Borderland Entrepreneurs: The dynamics of cotton production and smuggling by farmers along the Mukumbura border post between and .

By

Dombo Sylvester University of KwaZulu-Natal [email protected]

Abstract

The Zimbabwe-Mozambique borderland, which stretches for thousands of kilometres, is one of the longest and poorly managed in the region. Cotton is the major grown along the border. As the borderland communities are full of related people, the production seasons see Mozambican farmers coming to Zimbabwe to buy planting seeds and other inputs whilst Zimbabwean farmers would cross the border in search for fertile soils. The marketing period, depending on the strength of the country’s producer prices, is marked by cotton smuggling to both sides of the border as farmers search for higher prices. This paper seeks to explore the dynamics of cotton production and marketing (smuggling) along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border as the farmers take advantage of the porous border to obtain better rewards for their . It examines the role played by cotton buyers who are often willing accomplices in the smuggling of this bulky commodity. While not taking the initiative away from the farmers, this paper also looks at the role of corrupt border officials in aiding this smuggling. Though there are several routes used by farmers from both sides of the border to smuggle cotton, this paper will focus on the smuggling at the Mukumbura border post. This paper is premised on oral interviews with farmers on both sides of the border as well as various cotton buyers and border officials.

1

Introduction

The Zimbabwe-Mozambique border is one of the longest and poorly managed in Southern Africa. It extends for over 1231km, and is the second longest after the Malawi and Mozambique border which extends for 1569km.1 The popular perception about African borders in general and Mukumbura Border post in particular is that borders are a colonial creation which ignored the way people used to live before the advent of colonialism. Even though it is assumed that the people from Mozambique and those from Zimbabwe speak different languages, at the areas on either side of the Border, people speak the same or similar language and share the same customs. Therefore, for the inhabitants of this borderland, the border is an inconvenience. The people always moved between the two countries, and they continue to do so up to this day with little regard to measures. To some inhabitants, it is not really a border in the stricter sense of the word as they can walk in and out of both countries without following the correct procedures of cross-border movement of using passports and other travel documents.

The Mukumbura Border post, as it is known in Zimbabwe or Mecumbura Border post as known in Mozambique, has become a source of livelihood for its inhabitants. While the border is predominantly located in a rural setting, this has allowed the majority of the people to make a livelihood out of agricultural commodities, primarily cotton, which is the major cash crop grown on both sides of the border. This paper examines how farmers on both sides of the border negotiate favourable prices for their contraband; make choices whether to sell in Zimbabwe or Mozambique and also how they maneuver through a maze of cotton merchants. This, as will be shown, has caused a ‘border dispute’ between the cotton merchants from the two countries involved. The paper further argues that Mukumbura border post has become a locus of opportunity primarily for cotton farmers who obtain inputs from Zimbabwe, but grow their crop in Mozambique for a predominantly Zimbabwean market. The paper attempts to map out the livelihoods afforded to these farmers at the border, and how, with the help of border officials, they have participated in the ‘illegal’ marketing of cotton at the borderland. The marketing of

1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Zimbabwe. Accessed 25 August 2011 2 cotton along this border has never been a concern for the two governments until early 2011, when Mozambican merchants began losing most of the cotton produced on the borderland to Zimbabwean cotton merchants.

Research for this article was conducted in the Mukumbura area, primarily on the Zimbabwean side of the border between January and February and May to July in 2011 when the selling season for cotton was at its peak. I mostly dealt with the cotton farmers. Mozambican cotton farmers were interviewed when crossed the border to sell their produce in Zimbabwe. However, it has to be noted that that some of these people are transnational beings, thus at times it is difficult to tell whether they are Zimbabweans or Mozambicans. In addition to these sources information was obtained from Zimbabwean companies that finances most of the farmers in getting inputs. Given that this trade is illegal, winning their confidence was difficult since they suspected that I was an undercover custom official. Once I got their trust, they provided useful information on the ‘smuggling’ of cotton between the two countries and how it is effected, and the benefits and challenges that have accrued to both the farmers and the cotton merchants respectively. However, the identity of my informants is protected by the use of pseudonyms in this paper. As will be shown later, the language of commerce in this particular area is predominantly Kore-kore, a sub dialect of the Shona language which I speak fluently. Although a large number of Mozambican farmers speak Sena, they are also able to speak this Kore-kore language because of their historical interaction with Zimbabwean communities across the border. Therefore communication was never a problem for me as I managed to converse without problems with most of my informants.

