their king ungrudgingly as long as he remains within the limits of the law; even if a chief were to wrong a few individuals, the whole community would not take up the quarrel; but, if he were to issue orders calculated to injure the interests of the whole community, they would not be obeyed.82

Van Reede found the Kerala polity neither democratic, nor monarchic, nor oligarchic, but a combination of all of three. He deemed it an ideal type of polity in which the weak were protected from the strong.83 However, these codes of conduct, or the ‘laws of Cheraman Perumal’ as they were known, should not be interpreted as a fixed constitution or a social contract but viewed merely as a highly contingent description of the rules and objectives of the political game.84 Therefore the fluctuations in the political fortunes of swarupams need to be explored not in the ‘ritual’ realm, but in terms of the economic forces which shaped and re-shaped these political forms. Economic forces determined their position in relation to other rajas or ‘feudal lords’, such as naduvazhis and desavazhis, and other power nodes in the political hierarchy of Kerala. The reason for the success or failure of these ruling houses has to be sought in their fortunes or misfortunes in accumulating resources to support their claims. It was in this context that maritime trade attained such overwhelming importance in the regional political economy.

Lords of the horses

As discussed earlier, the political power and the limited economic resources of the Kolaswarupam were dispersed among its lineages and lineage segments. Although the land of Kolathunadu was not suitable to extensive paddy cultivation, geo-climatic features combined to help it to produce high quality pepper and other spices such as cardamom, ginger, and wild cinnamon, which were in great demand throughout the Indian Ocean region. The growth of a number of port towns along the coast of Malabar was one of the most palpable consequences of this great demand for Malabar spices on the world markets. Pertinently, Kolathunadu covered the extensive coastal belt of North Malabar which was aptly suited to the development of a number of maritime trade centres. The bulk of the spices produced in the hinterland were shipped across the sea from these coastal port towns of Kolathunadu. The possibilities to accu- mulate income from maritime trade, supplementing the land-based returns, must have been the main attraction for the local political elites. 42 CHAPTER TWO

Therefore, it is not surprising that the political seat of the Kolaswarupam was transferred, moving with the shift to the focus of maritime trade in the region. Ezhimala, which was the original seat of the Kolathiris, had been an important hub of maritime trade at an earlier period. The ancient sea ports of the region, such as Ilangopatanam,85 Achalapatanam,86 and Kachilpatanam,87 were located in and around the general area of Ezhimala. It seems logical to assume that the disappearance of these old trading centres and the silting up of the old royal port city of Maday contributed to the emergence of Cannanore as the main port of the kingdom.88 The loss of status of Ezhimala as a maritime commercial hub might have been the deciding factor in the eventual shifting of the political centre from the former to Cannanore—one of the emerging port towns in the kingdom.89 The name of the port city of Cannanore emerged from obscurity into the limelight of history only by the end of the fifteenth century, when the Portuguese appeared on the scene.90 The rapid growth of this port city was probably linked to developments in the state of Vijayanagara during the fifteenth century. The expansionist thrust of the Vijayanagara rulers all over South India and their concomitant continuous conflicts with the Bahmani Sultanate compelled the former to search for easy access to the Arabian Sea horse trade. Cavalry played a vital role in the military successes of the Vijayanagara rulers. Saletore commented: ‘the foreign policy of the [Vijayanagara] rulers was to a large extent governed by the necessity of securing for themselves a continuous supply of horses from Ormuz’.91 Firishtah claims that in 1443 the Vijayanagara army was constituted of no fewer than 80,000 horsemen.92 Because these horses which were imported from Western Asia had a short life span, a continuous supply of them had to be maintained in order to keep the cavalry force up to strength.93 During the second half of the fifteenth century, the Empire suffered enormous setbacks at the hands of the Bahmani Sultanate. The control over the Konkan Coast gradually slipped from the hands of the Vijayanagara rulers. The massacre of Muslim traders at Bhatkal—the most important port in Konkan which supplied the Vijayanagara kings with horses—carried out on the orders of King Virupaksha in 1469 and the subsequent loss of control over Konkan and Goa greatly curtailed the direct access of the Empire to the ports along the south-west coast of the Indian Subcontinent where horses from West Asia were disembarked.94 Varthema reports horses were very expensive in Vijayanagara, ‘because those kings who hold the seaports do not allow them to be brought there’.95 This political situation favoured the prospects of Malabar ports, which were untouched by the political turmoil raging in the rest of South India. There is cogent evidence to back the claim that, by exercising its THE RAJAS OF KOLATHUNADU 43 influence on a large portion of peninsular India, the Vijayanagara state was an important hinterland of the Malabar ports.96 The thriving presence of West Asian traders along the Malabar Coast made it easier for the Vijayanagara rulers to gain access to the West Asian horses imported into Malabar ports. The geographical features of the port of Cannanore made it suitable to the disembarkation of horses. In contrast to the earlier harbours of Kolathunadu, this port was not located on a river estuary. This fortuitous situation spared it from the danger of silting up and also meant that ships could anchor close to the land from where they were hauled ashore by elephants.97 Of course, the trade in these war horses was a lucrative one. Each stallion, Barbosa reports, cost ‘from four to six hundred cruzados, and some specially chosen for his own [King’s] use he buys for nine hundred or a thousand cruzados’.98 Prior to the Portuguese success in transferring this lucrative money-spinning trade to Goa by the second decade of the sixteenth century, Cannanore had been reaping the profit from the horse trade for some considerable time and had been the main port at which the Persian horses for the Vijayanagara monarchs were disembarked.99 The importance of the horse trade in the prosperity of this port town is also significant for another reason. On the eve of the arrival of the Portuguese, pepper, the most important maritime trade commodity, which was produced in the hinterland of Cannanore, was usually taken to the port of Calicut for export.100 The success of the Zamorins in attracting the pepper supply from the hinterland of Cannanore with the help of the wealthy West Asian Muslim traders who had settled in Calicut had deprived this port of the most profitable branch of Malabar maritime trade. Despite this obstacle, Cannanore maintained its importance, probably because of its strategic importance as the supplier of horses to the Vijayanagara monarchs.101 This is a persuasive explanation of why the Vijayanagara ruler responded so promptly to the problems between the Mappilas and the Portuguese in Cannanore in 1505, as these could have affected the ongoing horse trade at the port.102 Beyond this imperial interest, the horse trade constituted one of the main sources of the income of the Kolathiris before the Portuguese take- over of the trade in the sixteenth century. It earned them the nickname of ‘lords of the horses’.103 Each horse which was disembarked in the Cannanore port provided the Kolathiri an income of 25 ducats in port tax.104 These horses were taken to Vijayanagara via the inland trading routes across the Ghats. In view of their weak resource base, this additional income must have certainly helped to boost the political legitimacy the Kolathiris, who otherwise had to depend on the rather meagre incomes from their private estates and the customary payments from their subjects. Therefore, it is not surprising that the attempts of the Portuguese 44 CHAPTER TWO

Estado to divert the horse trade from Cannanore to Goa elicited a voci- ferous protest from the Kolathiris.105 The expropriation of the income from the horse trade, which had directly enriched the Kolathiris’ exchequer, might also have had an impact on the existing power relations in Kolathunadu. Precisely at this juncture, contemporary Portuguese travellers noticed the gradual emergence of local Muslim traders as an influential factor in regional politics.106 Indeed, by the middle of the sixteenth century Cannanore witnessed the emergence of a Mappila royal family, known as the ‘Arackal Swarupam’.107 It is noteworthy that the increasing clout wielded by the Arackal Swarupam in the political sphere of Cannanore ran counter to the waning economic position of the Kolathiris.

The Arackal Ali Rajas

The reinvigoration of the political and economic conditions in West Asia in the ninth century AD after the emergence and establishment of Islam triggered remarkable changes in the pattern of the Indian Ocean trade.108 The Islamic trade diaspora which had established itself at various port cities across the Indian Ocean world intensified the trade relations between West Asia and India. This expansion of traders gradually led to the emergence of Islamic trade settlements in different parts of the Indian Ocean regions. The presence of Muslim traders along the coast of northern Kerala can probably be traced back as far as the emergence of Islam in West Asia itself in the seventh century. Since Kerala had commercial contacts with West Asia long before Islam came on the scene, it is not at all surprising that the religion newly sprung in from Arabian soil should have gained an early foothold on the Malabar Coast.109 Very early, the temporary marriages (mu’ta) contracted with the local women by these Arab traders and the ‘conversion’ of the lower strata of the Malabar society gave rise to an autochthonous Muslim community along the coast—the Mappilas.110 In due course, the growing Islamic commercial presence stimulated the proliferation of a number of new trading centres along the Malabar Coast. In fact, on the eve of the Portuguese arrival in Malabar they were so powerful that ‘if the King of Portugal had not discovered India, Malabar would already have been in the hands of the Moors, and would have had a Moorish King’.111 Although the commercial power of these Muslim traders (the majority of whom were West Asian Muslims) had somewhat shrunk by the second half of the sixteenth century. However, although their commerce was impinged on by the Portuguese attempt to control the pepper trade in Malabar, the Mappila Muslims remained the THE RAJAS OF KOLATHUNADU 45 driving force behind the commercial prosperity of Cannanore, even during the Dutch period. One of the most important developments in the history of the Muslim community in Kolathunadu during the seventeenth century was the solid establishment of the Arackal Swarupam as one of the prominent taravadus in the political economy of the region. Some scholars trace the origins of the Arackal Swarupam back to an earlier period.112 However, the present evidence does not permit a claim to an origin earlier than the sixteenth century. Ibn Battutta, who visited Malabar during the fourteenth century, gives a detailed description of the kingdoms and Muslim settlements along the Malabar Coast but does not refer to the Arackal family.113 Duarte Barbosa, who lived in Cannanore for a long period as a Portuguese official, also remains silent about it. The earliest indigenous source which provides information on the origin of the Ali Rajas is the Arabic text Tuhfat-ul-Mujahidin written by Sheikh Zain- ud-Din in 1583. Describing the political incidents during the Portuguese period, Zain-ud-Din says that: In the year 952 A.H. [1526–7], 8 Muharram, Farangis [Portuguese] killed Abu Bakr Ali and his nephew Kunji Supi who where the leaders of the Muslims in Cannanore. Abu Bakr Ali is the uncle of Ali Adiraja of Cannanore and Kunji Supi is the father of Ali Adiraja.114 It strikes some people as remarkable that in this source a Muslim chief is styled a ‘raja’. Although there were other similar attempts to attain royal dignity by some other Muslim trading magnates in Calicut during the sixteenth century, all of them failed to establish their authority as they were not in a position to override the established political power in the region.115 Although they failed, the Arackal Ali Rajas did succeed in evolv- ing into an independent power centre in the traditional political set-up of Kolathunadu. Authority in the Arackal Swarupam, as that of other taravadus, was organized along the matrilineal line in which muppu was the essential cri- terion by which to ascend within the power hierarchy in the house and become the Ali Raja.116 As said earlier, the stanam or position immediately second in the hierarchy was that of the karanavar. Mirroring other swarupam polities, power was not concentrated in the hands of the Ali Rajas, but disseminated within the Arackal Swarupam and shared by various ‘men of prowess’ in the Bazaar. The karanavar, the immediate deputy of the Ali Raja in the line of succession in the Swarupam, also wielded considerable influence in the commercial and political life of Cannanore.117 Nor was it the only swarupam to wield influence. The account of Alexander Hamilton incontrovertibly reveals that other influential Mappilas in the Bazaar shared power alongside the Ali Raja.118 This gives a clue to the inner working of a ‘bazaar government’ run by various co-operating merchants. 46 CHAPTER TWO

Nevertheless, there were some pertinent differences. In comparison with the other swarupams in Kerala, the distribution of authority within the Arackal Swarupam appears to have been less complex, a clue pointing towards the comparatively recent origin of the house. One of the peculiar customs of this Swarupam which differentiated it from other taravadus was that women known as the ‘Arackal Beebis’ were not excluded from muppumura, making them free to attain the highest position in the hierarchy. Importantly, in the commercial context, unlike other taravadus, the Arackal Swarupam attained its legitimacy in the regional power system not through its control of landed properties, but through maritime trade and its limited control over the land does not seem to have adversely affected the legitimacy of the Arackal Swarupam in asserting its status in Kolathunadu. The reason was that controlling ‘land’ did not necessarily imply the possession of sakti. It was the control over people which counted more in the attainment of this.119 The Arackal Swarupam successfully exercised control, albeit with varying intensity, over a large number of people who were associated with the maritime enterprise of the house in Malabar. The surplus accumulated through trade undoubtedly helped the Swarupam to expand its influence over people, who subsequently became integrated into the extensive redistribution system functioning under the Ali Rajas. Consonant with the postulated state of flux in the region, which is inexorably linked to the waxing and waning of sakti, the dependent groups were constituted of fluctuating circles on different levels. While the Swarupam effectuated its direct, that is, more stable sway over an inner circle consisting mainly of the Cannanore Bazaar, its influence tended to dissipate towards the outer circles. Obviously such control was essentially fragile and inconsistent. It depended entirely on the success or failure of the Swarupam in maintaining its control over the regional maritime trade and hinterland trade networks. It is essential to analyse the political strategies adopted by the Arackal Swarupam in its dealings with both the European companies and local elites during the pre-colonial period from this perspective. Moreover, the significant role of the Ali Rajas in the coastal rice trade gave rise to a ‘community of subsistence’ under the Arackal Swarupam. Given the failure of the region to produce the amount of rice required to support its entire population, the rice trade with Canara was crucial to the day-to-day life of Kolathunadu. The nearly complete dependence of the Cannanore Bazaar and its vicinity on this supply significantly strengthened the power of the Arackal Swarupam.120 It seems that the Arackal House worked along the same lines as the wet-land controlling taravadus in Kolathunadu which were supposed to provide subsistence for their dependent communities of labourers and service classes.121 Succinctly, the THE RAJAS OF KOLATHUNADU 47

Arackal Swarupam replicated the regional political taravadus in all aspects. It evolved into the embodiment of sakti exercising control over a significant resource base and a widespread community of dependents across the region. This congruence of political, economic and religious power formed the essence of the political legitimacy of the Arackal Swarupam in Kolathunadu.122 The folk traditions of the region also locate the political status of the said Swarupam in the cultural matrix of Kolathunadu, in which it is depicted as a nodal point of sakti in the regional cosmic order.123

Legitimacy and sakti

As in the case of other political families of Kerala, the origin of the Arackal House has become entwined in various ‘myths’ and ‘legends’. As in the history of the Kolaswarupam, there were attempts to rationalize the influential political status attained by the Arackal House from both Brahmanical and regional perspectives. This involved various traditions linking the Arackal House either to the Kolaswarupam or to the legendary Cheraman Perumal, depending on the viewpoint of the narrator. Although some of these ‘legends’ explain the origin of this family as an offshoot of the Kolaswarupam, thereby underlining its right to share the political dignity of the latter, the Arackal Swarupam itself categorically chose to trace its origin directly to Cheraman Perumal.124 Nevertheless, the first legend seems to have been more popular than the latter in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This is attested to in the reports concerning the Ali Rajas submitted by VOC officials. They [the Ali Rajas] trace their origin to a princess of Kolathiri who was got with child by a prominent Moor or Arab and who then, being reconciled with the king, was granted the honorary title of crau or prince with the authority over the Muslim bazaar [of Cannanore], the Lakkadive Islands and many other good estates.125 With a slight variation, the Dutch chief Adriaan Moens also refers to this story in his Memoir: He is of Kolathiri extraction. A certain princess of this dynasty, on account of having to do with a person of lower standing, had lost her caste or nobil- ity, and in order to cover up the disgrace, she was given in wedlock to a rich Arabian Moor on whom was conferred the title of prince and the general name of Ady Ragia, in that country indicating that he was the head of the Moors of that kingdom.126 Whatever the authenticity of this story is, its permeation into and embed- ding in the society indicates that it attained a sort of historicity at least among a segment of the people, allowing them to come to terms with the 48 CHAPTER TWO powerful presence of the Ali Raja in the political economy of Kolathunadu. In spite of this strong articulation of the legend in the society, there is no evidence to show that the Ali Raja depended on it to legitimize his political power in Kolathunadu. The matter of the relationship between the two swarupams is not referred to in the surviving correspondence between the Kolaswarupam and the Ali Rajas and the Dutch Company in Kerala. This link indicates that the actual power relations in Kolathunadu were not articulated in essence through such ‘legitimacy’ claims, but through sakti. Interestingly, the Brahmanical view articulated in the Keralolpathi legend tried to paint the Ali Rajas as traders pure and simple, unadorned by any political or affinal relationships with the Kolaswarupam.127 This might be considered a deliberate ideological move on the part of the Brahmins to explain the powerful presence of the Arackal family in the varna order in Kolathunadu, in which the Ali Rajas were attributed the status of Vaisyas. Whatever the ideological overtones of such a story, the very appearance of the Ali Rajas in this Brahmanical narrative proves the indisputable position the former had attained in the power structure of Kolathunadu. Theoretically, the Ali Raja derived their authority from the Kolathiri.128 In practice, at least by the seventeenth century, the claim of the Kolathiris to political superiority over the Ali Rajas did not have any actual relevance to the determination of the power status of the latter in Kolathunadu. The endeavours of the Dutch Company to grasp the inner workings of the power relations in Cannanore often met with apparently insurmountable difficulties and its officials had a hard time comprehending the dynamics of the local society. Van Reede, who showed a special interest in understanding the Kerala body politic, did discern the peculiarity of the regal status enjoyed by the Arackal family. In his attempt to interpret the political status of the Ali Rajas in Kolathunadu, he was confronted with the task of explaining the title ‘raja’ attached to them. He observed that the title ‘Ali Raja’ does not mean that the individual concerned wielded a regal or princely authority over the other Muslims, as the Dutch had thought at the beginning of their establishment in Cannanore. Van Reede qualifies this title as an honorary epithet bestowed on the Ali Raja by the ‘real’ raja—the Kolathiris. He thought the Company had made a mistake when it had its earliest commercial dealings in Cannanore with the Ali Raja, after adopted the misconception that was he ‘an independent lord of the Muslims’.129 Nevertheless, undeniably this new realization of the ‘actual’ political status of the Ali Rajas had to do more with the recognition of this individual as the main commercial competitor of the Company in Cannanore, whose power was completely dependent on trade and ship- THE RAJAS OF KOLATHUNADU 49 ping.130 In spite of this, Van Reede’s remarkable observation revealed the limited scope of ‘raja-ship’ in Kerala—at least in the case of the Ali Rajas. The Arackal Swarupam, as did the other swarupams of Kerala, did not exercise any sort of territorial sovereignty over a well-defined ‘kingdom’. Its political status and consequently its authority were characterized by a network of personal relations transcending spatial limits. The Arackal Swarupam maintained control over a group of dependents, operating as a part of a commercial network which blurred regional concepts and social identities. The nucleus of this maritime kingdom was based in Cannanore from where the control mechanism was operated. In brief, the Arackal Swarupam was a ‘house by the sea’ which attained its royal status through maritime trade. Many of the foreign travellers who visited Kerala during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not fail to observe the contradiction between power and status. This indicates the inherent tension in the socio-political organization of Kerala. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Tomé Pires comments; ‘There are great kaimals in this country, some of whom are greater than many of these kings, though they have not the title of king.’131 He equated ‘greatness’ with military power.132 Barbosa also mentions the great lords of Malabar ‘who wish to be called kings, which they are not’.133 In his interpretation, kingship in Malabar was something expressed through special privileges from which others were barred and included minting coins and roofing houses with tiles. Nevertheless, he was not blind to the fact that these prerogatives could have been achieved by force. Barbosa attributes kingship to only three political powers in Kerala: the ‘Venattadikal’ (the king of Travancore); Kolathiri; and the Zamorin of Calicut. The subtle differences between a ‘king’ and a ‘lord’ emerge more explicitly in the narrative of Pyrard de Laval. He notes the existence of ‘petty kings of petty territories’ enjoying sovereign power in their own lands, albeit vaguely subordinated to a greater king.134 He differentiates slightly between these little lords and ‘great king’—a disparity in power. The narrowing of the difference in the resource base of the old royal houses and the newly emerging power centres can be seen in these foreign observations. The subtle differences between the various lords of Malabar who were striving to develop new resource bases, in which maritime trade was very much to the fore, created a complex socio-political situation in which incessant conflicts and ever-changing power relations became common features. This development was very apparent in Kolathunadu, where the Kolaswarupam gradually had to cede its political claims to newly emerging power groups. In this context, it is noteworthy that the rise of the Arackal family to the position of a royal lineage was attributable not only to its ‘ritual’ relationship with the Kolaswarupam. The polit- 50 CHAPTER TWO ical status of the Arackal family in Kolathunadu had been elevated by its success in acquiring power or sakti, which ineluctably legitimized its position in the traditional power concept of the region. This is conspicuously apparent in the account of Pyrard de Laval who visited this region in the first decade of the seventeenth century. The people of the country [Cannanore] have told me that it is not long since the Malabars [Muslims] of Cannanore were in like condition with the rest of their race, and obeyed that Nair King [Kolathiri], but that they became so strong that they made a king for themselves, and no longer recognised the Nair king nor paid him any tribute: he resides far in the interior, and is often at war with the king of Cannanore.135 By the end of the sixteenth century, the control exercised over the Lakshadweep and the Maldive Islands by the Ali Rajas had transformed their position into the unassailable merchant magnates of Cannanore.136 It is interesting to note that although the relationship between the Muslim traders of this port and Calicut was very cordial throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, strengthened in particular in their mutual struggle against the Portuguese, in 1599 the Ali Raja held himself aloof from the final struggle against the Portuguese–Zamorin alliance of Kunjali Marakkar IV. In fact, it appears that he was on most amicable terms with the Portuguese at Cannanore.137 In this situation, the Ali Raja’s conduct was primarily that of a pragmatic commercial magnate rather than that of an Islamic leader and this option brought him political success. In spite of its close contact with the Islamic world around the Indian Ocean rim, the Arackal Swarupam did not introduce a new concept of kingship into Malabar or perhaps in the existing economic-cultural environment of Kolathunadu, embedded in whose traditional socio-cultural milieu its power was deep-rooted, such a feat was beyond it. The Arackal House was no more than a facsimile of the existing Malabar kingship—a swarupam kingship created and nourished by the traditional ideology of power in Kolathunadu.

Conclusion

Pre-colonial Kolathunadu presents the picture of a political system in which power was disseminated in numerous socio-political components or taravadus. The Kolaswarupam claimed a primus inter pares status among these power groups, which it justified by its superior control of the resources derived from landed property and maritime trade. This obviously helped the Kolathiris to maintain a larger dependent populace within the bounds of their distributive system. However, the gradual hiving off of the Kolaswarupam into various THE RAJAS OF KOLATHUNADU 51 lineages in the course of time naturally resulted in the segmentation of the resource base of the Swarupam and this erosion of power undermined its claims to superiority in the social hierarchy. Over and above this wearing- down process, new nodes of power began to emerge in which new power- bidders successfully appropriated a chunk of the limited resource base of the region. The emergence of the Arackal Swarupam by the middle of the sixteenth century effectively closed off any possibility for the Kolaswarupam to extract a fiscal surplus from the Indian Ocean trade. Denied access to the sea, the only possibility open to it to build up its economic base was through agricultural expansion. This was its Achilles’ heel as Kolathunadu is a narrow strip of land squeezed in between the Western Ghats and the Arabian Sea and therefore it was not able to provide sufficient space for the development of an extensive agricultural sector. The unfavourable demographic concentration also adversely affected any other attempts to expand agriculture in the region. The limited scope in the economic sphere prevented the Kolaswarupam from developing into a centralized political system with a strong resource base. Under these circumstances, by the seventeenth century it had faded into a weak symbol of authority, deprived of any actual power. In the peculiar socio-economic atmosphere of the region, the locally entrenched concept of sakti seems to have been more relevant to acquisition of power than the Brahmanical conceptualization of kingship. Power manifested through such signs as material wealth, political momentum, charisma, and the ability to sustain a dependent community under the control of a leader was well suited to encompassing various emerging power groups within its frame.138 It might be argued that the acceptance of the Arackal Swarupam as an intrinsic part of the local socio-cultural system was made possible by the open, ideological premise of sakti. By the seventeenth century, the Arackal Swarupam had successfully emerged as a power centre in the regional cosmos through the accumulation of wealth from oceanic trade. Control over a trade network and the resultant formation of a dependent community facilitated this house in entrenching its political status in Kolathunadu. This decisive importance of maritime commerce in determining the socio-political status of the Mappilas in Kolathunadu in general and of the Ali Rajas in particular requires an analysis of the emergence and expansion of a maritime trade network under the Ali Rajas in a long-term perspective.

CHAPTER THREE

LORDS OF THE SEA

Scholars striving to visualize the commercial world of pre-colonial Indian Ocean merchants meet with difficulty in their quest to obtain reliable source materials pertaining to their commercial activities. Often they have to be satisfied with the scattered references which appear in various, mainly foreign sources. The absence of any reliable local source materials at all exacerbates this problem when the research topic is the pre-colonial Malabar Muslim trading magnates. These merchants, whose commercial interests usually clashed with those of the European trading companies, generally appear in trade reports of the latter as ‘unruly guests’ who by ‘smuggling’ commodities contravened the clauses of the treaties and evaded the existing control mechanism. Not surprisingly, the ‘clandestine’ character of this trade is a barrier to obtaining a detailed picture of their commercial activities, even from the European East India Company accounts. The trading activities of the Ali Rajas of Cannanore are no exception to this. Nonetheless, by dint of combining scattered references from various sources with some ‘intelligent guess work’ produces, although still incomplete in many respects, a broader picture of their trading networks, organizational techniques, composition of commodities, and other matters.

The fifteenth century: decline or continuity?

The fifteenth century was a time of tremendous changes in the pattern of the Indian Ocean commerce which had been laid down during the preceding centuries. The Chinese junks abruptly withdrew from long-distance, oceanic trade, although so far no satisfactory reason to explain their disappearance from the stage has been found.1 The Black Death and the ensuing economic crisis in Egypt offered the Mamluk sultans the opportunity to introduce a spice monopoly in the empire which secured them a steady flow of money into the State treasury.2 This manoeuvre conflicted directly with the interests of the influential Karimi merchants and this clash of interests could have gradually weakened their leading role in the Indian Ocean spice trade. It was a time in which the Indian Subcontinent was also prone to politico-economic violence. The Delhi Sultanate, which maintained its 54 CHAPTER THREE sway over a large part of it, was in the twilight of its power as it was still reeling from Timur’s onslaught in 1398. Janet Abu-Ludhod regards the state of affairs in Asia in the fifteenth century as a preparatory stage to the impending dominance of Europe in the continent. After the disintegration of an Asian-dominant ‘thirteenth century world economy’, she inter- prets the Asian situation as one almost being conditioned to be replaced by the Euro-centric ‘modern world system’, proposed by Emmanuel Wallerstein.3 In this sense, the fifteenth century is presumed to be a period of decline and disintegration in Asian history. An opposite viewpoint is espoused by such scholars as André Gunder Frank and Kenneth Pomeranz. They fail to discern a phase of sharp decline in Asian economies as a reaction to the ‘rise of the West’ in the fifteenth century.4 A close look at the developments in fifteenth- century South Asia demonstrates that the pessimistic view of the ‘decline of Asia’ is indeed unfounded. There were changes but these were realignments rather than recession in the existing Indian Ocean commercial patterns. Indian Ocean trade did not fall apart in the course of the fifteenth century. On the contrary, as commented on by K. N. Chaudhuri, it was a period of unusual prosperity.5 In the Malay Peninsula, Malacca began to assume a pivotal role in the Indian Ocean commerce in the fifteenth century; seizing its chance after the Chinese withdrawal from the Oceanic trade.6 The greatest gainer especially gained greatly from the realignments in the Indian Ocean commercial system was the Indian Subcontinent. Traversing the length and breadth of the Indian Ocean, Gujarati traders began to claim a larger role on the maritime scene. Cambay emerged as the fulcrum of the Indian Ocean trade with its two arms stretching eastwards to Malacca and westwards to Aden.7 It was also the period in which the emergence of Vijayanagara and the Bahmani Sultanate invigorated the political economy of South India.8 The buoyant regional economy created prolific inland markets for the Indian Ocean merchants to sell their goods.9 Located in a geographically strategic position between the western and eastern spheres of the Indian Ocean and blessed with a spice-producing hinterland, the Malabar port cities continued to play an important role in the burgeoning maritime commerce of the period. The emergence of the port city of Cannanore by the middle of the fifteenth century must be located in this broader historical context.

The sixteenth century: changing port order in Malabar

Although in its initial phase the position of Cannanore in the oceanic trade of Malabar remained principally subordinate to Calicut, sixteenth- LORDS OF THE SEA 55 century political developments altered the existing situation in the area irrevocably. As M. N. Pearson comments, the introduction of the politics of violence into the Indian Ocean commerce by the Portuguese restructured the existing port-hierarchy in Malabar.10 The attempts of the Portuguese to control the pepper trade in this region and the capture of Malacca by the former [1511] shattered the Malacca–Calicut–Red Sea commercial axis which had flourished up to then. These upsets greatly diminished the role of Calicut, which had been the main redistribution centre in the Arabian Sea for South-East Asian spices. Seizing this opportunity, Cambay emerged as an alternative redistribution centre of South-East Asian spices to West Asian traders.11 The loss of its entrepôt status in the Indian Ocean trade relegated the position of Calicut to a minor player in Indian Ocean commerce.12 Profiting from Portuguese patronage, Cochin emerged as the main contender of Calicut for the control of the regional maritime trade and established itself as a crucial link in the emerging Malacca–Cochin–Lisbon axis. Cannanore, albeit rather fleetingly, became a part of this newly emerging Estado commercial system in the Arabian Sea when a Portuguese stronghold was established there.13 It was not all plain sailing for the Portuguese in their attempt to reorganize the maritime commerce of Malabar under Cochin. They met stiff resistance from the Zamorins and from the prominent foreign Muslim trading communities settled at Calicut. The confrontation between these two commercial interests led to the bifurcation of the existing port pecking order in Malabar in which Calicut had once enjoyed such an indisputable prominence. Now Calicut and Cochin formed two epicentres of regional maritime trade, representing two irreconcilable maritime interest groups. This development was a significant departure from that which had prevailed in the preceding centuries. The participation of Malabar ports in the Indian Ocean trade before the sixteenth century presents characteristics which not surprisingly resemble the operation of the medieval Gujarat port system. Ashin Das Gupta has described how this port system in which a principal port dom- inates the adjacent maritime ports worked. He also points out the recur- ring realignments which occurred in this system of port-hierarchy from time to time.14 A similar port system can also be observed in operation in medieval Kerala. Between the ninth and the thirteenth century, Cranganore and Quilon respectively had occupied the pivotal place in the oceanic trade of Malabar. All other ports along the Malabar Coast were integrated into this system as satellite ports of the principal harbour, albeit retaining and performing regional economic functions on their own account. Calicut took over the key position as the principal maritime port in Malabar, replacing Quilon from the fourteenth century.15 Under- 56 CHAPTER THREE standably the change from this single port dominated port order in sixteenth-century Kerala to that of a two port dominated system— Calicut and Cochin—generated a new situation in the region. There were ambiguities in the position occupied by Cannanore in the newly developing commercial scenario in the sixteenth century. Although the Kolathiri ruler was favourably disposed towards the Portuguese in Cochin,16 local Mappila traders were linked overtly and covertly to the struggle of the paradesi Muslim traders of Calicut against the Estado da India.17 The second decade of the sixteenth century witnessed further realignments in the port order after the departure of the major section of the foreign Muslim traders from Calicut.18 The vacuum created in the trans-oceanic trade by the exodus of the paradesi Muslim traders was gradually filled by the nascent local Islamic commercial interest groups in Malabar. Cannanore emerged to take its place alongside Calicut as the major centre of operations of one of these newly burgeoning groups. These two groups, both dominated by local Mappila traders, displayed a considerable difference in their attitude towards the Estado. The Calicut faction persisted in its adamant opposition to the Estado until the close of the sixteenth century when it suddenly crumbled with the fall of the Kunjali Marakkars of Kottakkal.19 By contrast, the Cannanore Mappilas responded cautiously to the changing circumstances. Sheltering behind the shadow of the Portuguese–Calicut struggle, Mamale Marakkar was able to build up a true thalassocracy, consisting of Cannanore and the Maldives-Lakshadweep Islands, and from his newly acquired position began to dominate the maritime commerce of the region.20 By the second half of the sixteenth century, the centrifugal forces working in favour of the rise of a multi-centric port system in Kerala had assumed a definite shape. The rise to power of the Arackal Ali Rajas as the predominant force in Cannanore was just one outcome of these developments. In this period, the port town of Cannanore, surrounded by its feeding Mappila ports of Kumbla, Nileswaram, Maday, Dharmapatanam, and Baliapatanam, assumed a place as a separate port system in Kerala alongside Calicut and Cochin.21 The appearance of such a multi-centred port system was the main feature of sixteenth-century maritime Kerala and it had profound repercussions on the regional political economy. This configuration was still in place when the Dutch East India Company established itself in Kerala in the second half of the seventeenth century. Against this historical background, the successful response of the Mappila traders of Cannanore, especially the Ali Rajas, to the changing maritime commercial circumstances in the Indian Ocean which was set in motion by the arrival of the European chartered companies eager to grab control of the regional spice trade, which set them on a collision course with the former, will be analysed. LORDS OF THE SEA 57

The rise of the Mappila trading network in Cannanore

As said earlier, the rise to prominence of the Cannanore Mappilas under the aegis of the Arackal Swarupam can be traced to the middle of the sixteenth century. Both regional and supra-regional factors precipitated such a development in sixteenth-century Kerala. The challenge posed by the Portuguese maritime power being exerted along the Malabar Coast severely affected the supremacy of both Calicut and the West Asian Muslim traders in the regional spice trade. Gradual changes were already at work militating against and undermining their dominance in the Arabian Sea spice trade. One such alteration in the established pattern was the strategy devised by the Mamluk sultans to monopolize the Red Sea spice trade in the fifteenth century. The resultant pressure forced a large number of karimi merchants to settle in the various port cities of the Arabian Sea, including Calicut.22 Their expatriate position rendered them vulnerable to even minor political changes in their host cities. Just as they sought new ports, Gujarati traders were able to expand their influential networks in the Indian Ocean, a process which reached its zenith at the beginning of the sixteenth century.23 The appearance of the Portuguese in the region only served to stimulate the changes which had already been set in motion. Gradually, an alteration occurred in the configuration of the Malabar maritime trading world which swung in favour of the native Mappila Muslim merchant magnates. It is important to note that the initial Portuguese attempt to control the maritime spice trade of Kerala did not conflict with the interests of the local Mappila Muslim traders who dominated the local and coastal trade networks.24 The Portuguese had no trouble distinguishing between mouros da terra and mouros da mecca, and it was the latter whom they identified as their commercial enemies and subsequently became the target of their attacks. The Estado, in fact, depended on Mappila traders as intermediaries who could supply the carreira with spices from the hinterlands of Malabar, far beyond the reach of its power to control. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the Mappilas were able to override the paradesi prominence in the spice trade of Kerala and, at the same time, they were gradually extending tentacles of control out over the regional spice trade. Under these circumstances, the initial years of the Portuguese presence in Malabar witnessed a more or less cordial relationship between these two groups which were mutually beneficial to each other. The predecessor of the Ali Raja, Mamale Marakkar of Cannanore, was not prepared to antagonize the Portuguese by openly joining hands with the Muslim traders of Calicut, and the Marakkar traders of Cochin even unequivocally supported the Portuguese against the interests of the Calicut merchants.25 58 CHAPTER THREE

The honeymoon period was brief. The perceptibly increasing influence of private Portuguese casados in Cochin forced the local Mappila trading magnates to migrate to Calicut and this point marks the beginning of the second wave of the anti-Portuguese struggle in Malabar.26 Nevertheless, the role of the Cannanore Mappilas in this struggle continued to be both rather sporadic and surreptitious. Instead of opting for open conflict with the Estado, members of the Cannanore Mappila elite were assiduously trying to link themselves with the emerging alternative spice route from South-East Asia to the Red Sea and Gujarat ports.27 The attempt of Asian merchants to circumvent the Portuguese control system along the Malabar Coast lent the Maldives a crucial importance. The most overwhelming evidence for this claim is the fact that the Portuguese attempt to establish control over the Maldives elicited a violent reaction from Gujarati traders who were trying to recoup for the loss of Malacca.28 Given these circumstances, Mamale Marakkar’s control over the Maldives assumes a special significance. It appears that its order-defying labyrinth of atolls enabled the Maldives to develop as an important outlet for Malabar pepper, which found its way from there along the developing alternative Indian Ocean spice route to various destinations, including the Red Sea.29 It is also not unthinkable that the mounting pepper export from Canara to the Red Sea during the third decade of the sixteenth century also might have been stimulated by the flow of Malabar pepper, especially from the northern regions, which managed to avoid Portuguese vigilance along the coast.30 Obviously the Cannanore Mappilas proved highly successful in their efforts to adjust themselves to and benefit from the changing commercial constellation in the Indian Ocean during the sixteenth century. This adaptability lay at the core of the strength behind the emerging Mappila ascendancy in Cannanore, which had reached a decisive point with the rise of the Ali Rajas in the middle of the sixteenth century. While the Portuguese challenge in Calicut was countered by Mappila traders under the leadership of the established local political power—the Zamorins—, in Cannanore there was a shift in the local power alignments. The Kolathiris were deprived of their control of the maritime space in the region, especially of their power over the port town of Cannanore. Around the same time, Mappila commercial and political interests there began to focus increasingly on the Arackal Ali Rajas who suddenly emerged from the shadows as the real champions of the cause of the Mappila Muslims’ trade interests in the region.31 At first glance, by and large the emergence of Arackal Swarupam appears to have been an indigenous response to the claim of the Estado da India to supremacy in the Arabian Sea spice trade. Such a conclusion is deceptive. Closer examination shows that it was the outcome of a long- LORDS OF THE SEA 59 term process of socio-economic change to which the local Mappila society had been subjected for at least two centuries. The growing affluence of the Mappila Muslims in the region, sustained by the expanding maritime commercial opportunities, culminated in the emergence of a new power centre in the region under the Ali Rajas. The Arackal Swarupam can be credited with being the first Muslim taravadu to achieve the status of a swarupam in Malabar. Moreover, the Arackal House is also one of the very few examples in South Asian history of a mercantile elite family which openly claimed political power for itself.

The Cannanore Bazaar

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the port town of Cannanore was divided into two power zones. One was Fort St Angelo, representing the European economic interest in the port. The other was the Cannanore Bazaar under the control of the Mappila Muslims of the region who played the dominant role in the commercial fortunes of the town.32 The Bazaar was situated along the shore of the Bay of Cannanore (now known as ‘Mappila Bay’) which provided anchorage for ships and boats. It rose to prominence at the end of the sixteenth century. Van Linschoten gives an interesting picture of a Mappila-dominated market functioning near the Portuguese fortress. His comparison with the European weekly markets is especially interesting. The Malabars without the fortresse have a village with many houses [there- in, built] after their manner; wherein there is a market holden everyday, in the which all kindes of victuailes are to be had, which is wonderfull, altogether like the Hollanders markets. There you find Hennes, Egges, Butter, Hony, Indian Oyle, and Indian Figges [that are brought from] Cananor, which are very great, and without exception the best in all India: of the which sorts of victuailes, which other such like they have great quantities: also very faire and long mastes for shippes, such as better cannot be found in all Norway, and that in so great numbers, that they furnish all the countries round about them.33 François Pyrard de Laval, who visited the Malabar Coast in the beginning of the seventeenth century, also noticed the workings of the daily market of the ‘moors’ in Cannanore and its bustling trade.34 By the seventeenth century, Cannanore had developed into a middle-sized port town inhabited by around 20,000 people.35 The Dutch chaplain Canter Visscher amply bears witness to this structural development from a daily Bazaar in the early seventeenth century to that of a fortified port town with definite political connotations by the beginning of the eighteenth century. Ali Raja has a large and handsome bazaar, where most of the Moors in his domains reside. This bazaar extends on one side nearly to the bay, and on the 60 CHAPTER THREE

other is within reach of the Company’s fort and cannon. It is itself sufficiently fortified with walls and artillery to enable it to resist the attacks of the heathens.36 The prosperity of the port town depended mainly on its commercial links. The maritime commerce of the Ali Rajas and the Bazaar men, who conveyed the local products away in their vessels to different parts of the Indian Ocean and returned with wares in local demand, invigorated the economic life of the entire region.37 Although spices constituted the most important commodities for international markets, trade in such bulk commodities as coconut products, areca nuts, rice and the like was crucial to the local socio-economic life—perhaps even more vital than the spices. Whereas the European interest in Cannanore was mainly in pepper, the Cannanore Bazaar where all the commodities were traded in response to the demands of the market constituted the core of the actual economic life of the port town. The Cannanore Bazaar was situated at the heart of the economic activities of the port town; the link which connected both the maritime and hinterland channels of trade together. Consequently, this Bazaar was transformed into the powerhouse of the Arackal family, whose source of revenue was primarily derived from maritime trade. Though details about the administrative set-up of the Bazaar are few, undoubtedly the extensive trade activities of which it was the hub necessitated a moderate system of management without which its smooth functioning would not have been possible. Though in a somewhat dramatic fashion, Alexander Hamilton described the presence of various administrative functionaries in the Bazaar under a loosely defined authoritative set-up of the Arackal Ali Raja. His government is not absolute, nor is it hereditary; and instead of giving him the trust of the treasury which comes by taxes and Merchandize, they have chests made on purpose, with holes made in their lids, and their coin being all gold whatever is received by the treasurer, is put in those chests by these holes; and each chest has four locks, and their keys are put in the hands of the Rajah, the Commissioner of trade, the Chief Judge and the Treasurer; and when there is occasion for money, none can be taken out without all these four be present, or their deputies.38 Indubitably the political and commercial interests of the Arackal House predominated in the day-to-day functioning of the Bazaar. But this is not to say that the Bazaar was the strictly closed domain of the Ali Rajas. It certainly also represented the economic interests of the other Mappila commercial magnates in Kolathunadu who ran their operations from there. In another sense, there was something of a merchant syndicate led by the Arackal Ali Rajas which controlled the day-to-day functioning of the Bazaar. LORDS OF THE SEA 61

Reports of the Dutch Company officials also present a picture of the collaborative functioning of a ‘bazaar government’ in Cannanore. The Arackal Swarupam, as did other swarupams in Malabar, often presented multiple power centres within the one family. The correspondence between Dutch officials and Arackal Swarupam reveals that the karanavar39 of the family often actively participated in the affairs of the Bazaar alongside the Ali Raja.40 The karanavar occupied the immediate second rank in the power hierarchy of the family, just below the Ali Raja, and acceded to the ‘raja-ship’ after the death of the ruling Ali Raja.41 By and large, it seems that the uncle-nephew or brother-brother power dichotomy in this matrilineal succession system was usually cordial and the occupiers of the leading positions complemented each other. The evidence shows that the assumed structural opposition between the sons of rajas and their nephews did not seriously challenge the traditional power relations within the family.42 The karanavar freighted his own ships to different parts of the Indian Ocean, which naturally gave him his own influential position in the power structure of the bazaar government.43 Interestingly, in the eyes of the Dutch officials in Cochin the karanavar was the actual ‘head of the merchants’ in Cannanore.44 The evidence shows that political and commercial responsibilities were shared between the members of the Swarupam. In a commercial deal signed between the VOC and the Ali Raja in 1686, other family members as the karanavar and one Coycoetiali Crauw appear as co-signatories, which lends credibil- ity to such an assumption.45 The influence of the ‘bazaar government’ was not confined to Can- nanore alone. By wielding their commercial influence, the Ali Rajas were able to exercise sway over such neighbouring Mappila ports as Maday, Baliapatanam, and Dharmapatanam. At times, this influence could also be political. The Ali Raja’s success in controlling Dharmapatanam by assuming the position of karthavu in 1680 can be seen as an attempt in this direction, which was thought could permanently integrate this important Mappila port with the core: the Cannanore Bazaar.46 Nevertheless, despite its dominance, the looming presence of the Arackal family hardly stopped other Mappila merchants from claiming their share in the commercial activities of Cannanore. On the contrary, their continuing presence, in spite of their subordinate status to the Ali Rajas, contributed to the accentuation of the central position of the port in an expanding maritime network. The letter sent by the Ali Raja to Cochin in 1715 mentions one Chekutty Pokker, who had sent his ship to Jaffnapatanam with a freight belonging to the Ali Raja.47 He is described by the Dutch officials as a ‘subject’ of the Ali Raja.48 This event suggests the composite nature of the commercial enterprise in Cannanore in which the superior status of the Ali Raja was not transposed into an 62 CHAPTER THREE absolute control over the trade affairs. It is also an affirmation of the presence of a ship-owning Mappila trading class in Cannanore alongside that of the Ali Rajas. The thriving commercial activities pursued in the Bazaar necessitated the concentration of a large number of ordinary people in and around the port city to serve as artisans, shopkeepers, sailors, manual workers and suchlike. Because of the impossibility of developing a dynamic agricultural sector, the employment opportunities provided by maritime commerce turned out to be crucial to the political economy of Kolathunadu. The Mappila Muslims, who had been immersed in Indian Ocean commerce for centuries, had tended to settle in the market towns along the coastal belt of Malabar. The British officials of the early twentieth century also noticed this trade-oriented occupational tendency of the Mappila Muslims of Kolathunadu, which was strikingly different to that found in the southern districts of the British Malabar.49 The popular image of the Mappilas which can be extrapolated from the folk traditions of this region also supports this assumption.50 Naturally the Bazaar and the opportunities of earning a livelihood related to trade attracted Mappilas from different parts of the region. Consequently it presented the Bazaar as the seat of Mappila economic power and the symbolic expression of the Ali Rajas’ political ambitions. However, as already hinted at, it would be wrong to assume that the Bazaar was populated entirely by the Mappilas. The people in the lower strata of the society also seized upon the employment opportunities provided by the booming maritime commerce at the port. Pyrard de Laval mentions that the Mukkuvas, Tiyyas and other lower class people were employed as day labourers in the port town.51 Exercising control over a substantial population in and around the city signals that there was at least a modest form of law and order mechanism at work under the auspices of the Ali Rajas. Nevertheless, it would be too greater a leap into the unknown to presume that the Ali Rajas presided over a systematized judicial configuration or bothered themselves with the Islamic sharia law. Certainly, the British colonial administration did suppose the existence of an Islamic judicial system in operation under the Ali Rajas.52 However, this supposition is open to question.53 According to Barbosa, in distinction to the paradesi or foreign Muslims who were allowed to follow their own legal systems, the Mappila Muslims of Malabar came under the jurisdiction of the local rulers.54 However, Pyrard de Laval indicates that the emergence of a new power centre in Cannanore under the Ali Rajas did create a distinct legal hierarchy among the Mappilas of Cannanore, under which the former formed the centre of justice. There can be no question that this new hierarchy in any sense conflicted with the existing local conceptualization of ‘justice’—a term which had more to do with the manifestation of an existing power struc- LORDS OF THE SEA 63 ture in the realm than any particular ‘judicial system’ per se. Though the Brahmins and other privileged sections of the society claimed special consideration in the judicial procedures by appealing to the Brahmanical dharmasastras, the dispensation of justice in medieval Kerala, especially in its northern regions, appears to have been more of a matter of power than a system defined either by Manu’s law or the system of any other law- givers.55 There is no reason to suppose that the ‘judicial’ procedure among the Cannanore Muslim would have deviated from this general picture in the region. It does not appear that Muslim lawyers played any role in the administrative set-up under the Ali Rajas. Pyrard de Laval explicitly states the exclusion of Muslim clerics from the judicial administration among the Malabar Muslims.56 The Ali Raja exercised judicial authority over his subjects and dispensed justice as an instrument to reify his power in society. This is apparent from the account of Alexander Hamilton, who witnessed the exercise of ‘justice’ by the Ali Raja over his servant who had committed a transgression.57 In short, the Ali Raja’s perception of juris- prudence should be sought not in his Islamic identity, but in the regional conceptualization of justice.

The Cannanore thalassocracy

The geographical constraints imposed on it, Kolathunadu did not provide much scope for extracting a substantial agricultural surplus sufficient to maintain an enduring state structure.58 This having been said, although the Ali Rajas’ activities had to concentrate on the sea, they did manage to establish control over a fairly sizeable strip of land along the coast. The primarily sandy coastal ground was not suitable to any sort of cultivation except coconut groves. Though not much information is available about land improvements, if any, carried out under the Ali Rajas, this does not exclude the possibility that their control over land might certainly have added up to their general commercial income. In 1717 the Dutch reported the attempt by the Ali Raja to plant young coconut palms on the piece of land lying between the Bazaar and the Dutch fortress. Admittedly the Dutch interpreted this more in the light of a strategic move on the part of the Ali Raja who was trying to impede the view of the Bazaar from the fortress, to say nothing of obscuring a clear line of fire from the cannons.59 Despite such desultory attempts to cultivate the coastal strip, it has to be borne in mind that the bulk of commodities from the region sought after by international trade, such as pepper and cardamom, were produced in the highlands, situated far beyond the direct control of the Ali Rajas. This picture begins to clarify only towards the end of the eighteenth century 64 CHAPTER THREE when the British administrators tried to calculate the income derived from the landed property of the ruling authorities in British Malabar. Their findings support the assumption that the agricultural sector played only a secondary role to maritime trade, which remained the main source of the Ali Rajas’ income.60 To understand the rise of Cannanore as an important maritime emporium properly, it is impossible to overlook the close association between the Arackal Swarupam and the Maldives and Lakshadweep. Politically as well as economically, the latter formed an integral part of the maritime state of the Ali Rajas until it was transferred to the British in 1908.61 Source material from which to reconstruct the evolutionary stages of the Ali Rajas’ relationship with these islands is not plentiful. All that is known comes either from legendary sources or from colonial materials, neither exempt from political and ideological undertones. The Keralolpathi makes a point of stating that the Lakshadweep Islands were granted to the Ali Rajas by the Kolathiris, the traditional rulers of Cannanore.62 Here some caution is advised because it should be remembered that the Kolathiris had never been in possession of even a rudimentary naval force which they could have used to exercise direct control over the Lakshadweep. It is probable that from an even earlier date the islands, which were inhabited by Mappila Muslims, had been under the influence of their counterparts on the mainland. The Kolathiris could have exerted only an indirect influence there on account of the presence of these mainland subjects. Consequently, the legend of the ‘grant’ turns out to have been more of a ritual claim to superior status over the Ali Rajas by the former, than the ceding of any actual control over the islands. Considering the pivotal significance of the Lakshadweep Islands to the Ali Rajas’ trade, it is not difficult to grasp the fact that an efficient mechanism would have needed to be in place to maintain such a control over a long period. In fact, the Ali Rajas’ authority over the Lakshadweeps was maintained by karyakkars (administrators) invested with civil and criminal powers who were assisted in their duties by a body of local elders (karanavars).63 This system was obviously constituted to support the Ali Rajas’ commercial interests in the islands. Naturally, a sort of economic exploitation was inbuilt in the system. Whatever the nature of the Ali Rajas’ control over the islands preserved in the descriptions of British officials, it has to be analysed with caution.64 Crucially, the Mysorean occupation of Cannanore and the subsequent imposition of British colonial rule fundamentally altered the political economy of the region. The enormous economic liabilities imposed on the Ali Rajas by the British interlopers might have compelled the former to foist a more severe economic policy in the islands. It is also natural to expect such negative images from a colonial power which was striving to usurp the islands from the Ali Rajas. LORDS OF THE SEA 65

Although the Lakshadweeps were very important to the thalassocracy, the Maldives in particular played a key role in the rise of Mappila power in Cannanore during the early decades of the sixteenth century. Canara rice was the principal key which opened up these atolls to the Cannanore traders. Despite their productive barrenness, far from constituting a poor commercial periphery, both the Maldive and the Lakshadweep groups served as wonderful natural staging posts between the monsoon systems of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. The Cannanore Mappila merchants ruled over an emporium which attracted traders, mainly from Gujarat, Bengal, and Aceh, who were not able to cross the Indian Ocean during one monsoon. The Portuguese bid to wrest control of the pepper trade of Malabar in the early decades of the sixteenth century only enhanced the strategic importance of the Maldives in the Indian Ocean trade. The Maldive atolls, lying beyond the control of the Portuguese, were transformed into the hub of an alternative trade route for the Asian traders who linked the western and eastern parts of the Indian Ocean. The ships from Gujarat, Bengal, and West Asia, which were prevented from approaching the Malabar ports because of the Portuguese presence, began to seek shelter in the Maldives. Hence, the islands inherited much of the earlier intermediate role of the southern Indian port towns of Calicut and Pulicat.65 The increasing importance of the Maldives after the coming of the Portuguese strengthened the control of the Cannanore traders over the islands. The Portuguese records reveal that the Cannanore trader Mamale earned a considerable income in tribute and duties from the king of the Maldives.66 This indicates that Mamale acted as the overlord of the islands, keeping the local king subject to him. The report of Pyrard de Laval reveals that the immediate political control exercised over the Maldives by such Cannanore Mappila merchant magnates as Mamale Marakkar continued more or less unchanged until the end of the sixteenth century.67 During the seventeenth century, when the local ruling lineage re-asserted its power over the islands, it seems that this influence gradually faded away.68 Apart from obtaining access to an important maritime crossroads safely situated beyond European control, there is evidence that the prevailing influence of the Ali Rajas over the Lakshadweep and some of the Maldive islands ensured them a privileged hold on local produce. The Ali Rajas monopsonized such Lakshadweep products as coconut, copra, coir, cowry, ambergris, and dried fish which formed a significant part of the merchandise traded by the Cannanore merchants. In days of sail, coir was also in great demand in the ship-building technology of the region.69 Unfortunately, the amount of the income extracted from the Lakshadweep Islands by the Ali Rajas is obscure. In 1702, the Dutch reported on the annual toll the Ali Rajas had been paying the Kolathiri 66 CHAPTER THREE

Rajas on their income from the islands, at a time when the latter were still able to maintain their power over the Ali Rajas. If this is true, the huge amount cited by the Dutch indicates the importance of these islands to the Ali Rajas.70 A report of the Joint Commission (1792–3) appointed by the British Government to inquire into the income obtained by the Arackal House from the islands stated that, prior to the Mysorean invasion, the Ali Raja would have earned 60,000 rupees profit annually from the coir trade alone. They usually sold the coir in the markets of Bengal and the Gulf.71 According to its calculations, the Ali Rajas would have earned a profit of around 5,00,000 rupees annually from their trade relations with the islands.72 Whatever the rationale behind such assumptions on the part of the colonial authorities, such statements indicate the importance of the islands to the general economic prosperity of the Ali Rajas during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although the Ali Rajas’ control over the Maldives was less than secure, it makes sense to investigate to what extent Cannanore was able to continue to retain its commercial grip on the islands. For example, in 1690 the Dutch reported the arrival in Dharmapatanam of two vessels belonging to the Ali Raja, one loaded with coir from the Maldives and other carried other island goods such as coconut, cumblamas, and amber.73 Cumblamas, a kind of dried fish from these islands, formed a major part of the merchandise which the Ali Rajas exported to Aceh in 1718.74 The cowry trade was a different story. It seems that in the seventeenth century this had become a royal monopoly of the Maldives Sultanate. The Dutch obtained most of their cowries directly from the islands through the agency of the Sultan.75 Even though, more than once in the same period the Dutch were able to trade in this commodity with the Ali Rajas. For instance in 1707, the Ali Raja supplied the Dutch Company with 20,000 lbs of cowries.76 It is possible that the Ali Rajas traded the bulk of their cowry stock with such other regions of the Indian Ocean as Bengal, where the shells were in great demand. The Bengal shipping lists supply ample evidence to prove that it was a regular trading commodity the Ali Rajas traded with Bengal. Overall it seems that the Ali Rajas remained a political and commercial power to be reckoned with, both in the Lakshadweeps and, to a lesser extent, also in the Maldives.

Cannanore and the commercial world of the Indian Ocean

As a part of the Indian Ocean trade networks, the merchants of the Cannanore Bazaar, particularly the Arackal Ali Rajas, were actively engaged in both the coastal and oceanic branches of maritime trade. The LORDS OF THE SEA 67

Mappila merchants of Cannanore maintained a complex network of trade relations with different parts of the Indian Ocean. The Red Sea ports, the Persian Gulf, Surat, Canara, the Maldives, Lakshadweep, Ceylon, Coromandel, Bengal, and Aceh figure as prominent trading regions in their network system. Although quantitative data from which to calculate the value of the trade pursued by the Ali Rajas and the Cannanore Bazaar is not to be found, the scattered references which appear in various European sources offer some sort view of their trading world. Their commercial contacts extended from short-distance coastal trade, linking the small ports along the west coast of India, to those traversing long dis- tances across the seas. Obviously, it was a network involving the exchange of both essential, bulk freights and valuable commodities. This picture points towards the existence of an intricate structure, which had evolved through a long-term process, consisting of a chain of merchant networks and multi-capital investments. These complex trade relationships carefully established over centuries proved to be the greatest asset of the Cannanore traders, offering them indispensable assistance in their bids to overcome the stiff competition posed by such big European companies as the VOC which appeared on the scene equipped with enormous capital and considerable naval power. The best way to go about compiling a vivid picture of the trade network operated across the Indian Ocean by the Mappila merchants of Cannanore is to attempt to categorize their commercial arena into different trade ‘zones’. Among these trade ‘zones’, the Arabian Sea undoubtedly occupied the prime position on the commercial chart of the Cannanore traders.

1. The Arabian Sea The Arabian Sea trade was the backbone of the politico-economic power of both the Ali Rajas and other traders in the Cannanore Bazaar. By the early sixteenth century, the presence of a powerful commercial class in Cannanore had already been observed by many European travellers and officials.77 Cannanore had developed strong commercial connections with various Arabian Sea ports by the time of the Portuguese had appeared in the region.78 Despite their efforts, thanks to the presence of a bustling paradesi or foreign Muslim trading class who frequented West Asian maritime cities, the neighbouring port town of Calicut continued to enjoy an advantage over other Malabar maritime cities. At the first glance, there seems to have been significant continuity in the Arabian Sea trading networks operating from the Cannanore port between the sixteenth and the eighteenth century, even though taken as a whole there might have been fluctuations in the frequency and volume of its trade. Certainly 68 CHAPTER THREE there was an undercurrent of change in the commercial world of the port town during both the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. The most significant alteration was in the role of the local Mappila merchants as they went about their commercial activities in this maritime town. Although Cannanore, and its satellite ports like Baliapatanam, Dharmapatanam, and Maday, were prominent centres of the local Mappila Muslims, unquestionably during the first half of the sixteenth century their role in maritime trade was much more modest than it was to become in the subsequent decades.79 The travel account of Tomé Pires reveals that the trading sphere of the Mappila merchants of Malabar during the early years of the sixteenth century was limited to as far as Cambay on the west coast and to Pulicat on the east coast of India.80 It is likely but not proven that they did not participate directly in the most profitable branches of the spice trade with the Red Sea–Persian Gulf areas, at that time still so obviously the domain of the paradesi Muslim traders. Although these foreign merchants continued to play a crucial role in the international trade of Cannanore during the first half of the sixteenth century,81 the evidence available demonstrates that, at about the same time, such local traders as Mamale Marakkar began to claim a greater share in the commercial life of the port town.82 Gradually the local Mappila traders overshadowed the foreign commercial elements in Cannanore and the neighbouring port towns. The upshot was that the trading horizon of the Mappila traders in the Arabian Sea appears to have expanded considerably during the sixteenth and the seventeenth century when the Red Sea–Persian Gulf cities became the regular ports of call for the Cannanore trading ships—a change which marked the end of the dominance of the paradesi Muslim traders in that branch of trade.83 The second half of the sixteenth century witnessed the emergence of the Ali Rajas as the main politico-economic force in the port town. In more general terms, this reflected the growing control of the Mappila merchants in the maritime affairs of the region. Emerging from the shadow of the foreign traders at the port, the Mappilas of Cannanore established an independent commercial identity in the intra-ocean maritime trade and, once they had achieved this goal, the surplus accumulated from their extensive trade activities ultimately ended up in Cannanore itself, inevitably having repercussions on the balance of power in the region. Although the Mappila traders of Calicut engaged in fierce competition with the Portuguese trade control mechanism in place along the western coast of India during the second half of the sixteenth century, the Cannanore merchants under the Ali Raja largely stood aloof from these troubles and slowly but surely established their suzerainty in the regional trade.84 It seems that, instead of adopting an all-out opposition to the Portuguese State, the Arackal Swarupam essayed a cautious path which LORDS OF THE SEA 69 suited its commercial interests. The gradual eclipse of the maritime power of the Estado da India by the beginning of the seventeenth century and the increasing degree of Portuguese private trading interests created a fairly placid atmosphere in which the local commercial interests could thrive. Sinnappah Arasaratnam has noted this comparative freedom enjoyed by the Northern Malabar port towns such as Cannanore and Calicut by the beginning of the seventeenth century, by which time the influence of the Estado da India in Cannanore had been considerably reduced.85 The political and commercial affairs of Cannanore fell largely under the control of the Ali Rajas and the Bazaar Mappilas. Despite these changes, accepting the cartazes issued by the Portuguese authorities, the Ali Rajas continued to send their ships to such Red Sea ports as Jeddah as late as the first decade of the seventeenth century.86 The occasional appearance of English and Dutch vessels along the coast of Malabar did not have much impact on the trade there during the first half of the seventeenth century. The vessels of the Bazaar merchants, with or without Portuguese cartazes, continued to ply the seas. The capture of the Cannanore fort by the VOC fleets in 1663 did not fundamentally alter the existing situation; it only signified the replacement of one of the players in the big game of the spice trade in the region. The advent of the Dutch along the Malabar Coast did not cut off the existing West Asian trade links of the local Mappila traders either. Cannanore traders actively participated in the Persian Gulf spice trade alongside other Malabar merchants. Probably Cannanore sailors usually took the coastal route linking various port towns along the west coast of India to reach the Persian Gulf, rather than heading off out across the sea. This prudent choice reduced the risks of the voyage and the retail trade conducted at various stops along the way increased their profits. In 1670, the Dutch officials noticed the appearance at Daman of two Cannanore ships bound for Muscat with a cargo of pepper and cardamom.87 Malabar merchants undoubtedly engaged in the impressive trade relations South India maintained with the Persian Gulf ports. As early as 1666, the VOC factory at Gamron complained that, because of the excessive trade pursued by the Malabar ships in pepper and other Malabar merchandise at Muscat, Basra and other Persian ports, it was not possible for the Company to benefit from the spice trade.88 If the Persian branch of the Malabar trade network was under the observation of the Dutch factory at Gamron, the Red Sea trade passed the VOC by virtually unnoticed. Mocha was one of the main destinations of the Cannanore merchants. In 1644, the English encountered a great ship from this port returning from the Red Sea, carrying around 500 men on board and a cargo worth 200,000 Mughal rupees.89 This situation persisted despite the assiduous attempts by the Dutch to gain control of the 70 CHAPTER THREE spice trade of the region. They duly noted that the Cannanore merchants derived considerable profit from their commercial transactions with Mocha.90 The Red Sea trade was so important that the capture by pirates of some return ships sent by the Ali Raja and other Bazaar traders to Mocha in 1706 had severe repercussions not only for the local traders but also on the transactions of the Company in Cannanore.91 The Red Sea ports seem to have been the regular meeting centres of Malabar merchants. The ship of the Ali Raja which returned from Aden in October 1698 had taken on board there the nachoda of the ship belonging to Chego Marakkar of Calicut.92 Another of the Ali Raja’s ships which returned from Aden in the same year carried on board the crew of the ship of the Calicut trader Secsia Marca (Sacria Marakkar?), who had sold his ship in Mocha.93 Steadily and deftly, the commercial entrepreneurs from Cannanore knit a network of trade links along the western coast of India, including both bigger and smaller ports towns in their commercial operations, and covering a variety of merchandise in their transactions. The Mappila traders along the Malabar Coast acted as a kind of loosely knit co-operative body whose presence made it extremely difficult for the European powers to control the regional trade.94 Cannanore merchants operated comfortably within this framework until the close of the eighteenth century. The entire coastal belt extending from Gujarat to Bengal was part of this Mappila system of trade. In European sources, Cannanore traders in this trading zone are often hidden behind the more general category of ‘Malabar merchants’. In 1636, the English reported the ‘frequent resort of Malabar merchants to Dhabol’ with pepper.95 The Dutch also mentioned the availability of Malabar pepper in Surat. The Dutch factory in Surat noted the departure from there of an English ship bound for home laden with Malabar pepper.96 It is important to set aside the European preoccupation with spices for a moment as their trade contact with Surat was not restricted to this commodity. Other local wares as coconuts, coir, betel nut and suchlike also appear as a part of their regular cargoes.97 Malabar trade with Gujarati ports had attained such a magnitude by the seventeenth century, the Mughal Emperor was deriving an income of 1,40,000 mahmudis in revenue from Malabar merchants in the ports of Broach and Cambay.98 The Dutch official at Wingurla, Pieter Paets, also observed the regular visits of the Malabar traders to the Bijapuri ports bringing coconuts and rice.99 In 1636, the Dutch reported the appearance before Goa of 300 Malabar vessels loaded with pepper and other wares.100 Even after the Dutch had established themselves permanently in Cannanore, seemingly unruffled local traders were not deflected from their ‘illegal’ trade with different port towns along the coast.101 In 1691 LORDS OF THE SEA 71 the Cochin commandant reported to Heren XVII about the complete freedom enjoyed by the Ali Raja and the Cannanore traders, who sailed the high seas without bothering to apply for Dutch passports. This free trade pursued by the Cannanore Bazaar was backed up by five or six heavily armed frigates riding at anchor right under the noses of the Dutch in their fortress at Cannanore.102 The Company servants were acutely aware that the Cannanore traders enjoyed an important share in the annual trade in the Gujarati ports of Surat and Broach. They reported that the Malabar traders used to send no fewer than forty or fifty strong frigates to Gujarat—probably every year.103 All these facts bear witness to the thriving Arabian Sea trade which enriched the local Mappilas during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.

