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Civil Rights and Civil Responsibilities CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL RESPONSIBILITIES HOW THE UNIONIST PARTY PERCEIVED AND RESPONDED TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 19681968----19721972 Master thesis in historhistoryy submitted at the UniversityUniversity of Bergen May 2010 His 350 Eirik Søreide Klepaker DDDepartmentDepartment of archaeoloarchaeology,gy, history, cultural studies and religion Front picture found at: http://www.nicivilrights.org/wp- content/uploads/2008/12/burntollet20march.jpg ii Thanks to Sissel Rosland, for giving me assistance and motivation when it was exceedingly needed. My Mum and Dad My fellow students iii iv Contents List of abbreviations...............................................................................................................vii CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1 Subject outline and previous research................................................................................ 1 Main questions ................................................................................................................... 4 Political and religious labels .............................................................................................. 4 Sources ............................................................................................................................... 5 Chapter outline ................................................................................................................... 6 Historical context: The formation of the Northern Irish state............................................ 7 The political parties............................................................................................................ 8 Organisations and movements ......................................................................................... 10 CHAPTER TWO: ESCALATION AND RECONCILIATION: OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1968.................................................................................................................. 14 THE PATH TOWARDS THE CROSSROAD .................................................................... 14 The riots in Derry ............................................................................................................. 15 Towards reform and the five-point plan........................................................................... 17 Ulster at the crossroads .................................................................................................... 19 THE OPPOSITION FROM WITHIN: OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1968............................. 21 SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................... 27 CHAPTER THREE: O’NEILL’S DOWNFALL: JANUARY TO APRIL 1969 ............. 29 ENOUGH IS ENOUGH....................................................................................................... 29 THE APPOINTMENT OF THE CAMERON COMMISSION .......................................... 31 THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN ........................................................................................... 35 The manifesto................................................................................................................... 36 THE CROSSROAD ELECTION......................................................................................... 38 THE AFTERMATH OF THE ELECTION ......................................................................... 39 Public Order Bill .............................................................................................................. 40 O’NEILL RESIGNS ............................................................................................................ 42 SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................... 45 CHAPTER FOUR: ULSTER BETRAYED ........................................................................ 47 IAN PAISLEY’S PATH TO STREET POLITICS.............................................................. 48 The fight begins................................................................................................................ 49 THE RIOTS IN DERRY AND THE AFTERMATH.......................................................... 52 Not on my land................................................................................................................. 53 THE BURNTOLLET MARCH AND THE NEW OPPOSITION ...................................... 58 The Protestant Unionists .................................................................................................. 60 THE RESULT AND CONTINUING FIGHT ..................................................................... 63 Reactions to O’Neill’s resignation ................................................................................... 65 SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................... 66 CHAPTER FIVE: THE FALL OF A PARLIAMENT: MAY 1969 TO MARCH 1972 . 68 THE HONEYMOON PERIOD ........................................................................................... 69 BACK TO THE STREET.................................................................................................... 76 THE CAMERON COMMISSION AND ITS AFTERMATH ............................................ 83 The response of the government ...................................................................................... 85 The loyalist response to the commission.......................................................................... 88 Calls for responsibility ..................................................................................................... 90 UNIONISM DISUNITED: 1970-1971 ................................................................................ 92 A less tolerant Unionist Party........................................................................................... 94 The By-elections and the intra-unionist conflict.............................................................. 97 v More violence and a new oppositional party ................................................................. 101 STORMONT’S SWANSONG: 1971-1972 ....................................................................... 105 A change of Prime Minister ........................................................................................... 106 Internment ...................................................................................................................... 110 A new Protestant party ................................................................................................... 113 The end of Stormont....................................................................................................... 116 SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................... 120 CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 122 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 131 Abstract ................................................................................................................................. 135 vi List of abbreviations APNI: Alliance Party of Northern Ireland CSJ: Campaign for Social Justice DCAC: Derry Citizens’ Action Committee DUP: Ulster Democratic Unionist Party IRA: Irish Republican Army NICRA: Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association NILP: Northern Ireland Labour Party PD: Peoples Democracy RUC: Royal Ulster Constabulary SDLP: Social Democratic and Labour Party UCDC: Ulster Constitution Defence Committee UPV: Ulster Protestant Volunteers UUP: Ulster Unionist Party vii viii CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION In April 2010 the responsibility for law and order in Northern Ireland was transferred back from Westminister to Stormont, thereby ending a 38 year long period of Westminister control. The Alliance Party leader, David Ford is expected to take the office as the first Northern Irish Justice Minister in almost 40 years. He was the preferred choice of the provinces two largest party’s, Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). This created some discontent among the two minor parties in Stormont’s four party coalition government, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), who felt that one of their representatives should have been considered. 1 If we go back 40 years, when the troubles in Northern Ireland began, the political situation was quite different. Then, the province had in reality only one main party, and that was the Ulster Unionist Party. The UUP had governed alone since the birth of the Northern Irish state. During this period the Catholic community had very little political influence. This would all change when the Catholic community, tired of being on the outside, mounted a civil rights campaign to demand more influence in Northern Ireland in the late 1960’s. The campaign would lead to the creation of both the SDLP and the Alliance Party, and was an intrinsic part of the process which led to the suspension of the Stormont parliament, and decades of violence. Subject outline and previous research ”I do not think a future historian of Londonderry will
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