Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070

Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence An International History

Carl Peter Watts

pal-watts-book.indb iii 10/29/12 9:48 AM Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070

RHODESIA’S UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE Copyright © Carl Peter Watts, 2012.

All rights reserved.

First published in December 2012 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States— a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

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ISBN: 978- 1- 4039- 7907- 0

Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data

Watts, Carl Peter, 1971– Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence : an international history / Carl Peter Watts. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-1-4039-7907-0 (alk. paper) 1. —History—1965-1980. 2. Zimbabwe—Politics and government—1965–1979. 3. Zimbabwe—Foreign relations—Great Britain. 4. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Zimbabwe. 5. Great Britain—Politics and government—1964–1979. 6. Great Britain—Foreign relations— Commonwealth countries. 7. Commonwealth countries—Foreign relations— Great Britain. 8. Great Britain—Foreign economic relations—United States. 9. United States—Foreign relations—Great Britain. I. Title.

DT2981.W38 2012 968.9104—dc23 2012040839

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Scribe Inc.

First edition: December 2012

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Contents

Acknowledgments ix Introduction: The Rhodesian Crisis in International History and International Relations 1 1 “Cudgelling Themselves Numb”: Anglo- Rhodesian Negotiations and the Search for a Settlement 13 2 “A Classic Strategic Blunder”: The Failure of British Deterrent and Coercive Strategies 53 3 “Moments of Tension and Drama”: Britain, Rhodesia, and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings 83 4 “A Concert of Convenience”: Britain, Rhodesia, and the Old Commonwealth 115 5 “An Essential Part of Our Cooperation in World Affairs”: Anglo- American Relations and Rhodesia 155 6 Preventing a “Red Army in Blue Berets”? The Rhodesian Problem at the United Nations 183 Conclusion: Reflections on the Rhodesian Crisis 203 Appendix: The Rhodesian Franchise 209 Notes 211 Bibliography 285 Index 303

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Introduction

The Rhodesian Crisis in International History and International Relations

On , 1965, the Rhodesian prime minister, Ian Douglas Smith, broadcast a proclamation to the people of Rhodesia that was modeled on the American Declaration of Independence. The proclamation observed that it was an “indisputable and historic fact” that Rhodesia had enjoyed self- government since 1923, claimed that the people of Rhodesia supported their government’s request for independence, and lamented that the British gov- ernment persisted in “maintaining an unwarrantable jurisdiction . . . to the detriment of the future peace, prosperity, and good government of Rho- desia.” The proclamation declared the Rhodesian government’s belief that “procrastination and delay strike at and injure the very life of the nation,” and that it was “essential that Rhodesia should obtain without delay sov- ereign independence, the justice of which is beyond question.” Finally, the proclamation affirmed the “unswerving loyalty” of the Rhodesian people to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, and asserted their “undoubted right . . . to promote the common good so that the dignity and freedom of all men may be assured.” Annexed to the proclamation was a new constitution that uni- laterally severed British responsibility for Rhodesia’s affairs. Smith went on to reiterate the justice of the Rhodesian cause and told the Rhodesian people that they had been cast in a heroic role of “worldwide significance.” He con- cluded, “We have struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilization, and Christianity—and in the spirit of this belief we have thus assumed our sovereign independence.”1 As Smith delivered his broadcast, the governor of Rhodesia, Sir , issued a statement to the press in which he announced that in accordance with his instructions from London he had dis- missed Smith and his Cabinet from office: “I call on citizens of Rhodesia to refrain from all acts which would further the objectives of the illegal authori- ties. Subject to that it is the duty of all citizens to maintain law and order in this country and to carry on with their normal tasks. This applies equally to the judiciary, the armed services, the police and public services.”2 However,