2. Ceylon, Coromandel, Bengal, and South-East Asia In comparison with the Arabian Sea, the other half of the Indian Ocean does seem to pale into insignificance in the trading network of the Ali Rajas. Although its role was less spectacular, there is little doubt that Cannanore merchants maintained links with the important trading centres in the eastern hemisphere of the Indian Ocean. Ceylon undeniably figured as an arena of strategic and economic importance in the Mappila struggle against the Portuguese Estado during the early half of the sixteenth century.104 The Mannar pearl fishery was certainly subjected to the powerful influence of the Marakkar traders of Calicut, but not much other information is to be found about the trade relations of the Ali Rajas with Ceylonese ports in the second half of the sixteenth century. It stands to reason that the strong Portuguese presence in Ceylon might have hindered any smooth commercial relations between the Cannanore Mappilas and Ceylonese ports in this era. This situation seems to have changed after the capture of Ceylon by the Dutch in 1658. The VOC reports suggest that the merchants from Cannanore engaged in commercial transactions with Ceylon, with or without the consent of the Dutch officials. The particular interest of the Cannanore merchants was in fetching elephants from the island as there was a good market for these animals in South India. The unwillingness of the Dutch to satisfy the demands of the Cannanore traders for Ceylonese elephants laid the way open for local traders to become directly involved in this branch of commerce. Although the Dutch were not disposed to carry elephants on Company ships for the Bazaar traders,105 they were willing to lend an ear to the request of the karanavar of the Bazaar when he wished to send his own ship to transport elephants from Ceylon.106 Another Dutch report mentions the capture of a ship belonging to the Ali Raja, which was carrying elephants and tobacco from Jaffnapatanam, by 72 CHAPTER THREE the Dutch authorities in Manapaar.107 In a letter to Cochin, the Ali Raja refers to one of his ships which he had sent to Jaffnapatanam.108 It is con- ceivable that on their return journey from the Coromandel Coast, the merchant ships from Cannanore also visited Ceylonese ports to carry out various commercial transactions. Coromandel ports had already come within the ambit of Cannanore merchants’ trade contacts by the beginning of the sixteenth century.109 This commercial interaction between the two maritime zones of the Indian Subcontinent continued unabated throughout the subsequent centuries. In 1644, among the other Indian Ocean ships, the VOC men noticed the presence of a Cannanore vessel in Pulicat.110 Two years later, in 1666, the Dutch officials in Cannanore reported that the two frigates belonging to the ‘moors’ of Baliapatanam—a satellite port of Cannanore —laden with cotton and iron were preparing to sail to Kayal.111 In 1704, the Company was favourably disposed to the Ali Raja’s request to dispatch his ship to South Coromandel with his merchandise.112 The capture of the deposed Sultan of the Maldives by two sons of the Ali Raja from Coromandel indicates the close connections maintained by the Arackal family with the Coromandel Coast.113 Interestingly, a Cochin shipping list of 1699 mentions the appearance of two ships owned by a Cannanore trader named Conje Ause Craauw (Kunju Hassen Craw?) which were outward bound to Tuticorin and Porto Novo, near Cochin.114 Farther along the east coast, the Ali Rajas had established commercial relations with Bengali ports at least by the seventeenth century, if not earlier.115 Om Prakash believes that the trade between Malabar and Bengal was overwhelmingly in the hands of merchants from the former region.116 The appearance of ships owned by the Ali Rajas in the Bengal shipping list of the Dutch East India Company supports this assumption. It is even possible that, in spite of the Dutch refusal to grant sea-passes to Malabar merchants to trade with Bengal, the direct trade between Cannanore and Bengal increased in the first quarter of the eighteenth century.117 This assumption of the expanding maritime links of the Cannanore traders is also bolstered by the frequent references in the VOC documents to their trade with Aceh in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Aceh, which functioned as a gateway to the China Sea, emerged as one of the most important Islamic port cities in the Indian Ocean during the early-modern period, because the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese in 1511 provoked repercussions in the Indian Ocean Islamic trade networks.118 By the middle of the sixteenth century, Aceh was established as a counterpoise to Portuguese Malacca.119 As a part of this re-arranged trading system among the Asian traders, the Ali Rajas naturally maintained commercial relations with Aceh. The dagregister of Batavia for 1625 reports the appearance of a Cannanore ship in Aceh in the compa- LORDS OF THE SEA 73 ny of other Moorish ships.120 This commercial relationship continued unabated even after the Dutch had established themselves in Cannanore. In 1708 the Dutch noted the appearance of a battered ship belonging to the Ali Raja which was returning from Aceh.121 Again in April 1712, the VOC officials in Madurai reported that, on her homeward voyage from Aceh, a ship owned by the Ali Raja had dropped anchor off Tuticorin.122 In 1716, the Ali Raja requested the Dutch Council at Cochin to grant him a sea-pass for his Aceh-bound ship.123 In another letter written to Commander Johannes Hertenberg in 1717, the Ali Raja requested the protection for his vessels homeward-bound from Aceh ‘if they happened to come across VOC ships’. This letter seems to have the character of anticipatory pre-emptive bail, designed to save ships which were not protected by the Dutch sea-passes from an accidental encounter with Dutch ships.124 The following year, the Ali Raja actually asked for another sea-pass from the Company as he planned to send his ship to Aceh.125 In 1720, Ali Issoeppoe, a trader from Ponnani, reported the capture of one of the Ali Raja’s ships which was on her way back from Aceh.126 Later, in 1723, the Ali Raja wrote to Cochin requesting a pass be granted to an Aceh-bound ship of 400 bhar belonging to the karanavar of the Bazaar.127 A perusal of various Dutch reports suggests that the Cannanore traders maintained what amounted to regular commercial relations with Aceh with or without the benefit of sea-passes from the VOC and, in this fashion, incorporated the two halves of the Indian Ocean trading world into their commercial network system. Although no quantitative or qualitative details of these commercial transactions have survived, the continuity and steady expansion of such an extensive trade network system is ample evidence of the significance of the Cannanore traders, especially the Ali Rajas, in the Indian Ocean trading world. This prominence was translated into enormous ramifications in the socio-political life of Cannanore.

3. Asian traders in Cannanore Alongside the intensive trade carried out by local traders, Cannanore attracted merchants from different parts of the Indian Ocean. This foreign presence considerably augmented the economic activity in the port city. Although the rise of the local traders under the leadership of the Ali Rajas had quashed the previous influence enjoyed by the West Asian traders in the port town, other Asian merchants, especially those from Gujarat who occupied a prominent position in Indian Ocean trade history, continued to flock to the Mappila markets along the Malabar Coast. In a letter dated 11 March 1680, the Dutch commissioner, Marten Huijsman, reported the presence of ‘five small foreign ships’ (vyf vreemde 74 CHAPTER THREE scheepjes) lying at anchor in Cannanore Bay and another seven in its satellite ports of Dharmapatanam and Vadakara.128 In 1698 the dagregister of Malabar reported that the Banjara merchant Caljardas, nachoda of a Surat ship, had traded cotton worth around 2,000 rupees in Cannanore.129 Obviously the Dutch maritime control mechanism did not produce its desired effect of preventing such traders from visiting the Malabar Coast. It was natural that the Dutch Company was worried about the increasing amount of shipping of Gujarati and other Asian traders in Cannanore and the neighbouring port towns.130 Unfortunately there are no Dutch shipping lists from Cannanore from which to assess the regularity of such commercial visits. There is a very high chance that the Dutch were not able to give an exact picture of this Asian trade in Cannanore and its satellite Mappila ports, as they would have been confounded by the mutual co-operation between the local traders and other Asian merchants who conspired to conceal their activities from Dutch vigilance.131 Asian shipping enhanced the magnitude of the commercial transactions in Cannanore and consequently enriched the exchequer of the Ali Rajas in the form of tolls and taxes. Although the Kolathiris were theoretically entitled to such tithes and tolls on transactions in the Bazaar, the undermining of their claims to sovereignty and the strengthening of the Ali Rajas’ control over the trade and commerce of the region paved the way for the latter to appropriate this income.132

4. Cannanore exports Spices, especially pepper, constituted the most sought-after merchandise in the intra-regional and oceanic trade offered by the Malabar port towns. Cannanore was no exception to this general picture. However, given the peculiar geo-climatic character of the sub-regions within Malabar, the qualitative and quantitative aspects of these spices varied considerably. Kolathunadu pepper, though quantitatively less in comparison with the supplies from the hinterlands of Cochin and Calicut, enjoyed a reputa- tion for superior quality.133 The Chirakkal and Kottayam regions were the main production centres of the pepper which was brought to the port of Cannanore.134 The report of the VOC council in Cochin of 1689 states that pepper production in Kolathunadu was around 20,00,000 lbs per annum.135 Pepper figures prominently among the commodities exported by the Ali Rajas and other Cannanore traders to Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Gujarat. Cannanore was also famous for its high quality cardamom, a product in great demand in West Asian markets which was exported in large quantities by Cannanore traders.136 The large amount of cardamom captured by the Dutch officials from a Mocha-bound ship of the karanavar of the LORDS OF THE SEA 75

Bazaar supports this assertion.137 This spice enjoyed great demand both beyond the Indian Subcontinent and within its boundaries. The Dutch reported that Bijapur and Golkonda absorbed the best quality cardamom from Malabar and its trade by both land and sea routes was overwhelmingly in the hands of Cannanore traders.138 Because of their high demand in the Indian Ocean trade, pepper and cardamom provided the Ali Rajas with their highest profit margin.139 Wild cinnamon which grew profusely in and around Cannanore and Calicut posed a not inconsiderable threat to the high quality Ceylonese cinnamon on offer in Asian markets.140 Malabar merchants enthusiastically marketed this cheap substitute throughout Asia, particularly in West Asian markets. In 1679, a Dutch report states that Cannanore merchants conveyed a quantity of 187,500 lbs wild cinnamon to Mocha alone.141 Another of bulk export product was arrack. Though information about the arrack trade in Cannanore is sparse, some indications hint at its importance in the local economy. The Dutch were aware of the widespread production of this commodity in Kolathunadu and of its large- scale export across the Western Ghats.142 The merchants in the Bazaar also engaged in the arrack trade and transported to distant markets on their vessels. It was reported in November 1689 that Koykuttiyali, the karanavar of the Bazaar, had sent his heavily armed ship laden with ‘uncooked’ arrack from nearby Dharmapatanam in a northerly direction.143 Besides these products, the Cannanore Bazaar indubitably traded in a wide range of such other local commodities as coconut and coconut products, areca, ginger and the like, although such merchandise evaded the eye of the European Company men who usually dismissed them as ‘trash’.144

5. Cannanore imports Extensive mercantile connections with specific parts in the Indian Ocean region helped each Ali Raja and his men to improve their profit margin by engaging in a remarkable import and transit trade. As part of a complex maritime network, they handled an array of both bulk and precious commodities. A fraction of such imports was intended for local consumption and a share was also destined for trans-regional markets and was transported either into the interior via land routes or re-distributed by sea. Their strong commercial relationship with West Asia was also reflected in their imports from there. As the West Asian ports were not able to offer much which was commercially viable to the Malabar markets, it seems that the bulk of what was returned was precious metals in the form of coins and bullion. The Cannanore ship captured by the Dutch in 1621 contained 2,000 gold ducats.145 Another Dutch account from the first half 76 CHAPTER THREE of the seventeenth century reported the appearance of a Malabar ship in the vicinity of Goa carrying a very large treasure from the Red Sea. Even though this ship came under the attack by the Dutch ships, the Malabaris were able to salvage their treasure which amounted to eight tons of gold, mainly in the form of Moorish ducats.146 It is no accident that the Dutch, as the proud descendants of Piet Hein, set their sights on those ships of the Ali Rajas returning from Basra and Mocha ‘being usually loaded richly with content’.147 There are hints that the Cannanore ships homeward-bound from Aceh also carried gold specie as well as other commodities.148 The Ali Raja’s control over the supply of precious metals put him in a position to mint his own coins in Cannanore by the seventeenth century.149 Opium and cotton were in great demand in Cannanore.150 The Ali Rajas engaged in both the wholesale and retail trade in these commodities. This substantial opium trade in the local market was noticed by the VOC men as early as the initial years of their settlement there.151 Gujarat ports appear as the main source of opium and cotton for the local market.152 Opium, cotton, and cotton clothes figure prominently among the merchandise which the Cannanore merchants brought back to the local market from the ports of North.153 Cannanore traders were deeply involved in the retail trade of opium along the western coast and reaped substantial profits from it.154 They also retailed the imported opium in the markets of South Malabar. The dagregister of Batavia of 1663 reports the appearance of two or three vessels from Cannanore carrying ten khandil (5,000 lbs) opium in Kayamkulam, where the Dutch maintained a factory.155 Cotton and cotton clothes were in large and constant demand in the local markets of Malabar. Consequently, Cannanore ships usually carried back both the raw cotton and cotton clothes from the northern markets on their homeward voyage. In 1673, the Cochin Council reported the arrival of three Cannanore frigates from the North laden carrying seventy khandil of raw cotton, some coarse cotton clothes, and other such products.156 Closer examination shows that all these cotton and cotton products imported from afar were not destined for local consumption alone, although some of these commodities were available in the Bazaar for retail at a higher price. In 1682, after their failure to acquire the quantity of cotton yarn required for the European market from Wingurla on time, the Dutch tried to purchase it from Cannanore. Their attempt came to nought because of the excessive price combined with the low quality of this commodity in Cannanore.157 Besides the opium and cotton trades, the Cannanore traders also engaged in the transit trade in other commodities. In 1716, the Ali Raja requested a sea-pass from the Cochin Commandment to re-export to Aceh half of the ambergris which had LORDS OF THE SEA 77 been brought from Muscat on one of his ships.158 It is also likely that on their long-haul voyages, the Cannanore merchants engaged in mercantile transactions at their ports-of-call. Hence, the Cannanore ship which appeared in Aceh in 1625 was laden with cotton procured in Masulipatanam.159 This transit trade in a range of commodities acquired from different parts of the Indian Ocean must have been of enormous assistance in spreading the risk involved in participating in volatile Asian market situations and, as an added bonus, improving the profit margin. Inferences have been made suggesting the involvement of the Ali Rajas in the import of horses from West Asia and South-East Asia. Although evidence to assess the volume of this trade is sparse, it would be fairly safe to assume that the great demand for horses among the South Indian ruling elites stimulated the Ali Rajas to engage in this branch of trade. They did engage in the horse trade with Muscat where they paid as much as 120–40 pagodas for each horse.160 It has been reported that once, at the behest of the Dutch Commander Johannes Hertenberg, the Ali Raja imported an Arabian horse to Cannanore.161 It is also noteworthy that the return cargo of the Ali Raja’s ship from Aceh also included horses.162 Malabar has always been a rice-deficit area, even though this cereal is the staple food of the locals. Consequently, the rice trade constituted an important basic branch and served as a kind of moedernegotie for Malabar in general, and for Cannanore in particular. The bulk of the rice imported into Malabar came from the neighbouring Canara and the Coromandel regions.163 Any disruption in these rice supply lines stirred up considerable unrest among the local people. In one of such incident, the Dutch officials in Cannanore reported that the Nayars and the other common people had to resort to pinnak or coconut cake for sustenance in order to survive.164 The people were relieved from their plight only after the arrival in the bay of the Bazaar vessels loaded with rice.165 The Dutch in Cannanore were passive witnesses to the regular sailings of the Bazaar vessels headed for the Canara ports to fetch rice.166 In another letter to Heren XVII, the Malabar Commandment commented on the arrogance of the Ali Raja and his fellow merchants who had dared to import huge quantities of rice from Canara without the consent of the VOC.167 The upshot of this trade in such a basic commodity meant that the Bazaar played a decisive role in sustaining the rhythm of the daily life of the region.

Conclusion

In the annals of the region the Ali Rajas’ rise to prominence in the political economy of Cannanore was not a bolt from the blue. In a region in 78 CHAPTER THREE which the geographical factors limited the possibility for producing a considerable agricultural surplus, maritime trade was the most lucrative area of resource mobilization available to the local elites. During the sixteenth century, the coming of the Portuguese and the decline of the paradesi Muslim commercial presence along the Malabar Coast opened the door for the emergence of Cannanore as the new hub of an extensive commercial network which dominated the various regional and long-distance maritime routes. At the interface of land and sea, under the Ali Rajas the Mappila trading class in Cannanore gradually made its mark as a new elite group who had accumulated not inconsiderable power for itself by the second half of the sixteenth century. Situated along the narrow coastal strip of northern Malabar and on the Maldive and Lakshadweep islands, their trading empire was a thalassocracy in the true sense of the word: a highly informal realm, based on the commercial resources of the sea, dominated by the Ali Raja who ruled with the acquiescence of highly competitive mercantile co-sharers. The European trading companies were neither able alter the existing networking system of the indigenous Mappila traders fundamentally nor were they able to destroy it. Instead of outright disruption, both were able to adjust themselves to suit the situation created by a complex process of changes occurring within the existing system of trade.168 The Arackal Swarupam presents a unique case in Indian history. The Ali Rajas’ principal portfolio remained to be one and the same, namely maritime trade.169 Their control of the sea helped them to achieve political significance in the regional power configuration by making able to exert their influence over the Mappilas of Cannanore and Lakshadweep who were linked to Arackal Swarupam through commerce. In a nutshell, the Ali Rajas’ political dignity was a by-product of the wealth derived from their control of trade and therefore the fluctuations in their commercial fortunes ineluctably had an impact on the political aura of the Arackal House. The achievement of such a commercial house in transforming its acquired wealth into political status seems to be a pertinent indicator of the flexibility of the political culture in the region—a situation which bears a close resemblance to the Malay political culture in South-East Asia.170 The Arackal Swarupam presents the closest example of a ‘maritime state’ primarily constituted of markets, merchants, and ships. The Ali Rajas’ control over the Lakshadweep and their frequent attempts to dominate the Maldives were far more a by-product of their commercial interests than territorial ambitions. Control over a trade network stretching across the Indian Ocean formed the core idea of an ‘administration’ in which dominion over a territorial kingdom did not seem to be crucial to their claims to sovereignty. The hermetically defined sociological iden- LORDS OF THE SEA 79 tities of ‘merchants’ and ‘kings’ lose their relevance in this context. These two conceived identities were combined in the Ali Rajas, in whom the realms of the king and the merchant were fused. As the scope of the possibility of accruing an agricultural surplus was limited in Malabar, particularly in the northern regions, the power basis of the traditional political centres in the region was invariably weak.171 Under these circumstances, a thalassocracy such as that of the Ali Rajas, was in a position to survive both internal and external challenges for a relatively long period of time; finally to succumb to the inevitable doom of such an indigenous system under the imposition of colonial power by the last decade of the eighteenth century. A fate it shared with other swarupams of Malabar.172 This background of a well-established, long-standing trade system functioning under the Ali Rajas presents a good platform for an analysis of the political and commercial presence of the Dutch East India Company in Cannanore during the period between 1663 and 1723.

CHAPTER FOUR

JAN COMPANY IN CANNANORE (1663–1723)

…because, in that case this fortress would be without estates or jurisdiction, our people would nowhere enjoy the slightest exercise but would be locked inside like prisoners.1

The endeavours of the Dutch and the English trading companies to appropriate a share of the Euro–Asian spice trade made only the slightest dent on the Arabian Sea trade in the early decades of the seventeenth century.2 The South-East Asian spice-producing areas, situated safely beyond the control of the Estado da India, were the initial focus of the English and the Dutch entrepreneurs. The early Dutch exploratory voyages conducted by what are known as the ‘pre-companies’ (voorcompag- nieën), formed before the creation of the VOC, did not venture to Malabar, which was the principal source of pepper for Europe until the end of the sixteenth century.3 However, the Dutch attempt to control the European spice trade was given an enormous boost with the formation of the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (Dutch East India Company) in 1602.4 To avoid conflict with the Estado da India in the Arabian Sea, the VOC successfully established its commercial presence slightly farther east in South-East Asia. Once the sole supplier, before long, the Portuguese lost their sway over the European spice market as both the newcomers, the English and the Dutch Companies, began to gain control of the major share in the supply of spices which they procured mainly from South-East Asia.5

The Malabar commercial scenario on the eve of the Dutch conquests

The nature of the Portuguese commercial presence in the Arabian Sea had undergone a transition in the seventeenth century. Niels Steensgaard argues that by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Estado da India had been transformed into what might be more aptly called a tax- gathering and redistributive enterprise than a real commercial power in the Arabian Sea.6 Portuguese attention was increasingly shifting towards its new colony of Brazil.7 As interest in the East waned, inevitably in the face of new contenders the Estado da India was gradually losing its control over the Malabar spice trade.8 Although the total pepper output from Malabar increased significantly during the sixteenth and the seventeenth 82 CHAPTER FOUR centuries, the share enjoyed by the Estado in this branch of trade barely grew at all.9 Consequently, initially the Malabar spice trade was left principally in the hands of Asian merchants. The re-emergence of Calicut and Cannanore as the major ports of trade in Malabar by the beginning of the seventeenth century was the consequence of this changing commercial picture in the Arabian Sea and it was just at this time that the growing influence of the Dutch East India Company in the western quarter of the Indian Ocean introduced a new drift to the course of developments in Malabar.10 The Dutch occupation of the Portuguese settlements in Malabar by 1663 marked the beginning of a struggle to gain control of the spice trade between the VOC and those Asian traders who had so far been enjoying a free hand at these ports.

The Dutch in Malabar

The Dutch conquests in Malabar were not the outcome of any well- thought-out plan devised by the Company in the boardroom in Amsterdam. The irregular visits of the Company ships to Malabar in the first half of the seventeenth century were not intended to create a perma- nent commercial presence in the region.11 If the Company had remained long undecided about its Malabar policy, its conquests in Ceylon changed the situation altogether.12 The continuing presence of the Portuguese in Malabar was henceforth considered a threat to the security of Dutch settlements in Ceylon.13 This consideration was shored up by concerns about the possibility of an English take-over of the Malabar trade; a coup which could have seriously undermined the plan of the Company to control the European spice market.14 These two security factors prompted the subsequent conquests and establishment of a chain of Dutch settlements along the Malabar Coast, including Cannanore, by 1663. The establishment of the earliest European bridgehead in Cannanore by the Portuguese dates back to the first decade of the sixteenth century.15 The factory soon developed into a fortified settlement of commercial and political significance. In spite of their weakened control over the Malabar trade and the changing nature of the European commercial presence in the seventeenth-century Indian Ocean, the Portuguese tenaciously succeeded in holding onto their settlement in Cannanore until it fell into the hands of the Dutch in 1663. Although the earliest contact between Cannanore and the VOC dated back to 1604 when the VOC ships under Admiral Steven van der Hagen appeared in the Arabian Sea, the interaction between the Dutch Company and the local Mappila traders remained inconsequential until the second half of the century.16 Admittedly, the Dutch had been invited by the local ‘Xabunder’17 to JAN COMPANY IN CANNANORE 83 establish a factory in Cannanore in 1608, but they did not take advantage of such an offer until 1663.18 The first military expedition mounted by Van Goens in 1658 to expel the Portuguese from Cannanore was unsuccessful but eventually, with tactical assistance from the Ali Raja, the Dutch succeeded in ousting the Portuguese garrison in 1663 and subsequently established themselves as the masters of the Fort St Angelo.19

The Cannanore fort

The Cannanore fort had served as a safe haven in which Portuguese interests had been able to flourish for more than one and a half centuries. It was built on a rocky headland in the Bay of Cannanore jutting out into the Arabian Sea. The roadstead provided the best defence, encircling one- third of the precincts of the fort, with only a single opening on the land- ward side.20 The fort which was ‘inherited’ by the Dutch from the Portuguese was a formidable structure. Most of the section which faced the land side was taken up with housing, probably for the common soldiers and other ordinary inhabitants, forming a sort of ‘lower town’. This residential area was protected by three bastions and a wall, stretching from one end to the other on the water. The main centre of the fort, constructed on a rocky cliff, was completely detached from the rest by a moat around twenty feet deep and sixty feet wide. This citadel was built along the edge of the moat on the far side, making it even more inaccessible. The safety of the fortress from an outside attack was assured by the rocky cliff on the sea side, which was naturally almost inaccessible but which nevertheless was reinforced by strong walls with glacis constructed on its slopes.21 Under the Portuguese, Fort St Angelo constituted a self-sufficient fort town, whose population was composed of soldiers, officials, their families and various institutions such as a hospital, a church and other facilities. Notwithstanding coming into possession of a stronghold on the fringes of the pepper country, the initial idea of the Dutch was to dismantle the fort completely and replace it with a small trading settlement.22 This was easier said than done. Its demolition was faced with obstacles from the very beginning. Commander Jacob Hustaert succeeded in postponing the initial plan by citing the unavailability of an adequate work force to dismantle the strongly built fort. He also pointed out that either an English take-over or the imminent return of the Portuguese to Cannanore were not unthinkable. He judged a garrison of seventy or eighty men sufficient to guard the settlement.23 Van Goens endorsed Hustaert’s opinion in his letter to the Heren XVII.24 The upshot was that the provisional decision of the Company was to maintain the fortress but to reduce its size in order 84 CHAPTER FOUR to economize on funding the settlement. In the first phase, the houses in the ‘lower town’ were demolished and the surrounding coconut grove was cleared away.25 Consequently all that remained was the grand structure of the fort, which had one purpose and one purpose alone, promoting the commercial designs of the Company.26 The maintenance of the Cannanore settlement was a subject of perpetual debate as there were repeated attempts by the Company management to give it away. Eventually, the pro-Cannanore officials were able to prevail and scupper the plans Batavia had fostered at different stages to dismantle or relinquish the settlement. They prevailed by citing a range of reasons linked to its strategic and political importance. The main gist of the argument was that, generally speaking, the Cannanore settlement was not really profitable, but this claim was counterbalanced by its supporters who pointed out its strategic importance to the control of the spice trade in Malabar. In the end, it was the location which tipped the scales in the debate. Even Hendrik van Reede, a Malabar commander who favoured a less aggressive, more laissez-faire policy than that of his predecessor and rival Rijckloff van Goens, feared that the abandonment of the fort would undermine Dutch control along the western coast, because a withdrawal could provide ample opportunities for the local Mappila traders, especially the Ali Rajas, to supply spices to other parties.27 Later Marten Huijsman was also quite adamant when he pointed out that the Company should maintain Cannanore as a base from where it could manage the affairs of the Canara and Mysore regions, which not only supplied rice and pepper but also had the potential to be developed as lucrative markets for Company goods.28 Quite apart from these arguments, the Company always kept anxious wary eye on its European competitors: the Portuguese might return and the English and French were poised waiting for an opportunity to take over the Dutch position in Cannanore.29 These circumstances ensured that Fort St Angelo survived, albeit subjected to some structural alterations under the Dutch. Nevertheless the matter was far from settled. The failure of the Company to turn Cannanore into a commercially important settlement, even after years of effort, raised questions about the rationale of maintaining the fort in its actual condition. Commander Isbrand Godske was doubtful about the feasibility of keeping a large garrison in Cannanore because of the paltriness of its trade and even less promising future. He suggested keeping only a tower garrisoned by fifteen or twenty men.30 Van Goens did not share Godske’s view and was far more optimistic about increasing the profitability of the settlement.31 How far the personal conflicts between Van Goens and Godske might have influenced their opposing views about the prospect of the Cannanore settlement can no longer be fathomed, but as long as Van Goens was able to maintain his strong JAN COMPANY IN CANNANORE 85 rapport with the Heren XVII, he could pursue his plans without much difficulty.32 But in 1679, the increasing imbalance of trade in Malabar forced the Heren XVII to suggest a thorough restructuring of the organization there which would involve giving up some of the settlements, including Cannanore.33 Another suggestion from Amsterdam was to come to an arrangement with the Portuguese which would have entailed exchanging Cannanore for Macao. This made good financial sense as Chinese tea was attracting more and more attention from the European Companies.34 None of these ideas was put into effect as they all foundered on the opposition of a faction which continued to put their faith in Cannanore. In 1684, a former protégé of Van Goens, Commander Gelmer Vosburgh, and the Cochin Council recommended the Company maintain the status quo in Malabar.35 Even Van Reede, who visited Cochin in 1691 as a commissioner, shared this opinion and continued to express his hope that conditions in Malabar would improve.36 The upshot was that Cannanore continued to be a part of the commercial establishment of the Dutch Company in the Arabian Sea region until it was transferred to the Ali Raja in 1770.37 From the time Malabar was detached from Ceylon in 1669, Cannanore came under the jurisdiction of the Malabar Commandment.38 The civil and military affairs of the fort were organized under the authority of one chief official or factor (opperhoofd). He was also in charge of running the commercial affairs of the settlement. In cases of special importance, the opperhoofd was advised to seek the consent of the Cochin Council. In other matters it was suggested he allow himself to be advised by the local council (raad van Cannanore) which, besides the factor himself, consisted of the leader (vaandrig) of the garrison, the bookkeeper (boekhouder), the skipper (stuurman) of the cruising ship stationed in Cannanore and the senior-most sergeant. All the criminal matters arising in the settlement were dealt with by the Cochin Council.39

The Dutch garrison in Cannanore The size of the Cannanore garrison fluctuated constantly. At the beginning, 200 military men were stationed there to supervise the demolition work, but it was soon found necessary to reduce the defence force to a more reasonable size.40 Earmarking Cannanore as the ‘key to the North’ and ‘the frontier of Cochin’, Van Goens recommended a garrison of eighty to hundred men at Cannanore, considering this number essential to control the local trade and protect the commercial interests of the Company there.41 Jacob Hustaert was confident enough to envisage a strong settlement with thirty or forty men after the completion of the 86 CHAPTER FOUR ongoing renovation work.42 Whatever the intentions might have been, apprehension about an imminent attack by either the local Mappilas or European competitors made it hard to reduce the strength of the garrison to a minimum.43 People were all too aware that once the fortress slid from their grip, it would be nigh on impossible to win it back.44 The Cannanore garrison was served by a variety of functionaries. Besides the ‘gequalificeerden’, the upper echelon of officialdom, such soldiers and civil professionals as the bookkeeper, surgeon, blacksmith, and clerks participated in the social life within the fortress.45 The soldiers were recruited from various European nationalities, but were mostly of Dutch or German origin. This policy, on occasion, created trouble as there was a risk that these soldiers might abscond to other European settlements near by. There were also instances of desertions by Dutch soldiers.46 Desertion was considered a criminal offence and, if caught, these renegades had severe punishments meted out to them.47 On the other hand, fugitives from other camps were usually welcomed.48 Poor working conditions, committing minor crimes, or the search for a better livelihood often motivated these ‘traitors’ to take their chance.49 Apart from various European nationals, local people were also recruited as a part of the labour force in Cannanore fort. In 1679, there were ten local people employed in various positions as linguist/interpreter, post- man, gardener and the like. This number which increased to twenty-nine in 1692 had again been reduced to a bare minimum of three by 1698.50 When danger threatened, the Company did not hesitate to entrust these people with military responsibilities.51 A glance at the names of such inlandse dienaren [native servants] in the lists of employees reveals that the majority were recruited from Portuguese topazes and mestiços.52 They, and their wives and children, constituted an important social class in Cannanore during the seventeenth century.53 Slaves were another important service group which lived within the walls of the fortress. The Dutch officials were the main slave owners, but occasionally a native servant also possessed a few.54 Local workers were also recruited as bricklayers and car- penters for occasional construction and maintenance work.55 Menial jobs in the fort were reserved for the lowest classes of the Malabar society, such as Pulayas, who were usually categorized under the title ‘coolies’ in the muster roll of the Company.56 The local Nayars were employed by the Company for various jobs, including letter-bearers, security men and were at times assigned to escort the Dutch Company servants on their journeys into the interior.57 The Nayar employee ‘Oenjanbar’ (?), who was held in high esteem, was described as a man who had formerly enjoyed a high position under the Kolathiri raja.58 This man even escaped the swingeing reduction of the Cannanore garrison as the Company thought that he could be help- JAN COMPANY IN CANNANORE 87 ful in winning assistance of local Nayar soldiers should the need arise. In an attempt to cut down the size of the garrison, religious functionaries were not appointed to the Cannanore fort, but the local Dutch employees were exhorted by Van Goens to uphold a moral way of life by reciting Christian prayers, singing psalms, and reading from the Bible on Sundays, as well as ‘meticulously observing their duties and obligations’.59 In brief, the Cannanore garrison was designed strictly to serve the commercial purposes of the Company and its size was kept to a minimum so as to be consistent in a striving for the economic viability of the settlement.

Jan Company and the local political elites

The interaction between the pre-colonial European trade settlements along the Indian Ocean rim and their host societies varied considerably. While some of these trade settlements developed as integrating nodes of maritime empires with significant socio-political implications for the local societies, at the other end of the spectrum there were commodity- gathering entrepôts which remained peripheral to the social life of the region.60 Between these two extremes ranged a string of commercial establishments of varying importance. The complex nature of the Dutch maritime empire was replicated in the commercial settlement pattern in Malabar. Cochin continued to enjoy its strategic position as the centre of Dutch commercial interests in Malabar but, in spite of their continuous efforts to subjugate the Zamorins, the Dutch commercial and political presence in Calicut was insignificant.61 In Cannanore, the Company was confronted with a completely different situation. Even though it had been able to obtain a strong foothold in the port city, its commercial and political influence was fairly limited. However, the stiff resistance the Company faced was not from the local political elite but from the Mappila Muslim traders. The Kolathiris and the Dutch entertained two distinct perspectives regarding the political position of the VOC settlement in Cannanore. From the Dutch point of view, this trading settlement was regarded as an ‘exclave’, incorporated by virtue of conquest from the Estado da India and administered by an overseas bureaucracy.62 The inhabitants of this trade settlement were claimed to be under the jurisdiction of the Company and, consequently, were supposed to maintain an identity of their own, distinct from their surroundings. The reality was that Dutch influence did not extend much beyond the range of the cannons of the fortress.63 Direct contact between the VOC men in Cannanore and the local people was limited and riddled with suspicion and distrust.64 88 CHAPTER FOUR

Nevertheless, the Dutch Cannanore settlement could not afford segregation from its local environment. Interaction on commercial and political levels was necessary to its survival. Cultural brokerage was a necessary corollary in such a situation. In order to overcome both linguistic and political limitations, middlemen were employed as linguists, informants, commercial and political intermediaries and in other such intermediary functions.65 It was through these cultural brokers that the Company carried on its everyday commercial and political dealings with the local people. It is impossible to ignore the fact that, contrary to the claims of the Company, the Kolathiris entertained an opposite view of the political status of the Cannanore settlement. As far as they were concerned, the Dutch settlement was just another form of foreign mercantile presence in Cannanore and not an independent political entity. Although the virtually autonomous status of the Company in the Cannanore fort was accepted by the Kolathiris, this acceptance did not deter the latter from continuing to claim suzerainty over the entire realm, including the fort. This attitude tallies with the general treatment of other foreign trade settlements in Malabar.66 Accordingly, the Company was supposed to pay homage to the Kolathiris by observing the customary obligations on such special occasions as a succession to the throne and official visits to the Company fort. This concession ran completely counter to the Company claims to sovereignty in Cannanore. Nevertheless, pragmatically accepting the reality the Company men were forced to adapt themselves to the local situation if they wished to promote their commercial aims.

The Dutch and the local political practice of gift-giving Operating within the complex power relations of Malabar in general and Cannanore in particular, the Company had to adopt a pragmatic political outlook if it were to succeed in its commercial ventures. Company servants were not averse to complying with the indigenous ritual systems if they felt it could be of use in bolstering their commercial aims in the region. The customary practice of gift-giving was paid special attention. The ritual relationship articulated through gift donation and reception envisaged a sort of hierarchical power relationship between the recipients and the donors of the gifts. As indicated by Nicholas Dirks, it linked individuals and corporations symbolically, morally, and politically, with the sovereignty of the king and created both a moral unity and a political hierarchy.67 This ritual practice had attained particular significance in Malabar where the hierarchical order of power was not clearly demarcated but was dispersed throughout the society. In this sort of political situation, efforts JAN COMPANY IN CANNANORE 89 to attain and sustain a distinct political identity through ritual expressions were very important to the members of the Malabar elite. Moreover, the practice of receiving gifts was considered as an eligible, though irregular, form of tax-gathering and supplemented its members’ meagre incomes.68 Therefore, by combining both the ritualistic and materialistic realms of power in one gesture, the customary practice of gift-giving was coloured by considerable political significance in Malabar. The insistent demands made to the Company for gifts by the Kolathiri princes, although despised by the Dutch as an expression of their avariciousness, have to be contextualized in this aspect of the culture.69 The Dutch were obviously quite aware of this too.70 Since political power was distributed even within the ruling lineages, the number of gift-receivers tended to be more than one, as is shown by the list of the Company. In Cannanore, there was a pecking order of gift-receivers, who were given presents on various occasions, from the Kolathiri downwards. The ariyittuvazcha or the accession of a new Kolathiri was one such event when the elites of the region were supposed to pay customary homage to the raja.71 The visits of various princes of the Kolaswarupam and other neighbouring principalities, including the Ali Rajas, to the fort were also occasions on which the Company could display its generosity.72 The local elites reciprocated the ritual gifts by conferring sanctions and concessions which came within the scope of their influence on the Company.73 Hence, instead of maintaining a political identity strictly independent of the local body politic, in practice the Company was forced to function within the confines of a local ritual system with a political status analogous to that of a local elite house or taravadu.

The Company and local communicators Perhaps just as much as the brooding physical presence of the great walls around the settlement, the language barrier limited the access of the inhabitants of the Cannanore fort to the outside world.74 Its occupants had to depend on linguists to carry on their contact with the locals. It is likely that the Portuguese language served as the medium of contact between various European company men as well as between the Europeans and the locals.75 Local linguists (dvibhashis) served as the intermediaries between the locals and the Company, in both commercial and political matters. In particular circumstances, the interpreter could be assigned such confidential political tasks as spying on the movements of rivals or tapping secret information from the Kolathiris.76 Unsurprisingly the dependence on local linguists was fraught with difficulties. Mostly the tolk or the local translator was a mestiço, well versed in the local language, Malayalam, as well as in Portuguese.77 This meant 90 CHAPTER FOUR that the Company had to manage the next step task of translating from Portuguese to Dutch. The problem of lack of easy communication was exacerbated as the locals used various scripts to write Malayalam. Hence a request was passed to the Ali Raja asking him to write in the ‘Sanskrit script’ instead of kolezhuttu, as it was difficult for the local Company linguist to read the latter script.78 To what extent the linguistic limitations of the Company in Cannanore affected its performance is a complex issue to try to unravel, but it seems that the Company did not overlook the possibility of such a ‘communication gap’ as one of the reasons behind its poor performance in Cannanore.79 The Malabar Commandment anticipated that the appointment of Pieter Vertangen, who had had experience with Muslim traders in Surat and a sound knowledge of their language, could improve the relations between the Mappilas and the Company in Cannanore.80 The local interpreters served as a sort of bridge between this European enclave and the outer world. Unquestionably, it seems that, the operation of this information channel received a severe setback after the reduction of the strength of the local servants at the end of the seventeenth century. The consequence is easily discernible in the poor functioning of the information system during the violent political upheavals in Cannanore in the second and third decades of the eighteenth century.81 The upshot was the interaction with the local society of the Dutch in Cannanore was restricted and riven by apprehension and mistrust. In a broader perspective, the Dutch settlement in Cannanore tallies with Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s ‘contained conflict’ model devised to represent the general character of the pre-colonial European interaction with Asiatic societies. He argues that European commercial enterprises in Asia in toto did not segregate violence from trade, but used it as an integral part of their commercial strategy. The limit to the extent of the violence was set largely by the cost it might entail.82 The commercial and political approaches espoused by the VOC in Cannanore largely support this view.

Jan Company’s commercial policy in Cannanore

The initial idea entertained by the Company had been to dislodge the Portuguese from their possessions and inherit their putative monopolistic rights in the region by entering into a formal treaty with the local raja. The treaty of surrender signed between the Portuguese and the Dutch in Cannanore typifies the latter’s misunderstanding of the actual position of the Portuguese in the local socio-political sphere. Considering itself master not only of the fort but also of the town, not to mention the entire area of Kolathunadu, the VOC assumed the position of a conquering JAN COMPANY IN CANNANORE 91 authority in the region.83 Labouring under this misapprehension, the Company got off on the wrong foot in its dealings with the local elites. As it considered itself to be on an equal footing with the local elites, the Company preferred to deal directly with the local raja and not with the Muslim ‘royal merchant’ Ali Raja—the overlord of the Mappila traders of Cannanore.84 Gradually, the realization that the Ali Raja and his merchants at the Bazaar enjoyed the actual control over the trade in the region forced the Company to renegotiate a trade agreement with the former.85 Although the first two treaties signed between the Ali Raja and the VOC concerned a mutual understanding about sharing the trade of the region, the third was more ambitious and was aimed at obtaining complete control over the trade of the Ali Raja and the local bazaar.86 This radical change in the policy of the Company towards the Ali Raja and his men was greatly affected by its failure to oblige the latter to operate within the orbit of the commercial designs of the Company in Cannanore. Hendrik Adriaan van Reede’s memoir exemplifies this change in attitude. All of a sudden, the Ali Raja was ‘revealed’ to the Dutch as no more than a powerful vassal of the Kolathiri and not an independent king of the Muslims in the area—the mistaken identity the Company had initially attributed to him.87 Nevertheless, the Ali Raja’s ‘deprivation’ of royal status and the demotion to that of a common merchant in the view of the Company did not fundamentally alter the reality of the situation. Cannanore trade continued to be dominated by the successive Ali Rajas and their men. The failure to make any headway in its commercial dealings with the Ali Rajas forced the VOC to search for alternative local links.

The Company and local commercial partners Its shortage of manpower and the intricacies of the hinterland trade left the VOC no choice but to depend on local merchants in its engagement in business transactions in Cannanore. The relative success of the Company in running its business in Cochin with the help of such Konkani Brahmin traders as Baba Prabhu, is what would have tended to steer it in this direction.88 This influential Cochin trader, as the Dutch had noticed, was originally a native of Cannanore who had migrated to Cochin.89 It is more than likely that the dominance of the Ali Rajas in Cannanore had forced Baba Prabhu to make this move. Konkani Brahmin traders enjoyed a close rapport with the Company in Cannanore too. Unlike the Mappila traders of Malabar, the Konkani Brahmins did not pose a direct challenge to the commercial interests of the Company. Their trade was overwhelmingly land- and coast-oriented, and was therefore not on a direct collision course with the maritime interests of the 92 CHAPTER FOUR

Company. Furthermore, their ritual status as Brahmins gave them ready access to the power structure in Malabar society and invariably helped them in their business ventures.90 The Company officials were conscious of the strategic problems involved in dealing with a few local merchants and they were constantly anxious that the latter could and would manipulate their near-monopoly rights.91 Despite such misgivings, in practice the Dutch had no option but to depend on a few trustworthy indigenous merchants as they did not have direct access to the production centres of the region. In the light of its failure to establish a consistent commercial relationship with the local Mappila traders, the VOC had to depend on these paradesi traders.92 As a native of Cannanore who still maintained his family contacts there, Baba Prabhu naturally took control of the Company affairs in the region. Although his intervention solved a problem, the fear still lurked that Baba Prabhu could manipulate these favourable conditions to his own commercial advantage.93 It was even alleged that he had been maintaining undercover commercial dealings with the Ali Rajas and the Zamorins which ran counter to the interests of the Company.94 Without any alternative possibilities, the Company had to acquiesce with a good grace in a commercial agreement with this merchant magnate if it were to pursue its plan to open up a commercial link with the Mysore kingdom through Cannanore.95 Besides Baba, other members of his family, notably his brother Abuga Prabhu and his son Nanoe Prabhu, also took a keen interest in doing business with the Company in Cannanore. In order to obtain an ample supply of pepper and cardamom from the hinterland of Cannanore, the Company was quite eager to conclude trade contracts with these Konkani traders. In 1699, the Company came to an agreement with Nanoe Prabhu, working in conjunction with Malpa Pai and Venidas, to supply it with cardamom. In August 1700, another trade contract was signed between the Company and Nanoe Prabhu and Malpa Pai for the same purpose. In 1701, Malpa Pai signed a contract with the Company to supply 250 khandil of pepper at Cannanore at the rate of 13½ European gold ducats per khandil. Venidas, a Bania merchant, also entered into individual contracts with the Company to supply spices to Cannanore.96 These local merchants were crucial to the successful implementation of the commercial strategy the Company devised to find markets for its imported goods in Cannanore which it preferred to use rather than paying for the spices in ready money. Regular contracts concerning the retailing of various imported merchandise were signed between the Company and these local traders.97 As might have been expected, the relationship between the Company and its local commercial collaborators was far from trouble-free. In spite JAN COMPANY IN CANNANORE 93 of claiming a superior authority over its inlandse dienaren (native servants), on the ground the Company did not exercise any actual control over their activities. Confined within the walls of their settlement, the Company men were never in a position to supervise and dictate the commercial engagements of these merchants in the interior markets.98 The prominent Konkani merchant Baba Prabhu was constantly subjected to the suspicious observation of the Company servants, in spite of being the most important commercial collaborator of the Company in Malabar. Conscious of its dependency on them, the Company trod warily, careful not to offend these traders who ‘have the hearts of the rajas in their hands’.99 Its servants also understood that their ritual position as Brahmins made them influential intermediaries in Company dealings with the political elites of Malabar. Another significant factor which mired this commercial partnership was bad debt. For the prompt delivery of goods to the VOC settlements in Malabar, local merchants demanded that they be paid before delivery as they in their turn had to pay the local producers, mostly small-scale farmers, in advance.100 Since the Company, loathe to spend any money, insisted on paying for pepper and other spices such as cardamom in merchandise, this problem became acute. The merchants had to contend with a double-edged problem: they had to supply spices to the Company, and find markets for its imported goods for which there was no conspicuous demand. As much of this Dutch merchandise did not find a ready local market, the smaller local merchants were hesitant about dealing with the Dutch. This hesitancy forced the VOC to depend more heavily on the few merchants who had more resources and more extensive commercial connections if it were to earn a profit from this import trade. Nor was this dependency the end of the plight of the Company. Many of its brokers, including Baba Prabhu, incurred huge debts to it.101 By 1687, the Company in Cannanore was owed a total debt of 34,816.–.7 florins from its local partners.102 Some of these were written off as bad debts, without any hope of recovery, by the Company. This is how one Nana Pattar, a local trader in Cannanore who was in arrears, managed to escape to Coromandel without paying off his debts.103 This incident illustrates the vulnerability of the Company in its dealings with the local merchants. The incessant commercial competition the VOC faced from its rivals, particularly the English and the Zamorins of Calicut, also had repercussions on its relationship with the local traders. The loyalty of its local partners was constantly in jeopardy as there was always a chance that they might change their allegiance if lured by the prospect of a more attractive offer from its competitors. Venidas and Nanoe Prabhu, its most important local partners, were no exception to this temptation. The Company 94 CHAPTER FOUR accused the English and the Zamorin of promising high rewards to per- suade these merchants to join their ventures.104 Yet, it was the challenge posed by the Ali Rajas and other Cannanore traders which hampered the growth of the commercial presence of the Company in Cannanore most. The Company officials complained that the Mappilas were neither ready to maintain a sustainable commercial partnership with the Company nor to allow other local merchants to do so.105 The Company blamed the Ali Raja for being eager to obstruct the functioning of its local merchants in Cannanore under a variety of pretexts. The conflict between Venidas Trambagoda, a Bania merchant settled at Cannanore, and the Ali Raja substantiates this accusation. An attempt by the Ali Raja to impose a toll on Venidas’ commercial dealings with the VOC in Cannanore triggered a dispute between the VOC and the Ali Raja about the political status of the local servants of the Company in Cannanore. Although the dispute was settled amicably after the intervention of Kolathiri princes, this incident is one example of the attempts by the Ali Rajas to enforce their commercial authority in the region.106 Notwithstanding the opposition from the Ali Rajas, the Company was able to attract small-scale traders, including some Mappilas, to do business with it.107 The most prominent Mappila merchant in the service of the VOC in Cannanore was the Company saraaf China Mayna, who had been at the service of the Ali Raja before entering that of the Company. His rise from a humble betel trader under the Ali Rajas to that of an influential figure under the patronage of the Company is a hint of the attempts of the latter to build an alternative trade outlet beyond the control of the Bazaar traders.108

Jan Company and its rivals in trade

The efforts of the Dutch East India Company to control the pepper trade of Cannanore met with stiff resistance from both Asian and European traders. Although the Company officials were initially under the impres- sion that they could control the trade of the region by juggling an admixture of diplomatic manoeuvres and commercial contracts, in the long run this turned out to be a misapprehension. The Mappila-dominated northern Kerala ports continued to operate as a free trade zone frequented by traders from various parts of the Indian Ocean and by European entrepreneurs during the period under discussion. JAN COMPANY IN CANNANORE 95

The Mappila merchants of Cannanore

The combined force of the Ali Rajas and other Mappila traders of the Cannanore Bazaar, which dominated a commercial network in which both hinterland and maritime spaces were combined, posed the main challenge to the trade interests of the Company in Cannanore.109 Virtually all the regional trade in pepper was dependent on the Ali Rajas and the Company was well aware of this situation.110 Moreover, the Ali Rajas’ barter trade in opium for pepper with the ports of South Kerala brought them into direct conflict with the interest of the Company in that region too.111 Apparently, as the VOC officials at Cannanore observed, the Ali Rajas were capable of throwing the entire commercial strategy of the Company in Malabar into disarray.112 The Company resorted to a judicious blend of diplomacy and force to manipulate the Ali Rajas’ control over the regional trade in its favour; but to no avail.113 Taking advantage of their sway over the neighbouring satellite ports situated at some distance from the VOC fort, the Ali Rajas and their Mappila traders could continue to trade uninterruptedly. Spices were easily redirected from Cannanore to these harbours along land routes and the transactions were carried out there.114 Fuelling such an alternative commerce, other European trading companies, especially the English, provided the Ali Rajas with other channels to deliver spices under favourable conditions.115 Regardless of his treaty commitments to the VOC, the Ali Raja signed a contract with the English on 21 November 1669 to promote the trade of the latter in Baliapatanam.116 In spite of the presence of the VOC in Cannanore, the Ali Rajas succeeded in delivering a large quantity of pepper to the English and the French. The dagregister of Batavia for 1681 reported that the English and the French were able to amass 1,000 khandil or 50,000 lbs of pepper from North Malabar alone with the help of the Cannanore Mappilas.117 The VOC was also aware of the secret deal made by the Mappila traders of Cannanore to supply 3,000 khandil of pepper to the English at Tanore in 1676.118 Although the Company men were busy devising plans to deal directly with inland merchants, they were careful to conceal such moves from the Ali Rajas.119 None of them materialized as the indigenous merchants were neither competent nor daring enough to override the control of the Ali Rajas.120 Paradoxically, the increasing competition from other European companies forced the VOC to nurture a more cordial relationship with the Ali Raja in order to prevail over the growing challenge they posed.121 Capitalizing on the uncertainty of the Company officials, the Ali Rajas openly defied the Dutch control system by undertaking independent voyages across the Arabian Sea without bothering to apply for a pass. The 96 CHAPTER FOUR report sent by Isaack van Dielen to the Heren XVII in 1691 highlights the waning control of the Company over the Ali Rajas. He states that the Ali Raja deployed heavily armed frigates to protect his shipping along the coast.122 The ports under the Zamorins, which served as the safest havens for the Asian traders in Malabar, also witnessed a remarkable increase in Asiatic shipping during this period.123

Maritime control system and its failure After their establishment in Malabar, it did not take long for the local Company officials to realize the futility of their diplomatic manoeuvres to achieve their commercial ends. Jacob Hustaert had serious reservations about the effectiveness of the treaties with the local rajas as an instrument by which to accomplish the commercial plans of the Company in Malabar. He did not believe that these ‘pernicious and untrustworthy’ Malabar rajas would honour the treaty promises. He argued that, because the Company had made commercial contracts with rajas along the coast who exercised no jurisdiction in the hinterland, it would be out of the question to control the inland trade. He explicitly pointed out that these rajas were not powerful enough to force the local merchants to deliver pepper to the Company.124 The proven ineffectiveness of the political contracts was not enough to make Van Goens give up his grand design for the Malabar trade. He was all set to pursue a more active policy of intervention in Malabar commerce by resorting to military strength.125 Van Goens was certainly astute enough to identify Cannanore and Calicut traders as the most serious potential threat to the commercial interests of the VOC in Malabar.126 The Company was convinced that local shipping originating from the southern ports of Malabar was insignificant, as the Portuguese were successfully exercising complete control over Cochin and Quilon. The thriving local shipping in the northern regions he attributed to the Portu- guese failure to control the Zamorins and the Ali Rajas.127 Consequently the VOC was forced to set up an extensive trade control mechanism to enforce the commercial privileges which it had been granted by the local rajas. Following the example of their Portuguese precursors, the Dutch also employed a ‘sea-pass’128 system, devised for the dual purpose of controlling the local trade and deriving an income for its settlements in Malabar.129 These sea-passes entitled the Company cruisers to inspect the local vessels and confiscate all the ‘unlicensed’ pepper from them.130 Theoretically a good idea, the successful implementation of the pass system was not an easy task to achieve in Malabar. From the point of view of its main aim of controlling the trade in spices, it proved to be a total failure. The efficacy of the sea-pass system was confined to maritime trade JAN COMPANY IN CANNANORE 97 in which VOC naval power was supposed to have an upper hand over local shipping. However, the Malabar Commandment frequently had to struggle with a shortage in the men and cruising ships it required to enforce the Company regulations on local trade.131 Much less geographically restricted, the local traders were not confined to the commerce of their shipping out of Cannanore alone. It was only one of the nodal points in the maritime space at the disposal of the Mappila traders who were spread along the coast.132 Commodity movement was not confined by any particular political boundary within Malabar either. All the port towns along the Malabar Coast provided opportunities for maritime trade, which created difficulties for the VOC men in Cannanore. Nearby Mappila ports like Baliapatanam and Dharmapatanam, safely out of sight of the direct observation of the Cannanore fort, were used by the Cannanore traders as immediate alternative outlets.133 Naturally, the local Mappila traders did their utmost to conceal information about this alternative commerce.134 Given these adverse circumstances, it was no accident that, in a report directed to Cochin, the Cannanore opperhoofd Jacob Schoors was eager to point out a regulation enforced by the Portuguese in the past under which all the ships from Kolathunadu, including those from Dharmapatanam and Baliapatanam, were forced to assemble in the Bay of Cannanore before sailing.135 This could be resorted to again, but at an expense which the Company had no intention of shouldering. The control of the Ali Rajas over the Lakshadweep-Maldive Islands also offered an alternative outlet by which to divert the local trade away from the vigilance of the fort.136 These island groups, which provided a safe opportunity for the Malabar traders to bypass the Portuguese control system along the Malabar Coast in the sixteenth century, were used for the same purpose by the Cannanore traders to elude the Dutch. Besides, the VOC was never in a position to oversee and halt the deliberate changes in their courses made by the local ships which were carrying sea-passes for speci- fied destinations issued by the Company. The Dutch records mention the voyages of two ships belonging to the Cannanore merchants Koykuttiali and Mussa to Muscat and Surat, though they were actually only entitled to trade in rice with Canara.137 The situation was aggravated when the local merchants set sail with their ships flying Dutch flags, but with no sea-passes issued by the Company.138 It was difficult for the Company hamstrung by its limited manpower to supervise all local shipping. It was therefore a widespread custom among local merchants, who were not permitted to carry pepper and opium, to transport these commodities in their coastal boats. In 1666, the Surat factory reported the appearance of Malabar vessels in Broach and Cambay carrying sea-passes issued from Cochin. These vessels, although 98 CHAPTER FOUR strictly prohibited to do so by the Company, carried pepper and cinnamon for sale and were bringing back a return cargo of opium. The Surat factory complained that this parallel trade caused the trade of the Company in these commodities heavy damage.139 The frustration of the Company servants in their failure to prevent local shipping is explicit in the letter Van Reede wrote to Heren XVII in 1675.140 The Company idea of controlling the local trade through the expedient of issuing sea-passes was given a severe jolt when the local merchants began to carry freight with the passes issued by other European maritime powers.141 In 1680 persistent requests to send patrol frigates to cruise along the Malabar Coast met with a favourable response from the High Govern- ment in Batavia. It was reported from Cochin that, as a result of the successful cruising of the Coast, ‘this year the pernicious Moors have not been able to undertake voyages with their ships’.142 This accomplishment had a positive reflection on the Company pepper trade with Persia. The Gamron Council was convinced it would now make a good profit from its pepper retail as the usual shipping of pepper to Muscat by Malabar traders had failed to eventuate that season.143 In some ways it might have been effectual but the strict patrolling along the northern Malabar Coast had disadvantages too. The Company men learned that, as a result of it, other European competitors could easily lay their hands on the surplus accruing from the hindering of local trade.144 As a matter of fact, strict surveillance along the Coast could have easily encouraged the redirection of spices across the Ghats to the Coromandel Coast and elsewhere.145 Preventing this trade carried out through a hinterland ‘so overgrown with thistles and thorns and the inhabitants so untrustworthy’ was far beyond the power of the Company.146 Aware of its limits, the Company tried to make pre-emptive arrangements with the local elites to prevent such an enterprise being pursued far beyond its control.147 Its efforts were in vain as the rulers usually ignored the requests and complaints of the Company which urged them to prevent the cross-country trade of the local merchants.148 The rajas, according to the VOC men, continued to be unreliable as long as this would promote their own interests.149 The Company was well aware of the discontent among the local rajas engendered by its attempts to chase the Asian traders away from their respective ports. Both Malabar rajas and the common people were upset by the impact of the Company policy on the trade in coconut and related products which formed the backbone of the local subsistence economy. Pertinently, this bulk trade in coconut products also contributed significantly to the rajas’ incomes in the form of tolls.150 Cochin thereupon issued a recommendation that the considerable trade in coconut products with Surat should be undertaken while maintaining strict vigilance along the coast. This would satisfy the rulers and it could JAN COMPANY IN CANNANORE 99 eliminate a section of Asian traders from Malabar trade.151 The Company apparently believed that, by taking over the role of Asian merchants as participants in the trade in bulk commodities, it could dissuade the latter from visiting the Malabar Coast. In this way it would be able to control the ‘contraband’ trade in pepper, cardamom, wild cinnamon, and opium. Ultimately, the failure to rein in the Mappila traders in the northern Malabar ports put an end to this scheme. In the absence of sufficient data to what extent the private interests of the Company servants limited the success of pass restrictions cannot be verified. The misuse of office was not altogether unknown among the upper echelon officials in Cannanore. The case of Pieter van de Kouter points in this direction.152 Van de Kouter, though publicly locked in insoluble conflict with the Ali Rajas, actually engaged in private dealings with the latter for his own profit. In a letter to Gelmer Vosburg, the Ali Raja mentions the attempt of Van de Kouter to invest in one of his ships bound for Cambay.153 In another instance, Constantyn Coup, who served as the head of the Cannanore fort between 1710 and 1712, was dismissed because of his unduly favourable disposition to the Ali Raja at the cost of the Company interest. He was accused of granting the Ali Raja sea-passes for Bengal, which had been declared a reserved commercial route by the Company.154 An anonymous letter written by a Company servant in Kayamkulam to Commander Johannes Hertenberg amply testifies to the corruption that was rampant among the Company officials in the southern ports of Malabar and this venality was a great advantage to the Mappila traders in their ‘smuggling’ of pepper into the northern ports.155 Although, it is unsafe to draw any definite conclusions from such limited data, these incidents indicate the probability of informal co-operation between the Mappila traders and the local VOC officials which eventually contributed to the failure of the Dutch control system in the region.