Contextualizing Cross-Border Trade

Like most international borders in Africa, the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border was arbitrarily drawn by the European colonizers following the Berlin Conference of 1884/5. These unilateral borders cut across ethnic and kinship groups and this has led to the controversies over the legality of the livelihoods pursued by such people at the

3 borderlands.2 While the authorities see the people as engaging in clandestine and illegal activities, the inhabitants of the borderlands see themselves as entrepreneurs who are only taking advantage of the prevailing economic conditions on both sides of the border to make ends meet. There is also agreement in the literature on cross border trade that while economic, social and political pressures are the major reasons for the escalation of informal cross-border activities, a critical facilitating factor is the close historical and cultural ties linking the border communities of contiguous states.3 Borderland inhabitants therefore see no reason why states should curtail their economic activities as they are free to belong to each side of the border as they have relatives on either side. Indeed, the most challenging aspect of controlling these people is that some do have dual identity cards, have families across the border and most of their children attend schools especially on the Zimbabwe side of the border. It is because of the restrictions imposed by the states that the people concerned do not use the official entry and exits points but their own, which the authorities have failed to control.

Literature on cross-border trade has been on the rise as evidenced by the works that have come up in the last decade or so. There are different perspectives that have been propounded by scholars to explain cross border trade. From one perspective, cross border trade is viewed as ‘informal’, illegal activity that threatens the economic stability of the regions and countries concerned.4 My study draws much from Ellis and MacGaffey’s study which attempted to describe some of the methodological and conceptual problems in researching aspects of sub-Saharan Africa's international "underground" trade, meaning commercial transactions which are conducted across international frontiers but which are unrecorded in official data.5 The cross border trade at Mukumbura can be described as part of what is variously referred to as the "second," "hidden," "parallel," "underground" and "informal" economy, all terms intended to convey the sense of

2 For an analysis of smuggling in other parts of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border see N. Pophiwa, ‘Smuggling on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border’ in J. Crush and D. Tevera, Zimbabwe’s exodus: Crisis, Migration, survival (Cape Town: Southern African Migration Programme, 2010) 3 S. L. Chachage, ‘Citizenship and Partitioned people in East Africa: The case of WaMasaai’, African Development, 28,1, 2003, pp. 53-54. 4 S. Ellis and J. MacGaffey, ‘Research on Sub-Saharan Africa’s Unrecorded International Trade: Some Methodological and Conceptual Problems’, African Studies Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 5 Ibid. 4 economic activity which is not officially reported to state authorities and which is therefore not directly taxable.6 Although such activities are not necessarily illegal, they may involve a wide range of degrees of illegality. In the same vein, Brenda Chalfin argues that the border zone of north-east Ghana, a tri-juncture spanning Ghana, Togo and Burkina Faso, is characterized by the extreme mobility of persons and things on the one hand and extreme state surveillance on the other.7 Numerous layers of state personnel- police, border guards, customs agents and army officers-occupy this site with the aim of regulating trade.8 On the Mukumbura border, it will be argued that there is a huge presence of the para-military police, popularly known as the Support Unit on the Zimbabwe side and the Border Frontera Guards on the Mozambican side. Whilst these officials are meant to regulate movement and ensure that no smuggling takes place at the border, more often than trade, in this case they are primarily there to aid in promoting illegal crossings and trade by extorting the farmers.

Studies on cross border trade in Zimbabwe have slowly been on the rise recently, especially following the collapse of the Zimbabwe economy since 2000. Most scholars have been focusing primarily on ‘border-jumping’. Victor Muzvidziwa, for instance, argues that border post management in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been an impediment to the development of cross-border trade.9 He states that state functionaries engage in corrupt practices and so does immigration and customs officials who are often ‘too zealous’ as they harassed traders and seized their goods.10 Government controls have often provided enough justification for the conduct of illicit trade as the traders argue that they are not recognized by the states involved. In the main, cross-border traders and smugglers are undercapitalized individuals who cannot afford to pay import duties for their goods and therefore resort to illegal methods. Some do not understand the bureaucracy of customs and are willing to use the ‘easy’ methods that fit very well into their immediate scheme of operations. Given that governments are always

6 Ibid, p. 20-21. 7 B. Chalfin, ‘Border Zone Trade and the Economic Boundaries of the State in North-East Ghana’, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 71, No. 2, 2001, p. 202. 8 Ibid. 9 V. N. Muzvidziwa, ‘Women without borders: Informal Cross-border trade among women in the Southern African Development Community Region (SADC), Addis Ababa, OSSREA, 2005, p. 48. 10 Ibid. 5 putting measures to combat illicit trade, smugglers have constantly shaped their activities to defeat the long arm of the law. Their responses, and the nature of interaction between the traders and the state, is the subject under discussion in this present study.

