5454 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 6 NOVEMBER, 1946 Time was also required to clarify the con- jerda, was ordered for 2nd December, and in fused situation existing with the French. The conjunction with this i Parachute Battalion intention was that all French troops in 78 was to drop at I)epienne and threaten Tunis Division area should be relieved as soon as from the south. The drop was successfully possible so that, under the command of General made and the parachutists reached Oudna, but Barre, all the French forces could concentrate the main attack did not take place, ior on on the protection of .the right flank on the line ist and 2nd December the enemy counter- Le Kef-Teboursouk-Testour. attacked with tanks and infantry towards By 23rd November a preliminary verbal Tebourba from the north and Blade Force was agreement had been reached that all troops of heavily engaged, suffering considerable casual- whatever nationality north of the line Le Kef- ties in tanks. Zaghouan should be under command First By the evening of 2nd December Blade Force Army and that all troops south- of this line was withdrawn west and the defence of the should be under French command. forward areas was left to ii Brigade and the By 24th November the forward concentration armoured infantry of Combat Command " B " of 78 Division and Blade Force, reinforced by who had to be ordered forward in a defensive light tanks from the United States i Armoured r61e. Our tank losses up to date amounted Division, was completed and orders were issued to approximately 40. Many enemy tanks were for the immediate resumption of the advance destroyed, but as he was left in possession of with, as a first objective, the line Tebourba- the battlefield most of these were no doubt Mateur. recovered. The survivors of i Parachute On 25th November the advance was resumed Battalion rejoined 78 Division on 3rd and ii Brigade attacked .the enemy at Medjez, December. seizing the village and establishing crossings On this date the enemy again attacked over the river. ii Brigade in strength at Tebourba and pene- On 27th November n Brigade occupied trated their positions at several places. The Tebourba and repulsed enemy counter-attacks Brigade was cut off and had difficulty dn with- • supported by tanks and dive-bombers, destroy- drawing during the night: 2 Hampshires, who ing several .tanks. On 28th November 11 failed to get the order to withdraw, suffered Brigade and 2/13 Armoured Regiment were on heavily but fought magnificently. Losses of the outskirts of Djedeida. equipment were considerable and enemy dive- We had attained the nearest point to Tunis bombing all day was on a heavy scale. that was reached until the final stage of the On 3rd December a series of enemy attacks campaign. on our positions at El Guessa developed from At the same time that 11 Brigade was the south-east and tank and infantry battles operating up the Medjerda Valley, Blade Force took place all day between Combat Command with i Parachute Battalion and the i Battalion " B " and the enemy, while ii Brigade with- of the i Armoured Regiment, United States i drew to more favourable positions north of Armoured Division, moved into the plain south Medjez. of Mateur, not without considerable supply diffi- During the period of the actions described, culties enhanced by the beginning of the rains. the administrative situation was precarious in Here Blade Force was involved in its first suc- the extreme. Dispatches of stores from Bone, cessful armoured engagement on 26th Novem- which was intended as the main supply base ber, an action which continued on and off for for the forward area, were seriously affected several days. A successful raid by the United by enemy bombing. An acute shortage of States light tank battalion resulted in the locomotives and rolling-stock, coupled with de- destruction of approximately 40 Stukas on the mands arising from the French mobilisation ground at Djedeida airfield. and the transfer of United States formations It was now evident that the enemy intended from the west, made compensating stores lifts to _£tand and fight along the entire front and from Algiers by rail impossible. There was was" present in considerable strength—see no reserve pool of motor transport to fall back Appendix " C." on. All resources were strained to the utmost. The following week saw hard fighting followed It was clear to me that the offensive against by the start' of our withdrawal. This week Tunis would have to be postponed to give was notable for the heavy scale of enemy air time to build up resources and to refit the attack, particularly by dive-bombers, to which troops who had been engaged for the past the leading troops were subjected, and which month. Several battalions of 78 Division were our own air forces were at this stage unable to under three hundred and fifty strong and the prevent.* They were still operating from Bone strain of -persistent dive-bombing was begin- aerodrome, with an unreliable (owing to the ning to tell. The heavy rain had also put all mud) advanced landing ground at Souk el my airfields out of action and movement off Arba. the main roads was becoming impossible. I ii Brigade were never able to occupy did not consider that a further offensive could Djedeida, but remained in contact with the in any case be undertaken until at least one enemy on 2Qth and 30th November, with Blade week's reserves of supplies of all kinds had Force concentrated in the area of Chouigui. been accumulated at railhead. By 30th November Combat Command " B," Meanwhile my Tafctical Headquarters had United States i Armoured Division, was conr moved in succession to Jemmapes, Constantine centrated forward, and an attack on Tunis, and Ain Seynour, while Main Army Head- with Combat Command " B " and Blade quarters opened at Constantine on 29th Force working to the east of the Med- November. By loth December the garrison at Medjez, * By the standards of later campaigns this enemy which included four French battalions, has been air activity was not on a serious scale. Its moral r reinforced by i Guards Brigade less a battalion, effect at the time, however, -was increased by the inexperience of the troops and by the scarcity of light preparatory to the temporary withdrawal A.A. weapons. of ii Brigade and Combat Command " B "