The English and the French Besides the local Mappilas, European competitors, the English and the French in the forefront, enjoyed an influential commercial presence in Malabar. The English East India Company posed a formidable challenge to the Dutch. The incident known as the Amboina massacre in 1623 and the subsequent weakening of the English presence in insular South-East Asia are said to have increased the significance of Malabar as an alternative spice procurement centre of the English Company.156 These might certainly have been contributing factors but the Dutch establishment of control over Bantam, Jambi, and Palembang in the mid-1680s is what truly limited the access of the English to South-East Asian pepper- 100 CHAPTER FOUR producing areas.157 This Dutch coup actually forced the latter to focus more on Malabar as an alternative source of pepper for Europe.158 The Dutch had mistakenly anticipated a steep decline in the supply of pepper to England after their successful establishment of a string of Dutch settlements along the Malabar Coast.159 They were wrong because the English and later the French were gradually able to appropriate a considerable share in the local trade. In the second half of the seventeenth century, notwithstanding the Dutch attempts to gain control of the export trade, the English were able to collect substantial quantities of pepper from Malabar.160 Initially operating from their factory in Kottakunnu on the bank of the Baliapatanam River, the English seriously contested the efforts of the Dutch Company to make itself master of the trade in Kolathunadu.161 Although the Dutch wished to drive the English out of there and extend their jurisdiction over the river under the pretext that the Portuguese had once enjoyed the same privilege, they failed to win any support from the Kolathiris.162 In 1675, the English gave up their settlement in Kottakunnu and left for Calicut.163 However, to the great disappointment of the VOC, the English returned to Kolathunadu in 1682 when they succeeded in acquiring the trade house abandoned by the French in Tellichery.164 Since Batavia was keen to avoid direct conflicts with other European nations in Malabar, the Company tried to foil the attempts of the English by influencing the local lord in its favour.165 However, by outplaying these diplomatic schemes, the English succeeded in developing the Tellichery Factory as an important spice procurement centre for the European market.166 The presence of the French in Kolathunadu added a new dimension to the European competition for spices in the region. On 5 March 1670, the French Resident Flacour assisted by four men established the first French commercial settlement in Kolathunadu, in Tiruvangadu near Dharma- patanam. It was described by the VOC officials as ‘no more than a dilap- idated clay brick house, in a large walled garden, but nonetheless suitable to be turned into a settlement’.167 However suitable it might have been, less than a decade later, by 1679, the French had moved their factory to Tellichery.168 When they left here in 1682, their nearest settlement in Northern Malabar was in Panoly, situated close to the Mayyazhi (Mahe) River.169 Their residence there was short as the internal political turmoil forced them to give up this settlement as well in 1706.170 The unremitting efforts of the French to establish a factory in Kolathunadu finally bore fruit in 1710 when the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara granted them a place south of the Mayyazhi River.171 The presence of these European competitors in Kolathunadu played a significant role in thwarting the commercial ambitions of the VOC in JAN COMPANY IN CANNANORE 101

Cannanore. While the VOC was not bound to respect the commercial freedom of Asian merchants in Cannanore under the pretext of its commercial contracts with the local elite, the Company position in its relationship with other European maritime powers remained vulnerable. The VOC was keen to avoid direct conflict with other European powers in Malabar, especially the English, as this could have been economically disastrous. The Dutch also had to reckon with the changing political atmosphere in Europe.172 This need to walk a tight-rope promoted a healthy commercial competition among the European commercial companies in Malabar. Both the English and the French traders were able to appropriate a large quantity of spices from local traders by virtue of their commercial strategies which outwitted the VOC.173 Conscious of their weak position in the region as opposed to that of the VOC, the English and the French were keen to comply with local demands to sustain their commercial presence in the region. The English and the French enjoyed the reputa- tion of paying for their purchases in cash and usually tried to procure spices at a higher market price.174 This competitive atmosphere created a seller’s market and a steady increase in prices in Kolathunadu.175 As a consequence of the acknowledged willingness of the former players, the local merchants and elites were more inclined to trade with them rather than the VOC.176 Surreptitiously supplying large quantities of pepper to the English, the Cannanore Mappila traders invented various pretexts for refusing to comply with the Company contract.177 The English had a double advantage, not only did they buy pepper at a higher price than the VOC, they also successfully marketed a part of it at a competitive price in Asia.178 The English successfully penetrated the local markets because they had the active support of the English country traders who, although operating outside the structure of the English East India Company, were in practice co-operating with it. The presence of this private element helped the English Company to overcome the limitations of its official structure and also aided it in following the commercial trends in the region closely. In another sense, as commented on by P. J. Marshall, private merchants helped to extend the British influence well beyond the normal sphere of the Company’s own trade.179 The English private merchants, who traded in such bulk commodities as cardamom, arrack, ginger and the like which required less capital investment, had no trouble in gaining access to the local spice markets. While the costly pepper found its way to England through the English East India Company, the bulk products were traded by English country traders within Asia.180 Manipulating the legal privileges of the English East India Company and co-operating intimately with the Asian merchants, these individuals easily outmanoeuvred the 102 CHAPTER FOUR

VOC system of control.181 In this context it is not surprising that the Dutch chaplain Jacobus Canter Visscher observed that it was not the English Company, but the English private trade which posed the greatest challenge to the Company in Malabar.182 Besides the English country traders, it appears that the French also did brisk business in such various local bulk products as copra and coir while they were busily supplying cotton and opium to the local market.183 Both the English and the French tried to observe the local political and economic requirements which were indispensable to their survival in the regional trade as scrupulously as possible. As said earlier, gift-giving to the political elites in the region was often practised as a means to achieve commercial goals.184 The English fully realized the political importance of obtaining access to the power circle in the region.185 The tactical interventions of the English in the struggle between the VOC and the Zamorins won the former considerable influence in the port town of Calicut and its adjacent areas.186 This piece of canny judgement eventually helped the English to assume a strong presence in the regional commerce and contributed to their success in the pepper trade with Europe.187

Conclusion

The Dutch did not find themselves in a commercial vacuum when they established themselves in Cannanore in 1663. The presence of a formidable local commercial group with an adequate resource base and extended commercial links across the Indian Ocean and the hinterland of Malabar limited the prospect of them indulging an easy take-over of the regional trade at the minimal expenditure envisaged by the Company. The attempts of the Company to control the Mappila trade through the deployment patrol ships did not produce the expected results. The existence of both alternative land routes and parallel routes along the coast nullified the viability of such control exercises. Externally, the Malabar Commandment usually failed to obtain prompt assistance from Batavia in the form of the men and ships needed to cruise the coast. Furthermore, the Company plan to reduce the Cannanore garrison to the bare minimum in order to cut the mounting losses of the Malabar Commandment severely affected the functioning of its coastal control system. Local flotil- las sailed past under the eyes of the Cannanore garrison, unhindered by the VOC cruisers which were powerless to intervene. The growing commercial activities of the English and the French traders in and around Cannanore during the 1680s also contributed considerably to the weakening of the VOC plan to control the regional trade with the help of its naval power. JAN COMPANY IN CANNANORE 103

The Dutch designs to outplay and overcome the commercial influence of the Ali Rajas and other Mappila traders in Cannanore with the help of other local traders were also not an undivided success. The commercial strategy of the Company did not dovetail with the demands of the local market. Crucially, the local traders preferred to supply spices for ready money, the Company had a pronounced preference to exchange them for merchandise and through all its struggles to gain a foothold, the Company was never in a position to control the activities of the local traders who were willing to collaborate with it in the inland. A detailed analysis of the VOC trade in Cannanore between 1663 and 1723 is the best way of providing a picture of the extent of the influence the Company gained in the regional economy.

105

CHAPTER FIVE

THE VOC TRADE IN CANNANORE (1663–1723)

The foremost objective of the VOC in Malabar was to win control of the regional spice trade, that of pepper in particular. The initial commercial strategy pursued by the Company in Cannanore was essentially designed to achieve this primary goal. Although the Dutch engaged in both import and export trades with Cannanore merchants, it was the pepper from Cannanore—‘the bride around whom everyone dances’—which lured them the most.1

The VOC trade in Cannanore: exports

1. Pepper At the outset of its establishment in Malabar, the VOC was confident enough of its prowess to appropriate a larger share of the pepper production in Malabar and market a major part of the commodity in Asia itself, ‘leaving behind an excellent quantity for the fatherland’.2 From this commercial point of view, Cannanore was not as important as either Cochin or Calicut which had extensive pepper-producing hinterlands. The superior quality of Cannanore pepper did not weigh heavily in the thinking of the Company which was in the throes of a broader plan involving grab- bing control of the pepper trade in the Indian Ocean to ensure that it did not fall into the hands of its European competitors. This coup, if accom- plished, would enable it to regulate price of pepper in the European market. As discussed earlier, the attempt by the VOC to control the Malabar pepper trade by concluding arbitrary contracts had foundered because of the alternative means of supply of pepper were available to the local merchants. This ‘smuggling’ was more rampant in the northern regions, where a rich, indigenous, ship-owning maritime commercial group maintained a stronger presence, than in the South.3 The highly competitive market situation contrived and maintained by both European and Asian merchants kept the prices in Cannanore and Calicut higher than those in the southern ports of Malabar, especially Cochin and Kayamkulam. This price difference obstructed the regular purchase of pepper in Cannanore from the very beginning and it made the VOC trade in Cannanore pepper economically unviable.4 Com- 106 CHAPTER FIVE Source: Based on figures in Table 1. Table in on figures Based Source: Figure 1 The VOC Trade in Cannanore Pepper (1663–1700) Figure Trade 1 The VOC THE VOC TRADE IN CANNANORE 107 pounding the problem, the local Company officials were obliged to buy pepper at a price fixed in Batavia, which exposed the Company by making it more vulnerable commercially in such a highly flexible and competitive market situation as that in Cannanore.5 Hence, Van Goens’ highly ambitious plans to buy up a large part of the pepper production in Cannanore and Calicut at the market price and thereby control the pepper price never materialized.6 The local trade in pepper continued unabated in spite of the legal claim the Company made to its trade. In fact it was so strong that it eventually forced the Company to suspend the purchase of Cannanore pepper by 1684.7 Despite this array of problems, the local Company servants were unremitting in their efforts to restore the pepper trade with the North Malabar ports, although this decision flew in the face of serious doubts raised in Batavia about the profitability of such an effort. Instead of giving up the pepper trade of North Malabar altogether, the Cochin Commandment suggested the expedient of adopting strategic market interventions to eliminate local competition. As early as 1666, it was suggested to the Heren XVII that the Company should buy pepper at a higher price in Cannanore and Calicut and sell this at a lower profit in Surat and Persia, which would have cruelled the pitch of the local competitors by making it difficult for them to make a profit from their trade.8 The VOC men in Malabar argued that a total withdrawal from the North Malabar pepper markets would only mean an increasing participation of its competitors in this branch of trade, which would ultimately destroy the Company prospects in Persia and Surat.9 Although the strategic importance of Cannanore as a major outlet for pepper and the constant pressure exerted by the local officials forced the Company to keep it under control, the purchase of pepper from Cannanore remained irregular. The Company trade accounts unequivocally show that the procurement of Cannanore pepper was for the most part paid for in merchandise.10 Another fly in the ointment was that the high price in Cannanore encouraged the local traders to transport pepper in from South Malabar.11 In 1678, the Dutch cancelled the procurement of pepper from Cannanore for this very reason.12 The Company was not prepared to buy the same pepper which it could have procured in South Malabar at a lower price. As a result of the irregularity of the trade, Cannanore pepper either figured less prominently in or was altogether absent from the annual purchase list of the Company in Malabar. Nevertheless, the Company did make irregular purchases of pepper from Cannanore between 1663 and 1700 (Figure 1). There are long gaps between the years 1674 and 1680 and again between 1687 and 1700 when the Company purchased no pepper from Cannanore at all. It is only for three years in the first quarter of the eighteenth century that the Cannanore pepper figures in 108 CHAPTER FIVE the annual export list of the Malabar Commandment. After this short period of pepper trade between 1700 and 1706, the Company withdrew altogether from the Cannanore pepper market. This indicates that Cannanore merchants had successfully outplayed the VOC and were regulating the local supply according to the international demand by the beginning of the eighteenth century (Table 1).13

Table 1 The VOC’s Pepper Trade in Cannanore (1663–1706) ______Years Quantity (Dutch pounds) 1663 0 1664 0 1665 0 1666 0 1667 50,000 1668 96,717 1669 79,995 1670 76,545 1671 62,545 1672 119,411 1673 69,608 1674 5,825 1675 0 1676 0 1677 0 1678 0 1679 0 1680 92,054 1681 134,672.5 1682 87,014.5 1683 0 1684 0 1685 0 1686 0 1687 127,228 1688 0 1689 0 1690 0 1691 0 1692 0 1693 0 1694 0 1695 0 1696 0 1697 0 1698 0 1699 0 1700 692,917 1701/1702 54,882 1703/1704 146,152 ______1705/1706 7,000 Source: VOC 1474, 1658, 1713, 1724. THE VOC TRADE IN CANNANORE 109

Besides the failure of the Company to keep local and other European traders away from participating in the pepper trade of Cannanore, the withdrawal of the Company from the Cannanore pepper market by the end of the seventeenth century was no doubt also affected by the increasing control of the VOC over the pepper supply from South-East Asia. By then, the Company procurement of pepper in Bantam and Palembang had risen considerably and it could be had at a lower price than it would have had to pay in Malabar. Leaving aside this consideration, the increasing stock of pepper in Malabar and Gale in Ceylon also compelled the Company to slow down the pepper trade in Malabar.14 Given the ins-and-outs of the situation, it was not surprising that the Dutch did not display much enthusiasm to pursue their pepper trade in Cannanore any longer.

2. Cardamom Pepper was not the only spice which the Company had a particular interest in buying from Cannanore. Cardamom ran it a close second. The major cardamom production centres of Malabar were located in the high ranges of North Malabar.15 Utilizing this advantage, the Cannanore settlement developed as the most important centre of the Company cardamom procurement (Figure 2). The VOC was intent on keeping the cardamom trade under its control, as trade in other spices which could profit the Cannanore settlement was very restricted.16 Apart from Europe, the Company considered West Asia the most promising market for Cannanore cardamom. The annual Malabar export lists to the VOC settlement in Gamron show quite clearly that the Company ensured a regular annual supply in this commodity from Malabar. It also tried to market Pegu cardamom in Persia, but the VOC factory at Gamron preferred the Cannanore variety because of its higher profit margin and the lower risk of it being spoiled in transit.17 Surat, which was the main entrance to the vast hinterland consumer markets of Mughal India, remained pretty much outside the purview of the Company trade in cardamom because of the low profit margin it offered.18 The Company tried to control the cardamom trade by the expedient of concluding various treaties with the Kolathiris and the Ali Rajas, but such arrangements usually failed to meet the requirements of the Company. As in its handling of the pepper trade, the VOC failed to adjust its commercial policy to the local situation. In this branch of trade too it had to compete with both local and European traders. Shrewd busi- nessmen like the Company servants realized that the local traders would be able to make more profit elsewhere than they could by supplying the Company with cardamom.19 ‘The Muslims’, the VOC complained, ‘speak 110 CHAPTER FIVE Source: Based on figures in Table 2. Table in on figures Based Source: Figure 2 The VOC’s Cardamom Export from Malabar (1699/1700–1722/1723) Malabar Export from Cardamom VOC’s The 2 Figure THE VOC TRADE IN CANNANORE 111 one day thus and the other day entirely differently [to the Company] and are accustomed to sell that crop to those who want to offer the most for that’.20 The stubborn persistence of the Company in its effort to try to trade spices for merchandise rather than paying cash also greatly affected its attempts to purchase cardamom, because the local traders in Cannanore and Calicut adamantly preferred specie to merchandise for their cardamom deliveries.21 Naturally, the best quality cardamom was kept by the Mappilas for their own trade with Mocha and Muscat.22 They also supplied good quality cardamom to the English who were ready to pay a higher price and in specie. In 1717, Commander Johannes Hertenberg wrote to Batavia that, by bidding a higher price for cardamom, the English were able to appropriate a share which had already been promised to the Company by local traders.23 Certainly the attempts by the Company to procure cardamom at a price fixed in Batavia limited the freedom of the local officials to compete with other potential buyers in the market.24 The efforts made by the Dutch to compensate the diminishing supply of cardamom from Cannanore by coming to alternative arrangements with merchants in the nearby principalities were thwarted, either because of the obstacles created by Mappila merchants in the Bazaar or because of the low prices quoted by the Company.25 The procurement of cardamom from Calicut was absolutely ruled out as it required advance payment in specie.26 The Company was invited by the neighbouring princes of Kottayam and the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara to establish a trade settlement in their territories but both offers were declined, although the local VOC men only rejected such an opportunity with some hesitation as it would have reduced their dependence for spices on the Cannanore Mappilas.27 As an alternative source, the Company made attempts to grow cardamom in the conquered lands of Paponetty and Edatturutty, but the sandy soil of these regions was not suitable to such a venture.28 Occasionally, the Company fell victim to the unpredictable weather in the solutions it found to try to improve its share in the cardamom trade. On more than one occasions, heavy rain damaged the cardamom harvest and consequently the Company trade in this commodity.29 There were also occasions when the time difference between the cardamom harvest in Cannanore and the departure of the Company ships affected its export to Europe. The Company men said that the earliest moment at which this spice could be harvested was in January, but this was too late for direct export to Europe. It was difficult for the VOC to preserve the stock properly in its storehouse until the next shipping season.30 The competition it faced from both Asian and other European traders compounded by the annual increase in its price level made it impossible for the Company to maintain a prominent share in the cardamom trade. 112 CHAPTER FIVE

This situation put Mappila traders and the English in a formidable position to be able to control the lion’s share of the cardamom output from Cannanore and Calicut.31 However, as can be deduced from the export list, the Company continued to maintain its regular presence in the regional cardamom trade, though with considerable fluctuations, throughout the first quarter of the eighteenth century (Table 2).

Table 2 The VOC’s Cardamom Export from Malabar (1699/1700–1722/1723) ______Years Quantity (Dutch pounds) 1699/1700 38,611 1700/1701 30,400 1701/1702 33,875 1702/1703 0 1703/1704 25,575 1704/1705 10,750 1705/1706 52 1706/1707 18,850 1707/1708 50 1708/1709 50,250 1709/1710 50 1710/1711 19,700 1711/1712 30,000 1712/1713 26,100 1713/1714 15,000 1714/1715 40,450 1715/1716 61,050 1716/1717 13,000 1717/1718 25,650 1718/1719 26,700 1719/1720 9,300 1720/1721 0 1721/1722 21,750 ______1722/1723 6,450 Source: VOC 1634, 1646, 1658, 1713, 1724, 1731, 1741, 1757, 1773, 1790, 1807, 1825, 1905, 1912, 1924, 1959,1977,1994, 2011.

3. Timber Except for pepper and cardamom, the quantity of VOC exports from Cannanore was insignificant. At one period, the Company showed particular interest in the procurement of first-class timber from the hinterland of Cannanore for shipbuilding. The plan was to transport the logs along the Baliapatanam River using local labourers but again in the financing of this undertaking the local merchants insisted on receiving advances in specie.32 Besides this, the intransigent attitude of the local princes nipped this venture in the bud.33 Alternative attempts were made by the Company to procure mast-wood for ships from the Ali Raja, THE VOC TRADE IN CANNANORE 113 although it seems that this trade was never developed beyond the marginal throughout the period of this study.34

4. Ambergris, wild cinnamon, and coconut products The attempt by the Company to purchase cowries and ambergris from the Ali Rajas was not an overwhelming success.35 The Company servants alleged that, although he brought in a considerable amount of ambergris annually from the Maldive-Lakshadweep Islands, the Ali Raja did his best to conceal this import from the Company so that he could trade it with the English for a higher price.36 Although it was interested in these more specialized commodities, the Company paid scant attention to trying to participate in the trade in such various local bulk merchandise as wild cinnamon, coconuts, coconut oil, and the like from Cannanore, despite their obvious importance to the local economy. For a brief period, it did have designs on establishing a foundry in Cochin, in which it would have uti- lized iron ore from the hinterland of Cannanore. It was thought that this plan would expedite its shipbuilding enterprise in Malabar, but had to relinquish the idea after initial testing of the samples showed that ‘it would not even be worth the coal’ needed for its refining.37 The upshot was the Company had to depend largely on an import market to improve its balance of trade in Cannanore.

The VOC trade in Cannanore: imports

1. Opium The advantage the Cannanore traders enjoyed over the Company in the regional export market was also reflected in its imports. For the Company men, Malabar was ‘not a land of great consumption of merchandise’.38 This apparently lethargic demand for consumption goods forced the Company to opt for commodities which were readily saleable in the region. Opium was considered a commodity to be in immense demand throughout Malabar. In a report sent to Heren XVII from Cochin in 1675, it is stated, ‘Next to money, opium is the foremost merchandise [in Malabar] and must be considered [among the locals] as rice or bread among ourselves’.39 Although obviously an overstatement, there is little doubt that the use of opium was widespread both among the common people and the elite as an intoxicant and as a medicine.40 Even before it had established itself permanently in Malabar, the Company had realized the high marketability of opium in region.41 Nevertheless, despite the enormous demand, from the very beginning 114 CHAPTER FIVE of its settlement in Malabar the Company was well aware of the difficulty in monopolizing the opium trade there owing to the strong competition from the local merchants.42 The Ali Raja and his Mappila traders were said to be providing opium throughout Malabar and bringing back pepper from the southern regions in return for it.43 The 1664 treaty between the Ali Raja and the Company strictly prohibited the import of opium by the former and asserted it was a Company monopoly.44 In spite of its contracts with the Ali Raja and with the rulers of Cochin and Kayamkulam, the Company remained dubious about whether it would be able to force the Calicut merchants to abandon this profitable trade.45 Its forebodings proved right in the course of time. Traditionally, the northern port towns, mainly Surat, had been the main sources of the opium imported to Malabar by the local Mappila traders. With its factories in Bengal, the Company showed a particular interest in vending the cheaper Bengal opium.46 Initially the retail trade of the Company in this commodity in Malabar seemed to be quite promising. In 1666, it was reported that the Company had been able to prevail over other traders in the retailing of opium in Malabar and derived considerable profit from it.47 Apparently opium attracted particular attention from local officials as it was an article in such great demand locally that ‘without which no pepper could be obtained’.48 The initial optimism about its commercial prospects did not last long as the Company failed to contain the local trade. In 1679 the Malabar Commandment complained that the intensive retail sales of opium by Cannanore Mappilas, who continued to operate largely beyond the control system of the Company, had completely ruined the market.49 Since opium constituted an important part of their return cargo from the northern ports, the intensive coastal trade carried out by the Mappila traders between both regions exerted a decisive effect on the opium market in Malabar. In 1692, the Malabar Commandment reported that the Malabar market was awash with opium brought from the north by the Mappila traders.50 Besides the amount being brought in from Surat by the Mappilas, a large quantity of Bengal opium was also soon being transported across the Ghats by the Tamil Pattar Brahmins and other traders from the Coromandel Coast. This overland trade helped to undermine the opium monopoly imposed by the Company.51 Although the Company tried to dislodge its market competitors by fixing a low exchange ratio against pepper (1 lb. opium for 40 khandil pepper), the move did not produce any remarkable result.52 The local merchants succeeded in flooding the Malabar market with opium at an even lower price, considerably reduc- ing the profit margin of the Company.53 The situation deteriorated more sharply with the entry of other European competitors, against which the Company had no other remedy than to register its protest through offi- THE VOC TRADE IN CANNANORE 115 cial channels.54 Cannanore, inhabited by a flourishing Mappila merchant community, was never in short supply of such ‘smuggled’ opium. This might be a satisfactorily explanation of why opium, although regarded as the most sought-after article of consumption in Malabar, is missing altogether from the lists of its imports to Cannanore.

2. Japanese copper It was the growing local demand for Japanese staff copper which, to an extent, compensated the mounting Company expenditure in Cannanore. Although consumed to some extent locally for the manufacture of household utensils, roofing temples and other purposes, the bulk of the copper was sold in the interior markets of South India.55 This trans-regional demand prospered with the booming copper trade of the VOC with Japan.56 Copper was in such demand in Cannanore, at times the Company failed to meet the local requirements.57 As a result of this soar- ing trade the Company derived a substantial profit and there was no serious competition from either local or European traders.58 No regular information can be found about the quantity of Japanese copper imported to Cannanore during the seventeenth century. The data available imply that the annual import by the Company to Cannanore was comparable to that in the eighteenth century.59 Most of the copper was exchanged for spices. By the early eighteenth century, when its pepper had almost disappeared from the Company trading list, Cannanore tended to become an import market for the VOC rather than a place to buy. Thereafter, copper was traded in Cannanore mainly for ready money. As the chart below clearly demonstrates, Japanese copper was regularly traded in Cannanore during the first quarter of the eighteenth century (Figure 3).

3. Cotton Cotton, another marketable commodity in Malabar, continued to be traded largely under the control of Asian traders. While Muslim and Bania traders joined the local Mappilas in supplying Malabar with large quantities of cotton from Surat, there was also a considerable transport of the fibre from the Madurai region.60 The Company was averse to pursuing this trade as it was both voluminous and less profitable.61 Never- theless, the tactical importance of the cotton trade did not escape its attention. It was felt that an extensive participation in the cotton trade could deter Asian merchants from Malabar from coming to Cannanore and consequently from the participation of the latter in the spice and opium trade of the region.62 116 CHAPTER FIVE 1839, 1852, 1866, 1881, 1905, 1912, 1947, 1963, 1977, 1994, 2011. Figure 3 Japanese Copper Import to Cannanore (1702/1703–1722/1723) to Cannanore Copper Import 3 Japanese Figure Source: VOC 1694, 1713, 1731, 1746, 1757, 1762, 1773, 1778, 1790, 1807, 1825, VOC Source: THE VOC TRADE IN CANNANORE 117

4. Horses and elephants

For various reasons, the Company turned a deaf ear to the requests of the local merchants to participate in the flourishing trade in war animals. The Company officials judged the transport of Ceylonese elephants to be not only risky, but economically unviable.63 Experience had taught the Company that the imported elephants often had to be handed over as ‘gifts’ to the local elites.64 Nor was the Company enthusiastic about dealing in war horses. It rejected the invitation of the Mysorean ruler to supply horses from Persia through Cannanore, although the reason for its refusal remains unclear.65 The efforts of the Company to make a deal with the Ali Raja to facilitate the import of coffee had to be accounted a failure as the local traders were content with their meagre profit from this trade.66

5. Spices and other small-quantity merchandise The marketing of South-East Asian spices, especially cloves, nutmeg, and mace, in Cannanore remained negligible. Nevertheless, the Company trod a wary path and was cautious not to sell them at a low price in Cannanore, because there were reports about the re-export of this merchandise from Cannanore to other coastal markets, especially Surat, which could ultimately affect the Company trade in these commodities.67 Besides the various pieces of merchandise mentioned above, the Company also imported limited quantities of tin, sandalwood, quicksilver, vermilion, lead, powder sugar, and various silk clothes from Bengal into Cannanore. Occasional attempts to increase the price of imported goods elicited a negative response from local traders, who simply voted with their feet and kept away from the market.68 The same happened in 1713 when the High Government in Batavia insisted on payments in ready cash from the local traders for Company merchandise. This new regulation created great difficulty for the local merchants and limited the scope of their trade with the Company.69 The unfavourable commercial atmosphere in the region forced the Company to search for alternative means to improve the financial condition of the settlement. As early as 1664, Van Goens had suggested exploiting the limited amount of landed property in and around the fortress by planting young coconut palms to provide the settlement with an additional income. Eight or ten slaves were sent along with the new Cannanore opperhoofd Gelmer Vosburg to undertake this task.70 The Malabar Commandment was confident of deriving a considerable income from the 50,000 young coconut palms planted within the fortress.71 However, as it did not possess any sizeable landed property beyond the 118 CHAPTER FIVE fortress, it was necessary for the Company to explore new commercial opportunities to tide itself over this situation successfully. At this juncture, the attempt it made to open up a new trade channel to Mysore with the help of local partners should be analysed against this background.

Into the hinterland of Cannanore

In 1679, Marten Huijsman, who was in charge of the Malabar Commandment, wrote to Batavia reporting the initiative taken by the Wodeyar of Mysore who wanted to establish trade relations with the VOC in Cannanore. The Nayaka had sent a Brahmin envoy to Cannanore to open negotiations. This Brahmin requested the acting onderkoopman, Jacob Schoors, to send somebody along with him to Mysore to discuss some toll concessions and other privileges which the Mysore ruler would like to confer on the Dutch.72 The envoy also warned the Dutch that they should not let this opportunity slip as it would be very difficult for them to manage their own affairs without the active consent of the Mysore court.73 Commander Marten Huijsman informed the High Government in Batavia that, since Mysore was a lucrative market situated virtually next door to Cannanore, the Cochin Council had decided to authorize Schoors to send Assistant Hellingh to Mysore with a small present ‘in order to listen to what desire the same Nayaka might have, to accept the privileges formally and also to learn what trade can be done there, without us having to make any promises anywhere but try, as best you can, to make the [Mysorean] traders come down to Cannanore, or at least as close as possible, to conduct trade’.74 This incident illustrates the doubts and hesitations entertained by the Dutch officials about the trade prospects of the inland markets of southwest India. With no acquaintance of the situation in the hinterland and no clear idea about the future prospects of success of such a venture, the Dutch naturally failed to grasp the importance of the opportunity. They were prudent enough to make preliminary enquiries rather than simply jumping headlong into murky waters. Consequently, instead of doing business directly with the Nayaka, the VOC wished to transfer the responsibility and risk onto the shoulders of the Mysorean traders but the commercial prospects were too attractive for them to be rejected out of hand. For some reason, the subsequent letters show this first diplomatic move was postponed. The Cannanore factory appears to have been overly suspicious of the Nayaka’s intentions. It was believed that the invitation for the visit of a Dutch mission was intended solely to impress the Nayaka’s THE VOC TRADE IN CANNANORE 119 main political rivals, in particular the Madurai Nayaka.75 After some mulling backwards and forwards, when it was finally decided to go ahead with the mission this once more had to be aborted because the Chetty trader who had been entrusted with the task of conducting the Dutch Assistant to Srirangapatanam failed to materialize on account of some illness.76 After these hiccoughs, the Mysore ruler again took the initiative. This time the Cannanore factor received a letter from the ‘Governor’ of Srirangapatanam via a Chetty, apparently the ‘mint master’ of Cannanore. He, accompanied by the onderkoopman Jacob Schoors, brought this letter to Cochin.77 The Governor’s letter once again stressed the lucrative prospects which the opening up of trade relations with Mysore would bring in its train; a reference to the spices, minerals, lacquer and other sought-after commodities to be had there. The Governor also suggested that, in order to make an auspicious start, the Nayaka should be presented with two Ceylonese elephants and 400 to 500 horses. For the latter, he was ready to make an attractive payment.78 On their part, after some hesitation, the Dutch responded that they would be able to comply with regard to the elephants but the supply of horses was a different matter. They explained to the Chetty that the best they could do was to make a request to Batavia to procure six to eight six-year-old Javanese horses.79 Eschewing this compromise, the Chetty observed that the Nayaka would prefer Muscat horses to Javanese ones.80 His horses had to be robust, able to endure hardship, and of a particular colour, preferably either entirely black or entirely white but bays and a variety of yellowish/sandy coloured animals would also be acceptable. The Mysore ruler was ready to pay 1,000–2,000 pagodas to the Dutch as an advance. As the Dutch were not in a position to give any assurances on this matter, they missed a splendid opportunity to revive the once flourishing horse trade to the Carnatic region through Cannanore.81 Apart from horses, Mysore desired black and other varieties of lacquer. The Dutch showed some interest in this trade, because they had learned that the English used to import a large quantity of coral and lacquer, the bulk of which they sold in Mysore, into Calicut.82 Before taking any further steps, the VOC servants tried to acquire more information about this English trade. The English annually imported some quantity of ‘tack’ coral of different varieties and managed to market it at an impressive price.83 This information disclosed that the English sold the best sort of coral at a weight of 50 pounds for 600 to 800 rix-dollars and the second quality at 75 pounds for 750 to 900 rix-dollars, and the third quality at 100 pounds for 600 to 640 rix-dollars.84 Scenting an opportunity, the Dutch felt that they should attempt to compete with the English and appropriate a share of this lucrative trade for the benefit of the 120 CHAPTER FIVE

Company.85 In order to become better acquainted with this new trade, the Dutch decided to send Assistant Jan van Raesvelt to the Nayaka bearing a gift and a letter. They also decided to reply to the earlier letter written by the Governor of Srirangapatanam.86 Although they took this initiative, the Dutch were pessimistic about the response of the Ali Raja and his Mappila followers to their initiative. The launching of a direct VOC trade channel with Mysore beyond the control of the Mappila traders of Cannanore could well mean the gradual seeping of a profitable branch of trade away from the hands of the latter. Naturally, the Dutch feared that Ali Raja would try to throw a spanner in the works of the smooth operation of this trade contact with Mysore.87 Therefore, they preferred to intensify the patrolling of the coastline of Cannanore to curtail his power, which depended largely on his thriving maritime commerce. This measure, they hoped, could revive the commercial fortunes of the Company, which were tending to balance on a knife-edge in Cannanore, where it was locked in constant combat with the stiff competition from the local traders.88 In 1680, the Malabar Council grew more optimistic about the trade prospects in Mysore as it had visions of linking the Canara rice trade up to the West Asian horse trade. For a very long time Canara had been the rice bowl of the Arabian Sea.89 The Council calculated that, because of the war between the Arabs and the Portuguese, there would be a great demand for rice in Muscat and the adjoining areas. If it could supply rice, it could reap huge profits as well as establish good relations with Muscat. On the ships which had transported rice to this region, the VOC could bring horses back to Cannanore where they could be sold in the Mysorean market.90 To take charge of such voyages, the Council advised employing a skilled captain, such as Simon van den Berg or Govert Wyngaard, who was considered to have had sufficient experience in Persia and Muscat.91 It was also suggested that the Company could earn 80 rix- dollars for each load of rice in Muscat, and hence it could reap a good profit from both the rice and the horse trade.92 Preparatory to putting this plan into action, Assistant Jan van Raasvelt was sent to Srirangapatanam where he had several meetings with the Nayaka.93 In spite of the fact that the Nayaka preferred the Company to bring its merchandise directly to Mysore without resorting to any intermediaries, this suggestion was also unacceptable to the Company as it had no acquaintance of the land and its administration and was wary about stepping into uncharted territory.94 It would have preferred the Mysore traders to come down to the Dutch factory in Cannanore to purchase merchandise and pay for it in cash.95 Even though nowhere in the Dutch accounts is it clear why the Nayaka insisted on direct commercial dealings, what does clearly emerge from this episode is the abiding hesi- THE VOC TRADE IN CANNANORE 121 tation of the Dutch to become too closely and too directly involved in areas which were beyond their immediate control. Setting such problems aside, the Company envoy, Van Raasvelt, made a thorough survey of the market conditions in Srirangapatanam, the capital of Mysore. Consequently, his report provides plenty of detailed information about the local prices and it conveniently compares them with the prices in Surat.96 This market analysis helped the Company to determine the quantity, quality, and price level of the commodities to be imported.97 The large quantities of marketable merchandise quoted by the report draw attention to the significance of Mysore as the most important hinterland of Cannanore: a large market for Indian Ocean merchandise and a lucrative opportunity for the local traders, including the Mappilas of Cannanore, to enhance their commercial fortunes through trade with that region. Cotton and local iron and steel were the items of merchandise which could be purchased from Mysore in exchange for the Dutch commodities.98 Van Raasvelt noted that in Mysore 500 pounds or one khandil of cotton would cost 28 pagodas, local iron and steel would cost 8 pagodas and 10 pagodas respectively.99 The information received by the Company from the inland trader Ballachitty and others also substantiated the details given by Van Raasvelt.100 The big price difference between Surat and Srirangapatanam indicates the risks and expenses involved in the inland trade of that time. The description of the large number of inland toll centres which existed within such a short distance as that between Cannanore and Mysore offers one of the reasons behind this price difference. Dutch reports stated that the journey between Cannanore and Srirangapatanam would take five to six days and letters would take at least four days.101 There were two trading routes across the Western Ghats con- necting Cannanore to Srirangapatanam. The first one, the Perambadi Route, passed through Irukkur. The route to Irukkur lay in the domain of the Kolathiris. The second option was the Peria Ghat Route which passed through North Wynad, and involved journeying quite a distance through the sphere of influence of the Raja of Kottayam. The Dutch considered that the Irukkur Route was nearer to Cannanore and therefore more appropriate for use as the Mysore link.102 Against this the Kottayam Route was considered safer. Along this route alone, there were nine Kottayam and six Mysorean tollhouses.103 After a large number of details about the various trade prospects in Mysore had been successfully gathered, now all depended on the capaci- ty and willingness to act upon them. In their attempts to take appropriate action, the Dutch faced problems from the very beginning. Although the Company insisted on the Mysorean traders journeying down to Cannanore to fetch goods, it also encouraged its own local brokers to 122 CHAPTER FIVE become involved in this trade. Therefore, soon after receiving the report from Van Raasvelt, the Company signed a contract with Baba Prabhu, the influential Konkani broker, stating that the latter would be the recipient of Company goods in Cannanore, for the principal purpose of reselling them in the Mysorean markets.104 Baba Prabhu agreed to supply the Company with 320 khandil pepper from Kottayam and to take merchandise to a value of 5,142½ sao tome, for which he agreed to pay cash within a year.105 He was allowed to retail the merchandise for cash either to the Mysorean merchants or to the Cannanore traders and was allowed to enjoy ½ per cent brokerage fee from this trade.106 He was permitted to sell sugar in Calicut and in the northern part of Malabar as far as Mangalore, but other merchandise could be sold only in Kolathunadu or in Mysore, under the penalty of the confiscation of goods.107 These exactions were clearly an attempt on the part of the Company to steer Baba Prabhu well clear from the markets in southern Malabar. Despite the promise it appeared to offer, the Company servants remained sceptical about the successful fulfilment of the contract with Baba Prabhu and decided to assign two smart topaz soldiers to keep an eye on him.108 As already surmised, the results produced by the contract were not encouraging. In 1682, it was reported that only one-third of the commodities assigned to the Mysorean trade had been sold by Baba Prabhu, who was alleged to be promoting his own private fortune by indulging in trade relations with the English and the French.109 The VOC officials also claimed that a portion of the blame for the failure could be attributed to the interference of the Mappilas of Cannanore, who attempted to obstruct Baba Prabhu and his assistants in carrying out this trade several times.110 The Malabar Council remained undaunted and hoped to give the Mysore trade an extra impetus by encouraging the import of larger quantities of spices and copper from Batavia. In 1683, the Council ordered 3–4,000 pounds cloves for Malabar, expressing the hope that a large share could be diverted to Mysore.111 It also requested more Japanese copper which could be exchanged in Cannanore against merchandise from Mysore.112 Initially, the results of the Mysorean connection looked promising. For example, in 1683 one prominent Mysorean trader approached the VOC servants in Cannanore requesting the Company deliver its merchandise to ‘Oemesjerre’, an inland bazaar in Kottayam, situated a few miles inland from Cannanore.113 The Dutch torpedoed the proposal by insisting that the payment should be made in Cannanore, only after which would the Company be ready to provide an escort to the above-mentioned place, but at the merchant’s own risk.114 Probably the Mysorean Chettys were used to procuring essential commodities in the inland bazaars of Kolathunadu and Kottayam through the Mappila traders, a manoeuvre THE VOC TRADE IN CANNANORE 123 which avoided the inconvenience and expense of coming down to the coastal centres. An incident such as this indicates the weakness of the Company when it attempted to comply with the demands of the Mysorean merchants as its stance made it more convenient for the latter to depend on the Mappila traders rather than on the Dutch. In 1684, on behalf of the Company, Commander Marten Huijsman entered into a contract for various items of merchandise with some Mysore traders.115 However, by the end of that year, Commander Gelmer Vosburg was writing to the Heren XVII stating that the trade with the Mysorean merchants had failed to fulfil the high expectations raised by the initial successes.116 The nub of the problem appears to have been that the traders from Mysore were either unable or unwilling to pay cash for the merchandise the Dutch offered them.117 They wanted to obtain at least a share of the Company goods on credit. For their part, the Dutch feared bad debts and kept insisting on payments in cash.118 The upshot was that eventually the inland traders stayed away from the Dutch factory in Cannanore. As the Dutch themselves stubbornly continued to avoid the trade markets in the interior, they soon had to adjust their expectations.119 Looking for other options to market their merchandise, their attention once again focused on their main rivals: the Mappilas of Cannanore. One of them, one Koy Kutialy Krauw, was allowed to buy the Company merchandise at the Surat price level for the certain guarantee that he would pay the amount back by the coming December.120 He bought 2,000 pounds of nutmeg from the Company for 220 Moorish heavy ducats or 440 rix-dollars.121 Now, the Dutch felt that they were actually better off dealing with the Cannanore Mappilas than with the merchants of Mysore.122 Under these conditions, the Company was still able to make a profit from their Cannanore settlement in 1684.123 The change in the attitude of the VOC towards the Ali Raja and the Cannanore Mappilas is reflected in the treaty which was signed between Commander Vosburg and the Ali Raja, the Karanavar and Koy Kutialy Krauw of the Cannanore Bazaar in 1686. Under the terms of this treaty, the Mappila traders in the Bazaar agreed to accept Company merchandise which was valued at up to 10,000 ducats.124 The Cannanore merchants said that they would pay within one year of receipt of the goods from the Company. The Company in its turn promised not to supply these commodities to any other party during the next twelve months.125 After these initial attempts, it appears that, at least during the seventeenth century, the Dutch never managed to develop direct commercial relations with Mysore and that in this regard they continued to depend on the Mappila mercantile network. 124 CHAPTER FIVE 646, Figure 4 The VOC in Cannanore: Income and Expenditure (1663–1723) and Expenditure Income in Cannanore: VOC The 4 Figure 1658, 1674, 1708, 1724, 1740, 1757, 1773, 1790, 1807, 1825, 1839, 1852, 1866, 1881, 1905, 1943, 1947, 1977, 1994. Source: VOC 1352, 1355, 1360, 1373, 1388, 1406, 1410, 1425, 1448, 1454, 1474, 1519, 1527, 1528, 1571, 1582, 1598, 1625, 1634, 1 VOC Source: THE VOC TRADE IN CANNANORE 125

Conclusion

A general overview of the income-expenditure record of the VOC settlement shows that the Company was able to maintain a favourable economic balance in Cannanore at least for the period between 1685 and 1715 (Figure 4).126 This was remarkable in comparison with the general condition of the Malabar Commandment during the period under study.127 Nevertheless, considering the rather insignificant amount of trade carried out by the Company in Cannanore, the settlement was actually an administrative burden on the Company and had little commercial significance. Over and above this, the failure of the Mysore venture helped to undermine any optimism the Company might have felt about reviving its commercial fortunes in Cannanore. Initially, the primary objective of the VOC in Malabar was to acquire a major share in the pepper output of the region; a move which would have enabled it to regulate the pepper price in Europe. To bring off this coup, it was essential that the Company prevent Malabar pepper falling into the hands of other European rivals, especially the English and the French. Despite its best intentions, the Company was not able to prevent its competitors from trading with the local traders. Eventually, the failure was nullified as the Company was able to glut the European pepper market without the Malabar crop as it enjoyed relatively successful control over the South-East Asian pepper trade. The imported items of merchandise, with the exception of copper and opium, were not in high demand in the inland markets. The Company opium trade was affected by the large quantities of this commodity brought into the inland markets by local traders, especially the Mappila Muslims of Cannanore. One of the major reasons for the failure of the VOC to control the pepper trade in Cannanore was its price policy. The prices of the spice were not fixed locally, but at the VOC headquarters in Batavia. The failure of the Company to adapt to the market fluctuations minimized its purchasing power in Cannanore. Its import trade was also confronted with the same problem. The Company found it difficult to market its merchandise at the price quoted in Batavia in Cannanore where a free market was in operation. Consequently, it had to compete with other Asian and European merchants who were more flexible in adapting and willing to adjust to the local situations. The Dutch East India Company—the largest commercial entrepreneurial establishment in the seventeenth-century Indian Ocean—also suffered from internal disadvantages. Being a highly centralized commercial enterprise, it had to bear considerable institutional expenditures and protection costs compared to the commercial enterprises of local merchants. It had to demand a comparatively high profit margin from its 126 CHAPTER FIVE commercial transactions. In this aspect of trade, the local merchants enjoyed an advantage over the Company. As observed by the Company servants, the local traders were content with a small profit margin as their business did not incur any of the unnecessary expenses which the Company had to carry.128 Consequently, the Company was never in a position to influence or control the regional and intra-regional trade of Cannanore and therefore its poor performance there was not unexpected. 127

CHAPTER SIX

POWER POLITICS IN KOLATHUNADU (1663–1697)

In the month of October 1690, three Dutch soldiers deserted from the Dutch fort in Cannanore and were subsequently caught in Maday—a place some twenty kilometres to the north of Cannanore—by the Nayars of the Kolathiri prince, Kepoe.1 Although they tried to hide their real identity by first claiming that they were English and later Portuguese, the Nayars who were sent by the Company to track them successfully exposed the falsehood of their assertion. Realizing the graveness of the situation and in fear of capital punishment, the soldiers pleaded desperately with the Prince not to extradite them to the Company. Moved by their piteous entreaties, the Prince took them under his protection and ordered the Company Nayars to turn back, stating that he would take them to Cannanore personally; a promise which, in fact, he did not keep. The Company servants complained to the Ali Raja about this incident. The latter assured them he would settle the issue by promising he would advise and caution the inexperienced young prince about his precipitate action. A solution was reached by which the Prince promised to bring the deserters to Cannanore personally and place them under the protection of the ‘Chatangodda’ temple, situated at the rear of the Bazaar. After considerable discussion among the princes of Kolathunadu, it was agreed to hand the soldiers over to the Company for 400 or 500 ducats, paid partly in gunpowder and partly in lead. In the meantime, the Ali Raja had held some discussions with Karanavar Kuttiyali and the Prince concerning the affair and decided that the Karanavar would go to the fort to request and obtain a promise from the authorities that, when the soldiers were handed over to the Company, they would not be punished. When this had been done, the Karanavar sent a servant to escort the soldiers back to the fort. However, the Prince changed his mind and refused to hand the soldiers over. Hearing this news, the Dutch official who had been sent from the fort to receive the soldiers decided to return but he was stopped by the Karanavar. The Karanavar requested the Dutch official not to return before he could hand the soldiers over to the Company. He added that he would not return to the Bazaar with the matter unresolved. Seizing a sword and shield, he went in person to fetch the Dutch soldiers but was stopped near the temple premises by the Nayars. Paying no heed to them, the infuriated Karanavar confronted the Prince face to face and vowed that he would not give way until the renegades were returned. 128 CHAPTER SIX

Although this unheard of incident created a considerable stir among the Nayars, the Prince ceded to his demands and emerged from the temple premises in the company of around 2,500 Nayars. The Mappilas in the Bazaar immediately swarmed to support the Ali Raja with their weapons grasped in their hands. They joined the Prince and his Nayars and moved off towards the coast in a procession. When they reached the coast, this spectacular parade of armed men made a stand facing the Bazaar. There, in a public demonstration of his grandeur, the Prince moved on farther and asked Kunju Wissie Crauw, the son of the late Karanavar, to precede him to the fort of the Hollanders and hand the three soldiers over to the Dutch authorities through Karanavar Koikuttiyali Crauw. Seven weeks after their desertion, the soldiers were finally handed over to the Company. Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council concluded the report with a reflective analysis on the incident. Although the prince was clearly three times stronger in terms of manpower, lightly armed with bows and arrows, he believed that he was too weak to stand a chance against the Moors, and would probably have failed in that [encounter]…but this also shows what power, influence, and respect [mean] here [in Cannanore] (italics added).2 Quite obviously the VOC officials in Cannanore were not completely blind in forming their perception of the underlying structure and pattern of power relations in Kolathunadu. The detailed description given by the Malabar Commandment of such an apparently insignificant incident as the desertion and the return of three soldiers was obviously penned to paint the VOC authorities in Batavia and Amsterdam a vivid picture of the way power relations worked in Kolathunadu. Taking this perspective, namely that the Arackal Swarupam constituted an intrinsic part of the regional power structure, it is possible to proceed to analyse and understand the dynamics of political relations in Kolathunadu between 1663 and 1723.

Drive towards centralization: Prince Ramathiri (1663–1673)

The ejection of the Estado da India by the VOC in 1663 did not have any immediate impact on the regional socio-political life. The success of the Dutch attempt to oust the Portuguese was not received with any particular enthusiasm by the regional powers—especially not the Ali Rajas. The tepid support accorded to the VOC by the Ali Raja against the Portuguese should be seen more in the light of a tactical move, as it was later perceived to be, to obtain control of the fort.3 The decision of the Dutch to remain largely undermined the objective of the Ali Raja. For his part, apart from the formal treaty he signed with the VOC, to a great extent POWER POLITICS IN KOLATHUNADU 129 the Kolathiri Raja remained indifferent to and held himself aloof from coastal affairs. It seems that the political atmosphere in the region was affected more by the increasing power of the Nayakas of Ikkeri than by the Dutch occupation of the Portuguese fort. On the eve of the arrival of the Dutch in Cannanore, the Ali Raja and with him the members of the political elite of the kingdom were primarily engrossed in this mounting pressure from the north. The expansion of the Ikkeri kingdom under Sivappa Nayaka (1645– 60) has a significant role in Malabar history. It brought a decisive end to the immunity of the northern regions of Malabar to external military intrusion. It is said that, in his push towards the Malabar frontier, Sivappa Nayaka had established strongholds which brought the Ikkeri Nayakas into close contact with Kolathunadu politics.4 Inevitably the growing menace along the northern frontier of Malabar had a decisive impact on the political relations in the region. The succession of Somasekhara Nayaka to the kingship immediately after the short reigns of Venkatappa Nayaka II (1660–1) and Bhadrappa Nayaka (1662–4) was almost contemporaneous with the establishment of the VOC settlement in Cannanore. Under these circumstances, the local elites in Kolathunadu looked to the VOC as a potential ally in their struggle against the Nayakas. Therefore their early interactions with the Company were played out against this particular background.

Ramathiri and the Company: early contact The political economy of Kolathunadu immediately after the establishment of the VOC in Cannanore was invigorated by the centralizing drive of Prince Ramathiri, who was next to the Kolathiri in the line of seniority (muppumura) to the ‘rajaship’. Even before his accession to the highest position in the power hierarchy of the Swarupam, the Prince held the reins of power in his hands.5 His initial contacts with the VOC officials in Cannanore appear to have been very limited. Consequently, the local Company servants were taken somewhat aback by the unexpected visits of this heir apparent, Prince Ramathiri, who had not shown his face in the fort for quite some time, offering promises to protect the commercial interests of the Company in the region. He was happy to give assurances of Company control of the entire trade of the region in pepper, cardamom and opium, and actually promised to take action against the contraband trade being busily conducted along both land and water routes. In the end, the cat was out of the bag and the real purpose of the visit was revealed—his chief aim was to secure a promise of VOC ships to serve in his offensive against the expanding power of the Ikkeri Nayakas.6 Although the officials refused such assistance for ‘decent reasons’, the 130 CHAPTER SIX developments soon proved to be crucial to the commercial interests of the Company.7 A Dutch report explains that, with the backing of the Kolathiris, two powerful Mangalore families were at war with the Ikkeri Nayaka. The rebellious group besieged the Mangalore Fort as the Nayaka had intended to hand it over to the Portuguese.8 The close association between the Portuguese and the Nayaka was a serious concern to the Dutch in the region. It was reported that Barsaloor had already come into Portuguese possession and a possible take-over of Mangalore would make their commercial presence substantially stronger in the region. Precarious though the situation was, the VOC was not yet ready to intervene directly in developments as any move would antagonize the powerful Nayaka.9 Despite its caution, the Company really did not want to let Mangalore fall into the hands of the Portuguese. Therefore, rather than making a full commitment to the struggle, the Company decided to assist the rebellion indirectly by providing gunpowder in return for either money or pepper.

For the sake of trade: the Ali Raja’s Mangalore mission and its failure Naturally, the active role of the Ali Raja in this regional political development did not escape the attention of the VOC officials in Cannanore. Commander Isbrand Godske, who visited the Cannanore fort in 1666, was not able to meet either the Ali Raja or Prince Ramathiri as both were on the border endeavouring to settle the dispute with the Nayaka.10 An amicable settlement of the conflict would have been the best outcome for the Ali Raja because the tentacles of his commercial interests also spread out along the nearby Canara Coast. Given this fact, an impending Portuguese take-over of the Mangalore Fort and subsequently of the trade in its vicinity would not have been welcomed by the Ali Raja. The tactful move made by the Ali Raja when he set up a commercial establishment close to Mangalore was most likely a precautionary measure against any such potential development. In a letter to Batavia, Rijckloff Van Goens reported the Ali Raja’s attempt to settle in the vicinity of Mangalore with the permission of the Ikkeri Nayaka. He interpreted this to mean that the latter had been unable to maintain his previous authority after the establishment of the Company in Cannanore.11 Although Van Goens described this as a positive development which would help the Dutch to deal directly with the ‘inlanders’, there is no reason to believe that the Ali Raja had any intention of abandoning Cannanore. The same report stated that the Karanavar of the Arackal House continued to remain in charge of the commercial affairs of the Bazaar. This information supports the assumption that, although his failure to secure the Cannanore fort might have prompted a search for a stronghold away from the Dutch presence, the Ali Raja’s decision to establish a trade settlement near Manglore was moti- POWER POLITICS IN KOLATHUNADU 131 vated largely by the growing Portuguese threat to his commercial ambitions in that region. Interestingly, not all the Dutch officials shared Van Goens’ opinion. Commander Godske, in a report to Heren XVII argued that the Ali Raja’s decision could disrupt the commercial activities of the Company in Cannanore as the latter had the power to shift the entire trade of the port to a harbour of his own choice.12 These two conflicting reflections show that both Company officials sought to interpret this incident, each in his own way, in order to score over his rival faction, instead of analysing the local political developments impartially from the point of view of an outsider. The abrupt return to Cannanore of the Ali Raja brought an end to all the conjecture. In May 1666, it was reported to Cochin that the request of the Ali Raja to establish a factory near Mangalore had been refused by the Nayaka. This would have left the Ali Raja with no other option but to return to Cannanore.13

Growing tension: Ramathiri and the VOC The return of the Ali Raja and the failure to improve the performance of the VOC in Cannanore forced the local Company servants to pin their hopes on the previous promises made by Prince Ramathiri, who had said that he wished to trade with them directly if the Ali Raja and his men were not prepared to comply with their commercial obligations.14 As it turned out, Prince Ramathiri had larger goals in his sights. The incessant competition between various European companies to acquire a slice of the spice supply from Malabar gave the local ‘men of prowess’ greater scope to appropriate a share in the regional trade profit. The VOC reported from Cannanore that both Prince Ramathiri and the Ali Raja were maintaining close commercial relations with the English and the French and each was trying to take advantage of the commercial rivalry of the former to extort more profit from them.15 Again, in 1668 it was reported that Prince Ramathiri had tried to make a deal with a Portuguese captain, probably a privateer, to draft a joint plan to attack Canara.16 Whatever the authenticity of such conjectures might have been, future developments were correct in pointing towards a deliberate attempt by the Prince to exploit the competitive commercial atmosphere to benefit his political ambitions. In their report the Dutch, who were angered by the active role played by Ramathiri in the establishment of an English settlement in Kottakunnu in 1670, pointed out the increasing influence of the Prince in the political affairs of the region. They accused Ramathiri of preventing the Company men from approaching the Kolathiri to complain about the underhand machinations of the Prince to subvert the contract.17 The VOC was asked to hand over a written complaint 132 CHAPTER SIX directed to the Kolathiri through the Prince, who tried to play down the accusations by assuring the Company servants that he was straining every sinew to keep the contact between the Company and Kolathiri intact, thereby successfully keeping the Kolathiri at arm’s length from such political affairs. The attempt of the Prince to usurp the authority of the raja was facilitated by the latter’s great age and by the fact that he was exerting himself to the utmost to win over the ‘great men’ of the region to the purpose.18 The greatest concern of the VOC was not the increasing power of the Prince but the development of political conditions in favour of the English and the French. From the Company point of view, the weakening of the kingship could damage its ‘legal’ claim to the regional trade which would ultimately cause it to be lost to its European competitors. The problem was not confined to the Company and the Kolaswarupam alone. It had wider ramifications in the local set-up.

Changing commercial atmosphere and shifting strategies: the Ali Raja and the Company The changing local power relations and the growing maritime trade opportunities forced the Ali Raja to be constantly on guard to devise strategies to sustain his dominant position in the political economy of Kolathunadu. The opening up of greater commercial opportunities offered by the growing competition for spices gradually ignited more conflicts among the Mappilas. There are some suggestions, albeit nebulous, to support such an assumption. In a report to the Netherlands, Van Goens explains the rather benign attitude of the Ali Raja to the Company as the outcome of increasing problems in the Mappila ranks. The report averred that the Mappila merchants scattered along the coast, who earlier had operated under the control of the Ali Raja, were being encouraged to try their hand at being free entrepreneurs with the blessing of the English and the French.19 His loosening grip on local merchants and supplies is what might have pushed the Ali Raja closer to the Company. Ignoring the demands of Prince Ramathiri, the Ali Raja refused to supply pepper to the English.20 It is likely that the Ali Raja made an effort to exploit the already strained relationship between the Company and the Prince to his own advantage. On his visits to the fort, the Ali Raja tried to instigate a rift between the Prince and the Company and promised to participate in a joint action against him and the English. The Ali Raja pledged that he ‘would not rest before he saw the Prince driven out of the government and the French and the English chased from the land’.21 Showing a certain degree of circumspection, the Dutch did not rely on such statements. POWER POLITICS IN KOLATHUNADU 133

They wondered whether the Ali Raja was showing off his reliability while surreptitiously carrying out his own agenda. At this juncture, a thorough reorganization in the administrative structure of the VOC in Malabar which had been separated from Ceylon and become an autonomous Commandment under Hendrik Adriaan Van Reede, appointed its commander in 1670, occurred. In spite of the fact it could have been disruptive, this administrative change did not fundamentally alter the vigorous mercantile-cum-political policy pursued by the VOC in Malabar under Van Goens up to that time. Van Reede, who had served under Van Goens during his Malabar expeditions and conquests between 1658 and 1663, tended to adhere to the same policy as his former master until he retired from the post in 1677. At the beginning of his career in Malabar, the challenging rise of Prince Ramathiri with the assistance of the English and the French was the main political crisis with which he had to contend. Despite his overtures of friendship, Van Reede was not ready to trust the Ali Raja whom he identified as one of the main challengers to the monopoly claims of the VOC in Malabar.

Conflicting interests: Ramathiri versus the VOC The increasing influence Ramathiri was gaining in the regional politics was revealed even more explicitly in the harsh reply the Company received to its complaints against him to the Kolathiri. The Prince rejected the privilege claims of the Company over other European traders on the basis of its contract with the Kolathiri outright. On the contrary, he affirmed that the regional trade was open to all, including the English, the Danes, and the French.22 Upon being told that they did not have any specific right, the Dutch had alleged that the Prince’s decision to contravene the old treaty had been instigated by the influence of the English, who had succeeded in striking an accord with the former by plying him with precious gifts.23 Sagely, the Prince successfully played off the various European powers to extract more resources to support his own political designs. For their part, the English and the French were completely at his mercy as he offered them protection—of course at a cost—from any encroachment on them by other local ‘men of prowess’.24 The close relations maintained by the Prince with the English and the French were inextricably linked to the benefits he was likely to reap from such alliances. In contrast to damage his strained relationship with the Dutch might cause, the Prince’s contact with the English and the French directly benefited his fiscal and military requirements.25 For its part, by and large the VOC did its best to pretend to be an independent political power and thereby it limited its accessibility to the local elites. The Dutch 134 CHAPTER SIX designation of Cannanore as a ‘conquered territory’ wrested from the Portuguese deprived the local elites of the right to exact any tolls or taxes from the Company. This deprivation pushed them closer to the English and the French who gave in, generally under pressure, to the demands of the local powers. Prince Ramathiri quite openly proclaimed his support of the English on one occasion when he was approached by the Dutch to expel the English after the capture of the Dutch ship the Meyboom by the latter. He pointed out that the VOC was neither ready to provide military assistance to the raja as it was bound to under the terms of the treaty nor to allow him to levy any tolls on merchandise. In contrast, besides waiving the right to a toll on merchandise, the English and the French paid the raja 1,500 pagodas for permission to trade. The Prince exacted that, if the Company wished to expel the English and the French, it should be prepared to compensate the losses incurred by the raja.26 The response received by the Company from the Karthavu of Dharma- patanam regarding this matter also had the same tenor as that of Prince Ramathiri.27 In a nutshell, it was economic interests pure and simple which ultimately determined the political behaviour of the local elites towards the European Companies.