Focusing primarily on the eastern border of Zimbabwe and Mozambique, Nedson Pophiwa’s work details the smuggling that takes place there of precious minerals like diamonds, often with the massive involvement of state officials.11 In addition to diamond smuggling, Pophipiwa argues that there has also been extensive tobacco smuggling through the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border after a stalemate in price negotiations between the state and the growers of the crop.12 Mozambique was used as a route to export the crop to lucrative tobacco markets overseas.13 During that period, the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority reported that millions of dollars worth of raw tobacco was being smuggled out of the country and sold into neighbouring countries where prices were high.14 They noted that the bulk of the crop was finding its way to Mozambique where the local currency could be fully converted on demand into United States Dollars. Fish smuggling is another lucrative industry along the Zimbabwe-Zambia border. The big players in the kapenta fishing industry are alleged to smuggle millions of tonnes of fish annually from Lake Kariba into Zambia. Whilst smuggling of clothes, minerals, fish and to a lesser extent tobacco has been studied, this paper seeks to study the smuggling of a bulky agricultural commodity, cotton at the Mukumbura borderland between Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Being a bulky commodity, it is largely difficult for farmers to smuggle cotton without the aid of border officials. Hence, the connivance between border officials and cotton smugglers need to be interrogated.

In this study, I desire to find out how and why borders are perceived by those continuously crossing them as corridors of opportunity rather than as divisions and

11 N. Pophiwa, Smuggling on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, http://www.idrc.org.sg/es/ev-158067- 201-1-DO_TOPIC.html. Accessed 8 august 2011. 12 N. Pophiwa, Smuggling on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, http://www.idrc.org.sg/es/ev-158067- 201-1-DO_TOPIC.html. Accessed 8 august 2011. 13 Ibid. 14 L. Makombe, ‘Raw Tobacco being smuggled: ZIMRA’, The Herald 22 April 2003. 6 barriers?15 Indeed as Prescott has pointed out, boundaries have a significant impact on the economy, culture and environment of the borderlands.16 This study therefore seeks to examine how the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border is both a barrier and a conduit for cross border movements of goods.

Cotton Production in Zimbabwe and Mozambique: Key Players

Cotton production in Zimbabwe started during the colonial period and the sole buyer of the crop was a parastatal, the Cotton Marketing Board up to 1995 before it was renamed Cottco as a private company. It was deregulated in 1993 and new entrants were Cotpro 1995, Cargil 1996, Tarafern 2000, Farmers World 2000 and FSI Agricom in 2001.17 Before the deregulation Cottco used to set the prices of cotton and it was the only company that provided inputs to farmers. But by 2004 most cotton buyers began giving inputs to the farmers and the greatest competitor to Cottco became Cargil and Tarafern. Increased competition as a result of the entrance of new players into this industry resulted in the increase in cotton prices. Production is mainly done by small scale farmers whose production increased from 65 000 tonnes in 1980 to 298 000tonnes in 2000 whilst planted area increased from 59000 hectares to 376000 hectares over the same period.18

In Zimbabwe, commercial farmers began to stop cotton farming in favour of more profitable alternatives such as tobacco in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Cotton Marketing Board responded in 1992 with the introduction of a credit scheme designed to assist smallholder farmers in expanding their cotton production. By the time this sector’s liberalization in 1994, smallholders accounted for 60% of production.19 Their share had

15 D. K. Flynn, “We are the Border”: Identity, Exchange and the State along the Benin-Nigeria Border’, American Ethnologist, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1997, p. 311. 16 J. R. V. Prescott, Political frontiers and boundaries, London: Allen and Unwin, 1987, 159 17 D. Dombo, ‘Analysis of factors affecting the buying of cotton in Zimbabwe: the case of Manicaland and Masvingo regions’, MBA, Africa University, 2005, p. 1.

18 The Herald 13 July 2004. 19 Ibid. 7 risen to almost 90% by the onset of the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme.20 Mozambique operates the only local monopoly system in the region and is the only country that maintains a fully-administered, pan-seasonal, and pan-territorial price where merchants get concessions to buy cotton within a particular region at a set price. The government’s role in price setting is strong in Mozambique because of a very weak state of farmer organizations in the country.21 The setting of prices by the government meant that prices were not always competitive and contributing to illegal buying and this has led for calls to reform the marketing system in Mozambique.22 Faced with persistent illegal buying which it could not control, with mounting farmer protests to be allowed to sell to whomever they wished, and with donor pressure to open the sector to increased competition, government in 2000 launched a short-lived attempt to gradually liberalize the sector. In October 2000, during the first national meeting of government and stakeholders, participants adopted an “open concession” model with a view towards eventual full liberalization. The model allowed communities within concession areas to opt out of their implicit contract with the concession company and deal with a competing company from input provision through sale of the seed cotton.23

