September 1991 l%IDJ Volume 60 Law Enforcement Bulletin Number 9 Features Focus on Foreign Counterintelligence 5 Corruption: A Continuing Counterintelligence Challenges Challenge for Law Enforcement 1 in a Changing World By Otis E. Cooksey By William S. Sessions 22 The Kentucky State Police 10 Foreign Counterintelligence: Drug Testing Policy An FBI Priority By W. Michael Troop and Jerry Lovitt By James E. Tomlinson 28 Custodial Interrogation Espionage Awareness Programs By Kimberly A. Crawford 17 By Freddie L. Capps, Jr. Departments 9 Bulletin Reports 20 Point of View By David A. King 14 Police Practices By D.R. Staton and 26 Book Reviews Larry Edwards United States Department of Justice Editor-5tephen D. Gladis, D.A.Ed. Federal Bureau of Investigation Managing Editor-Kathryn E. Sulewski WaShington, DC 20535 Art Director-John E. Ott AssistantEditors-Alice S. Cole William S. Sessions, Director Karen F. McCarron Production Manager-Andrew DiRosa Contributors' opinions and statements StaffAsslstanf-Carolyn F. Thompson should not be considered as an endorsementfor any policy, program, or The FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin service by the FBI. (ISSN-0014-5688) is published monthly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 10th and The Attorney General has determined that Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W ., Washington, the publication of this periodical is necessary D.C. 20535. Second-Class postage paid at The Cover: This issue focuses on a unified in the transaction of the public business Washington, D.C., and additional mailing approach to foreign counterintelligence, required by law of the Department of Justice. offices. Postmaster: Send address changes highlighting the importance of Federal, State, Use of funds for printing this periodical has to FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin, Federal and local cooperation in confronting new FCI been approved by the Director of the Office Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C. challenges. of Management and Budget. 20535 ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310 n recent years, the world witnessed some truly fore, the need for an active, aggres ive counterintel­ amazing events- the fall of the Berlin Wall and ligence response has abated. Unfortunately, this is far I the reunification ofEast and West Germany, the from true. beginnings of democratic governments aero s Ea t­ There can be no doubt that important changes ern Europe, and the easing of political tensions be­ are taking place in the world today. However, im­ tween the United States and the Soviet Union. As a proved diplomatic relations do not necessarily de­ result, the current perception of most Americans is crease the foreign intelligence threat to U.S. national that foreign intelligence activity directed against the security. The truth remains: That threat still exists, as United States and the West is decrea ing, and there­ it did in the past and as it will in the future. Third, pro ecuting spies was A heightened found to be an effective tool to deter­ " awareness by all mi ne the ex ten t ofthe damage caused to national securi ty. U nfortunatel y, Americans is the most some of the espionage cases of the effective weapon 1980s resulted in grave damage to available to... meet the U.S. national security interests. But, counterintelligence without the prosecutions that fol­ challenges of today lowed, an accurate accounting of and those of the years what was lost would not have been possible, and appropriate steps to to come. min imize the damage wou Id not ha ve been taken. Fortunately, in 45 per­ FBI Director Sessions cent of the espionage case during " the 1980s, the work the U.S. counter­ intelligence community uncovered either prevented the e pionage ac­ Decade of the 1980s ]n addition to the importance tivity or significantly limited the The last decade ofthe cold war, ofpublic awareness, the 1980s taught damages. us several other important les ons. the 1980 , was designated by the The Changing World media as "The Decade of the Spy." First, the American public received It was a time when Americans knew a rude awakening regarding the vul­ [n the 1990s, with theeasingof who theirenemies were-atime when nerability of the U.S. national secu­ ten ion between superpowers and President Ronald Reagan referred to rity community from spies within its military blocs, it is no longer pos­ the Soviet Union as "The Evil own ranks. For example, both John sible to identify the U.S. counterin­ Empire." The American public Walker and Jerry Whitworth served telligence mission in term of these showed strong support of counterin­ in the U.S. avy; Karel Koecher, relation hip alone-the world has telligence efforts and participated in Larry Chin, and Edward Howard all become much too complex for that. the process by reporting uspicious worked for the Central Intelligence America ha ' negotiated hi toric arms events. Agency (CIA); Ronald Pelton was a reduction treaties with the Soviets. During the 1980 , more