The fall of Ramathiri Naturally, the persistent efforts made by the Prince to enhance his authority began to destabilize the power equilibrium in the region. This erosion of the balance of power gave rise to a state of continuous conflict between the Prince and those opposing him who resented the strengthening relationship between the Prince and the English and the French.28 The [1671] report sent to Batavia from Cochin mentions the ongoing conflict between the Prince and a faction of Nayars whom Ramathiri had offended on account of a certain ‘unfair verdict’ (onrechtvaardigh vonnis).29 Although the Prince was able to contain the uprising of around 2,000 them with the help of his own limited number of Nayars, neither side was able to obtain a decisive victory over the rival group. The fact that the rebellious Nayars had won the backing of the second prince—the third in the Kolaswarupam power hierarchy—complicated the situation. This position of the second prince, who was opposed to the English-French alliance of Ramathiri, plunged the entire realm into complete disarray.30 The involvement of the Ali Raja, against whom Ramathiri had solicited the assistance of the English undoubtedly strengthened the ability of the opposition to seize the upper hand over Ramathiri.31 This necessitated the tough intervention of the aged Kolathiri and the local ‘men of prowess’ in this matter. In 1673, it was reported that the raja had suspended Prince Ramathiri POWER POLITICS IN KOLATHUNADU 135 from his ‘administrative duties’ and had him replaced with another of his nephews.32 In an attempt to restore order the Kolathiri constituted a rijksraad or ‘state council’ to assist in the task of governance.33 However, for various reasons these changes were delayed. The offended Ramathiri strove to regain authority by resorting to armed strength, which led to further violence and casualties on both sides. To make matters worse, the ritual ceremony at the temple to install a new prince had to be postponed on account of the failure to raise the sum of money which was supposed to be distributed among the Nayars on such occasions.34 While mayhem continued to play havoc in the land, Prince Ramathiri died suddenly. His demise eased the process of change introduced by the Kolathiri. According to custom, the raja inherited all the property of the diseased.35 The downfall of Prince Ramathiri, who was praised by the English as a ‘most faithful and judicious person’, obviously weakened the commercial presence of the English and the French in the region.36 Conversely, his death and the resultant change in the power relations reinforced the position of the VOC against its European counterparts. Although this was the eventual outcome, the actual role played by the Dutch in this political turmoil is not evident from the official reports. It was reported that, prior to the removal of the Prince and the outbreak of the crisis, various men of stature, including the Prince himself, had approached the officials to enquire about the position which might be taken by the Company in the impending conflict. Considering the complexity of the situation, Van Reede preferred to remain neutral.37 The strategy of the Company was probably to avoid placing more economic and political burdens on its settlement but all these events did adversely affect its stature among the local elites. They complained that the English and the French always came to the market with cash in hand and also did not hesitate to supply the locals with sufficient money in advance. The VOC, on the other hand, complied with neither of these requirements and hence violated the contract.38 Despite the lack of any overt references, it would be erroneous to assume that Van Reede, who supported an active involvement in the political and commercial affairs of Malabar, remained completely detached from the political developments in Cannanore because such an abstention could have had an effect on the commercial fortunes of the Company. Perhaps in the phrasing of his report to the Heren XVII, the Commander was insisting upon the need to adopt a more pro-active intervention in the Cannanore affairs. There is a strong possibility that the Company might have tacitly supported the Kolathiri faction against Ramathiri. It is evident that the Dutch were pleased with the outcome of the struggle, which put their European competitors at a dis- advantage. Subsequently, the local VOC officials Pieter Vertangen and Captain Renesse had a meeting with the Kolathiri, the new prince, and 136 CHAPTER SIX other ‘great men’ of the realm, in which they reaffirmed that the old contract would remain inviolate.39

Political restructuring in Kolaswarupam: the (re)invention of tradition At this juncture, the Kolathiri decided to take advantage of the new situation to re-establish his authority in the Kolaswarupam which had been appropriated by Ramathiri. Because he was found ‘not sufficiently competent’ to govern, the prince, who had been chosen in place of Ramathiri was removed from his authority.40 Installed with the consent of the ‘great men’ of the region, two principal Nayar nobles (vrijheren) were appointed as the ‘administrator’ (bestuurder) and his ‘deputy’ (vervanger) under the superior authority of the Kolathiri.41 Van Reede commented that this system had been in use in the land for many years until it was abolished by the powerful Ramathiri.42 From this perspective, the new changes introduced into the political set-up of Cannanore were interpreted as an attempt to re-instate the ‘old tradition’ of the Kolathiris. Consequently, it was considered to be an effort in the direction of strengthening the ‘Kolathiri-ship’, something the Company very much desired. However, it seems that in reality the incident signified a sort of reaction to the strengthening of the ‘raja-ship’ in Kolathunadu—a process which gained momentum, though was later aborted under Ramathiri.43 Although the Ali Raja apparently remained favourable to the cause of the Company, he did not let the opportunity slip to take advantage of the collapse of the Ramathiri-English alliance.44 According to the report, the Company was informed by a person, whom the Dutch called hoofd ragiadoor, about the constant petition of the Ali Raja to the Kolathiri to hand the English fort at Kottakunnu over to him.45 In its turn, the Company was informed by the Ali Raja that the English had visited the new Kolathiri to obtain his consent to continue their free trade in Kottakunnu. The Ali Raja suggested that, if the VOC was ready to pay the annuity which the English had been paying to the Kolathiri for the settlement, the Company could easily rid itself of the English competition. He gave further assurances that, after one or two years of imburse- ment, he would be in a position to help the Company to discontinue this payment. He cautioned the VOC about the imminent success of the English who had already influenced the raja and other influential persons by the presentation of great gifts and consequently only had to pay an annual rent to be able to continue to remain in Kottakunnu.46 As it turned out, the English refused to pay the huge amount of money (1,000 sao tome) demanded by the raja, a decision which temporarily sealed their fate in Kolathunadu.47 The favourable change in the political situation inspired the Company POWER POLITICS IN KOLATHUNADU 137 to move against the Ali Raja and his Mappilas. Van Reede argued that the Mappilas were the main obstruction stopping other inland merchants from trading directly with the Dutch fort. His intention was to assure other inland traders, especially the Chettys, safe access to the Company fort with the help of the new regime. This was to be put into action with the help of the prince and other influential men at the cost of some good gifts. It was thought that such people could counter any move the Mappilas might make to soil the ears of the raja against such an idea.48

Unnithiri: the new contester for power

Meanwhile, the changes in the power hierarchy in the Kolaswarupam complicated the situation, which had seemed virtually settled, all over again. The position of the late Prince Ramathiri was assumed by another of his nephews named Unnithiri, who was, according to the Dutch, did not find favour with the Nayars on account of his youth and tactlessness.49 Soon after the accession of Prince Unnithiri to the high position of ragiadoor-moor, he began to instigate trouble. With a few elephants and Nayars, he had ransacked the garden of a minor prince ‘in such a way that he showed strong signs of beginning to follow the footsteps of his uncle [Ramathiri]’.50 The actions of the Prince strained the relationship with the Kolathiri. The VOC report on a conversation between the Kolathiri and the Dutch Captain Renesse in December 1673 points in this direction. This report states that the Kolathiri requested Captain Renesse to meet him at the temple near the Mappila Bazaar. Considering it as a chance to discuss with the Kolathiri the plan to obtain safe passage for the Chetty merchants to trade directly with the VOC without the hindrance of the Mappilas, the Captain accepted the invitation. During the meeting, the Kolathiri described the contemptuous behaviour of Prince Unnithiri towards himself and others, which was causing tension in the Swarupam. In his attempt to resolve the dilemma, the raja was advised by his council to divide authority into two—the northern lands under Unnithiri and the southern part under one of the nephews of the Kolathiri.51 This nephew of the Kolathiri, who was close to his uncle, promised the Company every assistance.52 The Company seized the occasion as a chance to introduce the nephew to the plan to facilitate the access of Chetty traders, instead of the Mappilas, to pursue their commerce directly with the fort officials. Captain Renesse promised the Prince high dividends and great benefit for the country if the plan were to succeed. The Prince was advised to con- sult and win the support of various ‘men of prowess’ first before the idea was put into action. The Company offered to support the Prince up to 138 CHAPTER SIX the hilt in this matter.53 Aware of the machinations, the Ali Raja was prudent enough to counter the move of the Company by befriending the English. As the English reported, the Ali Raja had a meeting with their factor in Kottakunnu in which he promised to pay off the balance of his account and to maintain a close friendship.54 In the constant flux of ever- shifting power relations such assurances were destined to falter. Prince Unnithiri was obviously not happy about sharing his authority with the new contender for power. He set about stirring up new troubles by attacking other princes and plundering and devastating the gardens of the Mappilas, those of the Ali Raja in particular.55 In response, the Ali Raja began to take steps to arm his people against the Prince and a general proclamation was issued which summoned the population from all quarters to strengthen the defences.56 Consequently, the question of the authority in the Kolaswarupam had to make way for the broader issue of a power struggle in the region. The choice of picking a quarrel with the Ali Raja cannot have been accidental. The prevailing influence of this man in the local power politics greatly damaged any intentions Unnithiri, who was apparently in the process of emerging as a new power centre in Kolathunadu, might have had to appropriate the supreme authority into his hands. As happened in the case of Ramathiri, his attempt to protect and promote the English trade in Baliapatanam was devised to extract financial benefits from them.57 It was doomed to failure as the volatile political situation in the region forced the English to think twice about the precarious position of their settlement in Kottakunnu. The Dutch claimed that the impending threat of the Ali Raja’s reprisal against Unnithiri and his allies and the growing demands from the Kolathiri forced the English to abandon their settlement and retreat to Calicut and to leave it to Unnithiri.58

Competition for Kottakunnu: the Ali Raja and the VOC When the news of the English decision to abandon their settlement reached the Ali Raja, he sent his frigates to sail to Kottakunnu. But the Dutch, who were careful not to let this place fall into his hands, tried to thwart this move by stirring up the Kolathiri and, if this should fail, by planning to help Prince Unnithiri in his struggle against the Ali Raja. When Unnithiri and the Dutch officials eventually met, the Prince offered the VOC the former English settlement and promised to work assiduously to promote the Company trade in the area.59 The VOC intervention in this development indicates that, in spite of the absence of any open hostility, inherent tension persisted between the Company and the Ali Raja.60 Despite their effort to improve their position, the Dutch noted that the Ali Raja’s actions were not greatly resented by the Kolathiri and POWER POLITICS IN KOLATHUNADU 139 other ‘men of prowess’ in the region. There is a strong possibility that the Ali Raja’s attempt to occupy Kottakunnu was indirectly supported by the Kolathiri as a check to the increasing power of Unnithiri. The VOC decision to occupy Kottakunnu to prevent the Ali Raja from stealing march on it greatly upset the Kolathiri. He tactically rejected the Company request that it take possession of Kottakunnu on the grounds that the land of Kottakunnu had originally belonged to a temple. When he gave this land to the English, Ramathiri had defiled the temple and this desecration is what had caused the Kolathiri and other ‘great men’ of the land to turn against him.61 Therefore, instead of Kottakunnu, the raja offered the Company a commercial settlement near Dharmapatanam—a place situated near the river route which provided a connection to Mysore. Whatever the rationale behind the argument of the Kolathiri might have been, the Company did not fail to spot the commercial importance of both Kottakunnu, situated in the vicinity of the Baliapatanam River, and of the settlement offered near the Dharmapatanam River. As reported by local officials, mastery of both of these river routes would give the Company not only considerable control over the spice trade in the region, it would also offer it greater opportunities to trade directly with the merchants in Mysore. This crucial economic importance of Kottakunnu explains why the Ali Raja was so keen to occupy the site. In his report Van Reede suggests both to make efforts to occupy Kottakunnu with the help of Unnithiri and, at the same time, to accept the Kolathiri’s offer of a settlement in Dharmapatanam. He argued the establishment of the VOC control over these two vital river systems could easily curb the commercial strength of the Ali Raja, which would ultimately result in the complete control over the regional trade by the Company.62

An anti-Ali Raja alliance in the making The Dutch strategy of instigating trouble between the Ali Raja and the princes gradually proved its mettle. In a letter to Batavia, Van Reede reported an open fight between the Ali Raja and the Prince Regent, although the cause of the scuffle is not clear from the narration. He wrote that this was an appropriate opportunity to avenge all the troubles which had been perpetrated by the ‘Mahommetaenen’ against the Company from the beginning.63 On the pretence of being the champion of the cause of the princes, the Company did try to move directly against the Ali Raja and his Mappilas citing a number of grounds. On March 1677 the can- nonade against the Bazaar by the Company was explained as an attempt to obtain satisfaction for complaints made by the Kolathiri against the Ali Raja and to punish the latter for the violation of the treaties.64 Although 140 CHAPTER SIX the clash was settled with the promise that the Ali Raja would pay some fines, nothing materialized afterwards.65 The growing tension between Unnithiri and the Ali Raja continued to disturb the regional political stability.66 As they had been angered by the high-handed behaviour of the Ali Raja, it was reported that both Unnithiri and the Kolathiri had promised to hand over the tolls of the bazaars in Cannanore, Dharmapatanam, and Baliapatanam to the Company.67 Although such an endowment of tolls on the Company was a pretty meaningless gesture because the Kolaswarupam had no control over the toll collection, the Kolathiri was obviously trying to demonstrate the legitimacy of his authority over these port-bazaars. The Kolathiri’s attempt in this direction was unmistakably encouraged by Van Reede who had been striving to crush the power of the Ali Rajas in Cannanore. Although the endless trouble affected the trade of the Company in Cannanore, Van Reede felt that such a sacrifice was necessary to restrain the Mappilas from making any headway in Cannanore.68 The Malabar Commandment was optimistic as it had the support of the Kolathiri and the princes who were wooed by the prospect of sharing the trade profits with the Company.69 Van Reede, following the example of Cochin, was obviously trying to strengthen the ‘raja-ship’ in Kolathunadu; an institution which he thought could definitely strengthen the commercial control of the VOC in the region. The crisis worsened when the English also entered the fray against the Ali Raja. The English desertion of Kottakunnu in favour of Calicut restricted their commercial relations with the Ali Raja, who had enjoyed considerable commercial transactions with the English traders in Baliapatanam. In a letter directed to the VOC official Daniel Joncktys in Cannanore, the Director of the English East India Company in Surat requested help in retrieving a considerable sum which the English had advanced to the Ali Raja for the delivery of spices.70 The VOC considered the emerging favourable political situation in Cannanore to be an opportunity to form an anti-Ali Raja alliance with the English by supporting their persistent demands for payment of their debt. It is particularly important to note that this problem was largely concerned with some English officials’ private deals with the Ali Raja.71 This hints at the increasing influence of the private trade interest in the English East India Company set-up in Malabar. Despite showing willing, the VOC was careful not to offer the English any advantage beyond the reimbursement of their debt. The Cannanore officials were given particular instructions not to give the Ali Raja any opportunity to pay his debt in spices—a privilege of the Company—, but in specie.72 The intention of the Company was to use the threat of an English attack to intimidate the Ali Raja and bring him under its control. POWER POLITICS IN KOLATHUNADU 141

Such an anti-Ali Raja alliance was bound to fail as it was built on con- tradicting interests. The Company essentially distrusted the Kolathiri princes, considering them ‘false in their promises, capricious by nature, avaricious’ and overall striving to seek their own advantage.73 The Kolaswarupam was constituted of conflicting groups. The Kolathiri raja was ‘merely a king in name’, who refrained from meddling in government.74 As a result, the actual authority was vested in the hands of the ragiadoor-moor, Unnithiri. However, the people from Maday were not prepared to acknowledge him, citing as their reason his improper behaviour.75 Above all, an enduring English–Dutch alliance was altogether out of the question. The departure of Van Reede, who took an anti-Ali Raja stand both overtly and covertly, from Malabar in 1677 obviously turned out to be favourable to the latter. This burgeoning situation assured and strengthened the position of the Ali Raja in the regional power structure.

The Dutch ragiadoor-moor and the failure of the Cochin model

The death of the aged Kolathiri in 1680 and the succession of the second prince to his position deepened the crisis in Cannanore.76 The Dutch reports from this period are focused mainly on the issue of the ‘ragiadoor- moor-ship’, which they regarded as the highest ‘office’ in the ‘state’. However, as discussed in the second chapter, a state form ‘administered’ by officialdom does not seem to fit the Kolathunadu polity. Moreover, the VOC documents do not permit the inference of any sort of active involvement by ‘officials’ in the mutual dealings between the local elites, including the Kolathiri, and the Company. It seems that the Dutch perception that the post of ragiadoor-moor as one of a great importance was based on the fact that the race for the ‘office’ involved such dominant members of the elite in Kolathunadu as Prince Unnithiri and the Ali Raja. However, a close reading of the developments in Cannanore casts doubt on the attributed importance of the post of ragiadoor-moor. There is little doubt that the so-called struggle for the post of ragiadoor-moor should be analysed in the context of the increasing competition for power in Kolathunadu—especially between the Ali Raja and Unnithiri. The Ali Raja, now referred to as the ‘head of the Moors of Cannanore and Dharmapattam’, was obviously growing more powerful.77 The Dutch noted that the Ali Raja was spending a great deal of money to enhance his influence over the successor to the old Kolathiri.78 Despite his overtures, the report continued that he had not yet been able to acquire the desired position of ragiadoor-moor or the absolute title of ‘Ali Raja’ itself. Owing to their own private interests and the prevailing discord, the new Kolathiri and other ‘great men’ of the land were not able to take a decision on the 142 CHAPTER SIX matter. The Dutch officials were apparently pleased about this dilemma. They were afraid that a decision in favour of the Ali Raja would swell his arrogance and he was already at loggerheads with the Company on various matters. They inferred that the delay in conferring the title on the Ali Raja might have had some connection with an earlier promise made by the Kolathiri to grant the Company the tolls of the Bazaar. The local Company officials had plans to acquire the right to collect the toll of both the Bazaar and Dharmapatanam from the Kolathiri at a civil price, which could ultimately help them rein in the Ali Raja and improve the VOC trade at Cannanore.79 The toughening of the Company stance towards the Ali Raja was clearly revealed in the treaty signed with the latter in 1680.80 Whereas the earlier treaties had allowed the Ali Raja to continue his trade to a limited extent, the new treaty put him completely at the mercy of the Company. However, the enforcement of the treaty depended on the degree to which the Company could tighten its grip on him which required both the consent and help of the Kolathiri and other princes of the Swarupam. Although the Malabar Commandment was very much in favour of instigating trouble between Prince Unnithiri and the Ali Raja, such a plan had to be called off because of the lack of support from Batavia.81 Also the intensive power struggle going on within the Swarupam meant that the desire of the Company to turn the Kolathiri and other princes against the Ali Raja was more difficult to realize than had been thought. It was necessary for the Kolathiri to retain the support of the Ali Raja if he were to face the challenge thrown at him by Unnithiri. The Dutch reported that Unnithiri’s attempt to obtain the office of the ragiadoor-moor was seriously challenged by the Ali Raja who claimed that post for himself. The Prince’s ambition was seemingly being thwarted because the new Kolathiri was favourably disposed to the Ali Raja. In a letter to Batavia, Commander Marten Huijsman reported a request of the Kolathiri to help the Ali Raja in his battle with Unnithiri for the office of ragiadoor-moor. However, Huijsman, who considered this move to conflict with the interests of the Company, tactfully refused any assistance in this regard.82 In no way should this request from the Kolathiri be taken as simply an example of his powerlessness to confer an administrative office upon his own choice; more essentially it reveals that awarding honours or political status to a person was not the absolute prerogative of the Kolathiri. Instead, it was more of a matter of the power or sakti of the contender for the position. From this perspective, it was not the absolute importance which was attributed—here by the Dutch—to the position of ragiadoor- moor which counted. The importance of the position was proportionate to the sakti of the bearer of the status of the ragiadoor-moor. To put it in another way, the whole episode of the competition for the ragiadoor-moor POWER POLITICS IN KOLATHUNADU 143 status as described by the Company can only be understood from the perspective of the manifestation of sakti. Success or failure in attaining this status would not have brought any particular advantage or disadvan- tage to the contenders as the position of ragiadoor-moor does not seem to have offered any ‘administrative privilege’ to the successful candidate. Far more importantly, success in attaining the status of ragiadoor-moor could have been regarded as a ‘sign’ by which the sakti of the successful candidate was communicated to the local society. In this context, the significance of ragiadoor-moor status can be perceived only in relation to the sakti of the bearer of the title.83 The Dutch perception of the significance of the post of a rijkskanselier, with which they associated the status of a ragiadoor-moor, was no doubt influenced by their idea of ‘state’ and ‘administration’ in Europe.84 Their concept of the ‘ragiadoor-moorship’ was also coloured by their political experiences in Cochin where the influential ‘Paliath Achanmar’ held this post by hereditary right and exercised considerable influence in the regional politics. The description given by Van Reede, who was in charge of this office there between 1663 and 1665, offers ample evidence that his political experience at home had shaped his understanding of ragiadoor- moor-ship in Cochin. The daily events are mostly administered by a man who might be called first councillor, if he did not moreover exercise another rule. But since he has the function of a stadtholder rather than one resembling that of a councillor, the Portuguese called him ‘regedore maior’ or supreme administrator. For this function the king generally uses distinguished people, but then those who have more experience and knowledge than the personal power of nayars, always looking to dignity of birth, because the Malabars attach particular importance to this. It is to him that the stewards and governors, sheriffs and tenants have to render account, while he attends to everything that concerns the king and the kingdom.85 It was this Cochin ragiadoor-moor envisaged in the likeness of the European State bureaucratic models which the Dutch also assumed to be present in the Cannanore political context. Pertinently, Van Reede’s particular emphasis on the ‘dignity of birth’ as the main prerequisite for being appointed to the position of ragiadoor-moor might have been motivated by an urge to extol his own noble birth, of which he was very proud, to a Dutch audience.86 There does not seem to be any evidence to assume that the ragiadoor- moor status in Kolathunadu was hereditary and that its holder had any significant role in the regional political life, except when this title was assumed by a ‘man of prowess’. It would be safe to conclude that, even in comparison with Cochin, the push for the institutionalization of political power appears to have been very feeble in Kolathunadu. However, the Dutch officials did not seem to have made any distinction between the 144 CHAPTER SIX ragiadoor-moor in Kolathunadu and that of the rijkskanselier in Europe.87 They obviously considered it to be a politically legitimized ‘administrative post’. The political actions of Pieter van de Kouter in Cannanore should be seen in the light of this Dutch understanding of local polity. As reported from Cochin, the failure of the Kolathiri and others to reach a general agreement regarding the position of ragiadoor-moor interestingly led to an invitation to the Cannanore factor Pieter van de Kouter to assume the office.88 Although the official Dutch report cited the antipathy of the Kolathiri to the Ali Raja aroused by the latter’s arrogance as the reason for this invitation, it is hard to believe that there was a sudden change in the mind-set of the Kolathiri which would have made him hos- tile to the Ali Raja. There is no unambiguous evidence to suggest that private interests were involved when Pieter van de Kouter threw his weight behind the proposal of the Kolathiri citing a couple of strong reasons for having done so.89 When the proposal was initially turned down by the Cochin Council, the Kolathiri resolved to send two principal persons to Cochin with a written request that a decision be made in favour of Pieter van de Kouter’s appointment. To the great embarrassment of the Kolathiri, the Ali Raja and Unnithiri were later accused of abducting these envoys on their way to Cochin. Although they strenuously denied this accusation, Van de Kouter seized this moment as an opportunity to wreak vengeance on the Ali Raja by bombarding the Bazaar.90

The Ali Raja’s political setback in Dharmapatanam Prior to this incident, the Ali Raja had also had to suffer some setbacks in his endeavours to control the Mappila port-bazaar of Dharmapatanam. As mentioned earlier, the Ali Raja’s control over the Mappilas had never been either absolute or unconditional. Earlier, the Dutch had noticed that the Mappilas of Baliapatanam were bitter enemies of the Ali Raja and that they ‘constantly engage in armed conflict and, they will take any occasion they find to cut each other down’.91 Aware of this dysfunctional relationship, the Company even fostered plans to replace the Ali Raja and his men in Cannanore with those Baliapatanam Mappilas. The intensifying centrifugal forces operating within ‘Mappiladom’ were manifested in an incident involving the Karthavu of Dharma- patanam reported by both English and Dutch officials. Although the Ali Raja exercised a profound influence on the Mappilas of nearby Dharma- patanam, the proclaimed leader of the Mappilas of that port-bazaar was a man with the title of ‘Karthavu’. After this man’s mysterious death in 1682, the Ali Raja assumed the title of karthavu and obtained absolute rights over the Dharmapatanam Bazaar. However, a section of the local POWER POLITICS IN KOLATHUNADU 145

Mappilas under the leadership of the rightful successor to the deceased rose against the Ali Raja and claimed that the old Karthavu had been murdered at the instigation of the latter.92 It was reported that these Mappilas, with the assistance of the ‘pirates from Badagara’, had attacked and succeeded in expelling the Ali Raja from office. Nevertheless, their victory over the Ali Raja seems to have been indecisive. Ensuing reports reveal that the Ali Raja was trying to fortify a cliff on an island off Dharmapatanam in order to give himself control of the undefended Bazaar with the help of his cannons and his minions stationed there.93 The newly installed Karthavu pleaded with the Company for help to combat the Ali Raja, promising it possession of the cliff as well as his friendship. But, although they were well aware of the strategic importance of the island cliff for the control of the trade in the region, the Dutch did not consider the matter pressing enough and felt that it was better to leave the cliff under the control of the Ali Raja than of anybody else for the moment.94

Changing attitude of the VOC towards the Ali Raja At this juncture, its fading optimism about the prospects of Mysore trade forced the Company to reassess its policy.95 Growing concern about the marketing of the imported Company goods in Cannanore and its hinterland forced the VOC to change its mind in favour of the Ali Raja, because he, unlike the other traders who had only little capital, remained the sole candidate with whom the Company could trade.96 The Malabar Commandment under Marten Huijsman now accepted that the Ali Raja has ‘penetrated the government so deeply that he will not easily be detached from it except by his death’.97 Discretion was the better part of valour and the wisest course was for the Company to eschew the internal affairs of the Kolathiri, Unnithiri, and the Ali Raja, unless these seriously threatened the interests of the Company. The increasing presence of the English might also have influenced the Dutch attitude towards the Ali Raja, whose friendship was essential to stem the advance of their rivals in the spice trade.98 This change in the Company attitude was clearly demonstrated in the sacking of Pieter van de Kouter, who had argued fervently for the political intervention of the Company in Cannanore and was an advocate of the anti-Ali Raja strategy of the Company. The report of Commander Gelmer Vosburg reveals hitherto unreport- ed actions taken by onderkoopman Van de Kouter against the Ali Raja. Most of his anti-Ali Raja rhetoric and actions seem to have been based on flawed arguments. It is interesting to note that both the Kolathiri and Prince Unnithamburan complained to Gelmer Vosburg about the Van de Kouter’s ‘unreasonable actions’ against the Ali Raja.99 This indicates that 146 CHAPTER SIX

Van de Kouter’s claim that he had the wholehearted support of the Kolathiri in attempts to seize the post of ragiadoor-moor was pretty men- dacious. Probably many of his reproaches against the Ali Raja and his ‘mooren’ were devised to justify his own actions in Cannanore. If the complaints levelled against him by the Ali Raja are to be believed, Van de Kouter more or less seems to have assumed the position of ragiadoor-moor or acted accordingly without the full knowledge of Cochin. The Ali Raja alleged that Van de Kouter, ‘posing as the ragiadoor-moor of King Kolathiri’, had recruited a private ‘local army’ and had bombarded the Bazaar. Afterwards the Ali Raja had even been forced to pay for the expenses incurred by this adventure.100 It is noteworthy that the letters from the Kolathiri, written in support of Van de Kouter’s assumption of the office, failed to satisfy the Cochin Council.101 A re-reading of the complaint levelled against Van de Kouter by the Kolathiri implies that the story about the abduction of the envoys of the Kolathiri bearing letters to Cochin in support of Van de Kouter could have been fabricated.102 Although absolutely nothing is known about Van de Kouter’s private trade interests, it is possible that his strategy was to extract personal benefit from the office of ragiadoor-moor.103 However, the changing circumstances forced the Company to review its policy in Cannanore; an exercise which ultimately resulted in the dis- missal of Pieter van de Kouter from the office of onderkoopman in August 1686 and later his prosecution by the raad van justicie.104 Unquestionably there was a visible change in the attitude of the VOC towards the Ali Raja after 1680. This shift in the policy of the Company corresponds by and large to the change in the Malabar strategy pursued by the Heren XVII and the Batavia Government. Rijckloff van Goens’ resignation as Governor-General in 1681 significantly influenced subsequent Dutch commercial policy in Malabar.105 The aggressive militaristic commercial policy adopted by Van Goens was now discarded by the Batavia Government. Instead, the VOC preferred to maintain a more amicable relationship with the local political and commercial elites.106 This change in policy created a closer relationship with the Arackal Swarupam in the years to come.

Run to the coast: Prince Unnithiri

Although the VOC henceforth succeeded in running its business successfully in Cannanore with the help of the Karanavar of the Arackal Swarupam who had a better rapport with the Dutch, new troubles were in the offing.107 The growing influence of Unnithiri in the regional political economy and the increasing presence of ‘interlopers’, especially the POWER POLITICS IN KOLATHUNADU 147

English, in the regional spice markets posed problems for the Company.108 The growing collaboration between the Prince and the English traders, the Company complained, violated its contract with the Kolathiri. The efforts of the Company to restrain the Prince from participating in this ‘illegal’ trade aided and abetted by the Kolathiri miscarried when Unnithiri openly defied the intervention of the Dutch officials in his affairs, saying that, as ‘the lord of the country’, he had the right to do as he wished.109 It was reported that he was even attempting to monopolize the regional trade in rice, arrack, copra, and salt by forbidding others to trade in those commodities. In a rather dramatic statement Pieter van de Kouter wrote: In short, he seems to be more like a merchant than a prince, that whose ancestors would never have done, which have already visited great damage on the poor and the ordinary traders, and has virtually stolen their bread from their mouths, hence there is almost nothing left for them but begging.110 Whatever his other commercial ventures might have been, the Company was more concerned with Unnithiri’s attempts to make himself master of the cardamom trade, which naturally clashed with the interests of the Company. He confiscated the cardamom of those merchants who were not willing to trade with him, depriving the Company of the best sort of this spice. The rumour about the possible return of the English to Kolathunadu with the assistance of Unnithiri exacerbated worries.111 The Cannanore Council did not hesitate to suggest that Unnithiri should be expelled, not just from his position ragiadoor-moor but also that his power and authority should be curtailed so that ‘in no way does he keep the power to privilege any nation with such accommodation’.112 Once more the Company took advantage of the unrelenting power struggle between the Kolaswarupam princes when Unnithamburan, the second prince in the line of succession, promised to bring Unnithiri down with the help of the Company and the Ali Raja, who also offered his services in this matter. The latter’s participation in the intrigue definitely had to do with his growing competition with the Prince in the hinterland markets.

A miscarried attack: the Mappila attack on the VOC fort in Cannanore Notwithstanding the fact that there was a gradual wind of change in the political atmosphere in Cannanore favouring the growth of a more amicable relationship between the Company and the Ali Raja, the effects of this change do not seem to have permeated to the bottom level of the society. The continuing resentment to the Dutch found among the ordinary Mappilas was revealed in a sudden attack on the fort on 15 March 1687. When the Karanavar of the Bazaar was paying a visit to the VOC 148 CHAPTER SIX fort in order to resolve certain commercial problems with the Company, a group of ten to twelve armed Mappilas, probably his own entourage, launched an attack on the VOC soldiers guarding the gate. This assault resulted in the death of five soldiers, among them four Dutchmen.113 Although this incident does not appear to have been the outcome of any well thought-out plan, the attack and the subsequent developments are an indication of the dwindling political and commercial influence of the Dutch in Cannanore.114 On account of the changing circumstances, retribution against the Mappilas was out of the question. The Dutch were afraid that this would fan the antagonism of the Mappilas against the weakly garrisoned fort and it could have a decisive effect on the already dwindling commercial transactions in Cannanore.115 Above all, the Dutch were concerned that the English, who established themselves in Tellichery in 1682, could easily ‘fish to their advantage in these troubled waters’ with the support of Prince Unnithiri.116 The Company could not afford to alienate the Mappilas completely and court the possibility of the formation of a grand Mappila–Unnithiri–English alliance against the tenuous- ly guarded the VOC settlement in Cannanore. The emergence of two conflicting factions as the contenders for the dominant power in Kolathunadu placed the VOC in a dilemma. Unnithiri, with the apparent support of the English, was indubitably the greatest challenge to the ritual position of the Kolathiri in the regional power set-up. The Ali Raja attached himself principally to the Kolathiri, although his was never an absolute loyalty. Although at loggerheads with the Ali Raja, the VOC could not find it tactically acceptable to exploit the conflict between the former and Unnithiri, owing to the latter’s alliance with the English.117 In 1687, the Company reported that the ongoing conflict between the princes in Kolathunadu had flared up to an extent the Kolathiri was no longer been able to hold out without ‘outside’ assistance: he had requested help from the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara—a ‘man of prowess’ in the nearby territory of Vadakara.118 Clearly, as there was no significant disparity in power between the various competing groups in Kolathunadu, a decisive victory over the rival group could only be achieved with significant support from ‘outside’.

Threat from the sea: the Maratha ‘pirates’ and Cannanore politics While these power politics were being played out on land, a new maritime menace was presenting itself along the coast of Malabar in the form of the Maratha sea force. It was reported from Barsaloor that twenty-two sail of the ‘Sambagia Ragias sea armada’ were getting ready to pounce upon the Cannanore Bazaar.119 The regional elites, especially the Ali Raja, lost no time in assessing the gravity of the situation and called for the assistance POWER POLITICS IN KOLATHUNADU 149 of the Company to repulse any surprise attack. The VOC repudiated the request as it judged that it was better to remain neutral. The Company was obviously not ready to antagonize the Marathas by co-operating with the locals, as this could affect its trade prospects along the west coast of India. Perhaps the local Dutch officials even saw this as an opportunity to curb the might of the Ali Raja and to revenge the death of the soldiers in the previous attack on the fort, for which ‘we have neither enough power nor orders [from Batavia] to do it ourselves’.120 The Company antipathy towards the Ali Raja spilled over to such an extent it even rejected the request of the Kolathiri to provide gunpowder and other assistance to the latter to foil the English attempt to build a stone fort in Tellichery under the patronage of Unnithiri.121 Events took an unexpected turn when the Marathas allied themselves with the Ali Raja to fight against Unnithiri, although their commanders actually refused to render the Kolathiri-Ali Raja combined force any assistance at the time of their engagement with the enemy.122 The failure of this operation undoubtedly improved the position of Unnithiri in the regional power configuration.

The growing tension ‘within’: the Ali Raja and the princes Although the Ali Raja’s alliance with the Kolathiri remained unaffected, the growing influence of the princes, Kepoe Tamburan and Unnitham- buran, generated some resentment in Kolathunadu. The Dutch described both princes, especially Kepoe, as overbearing and ill-tempered men who were poised to interfere in the Ali Raja’s affairs.123 However, owing to the constraints which hindered any direct move against the Ali Raja, they had to fall back entirely on these princes to control his influence in Cannanore. In March 1690, Captain Hendrik Reyns met both Unnithamburan and Kepoe and lodged a complaint about the killing of the Company soldiers by the Mappilas and also about the money owed to the Company by the Ali Raja. In his attempts to obtain satisfaction from the Mappilas, the Commander succeeded in extracting a promise of assistance from the princes.124 Even though the Ali Raja promised to deliver the two Mappila culprits accused of the murder through the hands of Prince Unnithamburan, the Company alleged that they were actually not who they were claimed to be, but mere slaves of the former.125 The relationship between the princes and the Ali Raja was placed under even more pressure when Unnithamburan’s mediation in the matter of discharging the debt proved ineffectual.126 The Prince, agitated by the indifference of the Ali Raja, refused to undertake any further negotiations on behalf of the Mappilas. However, after having taken some time to reconsider, the Ali Raja agreed to settle the arrears himself. Kepoe Tamburan, who learned of this, considered his decision an insult to 150 CHAPTER SIX

Unnithamburan and asked the Company not to issue sea-passes directly to the Mappilas, but to abide by the ‘old custom’ (oude gewoonte) which meant giving them either to the raja or to the princes.127 In another instance, when the Nayar soldiers of Kepoe Tamburan were beaten off by Prince Unnithiri as they attempted to ransack some of the villages which belonged to the latter, Kepoe blamed the Ali Raja for this debacle.128 It goes without saying that the Company did not wish to let slip this opportunity to turn the tables on the Ali Raja. At the request of the VOC, the Prince consented no longer to allow the Bazaar vessels to trade in rice with Canara. Although the Prince promised armed vessels to assist the Company against the Ali Raja, the Dutch declined this offer, stating that the VOC had enough power to punish the Mappilas.129 Notwithstanding these ‘internal’ schisms, exacerbated at times by the Dutch themselves, the overall power relations in Kolathunadu displayed very few signs of alteration during this period. A powerful anti-Kolathiri faction which was always at work was strengthened during the time of Unnithiri with the assistance of the English. For the most part the Ali Raja threw in his lot with the Kolathiris.130 For the sake of their commercial interests the European Companies, especially the English and the Dutch, were forced to allow themselves to be caught up in these ‘internal’ power struggles. The English had to opt for the anti-Kolathiri side, as the VOC claimed a rightful privilege to the regional trade by virtue of its contract with the Kolathiri. Consequently, the initial plans and attempts of the VOC to remould the entire institutional and commercial system in Cannanore for its own benefit aborted, checked by the resistance of the local Mappila traders under the Ali Rajas. Although it tried to expunge the influence of the Arackal Swarupam from Cannanore on various occasions, ultimately the Company had to succumb to the reality of the situation, especially in the face of the challenging growth of the English in Tellichery. Soon more drastic changes were in the offing by the beginning of the last decade of the seventeenth century in Kolathunadu when the prevailing upheaval restructured the existing power relations in the region.

Changing balance of power in Kolathunadu

The demise of the aged Ali Raja on 24 January 1691 ushered in rapid changes in the political economy of Kolathunadu.131 He was succeeded in his position of the Ali Raja by Kunjamu Crauw, the Karanavar of the Arackal Swarupam. Because the VOC had maintained a very strained relationship with the late Ali Raja throughout his lifetime, anticipation ran high about his successor, who had a better record of a good relation- POWER POLITICS IN KOLATHUNADU 151 ship with the Company. This hope soon dimmed because on 3 November 1692, the Kolathiri, who was around eighty years old, also passed away.132 His demise intensified the contest for power between the two dominant lineages of the Kolaswarupam, namely the Udayamangalam Kovilakam and the Palli Kovilakam. The new Kolathiri, who belonged to the Palli Kovilakam, faced stiff opposition from the princes of Udayamangalam, who were opposed to the solemnization of his position. Significantly Unnithamburan and Kepoe were members of the Udayamangalam Kovilakam. In the opposing camp was Prince Unnithiri the nephew of the new Kolathiri and, of course, a member of the same taivazhi. The pend- ing change in regime obviously threatened the influence of the Udayamangalam princes, as it was apparent that Unnithiri would be the chief beneficiary in this new development. The rivalry reached the extent of denying the Udayamangalam princes permission to visit the Baliapatanam Fort and perform in it the ceremonies required after the death of the Kolathiri.133 The ‘wise men’ of the land cautioned that the body of the deceased Kolathiri would not be cremated before such cere- monial obligations had been properly satisfied, as they had never heard of or witnessed any other exemptions. The Dutch believed that the root cause of the trouble was the jealousy of Unnithiri felt by the Udayamangalam princes. The princes feared that the imminent take-over of the position of the Kolathiri by a new person close to Unnithiri would spell the end of their privileged status of ragiadoor-moors they had enjoyed under the old regime. They were convinced that Unnithiri would strip them of the position of ragiadoor- moor.134 Certainly the political circumstances in Cannanore were shifting in favour of Unnithiri. In the midst of this political turmoil, the Kolathiri-elect requested the assistance of the Company in completing all the requisite rituals, but the Company declined its help on the pretext it had no wish to become involved in internal political affairs. Less than judiciously, the Company simply expected that the victory of the lawful successor of the strongest faction would secure its commercial aims.135 It had to pay for this lack of foresight. Its aloofness seriously injured the economic interests of the VOC in the long run. The empowerment of Unnithiri after the accession of the new Kolathiri reinforced the commercial power of the English in Kola- thunadu. Under the active patronage of the new Kolathiri and Unnithiri, the English had no difficulty in achieving their goal of raising the status of their Tellichery settlement to that of a fortified trade centre, thereby posing a serious commercial and military challenge to the VOC settlement in Cannanore. Although the Dutch strongly protested that this ran counter to the contract with the Company, Unnithiri remained obdurate. He blamed the Dutch for the debacle, as earlier he had requested them to 152 CHAPTER SIX establish a settlement in Tellichery, which they had failed to do.136 Although the opperhoofd, Adam van der Duyn, argued the cause earnest- ly before the Kolathiri, reiterating the clauses of the treaty by which all other ‘foreign nationals’ were not allowed to establish themselves in the domain, all such attempts ended in failure.137 As a consequence of the changing power relations in Kolathunadu the VOC had to bear hapless- ly with the English commercial presence in Tellichery. As alluded to earlier, the old factional rivalry in which the Arackal Swarupam was very much involved deepened when troubles began to surface between the Udayamangalam princes and Unnithiri. Apparently, the Ali Rajas who had had a close rapport with the Udayamangalam princes, especially Kepoe, remained loyal to him even after the change of regime.138 This relationship was quite the reverse of the situation which the Company sought to develop in its favour in Cannanore. Rendering any help to Kepoe against the burgeoning Unnithiri–English faction would automatically strengthen the cause of the Ali Raja. On the other hand, it would be unquestionably irrational to support the Kolathiri, as in practice he was under the control of Unnithiri. The end result was that the VOC was politically neutralized to a great extent in Cannanore.

The death of the Kolathiri and the increasing political confusion in Kolathunadu The struggle for power in Cannanore intensified with the death of the Kolathiri at the beginning of 1696. The lawful succession of a new Kolathiri from the same Palli Kovilakam was not easily conceded by Kepoe Tamburan. This situation led to a struggle for power face-to-face between Unnithiri and Kepoe. Prince Unnithiri assumed control not only of Baliapatanam but also of Maday, where the titular deity of the Swarupam was located and consequently where the ritual ceremonies to inaugurate a new Kolathiri were traditionally performed.139 Approached for assistance, the Dutch did their best to keep aloof from this factional conflict.140 They were more concerned about the dwindling trade in Cannanore in the wake of the internal disturbances created by the power struggle between the princes. Although the Company expected to improve its commercial performance when the new Kolathiri assumed office in 1697 after this period of chaos and uncertainty, the course of developments in Cannanore was heading in a new direction by the closing years of the seventeenth century.141 The transition of power from the Palli Kovilakam to the Udayamangalam Kovilakam in 1698 marked a change in the political relations in Cannanore which eventually led to a new round of realignments in the existing power relations. POWER POLITICS IN KOLATHUNADU 153

Conclusion

The detailed analysis of the power struggle among the various elite groups of Kolathunadu is indicative of the dynamics of social relations in the region. The interaction of the Arackal Ali Rajas with other local elites, especially the Kolaswarupam princes and European companies, fluctuated continuously throughout this period. In spite of this disturbance, the Ali Rajas remained pretty closely involved with the Kolathiri faction. On the other hand, there was a perceptible change in the VOC policy towards the Ali Rajas by 1682. The Dutch, who had been striving overtly and covertly to curtail the political and commercial influence of the Ali Rajas and the Mappila traders of Cannanore from the beginning, began to adopt a more favourable attitude towards the latter. The growing commercial influence of the English in the region after the establishment of the Tellichery Factory in 1682 was a crucial factor which influenced this change of heart. Externally, the declining influence of Van Goens in the Company affairs and the changes in administrative structure in Batavia by the end of the 1670s had a decisive impact on the Dutch policy towards the Ali Rajas in Cannanore.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

THE COAST ADRIFT: THE ALI RAJA AND THE RISE OF NEW MARITIME POWERS (1698–1723)

On 18 October 1698, the Dutch officials in Cannanore received a message from Kepoe Tamburan announcing the death of the Kolathiri.1 The implication of this message was considerable. With the death of this Kolathiri, the forty years of continuous succession of Palli Kovilakam princes to the Kolathiri-ship came to a halt.2 According to muppumura or seniority the right to succession now passed to the Udayamangalam Kovilakam. Initially the Company was optimistic about the change. It was reported that the shift of authority to the Udayamangalam Kovilakam had aroused great expectations among the general public. The transition of power to the Udayamangalam Kovilakam, described as a house of ‘many shrewd, rich princes’, was expected to signal the end to the years of confusion and turmoil in the region.3 What was to happen showed that such expectations were misplaced. A letter sent to the Heren XVII in 1701 says that the Kolathiri-elect was still not able to assume the position because of the persistent conflict between the powerful princes in the Swarupam.4 There is little doubt that the new Kolathiri possessed neither the sufficient resources nor the military strength to counter the challenge to his claim to the position. The Ali Raja, who was concerned about seizing the opportunity to defend and reinforce his own power in this volatile political situation, probably refrained from offering the Kolathiri any solid assistance, so that the latter was forced to request the help of the Company to try to secure his position. In reciprocation, the Kolathiri promised the tolls from the Cannanore Bazaar, which the Mappilas never paid to the raja, as compensation for the expenses expected to be incurred by the Company.5 This situation indicates that the relationship between the new Kolathiri and the Ali Raja had grown increasingly uneasy. At this juncture, the Arackal Swarupam was also anxious about the mounting challenges to its control of the regional trade emanating from other ‘men of prowess’ in the vicinity of Cannanore. The Mappilas in such port towns as Dharmapatanam were trying to build up their own commercial networks by making inroads into the markets in the hinterland previously dominated by the Ali Raja. Even more serious competition in the hinterland production centres was in the offing as regional elites, especially the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara, began to take an active 156 CHAPTER SEVEN interest in reaping benefits from the burgeoning maritime commercial activities in the region.

Close encounters along the coast

The Vazhunnavar of Vadakara, who enjoyed great notoriety among the European itinerants and merchants as the protector of the infamous pirate lairs in northern Malabar, was a powerful landlord whose territory lay in the vicinity of Cannanore.6 When the opportunities provided by the European commercial competition in Malabar opened up the possibility to alter his dubious status of being ‘lord of the pirates’ to the more acceptable status of ‘mercantile lord’, his transition caused a fairly radical change in the commercial atmosphere in the area as well as in the Arabian Sea. In various communications with the Dutch, the Vazhunnavar expressed his willingness to provide the Company with a trade settlement in his territory. A well-judged generous gesture which in its turn would enable him to gain control of all the merchandise produced in the area. He was aware that the presence of the dreaded Malabar pirates scared off merchants, especially foreigners, and discouraged them from trading in his territory.7 He hoped that the establishment of a Dutch settlement would facilitate the ousting of the pirates from his area. In its turn, such an expulsion would attract more traders to his domain and hence stave off the diversion of merchandise to Cannanore and Calicut.8 In another letter, through the intermediation of his ragiadoor, Kunju Kurup, the Vazhunnavar even promised to provide the VOC with a fort built at his own expense.9 Obviously, the Vazhunnavar’s plan was a direct threat to the economic interests of the Ali Raja as both were dependent on the same hinterland for the extraction of wealth through trade and the consequent augmentation of their power status in the region. This new development complicated the power struggle in the region even more. In a letter to the Heren XVII, dated 8 April 1701, Commander Abra- ham Vink described the ruling Vazhunnavar as a respectable, capable young person, ‘quite different in character from his ancestors who have so far been known as none other than a king’s regents and patrons of a wild people who live by piracy on the high seas and in the vicinity of their beaches’.10 This sudden change in the political attitude of the local VOC officials towards the lord of Vadakara was obviously made astutely with the consequent political and commercial advantages firmly in their sights. Not only could this change of heart mean that they would be able to seize control of the cardamom supply of the region, the Vazhunnavar was also being embraced as a potential ally who would help resist the Zamorin on the border.11 THE COAST ADRIFT 157

Despite such promising beginnings, the same old story was to repeat itself. The Company officials, who were not able to take any initiative and proceed without the consent of Batavia, procrastinated, causing lamenta- ble delays in responding to the demands of the local elites. The situation was made even worse because Batavia was obviously did not favour increasing the institutional burden of the Malabar Commandment which was already reeling under a huge deficit. The Governor-General and Council were even seriously discussing letting some of the settlements go. This wavering support increased the pressure on the Cannanore officials who had to satisfy the enquiries of the local elites. They tried to postpone giving any definite answers to the queries and, as always, this procrastina- tion did not produce the desired results. On 7 March 1701, it was reported from Cannanore that, annoyed by the delays in receiving any explicit reply from the Company about help in securing his position, the Kolathiri had demanded an immediate solution. If he were not given one, he would search for an alternative means to support his cause.12 Clearly the attempts to avoid becoming involved in the regional power struggle without the promise of any immediate returns had a negative impact on Dutch political and commercial influence in Kolathunadu. Local elites, who mulled over how to use trade as an instrument to demand assistance, especially in the concrete form of gunpowder and other military material, from the Company were constantly frustrat- ed by the indifference shown. This apparent lack of enthusiasm to satisfy the demands of the Kolathiri was immediately reciprocated by the tough stance towards the Company adopted by Prince Kepoe. The Cannanore officials wrote to Cochin reporting that they had refused Kepoe’s demand for five packages of copper which he asked to be deducted from the toll.13 In reprisal, the prince ordered the Company Nayars to stop serving the Dutch and threatened to prevent the collection of the firewood essential to the fort.14 Nevertheless, the mounting pressure on the Kolathiri to mount a campaign against the Ikkeri Nayaks who were encroaching along the northern border of Malabar and the threat of combat being posed by Unnithiri from the south withheld Kepoe from entirely severing his relationship with the Company.

Trans-regional alliance against the Ikkeri Nayaka: resurgence of the border conflict In February 1702, two envoys of the Mysore raja visited Cannanore to ask the assistance of the Kolathiri princes in a campaign against the Ikkeri Nayaka.15 This request propelled the Kolathiri princes into the struggle between the various ‘successor states’ of Vijayanagara in South India. The Company reports intimate that the princes readily agreed to join the fray, 158 CHAPTER SEVEN as the Ikkeri Nayaka was still occupying some regions which had previously belonged to the Kolathiri. Prince Kepoe moved northwards with about 12,000 Nayars. A Dutch missive of 23 June 1702 reports that Kepoe succeeded in expelling the intruders and occupying such fortresses as Kaviur Kotta, Chitty Kotta, and Kanjira Kotta, and that Fort Deckol (?) was about to fall into the hands of the joint forces of Kepoe and Mysore.16 It is particularly noteworthy that Kepoe received active assistance from various quarters, including the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara who dispatched his forces to fight under him. The same Dutch report mentions that the Ali Raja refused to join the combined forces as he wanted to protect his own private commercial interests in Canara.17 Obviously the Ali Raja, who apparently had strong commercial links in Canara, was not prepared to antagonize the Ikkeri Nayaka. However, there is little doubt that he rendered the Prince covert assistance.18 When the conflict stumbled on still yielding no decisive result, Prince Kepoe was forced to request his arch-rival, Prince Unnithiri, to lend him military assistance against the Nayaka. In a gesture of rare goodwill, Prince Unnithiri not only dispatched his own military force but also rallied the fighting force of the Prince of Alladathunadu19 on his way to the front line.20 If he were to carry on a prolonged struggle against the powerful Nayaka, Prince Kepoe had to rely on extensive military assistance from potential allies. Constant requests for assistance in the form of ships and guns from the VOC were the outcome of his predicament. Although the Company was assured of a share in the spoils of the war as a compensation for such military aid, these requests were usually turned down with various excuses.21 The vacillation the Company displayed towards complying with the prince’s requests might have been partially attributable to its hesitancy about annoying the Nayaka and consequently avoiding any adverse effect on its trade interests in Canara. Although the conflict between Ikkeri and the Mysore-Cannanore combined force had come to an end by the beginning of 1703, the Ikkeri Nayaka still continued to pose a potential threat along the northern borders of Malabar.22 The cessation of the conflict was promptly followed by the official accession of the Udayamangalam Kolathiri in Maday without any opposition from other princes.23 The active involvement of the Kolathunadu princes in the campaign against the Ikkeri Nayaka confirms that the power within the Swarupam was chiefly confined to the hands of the rich and capable princes. The failure of the Kolathiris to become the embodiment of sakti or power in the realm greatly nullified their significance in the political life of Kolathunadu. The changing politico-economic conditions in the region accelerated this process of the dissemination of sakti status usually attributed to the position of the Kolathiri among various contenders in the THE COAST ADRIFT 159 region. This waning in symbolic significance intensified the struggle between various ‘men of prowess’ to bolster their own power and achieve the position of the sole custodian of sakti. As a maritime merchant and a chief contender for power in Kolathunadu, the Ali Raja had to tackle problems on two fronts—land and sea—if he were to maintain and augment his claim to sakti. But, as maritime trade was the core sinew of his power, the main challenges to his authority with which the Ali Raja had to deal came from that direction. In the ever-shifting and entirely opened-up arena of maritime commerce, the Ali Raja had to adopt a more pragmatic strategy to keep up and increase his share in trade, thereby upholding his sakti in the regional political economy. Undoubtedly, the European entrepreneurs backed by considerable capital and maritime strength were the foremost challenge to the Ali Raja’s trading interests in Cannanore. In the atmosphere of mounting competition, his responses to both ‘external’ and ‘internal’ challenges were strictly calculated to guard his commercial interests. This choice is perceptible in various incidents recounted from Cannanore by the VOC officials. For instance, the seizure of one of his ships by the Portuguese near Daman in 1705 and his subsequent reaction were indeed significantly at variance with his indifference towards intervening in the long drawn-out struggle between the Mappilas of Dharmapatanam and the nearby Nayars caused by a minor incident. In the first instance, the Ali Raja did not waste any time in handing a strongly worded complaint against the Portuguese to the Dutch and asked the latter to compensate for his loss under the terms of the treaty of 1664.24 In another similar incident, the VOC had to intervene to prevent the Ali Raja from capturing Portuguese ‘pirate’ ships near Cochin.25 In the second instance, the Ali Raja seemed to be reluctant to take sides with any of the belligerent groups which did not hold out the prospect of affording him any profit and would only stir up a hornet’s nest for him.26

The Vazhunnavar of Vadakara versus the Ali Raja However, it was not the European companies per se, but the resilience of the local elites, or at least a few of them, in responding constructively to the growing prospect of maritime commerce which threatened the commercial influence of the Arackal Swarupam in the region. The attempt of the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara to re-invent his status from that of ‘lord of the pirates’ to the promoter of ‘legitimate’ trade in the changing commercial world in northern Malabar has already been cited. The growing tension between the Vazhunnavar and the Ali Raja was not entirely unexpected as both of them had to compete with each other to dominate the spice-producing hinterland of northern Malabar. Unlike his opponent, 160 CHAPTER SEVEN the Vazhunnavar had never been a ship-owning maritime entrepreneur.27 The lack of this status did not prevent him, shrewd businessman that he was, realizing the potential of maritime trade and consequently trying to convert his territory into a hub of international trade by various means. On several occasions the Vazhunnavar, as shown above, tried to convince the Dutch Company to establish a factory in his territory. If it did so, he anticipated that it would attract merchants and spices to his realm and subsequently raise an income from tolls. In spite of his failure to woo the VOC, it seems that the lord of Vadakara was partially successful in draw- ing more trade to his coast. This inference is supported by his various requests to the Company to supply sea-passes so that he could send ships to different parts of the Indian Ocean. In a letter to Cochin, the Vazhunnavar asked the help of the Dutch in supporting his venture of building a ship which he intended to send to China.28 His requests for passes for such far destinations as Surat and Bengal indicate that the Vazhunnavar’s efforts to promote trade in his ports paid good dividends.29 Despite the reluctance of the Company to issue passes to such distant destinations as Bengal, undaunted the Vazhunnavar was able to secure alternative support from the English and the French to bring his plans to fruition.30 In one of his letters to Commander Barent Ketel, the Kolathiri complained about the dispatching of ships by the ‘Adiyodi’ (Vazhunnavar) to faraway destinations such as Bengal, Muscat, Surat, and Mocha without his consent.31 If this allegation is true, the Vazhunnavar had successfully challenged the Ali Raja’s unquestioned status as the ‘lord of the sea’ in Malabar. The enterprise of the former constantly fed a rift between the Ali Rajas and the Vazhunnavar in Malabar during the eighteenth century. In one of his letters to Cochin in 1706, the Ali Raja himself wrote about the mounting tension between the two on both land and in the sea and the possibility of an outbreak of open hostility in the near future.32 For his part, the Vazhunnavar never halted his efforts to instigate a rift between the Ali Raja and the Company. His attempt to belittle the promise of the Kolathiri to grant the right to collect tolls from Cannanore was viewed by the VOC officials as no more than as a sign of his hatred of the Ali Raja and an attempt to attract the Company trade to his territory.33 Although the local officials supported the idea of establishing a trade settlement in Vadakara,34 Batavia was never convinced of the value of the commercial prospects of such a move, especially when his record of increasing co-operation with other European competitors was taken into account.35 The Vazhunnavar was apparently not pleased with what he regarded as his neglect by the Company and its failure to heed his constant appeals for closer trade relations. He blamed the local VOC officials for caring THE COAST ADRIFT 161 only about their own advantage and not for that of the Company. He also pointed out the complex work structure of the VOC as a reason for its failure to respond quickly to the demands of the local elite and advised that ‘absolute power’ be delegated to the opperhoofd so that he could act independently of Cochin and Batavia.36 In the meantime, the Vazhunnavar persisted in his efforts to gain control of the trade in the region. His attack on the territory of Kunju Nayar, one of the prominent local landlords, in May 1706, which would have enabled him to control the Mayyazhi (Mahe) River and hence an important waterway to the spice hinterland, brought him into conflict, albeit temporarily, with the French in Panoly.37 It is noteworthy that the VOC had been informed earlier of an attempt by the Vazhunnavar to attract the French by offering them a settlement on the Mayyazhi River.38 In spite of an unexpected turn of events which led to the French departure from Panoly, the Vazhunnavar was obviously keen to attract European companies to his own domain. It was therefore natural that he reacted promptly to satisfy the desperate search by the French to obtain a settlement in Kolathunadu and he succeeded in settling them south of the Mayyazhi River in his own territory.39 The Company was informed that, in an attempt to wreak vengeance on the Ali Raja, the Vazhunnavar had approached the ‘pirates of Sivaji’, asking them to launch an attack on the Cannanore Bazaar in September 1707.40 It tried to save the situation by promising to intervene and to work out the problems between the Ali Raja and the Vazhunnavar circumventing the need for the ‘robbers’ to become involved.41 The Vazhunnavar’s claim that he had invited the Maratha sea forces was probably an attempt to sow panic among the Cannanore Mappila traders as nothing came to pass within the stated time.42

The Ali Raja: strengthening the position

On 11 March 1709, the Kolathiri died and was succeeded by his brother who was around eighty years old.43 Because of his great age, the real power remained in the hands of Prince Kepoe. Although he was on a quest to rally allies, including the VOC, who would join his conflict with the Ikkeri Nayakas, it transpired that luck had apparently deserted him.44 Even so, the internal power struggle continued to ravage the political atmosphere in the area. In an incident reported by the Dutch factor Constantyn Coup, the property of the landlord Kunju Nayar, who had allegedly mishandled a young prince who had been sent to negotiate on behalf of Prince Kepoe, was ransacked by the joint forces of Kepoe, Unnithiri, and the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara. The Dutch factor com- 162 CHAPTER SEVEN mented that the problem which could have been avoided by the judicious presentation of some gifts had been aggravated by the involvement of the Ali Raja, who encouraged the princes to pursue their grievances by promising to supply all the necessary paraphernalia of war at his own expense.45 Although the motivation behind the participation of the Ali Raja remains ambiguous, it confirms the close association of the Arackal Swarupam with the power politics in the region. After the death of the aged Kolathiri on 27 July 1712, serious concerns arose about the revival of the old factional rivalry between Princes Kepoe and Unnithiri.46 The new Kolathiri was Prince Kepoe’s eldest brother, who was described by the Dutch as ‘a shrewd and wise king’.47 The VOC was concerned about the risk of the unrelenting tension which might certainly affect its trade in Cannanore and tried to resolve the problem by mediating between the princes. The Ali Raja had also been invited to the court to attend the reconciliation talks. This invitation again confirms the crucial role of the Arackal Swarupam in sustaining the regional power equilibrium in the face of the changing circumstances.48 The accession of a new Kolathiri was anticipated with high hopes by the Company. Although his attempt to resolve the long-standing problem between the Udayamangalam Kovilakam and the Palli Kovilakam proved his administrative potential, the Company had serious doubts about his ultimate success in office because the Ali Raja was always there hovering in the wings. The VOC suspected that he was more interested in sustaining the rift between the two parties, a move which he regarded as a safe- guard for his own private interests.49 The correspondence between the Kolathiri and the Company convincingly shows that the Ali Raja associated closely with the Kolaswarupam, with the Udayamangalam Kovilakam especially, and exerted considerable influence on the political affairs of the region. The interdependence between the Udayamangalam branch and the Ali Raja in their joint efforts to uphold their status in the regional power structure might have been one of the reasons which motivated the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara to move against the Ali Raja with the help of the Company. However, the friendly relationship between the Ali Raja and the Kolathiri proved to be a major impediment to his ambitions to gain decisive control of the hinterland spice supply. His strategy was to destabilize this power relationship by pitting the Company against the Ali Raja. Putting his machinations into practice, in 1712 the Vazhunnavar wrote to Commander Barent Ketel alleging that Kunjoessa Crauw Alias Ali Raja had not only usurped all the rights and privileges of the Kolathiri, but had even begun to mint new coinage. He requested the immediate intervention of the Company to protect the prerogative of the raja to strike coinage.50 The right to mint coins was deemed to be an exceptional privilege by THE COAST ADRIFT 163 the most powerful political elites in Malabar.51 Shrewdly, the Vazhunnavar was hinting at the political motives being nurtured by the Ali Raja in the hope of transforming himself into an independent sovereign in his own right. However, these allegations, whether founded or unfounded, did not produce the desired effect as long as the Ali Raja maintained a good understanding with the Kolathiris. Quite the reverse was true. On one of his occasional visits to the fort on 27 December 1713, Prince Kepoe requested that the Company mediate with the Ali Raja to encourage him to recommence the minting of the local coins, the fanum and the tara (taram), which had not been issued for the last thirty years owing to the disunity among the princes.52 In all probability, this is an indication that the Ali Raja had already begun to mint coins with the full consent of the Kolathiris. His control over the supply of precious metals from West Asia and elsewhere was crucial in the monetization of the local economy. In such a weak political system as that in Kolathunadu, it was not an unexpected move that the Ali Raja should begin to mint coins for local and international commercial purposes.53 On 5 December 1713, two of the Brahmins of the Kolathiri visited Cochin. They promised to annotate the two letters from the Kolathiri and the Vazhunnavar which had been received in Cochin the day before. These letters raised grave questions about the authority of the Ali Raja. Their contents averred that the Ali Rajas had been granted the authority over ‘18 Maldive islands’ and the title ‘Ali Raja’ on the strict condition that they make regular payments to the Kolathiris.54 Accordingly, the incumbent Ali Raja and his predecessor, ‘Kartamamaly’, had not been duly honoured with the title because of their failure to satisfy this condition. The Ali Raja was blamed for instigating the problems between the princes and it was alleged that he was building a fort so that he could break away from the authority of the Kolathiri with the help of Prince Unnithiri, using the pretext of the threat of the ‘Sivaji’s robbers’ as grounds for his construction. The last accusation, that the Ali Raja mistreated Brahmins and dese- crated Malabar temples, can be taken as a feeble attempt by the Brahmins to ‘ideologize’ the growing commercial rivalry between the Arackal Swarupam and the Vazhunnavar. However, the overall tenor of the report was to stress that the Ali Raja had no right to claim independent sovereignty on the grounds of his commercial wealth. Although his behaviour was projected as a challenge to the ‘traditional’ power order, in reality the conflict was between the local landed elite, who had quite recently become attracted by the profits to be had from maritime trade, and the commercial elite, who had been dependent almost entirely on maritime trade as their source of power for centuries. This conclusion is apparent in the letter sent to Commander Barent Ketel by the Kolathiri at the 164 CHAPTER SEVEN beginning of 1714. The Kolathiri not only refuted the allegations of a conflict between the Ali Raja and the ruling elites on the grounds of the various issues stated above, he went as far as to assert that the Vazhunnavar had forged the letter in the name of the Kolathiri to serve his own malign purposes against the Ali Raja. The Kolathiri alleged that it was his madampi, the Vazhunnavar, who had overturned the established power order by dispatching ships without the consent of the Kolathiri and without paying him the tolls and other dues which were his right.55 In his letter to Barent Ketel, the Ali Raja maintained that it was the Vazhunnavar’s intention to turn the Company against him by passing on such falsified information.56

New regime and the continuing power conflict

The death of the Kolathiri on 22 May 1716 once again set the scene for a deep crisis in regional power relations.57 The succession of Tekkelamkur Tamburan (second senior-most) to the position of Kolathiri created new alignments in the existing political configurations. He was an adoptee from the Travancore royal line; a position which largely estranged him from the autochthonous power group in the region.58 Prince Kepoe and the Ali Rajas, who had been close to the symbolic power centre for years, had gradually begun to edge away from it. Consequently, the new Kolathiri became isolated from the powerful local elites and princes, which logically undermined his claim to power. This situation deepened the complications in the political struggle in Cannanore. Although the intricacies in the political affairs showed no signs of being unravelled, there were a few changes in the position of the contesters for power in Cannanore. Prince Unnithiri ascended to the stanam of Vadakkelamkur and continued to pose the main challenge to the political authority of the Udayamangalam Kovilakam in Kolathunadu. Moreover, the relationship of the Company with the Ali Raja in Cannanore began to deteriorate as a consequence of the changing circumstances. The Bazaar which was situated on the shores of Cannanore Bay remained unprotected by any defence structures until the end of the seventeenth century. This exposure to assault was certainly a matter of concern in view of the changing political situation. The mounting danger of attack along the Malabar Coast by the Sidis and Marathas provided the Ali Raja with adequate justification to strengthen the defence of the Bazaar so that it would be ready to face any unexpected turn of events from either internal or external forces. The building of a rectangular construction, called ‘Fort Wallarwattam’, to protect the Bazaar, was given a boost in 1712 when rumours ran rife about a huge combined Sidi- THE COAST ADRIFT 165

Sambaji force supposedly on the move along the coast.59 Despite the manoeuvrings of the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara which he had devised to turn the Company against the Ali Raja in this matter, the Dutch initially ignored the rumours of the move, not deeming it a serious threat.60 However, Batavia was showing concern about what it deemed the sheer negligence of the local officials in observing and reporting on developments in the Bazaar, not to mention the Ali Raja’s attempt to construct the fort without obtaining the prior permission of Cochin.61 The subsequent attempt of the Ali Raja to cultivate a coconut grove between the Dutch fort and the Bazaar did indeed jolt an immediate reaction from Cochin, because it was interpreted as a tactical plan to shield the newly built fort and the Bazaar from the surveillance and cannon of the Dutch fortress.62 The political disorder initiated by the death of the Kolathiri in 1716 and the plundering of Baliapatanam by the Sidis in the same year gave the Ali Raja ample opportunity to carry on with his construction plan.63 The mounting rumours about a Mappila conspiracy to overrun the Dutch fort gave rise to greater apprehension about his construction drive which by then was in full swing in the Bazaar.64 The growing power of the Ali Raja was causing perceptible concern not just to the Company, but also to other members of the local elite, including the Kolathiri. The new Kolathiri, who was virtually isolated in the political structure, was desperately striving to ally himself with the Company to validate his authority in the Swarupam. His attempt to regain the alienated rights of the Kolathiri brought him into conflict with both Kepoe and the Ali Raja. The growing uneasiness between the Kolathiri and the Ali Raja came to the surface about the issue of a ship stranded on the Cannanore Coast. In a request for the assistance of the Company in salvaging his honour and regaining his rights to tolls and other sources of income, the Kolathiri accused the Ali Raja of attempting to gain domination of the region by instigating a schism among the princes.65 However, at this juncture the growing power struggle within the Kolaswarupam weakened the possibility of the emergence of a joint front against the Ali Raja.