In Zimbabwe, the onset of the economic crisis in 2001 made acquisition of foreign exchange a top priority, and cotton production appeared an attractive way of achieving this goal. In addition, the real exchange rate depreciated spectacularly during 2001/2002, but the existing cotton companies did not pass on the benefits to farmers. As a result the total number of ginners rose from 5 in 2000/1 to 17 in 2006/7. The increase in the number of ginners meant that cotton production in Zimbabwe has been competitive second only

20 N. Gergely and C. Poulton, ‘Historical Background and recent institutional evolution of African cotton sectors’, David, Tschirley, C, Poulton and P, Labaste (eds.), Organization and Performance of Cotton Sectors in Africa: Learning from reform experience, World Bank, Washington, 2009, p. 40. 21 J, Baffes, David Tschirley and Nicolas Gergely, ‘Pricing systems and prices paid to growers’, D, Tschirley, C, Poulton and P, Labaste (eds.), Organization and Performance of Cotton Sectors in Africa: Learning from reform experience, World Bank, Washington, 2009, p. 68. 22 D. Tschirley, C. Poulton, D. Boughton, The Many paths of cotton sector reform in Easter and Southern Africa: Lessons from a decade of experience, Working Paper No. 18, June 2006.

23 Ibid 8 to tobacco. This has led to a massive increase in efforts by cotton merchants to tie a lot of farmers under contracts so that they would get a captive market, and be insulated from serious competition.

The entry of new cotton companies in Zimbabwe marked the proliferation of seed of uncertain quality, little or no insecticide, and no extension advice. In the same vein, entry of these new companies was also accompanied by large increases in credit default among farmers. The defaulting farmers, especially at the border areas, provide an interesting way to look at how business is conducted. As will be shown, most farmers at the borderland have dual homes, one in Mozambique and the other in Zimbabwe, and, as a result, they just cross the border when the marketing season starts. Several companies have lost their inputs to such unscrupulous farmers who are taking advantage of the absence of controls to get loans but sell their produce to other companies. Whilst such double-playing happens in the interior, the farmers are obliged to pay back the loans or will risk losing their belongings to these companies as they can attach anything of similar value to the loan provided. In Mozambique there is the perennial problem of very inadequate input packages and no extension advice has often been used as a pretext to buy indiscriminately during the harvest.24 Cotton production in Mozambique is characterized by low levels of productivity, low prices and low returns. As a result cotton farmers in Mozambique are often no better off than their neighbors who do not grow cotton.25 Within this context, it is easy to understand their desire to ‘smuggle’ the crop to market it in Zimbabwe.

At the border area on the Mozambican side, inputs and chemical distribution is often late and this leads the majority of the farmers to approach cotton companies from Zimbabwe to fill in the void, thereby creating conditions for the eventual sale of Mozambican cotton in Zimbabwe. This is due to the fact that Du Mucumbura is further away from the centres of commerce in Mozambique, and is much more linked to activities in Zimbabwe.

24 David Tschirely, ‘input credit and extension’ David, Tschirley, Colin Poulton and Patrick Labaste (eds.), Organization and Performance of Cotton Sectors in Africa: Learning from reform experience, World Bank, Washington, 2009

25R. Pitoro et al, Prospects for BT Cotton in Mozambique, Research Report No. 5E, June 2009 http://www.aec.msu.edu/fs2/mozambique/iiam/rr_5e.pdf, Accessed, 25 August 2011. 9

Production is mainly done by small scale farmers whose output increased from 65 000 tonnes in 1980 to 298 000tonnes in 2000 and planted area increased from 59000 hectares to 376000 hectares over the same period.26 However, the general trend is that farmers have never been satisfied with the price they get from the buying companies. For example, in 2004, Cottco was offering ZW$1 800/kg when the farmers expected to get ZW$5 000/kg.27 There has always been price impasse during the beginning of each marketing season after 2000, with the farmers mostly accusing the buyers of being exploitative and hungry for profits through the input credit scheme.28 The lack of better prices has led most farmers to dishonour their contractual obligations to sell their produce to the financiers. This situation presents numerous problems for companies at the borderland as most farmers devise better ways of getting the best prices for their produce.

During research, the people who dwell in the following areas on the Zimbabwe side of the border were consulted; Gungwa, Chigango, Kapfudza, Mukumbura, Chisecha and Chimbuwe. On the Mozambican side of the border most farmers of the farmers interviewed were from Du Mecumbura. It is said that this area was formerly a FRELIMO camp during the war of liberation of Mozambique.29 In addition, most Mozambicans involved in cotton production are settled along the Mecumbura River for water supply. It also has to be noted that the population density in the Mozambican Area is relatively low compared to that of the areas on the Zimbabwean side. This has inevitably led to many farmers from the Zimbabwean side to cross over to the Mozambican side in search of fertile land.30 However, these people still maintain their homes on the Zimbabwean side due to the belief that the Zimbabwean economy is stronger than the Mozambican economy. It was also interesting to realize that most of the farmers on the Zimbabwean side do not have fields in Zimbabwe, and new farmers are clearing land on the Mozambican side.