pal-watts-book.indb 1 10/29/12 9:48 AM 2 Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 the dismissal of the Rhodesian government was not reported to the Rhode- sian public because of strict press censorship. The situation in Rhodesia remained calm, but the Rhodesian government had taken steps to ensure that this would be the case. On November 3, Smith asked Gibbs to sign a proclamation introducing a state of emergency, which was supported by an affidavit from the commissioner of police. Smith assured Gibbs that this was not a prelude to a (Unilateral Declaration of Indepen- dence) UDI and the governor was therefore persuaded to sign the procla- mation, which was issued two days later.3 With the domestic situation under control, the Rhodesian government hoped that the international controversy over the UDI would last only a matter of days. Smith recognized that UDI would infuriate “starry- eyed liberals and the frustrated communists,” but he placed his faith “in the theory that sudden storms are short.”4 This was a sad delusion; the storm would be anything but short. The situation in Rhodesia was inescapably part of what W. E. B. Du Bois had famously predicted would become “[t]he problem of the twentieth century . . . the problem of the color line.”5 The international indignation aroused by UDI—among the African nationalists in Rhodesia, within the Organization of African Unity, among the members of the Commonwealth, and at the United Nations—combined with the intrusion of the into African politics meant that the Rho- desian situation remained a festering sore on the international body politic for the next 15 years. A combination of economic sanctions, guerilla war- fare, and changing political attitudes toward Rhodesia in the United States and South eventually undermined the capacity of the white minority regime to further resist the transition to black majority rule. As the respon- sible colonial power, Britain was embarrassingly impotent throughout the UDI period, and was not able to grant legal independence to the state of Zimbabwe until April 1980. This book seeks to examine why Britain, in con- junction with its international partners, was unable to manage the issue of Rhodesian independence more effectively and prevent a UDI from occur- ring, or to bring a swift end to the crisis as it unfolded.

The Rhodesian Crisis: Historiography and Sources

During the 1960s, the disintegration of the Central African Federation and the concomitant problems of granting independence to attracted a significant amount of coverage in the British media and a high degree of interest among academics. The level of scrutiny inten- sified in the wake of Rhodesia’s UDI. Many books were published that examined the events leading up to UDI and subsequent efforts to bring Rhodesia back to legality through diplomatic negotiations and economic sanctions. With the escalation of the armed confrontation between Afri- can nationalists and the UDI regime, a number of books also appeared about the guerilla war. After Rhodesia eventually became legally indepen- dent as Zimbabwe in 1980, a couple of studies of the

pal-watts-book.indb 2 10/29/12 9:48 AM Introduction 3 Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 negotiations emerged and a few other books on Rhodesia’s independence were published, then interest generally subsided for almost twenty years.6 However, during the last decade or so, a combination of media attention, fresh archival material, new oral histories, ongoing archival cataloguing and digitization projects, periodic academic conferences, and a flurry of publications, has revealed a resurgent interest in the Rhodesian crisis and the recent history of southern Africa. Media reports about ’s activities a few years before his death, and accounts of the troubled rule of in present day Zimbabwe, have contributed to a renewed focus on the country’s history and contem- porary politics.7 In a debate at the in October 2000, Smith refused to apologize for atrocities committed while he held office. He said he had no regrets about the estimated 30,000 Zimbabweans killed during the period of rule. On the contrary, Smith suggested, “The more we killed, the happier we were. We were fighting terrorists.”8 Professor , then shadow Home Affairs Minister for the Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, was astounded that Smith “could actu- ally today stand up and feel no remorse, no contrition, find nothing wrong in the system he defended.”9 When Smith died in November 2007, some commentators noted that many people who remembered the Rhodesian cri- sis would remain sympathetic to Smith because he had been correct in his prediction that the Mugabe regime would become just as dystopian as so many other African states. However, such assessments neglected the fact that Smith’s ruthless defense of UDI left a legacy of bitterness that ultimately made Mugabe’s rule possible.10 One writer even asserted that “those black Zimbabweans who lived through the Smith years would still prefer Mugabe, despite the current brutalities inflicted upon them.”11 This is a bold and con- troversial claim, but it does serve to underscore the continuing significance of the UDI period for Zimbabweans.12 Research on the Rhodesian crisis has been assisted by the vast numbers of public and private records that have been released during the last 15 years in Britain, Zimbabwe, South Africa, the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.13 These records have been supplemented by several oral history projects that have captured the story of Rhodesia’s painful journey toward independence in the words of the people who lived through it. In 1999, David Dimbleby presented a BBC documentary series titled Rebel- lion!, which featured interviews with many of the surviving protagonists.14 In September 2000, the Institute for Contemporary British History (ICBH) organized a Witness Seminar on UDI, held at The National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom.15 This was followed by a further Witness Seminar on the Lancaster House settlement organized by the ICBH and the Cold War Stud- ies Centre at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), which was again held at The National Archives, in July 2005.16 Archival cataloguing and digitization projects have also facilitated the study of UDI. For example, the Rhodesian Army Archive is a major research collection deposited at the and Commonwealth Museum in