than National Security Agency employee; The Soviets have introduced their 45 people were arrested for e pio­ Richard Miller wa an FBI Special programs of Glasnost, opennes. to nage. Increased human and techni­ Agent. the We t, and Perestroika, internal cal resources, enhanced analytical Second, many of the dangers economic and political restructur­ and training programs, and improved were posed by volunteers. That is, ing. And, the world has witnessed coordination within the U.S. intelli­ many of those arrested during the the nations of Eastern Europe revolt gence community and with friendly 1980s, including Walker, simply against their former Communist foreign intelligence services contrib­ offered to spy on their country. And leaders in favor of new freedom and uted significantly to these arre t . they offered to py not because they economic diver ity, and in some However, much of the success in had ideological difference with the ca es, more democratic forms of counterintelligence efforts came as a U.S. Governmentor ideological ym­ government. result of a heightened public aware­ pathy with a foreign government, as Whi Ie all Americans can agree ness of the full damage caused by was the case during World War II that the world has changed, and most espionage, as well as the public' and the fir t decade ofthe Cold War. see that change as positive in terms support of the measures designed to They spied for the basest of rea­ of an enhanced prospect for world protect America' vital information. on -money. peace, the public tends to view this L new world order to be devoid of would require numerous verifica­ of Glasnost. This, in turn, may have danger. So, the logic goes, that if tion sites, again expanding Soviet far-reaching implications involving there i no longer a threat to U.S. access. the Soviet military and its intelli­ national security, then counterintel­ But, the Soviets are interested gence services, U.S. national secu­ ligence measures are not needed. in more than American military rity, and the emerging "new world But, the reality is that arm secrets. The Soviet economy is in order." reduction treaties between the United desperate shape and can be revi­ All in all, while the nature of State and the Soviet Union give talized with Western technology, the Soviet intelligence threat may be Soviet "inspectors" potential access capital, and experti e. Tn order to changing, its objectives and actions to some of this country's most sensi­ strengthen that economy, the chair­ are not. The Soviet intelligence serv­ tive projects. Glasnost has dramati­ man of the KGB has publicly stated ices are more active now than they cally expanded the number of ex­ that it plans to a sist Soviet busi­ have been at any time in the past 10 changes between the United States nesses because, as he says, "They years, and there is every reason to and the Soviet Union in such areas a are not good businessmen." The So­ believe that they will continue their business, science, and education. In viets have systematically expanded pursuit of Western intelligence dur­ fact, since Glasnost, the number of their intelligence collection beyond ing the 1990s. Soviets traveling to the United States military intelligence targets and now The threat ofEastern European increased almost400 percent; in 1990 routinely include Western economic countries to the United States cannot alone, more than 100,000 Soviets information and technologie . be fully as essed because they them­ visited the United States. Past expe­ Since the Soviets can no longer elves have not yet fully defined the rience shows that these exchange rely on their former surrogate intel­ nature and scope oftheir intell igence groups often contain intelligence ligence services in the Eastern Bloc services. Some of these countries officers. Furthermore, the countries to coll ect intelligence for them, they are no longer collecting intelligence of Eastern Europe, while attempting must find other sources of intelli­ on behalf of the Soviet Union; to move away from the Sovietsphere gence and develop new surrogate however, they will, in all likelihood, of influence, are now fighting for their own economic survival-and they, too, have a need for Western technology. .improved diplomatic relations do not Current Intelligence Threats "necessarily decrease the foreign intelligence AnTIS control treaties between threat to U.S. national security. the Soviet Union and the United States will hopefully lead to a dimin­ ished threat level between the na­ tions. However, from acounterintel­ ligence perspective, these treaties services. The Soviets have started refocus their collection activities in will give the Soviet intelligence using the intelligence services of the United States to fulfill their" own services routine access to sensitive other countries to obtain Stealth tech­ requirements. Since, as with the area and to knowledgeable Ameri­ nology and acquire restricted com­ Soviets, the current major focus of cans who are linked to classified puter technologies for them elves.