26 The Herald 13 July 2004. 27 The Financial Gazette 3-10 June 2004 28 The Financial Gazette 15 July 2004 29 Interview with Mr. Chitima, 27 February 2011. 30 Interview with Mrs. Maworesa, 27 February 2011 10

Whilst Zimbabwe has just concluded one of the most chaotic but revolutionary land resettlement programme between 2000 and 2005, it is important to note that this has by and large excluded most small scale farmers as land moved from white farmers to ZANU PF elites.31 This has meant that most peasants are still eking out a living on poor soils. However, for cotton farmers bordering the Mukumbura border post, this has allowed them to move across the border in search of fertile soils. It is therefore not surprising that a number of farmers from Gungwa, Chigango, Kapfudza, Mukumbura, Chisecha and Chimbuwe are clearing forests on the Mozambican side so that they grow crops.32 The other incentive for these farmers is that the land on the Mozambique side of the border is virgin and therefore relatively more fertile compared to that in Zimbabwe. This means less application of artificial fertilisers.

Even though the border is unmarked, those familiar with it identify it through landscapes such as trees and rivers. The crossing point used are mainly those areas that have been cleared of mines that were planted by the Rhodesian Armed Forces trying to stop the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) forces from crossing from Mozambique into Zimbabwe.33 Most of the mines have been identified by the government and are marked with some red marks put against the mine but a number of people and their domestic animals are still being killed by those uncleared mines. As a result of fear of those mines, there are known routes which people follow when crossing into and from either country. This brings us to the role of the para-military and the border guards from either side. While people who are crossing the border to either see their relatives or to go to school or fields do that without any hassles, it is those who are moving their agricultural produce who are supposed to pay bribes in order to gain passage. Most farmers I have spoken to argued that without the help of the border guards and the cotton merchants, it would have been difficult to carryout business at the border. One farmer told me that they sell their cotton early in the morning between 03:00am and

31 For a detailed analysis of land reform in Zimbabwe see for example Moyo, S. (2000) ‘The Political economy of land acquisition and redistribution in Zimbabwe, 1990-1999’ Journal of Southern African studies, 26, 1, and Sachikonye, L. M. (2005) ‘The land is the economy: Revisiting the land question’ in African Security Review, 14, 3. These scholars argue that the land reform was chaotic so much that it ended up benefitting the leadership in ZANU-PF at the expense of the landless peasants. 32 Interview with Mr. Chimoto, a farmer from Gungwa village, 20 January 2011 33 Interview with Mr. Masawi, a farmer, 20 January 2011 11

06:00am whilst the officials will be ‘sleeping’.34 The farmers’ argument was that since they often make lots of money, the cotton merchants could be robbed but they ignore such threats to meet with the farmers very early.35 In addition, this buying happens outside the buying points designated by the Cotton Growers Association (CGA). This clearly shows that the cotton merchants, in search for an elusive target set by their managers due to competition are willing accomplices in the ‘smuggling’ of cotton between the two countries.

Until recently, there has never been conflict between the Mozambican farmers and Zimbabwean farmers over the land issue. This is explained by the fact that most of the people on the borderland are relatives. There are intermarriages between borderland communities which ties these communities together. Furthermore, because of the better standards of schools in Zimbabwe a number of Mozambicans living on the borderlands send their children to Zimbabwean schools close to the border. In addition, there has never been any language barrier as the languages spoken are almost similar. In Mozambique, they speak Sena, which is more or less similar to Kore-Kore spoken by the people from the Zimbabwean side. Whilst the people try to negotiate the border restrictions of the heavily armed policemen and the Mozambican Borderfrontera Guards, their main stumbling block are the landmines that that were set up by the protagonists during the struggle for independence in both Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Most victims of the landmines are however those who are seeking to clear new lands for cotton production. There are however no statistics of smugglers being killed by land mines. This is mainly due to the fact that these farmers have their own ‘entry points’ they use to enter the country to sell their commodities.