pal-watts-book.indb 3 10/29/12 9:48 AM 4 Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 London.17 Cataloging of that collection has facilitated an oral history project about the Rhodesian security forces who served during the guerilla war of the 1960s and 1970s.18 Other highly significant developments include the Aluka Project’s Struggles for Freedom in Southern Africa Collection, and the Nordic Africa Institute’s Documentation Project on the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa, which have greatly assisted scholars examining the UDI period from the perspective of African nationalists.19 The availability of this abundant and rich material has generated a great upsurge in scholarship, which was evident in two academic conferences that marked the fortieth anniversary of UDI in November 2005. In Septem- ber 2005, the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humani- ties, Cambridge, organized a conference titled “UDI Forty Years On: Liberation, Confrontation and Cooperation,” which was opened by Ken- neth Kaunda, former president of Zambia (1964– 91).20 In January 2006, a similar conference was held in the Cold War Studies Centre at the LSE, which was opened by Lord Owen, who was involved in the Rhodesian crisis as Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for the Navy (1968– 70), and later as (1977–79). 21 Those conference proceedings generated an edited collection of essays on southern Africa in the Cold War that was wide- ranging in its chronological and geographical scope but did not deal comprehensively with UDI.22 The last decade has seen significant research output on the Rhodesian cri- sis, with the completion of several doctoral theses and an increasing number of specialist journal articles on various aspects of UDI.23 Many useful books have also been published, although none purport to be an international his- tory of UDI. Scholars of British policymaking have been well served by the British Documents on the End of Empire Project, which has made available a wide selection of documents on the Rhodesian crisis.24 There have been several recent studies of ’s government that deal in whole or in part with international policy, including Rhodesia, and these books have made an important contribution to the debate on Labour’s performance in office during the period 1964– 70.25 In terms of autobiography and biog- raphy, historians of Rhodesia during the UDI period have had the benefit of Ian Smith’s vituperative memoirs,26 and Alan Megahey’s study of the “beleaguered” governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs.27 No books have been written recently on the Commonwealth and the United Nations aspects of the Rhodesian crisis, but there have been some excel- lent studies of the United States’ involvement.28 Richard Wood has fur- nished the scholarly community with what is undoubtedly the lengthiest account of Rhodesia’s attempts to obtain independence, which is based on the papers of Ian Smith as well as British public records.29 However, Wood’s chronological narrative is heavy on detail and does not effectively separate the various international strands of the Rhodesian crisis. A key task of this book is therefore to provide a clearly structured international history of the period leading up to UDI.

pal-watts-book.indb 4 10/29/12 9:48 AM Introduction 5 Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 Arguments and Scope of the Book

Historians have tended to view UDI as the inevitable outcome of an intrac- table political problem. Robert Holland, for example, has commented that “Anglo- Rhodesian talks were really concerned with the cultivation of images for media presentation, since the two sides were too far apart for a real agree- ment to be practicable.”30 This view is supported to some extent by the fact that a feeling of inevitability pervades the documentary record for many months before Rhodesia actually declared its independence.31 More recent oral history records have also tended to confirm the contemporary impres- sion that a UDI could not be avoided, and that it was really a question of when, rather than if, it would occur.32 It is a common observation that histo- rians can become captives of their documentary evidence, which often leads them “to conclude that what was done was the only thing that could have been done.”33 It is a central contention of this book, however, that although the problem of Rhodesian independence was highly complex, a UDI was by no means inevitable. The documentary record does suggest that there were courses of action that were dismissed or remained underexplored—not only in Britain but also in the Commonwealth and the United States— which could have been pursued further and may have prevented a UDI. This book will also demonstrate that there were structural weaknesses in the machinery of government of each of the major actors, particularly in Britain. This made the management of the Rhodesian crisis more difficult, contributed to the likelihood of a UDI, and exacerbated tension in relations between Britain and its international partners. Chapter 1 explains briefly the collapse of the Federation of Rhodesia and — also known as the Central African Federation (CAF)— and the emergence of the Rhodesian independence problem. However, the main purpose of the chapter is to survey the negotiations between the British and Rhodesian governments in the year preceding UDI. The chapter observes the dominant role that Harold Wilson played in the shaping of British policy and in the conduct of negotiations, but suggests that the focus of the negoti- ations was misplaced. Although British ministers and officials did remarkably well to keep the Rhodesians talking for so long, they expended an enormous amount of effort trying to reach agreement on constitutional arrangements that were acceptable to the British government, the Rhodesian government, the African nationalists in Rhodesia, and the wider international community. It would have been more realistic to try to maintain the status quo for a few years, during which time the transition to African majority rule could have been planned. Such an arrangement might have been acceptable if the British government had been prepared to offer a massive program of aid and techni- cal assistance, which would have engaged the Rhodesian government’s key concern about economic uncertainty, and facilitated the education and train- ing of Africans for future majority rule. Literature on negotiation theory is used in this chapter to analyze and evaluate the conduct of Anglo- Rhodesian negotiations.