Alienating from the Kolathiris

1. Unnithiri At this point, the Vadakkelamkur Unnithiri, who had successfully maintained a virtually independent political status in Kolathunadu for a longish period of time, finally decided to break away from the nominal authority of the Kolathiri. Unnithiri’s self-proclamation of his status as an 166 CHAPTER SEVEN independent raja in 1717 was the final blow to the severely weakened stature of the ‘raja-ship’ in Kolathunadu.66 This final calamity was preceded by Unnithiri’s attempt to ruin the accession ceremony of the new Kolathiri in Maday. The Dutch reported that, although he tried to impede the ritual ceremonies by employing armed men to cause a disruption, his meddling was foiled by the Kolathiri’s men.67 This incident necessitated the splitting up of the royal status between the two rival power groups in the Kolaswarupam.68 The Company was anxious that the Ali Raja would seize the opportunity to exploit the situation to strengthen his position by ‘playing the master over the divided princes at his pleasure’.69 Suspicious that a secret agreement had been sealed between Prince Kepoe and the Ali Raja, the Company took immediate measures to strengthen the defence of the fort so as to be ready to undertake any urgent measures.70 In this chaotic political situation, as mentioned before, the Kolathiri was forced to rely completely on the Company to defend his status. In an intriguing letter to Admiral William Backer Jacobson in Chettua, the Kolathiri pleaded for help to bolster his power asking the Company to repeat the efforts it had made for the Cochin Raja.71 By requesting a helping hand to fight against both the Ali Raja and Unnithiri, the Kolathiri confirmed his willingness to put the country under the control of the Company.72 This desperate attempt by the Kolathiri to defend his status illustrates the dynamic changes to which the political economy of Cannanore was being subjected in the opening decades of the eighteenth century. By the end of 1718, the power configuration in Cannanore was a very perplexing one in which, as commented on by the Company men, ‘all were pursuing their own interests without bothering about the well- being of the kingdom at all’.73 After the establishment of their factory in Tellichery, the English were steadily expanding their influence in the regional trade and politics. Their growing political influence was explicitly revealed in their engagement with a member of the local Nayar elite, the Narangapurathu Nayar, in an effort to recover the huge debt he owed them.74 Although he continued to maintain his strong relationship with the English camp, Unnithiri had no intention of antagonizing the VOC. The Company described him as a ‘duplicitous man straddling both sides’.75 Unaware of their aspersions, Unnithiri was gradually strengthening his self-styled position as an independent power centre with the help of the English. In September 1718 the factor in Cannanore was invited with the English to attend the consecration of a new heydensche pagood (heathen temple) which had been built by the Vadakkelamkur. It was obviously a symbolic act of secession and the announcement of the construction of a new power centre within the Swarupam. Naturally, this aroused the displeasure of the Kolathiri.76 THE COAST ADRIFT 167

On 21 March 1720, Ali Raja Conjammisie passed away and was succeeded by his nephew, Coenisja Mamale.77 After the prescribed days of mourning had been observed, the first action of the new Ali Raja was to mobilize his people and the Vadakkelamkur to take up arms against a Nayar noble called ‘Dangre’. Despite its success, this operation did not bring about any fundamental change in the relationship between the Ali Raja and the Vadakkelamkur. The attempt by the Vadakkelamkur, who had been buoyed up by this feat of arms, to attack Kottayam ended in dis- aster. He blamed the Ali Raja, who did not offer the anticipated help, for the debacle.78 The Company was informed that Unnithiri had advised the Ali Raja to attack the Dutch fort on his authority. The Dutch alleged that Unnithiri, who was jealous of the burgeoning power of the Ali Raja in the country and his intimacy with the Dutch, had entertained plans to turn him against the Company.79 The supportive role played by the English in the background to all these operations is noteworthy. They not only assisted Unnithiri to attain independent ritual status by supporting the construction of the temple, on a more practical level they also provided the gunpowder and lead needed for his campaign against Kottayam—‘the best trade centre in the whole kingdom’.80 The English roundly supported the political aspirations of the Vadakkelamkur, a move which helped them to penetrate the inland markets and gain control of them. The letter sent from Cannanore on 18 February 1720 depicts the growing fear of the Dutch who were gradually losing control over the spice trade, especially that in cardamom, to the English who had effectively outsmarted them.81 In another letter to Cochin, the Cannanore factor wrote that, notwithstanding the promise of the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara to trade with the Dutch, the merchants of Vadakara preferred the English who did not hesitate to procure other local merchandise, including pepper and arrack, from them.82

2. The Ali Raja The death of the Vadakkelamkur Unnithiri on 29 July 1720, preceded by that of Prince Kepoe a few days earlier, had immediate political ramifications in Cannanore which turned out to be unpropitious for the Ali Raja.83 The deaths of these princes signalled the end of the protracted struggle between the two most powerful political elites in Kolaswarupam. The death of Kepoe certainly seems to have had an adverse effect on the position of the Ali Raja in regional power relations. It severed, if only temporarily, the Ali Raja’s long-standing relationship with the Kolaswarupam. Prince Kepoe, who had maintained a good understanding with the Arackal Swarupam for the sake of his political ambitions, also served the purpose of the Ali Rajas in expanding their influence in the 168 CHAPTER SEVEN region. Despite this support, the political atmosphere after his death was not well disposed to the Ali Raja. Neither the Kolathiri nor Unnithiri’s successor—the two prominent competitors in the regional power struggle—was sympathetic to him. The growing dominance of the Ali Raja in the local power relations was an unquestionable threat to both of them and they in their turn preferred the support of the European companies which were thought to have no direct interest or role in the regional power relations, except for the purposes of trade. The Kolathiri, who was determined to restore the lost status of the ‘raja-ship’ in the regional power structure, allowed the Ali Raja no chance to make use of his conflict with the new Vadakkelamkur. The closely knit relationship of the English, the strongest competitor of the Ali Raja in the local markets, with this Palli Kovilakam prince also curtailed any possibility of a compromise between these two members of the local elite. This changing power relationship culminated in a series of clashes between the Mappilas of the Bazaar and the Nayar soldiers of the Vadakkelamkur and his supporting elites. According to the Dutch, the new Vadakkelamkur, Coenja Ommen, followed in the footsteps of his uncle, Unnithiri, by allying himself with the English and asserting his claim to the ‘Kolathiri-ship’.84 The death of the powerful Prince Kepoe of the Udayamangalam Kovilakam also boosted his claim to the kingship. Unsurprisingly, the initial plan of the Vadakkelamkur was to move against the Ali Raja—a major challenge to his claim to power in Kolathunadu and a key obstacle to the English domination in the regional trade.85 The Ali Raja responded to this grave situation quickly by strengthening the defences of the Bazaar to which he added a large number of cannons and summoning assistance from every possible direction.86 Although the Vadakkelamkur requested the help of the VOC in assisting his claim to kingship because they suspected a conspiracy between him and the English ‘troublemaker’ Robert Adams to turn the entire country against the Mappilas, the Company men did not deign to favour it with a positive response.87 In their eyes, a victory by the Prince would have certainly meant the success of the English in dominating the regional spice trade. In order to prevent this commercial calamity, the VOC was forced to support the cause of the Ali Raja. The involvement of this European commercial interest added a new dimension to the internal power struggle between the Ali Raja and the Vadakkelamkur. The final showdown between the Vadakkelamkur and the Ali Raja occurred on 25 May 1721 when the former became embroiled in a direct conflict with Mappila labourers who were working outside the Bazaar. The report from the envoys of the Ali Raja to the VOC provides us with some prior background to the conflict between the two. Allegedly, the Vadakkelamkur had attempted to extract customary payments from cer- THE COAST ADRIFT 169 tain estates of the Ali Raja (Kanatur Tara) by claiming their overlord-ship. This initiated a series of clashes between the supporters of the two ‘men of prowess’ in the region.88 The incident on 25 May was the culmination of this development. In it, Prince Coenja Ommen and his men were completely overpowered by the Mappilas and he was taken to the Bazaar as a captive.89 Although the Prince was later released, if the tale of the Ali Raja is to be believed, with all due respect, the action elicited an outcry among other local elites.90 The maltreatment and disgrace the Prince claimed to have been suffered at the hands of the Ali Raja was sufficient to put the Vadakkelamkur-English strategy against the Ali Raja into action. The Vadakkelamkur successfully turned a major section of the members of the elite against the Ali Raja and unleashed a mass attack against the port towns along the coast in which the Ali Raja had dominant control. The Dutch claimed the reaction had led to the brutal assassination of the Mappilas in certain bazaars in the north of the kingdom including, ‘against the custom and practice of the heathens’, that of women and children.91 In an earlier Dutch report, it was stated that the Mappilas from Cape Ezhimala and Nileswaram had been expelled by the local elite.92 However, the powerful Mappila port towns of Dharmapatanam, Baliapatanam, and Maday successfully withstood the assault.93 The Dutch were surprised at the palpable indifference of the Mappilas of other southern Mappila port towns to the developments in Cannanore.94 The attacks were focused entirely, as observed by the VOC, on the Ali Raja’s people, property, and places.95 The widespread participation of groups referred to as Tiyyas and Malayas ‘from the highlands’, who joined the Nayars in the attack on the Cannanore Bazaar, turned out to be a decisive factor which significantly strengthened the anti-Ali Raja faction against the formidable defence of the Bazaar.96 This unforeseen situation indubitably minimized the chances of an easy victory over the Princes and it simultaneously forced the Ali Raja to adopt a more defensive position.97 The reports from Cannanore also observed that other members of the local elite from distant places like Kunju Nayar and such personages as the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara had joined the fray. The Dutch were also quick to point out the alleged active involvement of the English behind the decision of the last-mentioned who had never at any time been sympathetic to the Prince.98 It was a known fact that the English in Tellichery supplied all essential support, including rice, gunpowder, and lead which they transported to the Prince on their vessels.99 This active English involvement in the struggle was the main reason which stimulated the VOC to intervene. Its first serious concern was to ensure the security of the fort, on which, its men were afraid, the English had set their sights as a prime target.100 There was growing concern among 170 CHAPTER SEVEN the Dutch officials about the necessity of providing support to the Ali Raja. An English success in controlling the regional spice trade through the Vadakkelamkur would hardly have left the Company European spice trade unscathed. The attempts by the Vadakkelamkur to occupy the small hill situated near Carla (Kadalay) and to isolate the Bazaar from Dharmapatanam were promptly opposed by the VOC. The possibility of positioning cannons on this hillock would certainly have given the Prince, and with him the English, the advantage in controlling Cannanore Bay. The Vadakkelamkur was quick to defend the occupation of the hill, stating that it was no more than an undertaking to restore a ruined palace of his predecessors.101 Nevertheless, the swing of the Company towards the Ali Raja resulted in a series of exchanges between the Kolathiri and the Vadakkelamkur on the one hand and the VOC on the other. Although the Cannanore officials had been advised by Cochin to make an endeavour to settle the dispute peaceably through the mediation of the Company, results were slow in coming.102 The initial attempts of the Company to exploit the discord among the princes so as to weaken the anti-Ali Raja front did not work out.103 It seems that the Vadakkelamkur succeeded, at least in the early phase, in uniting the princes of both Kovilakams under his general leadership against the Ali Raja.104 The failure of the local officials to reach a peaceful agreement left the Company with only one choice: to give the Ali Raja its active support by supplying him war materials on demand.105 By September the persistent efforts of the Ali Raja and the Company to instigate a schism among the princes had borne fruit. Although some of the Udayamangalam princes and the Kolathiri as well had shown an inclination to settle the dispute, the conditions they advanced were so unacceptable to the Ali Raja he preferred to continue the fight to raise the siege of his important trade centres.106 Unquestionably, the powerlessness of the princes at sea and the support of the VOC were both factors which helped the Ali Raja to continue to pursue his maritime trade without any serious obstruction.107 Both the Company and the Ali Raja were scrupu- lous in their efforts to guard the coast to prevent English vessels from approaching the bay.108 By the end of the year, the Vadakkelamkur and the Kolathiri had made more attempts to settle the dispute but at a price. The mediation of Kottakkal Marakkar Kuttimusa in trying to resolve the dispute was rejected outright by the Ali Raja as one of its terms was the destruction of his fort in Cannanore.109 The evidence shows that the anti-Ali Raja alliance began to falter when the internal struggle for power revived after a short lapse. In a letter to Cochin, the First Prince of Udayamangalam unequivocally assured the Ali Raja of the support of the Kovilakam and asked for monetary assistance to assure the support of his allies and servants.110 The THE COAST ADRIFT 171

Ali Raja and the Company also succeeded in luring the Prince of Naduvil Kovilakam (Cunhome Tamban) and Chetticherry Nambutiri111 into their alliance to discuss the matter of peace with the Ali Raja.112 Although such an attempt ultimately failed because of the intervention of other princes, the belligerent letter written to the VOC by the Kolathiri testifies that there were serious rifts among the princes on the issue of peace.113 The rewards of the steady efforts of the Ali Raja and the Company to gain the support of other local elites outside the Kolaswarupam were not particularly encouraging. Although the Kottayam princes promised to support the Ali Raja in name, they did not offer any active help in the conflict. While the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara pursued his rivalry with the Ali Raja, the Kottakkal Marakkar Kuttimusa, as the Dutch observed, refused to help his ‘co-religionist’ on the grounds of his relations with the English.114 Nevertheless, after extensive bargaining, the Ali Raja was able to ‘purchase’ the peace for 10,000 gold Cannanore fanum and an elephant. For the time being this brought the seemingly endless confrontation between the Kolathiri and the Ali Raja in Cannanore to an end.115

Conclusion

The period between 1698 and 1723 witnessed increasing tension in the power structure of Kolathunadu. Although there was a political shift within the Kolaswarupam in 1698 when the right to assume the ‘raja- ship’ passed from the Palli Kovilakam to the Udayamangalam Kovilakam, the actual power remained in the hands of the most prominent princes of the Swarupam—Unnithiri and Kepoe Tamburan. Unnithiri’s self- declaration as an independent raja in 1717 was the culmination of the mounting pressure in the Swarupam. Generally speaking, the Ali Rajas were closely allied to the ‘official’ Kolathiri camp, at least until 1716 when the Tekkelamkur Tamburan, who was an adoptee from the Travancore family, acceded to the office of Kolathiri. In the meantime, owing to the growing challenge to the established order within the Kolaswarupam, the Kolathiris were forced to depend on the Ali Rajas to maintain their status in the elite configuration in Kolathunadu. This period also witnessed the simultaneous rise of new power centres in Kolathunadu, which seriously challenged the dominance enjoyed by the Arackal Swarupam in the political economy of the region. The expanding maritime trade opportunities, promoted to a great extent by the ongoing competition among the various European trading companies for Malabar pepper, opened up new opportunities through which the local elites could appropriate a share of the profit. The emergence of the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara as a competitor of the Ali Rajas in the control 172 CHAPTER SEVEN of the maritime trade of the region was one consequence of this trend. The incessant strivings of the Ali Rajas to maintain and enhance their political power and commercial influence in the region and to withstand the new challenges provided the background to the 1721 outbreak. The exertions of the competing European trading companies to foster their own agendas by winning over the support of the local elites was certainly a complicating factor in power relations in Kolathunadu. Directly or indirectly, both the English and the Dutch contributed to the intensification of the internal power struggle in Kolathunadu. The open conflict which broke out between the Ali Raja and the Kolathiri factions in 1721 was the culmination of the mounting pressure in the power structure of Kolathunadu. This violent outbreak was an indication that the Ali Raja was gradually drifting away from the traditional power centre of Kolathunadu—the Kolaswarupam—and had begun to assert a more independent status in the regional power structure. 173

CONCLUSION

The point of departure of this study was the doubts raised about the plau- sibility of two dominant tendencies in Kerala historiography. The first of these is the anachronistic approach of a so-called religious frontier which divides Kerala between Muslim Mappilas and a more indigenous, ‘Hindu’ local society. A closer examination of the developments which took place in Kolathunadu between 1663 and 1723 demonstrates the unproductive- ness of analysing the events from such a perspective. The Mappilas of Malabar in general and Kolathunadu in particular did not constitute one single political interest group organized under a distinct ‘Islamic’ identity but were segmented into various factions functioning as intrinsic components of the regional socio-political order. The weakness of the second approach is that it has analysed kingship in Kerala too narrowly as a problematic concept which needs to seek some external form of legitimacy, in particular that provided by Brahmins. In my view, both tendencies have led to a serious de-contextualization of the existing early-modern regional identities. This is not to argue that trans-regional social identities did not exist or were wholly insignificant in Malabar, but I would like to suggest that they were not the sole or, put another way, the dominant factors which shaped the history of the region. In Kolathunadu, the regional cosmological concept of sakti, in which ‘religious’ identities do not seem to have accrued any particular importance, exerted an enormous influence on the power relations. In fact, the Arackal Swarupam and the Mappila Muslims of the region constituted an integral part of this socio- political framework. The dissemination of Islam in the region was a slow process. Importantly, a large-scale ‘conversion’ effectuated by Islamic institutional mechanisms was absent in pre-colonial Malabar.1 Traces of any such development are even weaker in Kolathunadu. The Mappilas of Kolathunadu were mainly, though not exclusively, traders by profession and made up a trading ‘caste’ in the society. It is notable that Duarte Barbosa, a Portuguese official who was acquainted with the local language and spent long years in Cannanore and Calicut, classifies the ‘heathen’ not according to the Brahmanical four-fold varna order, but according to the way in which he observed these social groups functioning in the society. Such social components were more akin to professional groups constituted in the form of communities with their own ritual systems.2 Among these communities, the Mappilas should not be conceived of as a segregated ‘religious’ group, but as a professional commercial jati which 174 CONCLUSION fitted rather well into the social structure. Neither ‘Mappila’ nor ‘Jonaka’—the two common denominations by which the local Muslims were referred to in local Malayalam sources—seems to have had any particular ‘religious’ connotations. In spite of a long tradition of contact with the Islamic world across the Indian Ocean rim and the political clout they gained under the Rajas, Cannanore was not transformed into a hub of Islamic learning.3 It seems that ulama exerted no substantial influence on the Muslim population of Malabar until the nineteenth century when the local political system was eliminated under the colonial system.4 It is therefore not surprising that the Malabar Muslims were considered ‘corrupted Muslims’ by their ‘puritan’ counterparts in West Asia.5 In brief, the socio-political actions of the Mappila Muslims of Kolathunadu in general and the Ali Rajas in particular can be satisfactorily explained only from the local perspective of sakti. All these factors do not mean that the regional political economy remained static until the advent of the colonial occupation. There was indeed growing tension in the power relations in Kolathunadu attributable to various reasons. Geographical and demographic factors limited the possibility of any expansion in agricultural output. Consequently, the alternative resource mobilization possibility was centred on maritime trade. However, the prospects for the local elites to appropriate a surplus from maritime trade were restricted by the dominance in the regional trade of the Arackal Swarupam, commanding resources and exerting considerable control over the merchants, mostly Mappilas, and over the hinterland markets in the region. Having been an integral part of a complex Indian Ocean trading network for centuries, it was very difficult for other local elites to displace this well-constructed system. The growing power of the Ali Raja in the regional political economy remained almost unchallenged until the VOC, the English East India Company, and English private traders began to make their presence felt in the regional market and set about appropriating a share in the local trade. Even though the VOC was initially poised to challenge the dominance of the Ali Rajas in Cannanore, it soon transpired that this would be an unprofitable and unsuccessful undertaking. The aspirations of the Dutch Company to control the regional pepper trade in order to regulate the European market proved unattainable without being prepared to pay a heavy cost. With the limited manpower and resources it had at its disposal in Cannanore, the Company was never in a position to demolish the extended commercial network run by the Ali Rajas, which encompassed both the hinterland and the coastal belt of Malabar. By the 1680s, the influence of the VOC in Kolathunadu was being increasingly confined to the physical boundaries of the fort. Because of the irregularity of their appearances, patrols by armed VOC ships along the Malabar Coast did CONCLUSION 175 not have any lasting impact on the local trade network in Kolathunadu. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the VOC had to withdraw from the pepper market in Cannanore altogether. The weakening of the VOC influence in Kolathunadu in the 1680s was also hastened by the changing commercial policy of the Company in Malabar. The aggressive commercial policy combined with active intervention in regional political affairs promoted by Van Goens in Malabar, also followed to an extent by Van Reede, gave way to a more compromising attitude. The failure of Van Reede either to strengthen the ‘raja-ship’ in Kolathunadu on the lines of the Cochin model or to make effective inroads into the regional trade with the help of the Kolathiri by the expedient of marginalizing the Ali Rajas could have influenced subsequent VOC policy, which was to adopt a more co-operative attitude towards the latter. The failure of the commercial venture of the Company in Mysore, contrived in an endeavour to usurp Mappila commercial control in the region, could have also been a factor which inspired this policy change. In precisely the same period, the growing presence of the English, especially the private traders, along the coast lent the commercial and political presence of the Europeans in the region a new dimension. In spite of initial setbacks in its efforts to take root in the northern part of Malabar, the influence of the English East India Company grew rapidly after the establishment of the Tellichery Factory in 1682. Above all, the success of the English in attracting local trade depended on their ability to build a close rapport with the local elites and trading classes. Unlike the VOC which claimed its right to trade in Cannanore as an independent political entity by virtue of its conquest of the port from the Portuguese, the English traded within the confines of the existing power set-up in the region. Their willingness to pay tolls on merchandise and to supply war materials on demand was a great incentive to the local elite whose members were constantly striving to enhance their power in the regional political structure. This elite support undoubtedly facilitated the English Company in gaining easy access to the regional trade. The English readiness to purchase with ready cash at market prices and to give advance payments prior to delivery proved a very attractive inducement to the small-scale local traders. Certainly, the presence of a strong English private trade interest in the regional trade gave the commercial presence of the English Company more flexibility. English privateers, who traded principally in low value, bulk agricultural products, paved the way for a close association between the local suppliers and the English Company. This inevitably helped the English Company to grab more control of the spice trade in the face of mounting Dutch antagonism. The growing English and French presence in North Malabar was a 176 CONCLUSION matter of great concern to the VOC. Its officials were afraid that these European rivals would appropriate a considerable share of the Malabar pepper trade and consequently destabilize the pepper market in Europe. This fear, combined with the political and commercial disappointments mentioned earlier, had forced the VOC to revamp its commercial policy in Cannanore by the closing decades of the seventeenth century. Instead of offering the Ali Raja unrelenting opposition, the Company entered into a strategic co-operation with him in its endeavours to check the increasing English and French influence in the regional trade. The growing competition between the European companies had repercussions on the elite power relations in Kolathunadu. The strong Euro- pean presence in the regional trade opened up new avenues for the local ‘men of prowess’ to claim a share in the profit from the burgeoning maritime trade in the region. As the companies were keen to prevail over the formidable trade network operating under the Ali Rajas in order to penetrate the hinterland supply lines, they had to win the assistance of the local elites at all costs. Some of these local elites successfully exploited this opportunity to forge closer relations with the companies, a decision which eventually helped them to enhance their position in the regional power relations. The comparative technological superiority of the Euro- peans in their employment of firearms and navigational techniques also encouraged a growing demand from the local elites.6 While the VOC was hesitant to heed requests to provide such assistance, the English had no such qualms about satisfying their demands. Consequently, as the last chapter reveals, the English Company emerged as a crucial player in the constantly shifting power relations galvanizing the regional political economy. The success of some of the local elites in taking advantage of this situation to carve out their own niche in the regional trade clashed directly with the interests of the Ali Raja. The intensifying competition to control the production and supply system in the hinterland, which had long been virtually the sole preserve of the Ali Raja, was a reflection of the power structure in the region. Ineluctably under such circumstances, the fluctuations in the power relations between various ‘men of prowess’ in the region intensified during this period. Seizing the opportunity, the centrifugal forces operating within the Kolaswarupam gained considerable strength. Although at first glance the upshot appears to have been a clash between two opposing dominant lineages in the Swarupam, namely the Palli and Udayamangalam Kovilakams, a closer look at the sources reveals a much wider canvas of change. As the last chapters show, the struggle for power transcended the structural boundaries of the kovilakams and the Kolaswarupam and encompassed the entire regional cosmos. The Ali Rajas’ close involvement in the struggle among the CONCLUSION 177

Kolathiri princes and other ‘men of prowess’ was an integral part of this struggle for power. The intensifying competition to gain access to the surplus generated by maritime trade also set off centrifugal tendencies in the ‘informal’ maritime state of the Ali Raja. The attempt by the Ali Raja to assume direct control of the neighbouring Mappila port of Dharmapatanam was strenuously opposed by the local Mappila elite family which possessed the status or stanam of the karthavu. Later, the rise to prominence of the Mappila trading house of the Keyis of Tellichery, in alliance with the English, can be perceived as an outcome of this trend.7 Likewise, the growing determination of the local elites to make their mark in the maritime trade offered the Mappila merchants along the coast new opportunities. The success reaped by the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara in maritime commerce would not have been possible without the assistance of the local Mappila traders. These new alliances helped to ignite a new round of conflicts between the Kolathiri princes and the Ali Raja in the third decade of the eighteenth century. The conflict which erupted between the Ali Raja and the Kolathiri princes in 1721 was therefore the outcome of the mounting pressures within the power structure of the region. The striving of the Ali Rajas and other local elites to enhance their power status in the regional political order by expanding their resource base ultimately led to an open clash between these interest groups. Religious consciousness hardly affected this development, if at all. As is revealed in the letters sent to the Company by the members of the local elites, the latter were concerned with the contra- vention of the social order by the Ali Raja and his entourage. None of the correspondence to the VOC from either the Ali Raja or his opponents contains any references to the religious difference between the two engaging factions.8 The conflict—an offshoot of both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ stimuli—was confined to the question of the reproduction of the social order within the region. The staunch support rendered the Ali Raja by the VOC and the willingness of the English to endorse the princes did not have much to do with this internal power struggle. In both cases, these were strategic choices made to spoil any intention the other might have nurtured to gain a stronger foothold in the regional trade with the assistance of the local elites. In spite of their intimate involvement in the struggle, the English and the Dutch looked at the developments from a different angle from that adopted by the local elite and consequently each participated with its own distinct agenda. Apparently, it was not the Mappilas but these European company men who formed a ‘frontier’ group which remained at the periphery of the local socio-political system.

179

NOTES

Notes to Introduction

1 Peter Hardy, quoted in S. Nurul Hassan, ‘Medieval Indian History: Danger of Communal Interpretation and the Need for Reconsidering Priorities’, in id., edited and introduced by Satish Chandra, Religion, State and Society in Medieval India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 27. 2 K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). André Wink, Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic world, I (Leiden: Brill, 1990). 3 Quoted in Lakshmi Subramanian, ‘Of Pirates and Potentates: Maritime Jurisdiction and the Construction of Piracy in the Indian Ocean’, in Devleena Ghosh and Stephen Muecke (eds.), Cultures of Trade: Indian Ocean Exchanges (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), 20. 4 In recent decades, scholars have paid particular attention to casting more light on the close association between maritime trade and political formation in early-modern South Asia. For instance, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, ‘Of Imarat and Tijarat: Asian Merchants and State Power in the Western Indian Ocean, 1400 to 1750’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 37/4 (Oct. 1995), 750-80. See also Sanjay Subrahmanyam and C. A. Bayly, ‘Portfolio Capitalists and the Political Economy of Early Modern India’, The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 25/4 (1988), 401-24. 5 Some scholars contend that ‘Mappila’ is a derivative of ‘Mahapilla’, which means ‘the great child’. Another interpretation states that the term ‘Mappila’ means ‘son-in-law’. Another denomination used to refer to the local Muslims in local Malayalam sources was ‘Jonaka’. This might be derived from ‘yavana’—a Sanskrit term for Ionians. The Mappilas gradually spread along the coast of Kerala but tended to settle especially in various ports in the northern part of the region, of which Calicut and Cannanore were the most important. They were considered the descendants of both pure Arab traders and local women and of local ‘converts’. Probably this mixed Mappila identity included some Marakkayar Muslim elements from the Coromandel Coast too. There are indications that a few Marakkayar traders from the Coromandel Coast had migrated to Malabar to pursue trade as early as the end of the fifteenth century and had subsequently gained prominence in the maritime trade of the region. This ‘Marakkayar’ identity gradually amalgamated into the general ‘Mappila’ identity. For example, by the middle of the sixteenth century in Calicut the title ‘Marakkar’ had become an honorary one, bestowed by the local king, the Zamorin, on the prominent Mappilas of the region. This indicates the flexibility of social identities in pre-colonial South India. C. Gopalan Nair, Malayalathile Mappilamar [Mappilas of Malayalam] (Manglore: Basel Mission Press, 1917), 2; C. A. Innes and F. B. Evans, Malabar and Anjengo, I (Madras: Superintendent Government Press, 1908), 26; S. Jayaseela Stephen, The Coromandel Coast and its Hinterlands: Economy, Society and Political System (AD 1500–1600) (Delhi: Manohar, 1997), 114-15; M. R. Raghava Varier (ed.), Sthanarohanam: Chatangukal [Ascension to the stanam: Ceremonies] (Sukapuram: Vallathol Vidya Peedam, 2004), 46-7. 6 M. R. Raghava Varier (ed.), Keralolpathi Granthavari: The Kolathunadu Traditions [Origin of the Kerala chronicle: The Kolathunadu traditions] (Calicut: Calicut University, 1984), 25. 7 Ibid. 30. 8 The Kulasekharas ruled over Malabar between c. AD 800 to AD 1124. See for more details M. G. S. Narayanan, Perumals of Kerala (Calicut: Private Circulation, 1996). Among the political powers which emerged after the disappearance of the Kulasekharas of Mahodayapuram, Venadu (later the kingdom of Travancore) in the south, Cochin 180 NOTES

(Perumpadappu Swarupam), Calicut (Nediyirippu Swarupam), and Cannanore (Kolaswarupam) in the north were considered the most prominent. 9 Duarte Barbosa, The Book of Duarte Barbosa: An Account of the Countries Bordering on the Indian Ocean and their Inhabitants, II, ed. M. L Dames (repr., London: Hakluyt Society, 1921), 79, 85; A. Galletti, J. van der Burg, and P. Groot (eds.), The Dutch in Malabar: Selection from the Records of the Madras Government, No. 13 (Madras: Printed by the Superintendent, Government Press, 1911), 143. 10 The term ‘Malabar’ was used by the early Arab travellers to denote the western coast of India, but in later centuries it was confined to denoting the pepper-producing south- western coast of India which roughly corresponds to the modern Kerala State of the Indian Union. Under the British colonial administration only the northern part of Kerala, with the exception of the modern Kasaragod District, was known as Malabar. In this study the term ‘Malabar’ will be used to denote the entire state of Kerala, because the region was popularly known as ‘Malabar’ during the pre-colonial period. However, for convenience, in the Introduction and Chapter One the term ‘Malabar’ will be mainly used to represent the region which was under the British administration. 11 Teyyattam is a ritual performance which was and still remains widespread in the northern part of British Malabar. For more details about the historical relevance of Keralolpathi traditions, see Kesavan Veluthat, ‘The Keralolpatti as History’, in id., The Early Medieval in South India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 129-46. 12 William Logan, Malabar, 2 vols. (Madras: Superintendent Government Press, 1951). This is not to suggest that the there was no historiographical tradition in Kerala prior to the British. Composed in the eleventh century, Athula’s Sanskrit kavya, Mushikavamsam, is an attempt to construct the history of the Mushika royal family of Ezhimala in a chronological order. Sheikh Zain-ud-Din’s Tuhfat-ul-Mujahidin, which describes the historical developments in Kerala during the sixteenth century, is another important example of the local historiographical tradition. Various Keralolpathi traditions of Kerala can be considered attempts to interpret the history of this area from a Brahmanical perspective. Although Portuguese and Dutch officials and other foreign travellers did write ‘histories of Malabar’ prior to the British, most of their works turned out to be observations of the contemporary Kerala culture and polity with a brief introduction narrating the story of either Parasurama or Cheraman Perumal. An important example of this category is Historia do Malavar written by Diogo Gonçalves. K. Raghavan Pilla (ed.), Mushikavamsam [Mushika Dynasty] (Trivandrum: University of Kerala, 1983); Velayudhan Panikkassery (ed.), Keralam Pathinanchum Pathinarum Noottandukalil [Keralam in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries] (Kottayam: Current Books, 1997); Varier, Keralolpathi Granthavari; Diogo Gonçalves, Historia do Malavar [History of Malabar], ed. Josef Wicki S. I. (Münster, Westfalen: Aschendorff, 1955). 13 This trend was already visible in P. Shungoonny Menon’s A History of Travancore (1878). It was followed by Travancore State Manual (1906) after the fashion of Logan’s Malabar Manual by V. Nagam Aiya and Cochin State Manual (1911) by C. Achyuta Menon. Another Travancore State Manual was compiled by T. K. Velu Pillai in 1940. Although ‘state manuals’ attempted to present the histories of those respective princely states in a broader framework, the analytical framework remains that of dynastic eulogies. P. Shungoonny Menon, A History of Travancore (First published 1878; repr., Thiruvananthapuram: Government of Kerala, 1983); V. Nagam Aiya, The Travancore State Manual, 3 vols. (First published 1906; repr., Thiruvananthapuram: Government of Kerala, 1999); C. Achyuta Menon, Cochin State Manual (First published 1911; repr., Thiruvananthapuram: Government of Kerala, 1995); T. K. Velu Pillai, The Travancore State Manual, 4 vols. (First published 1940; repr., Thiruvananthapuram: Government of Kerala, 1996). 14 K. V. Krishna Ayyar, The Zamorins of Calicut (First published 1938; repr., Calicut: University of Calicut, 1999). 15 E. M. S. Nambootirippadu, Collected Works of E M S Nambootirippadu Vol. 9-1948, ed. P. Govinda Pillai (Thiruvananthapuram: Chinta Publishers, 2000). 16 Later this work was published under the title ‘The Kunjalis: Admirals of Calicut’. O. K. Nambiar, The Kunjalis: Admirals of Calicut (London: Asia Publishing House, 1963). TO INTRODUCTION 181

17 K. M. Panikkar, Malabar and the Dutch (Bombay: Taraporevala, 1931); Id., Malabar and the Portugese: Being a History of the Relations of the Portuguese with Malabar from 1500 to 1663 (Bombay: Taraporevala, 1929). 18 P. K. S. Raja, Medieval Kerala, 2nd edn. (Calicut: Nava Kerala Cooperative Society, 1966). 19 Some of his important articles have been published in English. Elamkulam P. N. Kunjan Pillai, Studies in Kerala History (Kottayam: National Book Stall, 1970). 20 Later M. G. S. Narayanan has modified several aspects of the conceptualizations of Elamkulam Kunjan Pillai, including those of the concept of the Chera ‘empire’ and the ‘hundred year war’. Narayanan, Perumals of Kerala. 21 Oxford University Press has published an English translation of this book in 1988. Geneviève Bouchon, Regent of the Sea: Cannanore’s Response to Portuguese Expansion 1507– 1528 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988). 22 Margaret Frenz, From Contact to Conquest: Transition to British rule in Malabar, 1790–1805 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003). 23 Dilip M. Menon, ‘Houses by the Sea: State Experimentation on the Southwest Coast of India 1760–1800’, in Neera Chandhoke (ed.), Mapping Histories: Essays presented to Ravinder Kumar (New Delhi: Tulika, 2000), 161-86. 24 Chirakkal T. Balakrishnan Nair, Theranjedutha Prabandhangal [Selected essays] (Thrissur: Kerala Sahitya Academi, 1996); M. P. Kumaran, Kolathupazhama [History of Kolathunadu] (Thrissur: Kerala Sahitya Academi, 1998). 25 K. K. N. Kurup, The Ali Rajas of Cannanore (Trivandrum: College Book House, 1975). 26 Ruchira Banerjee, ‘A Wedding Feast of Political Arena? Commercial Rivalry between the Ali Rajas and the English Factory in North Malabar in the 18th Century’, in Rudrangshu Mukherjee and Lakshmi Subramanian (eds.), Politics and Trade in the Indian Ocean World: Essays in Honour of Ashin Das Gupta (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 83-112. 27 Roland E. Miller, Mappila Muslims of Kerala: A Study in Islamic Trends (Madras: Orient Longman, 1976). 28 Stephen Frederic Dale, Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier: The Mappilas of Malabar, 1498–1922 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). 29 K. N. Panikkar, Against Lord and State: Religion and Peasant Uprisings in Malabar, 1836–1921 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989). 30 M. O. Koshy, The Dutch Power in Kerala, 1729–1758 (New Delhi: Mittal Publi- cations, 1989). 31 P. C. Alexander, The Dutch in Malabar (Annamalai Nagar: Annamalai University, 1946). 32 Panikkar, Malabar and the Dutch. 33 T. I. Poonen, A Survey of the Rise of the Dutch Power in Malabar, 1603–78 (Trichnopoly: St. Joseph’s Industrial School Press, 1948). 34 T. I. Poonen, Dutch Hegemony in Malabar and its Collapse, 1663–1795 (Trivandrum: University of Kerala, 1978). 35 M. A. P. Roelofsz, De vestiging der Nederlanders ter kuste Malabar [The settlement of the Dutch on the Malabar Coast] (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1943). 36 Hugo K. s’Jacob, The Rajas of Cochin: Kings, Chiefs and the Dutch East India Company, 1663–1720 (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2000); Mark Erik Jan de Lannoy, The Kulasekhara Perumals of Travancore: History and State Formation in Travancore from 1671 to 1758 (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1997). 37 Dale, Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier. 38 The interpretation of ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ societies as distinct ‘civilizations’ in the Indian Subcontinent still exerts a definite grip on scholars. For a recent discussion of such a view, see André Wink, Perspectives on the Indo-Islamic World: The Second Annual Levtzion Lecture (Jerusalem: The Nehemia Levtzion Center for Islamic Studies, 2007). See also J. F. Richards, ‘The Islamic Frontier in the East: Expansion into South Asia’, South Asia, 4 (Oct. 1974), 91-109. Likewise, Theodore Gabriel’s monograph on the Mappila Muslims of Malabar reiterates the argument that there has been an essential tension between the 182 NOTES

Muslims and Hindus in Malabar running along communal lines ever since the sixteenth century. Theodore Gabriel, Hindu-Muslim Relations in North Malabar, 1498–1947 (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1996). 39 In South Asian studies, scholars now tend to stress the ‘syncretic’ aspect of Islam. Among them Susan Bayly’s works are particularly notable. Susan Bayly, Saints, Goddesses and Kings: Muslims and Christians in South Indian Society, 1700–1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). This is also stressed by Richard M. Eaton. Richard M. Eaton (ed.), India’s Islamic Traditions, 711–1750 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1-34.

Notes to Chapter One

1 W. Gordon East, The Geography Behind History (London: Nelson, 1965), 4. 2 By the term ‘early-modern’, I mean the ancien régime, the period from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century. 3 Kumaran, Kolathupazhama, 15-23. 4 M. G. S. Narayanan also proposes the link between the Nannan of Tamil anthologies and the Nannan who appears in the Mushikavamsam. M. G. S. Narayanan, ‘Mushaka- vamsa as a Source of Kerala History’, in id., Re-Interpretations in South Indian History (Trivandrum: College Book House, 1977), 58-65 at 65. 5 Though the author gives the name of the vamsa as mushikavamsa, it is clear that the rulers were also known as the ‘Kings of Kolam’—most probably after the name of the town (Kolapatanam) established by the legendary founder, Ramaghada Mushaka. It seems that Kolaswarupam derived its name from this town which became more popular than the Sanskritized Mushikavamsam, which sounded alien to ears of the local people. Raghavan Pilla, Mushikavamsam, 26, 268. 6 M. G. S. Narayanan, Kerala Charithrathinte Adisthana Silakal [Foundation stones of Kerala history] (Kozhikode: Lipi Publications, 2000), 85-99. 7 Kumaran, Kolathupazhama, 94-7. 8 N. P. Unni, A History of Mushikavamsa (Trivandrum: College Book House, 1978), 14. 9 It is true that Mushaka rulers were under the influence of the Cheras of Mahodayapuram. However, their separate political identity from that of the Cheras was never completely annihilated. Kesavan Veluthat, The Political Structure of Early Medieval South India (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993), 114-17. 10 Marco Polo comments: ‘The people [of Eli kingdom] are idolaters and have a King, and are tributary to nobody; and have a peculiar language’. Marco Polo, The Book of Ser Marco Polo: The Venetian, Concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East, III, 3rd edn. ed. Henry Yule and Henri Cordier (repr., Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1975), 385. 11 Ibn Battuta, The Rehla of Ibn Battuta (India, Maldive Islands and Ceylon), tr. and com- mentary by Mahdi Husain (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1953), 186. 12 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 80. 13 R. Champakalakshmi, Trade, Ideology and Urbanisation: South India (300 BC to AD 1300) (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 95-102. See also Rajan Gurukkal, ‘Antecedent of the State Formation in South India’, in R. Champakalakshmi, Kesavan Veluthat, and T. R. Venugopalan (eds.), State and Society in Pre-modern South India (Trissur: Cosmobooks, 2002), 39-59. 14 The prefix ‘Mala’ in the local language Malayalam means hill. Although there is no unanimity among scholars regarding the meaning of the suffix ‘bar’, it is probably a corrupted version of the Malayalam word ‘vaaram’; means valley. Therefore, the term ‘Malabar’ can be a corrupt version of the Malayalam term ‘Malavaaram’, or The Hill Valley. 15 Innes and Evans, Malabar and Anjengo, I, 3. 16 According to William Logan, ‘…where they [laterite terraces] break off in abrupt cliffs the soil is extensively cultivated with coconut and jack and pepper. The flats also lying between the laterite terraces are thickly peopled and every inch of available ground is occupied’. Logan, Malabar, II, Appendix, CCLX. TO CHAPTER ONE 183

17 M. R. Raghava Varier and Rajan Gurukkal, Keralacharithram [History of Kerala] (Sukapuram: Vallathol Vidya Peedam, 2004), 112-14. 18 Tomé Pires, The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires: An Account of the East, from the Red Sea to Japan, written in Malacca and India in 1512–1515 and the Book of Francisco Rodrigues, ed. Armando Cortesão (Nendeln/Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1967), 76-7. 19 K. N. Ganesh, ‘Agrarian Society in Kerala (1500–1800)’, in P. J. Cherian (ed.), Perspectives on Kerala History: The Second Millennium, vol. II, part II (Thiruvanan- thapuram: Kerala Gazetteers Department, 1999), 131, 138. 20 Innes and Evans, Malabar and Anjengo, 391. 21 Ibid. 22 Rich Freeman, ‘Genre and Society: The Literary Culture of Premodern Kerala’, in Sheldon Pollock (ed.), Literary Cultures in History: Reconstructions from South Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 437-500 at 440. 23 Innes and Evans, Malabar and Anjengo, 2-3. 24 George Woodcock, Kerala: A Portrait of the Malabar Coast (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 44. 25 François Pyrard of Laval, The Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil, I, tr. and ed. Albert Grey (London: Hakluyt Society, 1887), 359. 26 This monsoon factor helped the Malabar people to avoid any serious famine which might have disrupted the smooth pattern of their lives throughout their history. Thus C. A. Innes commented ‘real famine is unknown in the land’. Innes and Evans, Malabar and Anjengo, 271. 27 Joan P. Mencher, ‘Kerala and Madras: A Comparative Study of Ecology and Social Structure’, Ethnology, 5/2 (Apr. 1966), 135-71 at 136. 28 The Dutch chaplain Canter Visscher, who lived in Kerala during the early eighteenth century, also paints a similar picture of the road system in Kerala. He states: ‘I have never seen a Malabari on horseback, and even their princes do not possess steeds. Indeed, they would be of no use in the low flat lands where the ground is much broken and very marshy, and intersected with streams. Besides this, there are no beaten roads, the whole country being covered with bushes and underwood’. K. P. Padmanabha Menon (ed.), History of Kerala: A History of Kerala Written in the Form of Notes on Visscher’s Letters from Malabar, III (Ernakulam: Cochin Government Press, 1933), 3. 29 Ibn Battuta, Travels in Asia and Africa (1325–1354), tr. and selected by H. A. R. Gibbs (London: Hakluyt Society, 1929), 231-2. 30 Logan, Malabar, I, 62. 31 For a description of the riverine system in British Malabar, see Innes and Evans, Malabar and Anjengo, 4-6. 32 John Richardson Freeman, ‘Purity and Violence: Sacred Power in the Teyyam Worship of Malabar’ (PhD Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1991), 5; Frenz, From Contact to Conquest, 10-11; Woodcock, Kerala: A Portrait of the Malabar Coast, 44; Mencher, ‘Kerala and Madras’, 153-5. 33 Probably, the gradual strengthening of a distinct cultural identity based on an independent language (Malayalam), which was gradually emerging as the literary language of the region, and the rise of a separate political culture in Kerala after the twelfth century AD promoted the idea of separation between Kerala and Tamilnadu. 34 The early Tamil poets divided the Malabar-Tamil regions into five geo-literary zones such as kurinchi, palai, mullai, marutam, and neytal, although politically they were divided under three political powers. Together the Chera, Chola, and Pandya rulers were called muvarasar. See Narayanan, Re-Interpretations in South Indian History, 6-10. 35 By the end of the ninth century the bhakti movement had grown in popularity throughout the regions, stimulated by the influence of the Cheras, the Cholas, and the Pandyas. M. G. S. Narayanan, Foundations of South Indian Society and Culture (Delhi: Bharatiya Book Corporation, 1994), 194. 36 For more details about the relations of Malabar with Karnataka regions, see K. G. Vasantha Madhava, ‘Karnataka-Kerala Contact and Adjustment 1336–1600’, Journal of Kerala Studies, 2 (Mar.-June 1979) 103-10. 184 NOTES

37 In 1519, the Portuguese factor captured a caravan of 5,000 oxen carrying pepper belonging to the Pattar Brahmins from Quilon through the Aryankavu Pass to the Tamil regions. This offers a clue to their active involvement in the land route trade across the Ghats. F. C. Danvers, The Portuguese in India: Being a History of the Rise and Decline of Their Eastern Empire, I (First published 1894; repr., London: Frank Cass, 1966), 346. 38 Pius Malekandathil, ‘The Portuguese and the Ghat-Route Trade: 1500–1663’, Pondicherry University Journal of Social Science and Humanities (PUSH), I/1&2 (2000), 129-54. 39 Markus Vink, ‘The Dutch East India Company and the Pepper trade between Kerala and Tamilnad, 1663–1795: A Geo-Historical Analysis’, in K. S. Mathew (ed.), Mariners, Merchants and Oceans: Studies in Maritime History (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995), 273- 300. 40 Hugo K. s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 1663–1701: de memories en instructies betreffende het commandement Malabar van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie [The Dutch in Kerala, 1663–1701: The memoranda and instructions concerning the Malabar Commandment of the Dutch East India Company] (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 158. 41 Logan, Malabar, I, 65. 42 J. J. L. Gommans, ‘The Silent Frontier of South Asia, c. AD 1100–1800’, Journal of World History, 9/1 (1998), 1-25. Even earlier, malaimandalam (Kerala) traders are supposed to have embarked at the Malabar Coast in their quest to supply West Asian horses to Tamil markets. Champakalakshmi, Trade, Ideology and Urbanisation, 394. Early speci- mens of Malayalam literature also mention the horse trade between Malabar and the Chola kingdom. M. R. Raghava Varier, Madhyakaala Keralam: Sampath, Samooham, Samskaram [Medieval Kerala: Economy, society, and culture] (Thiruvananthapuram: Chinta Publishers, 1997), 41. 43 Ludovico di Varthema, The Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema of Bologna From 1502–1508, tr. John Winter Jones, ed. Norman Mosley Penzer (London: The Argonaut Press, 1928), 50. 44 Binu John Mailaparambil, ‘The VOC and the Prospects of Trade between Cannanore and Mysore in the Late Seventeenth Century’, in K. S. Mathew and Joy Varkey (eds.), Winds of Spices: Essays on Portuguese Establishments in Medieval India with Special Reference to Cannanore (Tellichery: IRISH, 2006), 205-30. 45 David Ludden, Peasant History in South India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Burton Stein, Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980); Nicholas B. Dirks, The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of an Indian Kingdom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Velcheru Narayana Rao, David Shulman and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Symbols of Substance: Court and State in Nayaka Period Tamil Nadu (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992). 46 David Ludden, ‘Caste Society and Units of Production in Early-Modern South India’, in Burton Stein and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds.), Institutions and Economic Change in South Asia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 105-33 at 111-12. 47 Eric J. Miller, ‘Caste and Territory in Malabar’, American Anthropologist, 56/3 (June 1954), 410-20 at 416-17. 48 The Keralolpathi, as usual, attributes this ‘exception’ to Parasurama. Varier, Keralolpathi Granthavari, 6. For more details about the history of marumakkathayam in Kerala, see A. Sreedhara Menon, ‘Marumakkathayam: The Matrilineal System of Inheritance in Kerala’, in South Indian History Congress XVIII Session Souvenir, Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit (Kalady: 1998), 28-32. 49 William Logan based on the account given by Dr Hermann Gundert who gives a list of makkathayis and marumakkathayis in Malabar and their regional variations. Logan, Malabar, I, 155. 50 Ravindran Gopinath, ‘Gardens and Paddy Fields: Historical Implications of Agricultural Production Regimes in Colonial Malabar’, in Mushirul Hasan and Narayani Gupta (eds.), India’s Colonial Encounter: Essays in Memory of Eric Stokes (New Delhi: Manohar, 1993), 363-89 at 367, 377. 51 Ibid. 379. TO CHAPTER ONE 185

52 According to Eric Miller, greater spatial mobility was a particular feature of higher castes in Kerala. Miller, ‘Caste and Territory in Malabar’, 410. 53 Uralar were the people who looked after the property of the temples. The majority of them belonged to the Nambutiri caste. 54 Karalar were the people who were leased the landed properties of the temples from the uralar in return for handing over a portion of their produce to the temples. 55 The period of the second Chera kingdom witnessed various land grants and concessions to the temples and Brahmins by the ruling authorities. For more details about the organization of these emerging Brahmin settlements during this period, see Kesavan Veluthat, ‘Organisation and Administration of the Brahman Settlements in Kerala in the later Cera period—AD 800–1100’, Journal of Kerala Studies (Special Issue in Honour of the World Conference on Malayalam, Kerala Culture and Development), 4/1&2 (June-Sept. 1977), 181-91. For a discussion about the role of temples in medieval Malabar society, see Kesavan Veluthat, ‘The Role of Temples in Kerala Society (AD 1100–1500)’, Journal of Kerala Studies, 3 (June 1976), 181-94. 56 Kokasandesam (a medieval Malayalam poem) which describes the Edappalli king Tirumalacherri Nambutiri as a great military hero. Elamkulam P. N. Kunjan Pillai (ed.), Kokasandesam [Cuckoo Message] (repr., Kottayam: National Book Stall, 1997), 42. 57 Pyrard of Laval, Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval, I, 373. 58 For a discussion about the identities of these settlements, see Kesavan Veluthat, Brahman Settlements in Kerala: Historical Studies (Calicut: Calicut University, 1978). 59 Among the 1,017 Nambutiri Brahmin families enumerated by the colonial officials in the British Malabar, only seventy-nine were resident in Chirakkal taluk. Logan, Malabar, I, 119-20. 60 In a letter to the Heren XVII written in 1689, the Cochin Council reported that as a consequence of the disagreement among the elites in the region, one ‘Mana Pattere’ was appointed the ragiadoor-moor of Kolaswarupam in the place of Prince Unnithiri who was engaged in a conflict with the Kolathiri and the Ali Raja. Intriguingly, he has been described as a ‘moorman’—probably a mistaken identity. If this is true, the Pattar Brahmins did enjoy some influence in the socio-political system in the region, although not equal to that they enjoyed in Cochin, VOC 1448, Original letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 17 January 1689, fo. 355v. Hugo K. s’Jacob’s work on Cochin indicates the considerable influence exercised by foreign Brahmins, including the Pattars, in the political life of that principality. Hugo K. s’Jacob, The Rajas of Cochin (1663–1720): Kings, Chiefs and the Dutch East India Company (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2000). 61 From the Brahmanical perspective, the Nayars were regarded as sudras, occupying the lowest status in the fourfold social division. 62 Sambandam was a sort of temporary sexual relationship maintained by Nayar ladies either with their own caste people or with high caste men, especially the Nambutiri Brahmins. Hieronimo Discanto Stefano, a Genoese traveller who visited Malabar towards the end of the fifteenth century, mentions this peculiar custom stating that in this land ‘every lady may take to herself seven or eight husbands, according to her inclination’. R. H. Major (ed.), India in the Fifteenth Century: Being a Collection of Narratives of Voyages to India (Delhi: Deep, 1974), 5. 63 This is not to say that they were the sole community under arms in medieval Kerala. Almost all the other communities which enjoyed social power, such as the Syrian Christians of South Kerala, the Mappila Muslims, and the Tiyyas, had their own martial culture and training systems. Christians were even enlisted as soldiers under local rajas. See Lannoy, Kulasekhara Perumals of Travancore, 138. 64 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 55. 65 Ibid. 45-6. 66 Ibid. 48. 67 Vyapari Nayars were the indigenous traders of Malabar. Ibid. 55-6. 68 The main occupation of the Kusavan caste was pottery-making. 69 These people were mainly engaged in washing the clothes of the high caste people. 70 The people belonging to these castes were regarded as sub-castes of the Nayars. 186 NOTES

71 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 59. 72 Pyrard of Laval, Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval, I, 391-2. 73 William Logan considered ‘Tiyyan’ to be a corrupted form of the Sanskrit dvipan, which means ‘people from an island’, that is from Ceylon (Sri Lanka). Logan, Malabar, I, 143. 74 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 60. 75 Logan, Malabar, I, 143. 76 Francis Buchanan refers to the Tiyyas as an industrious people engaging in various trades. He also mentions that they did not pretend to be of the sudra caste, but were content with their lowly position as panchamas. Francis Buchanan, A Journey from Madras through the Countries of Mysore, Canara, and Malabar, Performed under the Orders of the Most Noble the Marquis Wellesley, Governor General of India, II (London: Cadell, 1807), 415-16. 77 Gopinath, ‘Gardens and Paddy Fields’, 377. 78 Barbosa gives a detailed account on the Pulaya and the Paraya castes. Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 68-70. 79 Logan, Malabar, I, 148. 80 Buchanan, Journey from Madras, 508, 525, 526, 559. 81 M. T. Narayanan, Agrarian Relations in Late Medieval Malabar (New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, 2003), 135-40. 82 S. D. Goitein (ed.), Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 188. Interestingly, the Italian Carmelite priest Vincenzo, who visited Kerala during 1657–1658, reports that there were about five or six Jewish families living near Ezhimala or Mount Deli. He states that they engaged in the business of metal-smelting and manufacturing brass vessels. Donald F. Lach and Edwin J. van Kley, Asia in the Making of Europe, vol. III, part II (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 893. 83 Bouchon, Regent of the Sea, 7-8. 84 P. Anthony (ed.), Payyanur Pattu: Pathavum Padanavum [Payyanur Song: Text and study] (Kottayam: D. C. Books, 2000), 28. The Narayan Kannur temple inscription of Ezimala also mentions the Manigramam merchant guild. Narayanan, Kerala Charithrathinte Adistana Silakal, 85-99. For a discussion about Manigramam guild, see Meera Abraham, Two Medieval Merchant Guilds of South India (New Delhi: Manohar, 1988), 13-39. 85 Ibn Battuta, Travels in Asia and Africa, 233-5. 86 For more details about the emergence of Mappila traders as the most influential trading group in Kolathunadu, see Chapter Three. 87 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 56. 88 Tottams are the ritual songs related to accompany the ritual teyyam dance performed among various Hindu communities in North Malabar. For the tottam of Katuvanoor Veeran teyyam, see M. V. Vishnu Namboodiri (ed.), Katuvanoor Veerantottam: Oru Veerapuravrittam [Katuvanoor Veeran tottam: A heroic ballad] (Kottayam: Current Books, 1997). For more details about Teyyam see John Richardson Freeman, ‘Purity and Violence’; K. K. N. Kurup, The Cult of Teyyam and Hero Worship in Kerala (Calcutta: Indian Publications, 1973). 89 Barbosa describes Taliparamba as a town of ‘both moors and heathen which has great traffic with the merchants of the kingdom of Narsinga (Vijayanagara)’. Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 80. 90 The hinterlands of Cannanore port town had been famous for their spices from a very ancient period. M. P. Kumaran has identified ‘Kottanora’, the place from where pepper was exported to the Roman Empire during the early Christian centuries, with the Kottayam Bazaar in British Malabar. See Kumaran, Kolathupazhama, 40-7. 91 The Dutch used to make commercial contracts with the Cannanore traders to acquire timber for shipbuilding purposes. VOC 1268, Letter from Rijckloff van Goens and the Colombo Council to Batavia, 13 June 1668, fo. 1123r-v. 92 Logan, Malabar, I, 148. 93 For more details about them see the account of Duarte Barbosa, Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 70-3. TO CHAPTER TWO 187

94 There are some references to their presence in Cannanore during the late seventeenth century. A Dutch manuscript mentions one Chetty occupying the position of ‘mint master’ of Cannanore. VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1680, fo. 1757r.