The period between 2005 and 2009 saw farmers on the Zimbabwean side opting to sell their cotton to Mozambican merchants, albeit at a small scale. This was caused by the monumental collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar and the hyper-inflation that obtained during that time. Zimbabwean farmers would opt to get cash in the Mozambican currency as it

34 Interview with Mr. Piano, a Mozambican farmer, 19 July 2011. 35 Interview with Mr. Mamombe, a farmer, 19 July 2011. 12 was stronger than the Zimbabwean currency. It was the desire to get foreign currency that pushed these people to sell their crop in Mozambique. However, in doing this they were infringing on their contractual obligations since they obtained inputs from Zimbabwean companies in return for the crop. It is important, however, to note that the selling of Zimbabwean cotton in Mozambique was not as pronounced as the selling of Mozambican cotton in Zimbabwe as will be shown later.

The period after 2009 saw a reversal fortunes as Zimbabwe officially adopted the United States Dollar as its currency following the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar. This saw an increase in the number of cotton growers as well as the growth in the Zimbabwean market for cotton produced in Mozambique. The same period also witnessed an increase in the number of Zimbabweans crossing the border to clear new lands for crop production. Therefore, land has been the chief motivator for the farmers to cross over as they believe that land is plentiful in Mozambique. Indeed the villages of Mukumbura and Mucumbura have close day-to-day ties with their equivalents on the other side of the boundary. There are other factors that motivate the crossing of the border like marriages, the search for basic commodities and even markets for perishables like tomatoes and vegetables. Martinez has argued that "the determining influence of the border makes the lives of border peoples functionally similar irrespective of location, nationality, ethnicity, culture, and language. In other words, all borderlanders share the border experience"36 Although it is true that borders everywhere present people with similar structural constraints and processes, including international delimitations, cross-border trade, migration, and border conflict, people do not deal with these constraints and processes in the same way everywhere.

The lure of the US Dollar? Cotton ‘smuggling’ along the Border

In this section I discuss the marketing of cotton along the borderland areas of the two countries. I discuss how the farmers/entrepreneurs have negotiated through the challenges

36 O. J. Martinez, ‘Border People’: Life and Society in the US.-Mexico Borderlands, Tuscon, University of Arizona Press, 1994, p. xviii. 13 they face in order to make a living out of the opportunities presented by the border. The argument that I will thus proffer is that far from being a barrier, the Mukumbura border has afforded its inhabitants a better livelihood than people from far away from the border. Even though there are risks involved, people have by and large devised ways of circumventing them in order to make the most out of the opportunities provided by the border. I also discuss the complicit of the various cotton players in this fast flourishing business of cotton ‘smuggling’ as they seek to meet their targets in order to remain competitive. The role of the governments will be discussed, albeit in passing as it was difficult to get their voice on the trade.

With the liberalization of the cotton sector in Zimbabwe, a number of companies have entered into the fray, trying to both finance and buy the cotton. More than ten companies are at present buying cotton in Mashonaland Central province, where the Mukumbura Border is. Recently, companies in Mozambique have been claiming that Zimbabwean companies are not observing the border as they buy their cotton from Mozambican farmers. This ‘border dispute’ was reported to government officials; the Governor of Mashonaland Central (where Mukumbura fall) and Mozambican Ambassador to Zimbabwe. This however was not the first time that such disputes were reported. In 1997, Zimbabwean officials denied allegations of a border dispute with Mozambique in the Eastern Highlands.37 The denials followed reports by the Maputo Daily Noticias that Zimbabwean farmers were altering border markers and pushing their lands deeper into Mozambique in an attempt to extend their farms for the production of tea and coffee on Mozambican soil.38 This earlier dispute has some similarities with the current situation obtaining in Mukumbura except that the dispute has been blown out of proportion by the merchants who are losing out in the buying of cotton. Unlike the Eastern Highlands ‘border’ dispute that pitted farmers on both sides, this recent dispute pitted merchants against merchants.

37 http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-18084222.html. visited 9 august 2011. 38 Ibid 14

The border issue was that the Mozambican cotton buyers were trying to stop the Mozambican farmers from delivering their cotton to Zimbabwean companies by using the politicians citing that they are getting into Mozambique illegally and taking the resources to Zimbabwe. However, according to Zimbabwean merchants, the issue of a border dispute was only an alibi and a smokescreen by the Mozambican companies who could not compete favourably with Zimbabwean companies. Their argument was that the cotton price in Mozambican currency is equivalent to US$0.50c39 while in Zimbabwe it was US$0.85c per kilogram of cotton.40 Thus, the issue was largely about the viability of cotton production by the farmers, and the Mozambican merchants’s struggle to be competitive. Hence, Mozambican merchants’ failure to offer competitive prices for cotton has resulted in them losing cotton to Zimbabwean merchants. The issue of currency also feature prominently in their marketing decisions. Ever since Zimbabwe began using the US dollar, many Mozambican farmers have been flocking to Zimbabwe. This has resonance with arguments that differences in national economic policies, regional resources, and monetary currencies make borders lucrative zones of exchange and trade, often illicit and clandestine.41 The market forces then forces these entrepreneurs to find the best market for their produce. Another angle to explore the border dispute between Mozambican and Zimbabwean cotton merchants is to look at it through the modus operandi of one Mozambican company. It is said a Zimbabwean called Mr. Chipisa working for Mozambican Cotton Company has been on the forefront of trying to stop these cross border cotton sales because he was failing to achieve his cotton volume target to justify the setting up of operations on the Mozambican side as all his anticipated volume was going to Zimbabwe.42 As noted by Baud and Schendel, members of local society at borderlands will try to use state institutions to their own ends and sometimes played off one state against another.43 Besides, Mozambican farmers believe that the Mozambican companies’ service delivery is very poor in that the inputs