pal-watts-book.indb 5 10/29/12 9:48 AM 6 Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 Chapter 2 uses correspondence from former members of the Rhodesian security services, recent oral testimony from British politicians and civil ser- vants, and documentary evidence from archives around the world to reexam- ine the viability of British military intervention in Rhodesia during 1964 and 1965. The chapter argues that the military and political obstacles to the use of force cited at the time and since have been grossly exaggerated. This chap- ter demonstrates that with sufficient resolve, the British government could have used force to prevent or end UDI. This would have offered an effective solution to one of the most protracted and embarrassing international prob- lems that confronted successive British governments during disengagement from Empire. The chapter situates the arguments on the use of force in rela- tion to theoretical analyses of deterrence and coercive diplomacy. The British government’s decision to abjure the use of force exposed it to profound criticism within the Commonwealth. Wilson and the right wing of the Labour Party had hoped that the Commonwealth would continue to serve as a vehicle for British economic and strategic interests, but these hopes foundered on the sharp rocks of the Rhodesian problem, which threatened to tear the Commonwealth apart. Chapter 3 examines why, despite wide- spread fears that it would not survive, the Commonwealth did not disinte- grate during the Prime Ministers’ Meetings held between 1964 and 1966. The chapter argues that a combination of British diplomatic dexterity, sup- port from the Old Commonwealth, and political divisions among the African Commonwealth states in particular allowed the Commonwealth to survive relatively unscathed. Chapter 3 also discusses the founding of the Common- wealth Secretariat, whose immediate origins are to be found in the context of the 1964 and 1965 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting. The chapter shows that the Rhodesian crisis quickly exposed tension between radical and conservative views about the proper functions of the Secretariat, but it also acknowledges the long- term implications of the Secretariat for the organiza- tional character of the Commonwealth. Chapter 4 extends the discussion of the Commonwealth dimension. It demonstrates that Canada developed a particularly proactive approach toward the Rhodesian problem but Britain, Australia, and New Zealand gave only limited encouragement to Canadian initiatives. This chapter also explains how the conventions of Commonwealth diplomatic representation made the problem more difficult to manage. By the mid-1960s the arrangements for intra- Commonwealth representation between its sovereign member states were well established. The exclusion of Rhodesia from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference ruled out the possibility of multilateral diplo- matic engagement. Opportunities to influence the Rhodesian government were therefore restricted to bilateral exchanges, but the mechanisms for such diplomatic representation, though technically correct, were limited and inad- equate. This chapter uses representation theory to confirm the necessity for sufficient bilateral exchanges between sovereign states and other international actors but demonstrates that the parties to such a diplomatic relationship can conceive the functions of representation in different terms.

pal-watts-book.indb 6 10/29/12 9:48 AM Introduction 7 Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 Chapter 5 explores Anglo- American consultation and cooperation during the period leading up to UDI. The chapter considers the formulation of US contingency plans to deal with the eventuality of a UDI, and US efforts to provide diplomatic support for Britain in its attempts to prevent a UDI. It is argued that on both issues there was considerable misperception and miscom- munication between Washington and London, which caused disappointment and even suspicion at senior levels of government on both sides. This chapter explains the misunderstandings and frustrations in Anglo-American relations by using some theoretical perspectives on alliance politics and thereby makes a useful contribution to the literature on the “special relationship” during the Wilson- Johnson era. Chapter 6 examines support for Britain in the United Nations during the Rhodesian crisis. Britain relied heavily on its Old Commonwealth partners and the United States to prevent the Rhodesian crisis from slipping out of its control in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, but this gave rise to certain anomalies. For example, Canada and New Zealand saw the United Nations as a cornerstone of their external relations, but they were placed in the invidious position of supporting the British claim that Rhodesia did not fall within the United Nations’ sphere of competence. The United States also found itself— not for the first, or the last time— supporting Brit- ish colonial policy despite America’s supposedly anti- imperial heritage. The situation offered opportunities for China and the Soviet Union to exploit anger among Afro-Asian nations who perceived racism in British policy. Brit- ain and its supporters feared the possibility of a “Red Army in blue berets” in southern Africa, but economic concerns were also highly significant. A Chap- ter VII resolution imposing mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia would have created a precedent that could have been used to bring similar measures against South Africa. This would have had more profound effects on West- ern economic interests than sanctions against Rhodesia. This chapter there- fore examines both the strategic and economic foundations of cooperation between Britain and its supporters at the United Nations during the Rhode- sian crisis. The chapter includes a theoretical consideration of the nature of international crisis and explains why Rhodesia’s UDI can be conceptualized in such terms.

