The Northern Pacification of 171Q-20 Downloaded From

478 July The Northern Pacification of 171Q-20 Downloaded from PAET I.—THE TEEATIES WITH PRUSSIA. FTER the death of Charles XII Sweden was obliged to submit A to peace with some, at least, of her adversaries upon the http://ehr.oxfordjournals.org/ best terms she could obtain, and in the first place with either Hanover or Eussia. George I and Peter the Great, mutually in almost declared hostility, were willing enough to secure permanent possession of their acquisitions in the war each at the expense of the other. Denmark stood, undecidedly, with Hanover, Prussia firmly with Eussia. George made his principal condition of peace the cession of the duchies of Bremen and Verden; Peter, that of his conquests south of Finland. If he would have restored Livonia at New York University on September 12, 2015 and the port of Eeval as well as Finland, peace would almost cer- tainly have been made with him. Just before the death of Charles was known, George, to protect his electorate from the attack which was believed to threaten from Sweden and Eussia combined, had concluded with Austria and Saxony the treaty of Vienna of 5 January 1719. This provided principally against the passage of Eussian troops through Poland into the empire and their junction with those of Prussia. It was never completed, because the republic of Poland never acceded to it, as was provided. The withdrawal of the Eussian army from Poland was claimed as its firstfruits, but this Peter would seem to have decided upon before,1 requiring all his forces to prosecute the war with Sweden, after his terms of peace had been rejected. But it had a powerful effect, especially at Berlin, as was seen in the negotiations there in the summer.2 1 Daniel Moore from Dresden, 11 January 1719, Becord Office, Poland 25: His Czarish Majesty signifies likewise that he is extreamly pleased to satisfy His Majesty and the Republic!?, and that they may name commissaries to conduct his troops into his own country, but that he hopes that the King and the Republic will be so good as to oblige the City of Dantziek to furnish him with some frigates, as they have already promised.' 2 See on this treaty Droysen, Gcschichte (ler preussischen Politik, iv. ii. 247 foil, and iv. 371 foil., and his essay ' Die Wiener Allianz ' in his Abhandlungen zur ncucrcn Oeschichte; also Michael, Historisclm Zeitschrift, LXX-III. i. 58. Droysen is, as usual, ultra-Prussian. Michael disposes of his view that there was any intention to 1907 THE NORTHERN PACIFICATION OF 1719-20 479 A plan for the pacification of the north, emanating, it would seem, in part from the British minister at Vienna, was circulated among the European courts in February.3 Its main proposals were that Sweden should give up her German provinces to their present occupants, who would then combine to force Peter the Great to restore everything excepting St. Petersburg, Cronslot, and Narva, and so much of Ingria and Carelia as depended on them, and, if he refused, to deprive him of those places also, and of Smolensk and Kiev as well for the benefit of the republic of Poland ; that the king of Poland should have the lands and royal Downloaded from revenues of Wismar and the isle of Poel, and 500,000 crowns4 to be subscribed by the kings of England, Denmark, and Prussia ; that Rostock should be a free imperial city ; and that the duke of Holstein-Gottorp should be restored to the rights of his ancestors in Holstein and Sleswick, upon conditions. That this plan suffi- http://ehr.oxfordjournals.org/ ciently represented George's views is shown by passages in the despatches of Craggs, secretary of state, to Lord Stair at Paris, as will be seen below. But these were the ideas of George only, or of George and the king of Poland. The Swedes were not prepared to cede the whole of Bremen and Verden, nor anything to Denmark or Prussia. The Danes were for pushing the war to its extremity, intending to win back the provinces in Sweden lost sixty years before. at New York University on September 12, 2015 Frederick William of Prussia held closely to his alliance with Peter the Great, and would have been content with a mortgage of Stettin only. And it was essential under present conditions to consult the wishes of France, a power with whom Great Britain, under the stress of the war with Spain, was in closer union than ever. The cardinal principle of French policy being always repression of Austria, the regent not only favoured Prussia, placing the interests of Frederick William only second to those of King George,5 but also would have Sweden retain territory in the empire and a dismember Prussia, nor can it be held that an attack on her separately