39 For 2011season, a kilogram of cotton was being sold for 15 meticais (US$0.50) which was considered to be the highest in two decades. This price was agreed upon by the National Forum of Cotton Producers and the Cotton Association of Mozambique, representing the buyers and producers respectively. 40 Interview with Collen Mubaiwa, Transit Depot Manager for Cottco Mukumbura, 22 July 2011. 41 D. Flynn, “We are the border”, p. 42 Interview with Mr. Mubaiwa, Cottco, 10 June 2011 43 M, Baud and W, Van Schendel, ‘Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands’, Journal of World History, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1997, p. 215. 15 are distributed late well after the rains have started and chemicals always arrive to farmers when their crops have been damaged by pests forcing them to borrow from their relatives and friends on the Zimbabwe side.44

At a meeting to discuss the border dispute between cotton merchants, government officials felt that there was no border issue at all, but noticed that it was one company that was failing to secure cotton because it offered poor prices compared to its competitors. They however didn’t discuss this phenomenon of ‘international trade’ in cotton between the two countries. For the Mozambique ambassador, he was said to have been happy that his people were taking advantage of the opportunity to make extra cash for themselves by selling to the highest bidder, whilst the Governor of Mashonaland Central was happy that Zimbabwean companies were offering competitive prices for cotton. One farmer remarked at the meeting

I am not a dull farmer, I know who gives me the best price for my crop and if it means crossing the border to sell, let it be so. After all we have been crossing the border for ages, why is it a problem today? Because we are making money out of our cotton? We will continue selling our cotton to the one who appreciates our labour!45

There are other factors that prompt Mozambican farmers to sell their produce to Zimbabwe companies such as Olam, Grafax and Cottco. As highlighted earlier, the merchants in Zimbabwe offer their farmers an inputs regime that allows the farmers to grow more cotton unlike the Mozambican merchants. Cottco and Olam are the two Zimbabwean companies that are on the fore-front in providing their farmers with input support. As a result, Mozambican companies will be at a disadvantage when it comes to buying as contractual obligations mean that a farmer has to sell to a financier to offset credit provided. Indeed some farmers in Mecumbura area are registered in the Cottco’s Grower database and access planting seed, fertilizers and chemicals like Zimbabwean

44 Interview with Mr. X, Mozambican farmer, 20 July 2011 45 Interview with Mr. Chamunorwa, Mozambican farmer, 10 February 2011. 16 farmers. Collen Mubayiwa the Transit Depot Manager for Cottco Mukumbura showed me about five farmers who are from Mozambique, but are registered as Cottco farmers. These are the farmers; N. Manuel, P.O.MAPININGA, T.ALVELINO, F.TAITOSSE; and J.PIANO.46 These are by no means the only farmers who opt to get inputs from Zimbabwe so as to market their produce to the lucrative Zimbabwe market. However, to some, this market since it is done across borders has been termed illegal. The provision of inputs to these farmers however does not guarantee the cotton merchants of the white gold as cotton is known within this region. There are instances when the farmers get inputs from merchant A but end up selling their produce to merchant B. This happens mostly when a company that would not have financed the farmers compete with the ones that would have financed the crop. Such companies usually will be offering more money compared to other companies and this leads to a phenomenon called side marketing, which has almost culminated into price wars.