Methodology

This book is first and foremost an international history, which seeks to illuminate the Rhodesian crisis from the perspectives of Britain, the Com- monwealth (especially the Old Commonwealth), the United States, and the United Nations. However, in the last two decades the field of International History has come to mean something very different from the state-centered approach of this book. The “cultural turn”— which has been driven mainly, but certainly not exclusively, by American historians— has greatly affected the pattern of scholarship on international history. The trend began with analy- ses of the way in which states used culture as a policy tool in the ideological

pal-watts-book.indb 7 10/29/12 9:48 AM 8 Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 context of the Cold War. A range of new approaches has proliferated, such as those based on race, gender, “collective memory,” and identity, which has transformed the field of inquiry.34 Historians have also seized on the con- cepts of globalization and transnationalism in order to address themes such as diasporas, migration, disease, the environment, human rights, and terror- ism.35 The significance of these developments is evident in the response of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), which has sought to remain relevant by reaching out beyond its original constituency of diplomatic historians. SHAFR has encouraged closer association with pro- fessional bodies such as the American Studies Association and Organization of American Historians, whose members pursue scholarship on cultural and transnational history, and the SHAFR journal, Diplomatic History, regularly publishes articles on these themes.36 Cultural approaches have also become dominant in the “new imperial history,” whose adherents emphasize the mutual interplay of cultural influences between metropolitan and colonial societies, and the continuing effects of this even after decolonization.37 It is undoubtedly true that the “cultural turn” has enhanced understanding in the fields of international and imperial history and it is certainly no longer the case that practitioners of international history are characterized by the reactionary conservatism lamented even a decade ago.38 Younger scholars especially have been quick to embrace cultural approaches, lest they be con- sidered “old-fashioned” or “retrograde.”39 However, as Frederick Cooper has suggested, the bandwagon effect has produced a “conformism of the avant- garde,” which militates against other approaches.40 One would hope that a more traditional international history of the type found in this book can still find acceptance, first because “it is the diversity of approach in our profession that helps to make the discussion of controversial historical issues exciting and productive.”41 Second, a state- centered approach is clearly rel- evant when discussing issues such as the collapse of a federation, the nego- tiation of constitutional arrangements under which a colony may become independent, the possible use of force to achieve a policy objective, inadequa- cies in the arrangements for diplomatic representation, structural problems in the relationship between allies, or the utility of economic sanctions to coerce a rogue state. This is certainly not to say that a state- centric approach is the only way to write about the Rhodesian crisis; it is merely that the themes selected for investigation in this book are concerned with the interaction between states. Although the book is traditional in its focus on the diplomatic relationship between states, it is more novel in its interdisciplinary methods, as it uses multiple theoretical perspectives from International Relations (IR) to frame different aspects of the empirical research. Many theoretically oriented works tend to test and illustrate a single theory by using multiple comparative case studies or by adopting an in- depth case study approach. For example, the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, established in 1975, adopted both qualitative and quantitative methods to investigate the nature of inter- national crisis, consisting of “in- depth studies of perceptions and decisions