was contem- plated, though the Prussians, no doubt, thought otherwise. The main part of the treaty is printed by Dumont, vni. ii. 1, and Lamberty, x. 72. Its' exordium ' was the execution upon the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Peter's niece's husband, which •was promptly carried out. 3 Plan projetU pour la paix ginirale du Nord a traitler a Brunsvic, printed by Dumont, vm. ii. 8. Droysen (iv. ii. 154) says that it was drawn up at Vienna by St. Saphorin and count Flemming, the British and Saxon ministers, and count Sin- zendorff, and submitted to the emperor. There are copies with lord Polwarth's despatches (Becord Office, Denmark 41), and several in the French archives (Suede 137, 145) received from different courts. Polwarth (4 March) says that the project was being handed about as received ' from a private hand at Vienna.' James Haldane (Caesel) says that it was reputed there to have been published by king George's order; he attributed it himself to the Saxon Schmettau at Vienna (Record Office, German States 119, 20 March). 1 So in Polwarth's and other copies. 1 Cf. ante, vol. xx. 47-9, 273, xxi. 464-6. 480 THE NOR THERN PA CIFICA TION OF 1719-20 July voice in its affairs. But if the claims of Hanover and Prussia were to be allowed, this could only be at the expense of Denmark. George, however, would not readily give up his Danish ally, and while willing that Prussia should have Stettin and its district, refused absolutely to allow anything to her ally the tsar. Gradually the obstinacy of the Danes and the exigencies of the European situation obliged him to modify his policy, as desired by the regent. We may follow the discussions at Paris in the corre- spondence of Craggs and Stanhope with Stair and Dubois/5 The intercourse of the two latter was by no means smooth; the cold, Downloaded from insistent ambassador, the quick and nervous abb6 were naturally antipathetic, and the irritability of the latter was increased by the difficulties of his position. It required all the soothing diplomacy of Craggs to prevent an open rupture. And Stair was constantly mistrustful of the regent's sincerity in regard to affairs both of http://ehr.oxfordjournals.org/ north and south.7 On the other side the treaty of Vienna roused great jealousy. Complaint was made that it had not been com- municated, as the friendly relations of the two powers demanded. The answer was that this had not been thought necessary, as neither Great Britain nor France was concerned in any way; that it was natural to take precautions in the north; that a treaty of a similar character had been concluded in 1717 between France, Eussia, and Prussia in similar secrecy, and so on.8 The difference was com- at New York University on September 12, 2015 posed, for the necessities of the regent and of George demanded its composition, but it was serious.0 First, we have despatches from Craggs of 12 and 17 January, o.s., the latter a very long and important private letter, whose burden throughout is the necessity for the king and the regent' to unite and act together in strict concert upon the northern affairs.' Stair must particularly try to discover French sentiments in regard to the tsar. It was very necessary for him to talk of a general peace in the north, including Kussia, and to give all public appearance of a desire for it. But some restitution must be made to Sweden: namely, ' those provinces, for whose sake only we can 8 Record Oflice, Foreign Entrybook 30, France 163 foil.; British Museum, Stowo ilSS. 246-7. See also the letters of Stair to Robethon, ibid. 231, and the luminous narrative of Wiesener. 7 Private despatches, passim ; cf. Wiesener, iii. 97, 98. Stair's general view was that Great Britain must make herself strong enough to stand alone. He sums up (26 March) : ' In one word, my dear Craggs, so long as yon stand firm upon your leggs you will lead France, when ever wee come to be obliged to lean upon her for support, she'll help to tumble us down.' " Stair, 30 January, Record Office, France 1G3. See on the subject Wiesener, iii. 19 foil. 9 Dubois wrote retrospectively to Robethon on 25 February: ' Je vous avoue avcc la derniere sincerity qu'il n'y a eu aucune circonstance pendant toute la Regence qui ait fait perdre plus de terrain a S.A.R. que celle ey' (Stowe 31S. 231, f. 269). 1907 THE NORTHERN PACIFIC A TION OF 1719-20 481 suppose that Sweden will enter into a peace. The question will be, whom we shall pitch upon to come into the general treaty of peace, because they will not be able to make war alone.' Con- fusion would be worse confounded, if the king, the regent, and the emperor all held different views.

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