The cotton companies involved are so quick to absolve themselves of any wrong doing in the trade. As pointed out, they will be seeking to meet their set targets for each growing year and they will buy even the cotton they did not finance. One merchant talking about the so-called smuggling saw nothing wrong with it. He argued;

As a buyer, my first instinct is to buy any cotton that comes my way. To me it’s not smuggling at all because what I want is to meet my targets, and after all it is these farmers who approached my company for seed and chemical inputs. Why didn’t people stop them from getting loans because they are from Mozambique? Besides, Mozambican cotton is of high grade, it will fetch us a lot of money.47

The recent conflict over the way Mozambican farmers are dealing with Zimbabwean merchants has brought to the fore the weaknesses associated with the use of the term smuggling to characterize this trade. For the borderland inhabitants, the term smuggling has therefore been seen as inappropriate because it is a legitimate response to the failure

46 Interview with Mr. Mubaiwa, 15 June 2011. 47 Interview with Mr. Madesera, 15 June 2011. 17 of the state to meet people’s basic needs. As one commentator asserts, “although border residents are fully aware that according to state laws it is illegal for them to sneak goods around the customs post, they do not regard it as morally wrong for them to do so.”48 This means that border residents believe that they have a right to move freely, and that guards are wrong to ask for bribes from them in the name of the state, for personal gain. The vocabulary for this kind of economic activity shows the acceptance, by the people, of smuggling as an important source of livelihood and wealth.49 While the state is deprived of revenue from duty and taxes, this is often the only meaningful economic enterprise that marginalised border residents can undertake.

In situations where side marketing of cotton is rife, most farmers would dump their traditional financiers for the new buyers and this phenomenon is rife at the border communities. What the farmers would do is that they would smuggle their cotton across the border at night and task their friends and relatives across the border to sell their cotton to the highest bidder regardless of whether they financed or not. In some situations, the farmers would just abandon their homes early in the morning and return in the evenings leaving their wives at home to deal with the financiers and most companies complain that they would be told that ‘baba havapo handinga kutengeserei donje ndongovawo mukadzi’ (the father is not around I can’t sell you the cotton because I wasn’t given that instruction).50 Most border farmers have perfected the art of getting financed, and then dump the financiers opting to pay cash for the inputs later in the year. Whether it is criminal or not is another issue to them; the most daring wouldn’t just pay while others will re-imburse the inputs given to them.

Most of these farmers have started many social networks within Zimbabwe and in Mozambique for their own benefits. For example, it is much cheaper and takes less time

48 D. Flynn, “‘We are the Border:’ Identity, Exchange and the State along the Benin-Nigeria Border” American Ethnologist 24(2) (1997), p. 324. 49 Ibid. 50 Most cotton merchants are told these words mostly by women and also by children when they visit the farmers they would have financed. There are instances where women have been beaten up or divorced by their husbands for selling the cotton without the instruction of their husbands. 18 for the Mozambican farmers to travel to Harare to buy groceries and other necessities compared to travelling within Mozambique. One farmer argued;

It is easy for me to sell my cotton in Zimbabwe, and then proceed to Harare in one day to buy my children food and clothes. If I were to sell to these companies in my country [Mozambique], I will get less money and will struggle to go Tete or Beira or Maputo to buy goods. I will spend four days travelling! Does that make sense? So it makes a lot economic sense for me to sell my cotton in Zimbabwe and buy my goods from there.51

It also has to be remembered that most of these farmers send their children to Zimbabwean schools to learn English. As a result, most people from Mozambique who live along the border can write English better than they write Portuguese. Therefore, for most Mozambican farmers, their economic life may be rooted in their land, but most of their social activities are in Zimbabwe and as such they seek money that they will be able to use in Zimbabwe.

51 Interview with Mr. Madesera, a Mozambican farmer, 30 July 2011. 19

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to show the entrepreneurial activities carried out by Zimbabwean and Mozambican farmers along the Mukumbura/Mucumbura border post. Most of these farmers are small scale producers who produce cotton primarily under the input credit scheme financed mostly by Zimbabwean companies. The unwritten agreement of this set up means that the farmers are supposed to sell their cotton to their respective financiers. This study has shown that there is no loyalty as far as marketing is concerned as the farmers seek to get the best prices for their crops. For Mozambican farmers, the lack of inputs from financiers on their side and the lack of competitive prices perpetually draw them to market their produce in Zimbabwe. Of course there are factors compel them to market in Zimbabwe like the distance to the towns for buying basic commodities, the lure of the United States Dollar, and more importantly the availability of financiers who also pay better prices compared to Mozambican merchants. All these factors put together means that Mozambican companies are at the losing end in the competition for cotton, thus the farmers are obliged to jump the border and smuggle their cotton.

The border, therefore has presented numerous financial opportunities for the borderland communities. Even though there are risks associated with smuggling cotton like the numerous landmines planted during the colonial period, the farmers still look forward to each next marketing season as they anticipate more opportunities to make money. As a result of this trade, many have managed to build proper houses, whilst others are sending their children to better schools in Zimbabwe. The threat by Mozambican firms to report the smuggling to the authorities was seen by most farmers as a threat to their source of income. It is therefore evident, from the foregoing analysis, that farmers at the border are real entrepreneurs who have taken advantage of the affordances of the border to eke out a living, and in some instances to make profits.

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