pal-watts-book.indb 8 10/29/12 9:48 AM Introduction 9 Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 by a single state; and studies in breadth of the 412 crises that plagued the international system from the end of World War I.”42 The ICB Project classi- fied Rhodesia as a “protracted conflict,” consisting of 11 international crises during the period 1965– 80. In a very detailed case study, Douglas Anglin used the ICB Project’s model of international crisis to analyze the nature of Zambian decision making during 1965– 66.43 By contrast, academic stud- ies that apply more than one theoretical perspective to the same case study are relatively uncommon. The classic example, written by the political sci- entist Graham Allison, is Essence of Decision, which was first published four decades ago. Allison explored US decision making during the Cuban missile crisis from three perspectives that explain foreign policy outcomes differently: the Rational Actor Model, the Organizational Process Model, and the Gov- ernmental Politics Model.44 A more recent example of multiperspectivism is Roger Pfister’s South Africa and African States, which uses theo- ries from political science and IR to explain the formulation of South African foreign policy and the interaction between South Africa and other states in sub- Saharan Africa.45 The methodological approach in this book is similar; it is intended to illustrate how the different facets of a historical case study can be analyzed using a variety of theories, such as those on negotiation, deter- rence, coercive diplomacy, and alliance theory. It has been suggested that the relationship between the fields of Interna- tional History (IH) and IR has been “ambiguous, indeed at times downright hostile.” But during the last 15 years, there has been “a thawing between the two fields.”46 Thomas Smith has explained the perception of the acrimoni- ous relationship through a familiar metaphor: “Perhaps because it is a child of history, International Relations, as it developed, has tried to distance itself from historical discourse, through methodological and theoretical innova- tions seeking general knowledge about international and global politics.”47 It is commonly observed that in the 1960s a transatlantic divide became established between the historically informed English school of IR scholars and the ahistorical community of American IR theorists that was increas- ingly turning to quantitative methods. Writing in 1972, Hedley Bull, one of the leading academics of the English school, lamented what he called the “long, dark winter of the ‘social scientific’ ascendancy.”48 Two decades later it seemed that the separation between theorists and empiricists was no less pronounced, as evidenced by the controversies over Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis and Samuel Huntington’s theory of the “clash of civiliza- tions.”49 In fact, the perception of a division between ahistorical American IR theorists and atheoretical British international historians has been somewhat exaggerated. John Hobson and George Lawson have recently commented that “history never really went away as a tool of IR theory” even among neorealist scholars who are renowned for their static world view.50 It has also been suggested that IR theorists have become more interested in historical narrative “not as an adjunct or empirical resource, but as a theoretical per- spective in its own right.”51 Neither is it true that the craft of the historian is inherently devoid of theory. Although historians pursue narrative-based

pal-watts-book.indb 9 10/29/12 9:48 AM 10 Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 explanations aiming for accuracy and descriptive completeness, they nev- ertheless seek to ascribe primacy to different categories of causes and con- sequences, thereby using theory implicitly.52 Perhaps the crucial difference is that “[w]hereas political scientists (standing aloof from the material they propose to organize) theorise first and then illustrate the theory, historians usually plunge in, then try to explain where they are, what is going on, and how they might explain what they have seen.”53 The divide between IH and IR has also been overstated in other ways. It is not particularly helpful, for example, to distinguish between history and political science by comparing the complexity of historical explanations with the parsi- monious preferences of political science. Historians certainly do recognize the complexity of events and processes but they nevertheless emphasize causal or consequential primacy, which places them not too distant from the political sci- entists’ emphasis on key “independent variables.”54 Jack Levy has contended that what best reflects the distinction between history and political science is the idio- graphic approach of the former compared to the nomothetic aims of the latter. In other words, historians are usually concerned with explaining particular events, whereas political scientists try to generalize about classes of events.55 Historians usually examine single cases in great depth, whereas political scientists mostly use clusters or sequences of examples, known as “data sets,” which tend to be largely devoid of detail. Edward Ingram has commented on this difference between the two disciplines: “The historian’s single example may be more representative than the political scientist’s cluster. It is researched more deeply and comprehensively and set in a broader context. It implies a theory and tries to advance its develop- ment, perhaps by refinement, perhaps by revisionism; it continues a discussion instead of claiming to be a proof. Nor are historians persuaded that a cluster of lightly researched, detached— at best semidetached— cases, often written up by different scholars, is likely to advance the argument any better.”56 However, this distinction should not be pushed too far because histori- ans do not always write single case studies; they often adopt a comparative approach or test hypotheses against a range of cases.57 Neither is it uniformly true that political scientists base their findings on evidence that lacks sufficient depth. Douglas Anglin’s Zambian Crisis Behaviour, which is one of the ICB Project’s qualitative studies mentioned previously, runs to 254 pages exclud- ing notes and appendices, and cannot be said to be “lightly researched.”58 Two further bases on which history is sometimes distinguished from polit- ical science are predictive capacity and policy relevance. Since historians are first and foremost concerned with explaining the past, they usually decline to make predictions, whereas political scientists are inclined to believe that their theories have predictive utility.59 However, the confidence of politi- cal scientists was severely dented by their failure to predict an end to the Cold War, which raised questions about the utility of political science for understanding a phenomenon that dominated global politics for almost five decades.60 Unlike IR, the field of International History does not claim to be explicitly policy relevant. IR theorists tend to focus on the recent his- tory that is most relevant to the present concerns of policymakers, whereas