Notes to Chapter Two

1 D. D. Kosambi, The Culture and Civilisation of Ancient India In Historical Outline (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965). 2 K. V. Krishna Ayyar, A History of the Zamorins of Calicut: From the Earliest Times to 1498 AD (Calicut: Ramakrishna Printing Works, 1929), 92. 3 O. K. Nambiar, The Kunjalis: Admirals of Calicut. 4 It can be postulated that in Malabar, a region where the agriculture was almost entirely dependent on the monsoon and where there was no mammoth irrigation work for this purpose, it might be better to speak of ‘monsoon feudalism’— if the use of the term ‘feudalism’ is preferred—instead of ‘hydraulic feudalism’. It is also important to note that Edmund Leach uses the term ‘hydraulic feudalism’ to denote the ancient Sinhala polity which flourished until the time of Parakrama Bahu I (1164–97) in the northern dry zone of Ceylon, where the rainfall was scare and agriculture entirely dependent on large-scale irrigation projects, see Kathleen Gough, ‘Dravidian Kinship and Modes of Production’, Contributions to Indian Sociology, 13/2 (1979), 265-91; E. R. Leach, ‘Hydraulic Society in Ceylon’, Past and Present, 15 (1959), 2-26. 5 This work was published only later: Narayanan, Perumals of Kerala. Later, Narayanan adopted a more flexible stance on the Perumal rule, characterizing it as a sort of ritual sovereignty created and maintained by a Brahmin oligarchy. M. G. S. Narayanan, ‘The State in the era of Cheraman Perumals of Kerala’, in Champakalakshmi, Veluthat, and Venugopalan (eds.), State and Society in Pre-modern South India, 111-19. 6 Veluthat, Political Structure of Early Medieval South India. 7 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, ‘Aspects of State Formation in South India and Southeast Asia, 1500–1650’, Indian Economic and Social History Review, 23/4 (1986), 357-77 at 358. 8 Dick Kooiman, ‘State Formation in Travancore: Problems of Revenue, Trade and Armament’, in A. W. van den Hoek, D. H. A. Kolff, and M. S. Oort (eds.), Ritual, State and History in South Asia: Essays in Honour of J. C. Heesterman (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 587- 609 at 587. 9 Even though Burton Stein’s ‘segmentary state’ model radically altered the outlook of scholars about the nature of medieval South Indian states, Kerala historiography still remained largely overlooked. Stein excludes Kerala from his study of the South Indian macro-region for various reasons, including the presence of influential warrior lineages in medieval Kerala. He argues that these lineages were absent in the rest of South India. The problem is compounded by the absence of sufficient historical data to analyse the agrarian characteristics of the region. In spite of his serious criticism of the ‘segmentary state’ concept, Kesavan Veluthat states: ‘after this…no serious work in this area can follow the conventional pattern of treating dynastic/political history with chapters on “economy”, “society”, “culture” etc. as uncomfortable appendages’. Stein, Peasant State and Society, 48- 9, 58; Veluthat, Political Structure of Early Medieval South India, 7. 10 Kooiman, ‘State Formation in Travancore’, 603. 11 Ibid. 12 s’Jacob, Rajas of Cochin. 13 Dirks, Hollow Crown. 14 Frenz, From Contact to Conquest. 15 Lannoy, Kulasekhara Perumals of Travancore. 16 Frenz, From Contact to Conquest, 41-2. 17 Dirks, Hollow Crown, 5. 18 Ibid. 123. 19 Frenz, From Contact to Conquest, 42. 188 NOTES

20 Ibid. 44-5. 21 Ibid. 43. 22 Dirks, Hollow Crown, 70. 23 M. R. Raghava Varier, ‘State as Svarupam: An Introductory Essay’, in Champaka- lakshmi, Veluthat, and Venugopalan (eds.), State and Society in Pre-modern South India, 120-30. See also the sections written by M. R. Raghava Varier and K. N. Ganesh respectively in Cherian (ed.), Perspectives on Kerala History, 62-78, 222-7. 24 According to the Kolathunadu tradition of Keralolpathi, these four swarupams were the most prominent, although there were other swarupams in Kerala. Varier (ed.), Keralolpathi Granthavari, 38. 25 Nadu utaiyavar or nadu vazhunnavar literally means owners or rulers of the nadus. Narayanan, Perumals of Kerala, 90; V. V. Haridas, ‘The Rise and Growth of the Kingdom of Kozhikode’, Indica, 37 (2000), 123-36 at 126-7. 26 K. N. Ganesh, ‘Structure of Political Authority in Medieval Kerala’, in Cherian (ed.), Perspectives on Kerala History, 222-7 at 225. 27 However, it seems that women in each taravadu were also allotted particular property for their maintenance. G. Arunima argues that it was only under the colonial rule that women’s property rights in a joint family were degraded. G. Arunima, ‘A Vindication of the Rights of Woman? Families and Legal Change in Nineteenth-century Malabar’, in Michael R. Anderson and Sumit Guha (eds.), Changing Concepts of Rights and Justice in South Asia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 114-39. See also Id., ‘Multiple Meanings: Changing Conceptions of Matrilineal Kinship in Nineteenth- and Twentieth- century Malabar’, Indian Economic and Social History Review, 33/3 (1996), 283-307. 28 T. V. Mahalingam (ed.), Mackenzie Manuscripts: Summaries of the Historical Manuscripts in the Mackenzie Collection, I (Madras: University of Madras, 1972), 287. For a history of this house, see K. K. N. Kurup (ed.), Kudali Granthavari [Kudali chronicle] (Calicut: Calicut University, 1995). 29 K. N. Ganesh also indicates the importance of Brahmanism in attributing political power to the swarupams. He comments: ‘Thus the ritual power of the Brahmanas and the secular power of the non-Brahmanas who evolved into the Nayar caste were the two arms of political authority of the swarupams’. Ganesh, ‘Structure of Political Authority in Medieval Kerala’, 227. 30 In this context it is apt to indicate that the privileging of Brahmanical scriptures and the equation of ‘Indian culture’ with Brahmanical traditions and Sanskrit has a lot to do with European colonial discourses on India. For example, see Lata Mani, Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). See also Richard King, ‘Orientalism and the Modern Myth of “Hinduism’’’, Numen, 46/2 (1999), 146-85; Vinay Dharwadker, ‘Orientalism and the Study of Indian Literatures’, in Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer (eds.), Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia (Philadelphia: University of Penn- sylvania Press, 1994), 158-85; Bernard S. Cohn, ‘The Command of Language and the Language of Command’, in Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies IV: Writings on South Asian History and Society (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 276-329; Pamela G. Price, ‘Ideology and Ethnicity under British Imperial Rule: ‘Brahmans’, Lawyers and Kin-Caste Rules in Madras Presidency’, Modern Asian Studies, 23/1 (1989), 151-77. 31 John Richardson Freeman, ‘Purity and Violence’, 35-6. 32 Ibid. 348-63. 33 The appropriation into the Nambutiri Brahmin’s pantheon of worship and the ‘Brahminization’ of local gods and goddesses was an ongoing process. These local deities were mainly worshipped in the Brahmin temples as upadevatas or minor gods/goddesses. Their images were consecrated and clustered around the main Brahmin deity of the temple. On the other hand, the local Dravidian society also incorporated vedic-puranic concepts after modifying them to suit its cultural concepts. 34 Interview with K. V. Kunjikrishnan, 24 Apr. 2005. 35 For a similar view, see Dirks, Hollow Crown, 5. 36 Shelly Errington, Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian Realm (Princeton: Prince- ton University Press, 1989), 10. TO CHAPTER TWO 189

37 This is a door-panel draped with silk. It is the characteristic emblem of the Zamorins. Krishna Ayyar, Zamorins of Calicut, 36. 38 For the legend related to the pallimaradi of the Zamorins, see Ibid. 39 Varier (ed.), Keralolpathi Granthavari, 51. 40 This development was conspicuous during the reign of Rajaraja I (985–1012) and Rajendra I (1012–44). Yasushi Ogura, ‘The Changing Concept of Kingship in the Cola. Period: Royal Temple Constructions, c. AD 850–1279’, in Noboru Karashima (ed.), Kingship in Indian History (New Delhi: Manohar, 1999), 119-41. 41 The term ‘men of prowess’ is used by O. W. Wolters to denote ‘big men’ in South- East Asian polities whose legitimacy was not traced through lineages but ‘depended on their being attributed with an abnormal amount of personal and innate ‘soul stuff’, which explained and distinguished their performance from that of others in their generation and especially among their own kinsmen’. He also explains that after their death such ‘men of prowess’ could be reckoned as ‘ancestors’ of the land and were eligible for worship. The teyyam worship in Kolathunadu can be considered a form of worship of such ‘men of prowess’. O. W. Wolters, History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspective (Singa- pore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), 5-7. 42 Pyrard of Laval, Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval, I, 357. 43 Narayanan, Foundations of South Indian Society and Culture, 16. 44 Hermann Kulke proposes three successive phases in the state formation process, for instance: ‘local’; ‘regional’; and ‘imperial’. The ‘Early State’ model is assigned to the second stage of development, when the pristine state form of ‘chieftaincy’ extended its area of influence beyond its ‘nucleus’. Generally accepting his formulation of state development, it might be safe to label Marthanda Varma’s Travancore Kingdom an ‘Imperial State’. However, accepting the ‘ritual’ nature of kingship as an important feature of an ‘early kingdom’—an idea borrowed from the controversial ‘segmentary state’ model of Burton Stein—Kulke made his formulation of the ‘early state’ more rigid, thereby making it difficult to detect any possibility of change within this categorization. Consequently, it does not seem right to apply this term to Kolaswarupam. Hermann Kulke, Kings and Cults: State Formation and Legitimation in India and Southeast Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001), 262-93. 45 Dilip Menon, ‘Houses by the Sea’, 161-86. 46 Ibid. 166. As always to prove the rule, there were exceptional cases. For example, the powerful kingship of Kottayam did not have direct access to the coast and did not maintain any port under its control. Nevertheless, importantly Kottayam also benefited from maritime trade as a large quantity of the spices exported from Cannanore and its satellite ports were harvested in the Kottayam region. Even in the case of the Calicut kingdom, an argument has been put forward that, in spite of its commercial importance, it was the inland centre of Ponnani, imbued with ritual and administrative importance which formed the epicentre of the Zamorins’ political power. N. M. Namboodiri (ed.), Mamamkam Rekhakal [Mamamkam records] (Sukapuram: Vallathol Vidya Peedam, 2005), 35-6. 47 Ibid. 183. 48 The Zamorins of Calicut are an explicit example of such a centralizing process. The emergence of the Nediyirippu Swarupam has to be traced in the context of its close connection with the West Asian Muslim trade networks. 49 See Chapter One. 50 Dilip Menon uses the term ‘community of subsistence’ to refer to a sort of social group formation centred on big land-owning taravadus in the northern regions of British Malabar in the early twentieth century. He applies the term in the context of developments in the agricultural sector of the region, at a point at which large taravadus began to control wet-land paddy cultivation which led to the increasing dependence of the semi- independent cash-crop farmers, service castes and labourers on taravadus for food. Dilip M. Menon, Caste, Nationalism and Communism in South India: Malabar, 1900–1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 51 It is important to remember that, in comparison with the earlier periods, colonial rule which defined and systematized the landed property system by introducing land laws in 190 NOTES the region enabled land-owning taravadus to obtain greater control over the land and their dependents. Dilip Menon, Caste, Nationalism and Communism, 14-16. For more details about the land relations in the northernmost part of Kerala under the colonial rule, see K. K. N. Kurup, Land Monopoly and Agrarian System in South Kanara with Special Reference to Kasargod Taluk (Calicut: Calicut University, 2000). 52 For more details about the source of the income of the Zamorins, see Krishna Ayyar, Zamorins of Calicut, 264-6. 53 Varier (ed.), Sthanarohanam: Chatangukal, 79-83. 54 Ibid. 55 C. K. Kareem, Kerala under Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan (Cochin: Kerala History Association, 1973), 143-55. 56 Buchanan, Journey from Madras, II, 360. 57 Given the availability of royal records, this composite character of power exercised by Malabar kingship is more conspicuous in the case of the Zamorins of Calicut. See Varier (ed.), Sthanarohanam: Chatangukal. See also Nicholas B. Dirks, ‘From Little King to Landlord: Colonial Discourse and Colonial Rule’, in id., Colonialism and Culture (Michigan, The University of Michigan Press, 1992), 175-208. 58 Mailaparambil, ‘VOC and the Prospects of Trade between Cannanore and Mysore’, 205-30. 59 Dilip Menon, ‘Houses by the Sea’, 166. 60 Buchanan, Journey from Madras, II, 434-5. 61 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 52. 62 Ibid. 51-2. 63 In practice, there were differences between the various swarupams in the succession to the ‘raja-ship’. In Venadu, which was divided into various swarupams, strictly speaking only the Chiravay Swarupam had the right to assume the ‘raja-ship’. But this rule was not always followed to the letter. In Kolathunadu, both the Palli Kovilakam and the Udayamangalam Kovilakam enjoyed the right to become the Kolathiri during the period under discussion in this book. Later it seems that the Palli Kovilakam monopolized the right of succession. There was incessant competition among the five taivazhis of Cochin to assume the ‘raja-ship’. It was only in Calicut that the succession issue did not generate much tension. This could indicate that there were no ‘laws’ which systematized the succession issue within the various swarupams in Kerala. 64 ‘Memorandum of Van Reede to Commander Jacob Lobs’, in s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 110. 65 Varier (ed.), Keralolpathi Granthavari, 52-3. 66 For more details, see Chapter Six and Chapter Seven. 67 Madras Board of Revenue Consultations (1801) gives a list of kovilakams, including those by then extinct. According to it, the Palli Kovilakam was made up of eight houses and the Udayamangalam of three. British Library, Oriental India Office Collection, London, United Kingdom (OIC), Mackenzie Collection, General, vol. 50, Madras Board of Revenue Consultations, 1801, fos. 7245-6. 68 Melinda A. Moore, ‘A New look at the Nayar Taravad’, Man, New Series, 20/3 (Sept. 1985) 523-41. 69 It is possible that the new taivazhis created as a result of either agricultural expansion or internal dissention maintained ritual relations with each other and with the parent taravadus. M. Kelu Nambiar, An Epitome of the Malabar Law and Land Tenure (Madras: Higginbotham and Company, 1880), 8-9; Dilip Menon, Caste, Nationalism and Com- munism, 13. 70 Errington, Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian Realm, 58. 71 Though there were natural boundaries, such as rivers serving as the borders of the swarupams, the importance of these ‘frontiers’ was probably more symbolic. Raghava Varier has pointed out that the cultural geography (nadu) was more concretely conceptu- alized than the political geography (swarupam) in medieval Malabar. M. R. Raghava Varier, ‘Naduvazhiswaroopangalude Valarcha’ [The growth of naduvazhi swarupams], in V. J. Varghese and N. Vijaya Mohanan Pillai (eds.), Anjooru Varshatte Keralam: Chila Arivadayalangal [Five hundred years of Kerala: Some traces of information] (Kottayam: TO CHAPTER TWO 191

Current Books, 1999), 51-8. 72 Errington, Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian Realm, 285. 73 In this context it is important to note that powerful Brahmin gramams in North Malabar claimed independent political status by attributing their deities royal status. According to one story, the attempt of the Kolathiri to force the Nambutiri Brahmins of Taliparamba (Perumchellur) to perform a sacrifice for him was refused by the Brahmins who stated: ‘Kolathiri had no right to ask them to perform a sacrifice since within the jurisdiction of perumtrikkovilappan (the deity of the Rajarajeswara temple of Perumchellur, Taliparamba), the order of any king would not be valid’. The epithet of the deity, rajarajeswara (king of the kings), blatantly indicates the royal status assumed by the deity in no uncertain terms. This Siva temple not only assumed kingly dignity; it also undertook such royal functions as promoting literary activities, bestowing honorary titles on men of merit and the like. Similarly, ‘Payyanur Perumal’, the deity of Payyanur gramam, also resembled the legendary rulers of Kerala, even bearing the same title of ‘Perumal’. According to the legend related to the establishment of the Nileswaram Alladam Swarupam, the area which was later conquered by the combined force of the Kolathiri-Zamorin was under the authority of ‘Payyanur Perumal’, who received tribute from the latter. V. Govindan Namboodiri, Srauta Sacrifices in Kerala (Calicut: Calicut University, 2002), 98; John Richardson Freeman, ‘Purity and Violence’, 527-8. 74 Ganesh, ‘Structure of Political Authority in Medieval Kerala’, 225. 75 The disappearance of the Porlathiri Swarupam after the ‘conquest’ of Polanad by the Zamorins of Calicut is the only prominently cited incident which can be taken as an example of such a development in Malabar. The reappearance of the Porlathiri Swarupam after centuries based at Kadattanadu is as intriguing as its disappearance. Varier, ‘Naduvazhiswaroopangalude Valarcha’, 55; Panikkassery (ed.), Keralam Pathinanchum Pathinarum Noottandukalil, 64; Herbert Wigram, Malabar Law and Custom (Madras: Higginbotham, 1882), 4-5. 76 In his Tuhfat-ul-Mujahidin, Sheikh Zain-ud-Din states that the rajas of Malabar did not conquer each other and the Zamorin usually left the political status of the conquered rajas intact, albeit keeping them under his control. Panikkassery (ed.), Keralam Pathinanchum Pathinarum Noottandukalil, 56-7. 77 This is conspicuously illustrated in the reply given by Prince Unnithiri to the question posed by the English who asked why he was not ready to storm the house of the ‘rebellious’ lord Kunji Nayar and end the conflict. The Prince deemed it unfair to do this to anyone who was his equal, preferring ‘to drill out time and make him spend his money, and destroy his lands to humble him’. OIC, Orme Collections, vol. 169, Letter from Tellichery to Bombay, 10 Nov. 1711, fos. 189-90. 78 See Chapter Five. 79 The Kudali Swarupam also claimed some sort of authority over Kolathunadu. Mahalingam (ed.), Mackenzie Manuscripts, I, 287. 80 Canter Visscher’s hint of the existence of a ‘good army’ in Kolathunadu was obviously a reference to the Nair militia rather than an organized army under state control. Padmanabha Menon (ed.), History of Kerala, II, 10. In his memoir of 1677, Van Reede also expressed the same opinion about Kolathiris. He remarks: ‘Het Stamhuys bestaet uyt vier tacken, waerin tegenwoordich noch een groote menichte mannen en vrouwen in ’t leven sijn, en die door haer vermenichvuldiging oock tot armoede vervallen, alhoewel het landschap seer magtig is van nayros en lantheren, maar de vorstelijcke domeynen en erff- goederen sijn niet genoech de kinderen en het geslagt te voeden en onderhouden’ [the dynasty consists of four branches, within which a great number of men and women still live at present; who because of their fecundity also slide into poverty, notwithstanding the fact that the country is very powerful because of the Nayars and landlords, but the royal domains and inheritance are not enough to feed and support the children and the lineage]. s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 152. 81 Mahalingam (ed.), Mackenzie Manuscripts, I, 283. 82 It should be borne in mind that the general reports made on the Kerala polity by Dutch officials were greatly influenced by their close contact with Cochin, where a more structured kingship than that in Kolathunadu was in place. Moreover, the Dutch obvious- 192 NOTES ly tried to comprehend the functioning of the local polity through European intellectual idioms in which written laws played an important role in controlling civic life. The ‘laws’ of Cheraman Perumal have to be understood from this perspective. Galletti, Burg, and Groot (eds.), Dutch in Malabar, 51; Markus Vink, ‘The Dutch East India Company and the Pepper Trade between Kerala and Tamilnad, 1663–1795: A Geo-Historical Analysis’, in K. S. Mathew (ed.), Mariners, Merchants and Oceans: Studies in Maritime History (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995), 291. 83 ‘Memoir of Van Reede to Jacob Lobs, 1677’, in s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 106. William Logan has also expressed a similar view about Kerala Society—an egalitarian one—though a people with ‘little or no history in one sense to record’. Logan, Malabar, I, pp. vi-vii. 84 In this context, it is interesting to note Van Reede’s comment about the ongoing struggle among the different power groups of Malabar. He states that, in course of time, the old laws had been ignored and different interest groups were trying to change old practices in order to attain their own interests, which created problems in the society. s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 110. 85 The literary and inscriptional evidence from these areas supports the existence of these earlier port towns of Kolathunadu. Ilangopatanam appears in the Ramantali stone inscription. Annual Report on South Indian Epigraphy (Madras: Government of India Press, 1932), 86-7. 86 Achalapatanam appears in Athula’s Mushikavamsa. Raghavan Pilla (ed.), Mushikavamsam, 219. M. G. S. Narayanan traces the period of the composition of this kavya back to the first half of the eleventh century. Narayanan, ‘Mushakavamsa as a Source of Kerala History’, 65. 87 Kachilpatanam, another now vanished port town, is mentioned in the Payyanur Pattu which belongs to thirteenth or fourteenth century. Anthony, Payyanur Pattu, 3. 88 According to the mushikavamsam, the Mooshaka king, Vallabha II, established the town of Madayi. Raghavan Pilla (ed.), Mushikavamsam, 301. By the time of the arrival of the Portuguese, this port town has lost its commercial significance. 89 Chirakkal T. Balakrishnan Nair says that the Kolathiris had had a fortress (Kadalayi kotta) and a Krishna temple on the coast of the Arabian Sea where the Ali Rajas later set up their establishments. Gradually this fortress fell into ruin and the temple was removed to Chirakkal, the seat of the royal family, in 1828. Balakrishanan, Theranjedutha Prabandhangal, 67. 90 In his travel account, Ma Huan mentions the country of Hen-nu-erh, which bordered the Calicut kingdom. If this can be identified as Kannur (Cannanore), the date of the earliest reference about Cannanore goes back to 1433. Ma Huan, Ying-Yai Sheng-Lan: The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores, ed. J. V. G. Mills (Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, 1970), 138. 91 B. A. Saletore, Social and Political Life in the Vijayanagara Empire (AD 1346–1646), I (Madras: B. G. Paul and Co. Publishers, 1934), 424. 92 Mohamed Kassim Firishtah, History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India, Till the Year AD 1612, II, tr. and ed. by John Briggs (Calcutta: Editions Indian, 1966), 266. 93 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, I, 211. 94 M. H. Rama Sharma, The History of the Vijayanagar Empire: Beginning and Expansion (1308–1569), I, ed. M. H. Gopal (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1978), 74-5. 95 Varthema, Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema, 51. 96 Barbosa mentions about the supply of pepper to the capital city Vijayanagara, ‘that was brought from Malabar on oxen and asses’. Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, I, 203. 97 Varthema, Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema, 52. 98 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, I, 210. 99 Varthema, Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema, 50. 100 The Portuguese officials mention that the pepper of Dharmapatanam, an important satellite port of Cannanore, was sent to Calicut rather than to the Cannanore port. ‘Gaspar Pereira to D. Manuel, Cochin, 30 Dec. 1505’, in Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque Seguidas de Documentos que as Elucidam [Letters of Afonso de Albuquerque along with the documents which they elucidate], II, ed. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhao Pato and TO CHAPTER TWO 193

Mendoca (Lisboa: Academia Real das Sciencias, 1898), 361. 101 The specific interest of the Vijayanagara rulers in the horse trade of Cannanore might have been the reason the Zamorins did not try to force the diversion of this profitable trade to Calicut. 102 Bouchon, Regent of the Sea, 80. 103 Ibid. 19. 104 Varthema, Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema, 50. 105 ‘Kolathiri to D. Manuel, Cannanore, 6 Dec. 1507’, in Cartas de Affonso de Albu- querque, II, 401. 106 Tomé Pires, who visited Cannanore in the second decade of the sixteenth century wrote: ‘If Your Highness had not taken this kingdom [Cannanore] under your rule, it would be Moorish by now, because a certain Mamale Mercar was beginning to be very powerful’. Pires, Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires, 79. 107 The political and economic background to the development of this Muslim royal family of Cannanore has been meticulously analysed by Geneviève Bouchon. Bouchon, Regent of the Sea. 108 K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 34-6. 109 The accounts given in the ‘Periplus of the Erythrean Sea’ substantiate the existence of pre-Islamic trade relations between West Asia and India during the early Christian centuries. See K. A. N. Sastri (ed.), Foreign Notices of South India: From Megasthenes to Ma- Huan (Madras: University of Madras, 1972), 57. 110 Wink, Al-Hind, 71-2. 111 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 74. 112 Banerjee, ‘A Wedding Feast or Political Arena’, 83-112; Kurup, Ali Rajas of Cannanore. 113 Battuta, Rehla of Ibn Battuta. 114 Panikkassery (ed.), Keralam Pathinanchum Pathinarum Noottandukalil, 109. 115 The attempt of the Kunjali Marakkar of Calicut who rebelled against the Zamorin and the Portuguese is an example. See Pyrard of Laval, Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval, I, 350-2. 116 Jacobus Canter Visscher, Mallabaarse brieven: behelzende eene naukeurige beschryving van Jacobus Canter Visscher van de kust van Mallabaar: den aardt des landts, de zeden en gewoontens der inwoneren, en al het voornaamste dat in dit gewest van Indie valt aan te merken [Malabar letters: Containing a detailed description of the coast of Malabar by Jacobus Canter Visscher: The characteristics of the region, the customs and traditions of the inhabitants, and all the important highlights in this province] (Leeuwarden: Ferwerda, 1743), 362. 117 See Chapter Three and Chapter Five. 118 Alexander Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies: Giving an Exact and Copious Description of the Situation, Product, Manufactures, Laws, Customs, Religion, Trade etc. of all the Countries and Islands, which lie between the Cape of Good Hope, and the Island of Japan, I (London: C. Hitch and A. Miller, 1744), 294. 119 The concept of controlling people was considered as important in agricultural societies where land was plenty and population pressure was less. Anthony Reid indicates that a similar situation existed in South-East Asia where there was an ample supply of land and manpower was scarce. Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680: The Lands below the Winds, I (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988), 26. See also Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 24. 120 In 1698, the Dutch reported the introduction of control over the sale of rice in Cannanore by the Ali Raja, who tried to limit its distribution among his own dependents because of its scarcity. VOC 1627, Extract from the letter sent from Cannanore to Cochin, 11 Aug. 1698, fo. 278v. 121 Dilip Menon, Caste, Nationalism and Communism, 30-5. 122 The association of Muslim rulers with the sakti tradition is not very uncommon in South Indian history. See Kate Brittlebank, ‘Sakti and Barakat: The Power of Tipu’s Tiger. 194 NOTES

An Examination of the Tiger Emblem of Tipu Sultan of Mysore’, Modern Asian Studies, 29/2 (May 1995), 257-69. 123 The popular narrative-song ‘Murikkanchery Kelu’ and the story which connects the Arackal Beebi with Andallur kavu both clearly point towards the popular conceptualization of the Arackal Swarupam as a regional power centre. M. V. Vishnu Namboodiri (ed.), Murikkanchery Keluvinte Pattukatha [The narrative-song of Murikkanchery Kelu] (Kottayam: Current Books, 1999); Vanidas Elayavoor, Katha Parayunna Kolathunadu [The story-narrating Kolathunadu) (Trissur: Current Books, 1984). 124 In this ‘legend’, the origin of Arackal family is traced to Sri Devi, the sister of Cheraman Perumal, thereby justifying its royal dignity through the matrilineal line. Kurup, Ali Rajas of Cannanore, Appendix II, 99-100. 125 ‘Zij hebben haren oorsprong van een princesse van Colastrij, die door een voornaam moor of arabier beswangert, en die vervolgens met den koning versoent zijnde, de eer- naam van Crau of prinses ontfing met het gezag over de moorse Bassaar, Lekkerdivase Eylanden, en veele andere schoone landerijen...’. VOC 2601, Mallabaarse woordenboeken [Malabar wordbook], fo. 161r. 126 Galletti, Burg and Groot (eds.), Dutch in Malabar, 147. 127 Varier (ed.), Keralolpathi Granthavari, 25. 128 Padmanabha Menon (ed.), History of Kerala, II, 55. 129 ‘een vrij heer der mooren’. ‘Memorandum of Hendrik Adriaan van Reede to Jacob Lobs’, in s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 154. 130 ‘…haar [Mappilas] eygen welvaart, die geheel in de negotie en scheepvaart bestaat’ [their (Mappilas) own prosperity, which consists entirely of trade and shipping]. Ibid. 131 Pires, Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires, 74. 132 Pires describes these kailmals as, ‘They are called Kaimals in the same way as we say dukes, marquises, counts and other titles, because thy are lords possessing much land and vassals; and there are some Kaimals in Malabar with ten thousand Nayar [vassals], and there are others with a hundred or two hundred Nayars’. Ibid. 82. 133 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 6. 134 Pyrard of Laval, Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval, I, 370. 135 Ibid. 444-5. 136 The control over the Maldive Islands was the continuation of that exercised by the Ali Rajas’ predecessors, especially Mamale Marakkar, during the sixteenth century. For more details about Mamale Marakkar, see Bouchon, Regent of the Sea, 110-83. 137 Pyrard of Laval, Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval, I, 445. 138 A similar view is expressed by Barbara Andaya in her study on south-east Sumatra. She points out that the ultimate measure of a king’s success was the numbers of his followers. Barbara Watson Andaya, To Live as Brothers: Southeast Sumatra in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 35.

Notes to Chapter Three

1 Haraprasad Ray attributes the reason for this withdrawal to various internal developments rather than to any external pressure from other maritime powers. On the other hand, Meilink-Roelofsz suggests a connection between the rise of the Muslim maritime hegemony in the Indian Ocean and the withdrawal of the Chinese from long-distance maritime ventures. Haraprasad Ray, ‘China and the ‘Western Ocean’ in the Fifteenth Century’, in Satish Chandra (ed.), The Indian Ocean: Explorations in History, Commerce and Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1987), 109-24 at 118-19; M. A. P. Meilink- Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 AD and about 1630 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 74. 2 R. S. Lopez, H. A. Miskimin, and A. L. Udovitch, ‘England to Egypt, 1350–1500: Long-term Trends and Long-distance Trade’, in M. A. Cook (ed.), Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to the Present Day (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 93-128; John L. Meloy, ‘Imperial Strategy and Political Exigency: The Red Sea Spice Trade and the Mamluk Sultanate in the Fifteenth Century’, Journal of TO CHAPTER THREE 195 the American Oriental Society, 123/1 (2003), 1-19. 3 Janet Abu-Ludhod therefore takes it as a ‘fact’ that the ‘fall of the East’ preceded the ‘rise of the West’. Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System AD 1250–1350 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 361; Emmanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System, 3 vols. (New York: Academic Press, 1974, 1980, 1989). 4 André Gunder Frank and Kenneth Pomeranz argue that the Asian economies continued to be dynamic until the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was only after that date European dominance became a reality in Asia. André Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 5 K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 63. 6 Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence, 27-35. 7 Pires, Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires, 42. 8 For a recent comprehensive study on Vijayanagara, see Burton Stein, Vijayanagara (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). About the Bahmani Sultanate: Haroon Khan Sherwani, The Bahmanis of the Deccan: An Objective Study (Hyderabad: Manzil, 1953). 9 Abdul Rassaq gives a brilliant picture of Vijayanagara and its importance in the regional economy in the fifteenth century. Major, India in the Fifteenth Century, 21-43. 10 M. N. Pearson, ‘India and the Indian Ocean in the Sixteenth Century’, in Ashin Das Gupta and M. N. Pearson (eds.), India and the Indian Ocean, 1500–1800 (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1987), 71-93 at 71. 11 Sinnappah Arasaratnam, Maritime India in the Seventeenth Century (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 43. 12 Niels Steensgaard presumes that Calicut had already lapsed into its waning phase, vanquished by the competition from Cambay. Niels Steensgaard, ‘The Indian Ocean Network and the Emerging World Economy, circa 1500–1750’, in Satish Chandra (ed.), The Indian Ocean: Explorations in History, 125-50 at 131. 13 By 1505 the Portuguese had constructed a strong fort in Cannanore to replace the feitoria (factory) established there by Cabral in 1501. Bouchon, Regent of the Sea, 78. 14 Ashin Das Gupta, Indian Ocean Merchants and the Decline of Surat, c. 1700–1750 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1979), 1. 15 Pius Malekandathil, ‘Maritime Malabar and a Mercantile State: Polity and State Formation in Malabar under the Portuguese, 1498–1663’, in K. S. Mathew (ed.), Maritime Malabar and the Europeans, 1500–1962 (Gurgaon: Hope India, 2003), 197- 227 at 198. 16 Varthema, Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema, 50. 17 ‘Albuquerque’s Letter to D. Manuel, Cochin, 1 Apr. 1512’, in Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque, I, 38. The term paradesi means ‘foreigner’. Barbosa mentions that some of these Muslims nationalities such as Arabs, Persians, Guajaratis, Khorasanis, and Decanis settled in Calicut to trade. Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 75-6. 18 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 76. 19 For a detailed study, though nationalistic in approach, see Nambiar, Kunjalis: Admirals of Calicut. 20 For more details, see Bouchon, Regent of the Sea. 21 Pires, Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires, 77. 22 Geneviève Bouchon, ‘Calicut at the Turn of the Sixteenth Century: The Portuguese Catalyst’, Indica, 49 (1989), 2-13 at 7. For more details about the al-karimi merchants of Egypt, see Walter J. Fischel, ‘The Spice Trade in Mamluk Egypt’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 1 (1958), 157-74. 23 M. N. Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat: The Response to the Portuguese in the Sixteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 10. 24 Ashin Das Gupta, Malabar in Asian Trade, 1740–1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 8. 25 Pius Malekandathil, Portuguese Cochin and the Maritime Trade of India, 1500–1663 196 NOTES

(New Delhi: Manohar, 2001), 151-2. 26 This counter-attack was spearheaded by the Calicut merchants under the Zamorins, although the Cannanore merchants also participated in it. See Jorge Manuel Flores, ‘The Straits of Ceylon, 1524–1539: The Portuguese-Mappila Struggle over a Strategic Area’, in Sanjay Subrahmanyam (ed.), Sinners and Saints: The Successors of Vasco da Gama (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 57-74. For a hero-oriented, nationalistic narrative of the Portuguese-Mappila conflicts, see Nambiar, Kunjalis: Admirals of Calicut. 27 Bouchon, Regent of the Sea, 118. 28 ‘Simao Sodre to Dom Joao III, Cochin, 28 Dec. 1526’, in Documentos sobre os Portugueses em Mocambique e na Africa Central (1497–1840) [Documents on the Portuguese in Mozambique and in Central Africa], VI (Lisboa: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1969), 270. 29 ‘Alvaro Fernandes to Dom Manuel’, in Jose Ramos Coelho (ed.), Alguns Documentos do Archivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo acerca das Nevegacões e Conquistas Portuguezas [Some documents of Torre do Tombo concerning the Portuguese sailings and conquests] (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1892), 453. 30 The re-direction of the Malabar pepper supply through the Canara port of Bhatkal had already begun in the second decade of the sixteenth century. Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, I, 189. For an alternative view, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Political Economy of Commerce: Southern India, 1500–1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 128-32. 31 The Portuguese source mentions the Ali Raja’s leading role in the Mappila resistance to the Portuguese commercial interests as early as 1557. Manuel de Fariya y Sousa, The Portuguese Asia: Or the History of the Discovery and Conquest of India by the Portuguese, tr. John Stevens, II (Republished; Westmead: Gregg International Publishers Limited, 1971), 197. Zain-ud-Din also refers to the active participation of the Ali Raja in the anti- Portuguese struggle of the Malabar traders during the second half of the sixteenth century. Panikkassery, Keralam Pathinanchum Pathinarum Noottandukalil, 113, 119. 32 Alexander Hamilton noticed this structural opposition between the Dutch fort in Cannanore and the Mappila Bazaar of the Ali Rajas. Hamilton, New Account of the East Indies, I, 291-2. 33 Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, The Voyage of John Huyghen van Linschoten to the East Indies: From the Old English Translation of 1598, I, ed. Arthur Coke Burnell (London: Hakluyt Society, 1885), 67. 34 Pyrard of Laval, Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval, I, 448. 35 R. J. Barendse, The Arabian Seas, 1640–1700 (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1998), 54. 36 Padmanabha Menon (ed.), History of Kerala, II, 55. 37 ‘Memorandum by Adriaan Moens, 18 Apr. 1781’, in Galletti, Burg, and Groot (eds.), Dutch in Malabar, 143, 147. 38 Hamilton, New Account of the East Indies, I, 294. 39 Karanavar is a particular hierarchical position usually enjoyed by the eldest male member of a Malabar joint family or taravadu. He is considered the highest authority in the family. However in the Arackal House, the karanavar was the second most senior in the line of succession and occupied a position immediately below the Ali Raja. The position of the karanavar was usually occupied by the eldest nephew or a younger brother of the Ali Raja, who was the next most senior in the matrilineal line of succession. 40 ‘Memorandum by Commander Isbrand Godske to Commander Lucas van der Dussen (1668)’, in s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 73-4. 41 VOC 1519, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 10 Oct. 1692, fo. 640v. 42 Margaret Frenz suggests this structural opposition was an important cause of the weakness of Malabar royal power. This postulation is questionable on the grounds that most of the Malabar swarupams did not suffer any serious strife among kings’ immediate sons and the nephews. This occurred more distantly among the members of various lineages claiming seniority in succession. Even in eighteenth-century Travancore, the struggle between Marthanda Varma and the sons of his predecessor was only an external expres- TO CHAPTER THREE 197 sion of the real power struggle between the kingship and the Pillamar—the nobles of the land. Frenz, From Contact to Conquest, 145-7; Lannoy, Kulasekhara Perumals of Travancore, 45-53. 43 The maritime commercial ventures of the karanavar of the Arackal House appear regularly in the reports of the Malabar commandant of the Dutch East India Company. For example, see VOC 1694, Extract postscript from the letter written by the Company servants in Cannanore to the Commander Abraham Vink and the Cochin Council, 24 Oct. 1703, fo. 148; VOC 1993, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Cochin, 26 Mar. 1723, fo. 540r-v. 44 VOC 1425, Trade contract concluded between the Dutch East India Company and the Ali Raja of Cannanore on 2 Mar. 1686, Cochin, 13 Dec. 1686, fo. 109r. 45 Ibid. fo. 109r. 46 The title karthavu can be roughly translated as ‘lord’. 47 VOC 1866, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Barent Ketel, Cochin, 23 Mar. 1715, fos. 572v-576r. 48 Generale missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie [General missives of the Governors-General and Councillors to the Gentlemen XVII of the Dutch East India Company], 11 vols., ed. W. Ph. Coolhaas, J. van Goor, and J. E. Schooneveld-Oosterling (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960– 2004), VII: 1713–1725, 184-5. 49 R. H. Hitchcock, Peasant Revolt in Malabar: A History of the Malabar Rebellion 1921, introduction by Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. (repr., New Delhi: Usha Publications, 1983), 8. 50 In vadakkan pattukal or the Northern Ballads of northern Kerala, jonakas (another local term used for the Mappilas of the region) feature mainly as merchants residing at the angadis or bazaars of the region. M. C. Appunni Nambiar (ed.), 24 Vadakkan Pattukal [24 northern ballads] (Kollam: Modern Books, 1965), 160, 191, 230, 245, 316. 51 Pyrard of Laval, Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval, I, 444. 52 Report of a Joint Commission from Bengal and Bombay, Appointed to Inspect into the State and Condition of the Province of Malabar in the Years 1792 and 1793 (repr., Madras: Government Press, 1862), 165. 53 For a discussion on the role of British colonialism in constructing a unified ‘Muhammadan’ law based on certain textual traditions in order to satisfy colonial exigen- cies, see Michael R. Anderson, ‘Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India’, in David Arnold and Peter Robb (eds.), Institutions and Ideologies: A SOAS South Asia Reader (London: Curzon Press Ltd., 1993), 165-85. 54 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 76. Pyrard observed that the Mappilas as did other people of the land ‘speak same language, obey Nair kings and pay tribute to kings for their land’. This indicates the emerging ethos of a ‘Malayalar’ identity in medieval Malabar, imbued with political and cultural connotations as opposed to a paradesi or foreign identity. This could explain the attempt by the Ali Rajas to justify their newly acquired political identity in relation to the existing political structure of Malabar. Pyrard of Laval, Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval, I, 444. 55 A peculiar system of the execution of justice known as ankam—a duel in which two hired ‘chekavars’ of the opposing parties fought with each other to decide the case—operated in the northern region of Malabar. The main theme of the folklore of the region (Northern Ballads) exemplifies this spirit of the region. 56 Pyrard of Laval, Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval, I, 342. 57 Hamilton, New Account of the East Indies, I, 294-5. 58 See Chapter One and Chapter Two. 59 VOC 1891, Letter from Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to onderkoopman (Junior Merchant) Hendrik van Wiert, Cannanore, 14 Dec. 1717, fo. 59r-v. 60 OIC, Mackenzie Collection: General, vol. 50, Report by the Bombay Commission of Malabar to the Madras Board of Revenue, Calicut, 28 July 1801, fo. 31r. 61 Kurup, Ali Rajas of Cannanore, 118-21. 62 Hermann Gundert (ed.), Keralolpathi [Origin of Kerala] (repr., Trivandrum: Balan Publications, 1961), 123-4. 63 Kurup, Ali Rajas of Cannanore, 84-5. 198 NOTES

64 Theodore P. C. Gabriel, Lakshadweep: History, Religion and Society (New Delhi: Books & Books, 1989), 54-7. 65 Bouchon, Regent of the Sea, 152-4. 66 Ibid. 160. 67 Pyrard of Laval, Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval, I, 445. 68 It is interesting that the Ali Raja tried but failed to solicit the support of the VOC in his attempt to regain his control of the Islands from the King of the Maldives in 1652. This indicates that the previous control of the Ali Rajas over the Maldives had weakened by this time. VOC 1195, Letter from Van Serooskercken to Batavia, 16 May 1652, fo. 697v. 69 For details of the traditional ship-building technology in Malabar, see K. K. N. Kurup, ‘Indigenous Navigation and Ship-building on the Malabar Coast’, in K. S. Mathew (ed.), Ship-building and Navigation in the Indian Ocean Region, AD 1400–1800 (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1997), 20-5. 70 It has been reported that the Ali Rajas annually paid 18,500 fanums or 2,312 ½ rix- dollars to the Kolathiris in tolls in order to enjoy their control over the islands. VOC 1679, Letter from Commander Abraham Vink and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1702, fos. 41-2. 71 Report of a Joint Commission from Bengal and Bombay, 159. 72 For a discussion on this subject, see Ibid. 160-3. 73 The Dutch officials in Malabar, who were not well informed about these islands, usually considered the Lakshadweep to be a part of the Maldives. VOC 1474, Letter from Isaack van Dielen to Commissioner Van Mydreght, 20 Mar. 1690, fo. 592v. 74 VOC 1905, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Johannes Hertenberg, 6 Apr. 1718, fos. 293v-294r; VOC 1881, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Barent Ketel, 10 Apr. 1716, fo. 1012v. 75 F. M. Klinkenberg, ‘De kaurihandel van de VOC’ [The cowry trade of the VOC] (Doctoraalscriptie Geschiedenis, Leiden University, 1981); Jan Hogendorn and Marion Johnson, The Shell Money of the Slave Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 85. 76 VOC 1740, Letter from Commander Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 23 Apr. 1707, fo. 102v. 77 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, 80-1. 78 Ibid. 81. 79 Dagh-register gehouden int Casteel Batavia: vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India, 1664 [Daily register kept in Batavia Castle of all that happened there and throughout the Netherlands Indies, 1664], ed. J. A. van der Chijs (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1893), 172-3. 80 Pires, Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires, 82. 81 Varthema, Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema, 51. See also K. S. Mathew, ‘Khwaja Shams-ud-din Giloni of Cannanore and the Portuguese in the Sixteenth Century’, in K. S. Mathew and Joy Varkey (eds.), Winds of Spices, 35-45. 82 ‘If your Highness had not taken this kingdom [Cannanore] under your rule, it would be Moorish by now, because a certain Mamalle Mercar was beginning to be very powerful’. Pires, Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires, 77. 83 The foreign accounts on Cannanore merchants during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries particularly emphasize their commercial relations with the West Asian port towns, especially those in the Red Sea. Pyrard of Laval, Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval, I, 448; François Valentyn, Beschryving van ’t Nederlandsch comptoir op de kust van Malabar, en van onzen handel in Japan, mitsgaders een beschryving van Kaap der Goede Hoope en ’t eyland Mauritius, met de zaaken tot de voornoemde ryken en landen behoorende [Description of the Dutch factory on the coast of Malabar and of our trade in Japan, and a description of the Cape of Good Hope and the island Mauritius, including the affairs with regard to the afore-mentioned kingdoms and countries], vol. V, part II (Dordrecht: Joannes van Braam, 1726), 8; Padmanabha Menon (ed.), History of Kerala, II, 55. 84 However, this does not mean that the relationship between the Ali Raja and the Portuguese was always peaceful in the second half of the sixteenth century. There are indi- TO CHAPTER THREE 199 cations of conflict between the two in both the Portuguese and the indigenous sources. See note 31 of this chapter. 85 Sinnappah Arasaratnam, Maritime India in the Seventeenth Century (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 95. 86 M. N. Pearson, Coastal Western India: Studies from the Portuguese Records (New Delhi: Concept, 1981), 145; Subrahmanyam, Political Economy of Commerce, 242, footnote number 283. 87 VOC 1274, Original letter from Governor Van Goens and the Ceylon Council to Heren XVII, 30 Nov. 1670, fo. 23r. 88 VOC 1259, Letter from Gamron Council to Batavia, 14 June 1666, fo. 3354. See also VOC 1255, Letter from Director Roothaes and the Gamron Council to Heren XVII, 23 Sept. 1667, fo. 1106. 89 The English Factories in India: A Calendar of Documents in the India Office, West- minster: 1642–1645, ed. William Foster (Oxford: Clarendon, 1913), 179, 213. 90 Dagh-register Batavia 1681, 686. 91 VOC 1757, Original letter from Willem Moorman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1708, fos. 13r-14r. 92 VOC 1625, Letter from Commander Magnus Wichelman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 31 Dec. 1698, fo. 14. 93 VOC 1627, Extract from the letter sent from Cannanore to Cochin, 29 Sept. 1698, fo. 279r. 94 VOC 1261, Instruction from Van Goens to onderkoopman Gelmer Vosburg, Cannanore, 14 Dec. 1664, fo. 307r. 95 English Factories in India 1634–1636, Instruction from Surat to Thomas Pitt proceed- ing to Dhabol, 5 Mar. 1636, 176. 96 Dagh-register Batavia 1624–1629, 336. Entry is dated as 28 June 1628. 97 English Factories in India 1637–1641, President Fremlin and Francis Breton at Surat to the Factors in Persia, 31 Mar. 1641, 297. 98 Santha Hariharan, Cotton Textiles and Corporate Buyers in Cottonopolis: A Study of Purchases and Prices in Gujarat, 1600–1800 (Delhi: Manak Publications, 2002), 155. 99 VOC 1128, Letter from Pieter Paets in Wingurla to Adam Westerwolt, 28 Oct. 1637, fo. 210r. 100 Dagh-register Batavia 1636, 273. 101 VOC 1474, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen to the Commissioner Van Mydreght, 12 Feb. 1690, fos. 573v-574r. 102 VOC 1474, Original letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 31 Jan. 1691, fos. 503v-504r. 103 VOC 1519, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 10 Oct. 1692, fo. 685r-v. 104 Flores, ‘The Straits of Ceylon, 1524–1539’, 57-74. 105 VOC 1410, Original letter from Commander Gelmer Vosburg and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 28 Nov. 1685, fos. 616v-617r. 106 VOC 1406, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 11 Apr. 1684, fo. 790r. 107 VOC 1866, Translated letter from Paya Kandi Cadry, accountant of the Ali Raja’s ship, to Cochin, 15 Jan. 1715, fos. 312v-318r. 108 VOC 1905, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Cochin, 2 Dec. 1717, fo. 248r. 109 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 81; Pires, Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires, 76. 110 Dagh-register Batavia 1643–1644, 293. 111 VOC 1256, Letter from Commander Isbrand Goske, Cochin, to Van Goens, Colombo, 12 Nov. 1666, fo. 410r. Tomé Pires describes Kayal as the first port on the Coromandel Coast. Pires, Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires, 271. 112 VOC 1725, Resolution taken in the Cochin Council, 4 Dec. 1704, fo. 831v. 113 According to the report, the Ali Raja’s son Mamaly Crauw and his brother Conje Coyamoe kept the Sultan of Maldives, who had escaped to Coromandel from the Maldives, in their custody in Kariapatanam near Cape Comorin. VOC 1773, Secret letter from Commander Willem Moerman to Batavia, 28 Dec. 1708, fo. 445r-v. 200 NOTES

114 VOC 1638, Note on all the ships and vessels going from and coming to Cochin from 3 Jan. to 23 Dec. 1699, fo. 94. 115 Malabar had commercial relations with Bengal as early as the seventeenth century. Rice was imported to Malabar from Bengal. Pyrard of Laval noticed the presence of a Calicut ship as far away as Chittagong. Considering this long-term contact between the two regions, the Ali Rajas were probably acquainted with the region before the eighteenth century. Pyrard of Laval, Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval, I, 326-7. 116 Om Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 1630–1720 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 29. 117 See Appendix 3. 118 For a description of this Malacca conquest, see Danvers, The Portuguese in India, 220-9. 119 C. R. Boxer, ‘A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of Atjeh, 1540–1600’, Journal of South-East Asian History (1969), 415-28. 120 Dagh-register Batavia 1624–1629, 129. 121 VOC 1757, Letter from Commander Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 5 May 1708, fos. 230v-231r. 122 VOC 1825, Letter from Commander Barent Ketel, Cochin, to Batavia, 13 May 1712, fo. 86v. 123 VOC 1881, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Cochin, 10 Apr. 1716, fo. 1012v. 124 VOC 1905, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Cochin, 2 Dec. 1717, fo. 248r. 125 Ibid. 6 Apr. 1718, fos. 293v-294r. 126 VOC 1943, Translated letter from Ali Ali Issoepoe, Ponnani, to Cochin, 13 Feb. 1720, fo. 633r. 127 VOC 1993, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Cochin, 26 Mar. 1723, fo. 540r-v. 128 VOC 1352, Report based on the important information contained in the letter of Commander Marten Huijsman sent from Cochin to Batavia, 11 Mar. 1680, fo. 367r. 129 VOC 1607, Malabar dagregister [daily report], 1 Dec. 1697 to 15 Apr. 1698, entry dated 3 Feb. 1698, fo. 272r. 130 VOC 1519, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 10 Oct. 1692, fo. 685r. 131 VOC 1731, Letter from Commander Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 19 Nov. 1705, fo. 82. 132 VOC 1619, Extract from the letter sent from Cannanore to Cochin, 14 July 1699, fos. 433v-434r. 133 VOC 1245, Original letter from Van Goens to Heren XVII, 9 Jan. 1665, fo. 479; S. Botelho (ed.), O Tombo do Estado da India in Subsidios para a Historia da India Portuguesa [Register of the Estdo da India in subsidies for the history of Portuguese India] (Lisboa: Academia Real das Sciencias, 1868), 247. 134 Jan Kieniewicz, ‘Pepper Gardens and Market in Pre-Colonial Malabar’, Moyen Orient and Ocean Indien, 3 (1986), 1-36 at 2. 135 VOC 1448, Original letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to the Heren XVII, 17 Jan. 1689, fo. 396v. 136 Even though South Malabar also produced cardamom, its quality was inferior to that of the Cannanore Cardamom. Visscher, Mallabaarse brieven, 126. 137 Besides pepper, this ship which was captured by the Dutch official in Cannanore, Daniel Joncktus, on 8 Mar. 1678 also contained around 16,000 pounds of cardamom. VOC 1349, Report from koopman Steven Schoen to Batavia, 17 July 1678, fo. 1573r. 138 VOC 1321, Letter from Commander Hendrick van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 9 Dec. 1675, fos. 911v-912r. 139 VOC 1474, Original letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 31 Jan. 1691, fo.504v. 140 VOC 1352, Report based on the important information contained in the letter of Commander Marten Huijsman sent from Cochin to Batavia, 11 Mar. 1680, fo. 375r. 141 Generale Missiven, IV: 1675–1685, 396. 142 VOC 1474, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Quilon Council to TO CHAPTER THREE 201

Commissioner Van Mydreght, 8 June 1689, fos. 225v-226r. 143 VOC 1474, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen to Commissioner Van Mydreght, 12 Feb. 1690, fo. 573v. 144 English Factories in India 1637–1641, President Fremlen and Francis Breton at Surat to the Factors in Persia, 31 Mar. 1641, 297. 145 Om Prakash (ed.), The Dutch Factories in India, 1617–1623: A Collection of Dutch East India Company Documents Pertaining to India (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1984), 232. 146 Dagh-register Batavia 1644–1645, 42. 147 VOC 1352, Report based on the important information contained in the letter of Commissioner Marten Huijsman sent from Cochin to Batavia, 11 Mar. 1680, fo. 374v. 148 Generale Missiven, VI: 1698–1713, 559-560. 149 VOC 1825, Translated letter from the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara to Barent Ketel, Cochin, 2 June 1712, fo. 334r-v. 150 Roelofsz, De vestiging der Nederlanders ter kuste Malabar, 104. 151 VOC 1242, Letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Cannanore Council to Heren XVII, 11 Feb. 1664, fo. 1058v. 152 The English refer to seven Malabar ships in Broach seeking cargoes of cotton. English Factories in India 1624–1629, 245. 153 VOC 1474, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen to the Commissioner Van Mydreght, 12 Feb. 1690, fos. 573v-574r. 154 VOC 1349, Letter from Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 13 Feb. 1679, fo. 1459v. 155 Dagh-register Batavia 1663, 573-4. 156 VOC 1295, Letter from Hendrik van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 22 Apr. 1673, fo. 272v. 157 VOC 1373, Letter from Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 13 Mar. 1682, fo. 355r. 158 VOC 1881, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Barent Ketel, Cannanore, 10 Apr. 1716, fo. 1012v. 159 Dagh-register Batavia 1624–1629, 129. 160 VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1680, fos. 1756v-1757r. 161 VOC 1925, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Cochin, 10 Apr. 1719, not foliated; VOC 1925, Letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg to the Ali Raja, 22 Apr. 1719, not foliated. 162 VOC 1943, Letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg to the Ali Raja, 13 Feb. 1720, fos. 633v- 634r. 163 Pires, Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires, 76-7. 164 VOC 1627, Extract from the letter sent from Cannanore to Cochin, 11 Aug. 1698, fos. 278v-279r. 165 Ibid. 29 Sept. 1698, fo. 279r. 166 VOC 1454, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 25 July 1688, fo. 1239v. 167 VOC 1474, Original letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 10 Jan. 1690, fo. 15r-v. 168 Mitigating his earlier ‘revolutionary’ stance, Niels Steensgaard accepted this existing compromising spirit in the Indian Ocean world during the seventeenth and the eighteenth century in one of his later articles. See Steensgaard, ‘Indian Ocean Network and the Emerging World Economy’, 125-50. 169 In a letter to the Dutch East India Company, the Ali Raja explicitly conveyed the importance of maritime trade to the economic life of the Arackal house. Tamilnadu State Archives, Chennai (TSA), Dutch Records, vol. 103, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Willem Backer Jacobsz., Chettuva, 30 Nov. 1717, fos. 265-6. 170 A. C. Milner gives a detailed account of the importance of commercial wealth behind the emergence of new ‘rajas’ as well as for the maintenance of political power in the Malay world, where many of the political leaders were described as ‘great traders’. He argues: 202 NOTES

‘trade was not only the object of Malay political activity: the kingdom was, in the final analysis, a commercial venture’. A. C. Milner, Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1982), 14-28. 171 K. K. N. Kurup, History of the Tellicherry Factory (Calicut: Sandhya Publications, 1985), 7. 172 Even at the close of the eighteenth century the English noticed the strong, though uncertain, presence of the Ali Rajas in the Indian Ocean maritime trade. OIC, Tellicherry Factory Records G/37/10, Report to the Joint Commissioners by Robert Taylor, Tellicherry, 8 Mar. 1793, fo. 50.

Notes to Chapter Four

1 ‘…omdat dan dese fortresse sonder eenige landeryen off jurisdictie wesende soude end ons volk nergens de minste uytspanningh konnen genieten, maar als gevangenen binnen geslooten sitten’. VOC 1261, Instructions from Van Goens to onderkoopman Gelmer Vosburg appointed the opperhoofd (Factor) of the Cannanore fortress, 14 Dec. 1664, fo. 312v. 2 As pointed out by Sanjay Subrahmanyam, the official procurement of the European Companies in Malabar and Canara during the first half of the seventeenth century would very seldom have exceeded 1,000 to 1,200 tons. Subrahmanyam, Political Economy of Commerce, 249. 3 John Bastin, ‘The Changing Balance of the Southeast Asian Pepper Trade’, in M. N. Pearson (ed.), Spices in the Indian Ocean World (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996), 283-316 at 290. 4 The Generale Vereenichde Geoctroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie was chartered on 20 March 1602 with a total capital of 6,424,588 florins. For details, see F. S. Gaastra, De geschiedenis van de VOC [The history of the VOC] (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2002), 17- 22. 5 It has been argued that, while the Portuguese controlled 75 per cent of pepper imports to Europe up to about 1550 and again in the 1570s and the 1580s, the VOC was far ahead of them by the second decade of the seventeenth century. C. H. H. Wake, ‘The Changing Pattern of Europe’s Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400–1700’, Journal of European Economic History, 8 (1979), 361-403. 6 Niels Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), 86. 7 George D. Winius, ‘India or Brazil? Priority for Imperial Survival in the Wars of the restauraçào’, in Pius Malekandathil and T. Jamal Mohammed (eds.), The Portuguese, Indian Ocean and European Bridgeheads, 1500–1800 (Tellichery: MESHAR, 2001), 181- 90; Ernst van Veen, Decay or Defeat? An Inquiry into the Portuguese Decline in Asia, 1580– 1645 (Leiden: CNWS, 2000). 8 A. R. Disney, Twilight of the Pepper Empire: Portuguese Trade in Southwest India in the Early Seventeenth Century (Harvard University: Harvard University Press, 1978). 9 Pius Malekandathil argues that, although there was a steep increase in the production of pepper in Malabar by the seventeenth century (around 600 per cent), the share of the Estado da India in the pepper trade was only 3.1 per cent of the total production. Pius Malekandathil, ‘The Mercantile Networks and the International Trade of Cochin 1500– 1663’, Paper presented at the International conference on ‘Rivalry and Conflict, European Traders and Asian Trading Networks: Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, 23-26 June 2003, Leiden/Wassenaar. 10 Sinnappah Arasaratnam links this phenomenon to the rise of Surat in the north and to the expansion of the westward trade to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Arasaratnam, Maritime India in the Seventeenth Century, 95. 11 On the early relations between Malabar and the VOC in the first half of the seventeenth century, see Roelofsz, De vestiging der Nederlanders ter kuste Malabar. 12 Even in 1654, the Batavia government remained undecided about whether to con- TO CHAPTER FOUR 203 tinue Malabar trade or not. VOC 1208, Original General letter from Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker and the Batavia Council to Heren XVII, 7 Nov. 1654, fo. 80r. 13 Hugo K. s’Jacob, ‘De VOC en de Malabarkust in de 17de eeuw’ [The Dutch East India Company and the Malabar Coast in the 17th century], in M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz (ed.), De VOC in Azië [The VOC in Asia] (Bussum: Fibula-Van Dishoeck, 1976), 86; Els M. Jacobs, Koopman in Azië: de handel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tijdens de 18de eeuw [Merchant in Asia: The trade of the Dutch East India Company during the 18th century] (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2000), 85-99 at 55. 14 Leonard Blussé and Jaap de Moor, Nederlanders overzee: de eerste vijftig jaar, 1600– 1650 [The Dutch overseas: The first fifty years, 1600–1650] (Franeker: T. Wever. B.V., 1983), 251. 15 K. S. Mathew, ‘Trade and Commerce in Kerala (1500–1800)’, in Cherian (ed.), Perspectives on Kerala History, 180-221 at 185. 16 De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indie,1595–1610 [The rise of the Dutch power in East Indies, 1595–1610], III, ed. J. K. J. Jonge (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1865), 32. 17 The ‘Xabunder’ (shah bandar or harbour master) mentioned by the Dutch was probably the Ali Raja himself who had become the dominant figure at the Cannanore port town by the beginning of the seventeenth century. 18 Stukken afkomstig van het smaldeel onder bevel van Jacob de Bitter, 1608–1609 [Papers coming from the flotilla under the command of Jacob de Bitter, 1608–1609], 545, Letter from Jacob de Bitter to the Captain of Cannanore, 18 Oct. 1608, fo. 1r. 19 Roelofsz, De vestiging der Nederlanders ter kuste Malabar, 172; Dagh-register Batavia 1663, 178. For more details about the Cannanore conquest, VOC 1239, Original letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Cannanore Council to Heren XVII, 19 Feb. 1663, fo. 1646r-v. 20 VOC 1239, Ibid. fo. 1646r. 21 For a brief description on the Cannanore Fort as inherited from the Portuguese by the Dutch, see Dagh-register Batavia 1663, 178-9. 22 Dagh-register Batavia 1663, 179. 23 VOC 1239, Original letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Cannanore Council to Heren XVII, 19 Feb. 1663, fo. 1646r-v. 24 VOC 1239, Original letter from Rijckloff van Goens, Cochin, to Heren XVII, 19 Feb. 1663, fo. 1699r. 25 VOC 1242, Letter from Rijckloff van Goens and the Ceylon Council to Batavia, 10 Nov. 1663, fo.1006r. 26 Dagh-register Batavia 1663, 179. 27 VOC 1284, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 27 May 1671, fo. 2114r; Dagh-register Batavia 1663, 180. 28 VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1680, fo. 1756v. 29 VOC 1321, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 9 Dec. 1675, fo. 910r. 30 VOC 1255, Original letter from Commander Isbrant Godske to Heren XVII, 10 Mar. 1667, fos. 999-1001. 31 VOC 1256, Letter from Van Goens and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 18 May 1666, fo. 67v. 32 Severe disagreements on various administrative and commercial matters concerning Malabar flared up between Godske and Van Goens. For more details, see s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, p. LXVIII. 33 It is noteworthy that, although Van Goens became the Governor-General in Batavia in 1678, his power was weakened by the factional conflicts in the administrative council (Raad van Indië). This decline in Van Goens’ influence might have influenced the changing policy of the Heren XVII regarding Malabar. Kopieboek van uitgaande missiven, instructies en andere papieren van de Heren XVII en de kamer Amsterdam aan de kantoren in Indië, 1614–1795 [Copybook of the outbound letters, instructions and other papers of the Heren XVI and the Chamber of Amsterdam to the offices in India, 1614– 204 NOTES

1795], 320, Letter from Heren XVII to India, 19 May 1679, not foliated; s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, p. LXXIII. 34 Generale Missiven, IV: 1675–1685, 575; VOC 1352, Report based on the important information contained in the letter of Commander Marten Huijsman sent from Cochin to Batavia, 11 Mar. 1680, fos. 357v-358r. 35 VOC 1396, Letter from Commander Vosburg and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 18 Nov. 1684, fo. 769v. 36 ‘Instruction from Commissioner Hendrik Adriaan van Reede to Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Malabar Council, 23 Nov. 1691’, in s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 232. 37 The fort was transferred for 1,00,000 rupees. ‘Memorandum of Adriaan Moens (1781)’, in Galletti, Burg, and Groot (eds.), Dutch in Malabar, 148. 38 s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, p. LI. 39 VOC 1261, Instructions from Van Goens to onderkoopman Gelmer Vosburg appointed as the opperhoofd of the Cannanore fortress, 14 Dec. 1664, fo. 313r. 40 Dagh-register Batavia 1663, 179. 41 VOC 1239, Original letter from Rijckloff van Goens, Cochin, to Heren XVII, 19 Feb. 1663, fo. 1699r. 42 VOC 1242, Letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Cannanore Council to Heren XVII, 11 Feb. 1664, fo. 1060v. 43 In 1692 the total number of employees in Cannanore was 100. By 1720 the number had been reduced to twenty-three. However, the political turmoil in Cannanore compelled the Company to send more soldiers there in the following year. VOC 1527, Muster roll of the Company servants in Cannanore, 1692, fos. 519v-520r, 522r; VOC 1942, Letter from Company officials in Cannanore to Cochin, 23 Sept. 1720, fo. 110v; VOC 1977, Resolution taken in the Malabar Council, 4 Dec. 1721, fos. 203r-205r. 44 VOC 1284, Letter from Commander Hendrik van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 27 May 1671, fo. 2114r. 45 VOC 1351, Muster roll of the Company servants in Cannanore, 6 June 1679, fo. 2575r. 46 VOC 1295, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 22 Apr. 1673, fo. 273v; VOC 1304, Letter from Commander Van Reede, Cochin, to Batavia, 15 May 1674, fo. 646v; VOC 1474, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen, Cochin, to Commissioner Hendrik Adriaan van Reede, 17 Dec. 1690, fo. 718r-v. 47 In 1674 the escape and the recapture of five soldiers from Cannanore whom it was suggested should be punished as an example to others was reported. VOC 1304, Letter from Commander Van Reede, Cochin, to Batavia, 15 May 1674, fo. 606r. 48 VOC 1942, Resolution taken in the Cochin Council, Friday 12 Jan. 1720, fo. 292r-v. 49 VOC 1284, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 20 Apr. 1671, fos. 2087v-2088r. 50 VOC 1351, Muster roll of the Company servants in Cannanore, 6 June 1679, fo. 2575r; VOC 1527, Muster roll of the Company servants in Malabar in 1692, fos. 519v- 520r; VOC 1625, Letter from Commander Magnus Wichelman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 31 Dec. 1698, fo. 17. 51 In 1717, to protect the fort from a possible Mappila attack, the garrison was strengthened by recruiting three inlanders, possibly Portuguese mestiços, at a monthly salary of 2 rix-dollars and a para of rice. VOC 1891, Letter from Cannanore to Cochin concerning the fortification by the Ali Raja, 13 June 1717, fo. 44r-v. 52 Mestiços were of a mixed origin—born to Portuguese men and Indian women. Later, this term was also used to denote Dutch–Asian offspring in contrast to the ‘white castizos’ or Asia-born persons of pure European parentage. Topazes were dark-skinned Malabar Roman Catholics, who claimed Portuguese descent. The Dutch chaplain Canter Visscher gives a detailed note on the topazes who lived in Cochin in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Padmanabha Menon (ed.), History of Kerala, II, 36-40. See also Philip Baldaeus, A True and Exact Description of the Most Celebrated East-India Coasts of Malabar and Coromandel and also of the Isle of Ceylon (AES repr., New Delhi: Asian Educational TO CHAPTER FOUR 205

Services, 1996), 717. For a discussion on these racial divisions in Dutch Cochin, see Anjana Singh, Fort Cochin in Kerala, 1750–1830: The Social Condition of a Dutch Community in an Indian Milieu (Leiden: Brill, 2010), especially pages 33 and 92-96. 53 VOC 1528, Muster roll of the Company servants in Cannanore, 30 June 1693, fo. 546v; VOC 1434, Muster roll of the Company servants in Cannanore, 1687, fo. 264v. 54 For instance, the Company interpreter Ignatio possessed three slaves. VOC 1434, Muster roll of the Company servants in Cannanore, 1687, fo. 264v. 55 VOC 1274, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Malabar Council to Batavia, 14 Aug. 1670, fo. 112r-v. 56 VOC 1958, Extract from the letter sent by onderkoopman Daniel Simonsz., Cannanore, to Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council, 20 Aug. 1721, fo. 191r. 57 In 1692 thirteen Nayars were employed in Cannanore. VOC 1527, Muster roll of the Company servants in the various fortresses of Malabar, 30 June 1692, fo. 520r. 58 VOC 1625, Letter from Commander Magnus Wichelman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 31 Dec. 1698, fos. 17-18. 59 VOC 1261, Instructions from Van Goens to onderkoopman Gelmer Vosburg appointed as the opperhoofd of the Cannanore fortress, 14 Dec. 1664, fo. 313r-v. 60 Goa and Batavia, the headquarters of the Estado da India and the VOC respectively, greatly influenced the socio-political life of the host societies. British settlements like Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta can be included in the same category. For in-depth studies on the social dynamics of Batavia, see Hendrik E. Niemeijer, Batavia: een koloniale samenleving in de 17de eeuw [Batavia: A colonial society in the 17th century] (Amsterdam: Balans, 2005); Leonard Blussé, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht: Foris, 1986). 61 A detailed study on the subject, see s’Jacob, Rajas of Cochin. 62 The viewpoint about a ‘conquered territory’ is clear from the treaty signed between the Portuguese and the Dutch after the conquest of the fort in 1663, in which the sanc- tion of the local ruler is not regarded as a necessary prerequisite for the occupation of the settlement. VOC 1239, Articles of the treaty signed between Jacob Hustaert and Captain Anthony Cardoso, 15 Feb. 1663, fos. 1647r-1648v. 63 VOC 1333, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 14 Dec 1678, fo. 454. 64 For example, negative representations of Malabar people are abundant in Dutch reports. VOC 1242, Letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Cannanore Council to Heren XVII, 11 Feb. 1664, fo. 1059v; VOC 1891, Letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to onderkooman Hendrik van Wiert, Cannanore, 4 Aug. 1717, fo. 56v; VOC 1993, Letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 21 Apr. 1723, fo. 90v. 65 The Portuguese also depended heavily on such ‘linguas’ to communicate effectively with Asian societies. Dejanirah Couto, ‘The Role of Interpreters, or Linguas, in the Portuguese Empire during the 16th Century’, e-Journal of Portuguese History [online journal], 1/2 (winter 2003), http://www.brown.edu/Departments/ Portuguese_Brazilian_Studies/ejph/html/issue2/ pdf/ couto.pdf>, accessed 1 July 2007. 66 The concept of mercantile extra-territoriality was more or less generally accepted throughout Asia before the European intervention. Owen C. Kail, The Dutch in India (Delhi: Macmillan, 1981), 101-2. For a specific reference to the functioning of pre- European foreign trade settlements in Malabar ports, see Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 76. 67 Dirks mainly refers to the grants of titles, honours, and lands bestowed on the subjects by the king as ‘gifts’ and tries to define the ritual-cum-political hierarchy accordingly. Envisaging a hierarchical politico-ritual order, the reception of gifts from his subjects by the king could also have worked in a similar fashion. In Malabar, where rajas functioned more or less as big landholders, the reception of gifts would have been more akin to the accumulation of surplus production from the cultivators, reflecting a kind of Lord- Vassal relationship. Nicholas B. Dirks (ed.), ‘From little King to Landlord’, in id., Colonialism and Culture (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1992), 175-208 206 NOTES at 179-80. 68 Canter Visscher noticed that the Company gifts were usually sold by the Cochin king for their real value and ‘they would be better pleased if money was given them instead as they deem it no disgrace to receive pecuniary gifts’. In this respect it is also important that the Dutch noticed the sheer poverty of the members of the Kolaswarupam. Padmanabha Menon (ed.), History of Kerala, II, 33; s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 152. 69 VOC 1270, Original letter from Commander Lucas van der Dussen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 16 Feb. 1670, fo. 938v. 70 Padmanabha Menon (ed.), History of Kerala, II, 19. 71 VOC 1582, Letter from Commander Adriaan van Ommen and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 June 1696, fo. 21. 72 VOC 1634, Letter from Commander Magnus Wickelman and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 20 Nov. 1700, fo. 8v; VOC 1912, Letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 13 May 1718, fos. 316-17. Gifts usually consisted of various valuable items of textiles and fine spices. VOC 1852, Letter from Commander Barent Ketel to Batavia, 9 May 1714, fo. 64v. 73 VOC 1370, Translated letter from the Kolathiri giving toll concessions to the Company, 14 Mar. 1681, fo. 2274v. 74 Report of Hendrik Adriaan van Reede. See J. Heniger, Hendrik Adriaan van Reede tot Drakenstein (1636–1691) and Hortus Malabaricus: A contribution to the History of Dutch Colonial Botany (Rotterdam: A. A. Balkema, 1986), 21. 75 VOC 1993, Letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 21 Apr. 1723, fo. 114v. 76 VOC 1299, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 15 Dec. 1674, fo. 411r. 77 One Ignatio d’Orousjo appears as the main Company linguist in the Cannanore Fort. In a report of 1689, he had already been described as ‘old interpreter’ and passed away before the end of 1691. VOC 1474, Extract from the letter sent from Cannanore to Cochin, 16 Dec. 1689, fo. 199r; VOC 1527, Report on the debts of various Cannanore merchants incurred during the period of Pieter van de Kouter, 6 Nov. 1691, fo. 450r. 78 VOC 1741, Letter from Commander Willem Moerman to the Ali Raja, 2 Nov. 1706, fo. 662v. The ‘Sanskrit script’ might refer to the predilection of, for example, Konkani interpreters who preferred to use the devanagari script, but it is far more likely that it refers to the use of the arya-ezhuttu script which was a relatively new script initially preferred by Nambutiri Brahmins but also used by, for instance, Emanuel Carneiro, one of the interpreters employed by Van Reede for his Hortus Malabaricus. In this case, it could imply that the older, more commonly used kolezhuttu was still in use in the less ‘Brahmanized’ northern part of Kerala. This confusion might have created problems for the Company interpreters who were often recruited from the south. See Heniger, Hendrik Adriaan van Reede tot Drakestein, 148-9; A. Govindankutty, ‘Some Observations on Seventeenth Century Malayalam’, Indo-Iranian Journal, 25 (1983), 241-5. According to the seventeenth-century report compiled by Vincenzo, who met the Kolathiri twice, the Malabar language used three types of script: those in common use, the sampsahardam (sampradayam?), and the sacred letters of Tamil. Probably this refers to the respective kolezhuttu, arya-ezhuttu, and vattezhuttu. He added that to write to princes in ordinary script was considered improper. F. Lach and Van Key, Asia in the Making of Europe, 899. Considering the complicated linguistic situation in Kerala, the Dutch probably decided to invest in the knowledge of the more official arya-ezhuthu. s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 76-7. But Anquetil Duperron notes that all Muslims along the coast (from Cochin to Mangalore) used vattezhuttu. Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil Duperron, Voyage en Inde, 1754–1762: Relation de Voyage en Préliminaire à la Traduction du Zend-Avesta [Journey in India, 1754–1762: Account of the journey as preceding the translation of the Zend-Avesta] (Paris: École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1997), 220. 79 Although the Company servants stressed the ‘meanness’ of the Mappilas as the principal cause of trouble in Cannanore, they did not hesitate to acquiesce in the fact that their inexperience and misunderstandings contributed to it too. VOC 1252, Letter from Van Goens, Colombo, to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1665, fo. 465. TO CHAPTER FOUR 207

80 It is not clear whether the ‘moorse spraak’ (Moorish tongue) mentioned by the VOC officials was Persian or Arabic. It might also have been possible that, in the initial stages of their contact with Malabar, the VOC officials were not particularly aware of the linguistic and cultural differences between the Mappilas and other Muslim communities and assumed a uniform ‘Islamic’ linguistic-cultural identity throughout the Arabian Sea. VOC 1256, Letter from Van Goens and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 18 May 1666, fo. 68r. 81 The failure of the local Company officials to obtain prompt information about important incidents and the long delays in informing Cochin were severely criticized by the Cochin Commandment. VOC 1982, Letter from Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to onderkoopman Daniel Simonsz., Cannanore, 17 July 1721, fos. 294- 5; VOC 1982, Letter from onderkoopman Daniel Simonsz., Cannanore, to Cochin, 1 Aug. 1721, fos. 297-8. 82 Subrahmanyam, Political Economy of Commerce, 252-4, 295-7. 83 ‘...dat de Portugesen der stadt, forteresse ende gebiedt van Cananoor deselve sullen overgeeven weegen de Majesteyt van Portugal, aen den Neederlandsen veldt heer Jacob Hustaert in naeme der Edele Oostindisse Company’ [that the Portuguese, in the name of His Majesty of Portugal, will deliver the town, fortress and territory of Cannanore to the Dutch general Jacob Hustaert in the name of the Honourable (Dutch) East India Company]. VOC 1239, Articles of the treaty signed between Jacob Hustaert and Anthony Cardoso, 15 Feb. 1663, fo. 1647r. 84 The first treaty with the Kolathiri Raja was signed on 26 Mar. 1663. Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum: verzameling van politieke contracten en verdere verdragen door de Nederlanders in het Oosten gesloten, van privilege brieven, aan hen verleend, enz. [A collection of political contracts and other treaties made by the Dutch in the East, of privileges granted to them, etc.], II, ed. J. E. Heeres (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1931), 246-51. 85 VOC 1251, General letter from Batavia to Heren XVII, 30 Jan. 1666, fo. 283. 86 The first was signed on 11 Feb. 1664; the second, actually an enlargement of the first one, on 13 Dec. 1664. The third treaty was singed on 9 Apr. 1680. For details on these treaties, see Corpus Diplomaticum, II, 263-6, 297-301; Corpus Diplomaticum, III, 214-7. See also Appendix 4 and 5. 87 Interestingly, Van Reede also admits that the first contracts were already injurious to the wealth and power of the Ali Raja ‘that completely consists of trade and shipping’ [die geheel in de negotie en scheepvaart bestaat]. ‘Memoir from Hendrik Adriaan van Reede to Commander Jacob Lobs, 14 Mar. 1677’, in s’ Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 154. 88 For more details about Baba Prabhu, see Hugo K. s’ Jacob, ‘Babba Prabhu: The Dutch and a Konkani Merchant in Kerala’, in Leonard Blussé (ed.), All of One Company: The VOC in Biographical Perspective (Utrecht: HES, 1986), 135-50. 89 VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1680, fo. 1756v. 90 s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 203-4. 91 Ibid. 28. 92 Canara Brahmins, as were Tamil Pattar Brahmins, were considered ‘foreigners’ in Malabar. Padmanabha Menon (ed.), History of Kerala, III, 9; Barendse, Arabian Seas, 1640–1700, 241. 93 s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 35. 94 VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman, Cochin, to Batavia, 11 Mar. 1680, fo. 1676r. 95 For more details about this new plan, see Mailaparambil, ‘VOC and the Prospects of Trade between Cannanore and Mysore’, 205-30. 96 VOC 1559, Letter from the Cochin Council to Batavia, 22 Jan. 1694, fos. 145r, 295r, 296v; VOC 1582, Letter from Commander Adriaen van Ommen and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 18 Oct. 1696, fo. 499; VOC 1619, Cardamom contract between Commander Magnus Wichelman and the Cochin Council with Nanoe Porboe, Malpa Pooy and Venidas Trombagoda, 1699, fos. 142r-143r; VOC 1634, Letter from Commander Magnus Wichelman and the Malabar Council to Heren XVII, 20 Nov. 1700, 208 NOTES fo. 6r-v; VOC 1665, Letter from Extraordinary Council of India and the Governor General at Colombo to Batavia, 31 Dec. 1701, fo. 18; VOC 1607, Dagregister of Malabar Commission held under Swardekroon, 1 Dec. 1697 to 15 Apr. 1698, fo. 344v; VOC 1619, Letter from Magnus Wichelman and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 18 Nov. 1699, fo. 6v. 97 VOC 1627, Contract between the merchant Venidas and the VOC in the Cannanore fort, 8 Dec. 1698, fo. 230r-v; VOC 1619, Letter from Commander Magnus Wichelman and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 18 Nov. 1699, fo. 5v. 98 VOC 1708, Letter from Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 29 Nov. 1705, fo. 89v. 99 ‘…die de herten der ragias in hare handen hebben’. ‘Marginale aantekening bij de Memorie van Godske, 1668’ [Marginal note with the Memoir of Godske, 1668], in s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 79. 100 Giving advance payment for future delivery was a customary practice in pre-colonial Malabar. VOC 1658, Extracts out of the letter sent from Cannanore to Cochin, 25 Sept. 1702, fos. 340v-341r; Jan Keniewicz, ‘Pepper Gardens and market in Pre-Colonial Malabar’, 1-36. Especially page numbers 20-4. 101 Baba Prabhu, according to the Company records, was in debt to the sum of ƒ 101,975.1.8 plus an additional sum of ƒ 4915.8.6 which he had incurred from his business ventures in Cannanore between 1678 and 1679. s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 341-2. 102 VOC 1434, Letter from Commander Gelmer Vosburg and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1687, fo. 98r-v. 103 VOC 1527, Memoir about various Cannanore merchants indebted to the Company during the time of the opperhoofd Pieter van de Kouter, 6 Nov. 1691, fo. 450r. 104 VOC 1634, Letter from Commander Magnus Wichelman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 24 Feb. 1700, fo. 143r-v. The English report mentions that the Dutch broker Venidas refused to accept the employment offered him by the English Company. English Factories in India 1665–1667, 99. 105 VOC 1361, Report from opperhoofd Jacob Schoors, Cannanore, to Commander Marten Huijsman, 26 Apr. 1680, fo. 487r-v. 106 VOC 1619, Extract our of the letter sent from Cannanore to Cochin, 14 July 1699, fos. 433r-434v. 107 Although it is not possible to make out the regularity of their commercial dealings with the Company, the names of such local Mappila traders as Kunjamu, Pokker, and Hassen appear in the trade account of the Company in Cannanore. VOC 1625, Letter from Commander Magnus Wichelman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 31 Dec. 1698 with an appendix dated 17 Jan. 1699, fo. 12. 108 VOC 1425, Instructions from Commander Vosburg, Cochin, to the residents of Cannanore, 16 Mar. 1686, fos. 130v-131v. China Mayna later moved to Calicut and died there a poor man with an unpaid debt to the Company. VOC 1528, Report concerning onderkoopman Pieter van de Kouter, 11 May 1692, fo. 162v. 109 See Chapter Three. 110 VOC 1242, Letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Cannanore Council to Heren XVII, 11 Feb. 1664, fo. 1058v. 111 Ibid. fo. 1060r. 112 Ibid. 113 The Company plan to appropriate Cannanore trade from the Ali Rajas by a judicious admixture of diplomacy and threats is clear from the instructions to Gelmer Vosburg, the new opperhoofd of Cannanore in 1668. See VOC 1261, Instructions from Van Goens to onderkoopman Gelmer Vosburg appointed as the opperhoofd of the Cannanore fortress, 11 Jan. 1668, fo. 310r. 114 On one occasion it was reported that spices were taken to Dharmapatanam over land, transported to Calicut by small coastal crafts, and finally supplied to the buyer. VOC 1360, Letter from Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1680, fo. 1719v. 115 Notes of ‘illegal’ transactions between Cannanore Mappilas and the English and TO CHAPTER FOUR 209

French frequently appear in Dutch reports. VOC 1321, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 23 June, 1676, fo. 953v; VOC 1370, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1681, fo. 2133v; VOC 1474, Letter from Isaack van Dielen to the Commissioner Van Reede, 20 Mar. 1690, fo. 592r. 116 The draft of this treaty was prepared in 1668, although the actual treaty was signed only one year later with slight modifications to the earlier draft. OIC, Home Miscellaneous Series, vol. 629, Treaty between the Ali Rajas and the English, 1668, fos. 29-37. See Appendix 6. 117 Dagh-register Batavia 1681, 488-9. 118 VOC 1321, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 23 June 1676, fo. 953v. 119 VOC 1261, Instructions from Van Goens to onderkoopman Gelmer Vosburg appointed as the opperhoofd of the Cannanore fortress, 11 Jan. 1668, fo. 312r. 120 ‘...dat veel cleyne particuliere cooplieden genegentheyt hebben om met ons te han- delen, dogh door vrees van Adrasia en Carnoor dreygementen derven zij zulcx niet ondernemen’ [that many small private traders are favourably disposed to trade with us, but for fear of the threats of the Ali Raja’s and the Karanavar, they do not dare to undertake such (a venture)]. VOC 1361, Report from opperhoofd Jacob Schoors, Cannanore, to Commander Marten Huijsman, Cochin, 26 Apr. 1680, fo. 487r-v. 121 VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1680, fo. 1752r. 122 VOC 1474, Original letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 31 Jan. 1691, fos. 503v-504r. 123 VOC 1406, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 11 Apr. 1684, fo. 828v. 124 s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, p. LX. 125 Ibid. pp. LIX-LX. 126 VOC 1251, Letter from Van Goens and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 6 Mar. 1666, fo. 1722 127 VOC 1242, Letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 25 Feb. 1664, fo. 1119v. 128 For a discussion on Portuguese cartaz system, see M. N. Pearson, ‘Cafilas and Cartazes’, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 30th Session, Bhagalpur (1968), 200-7. 129 The Cannanore settlement charged an amount of 200 ducats for a sea-pass from Cannanore to Mocha and a Cannanore-Muscat pass cost 40 sao tome. VOC 1333, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman from Cochin to Cannanore, 7 Dec. 1678, fo. 493r; VOC 1474, Letter from Isaack van Dielen to the Commission Van Mydreght, 3 July 1690, fo. 635r. 130 VOC 1242, Letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 25 Feb. 1664, fo. 1119v. 131 VOC 1256, Letter from Commander Isbrant Godske, Cochin, to Van Goens, 12 Sept. 1666, fo. 385v. 132 VOC 1261, Instructions from Van Goens to onderkoopman Gelmer Vosburg appointed as the opperhoofd of the Cannanore fortress, 14 Dec. 1664, fo. 307r. 133 In 1681, the Cochin Council reported the inability of the Company to control the trade in Cannanore, because the Cannanore traders were sailing their ships out of Dharmapatanam and Baliapatanam instead of Cannanore. VOC 1370, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1681, fo. 2208v. 134 VOC 1256, Letter from Van Goens and the Ceylon Council to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1666, fo. 159v 135 VOC 1361, Report from Jacob Schoors, Cannanore, to Commander Marten Huijsman, 26 Apr. 1680, fo. 487r. 136 VOC 1299, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 15 Dec. 1674, fo. 410r. 210 NOTES

137 VOC 1256, Letter from Commander Isbrant Godske and the Cochin Council to Admiral Rijckloff van Goens, 18 June 1666, fo. 314v. 138 VOC 1343, Original letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 18 Oct. 1679, fo. 425r. 139 VOC 1256, Letter from Commander Isbrant Godske, Cochin, to Van Goens, 12 Sept. 1666, fo. 392r-v. 140 Hoge Regering te Batavia (High Government of Batavia) [abbr. HRB] 680, Letter from Commander Hendrik Adriaan van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 1675, not foliated. 141 VOC 1349, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 13 Feb. 1679, fo. 1460r. 142 ‘...de snoode mooren dit yaer geen voyagien met haer navetten hebben connen ondernemen’. VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 11 Mar. 1680, fo. 1706r. 143 VOC 1360, Letter from Director Reinier Casembroot and the Gamron Council to Batavia, 21 May 1680, fo. 1940r. 144 VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 11 Mar. 1680, fo. 1707v. 145 Ibid. fo. 1708v. 146 ‘...soo vol distelen ende doornen ende de inlanders soo trouwloos’. VOC 1242, Letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Cannanore Council to Heren XVII, 11 Feb. 1664, fo. 1059v. 147 VOC 1261, Instructions from Van Goens to onderkoopman Gelmer Vosburg appointed as the opperhoofd of the Cannanore fortress, 14 Dec. 1664, fos. 311v-312r. 148 VOC 1270, Original letter from Commander Lucas van der Dussen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 16 Feb. 1670, fos. 938v-939r. 149 VOC 1349, Memoir from koopman Daniel Jonques to his successor Jacob Schoors in Cannanore, 21 Sept. 1678, fo. 1492v. 150 ‘…om dat het een voornaemste middel en incomst tot haer onderhout is’ [since it is one of the most important means and income for their livelihood]. VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman, Cochin, to Batavia, 11 Mar. 1680, fos. 1689v- 1690r. 151 Ibid. 152 Pieter van de Kouter came to India in 1668; was appointed Assistant in 1673; took the charge as Bookkeeper in 1677 and continued until he was promoted to onderkoopman and the head of the Cannanore fort in 1680. VOC 1474, Roll book of all the Company servants in Cochin, Quilon, and Cannanore, 1687, fo. 480v. 153 VOC 1429, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Commander Gelmer Vosburg, Cochin, 28 Dec. 1685, fos. 1367v-1368r. 154 VOC 1825, Letter from Commander Barent Ketel, Cochin, to Batavia, 13 May 1712, fos. 86v-87v; VOC 1824, Resolution taken in the Political Council of Cochin, 26 Apr. 1712, fos. 506v-509r. 155 VOC 1978, An anonymous letter to Commander Johannes Hertenberg, Cochin, 9 Dec. 1721, fos. 405v-407r. 156 Bal Krishna, Commercial Relations between India and England, 1601–1757 (London: Routledge, 1924), 90-1. For more details of the Amboina incident, see W. Ph. Coolhaas, ‘Notes and Comments on the so-called Amboina Massacre’, in M. A. P Meilink-Roelofsz, M. E. van Opstall, and G. J. Schutte (eds.), Dutch Authors on Asian History: A Selection of Dutch Historiography on the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (Dordrecht: Foris, 1988), 198-240. 157 K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660–1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 316. 158 VOC 1396, Letter from Commander Gelmer Vosburg, Cochin, to Batavia, 18 May 1684, fo. 721v; English Factories in India (New Series), III: 1678–84, ed. Charles Fawcett (Oxford: Clarendon, 1954), 397. 159 VOC 1239, Original letter from Rijckloff van Goens, Cochin, to Heren XVII, 19 Feb. 1663, fo. 1695r. TO CHAPTER FOUR 211

160 Bal Krishna, Commercial Relations, 147. 161 The English established at Kottakunnu on 4 May 1670. English Factories in India (New Series), I: 1670–7, 289-90. 162 VOC 1270, Original letter from Governor Van Goens and the Ceylon Council to Heren XVII, 9 Jan. 1670, fo. 6r. 163 The English had already begun to move from Kottakunnu to Calicut by the middle of 1674 and had completely abandoned the former settlement by the beginning of 1675. VOC 1308, Letter from Commander Van Reede, Cochin, to Batavia, 15 May 1674, fo. 631v; English Factories in India (New Series), I: 1670-7, 340-41. 164 English Factories in India (New Series), III: 1678–84, 394-5. 165 VOC 1373, Original letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 21 Dec. 1682, fo. 344r. 166 Soon after the establishment of the English in Tellichery, it became an important pepper procurement centre for them in Malabar. The subsequent growth of the Tellichery Factory under the English substantiated the fear besetting the Dutch of this new English settlement. See English Factories in India (New Series), III: 1678-84, 406; Kurup, History of the Tellicherry Factory. 167 ‘...niet meer en soude wesen dan een vervallen aerden huys, in een bemuerde groote thuyn, maer echter bequaem tot een vastigheyt te maecken’. VOC 1274, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Malabar Council to Batavia, 14 Aug. 1670, fo. 113r. 168 VOC 1349, Letter from Commissioner Marten Huijsman and Commander Jacob Lobs to Heren XVII, 9 Mar. 1679, fo. 1522r; VOC 1343, Original letter from Com- mander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 18 Oct. 1679, fo. 425r-v. 169 It is not clear when they established the settlement at Panoly. According to the information from the Dutch sources, they were already in Panoly by 1705. VOC 1731, Extract from the letter sent from Cannanore by the Dutch officials to Commander Willem Moerman, Cochin, 3 July 1705, fo. 210. 170 VOC 1741, Resolution taken in the Cochin Council, Wednesday, 23 June 1706, fos. 341r-342r. 171 Vadakara is not traditionally considered as a part of Kolathunadu, but formed a part of the region called Walluvanadu. VOC 1790, Letter from Checoetty Poker, Cannanore, to Cochin, 22 June 1710, fo. 473r; VOC 1807, Letter from Commander Barent Ketel and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 24 May 1711, fo. 88r. 172 After the Treaty of Westminster in 1674 which ended the Third Anglo–Dutch War, there was a favourable change in the relationship between England and Holland. The accession of the Dutch stadholder William III as the King of England in 1689 united both countries politically until 1702. 173 This is apparent from the English report that, during the 1670s, the English still managed to obtain two-thirds of their pepper from the south of Cochin, where the control of the VOC was supposed to be tighter, by making the local merchants considerable advance payments. English Factories in India 1670–1677, 351. 174 Surprised by the high price at which the English bought pepper from Canara, the Malabar Commandment exclaimed ‘hoe sij daermede behouden konnen blijven is voor ons wat duyster’ [how they (the English) can afford this is somewhat of a mystery to us]. VOC 1373, Original letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 21 Dec. 1682, fo. 345r. 175 VOC 1343, Original letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 18 Oct. 1679, fo. 433r. 176 Hence, the Ali Raja justified his continuing trade with the English, in spite of his contract with the VOC, by saying that the former were ready to pay a higher price for his merchandise than the Company. VOC 1474, Original letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 31 Jan. 1691, fo. 504r. 177 In 1680, for instance, the Company complained that the Cannanore merchants delivered 200 khandil pepper to the English, but only four and a half to the Company, excusing themselves by saying that the new pepper had not yet ripened. VOC 1355, Original letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Quilon Council to Heren 212 NOTES

XVII, 24 Dec. 1680, fo. 274v. 178 It was reported from Gamron that, in 1677, the English sold Malabar pepper in Persia at 11 larins for 30 lbs. At the same time, the Dutch price for the same was 12 ½ larins/30 lbs. VOC 1329, Letter from Director Bent and the Gamron Council to Batavia, 5 June 1677, fos. 1548v, 1551v. 179 P. J. Marshall, ‘Private British Trade in the Indian Ocean before 1800’, in Om Prakash (ed.), European Commercial Expansion in Early Modern Asia (Aldershot: Variorum, 1997), 237-61 at 238. There are several studies which deal with the important role played by English private traders in the Indian Ocean trade in the seventeenth century. For the English private trade in India during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, see Ian Bruce Watson, Foundation for Empire: English Private Trade in India, 1659– 1760 (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980). 180 VOC 1270, Original letter from Governor Van Goens and the Ceylon Council to Heren XVII, 9 Jan. 1670, fo. 5r. 181 Consequently, in 1680 there is the report of the arrival of a ‘Zurat Bania or private English ship’ with English flags and manned by six or eight English, Surat Muslims, and Banias. It was chartered in the name of the Governor of Muscat with the consent of the Ali Raja of Cannanore. VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1680, fo. 1719v. 182 Padmanabha Menon (ed.), History of Kerala, I, 33. 183 VOC 1274, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Malabar Council to Batavia, 14 Aug. 1670, fos. 113v-114r; VOC 1284, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 20 Apr. 1671, fo. 2086v. 184 VOC 1291, Original letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 23 Nov. 1673, fo. 588v. 185 In a letter to Surat [1669], Alexander Grigby commented on the importance of gifts in Malabar; ‘there being noe accesse amongst them but by that key’. English Factories in India 1668–1669, 262. 186 It has been reported that, in 1717, the Zamorin pawned the toll at the Calicut port for the money he had borrowed from the English to meet the expenses of his war against the Dutch. VOC 1891, Original letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 25 Nov. 1717, fos. 12v-13r. 187 In 1736, the English Company was able to import as much pepper to London as the VOC in Batavia was receiving from the entire Archipelago. Kristof Glamann, Dutch- Asiatic Trade, 1620–1740 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), 90.

Notes to Chapter Five

1 ‘...de bruijt is daar ’t al om danst’. ‘Instruction of Jacob Hustaert to Commander Ludolph van Coulster and Council of Malabar, 6 Mar. 1664’, in s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 26. 2 ‘…voor ’t vaderland noch al een treffelycke quantiteyt soude overschieten’. VOC 1239, Original letter from Van Goens, Cochin, to Heren XVI, 19 Feb. 1663, fo. 1695v. 3 VOC 1242, Letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 25 Feb. 1664, fo. 1109v. 4 The Company clamoured that the pepper price in Kayamkulam was only one-third of that in Cannanore. VOC 1242, Letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Cannanore Council to Heren XVII, 11 Feb. 1664, fo. 1058v. 5 For instance, in 1707 Commander Moerman reported that the Company could not buy pepper from North Malabar at the low price fixed in Batavia (18 Moorish ducat per khandil) as the English and the French were ready to pay a higher amount for the same (24 Moorish ducat per khandil). VOC 1740, Letter from Commander Willem Moerman, Cochin, to Batavia, 23 Apr. 1707, fos. 123v-124r. 6 Van Goes was convinced that, although the Company was entitled to the entire pepper supply by virtue of its contracts with local rulers, because of the weak position of the Company north of Cranganore River, its commercial policy should be regulated ‘in accor- TO CHAPTER FIVE 213 dance with our power and not according to our wish’ [nae onse macht, ende niet nae onse wille]. VOC 1245, Original letter from Van Goens and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 9 Jan. 1665, fo. 479. 7 VOC 1396, Original letter from Commander Gelmer Vosburg and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 18 Nov. 1684, fo. 697r. 8 VOC 1251, Original letter from Van Goens and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 6 Mar. 1666, fo. 1725. 9 VOC 1388, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1683, fo. 1905v. 10 VOC 1474, An account of the Company pepper trade in Malabar between 1659 and 1689, fo. 456v. 11 VOC 1274, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Malabar Council to Batavia, 14 Aug. 1670, fo. 110r. 12 VOC 1349, Memoir from koopman Daniel Jonques to his successor Jacob Schoors in Cannanore, 21 Dec. 1678, fo. 1491r. 13 Taking into account that the Company pepper procurement from Calicut and its satellite ports, such as Ponnani, did not fare much better than Cannanore, the exclusion of the Company from the northern Malabar pepper market was almost complete by the beginning of the eighteenth century. There are only two entries (1699–1700, 1700–1701) which mention the export of ‘noordse pepper’, which usually denoted the pepper from Calicut in the export list of the Dutch Company from Malabar during the period under discussion. 14 s’Jacob, Rajas of Cochin, 92. 15 According to the Dutch report, the best cardamom was produced in Kottayam. Cardamom from Karangotte, Kakkatte, and Taliparamba was also considered to be of good quality. The worst quality cardamom was produced in the region of Maday. VOC 1349, Memoir from koopman Daniel Jonques to his successor Jacob Schoors in Cannanore, 21 Dec. 1678, fo. 1491v. 16 VOC 1333, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and Jacob Lobs, Cochin, to Cannanore, 17 Nov. 1678, fo. 489v. 17 VOC 1252, Original letter from Director Roothaes and the Gamron Council to Heren XVII, 23 Sept. 1667, fos. 1100-1101. 18 VOC 1242, Letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Ceylon Council to Batavia, 27 Dec. 1663, fo. 1024r. 19 VOC 1316, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 27 Mar. 1676, fos. 653v-654r. 20 ‘...der mooren die den eenen dagh dus, en den anderen dagh wederom geheel anders spreeken en die gewoon syn dat gewas te geven aende gene welcke meest daer voor willen geven’. VOC 1340, Letter from Jacob Lobs and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 5 Jan. 1678, fo. 1467v. 21 VOC 1299, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 21 July 1672, fo. 461r. 22 VOC 1349, Memoir from koopman Daniel Jonques to his successor Jacob Schoors in Cannanore, 21 Dec. 1678, fo. 1491r. 23 VOC 1891, Letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 25 Nov. 1717, fos. 27v-28r. 24 VOC 1807, Original letter from Commander Barent Ketel and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 25 Nov. 1711, fo. 7r. 25 VOC 1349, Memoir from koopman Daniel Jonques to his successor Jacob Schoors in Cannanore, 21 Dec. 1678, fo. 1491v; VOC 1694, Report from onderkoopman Gerrit Mulder, Cannanore, to Commander Abraham Vink, 25 Mar. 1703, fo. 86. 26 VOC 1448, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 17 Jan. 1689, fo. 354v. 27 The VOC men suspected that the intention of the princes was only to appropriate gifts from the Company and promote their own interests rather than those of the Company. VOC 1373, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 28 Mar. 1682, fos. 376v-377v; VOC 1619, Translated letter from 214 NOTES

Vazhunnavar of Vadakara to Cochin, 15 Dec. 1698, fos. 69-70; VOC 1674, Letter from Commander Abraham Vink and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 1 Nov. 1703, fo. 118r. 28 VOC 1977, Letter from Commander Hertenberg and Wijnhout to Batavia, 14 Apr. 1722, fo. 151r-v. 29 VOC 1329, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 17 Mar. 1677, fo. 1332v; VOC 1838, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Barent Ketel, Cochin, 12 Dec. 1712, fo. 318v. 30 VOC 1321, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 27 Mar. 1676, fo. 950r-v. 31 VOC 1370, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 9 Dec. 1675, fo. 2221v. 32 VOC 1268, Letter from Van Goens and the Ceylon Council to Batavia, 13 June 1668, fo. 1123r-v. 33 VOC 1277, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 16 Feb. 1670, fo. 1677r. 34 VOC 1284, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 20 Apr. 1671, fo. 2088r. 35 There are but a few instances when the Company succeeded in buying cowries from Cannanore. VOC 1757, Letter from Commander Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 13 Apr. 1708, fo. 76r; VOC 1807, Letter from Commander Barent Ketel and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 24 May 1711, fo. 45v. 36 VOC 1396, Original letter from Commander Gelmer Vosburg and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 18 Nov. 1684, fos. 698v-699r. 37 VOC 1454, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 17 Dec. 1687, fo. 1218r-v. 38 VOC 1242, Letter from Van Goens, Colombo, to Batavia, 10 Nov. 1663, fo. 1008r. 39 ‘...amphioen is naest het gelt de voornaemste coopmanschappen en moet werden aan- gesien gelyck rys of broot onder ons’. VOC 1321, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 9 Dec. 1675, fo. 912v. 40 Joan Nieuhof noted the widespread use of opium among the people of Malabar. Joan Nieuhof, Joan Nieuhofs gedenkwaerdige zee en lantreize door de voornaemste landschappen van West en Oostindien [Joan Nieuhof’’s memorable sea and land journeys through the important regions of West and East Indies] (Amsterdam: Voor de Weduwe van Jacob van Meurs, 1682), 143. 41 VOC 1133, Letter from Barent Pietersz., Surat, to Commander Cornelis Sijmonsz. van der Veer, Goa, 1 Dec. 1639, fos. 399-400. 42 VOC 1239, Original letter from Van Goens, Cochin, to Heren XVII, 19 Feb. 1663, fo. 1695v. 43 VOC 1242, Letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Cannanore Council to Heren XVII, 11 Feb. 1664, fo. 1058v; Dagh-register Batavia 1664, 573. 44 Dagh-register Batavia 1664, 175-6. 45 VOC 1242, Letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 25 Feb. 1664, fo. 1110r. 46 VOC 1242, Memoir from Rijckloff van Goens to Jacob Hustaert, 26 Dec. 1663, fos. 966v-967r. 47 It was reported that the Company managed to get 75 to 80 per cent profit more than its competitors from its retail in Bengal opium. VOC 1259, Letter from Rijckloff van Goens and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 18 May 1666, fo. 2630. 48 ‘…sonder deselve geen peper konde bekomen’. VOC 1355, Original letter from Herman Fentsel and the Council of Hugli, Bengal, to Heren XVII, 21 Nov. 1680, fo. 293r. 49 VOC 1349, Letter from Commissioner Marten Huijsman, Commander Jacob Lobs, and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 13 Feb. 1679, fo. 1459v. 50 VOC 1499, Letter from Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 31 Jan. 1691, fo. 555r. 51 VOC 1273, Written instructions from Van Reede to Commander Van der Dussen, 16 Mar. 1669, fo. 1511v. TO CHAPTER FIVE 215

52 Ibid. Letter from Commander Van der Dussen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 27 Feb. 1669, fo. 1389r. 53 VOC 1740, Letter from Commander Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 23 Apr. 1707, fo. 126r-v. 54 VOC 1352, Report based on the important information contained in the letter of Commander Marten Huijsman sent from Cochin to Batavia, 11 Mar. 1680, fo. 367r; VOC 1284, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 20 Apr. 1671, fo. 2086v. 55 VOC 1321, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 9 Dec. 1675, fos. 912v-913r. 56 For a detailed study on Japanese copper trade of the VOC during the eighteenth century, see Ryuto Shimada, The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper by the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 57 VOC 1807, Letter from Commander Barent Ketel and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 24 May 1711, fos. 50v-51r. 58 ‘…om dat dit een coopmanschap is, geen bederf onderworpen, en waer in wij bevin- den boven alle andere waren nog wel den meesten vertier te wesen, en goede winsten komt op te werpen’ [because this merchandise is not perishable, and, as we have experienced, more than all other commodities still trades best and makes good profits]. VOC 1598, Letter from opperkoopman and Provisional Commander Pieter Coesaart, Cochin, to Batavia, 14 Apr. 1697, fo. 320. 59 In 1688, 2,6607 lbs Japanese copper was traded in Cannanore and a quantity of 7,1280 ½ lbs in 1696–7. VOC 1474, List of merchandise traded in Cannanore from 1 Jan. 1688 to 31 Dec. 1688, fos. 472v-473r; VOC 1598, List of merchandise traded in Cannanore from 1 Sept. 1696 to 31 Aug. 1697, fos. 618v-619r. 60 VOC 1321, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 9 Dec. 1675, fo. 912v. 61 Ibid. 62 VOC 1349, Letter from Commissioner Marten Huijsman, Commander Jacob Lobs, and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 13 Feb. 1679, fo. 1460r. 63 VOC 1410, Letter from Commander Gelmer Vosburg to Batavia, 29 May 1685, fos. 616v-617r. 64 VOC 1625, Letter from Commander Magnus Wichelman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 31 Dec. 1698, fo. 12. 65 See the section below; ‘Into the hinterland of Cannanore’. 66 VOC 1740, Letter from Commander Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 11 Jan. 1707, fo. 85r-v; VOC 1757, Letter from Commander Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 13 Apr. 1708, fo. 78v. 67 The price of nutmeg which was brought to sell in Cannanore was fixed on a par with the Surat price in order to prevent its re-export by the locals. VOC 1388, Letter from Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1683, fo. 1936v; VOC 1634, Letter from Commander Magnus Wichelman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 24 Feb. 1700, fo. 142v. 68 VOC 1598, Letter from opperkoopman and Provisional Commander Pieter Coesaart, Cochin, to Heren XVII, 13 Dec. 1696, fo. 113. 69 VOC 1838, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Barent Ketel, Cochin, 12 Jan. 1713, fo. 357r-v; VOC 1839, Letter from Barent Ketel to the Ali Raja, 6 Feb. 1713, fos. 664v- 665r. 70 VOC 1261, Instructions from Van Goens to onderkoopman Gelmer Vosburg appointed the opperhoofd of the Cannanore fort, 14 Dec. 1664, fos. 312v-313r. 71 Calculating that a coconut palm would yield one fanum per year, 50,000 fanums or 2,083 rix-dollars were expected to be earned from the Company garden in Cannanore. VOC 1321, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 9 Dec. 1675, fo. 913r. 72 VOC 1349, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 4 Apr. 1679, fo. 1503r-v. 73 Ibid. 216 NOTES

74 ‘...om te hooren wat ditto nayck begeeren mocht zyn, de previlegien te accepteeren en wel te vernemen wat in den handel aldaar te doen zij, sonder ons ergens aen eenige beloften te verbinden maar nae vermogen te betrachten dat de coopluyden op Cananoor, off ten misten soo nae als mogelyck affcomen om den handel te dryven’. Ibid. 75 VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1680, fos. 1756v-1757r. 76 Ibid. fo. 1757r. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 For more details about horses in Indonesian history, see Peter Boomgaard, ‘Horses, Horse-trading and Royal Courts in Indonesian History, 1500–1900’, in Peter Boomgaard and David Henley (eds.), Smallholders and Stockbreeders: History of Foodcrop and Livestock Farming in Southeast Asia (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004), 211-32. 81 VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1680, fo. 1757v. 82 Ibid. 83 VOC 1361, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 19 June 1680, fo. 517r. 84 Ibid. 85 VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1680, fos. 1757v-1758r. 86 Ibid. fo. 1757v. 87 Ibid. fo. 1758r. 88 Ibid. 89 For a discussion on the rice trade of the port city of Basrur on the Canara Coast during the Portuguese period, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, ‘The Portuguese, the Port of Basrur and the Rice Trade, 1600–1650’, Indian Economic and Social History Review, 22/4 (1984), 433-62. 90 VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1680, fo. 1755r. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. fo. 1755v. 93 VOC 1370, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1681, fo. 2134r. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. fo. 2134r-v. 96 Ibid. fo. 2134v. 97 Ibid.; VOC 8985, Report from Assistant Jan van Raasvelt to Simon Schoors, Cannanore, concerning his experience with the Company trade in the land of Mysore, 28 Feb. 1681, fos. 118v-119r. 98 VOC 1370, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1681, fo. 2134v. 99 Ibid. Memoir about the prices and quantity of merchandises which can be traded annually in Srirangapatanam and in other bazaars nearby etc., 28 Feb. 1681, fo. 2167v. 100 Ibid. fo. 2168r. 101 VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1680, fo. 1755v. 102 VOC 8985, Report from assistant Jan van Raasvelt to Simon Schoors, Cannanore, concerning his experience with the Company trade in the land of Mysore, 28 Feb. 1681, fo. 119v. 103 Ibid. fo. 120r. Unfortunately, the names of these toll centres are not given in the documents. 104 This treaty was signed on 20 June 1681. 105 VOC 1370, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1681, fos. 2272r-2273r. 106 Ibid. fo. 2272v. TO CHAPTER SIX 217

107 Ibid. fo. 2273r. 108 Ibid. fo. 2134r. 109 VOC 1373, Original letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 21 Dec. 1682, fo. 344v. 110 Ibid. 111 VOC 1388, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 July 1683, fo. 1974v. 112 Ibid. fo. 1975r. 113 Ibid. fo. 1976v. 114 Ibid. 115 VOC 1396, Letter from Commander Gelmer Vosburg and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 18 May 1684, fos. 718v-719r. 116 VOC 1396, Original letter from Commander Gelmer Vosburg and the Cochin Council to the Heren XVII, 18 Nov. 1684, fo. 704r. 117 VOC 1410, Letter from Commander Gelmer Vosburg and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 3 Apr. 1685, fo. 572r. 118 VOC 1434, Letter from Commander Gelmer Vosburg and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1687, fo. 78r-v. 119 Ibid. fo. 78v. 120 VOC 1396, Letter from Commander Gelmer Vosburg and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 9 Aug. 1684, fo. 741r-v. 121 Ibid. fo. 591v. 122 VOC 1410, Original letter from Commander Gelmer Vosburg and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 28 Nov. 1685, fo. 540r. 123 The Cannanore settlement reaped a profit of ƒ 23742.7.11 in 1684. 124 HRB 599, Letter from the High Government in Batavia to Malabar, 27 Aug. 1686, fo. 355. 125 VOC 1425, Instructions from Commander Gelmer Vosburg to the residents of Cannanore, 16 Mar. 1686, fo. 129r. 126 It should be borne in mind that the income and expenditure list of the VOC settlement in Cannanore did not include either the profit or the loss on the sales of the goods procured from there or the transport costs incurred by the Company. In that case, the actual income and the expenditure of the Company in Cannanore might have been somewhat different from the figures mentioned in the VOC documents. 127 The Malabar Commandment was able to make a net profit in only four financial years throughout its existence in Malabar. But, if the total VOC trade in Malabar is taken into account, the share of Cannanore was comparatively insignificant. In that case the profit/loss made by the Company in Cannanore was not very decisive in determining the financial success or failure of the Malabar Commandment. s’Jacob, Rajas of Cochin, 176-8. 128 VOC 1284, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 27 May 1671, fo. 2113r.

Notes to Chapter Six

1 VOC 1474, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 31 Jan. 1691, fos. 506r-507v. 2 ‘...dog den prince schoon drie maal sterker van manschap med pijl, en boog ligt gewapend, zig te swak geloovde om een kans tegens de mooren te wagen, en waarschijn- lijk ook daar bij zoude te kort geschoten zyn…maar die ook doed sien, van wat magt, vermogen en ontsag hier is’. VOC 1474, Original letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 31 Jan. 1691, fo. 507v. 3 It was reported in 1663 that the Ali Raja proposed the VOC hand the fort over to him were it to be abandoned by the Company. VOC 1239, Original letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Council in Cannanore to Heren XVII, 19 Feb. 1663, fo. 1646v. 4 K. D. Swaminathan, The Nayakas of Ikkeri (Madras: P. Varadachary & Co., 1957), 95. 218 NOTES

5 It was Ramathiri who had signed the first treaty with the VOC on behalf of the Kolathiri. Dagh-register Batavia 1664, 322-4. 6 VOC 1242, Letter from Jacob Hustaert and the Cannanore Council to Heren XVII, 11 Feb. 1664, fo. 1061r-v. 7 The report does not mention what those ‘decent reasons’ (fatsoenlyk redenen) were. 8 VOC 1252, Letter from Van Goens and the Colombo Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1665, fo. 461. 9 Ibid. fo. 464. 10 VOC 1251, Original letter from Van Goens and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 6 Mar. 1666, fo. 1723. 11 VOC 1256, Letter from Van Goens and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 18 May 1666, fos. 68v-69r. 12 VOC, 1252, Letter from Commander Isbrand Godske to Heren XVII, 10 Mar. 1667, fos. 999-1000. 13 VOC 1256, Letter from Commander Isbrand Godske and the Cochin Council to Ceylon, 18 June 1666, fo. 314r-v. 14 VOC 1268, Letter from Van Goens and the Ceylon Council to Batavia, 13 June 1668, fo. 1123v. 15 VOC 1270, Original letter from Commander Lucas van der Dussen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 16 Feb. 1670, fo. 938v. 16 VOC 1268, Letter from Van Goens and the Ceylon Council to Batavia, 13 June 1668, fo. 1123v. 17 VOC 1273, Letter from Commander Van der Dussen and the Cochin Council to Van Goens, Colombo, 15 June 1669, fos. 1397v-1398r. 18 VOC 1274, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Malabar Council to Batavia, 14 Aug. 1670, fo.109v. 19 VOC 1270, Original letter from Van Goens and the Ceylon Council to Heren XVII, 9 Jan. 1670, fos. 4v-5r. 20 Ibid. 21 ‘...niet te sullen rusten voor hij den prins uyt de regeeringh en de Fransen en Engelsen van ’t landt gejaeght sagh’. VOC 1274, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 14 Aug. 1670, fo. 111r. 22 However, the commercial presence of the Danes in and around Cannanore does not seem to have had any significance at all. They established a factory in South Kerala at Erruwa or Edavai in 1695-6 and continued there till 1722. 23 VOC 1274, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 14 Aug. 1670, fo. 109r. 24 He assisted the French who had settled in ‘Tiryengaet’ (Tiruvangad) against the interventions of the local lord. The settlement was later strengthened under his blessing. VOC 1284, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 20 Apr. 1671, fo. 2086r-v; English Factories in India 1670–1677, 290. 25 It is notable that the English and the French supplied money and arms, often under pressure, to local princes to support their causes against their rivals. Unlike the Dutch, they also paid these princes tolls under contract. The English Factory Records sufficiently testifies to this fact. English Factories in India 1670–1677, 289-90, 314, 341. 26 VOC 1295, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 22 Apr. 1673, fo. 271v. 27 The Karthavu replied to the enquiry of the Company about his close commercial relations with the English and the French by saying that, if the Company were ready to pay as high a price for spices as the others and half in cash and the other half in merchandise, he would change his trade to the Company. Ibid. fo. 272r. 28 VOC 1284, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 20 Apr. 1671, fo. 2086r. 29 Ibid. 27 May 1671, fo. 2112r. From Baliapatanam the English also reported on the challenge faced by Ramathiri from a cousin of the raja with whom two-thirds of the Nayars sided. English Factories in India 1670–1677, 303. 30 VOC 1284, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 27 May TO CHAPTER SIX 219

1671, fo. 2112r-v. 31 English Factories in India 1670–1677, 321. 32 VOC 1291, Original general letter from Batavia to Heren XVII, 13 Nov. 1673, fo. 41v. 33 In all probability this ‘state council’ might have been constituted of various ‘men of prowess’ in the region. VOC 1291, Original letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 23 Nov. 1673, fo. 588r. 34 VOC 1295, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 22 Apr. 1673, fo. 270v. 35 VOC 1291, Original letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 23 Nov. 1673, fo. 589r. 36 English Factories in India 1670–1677, 320-321. 37 VOC 1291, Original letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 23 Nov. 1673, fo. 588v. 38 Ibid. 39 VOC 1295, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 22 Apr. 1673, fo. 270v. 40 In 1673 the English reported that, although showing great sympathy for the English, the Prince did not possess enough power and his gentle character made him of no use as a protector. English Factories in India 1670–1677, 325. 41 VOC 1308, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 15 May 1674, fo. 605r-v. 42 It is probable that Van Reede was referring to the kuruvazcha—a political system in which more than one person shares authority in a swarupam. However, it is particularly notable that in the kuruvazcha the authority was distributed within the swarupam not outside it, according to the muppumura. In this sense, the development in Kolathunadu diverged from the ‘custom’ of the land. 43 It is interesting to note that to an extent these developments in Cannanore resemble the political process in Travancore in the eighteenth century, when the attempt of Marthanda Varma to strengthen the kingship was seriously challenged by the local nobles called ‘Ettuveettil Pillamar’. For more details, see Lannoy, Kulasekhara Perumals of Travan- core. 44 VOC 1295, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 22 Apr. 1673, fo. 271r. 45 VOC 1299, Original letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 15 Dec. 1674, fo. 410v. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. fo. 411r. 48 VOC 1308, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 15 May 1674, fo. 646r. 49 Ibid. 50 ‘…invoegen syn oom’s voetstappen al vrij wat begande nae te volgen’. Ibid. 51 Ibid. fo. 647r. 52 Unfortunately the name of this prince is not mentioned in the document. 53 VOC 1308, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 15 May 1674, fo. 647r-v. 54 English Factories in India 1670–1677, 331. 55 VOC 1308, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 15 May 1674, fo. 647v; English Factories in India 1670–1677, 341. 56 VOC 1308, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 15 May 1674, fo. 647v. 57 The English records mentions that the English Factory at Baliapatanam paid customs to Unnithiri on trade. English Factories in India 1670–1677, 341. 58 VOC 1308, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 15 May 1674, fo. 648r. 59 Ibid. 648r. 60 The English reported that there were fourteen Dutch soldiers and a sergeant at 220 NOTES

Kottakunnu to protect the fort from the Ali Raja. English Factories in India 1670–1677, 341. 61 VOC 1308, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 15 May 1674, fo. 648v. 62 Ibid. 63 VOC 1321, Letter from Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 23 June 1676, fo. 953v. 64 VOC 1349, Memoir from koopman Daniel Jonques to his successor Jacob Schoors in Cannanore, 21 Sept. 1678, fo. 1493r. 65 VOC 1329, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 17 Mar. 1677, fo. 1332r. 66 The Dutch reported from Cannanore that the Ali Raja destroyed the houses of one ragiadoor of Unnithiri and other six people and killed a young Nayar on the Company land. VOC 1329, Letter from Commander Van Reede and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 17 Mar. 1677, fo. 1332r. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. fo. 1332v. 69 VOC 1343, Original letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 18 Oct. 1679, fo. 434v. 70 VOC 1343, Extract from the letter sent from Director Willem Volger, Surat, to the Dutch opperhoofd Daniel Jonques, Cannanore, 6 October 1676, fos. 451v-452v. The debt was amounted to 17,847 fanums. English Factories in India 1670–1677, 355. 71 VOC 1343, Extract from the letter sent from Cochin to Cannanore, 14 Nov. 1679, fo. 452v; English Factories in India 1678–1684, 373. 72 Ibid. fo. 453r. 73 ‘…vals in hare beloften zyn, wispeltuyrich van aert, geltsuchtigh’. VOC 1349, Memoir from koopman Daniel Jonques to his successor Jacob Schoors in Cannanore, 21 Sept. 1678, fo. 1492v. 74 Ibid. 75 This testifies to the fact that Maday, which was the original seat of the Kolaswarupam, remained a power centre in Kolathunadu during this period. Ibid. fos. 1492v-1493r. 76 VOC 1361, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Oct. 1680, fo. 560r. 77 ‘’t hooft der mooren van Cananoor, en Dermapatan’. VOC 1355, Original letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Quilon Council to Heren XVII, 24 Dec. 1680, fo. 270v. According to an English report, the Ali Raja took over the position of karthavu of Dharmapatanam in 1682. It is possible that the Dutch were referring to the domineering influence of the Ali Raja in this small port bazaar. English Factories in India 1678–1684, 394. 78 VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1680, fo. 1752r. 79 VOC 1355, Original letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Quilon Council to Heren XVII, 24 Dec. 1680, fo. 271r. 80 Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum 1676–1691, III, 214-217. 81 VOC 1355, Original letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Quilon Council to Heren XVII, 24 Dec. 1680, fo. 271v. 82 VOC 1370, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1681, fo. 2262v. 83 Later the conferring of the title of ragiadoor-moor on an unknown Pattar Brahmin points towards the fact that it was not such a coveted status as described by the Company. This indicates that the position of ragiadoor-moor cannot be regarded as an institutional- ized ‘administrative’ post of crucial importance in the power politics of Kolathunadu. VOC 1448, Duplicate letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 17 Jan. 1689, fo. 355v. 84 VOC 1355, Original letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 24 Dec. 1680, fo. 271r. 85 Quoted in Heniger, Hendrik Adriaan van Reede tot Drakenstein, 18-19. See also s’Jacob TO CHAPTER SIX 221

(ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, 118. 86 There is but little doubt that the appointment of Van Reede as the ragiadoor-moor of Cochin by the Cochin king in 1663 was above all motivated by the military strength of the Company upon which the new king, Vira Kerala Varma, very much depended rather than by his ‘noble birth’ about which the Malabar people were definitely unaware. J. Heniger pointed at the particular attention paid by Van Reede in highlighting his noble birth in all possible ways at a time when his family in the Dutch Republic was facing difficulties in maintaining its status in the noble order. Heniger, Hendrik Adriaan van Reede tot Drakenstein, 3-5, 97-8. 87 However, as mentioned above, the notable exception was Van Reede who equates the Cochin ragiadoor-moor with the Dutch stadtholder—an honorary political post in seventeenth-century Holland. But, unlike a stadtholder who was usually elected by the provin- cial councils of the Low Countries, the ragiadoor-moor post in Cochin was a hereditary one. 88 VOC 1388, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1683, fo. 1910v. 89 The main aims proposed were: (1) to settle the problem between the Kolathiri and Unnithiri; (2) to prevent the Ali Raja from attaining the position of ragiadoor-moor; (3) to establish peace in the kingdom; (4) to help the Kolathiri to recover his all lawful taxes and incomes usurped by the Ali Raja and Unnithiri; (5) to prevent all trade being pursued in the country without the consent of the Kolathiri and the Company; (6) to allow merchants from Mysore to trade in Cannanore without any hindrance; (7) to prevent or, at least, to control the trade of the Mappilas with all foreign nations; (8) to control the shipping of the region; (9) to remove the French settlement from Tellichery; and above all (10) to assist the Company to obtain all authority to control the Mappilas. Ibid. fo. 1911r-v. 90 Ibid. fos. 1912v-1913r; English Factories in India 1678–1684, 394. 91 ‘…altyt tegens malcanderen gewapent gaen, en soo zij maer occagie vinden malcanderen ter neder kappen’. VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1680, fo. 1753r-v. 92 VOC 1388, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1683, fo. 1914v; English Factories in India 1678–1684, 394. 93 VOC 1388, Ibid. fo. 1915r. 94 Ibid. 95 See Chapter Five. 96 VOC 1410, Letter from Commander Gelmer Vosburg and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 29 May 1685, fo. 616r. 97 ‘...zoo verre in de regering gepenetreert is, dat hij niet ligt als met syn doodt daar uyt zal geraacken’. Ibid. fo. 616r-v. 98 VOC 1360, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Apr. 1680, fo. 1752r. 99 The raja’s complaint included an account of the siege of the fort by the local Nayars, appalled by the atrocities perpetrated by Van de Kouter, which were obviously not reported to Cochin. VOC 1425, Instructions from Commander Gelmer Vosburg to the residents in Cannanore, 16 Mar. 1686, fo. 128r-v. 100 Ibid. fo. 129r-v. 101 VOC 1388, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1683, fo. 1912r. 102 It was reported that the two envoys sent by the Kolathiri with letters supporting the factor in his bid to take over the office of ragiadoor-moor were abducted by the Ali Raja and Unnithiri. Ibid. fos. 1912v-1913r. 103 In a letter to the Commander Vosburg, the Ali Raja accused Van der Kouter of having forcibly invested in one of the Ali Raja’s ships to Cambay, a blatant case of bottom- ry, but without actually paying for it. VOC 1429, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Commander Gelmer Vosburg, Cochin, 28 Dec. 1685, fos. 1367v-1368r. 104 He was later discharged from all accusations. VOC 1474, Roll book of all the Company servants in Cochin, Quilon and Cannanore, 1687, fo. 480v. 105 Van Goens, who assumed the position of the Governor-General of the VOC in 222 NOTES

1678, resigned the post in 1681 and died in Amsterdam the following year. 106 s’Jacob (ed.), De Nederlanders in Kerala, pp. LXXIII-LXXIV. 107 The Karanavar is described by the Dutch officials as a more discreet, friendlier and a much better merchant than the Adersia [een veel descreten en rykelycker humeur en onge- lyk beter coopman als Adersia]. VOC 1388, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1683, fo. 1917v. 108 VOC, 1406, Letter from the residents at Cannanore to the Commander and the Council in Cochin, 28 Feb. 1684, fos. 840v-842r. 109 The Prince directly retorted to the Company interpreter stating ‘wat meent den capiteyn of ick sulx echter sal nalaten, ben ick geen heer van myn lant om dat te mogen doen’ [what the captain thinks, shall I really refrain from that; am I not the lord of my country that I might do that?]. Ibid. fo. 840v. 110 ‘In somma hij gelykt eerder een coopman dan een prins te syn, wiens voorsaten sulx nogh noyt gedaen hebben, werdende de arme en gemeene coopluyden hierdoor al een groote afbreuck toegebragt en haer broot soo veel als uyt de mont genomen, want daer geschiet voor haer bijna niet meer overigh dan bedels’. Ibid. fos. 840v-841r. 111 Ibid. 112 ‘...hij in geeniger wyse eenige magt behout om eenige natien met soodanige woonin- gen previlegien’. Ibid. fo. 841v. 113 VOC 1434, Original letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 17 Dec. 1687, fos. 19r-20v, 103r-103v. 114 The attack took place while the Karanavar was in the fort itself. This makes it difficult to consider it a pre-planned attack. Nevertheless the Dutch conjectured a conspiracy theory to explain the incident. According to this, the attack was masterminded by the Ali Raja so that the Karanavar would be killed by the Dutch and he could seize possession of the latter’s wealth. In the absence of any satisfactory evidence, this supposition seems to have been founded solely on the continuing hostility of the VOC towards the Ali Raja. Ibid. fos. 107r-108v. 115 VOC 1434, Letter from Commander Gelmer Vosburg and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1687, fo.104v. 116 ‘...onder dit trouble water ’t haren voordeele wel zoude konnen vissen’. Ibid. fo. 106r-v. 117 VOC 1434, Letter from Commander Gelmer Vosburg and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 12 Aug. 1687, fo. 153r. 118 VOC 1434, Original letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 17 Dec. 1687, fo. 22r. 119 Ibid. fo. 22r-v. 120 ‘...wij geen magts genoeg nog ordre hebben om sulcx selvs te doen’. Ibid. fo. 23v. 121 VOC 1454, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 25 July 1688, fo. 1240v. 122 Ibid. fo. 1241r. 123 VOC 1474, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen to Commissioner Van Mydreght, 20 Mar. 1690, fo. 593r-v. 124 Ibid. 9 Apr. 1690, fo. 607r-v. 125 Ibid. fo. 607r. 126 Ibid. fos. 607v-608r. 127 However, whether such an ‘old custom’ existed in Cannanore seems to be doubtful as there is no extant evidence to prove this. Ibid. fo. 608v. 128 Ibid. fos. 608v-609r. 129 Ibid. fo. 608v. 130 VOC 1527, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 10 Jan. 1690, fo. 132v. 131 VOC 1519, Letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 10 Oct. 1692, fo. 640v. 132 VOC 1527, Original letter from Commander Isaack van Dielen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 22 Feb. 1693, fo. 50r. 133 Ibid. fos. 50v-51r. TO CHAPTER SEVEN 223

134 Ibid. fo. 50v. 135 Ibid. fo. 51r. 136 VOC 1559, Letter from Provisional Commander Alexander Wighmans and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 25 Aug. 1694, fo. 317r-v. 137 Ibid. fo. 318r. 138 VOC 1582, Letter from Commander Adriaan van Ommen and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 June 1696, fos. 19-20. 139 Madayi Kavil Bhagavati is the titular deity of Kolaswarupam. VOC 1582, Letter from Commander Adriaan van Ommen and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 31 Jan. 1696, fo. 264. 140 Ibid. 141 VOC 1593, Letter from Commissioner Hendrik Swardekroon, and the second of the Commissioner Jan Grootenhuys to Batavia, 10 Dec. 1697, fo. 8r.

Notes to Chapter Seven

1 VOC 1627, Report from Lieutenant and opperhoofd of Cannanore Barent Ketel to Magnus Wichelman, Cochin, 31 Oct. 1698, fo. 367r. 2 VOC 1625, Letter from Commander Magnus Wichelman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 31 Dec. 1698, fo. 14. 3 ‘veel wackere en reycke prinssen’. VOC 1627, Extract from the letter sent from Cannanore to Cochin, 19 Oct. 1698, fos. 279v-280r. 4 VOC 1646, Letter from Commander Abraham Vink and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 6 May 1701, fos. 125v-126r. 5 VOC 1646, Extract from the letter sent from Cannanore to Cochin, Feb. 1701, fos. 427r-428r. 6 Alexander Hamilton has given a vivid account of the Vazhunnavar in his travel account. Hamilton, New Account of the East Indies, 301-6. 7 VOC 1619, Original letter from Commander Magnus Wichelman and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 18 Nov. 1699, fo. 7v. 8 Ibid. Translated letter from the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara to Cochin, 15 Dec. 1698, fos. 69r-70r. 9 Ibid. 7 Feb. 1699, fos. 70v-73v. 10 ‘...vry verschillende van den aart syner voorsaaten die tot nogh niet anders bekent hebben gestaan, dan voor regenten en patroonen van een worst, en wild volck, dat sigh van den roff ter zee en ontrent haare stranden erneert’. VOC 1646, Letter from Commander Abraham Vink and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 8 Apr. 1701, fos. 103v-104r. However, in another report, he has been described as only the third in the hierarchy of succession, but possessing the entire authority because of the advanced age of his uncles. VOC 1619, Malabar dagregister, Saturday, 7 Feb. 1699, fos. 70v-73v. 11 VOC 1646, Letter from Commander Abraham Vink and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 8 Apr. 1701, fo. 105r. 12 VOC 1646, Extract from the letter sent from Cannanore to Cochin, 7 Mar. 1701, fo. 429r-v. 13 VOC 1658, Extract from the letter sent from Cannanore to Cochin, 28 Feb. 1702, fo. 337r-v. 14 VOC 1658, Letter from Commander Abraham Vink and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 5 Apr. 1702, fo. 69r-v. 15 VOC 1658, Extract from the letter sent from Cannanore to Cochin, 23 June 1702, fo. 339r-v. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. fos. 339v-340r. 18 It was reported that the Ali Raja provided some monetary assistance to the prince to enable him to carry on the war. VOC 1658, Letter from Commander Abraham Vink and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1702, fo. 103r. 19 Traditionally, Alladattunadu was considered to be the region lying between 224 NOTES

Kolathunadu and Canara. 20 VOC 1658, Extract from the letter sent from Cannanore to Cochin, 14 July 1702, fo. 340r-v. However, he soon returned from the field because, ‘these two princes can never get on with each other’ [deese twee princen nooyt met malkander hebben kunnen accorderen]. VOC 1658, Letter from Commander Abraham Vink and the Malabar Council to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1702, fo. 103v. 21 The Company was offered Fort Deckol as a reward for the help requested. VOC 1658, Extract from the letters sent from Cannanore to Cochin, 1 Sept. 1702, fo. 342r-v. 22 VOC 1694, Report from onderkoopman Jan Star and boekhouder Hendrik Wynhout, Cannanore, to Commander Abraham Vink, Cochin, 14 Mar. 1703, fo. 77. 23 The formal accession of the Kolathiri was on 1 Mar. 1703. VOC 1674, Letter from Commander Abraham Vink and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 1 Nov. 1703, fos. 112v-113r. 24 VOC 1708, Letter from Commander Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 29 Nov. 1705, fos. 67r-68v. 25 VOC 1943, Malabar dagregister, 11 Feb. 1720, fos. 625r-627r; Id. 13 Feb. 1720, fos. 628v-631r. 26 VOC 1708, Letter from Commander Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 29 Nov. 1705, fos. 92v-93v. 27 He was described by the Dutch neither as a pirate nor as a ship-owner, only as a border governor of the Kolathiri. VOC 1361, Letter from Commander Marten Huijsman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 19 June 1680, fo. 510v. 28 VOC 1724, Translated letter from the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara to Commander Willem Moerman, Cochin, 5 Apr. 1706, fo. 433r-v. 29 VOC 1790, Translated letter from the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara to Barent Ketel, 30 Oct. 1709, fos. 351v-352r. 30 VOC 1807, Letter from Commander Barent Ketel and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 24 May 1711, fo. 88r. 31 VOC 1852, Translated letter from the Kolathiri to Barent Ketel, Cochin, 9 Jan. 1714, fos. 204v-205r. 32 VOC 1724, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Willem Moerman, Cochin, 24 Sept. 1706, fos. 505v-506r. 33 VOC 1724, Letter from Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 28 Mar. 1706, fos. 179v-180r; VOC 1724, Letter from Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 25 Apr. 1706, fos. 198v-199r. 34 During the time of Commander Willem Moerman, the VOC established a small warehouse in Vadakara in 1705 under onderkoopman Harmanius Lindenberg and the linguist Joan de Cruz. It was soon abandoned by the Company. VOC 2601, Mallabaarse woordenboeken, fo. 165v. 35 VOC 1674, Letter from Commander Abraham Vink and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 1 Nov. 1703, fo. 118r; VOC 1724, Letter from the High Government of Batavia to Cochin, 2 July 1706, fo. 241r-v. 36 VOC 1724, Translated letter from the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara to Willem Moerman, Cochin, 26 Feb. 1706, fos. 415v-416r. 37 VOC 1724, Letter from Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 15 Nov. 1706, fo. 40r-v. 38 Ibid. 28 Mar. 1706, fo. 179r-v. 39 VOC 1790, Letter from Chekutty Pokker, Cannanore, to Barent Ketel, Cochin, 22 June 1710, fo. 473r. 40 VOC 1740, Letter from Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 19 Nov. 1707, fo. 25r-v. 41 VOC 1741, Letter from Willem Moerman to the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara, 26 July 1707, fo. 719r-v. 42 VOC 1740, Letter from Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 19 Nov. 1707, fo. 27r. 43 VOC 1773, Original letter from Barent Ketel and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, TO CHAPTER SEVEN 225

18 Nov. 1709, fo. 44r-v. 44 It is reported that in his search for help to fight against the Ikkeri Nayaka, Prince Kepoe requested the aid of Kanoji Angrea. VOC 1740, Letter from Willem Moerman and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 20 May 1707, fos. 209v-210v. 45 VOC 1807, Extract from the letter sent by Cannanore Factor Constantyn Coup to Cochin, 7 Oct. 1711, fo. 118r; Id. 3 Nov. 1711, fo. 118v. 46 VOC 1838, Letter from Commander Barent Ketel and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1713, fo. 179v. 47 ‘een schrander en verstandige vorst’. VOC 1825, Letter from Commander Barent Ketel and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 17 Nov. 1712, fo. 9r. 48 VOC 1838, Letter from Commander Barent Ketel and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 30 Apr. 1713, fos. 179v-180r. 49 VOC 1838, Letter from the High Government of Batavia to Commander Barent Ketel, Cochin, 14 Sept. 1713, fos. 107r-108r. 50 VOC 1825, Translated letter from the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara to Commander Barent Ketel, Cochin, 2 June 1712, fo. 334r-v. 51 At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Duarte Barbosa mentions that their names were the Kolathiri of Cannanore, the Zamorin of Calicut, the Raja of Venadu, and the Raja of Kottayam. Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 5-6. 52 VOC 1852, Letter from Commander Barent Ketel and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 9 May 1714, fos. 63v-64r. 53 The Ali Raja denied the accusation that he was minting local coins, but admitted that he was minting larins (a Persian silver coin) purely for commercial purposes. In a later letter to the VOC, the Vazhunnavar also supports this statement. VOC 1852, Letter from Commander Barent Ketel and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 9 May 1714, fos. 65v-66r; Id. Extract from the letter sent from Cannanore to Cochin, 19 Apr. 1714, fo. 199v. 54 Ibid. Translated letter from the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara to Commander Barent Ketel, Cochin, 31 Dec. 1713, fos. 198v-200r. 55 Ibid. Translated letter from the Kolathiri to Commander Barent Ketel, Cochin, 9 Jan. 1714, fos. 204r-205r. 56 Ibid. Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Commander Barent Ketel, Cochin, 9 Jan. 1714, fos. 205r-206r. 57 VOC 1881, Resolution taken in the Malabar Council, 29 July 1716, fo. 861v. 58 This shows that the practice of adoption between the royal house of Travancore and the Kolaswarupam was reciprocal. Such adoptions could also have caused internal schisms in the adoptive houses against the adoptee. The murder of the King of Travancore Ravi Varma—an adoptee from the Kolaswarupam—was a result of this problem. VOC 1905, Original letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 27 Nov. 1718, fo. 146r; Lannoy, Kulasekhara Perumals of Travancore, 15-17. 59 VOC 1825, Extract from the letter sent from Cannanore to Commander Barent Ketel, Cochin, 6 Aug. 1712, fo. 108r. 60 VOC 1852, Translated letter from the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara to Commander Barent Ketel, Cochin, 31 Dec. 1713, fo. 198r-v; VOC 1852, Letter from Commander Barent Ketel and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 9 May 1714, fo. 66v. 61 VOC 1852, Letter from the High Government of Batavia to Cochin, 21 Sept. 1714, fo. 437r. 62 VOC 1866, Letter from Commander Barent Ketel to the Ali Raja, Cannanore, 5 Oct. 1715, fos. 675v-676r. 63 VOC 1881, Resolution taken in the Malabar Council, 29 July 1716, fo. 861v; VOC 1891, Original letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 25 Nov. 1717, fo. 20v. 64 VOC 1891, Letter from Cannanore to Cochin about the fortification work by the Ali Raja, 13 June 1717, fo. 44r; Id. 6 July 1717, fo. 47r. 65 VOC 1912, Translated letter from the Kolathiri to Commander Johannes Hertenberg, Cochin, 1 Aug. 1717, fos. 399-401; VOC 1912, Letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg to the Kolathiri, Cannanore, 4 Aug. 1717, fos. 430-431. 66 VOC 1891, Letter from Cannanore to Cochin about the fortification by the Ali Raja, 226 NOTES

6 July 1717, fo. 47r-v. 67 Ibid. 27 Aug. 1717, fo. 53r-v. 68 VOC 1891, Letter from Cochin to onderkoopman Hendrik van Wiert, Cannanore, 30 Aug. 1717, fo. 58r. 69 ‘…den baas na welgevallen over de verdeelde vorsten spelen’. Ibid. 4 Aug. 1717, fo. 55r-v. 70 Ibid. fo. 55v. 71 ‘…gelijk U Edele Achtbare den koningh van Cochim groot gemaekt heeft, believe U Edele Achtbare ons, en ons ryk ook groot te maeken’ [As Your Excellency has made the king of Cochin great, Your Excellency might also be pleased to make us and our kingdom great]. VOC 1905, Translated letter from the Kolathiri to Admiral Willem Backer Jacobsz., Chettua, 3 Jan. 1718, fos. 253r-254r. 72 However, it is more likely that the tone of the letter did not imply any political sub- jugation to the Company, but an economic arrangement in which the Company was supposed to sustain and strengthen the ‘raja-ship’ by collecting and sharing the tolls in the port with the Kolathiri. The letter written by the Kolathiri on 10 Apr. 1719 and the reply from Cochin on 22 Apr. 1719 hint at how the local political elites perceived the position of the Company in the regional context. VOC 1925, Translated letter from the Kolathiri to Commander Johannes Hertenberg, Cochin, 10 Apr. 1719; Id. Letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg to the Kolathiri, Cannanore, 22 Apr. 1719, not foliated. 73 ‘…die alle hun eygen belangen volgen sonder haar aan ’s rycx welwesen eenigsints te bekreunen’. VOC 1905, Original letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 27 Nov. 1718, fo. 146r. 74 VOC 1852, Translated letter from Chekkutty Pokker to Commander Barent Ketel, Cochin, 15 May 1714, fos. 243r-247v. 75 ‘…een dubbelhertig man, over twee zyden hinkende’. VOC 1912, Letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 13 May 1718, fo. 316. 76 VOC 1928, Letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Batavia, 7 May 1719, fos. 128-9. 77 VOC 1943, Translated letter from Karanavar Kunju Mammaly, the present Ali Raja, to Cochin, 8 Apr. 1720, fo. 732r-v. 78 VOC 1942, Letter from the residents of Cannanore to Cochin concerning the designs of Prince Vadakkelamkur, 9 July 1720, fos. 105v-108r. 79 Ibid. fo. 107v. 80 ‘de beste handel-plaats van het gehele ryk’. VOC 1942, Original letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 16 Oct. 1720, fo. 21r. 81 VOC 1947, Extract from the letter sent from Cannanore to Cochin, 18 Feb. 1720, fos. 372-5. 82 Ibid. 28 Feb. 1720, fos. 376-7. 83 VOC 1942, Original letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 16 Oct. 1720, fo. 22r. 84 Ibid. fo. 22r-v. 85 Ibid. fos. 22v-23r. 86 VOC 1942, Letter from the Cannanore officials to Cochin, 23 Sept. 1720, fos. 111v- 112r. 87 Ibid.; VOC 1958, Original letter from Commander Joannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 20 Oct. 1721, fos. 28v-29v. 88 VOC 1982, Narrative account about the beginning of the problem between Prince Coenja Ommen and the Ali Raja given by the envoys of the Ali Raja to the chief interpreter of the Company, Cochin, 6 Oct. 1721, fos. 334-7. 89 VOC 1982, Letter from onderkoopman Daniel Simonsz., Cannanore, to Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council, 4 July 1721, fos. 292-3. 90 VOC 1982, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Cochin, 15 Aug. 1721, fos. 319-21. 91 ‘...tegen het gebruijk en usantie der heydenen’. VOC 1982, Letter from onderkoop- TO CHAPTER SEVEN 227 man Daniel Simonsz., Cannanore, to Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council, 4 July 1721, fos. 293-4. 92 VOC 1982, Extract from the letter sent by onderkoopman Daniel Simonsz., Cannanore, to Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council, 1 Aug. 1721, fo. 304. 93 Ibid. 28 Sept. 1721, fo. 332. 94 ‘…een groote onvoorsigtigheyd, en trouwlooscheyt der zuyderse dat dese hun geloofs- genoot dusdanig in den pekel laeten sitten’ [an enormous lack of concern and disloyalty (shown by) the southern (Mappilas), leaving their co-religionists to sit in such a pickle]. Ibid. 9 Aug. 1721, fos. 316-17. 95 Ibid. fo. 316. 96 Ibid. 4 July 1721, fo. 294. 97 Ibid. 1 Aug. 1721, fo. 298. 98 VOC 1982, Letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Cannanore, 17 July 1721, fo. 295; Id. Extract from the letter sent by onderkoopman Danile Simonsz., Cannanore, to Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council, 24 and 30 Oct. 1721, fo. 342. 99 Ibid. 20 Aug. 1721, fo. 324; Id. Translated letter from the Kolathiri to Cochin, 10 Jan. 1722, fo. 385. 100 VOC 1982, Letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Cannanore, 17 July 1721, fos. 296-7. 101 Ibid. Extract from the letter sent by onderkoopman Daniel Simonsz., Cannanore, to Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council, 1 Aug. 1721, fos. 301-2. 102 Ibid. Letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Cannanore, 11 Aug. 1721, fo. 314. 103 Ibid. fos. 313-14; Id. Extract from the letter sent by onderkoopman Daniel Simonsz., Cannanore, to Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council, 20 Aug. 1721, fos. 321-3. 104 VOC 1982, Letter from the princes of both branches of the kingdom of Kolathiri to Daniel Simonsz., the Factor of Cannanore, 17 Aug. 1721, fos. 325-6. 105 VOC 1958, Letter from Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council to Cannanore, 30 Aug. 1721, fos. 191r-195r. 106 Besides the Cannanore Bazaar, Maday, Baliapatanam, and Dharmapatanam were still besieged by the princes. VOC 1982, Extract from the letter sent by onderkoopman Daniel Simonsz., Cannanore, to Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council, 28 Sept. 1721, fo. 332. 107 VOC 1958, Extract from the letter sent by onderkoopman Daniel Simonsz., Cannanore, to Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council, 28 Sept. 1721, fo. 198r-v; VOC 1982, Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Cochin, 28 Sept. 1721, fo. 333. 108 This strict vigilance against English vessels was demonstrated in an attack on a rice- carrying English vessel in the Bay of Cannanore in Sept. 1721. VOC 1982, Extract from the letter sent by onderkoopman Daniel Simonsz., Cannanore, to Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council, 24 Oct. 1721, fos. 342-3. 109 Ibid. 8 Sept. 1721, fos. 368-9; Id. Translated letter from the Ali Raja to Cochin, 13 Dec. 1721, fos. 373-4. The Kolathiri and Vadakkelamkur tried to settle the dispute again in Jan. 1722 for the huge amount of 80,000 gold fanums plus the Ali Raja’s fort in Baliapatanam. This solution was also rejected by the Ali Raja. VOC 1982, Extract from the letter sent by onderkoopman Daniel Simonsz., Cannanore, to Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council, 31 Jan. 1722, fos. 395-6. 110 VOC 1982, Letter from the first prince of Udayamangalam Kovilakam to onderkoopman Daniel Simonsz., Cannanore, 13 Dec. 1721, fos. 372-3. 111 He is described as one of the three representatives of the gemeente [council] in the government. 112 VOC 1982, Extract from the letter sent by onderkoopman Daniel Simonsz., Cannanore, to Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council, 28 Jan. 1722, fos. 388-91. 228 NOTES

113 VOC 1978, Translated letter from the Kolathiri to Cochin, 10 Jan. 1722, fos. 439v- 440r. 114 VOC 1982, Extract from the letter sent by onderkoopman Daniel Simonsz., Cannanore, to Commander Johannes Hertenberg and the Cochin Council, 28 Jan. 1722, fo. 393. 115 VOC 2010, Original letter from Commander Jacob de Jong and the Cochin Council to Heren XVII, 26 Oct. 1724, fo. 44r.

Notes to Conclusion

1 Richard M. Eaton pointed out the conceptual flaws in the application of a term ‘conversion’ to denote the spread of Islam in early South Asia. Eaton, India’s Islamic Traditions, 14-20. 2 Barbosa, Book of Duarte Barbosa, II, 7. 3 It is probable that the changing pattern in the commercial interaction between Malabar and West Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries played an important role in this development. The formidable presence of the Portuguese in Cannanore and later the emergence of a strong Mappila commercial entrepreneurial group under the Ali Raja limited too much direct interaction between West Asian traders and religious functionaries with Cannanore. There is no evidence for the presence of a considerable number of West Asian traders or of Islamic ‘missionaries’ in Cannanore. It seems that the prime destinations in Malabar of such West Asian traders and religious functionaries were the port cities, especially Calicut and Ponnani, under the control of the Zamorins. These remained the commercial hubs of Asian traders in Malabar until the end of the eighteenth century. Consequently, it is no wonder that Ponnani developed as the centre of Islamic learning in Malabar. 4 At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Pyrard of Laval mentions that the Muslim clerics did not exercise any judicial authority over the Mappilas in Malabar. Pyrard of Laval, Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval, I, 342. Susan Bayly also points out that the collapse of the eighteenth-century political order and the establishment of British colonial supremacy in the nineteenth century were crucial to the development of modern ‘communal’ identities in Kerala. Susan Bayly, ‘Hindu Kingship and the Origin of Community: Religion, State and Society in Kerala, 1750–1850’, Modern Asian Studies, 18/2 (1984), 177-213. 5 Dale, Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier, 53. 6 C. R. Boxer indicated the superiority of European artillery was crucial to their success in maritime Asia. For a discussion on this subject, see C. R. Boxer, ‘Asian Potentates and European Artillery in the 16th–18th Centuries: A Footnote to Gibson-Hill’, in id., Portuguese Conquest and Commerce in Southern Asia, 1500–1750 (London: Variorum, 1985), 156-72. 7 For a brief description of the rise to prominence of this family, see A. P. Ummarkutty, History of the Keyis of Malabar (Cannanore: Edward Press, 1916). See also K. K. N. Kurup, E. Ismail, The Keyis of Malabar: A Cultural Study (Calicut: Malabar Institute for Research and Development, 2008). 8 The only reference which can be interpreted as ‘religious’ is one mention in the ‘forged’ letters written to the Company by the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara in the name of Kolathiri, in which the Ali Raja is accused of maltreating Brahmins and desecrating temples. However, taking this dubious reference as an indication of the existence of social tension based on ‘religious’ difference in Kolathunadu is far-fetched. More probably the stress in the accusation lay on the atrocities committed by the Ali Raja than on the religious difference between the two sides. VOC 1852, Translated letter from the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara to Commander Barent Ketel, Cochin, 31 Dec. 1713, fos. 198v- 200r. 229

APPENDIX 1

Factors of the VOC Settlement in Cannanore

Gelmer Vosburg 1665–1666 Pieter Vertangen 1666–1672 Daniel Joncktijs 1672–1678 Jacob Schoors* 1678–1682 Pieter van de Kouter 1682–1686 Bernhard Brochorst 1686–1688 Abraham Lefeber 1688–1691 Adam van der Duyn 1691–1698 Barent Ketel 1698–1702 Gerrit Mulder 1702–1710 Hendrik Wynhout* 1710–1711 Constantyn Coup 1711–1713 Hendrik van Wiert 1713–1718 Daniel Simonsz 1718–1725

* Provisional Factors Source: From various volumes of Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren (OBP). 230

APPENDIX 2

The Kolathiris (1663–1723)*

Kolathiri I ? –1680 Kolathiri II 1680–1692 Kolathiri III 1692–1698 Kolathiri IV 1698–1709 Kolathiri V 1709–1712 Kolathiri VI 1712–1716 Kolathiri VII 1716–?

* The succession years are given not according to the official accession to the position, which delayed, in some occasions, years, but according to the muppumura or eldership.

The Ali Rajas (1663–1723) The Ali Raja I ?000–1691 The Ali Raja II 1691–?

Source: From various volumes of Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren (OBP). 231

APPENDIX 3

The Ships of the Ali Rajas to Bengal (1700–1724)

1701 1 1704–1705 2 1706 2 1708 1 1710 1 1713 2 1716 1 1721 1 1722 1 1724 2

* The number of the Ali Rajas’ ships that visited Bengal may not be complete. There are years when Bengal shipping lists are not available pertaining to Asian shipping. Source: From various volumes of Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren (OBP), Bengal Shipping lists. 232

APPENDIX 4

The First Treaty between the Ali Raja and the VOC, 11 February 1664

Agreement of trade and friendship concluded between Jacob Hustaert, raat extra-ordinaris of India, governor and director of the island Ceylon, and the conquests on the Malabar Coast, in the name of the United Netherlands Chartered East India Company on the one side, and the Ali Raja, the lord and the supreme ruler of the moors in the country of the King Kolathiri on the other side. 1. Henceforth a solid peace and friendship will be maintained between the Honourable Company and the Ali Raja so long the sun and moon last. The Company will not tolerate the Ali Raja being oppressed by anyone against justice. 2. The Ali Raja will be allowed to keep and frequent such places by his people as before. 3. Also, that the vessels will pay so much to the Company for the passes as it was during the time of the Portuguese. 4. But, his subjects will not be allowed to buy and transport pepper or wild cinnamon from the districts and ports of the Zamorin, the king of Cochin, Porca [Purakkad], Calicoilan [Kayamkulam] and Coilan [Quilon] or of the king of Travancore. 5. So also they will not be allowed to export pepper or wild cinnamon from the above- mentioned lands across the uplands thither. 6. It will not be allowed to transport or sell opium by water or land into the lands of the above-mentioned kings with whom the Company entered into contract. 7. The Ali Raja is permitted to convey 150 khandil of pepper annually from the land of the king Kolathiri, without being allowed to purchase more. 8. He will also take care that the pepper produced in this land being delivered to the Company at the market price. 9. And when the Honourable Company considers it proper to send some of her minis- ters landwards to buy pepper from the first hand, the Ali Raja should not obstruct it in any way. 10. The same rule shall be applicable for the cardamom which the Company will trade in that country. 11. The Ali raja will be allowed to buy and transport sixteen khandil cardamom from here, but no more. 12. So also, annually, he will be allowed to bring in six khandil opium by his vessels from Surat, and sell it, but no more. 13. The Ali Raja will take care the sale of the opium brought here by the Company, will not be obstructed. 14. The Ali Raja will not be allowed to trade with the Portuguese, the English or any other Europeans. 15. The Ali Raja should punish those of his servants who violate this treaty. Likewise the Company will do on her side. 16. The cardamom, pepper and opium and other things in excess of the quantities referred to above that are exported or brought in by them will be confiscated and half of it will go to the Company and the other half to the Ali Raja. 17. And if the Ali Raja himself is being found violating this accord, the Company will not be bound to observe it any longer. 18. The Company will be free to inspect the incoming and the outgoing vessels. 19. No ships are allowed to sail from the havens, where the Ali Raja has some authority, without having obtained a passport from the Company factor in Cannanore. 20. And such passports will not be issued without knowledge of the Ali Raja, because otherwise some unknown pirates may be able to misuse these. APPENDIX 4 233

21. On account of both sides there will be erected a bazaar or marketplace where the servants of the Ali Raja and the inlanders will sell victuals and other small goods to the servants of the Company. 22. And as that everything may go on properly, there shall be appointed a supervisor by the Company and another one by the Ali Raja. 23. The Ali Raja promised to provide the garrison with food and other foodstuffs. Also the Company will protect the vendors from the harassment of the wilful soldiers and the wrongdoers will be punished appropriately.

Accordingly contracted and decided and signed in the dwelling of the Ali Raja, situated outside the Cannanore fortress, and in the fortress on 11 February 1664. Signed by Jacob Hustaert and the Ali Raja in the Malabar characters. At side was the Company’s seal, impressed in red sealing-wax. Under that: at the order of His Honourable and the Council. Signed by Cornelis Strick, Secretary.

Source: Corpus Diplomaticum, II, 263-6. 234

APPENDIX 5

The Third Treaty signed between the Ali Raja and the VOC, 9 April 1680

Renewal of the old contract and the mutual friendship, concluded between the illustrious Netherlands East India Company on the one side, and the Ali Raja, head and supreme chief of the Moors of this bazaar in Cannanore on the other side, in the name of the Honourable Rijckloff van Goens, the governor-general and the honourable members of the Council of the Indies, at the order of the Commissioner Marten Huijsman, commander of Malabar, Canara and Wingurla, with his approval and of the Council and Their Honourables Highmighties afore-mentioned, by us, undersigned, authorized for that purpose, namely: 1. That the treaty further confirmed by Admiral and Governor General Rijckloff van Goens on 13 December 1664 with the Ali Raja will be maintained and observed in its full vigour and intensity; likewise the articles mentioned below under penalty of which in the above-mentioned contract is mentioned. 2. That the Ali Raja and all merchants from the bazaar should return to their old residence again and continue their trade there as before. 3. That no vessels or ships belonging to this bazaar, or were sent by the inhabitants of this bazaar, on return, will be allowed to unload their merchandise on any other ports or bazaars, but the Cannanore bazaar, unless with license, being inspected by the Company. 4. That no vessels arriving in this bay after sunset or before sunrise will be permitted to unload their merchandise, but to stay there to be inspected in the morning. 5. That the chiefs and the inhabitants of the Cannanore bazaar, much less from some other bazaars, may sell nor supply pepper or cardamom to any foreign nationals, but directly to the Company, as has been agreed yearly, besides seventy to eighty khandil cardamom, or so much as they are able to obtain. If the Company does not need it, and what may be collected from the lands of the Kolathiri, Ali Raja and the merchants of this land will be allowed to convey with the license of the Company and according equity to Surat, Muscat and Mocha. But they will not be allowed to bring back more opium from Surat as stated in the old contract. 6. That henceforth all vessels will be required to request the proper sea-passes from the Company and pay for them. Those vessels sailing without passes will be confiscated with all their cargoes. 7. The Ali Raja, for the renewal of the friendship with the Company, should hand over the six cannons to the Company after signing of this treaty; and as soon as this is done, the sea-passes shall be granted without any obstruction as early, but everything depend on the consent of the Batavia Government. 8. That the Ali Raja may cultivate the piece of land lying within the limit of the Company, because the Ali Raja has proved that it belongs to him. And in any case there shall be no trees be planted, nor built houses, but nothing else will be done than sowing. That the minting of fanums shall be done according to convenience and the coins of the Company will have a reasonable value. That henceforth both sides will consider each other as ally and that all the enemies of the Company will be their enemies too. And every time when help is required, that should be served at the earliest. 9. That if the contract and these articles will be properly observed, all the earlier differences and displeasures with the Ali Raja and his merchants shall be void and forgot- ten, which will be confirmed at the visit of the Honourable Commissioner to Cannanore. APPENDIX 5 235

10. That of these articles, two in Dutch and other two in Malabar script shall be written and signed by the Ali Raja and four of his chief merchants, and our commissioners and one will be kept under the custody of the Company and another under the Ali Raja. Below: concluded at Cannanore, in the Company’s garden outside the fortress, on 9 April 1680. And it was signed with Malabar characters: the Ali Raja, the Karanavar, Bappinga and Coycoetialie.

Below: we, the signatories, Hendrik Reyns, capitan-ragiadoor and Jacob Derval, provisional lieutenant, specially commissioned by the Honourable Marten Huysman, commissioner and commander of the Malabar Coast, Canara and Wingurla, declare that [we have] concluded this renewal [of the treaty] with the Ali Raja and his merchants in public in the Company’s afore-mentioned garden, and signed: Hendrik Reyns and Jacob Terval Further below: Translated by me, Bartholomeus Vaas.

Source: Corpus Diplomaticum, III, 214-7. 236

APPENDIX 6

The Treaty between the Ali Raja and the English, 1668

Articles of agreement to be confirmed between the Rajah of Cannanore and Alexander Grigby in the behalf of the Honourable English East India Company for their settlement of a factory at Biliapatam [Baliapatanam]—1668 1. That the English shall during their pleasure reside at the port of Biliapatam with all freedom and liberty, and be always treated with honor and respect the Rajah at his own charge allowing them a house to live in and not suffer any to molest them; their brokers, servants or any belonging to them, that they may journey at their pleasure up and down in the country, or voyage from place to place in pursuance of their trade without any let or hindrance from the Rajah, or any governors or any person whatsoever. 2. That whatsoever goods or merchandize the English shall bring in or carry out, they are to allow the Rajah custom from the same after the rate of 1 ( 1 ½ at Carwar) 2 percent as at Surat, or as Mr. Grigby can best agree with the Rajah, pressure expected. 3. That for what goods shall be brought down and carried up into the country the English are to pay no custom but at port only; and if any goods are landed at port and not sold but reshipped for other places no custom to be paid for the same; also for what timber or provisions of all sorts they are to pay no custom. 4. That it shall not be lawful for the governor Droga of the custom house (Allee Rajah) or any other person in power, to obstruct by public prohibition, or private menaces, the sale of any of the English commodities or hinder them in buying the commodities of the country upon any pretext whatsoever, but that the English shall have free liberty to buy their goods of and to dispose of their merchandize to whom they please. 5. That if any merchant, native buy any goods of the English, or contract for any of the native commodities to be delivered them, and shall neglect either to pay their debts or perform their contracts; the Rajah or governor shall use means to force him or them to make satisfaction, and in default thereof the English shall have liberty to detain such person in their house till the debt is cleared. 6. That whereas the present fort appointed by the Rajah for their residence is in an ill condition to receive them the English shall have liberty to rebuild the same and to build warehouses for goods, and other outhouses such as shall be necessary and what charge they are at shall allowed them out of the customs due on goods imported and exported. 7. That the Rajah shall secure what estate, goods or monies the English shall bring on shore or buy in the country against all attempts whatsoever and if any part thereof n goods or monies be plundered or stolen within the Rajah’s dominions he is to be obliged to find out the thieves and make full satisfaction. 8. That in case any war shall happen between the Rajah and the Dutch or French or Portuguese it shall not be lawful for the Rajah on any pretence whatsoever to seize or deliver up or suffer to be seized or delivered up any part of the estate belonging to the English or any of their persons or servants; but he shall be bound to protect them and if any of the company’s estate be seized the Rajah shall be bound to make it good. 9. That no person of what quality so ever shall enter forcibly into the English house; but if any difference shall arise between the English and the natives, it shall be amicably composed between both parties; and in case (which god forbid) any quarrel shall arise, so that by drink or heat of, either party be killed, the rajah is to do justice on the native if the fault shall appear to be his; and the Englishman is to be kept in APPENDIX 6 237

irons till order shall come from the government and council concerning his punishment. And if any differences shall arise in accounts between any of the English brokers and the country merchants the chief for the English is to be acquainted with it, and determine the controversy according to the justice of the cause. 10. That if any of the companies servants shall absent himself from his duty to any part of the Rajah’s country; upon notice given, he shall use his endeavors to return and surrender him. 11. That if any wreck of ship or vessel appertaining to the English shall happen (which god forbid) in Biliapatam or any of the Rajah’s ports the Rajah’s people shall be obliged not only to use all means possible to save men and goods, or what else belonging there unto but also to restore whatever can be recovered, and prevent all manner of embezzlement.

Source: OIC, Home Miscellaneous Series, vol. 629, Treaty between the Ali Rajas and the English, 1668, fos. 29-37. 238

APPENDIX 7

The VOC Commanders of Malabar (1663–1723)

Pieter de Bitter 1663 Cornelis Valkenburg 1663 Ludolph van Coulster 1663–1666 Isbrand Godske 1666–1668 Lucas van der Dussen 1668–1670 Hendrik Adriaan van Reede 1670–1677 Jacob Lobs 1677–1678 Marten Huijsman 1678–1684 Gelmer Vosburgh 1684–1687 Isaack van Dielen 1687–1693 Hendrik Adriaan van Reede (Commissioner) 1691 Alexander Wighmans (acting Commander) 1693–1694 Adriaan van Ommen 1694–1696 Paulus de Roo (Commissioner) 1695 Pieter Coesaart (acting Commander) 1696–1698 Hendrick Zwaardecroon (Commissioner) 1697–1698 Magnus Wichelman 1698–1701 Abraham Vink 1701–1704 Willem Moerman 1704–1708 Adam van der Duijn 1708–1709 Barent Ketel 1709–1716 Willem Backer Jacobz (Commissioner) 1716–1718 Johannes Hertenberg 1718–1723

Source: Hugo K. s’Jacob, The Rajas of Cochin, 173. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Abraham Yuju, Jewish merchant, 21 Bantam, 99, 109 Abuga Prabhu, merchant, 92 Barsaloor, 130, 148 Aceh, 65-67, 72-73 Basra, 69, 76 Adams, Robert, English factor in Batavia, 84, 100, 102, 107, 111, 118-9, Tellichery, 168 122, 125, 128, 130, 134, 139, 142, Aden, 54, 70 146, 149, 153, 157, 160-1, 165 adiyalar, 35 - High Government in, 98, 117-8 Ali Issoeppoe, a merchant of Ponnani, 73 - VOC headquarters in, 125 Ali Rajas, 1-3, 5-6, 8, 32, 44-51, 53, 56- Bay of Cannanore, 59, 83, 97 79, 83-5, 89-92, 94-7, 99, 103, 109, Bazaars, 22, 122, 140, 169, see also 112-4, 117, 120, 123, 127-34, 136- Cannanore Bazaar 42, 144-50, 152-3, 155-6, 158-72, Bazaar government, 45, 61 174-7 Bengal, 65-7, 70-2, 114, 160 Alladam Swarupam (Nileswaram), 31, - Ali Rajas’ commercial relations with, 37, 40 66, 72, 99 - Alladathunadu, 158 - Bay of, 65 alwars, 15 - opium, 114 Ambergris, 65, 76, 113 - shipping list, 66 Amboina massacre, 99 - silk clothes from, 117 Amsterdam, 82, 85, 128 bhagavati (goddess), 31 Anjarakandi, river, 14 bhakti movement, 15 ankam, 34-35 bhargavakshetram (Keralam), 18 Arabian Sea, 3, 11-2, 42, 51, 55, 57, 58, Bhatkal, 42 65, 67-8, 71, 81-3, 85, 95, 120, 156 Bijapur, 70, 75 - horse trade, 42 Brazil, Portuguese colony, 81 - spice trade, 57-8 British census, 20 Arackal Beebis, 46 British Malabar, 4, 12, 14, 17, 62, 64 Arackal Swarupam, 37, 40, 44-7, 49-51, Broach, Gujarat port, 70-1, 97 57-9, 61, 64, 68, 78, 128, 146, 150, 152, 155, 159, 162-3, 167, 171, 173- Calicut, 2, 29, 32, 43, 54-8, 65, 67, 69- 4 70 Areca, 60, 75 - Kunjalis of, 25 ariyittuvazcha, 89 - Muslim traders of, 43, 45, 50, 55-7, 68 Arrack, 75, 101, 147, 167 - Nayars of, 21 - trade, 75 - Zamorins of, 4, 22, 25, 31, 33, 40, 49 Asari, 20 Caljardas, Banjara merchant, 74 Athula, author of Mushikavamsam, 10 Cambay, 54-5, 68, 70, 97, 99 Canara, 2, 12, 22, 58, 67, 77, 84, 97, Baba Prabhu, Konkani merchant, 91-3, 130-1, 158 122 - Brahmins, 18 Bahmani Sultanate, 42, 54 - Coast, 130 Baliapatanam, 2, 10, 56, 61, 68, 72, 95, - rice trade, 46, 65, 77, 120, 150 97, 100, 112, 138-40, 144 151-2, Cannanore Bazaar, 46, 59-61, 66-7, 71, 165, 169 75, 95, 123, 148, 155, 161, 169 - English traders in, 140 - export from, 74-5 - fort, 151 - fort, 69, 83, 86-9, 97, 99, 130 - frigates from, 72 - import to, 75-7 - Mappilas of, 144 Cardamom, 22, 41, 63, 69, 74-5, 92-3, - river, 100, 112, 139 99, 101, 129, 147, 156, 167 bania, Gujarati merchants, 22, 92, 94, - export from Cannanore, 12, 74-5, 109- 115 112 252 INDEX cartaz, 69 Coral, 119 Ceylon, 25, 67, 71-2, 82, 85, 109, 133, Coromandel, 22, 67, 71-2, 77, 93, 98, - capture by the Dutch, 71 114 Chaliens, 19 Cotton, 22, 72, 74, 76-7, 102, 121 changatam, protection system, 19, 34 - clothes, 76 Chego Marakkar, merchant of Calicut, - trade in, 115 70 Coup, Constantyn, Dutch factor in Chellur (Perinchellur, Taliparamba), 18 Cannanore, 99, 161 Cheraman Perumal, 28, 41, 47 Cowry, 65, 66 Cheras (of Mahodayapuram), 10, 14, 25- Cranganore (Kodungalloor), 55 6, 28-9 Cumblamas, kind of dried fish, 66 cherikkal, 34-5, 40 Cheruman, 20 dagregister of Batavia, 72, 76, 95 Chetticherry Nambutiri, 171 - of Malabar, 74 Chettys, merchants, 21-2, 119, 122, 137 Danes, 133 China Mayna, the VOC saraaf in desavazhi, 27-8, 41 Cannanore, 94 Dharmapatanam, 2, 21, 56, 61, 66, 68, Chinese junks, 53 74-5, 97, 100, 139-40, 142, 144-5, - tea, 85 155, 169-70, 177 Chirakkal taluk, 20 - Mappilas of, 159 - Kovilakam, 40 - River, 139 Chitty Kotta, fort, 158 dharmasastras, 63 Cholas, 14 Dielen, Isaack van, Dutch commander, chunkam, toll, 35 96, 128 Cinnamon, 98 Dutch East India Company (VOC), 3, - Ceylonese, 75 6, 61, 66-7, 69, 71-74, 77, 79, 81-2, - wild, 41, 75, 99, 113 85-7, 90-7, 100-3, 105-11, 115, 118, Cloves, 117, 122 120, 123, 125, 128-40, 145-56, 158- Cochin, 6, 26, 29, 55-7, 61, 72-4, 76, 62, 166, 168-71, 174-7 85, 87, 91, 96-8, 105, 107, 113-4, - exports from Cannanore, 105-13 119, 131, 134, 140-1, 143-4, 146, - fort in Cannanore, 83-85 157, 159-61, 163, 165, 167, 170, 175 - garrison in Cannanore, 85-7 - Commandant, 71 - imports to Cannanore, 113-118 - Council, 76, 85, 118, 128, 144, 146 - officials/servants, 15, 61, 69-72, 74, 77, - Portuguese casados in, 58 86-7, 118, 127, 131, 138, 142-4, 147, - ragiadoor-moor, 143 149, 155, 170 - Raja, 166 Duyn, Adam van der, Dutch factor of - shipping list, 72 Cannanore, 152 Coconut, 12, 63, 65-6, 70, 75, 98, 117 - cake, 77 Edatturutty, 111 - grove, 63, 84, 165 Egypt, 53 - oil, 113 Elephant, 43, 71, 119,137, 171 - trade in coconut products, 60, 75, 98, - Ceylonese, 71, 117, 119 113 - trade in, 117 Coenisja Mamale, Ali Raja’s nephew and English, 4, 33, 69-70, 81-4, 93-5, 99- successor, 167 102, 111-3, 119, 122, 125, 127, 131- Coenja Ommen, prince, 168-9 6, 138-41, 144-5, 147-53, 160, 166- Coimbatore, 15 72, 175-7 Coir, 65, 70, 102 - Company, 3, 81, 99, 101-2, 140, 174-6 - from Maldives, 66 - in Kottakunnu, 131, 136, 138 - trade, 66 - in Tellichery, 149-50, 169 Conjammisie, Ali Raja, 167 - private trade, 101-2, 174-5 Conje Ause Craauw, a Cannanore trader, Eralanadu, 29 72 Eraman Chemani (Raman Jayamani), Coorg, 15 Mushika king, 10 Copper, 115-6, 122, 125, 157 Eravallar, 20 Copra, 65, 102, 147 Estado (da India), 44, 55-8, 69, 71, 81-2, INDEX 253

87, 128 Jan Company, see Dutch East India Ezhimala (Mount Deli), 9-10, 12, 14, Company 42, 169 jati, 173 - Nannan of, 10 Jews, 21 Joncktys, Daniel, Dutch factor, 140 fanum, local coin, 163, 171 French, 3, 84, 95, 99-102, 122, 125, Kadalay (Carla), 170 131-5, 160-1, 175-6 kaimal, 49 - in Panoly, 100, 161 kalari, military training centre, 19 - in Tellichery, 100 Kallars, 16 - in Tiruvangadu, 100 Kanatur tara, estate of the Ali Raja, 169 Kaniyan, astrologer, 20 Gamron, VOC factory, 69, 98, 109 Kanjira Kotta, fort, 158 Geniza papers, 21 Kannada, 15 Ghat Road, 15, 121 karalar, 18 Ginger, 12, 22, 41, 75, 101 karanavar, 29, 45, 61, 64, 127-8, 130, Goa, 42-4, 70, 76 146, 150 Godske, Isbrand, Dutch commander, 84, - of the Bazaar, 71, 73-5, 123, 47 130-1 karimi merchants, 53, 57 Goens, Rijckloff van, 83-5, 87, 96, 107, Karthavu of Dharmapatanam, 61, 134, 117, 130-3, 146, 153, 175 144-5, 177 Golkonda, 75 karyakkar, 64 gramam, 17-8, 39 Kaviur Kotta, fort, 158 Gujarat, 1, 65, 70-1, 73-4 kavu, 30-31 - ports, 55, 58, 70-1, 76 Kayal, 72 - Sultan Bahadur Shah of, 1 Kayamkulam, 76, 99, 105, 114 - traders, 54, 57-8, 74 Kepoe Tamburan, prince, 127, 149-52, 155, 157-8, 161-8, 171 Hagen, Steven van der, Dutch admiral, Keralolpathi, 4, 32, 37, 48, 64 82 Ketel, Barent, commander, 160, 162-4 Hertenberg, Johannes, Dutch comman- Keyis of Tellichery, 177 der, 73, 77, 99, 111 Koikuttiyali Crauw/Kuttiyali, karanavar, Heren XVII, 71, 77, 83, 85, 96, 98, 107, 127-8 113, 123, 131, 135, 146, 155-6 Kolaswarupam, 2, 10, 29, 31, 35, 37-42, Horse, 15, 41-3, 77, 117, 119 47-51, 89, 132, 134, 136-8, 140-1, - from Ormuz, 42 147, 151, 153, 162, 165-7, 171-2, - Javanese, 119 176 - Muscat, 119 Kolathiri, 32, 39-40, 43, 47-50, 56, 65, - Persian, 43, 117 86, 89, 91, 94, 127, 129, 131-42, - trade, 15-6, 42-4, 77, 119-20 144-53, 155, 157-8, 160-66, 168, Huijsman, Marten, Dutch commissioner, 170-1, 75, 177 73, 84, 118, 123, 142, 145 kolezhuttu, 90 Hustaert, Jacob, commander, 83, 85, 96 Konkan, 42 Konkani Brahmins, merchants, 91-3, Ikkeri Nayakas, 129-30, 157-8, 161 122 Indian Ocean trade, 1, 22-3, 40, 44, 51, Korappuzha, river, 17 53-5, 62, 65-6, 72-3, 75, 174 Kottakkal Marakkar Kuttimusa, 170-1 - merchants, 53-4 Kottakunnu, 100, 131, 136, 138-40 Indian Subcontinent, 11, 34, 42, 53-4, Kottayam, 5, 12, 20, 22, 74, 111, 121-2, 72, 75 167 Irukkur, 22, 121 - princes, 171 Izhavas, 20 Kouter, Pieter van de, Dutch factor in Cannanore, 99, 144-7 Jacobson, William Backer, Dutch kovilakams admiral, 166 - Arathil, 37 Jaffnapatanam, 61, 71-2 - Chirakkal, 40 Jambi, 99 - Karipathu, 37 254 INDEX

- Muttathil, 37 Mappilas, 2, 6-7, 12, 14, 17, 21-2, 36, - Naduvil, 171 43-5, 51, 56-8, 59, 62, 64-5, 68-71, - Palli, 37, 151-2, 155, 162, 168, 171 73, 78, 86, 90, 94-5, 99, 102, 111, - Talora, 37 114-5, 120-3, 125, 128, 132, 137-40, - Udayamangalam, 37, 151-2, 155, 162, 144-5, 147-50, 155, 165, 168-9, 173- 164, 168, 171 5, 177 Koy Kutialy Krauw, Cannanore mer- - merchants/traders, 2, 5-8, 21-2, 40, 56- chant, 123 8, 60-2, 65, 67-70, 78, 82, 84, 87, 91- kuruvazcha, 36 2, 95, 97, 99, 101, 103, 111-2, 114-5, Kshatriyas, 1, 18-9 120, 122-3, 132, 150, 153, 161, 177 Kudagu, 22 - of Baliapatanam, 144 Kudali Taravadu, 29 - of Dharmapatanam, 144, 159 Kulasekharas of Mahodayapuram, 2, 14 - ports, 56, 61, 74, 97, 169, 177 Kunjalis, Marakkar traders of Kottakkal, Maratha, 148-9, 161, 164 25, 50, 56 Maravas, 16 Kunjamu Crauw, Ali Raja, 150 marumakkathayam, 17, see also Kunju Kurup, ragiadoor of Vadakara, 156 matrilineal Kunju Nayar, landlord, 161, 169 Masulipatanam, 77 Kunju Wissie Crauw, 128 matrilineal, 17, 29, 45, 61 Kusavan, 19 Mavilans, 12 Mayyazhi/Mahe, river, 100, 161 Lacquer, 119 mestiço, 86, 89 Lakshadweep, 50, 56, 64-7, 78, 97, 113 Mocha, 69-70, 74-6, 111, 160 Lead, 117, 127, 167, 169 monsoon, 13, 65 Mughal Emperor, 70 Macao, 85 - India, 109 Mace, 117 - rupees, 69 madampi, 164 Mukkuvas, fishermen, 20, 62 Maday, 2, 35, 42, 56, 61, 68, 127, 141, muppumura, 34, 36-7, 46, 129, 155 152, 158, 166, 169 - muppu, 34, 36-7, 45 - Kavu, 31 Muscat, 69, 77, 97-8, 111, 119-20, 160 Madurai, 73, 115 Mushikavamsam, Sanskrit kavya, 10-11 - Nayaka, 119 muvarasar of Tamizhakam, 14 makkathayam, 17 Mysore, 14-6, 35, 84, 92, 118-23, 125, Malabar Coast, 1, 3, 13, 15, 21, 26, 43- 139, 145, 158, 175 5, 55, 57-9, 69-70, 73-4, 78, 82, 97- - occupation of Cannanore, 64 100, 164, 174 - ruler of, 117-9, 157 - Malabaris, 76 - traders of, 118, 120-23 Malabar Commandment, 77, 85, 90, 97, 102, 108, 114, 117-8, 125, 128, 140, nadu utaiyavar, 29 142, 145, 157 naduvazhi, 19, 25, 27-8, 41 Malacca, 54-5, 58, 72 Nambutiri Brahmins, 17-8, 30, 32, 35 malainadu, 15 Nana Pattar, Cannanore merchant, 93 Malayalam, 4, 5, 89-90, 174 Nanoe Prabhu, Konkani merchant, 92-3 Malayalees, 13 Narangapurathu Nayar, a Nayar elite, Malayas, 169 166 Maldives, 50, 56, 58, 64-7, 72, 78, 97, nayanars, 15 113, 163 Nayars, 17-9, 21, 36, 77, 86, 127-8, - Sultanate, 66 134-5, 137, 143, 157-9, 169 Malpa Pai, Konkani merchant, 92 - of Calicut, 21 Mamale Marakkar, 56-8, 65, 68 - of Cannanore, 19 Mamluk Sultan, 53, 57 Nediyirippu Swarupam, see Calicut Manapaar, 72 Nileswaram, 2, 14, 31, 37, 56, 169, see Mangalore, 122, 130-1 also Alladam Swarupam - Fort, 130 Nutmeg, 117, 123 Mannan, 20 Mannar, pearl fishery, 71 onderkoopman, 118-9, 145-6 INDEX 255

Opium, 22, 76, 95, 99, 125, 129 Reyns, Hendrik, Dutch captain, 149 - trade in, 76, 97-8, 102, 113-5, 125 Rice, 12, 16, 22, 34, 46, 60, 65, 77, 84, opperhoofd, 85, 97, 117, 152, 161 113, 120, 147, 169 Ormuz, 42 - trade in, 46, 70, 77, 97, 120, 150 Palembang, 99, 109 sakti, cosmic power, 19, 30-2, 37-9, 46- Palghat Gap, 15 8, 50-1, 142-3, 158-9, 173-4 Pandya, 15, 25 sambandam, 19 Panoly, French settlement, see French Sandalwood, 117 Paponetty, Dutch conquered land, 111 sangam period, 14 paradesi traders, 22, 56-7, 62, 67-8, 78, Schoors, Jacob, Cannanore factor, 97, 92 118-9 paradevata, 37 Sea Pass, 73, 76, 96, see also, cartaz Parayan, 20 sharia, Islamic law, 62 Pattar, Tamil Brahmins, 15, 18, 114 Sheikh Zain-ud-Din, 45 Payyanur gramam, 17 - Tuhfat-ul-Mujahidin, 45 - Pattu, 21 Sidis, 164-5 Pepper, 12, 15, 22, 41, 43, 58, 69-70, Silk clothes, 117 81, 83-4, 92, 95-7, 100-1, 105, 112, Slave, 14, 20-1, 86, 117, 149 114-5, 122, 125, 129-30, 132, 167, South-East Asia, 38, 58, 71, 77-8, 81, 171, 175 99, 109 - trade in, 44, 55, 63, 65, 74-5, 94-5, - pepper trade, 125 98-9, 102, 105-9, 125, 174, 176 - spices, 55, 117 Persia, 98, 107, 109, 117 Srikanda, Mushika king, 11 Persian Gulf, 66-9, 74 Srikandapuram, 22 Perumals, rulers of Mahodayapuram, 2, Srirangapatanam, 15, 119-21 see also Cheras of Mahodayapuram - governor of, 120 pidarar, sakteya Brahmins, 31 St Angelo, Cannanore fort, 3, 59, 83-4 Pieter Paets, Dutch factor in Wingurla, stanam, 34-5, 45, 164, 177 70 - stani, 35 Porto Novo, 72 Sugar, 117, 122 Portuguese, 3-5, 7, 10, 15, 21-2, 33, 42- Surat, 67, 70-1, 74, 97-8, 107, 109, 114, 5, 50, 55-9, 65, 67-9, 71-2, 78, 81-5, 117, 121, 123, 160 89-90, 96-7, 100, 120, 127-31, 134, - cotton from, 115 143, 159, 173, 175, see also, Estado - Dutch factory in, 70, 97-8, 140 - casados in Cochin, 58 - merchants in, 90 - language, 89 - opium from, 114 - topaz, 86, 122 puja, 31 Taliparamba, river, 14 Pulaya, 86 Tamil anthologies, 10, 14 Pulicat, 65, 68, 72 tamburan, 32 Tanore, 95 Quicksilver, 117 tara/taram, a local coin, 163 Quilon, 55, 96 taravadu, 29-31, 33-4, 37-9, 45-7, 50, 59, 89 raad van justicie, 146 Tekkelamkur Tamburan, 164, 171 Raasvelt, Jan van, VOC servant, 120-2 Tellichery, 100, 148-52, 169, see also ragiadoor-moor, 137, 141-4, 146-7, 151 English, French Ramaghada Mushakan, 10 - factory in, 100, 153, 166 Ramathiri, prince, 128-139 - river, 14 Red Sea, 55, 57-8, 68-70, 74, 76 teyyattam/teyyam, ritual dance, 4, 22, 30, - ports, 67, 69-70 32 Reede, Hendrik Adriaan van, 15, 41, 48- Timber trade, 112-3 9, 84-5, 98, 133, 135-7, 139-41, 143, Tin, 117 175 Tiruvangadu, French settlement, see - Memoir of, 91 French Renesse, Dutch Captain, 135, 137 Tiyya, 17, 20-2, 36, 62, 169 256 INDEX topaz soldiers, see Portuguese Venidas, Bania merchant of Cannanore, tottam, ritual song related to teyyattam, 4, 92-4 22 Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie Travancore, 6, 26, 29, 33, 164, 171 (VOC), see Dutch East India - King of, 49 Company Tuticorin, 72-3 Vermilion, 117 Vertangen, Pieter, Dutch factor in Udayamangalam Kovilakam, see Cannanore, 90, 135 kovilakams Vettuvan, 12, 20 ulama, 174 Vijayanagara, 15-6, 42-3, 54, 157 Unnithamburan, prince, 145, 147, 149- Vikramaraman, Mushika king, 10 51 Vink, Abraham, Dutch commander, 156 Unnithiri, prince, 137-42, 144-52, 157- Visscher, Jacobus Canter, Dutch chap- 8, 161-8, 171 lain, 40, 59, 102 uralar, 18 Vosburgh, Gelmer, Dutch commander, 85 Vadakara, 74, 160, 167, see also vyapari Nayars, 21 Vazhunnavar of Vadakara Vadakkan Perumal, Kolathiri, 32 Wallarwattam, fort of the Ali Rajas, 164 Vadakkelamkur, 164-70, see also West Asia, 65, 67, 69, 74-5, 77, 109, Unnithiri 163, 174 vadugas, 16 - horse trade, 120 Vaisya, 1, 18, 48 - traders, 55, 57, 73, Valarpattanam, river, 14 Western Ghats, 11-5, 22, 51, 75, 121 Vannattan, 19 William Logan, author of Malabar Vazhunnavar of Vadakara, 100, 111, Manual, 4 148, 155-6, 158-9, 161-2, 165, 167, Wingurla, 70, 76 169, 171, 177 Wodeyar, rulers of Mysore, 16, 118 velichappadu, Shaman, 32 Wynadu, 12 Vellalas, 16 Zamorins of Calicut, see Calicut Venadu, 26, 29, see also Travancore