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Index

Africa Bureau, 21, 23, 71 Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 101– 6, 110– African National Congress, 15– 16, 22 11, 138. See also Nigeria Algeria, 57, 186 Ball, George, 162, 165, 167– 70, alliance theory, 177–82 172– 82, 199, 268n46, 272n105, Alport, Cuthbert, 17 276n175 Anderson, John, 59– 60 Banda, Hastings, 101, 165, 248n137 Angola, 157, 159, 169 Beadle, Hugh, 38, 39 Armah, Kwesi, 90 Belgium, 186 Attlee government, 14, 21 Bellenger, Frank, 68 Australia: aid and technical Bennett, Oliver, 124, 129 assistance policies of, 125– Benoy, Maurice, 142 27, 154; Canadian policy Bentley, Alfred, 59– 60, 63, 171 given limited encouragement Berlis, N. F. H., 142 by, 6, 94, 120, 130–31, 135, Bermuda Conference, 184, 196 138; Commonwealth Prime Billericay Constituency Labour Party, Ministers’ Meetings and, 90ff.; 207, 284n22 Commonwealth Secretariat and, Board of Trade, 45, 49 95, 110–11; contingency planning Bottomley, Arthur: bureaucratic conflict by and response to UDI, 14, with Foreign Office and, 49– 51; 116–17, 146, 149–50, 153–54, Canadian relations and, 134– 206; deterrence and, 116, 132– 35, 148; Commonwealth Prime 39; diplomatic representation in Ministers’ Meeting (June 1965) and, Salisbury, 116–17, 139–46, 153– 98, 100, 101, 103; Confederation 54; economic sanctions and, 135, of British Industry unimpressed 146, 149–50, 183–84, 195ff.; by, 206; correspondence with Ian force against Rhodesia opposed Smith, 25, 34; economic sanctions by, 58, 68, 118, 132, 149, 205; doubted by, 77; negotiations with influence on Rhodesia perceived and assessments of Ian Smith, 30, by other actors, 116, 132, 252n4; 32, 35; Rhodesia policy summarized interests in Rhodesian question, for Cabinet, 28; Rhodesia visit by 118–19; sympathy toward white (Feb.– Mar. 1965), 29– 30, 40, 76, Rhodesians, 118–19, 138, 221n123; technical and financial 144, 149, 153; United Nations assistance for Rhodesian government and, 119, 133, 136, 149, 187– suggested by, 44; US relations and, 89, 194–95; white Rhodesian 180; Wilson’s trip to Salisbury (Oct. migration to suggested, 126– 1965) assessed by, 37; Zambian 27, 154. See also Hasluck, Paul; copper production and, 66 Menzies, Robert Bowles, Chester, 160

pal-watts-book.indb 303 10/29/12 9:49 AM 304 Index Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 Britain. See armed forces; civil servants; 128– 31; Rhodesia policy given institutions of government; political limited encouragement by Britain, parties; politicians; relations Australia and New Zealand, 6, 94, with individual countries and 120, 128, 130– 31, 135; sympathy organizations toward African nationalists, 117, of the Rhine (BAOR), 57 120; United Nations and, 7, 122, British Council of Churches, 71 141, 188– 89, 195, 202; white British Defence Liaison Staff (Salisbury), Rhodesian migration to suggested, 59 126– 27, 154. See also Martin, Paul; British South Africa Police (BSAP), 61– Pearson, Lester 62, 64, 234n65, 234nn68– 71 Caradon, Lord. See Foot, Hugh Brodie, J. K., 143 Carter, Thomas, 124, 130 Brown, George: Central African Cassells, James, 65 Federation and, 21; contingency Castle, Barbara: Central African planning in Department of Federation views on, 22; Economic Affairs and, 175; defense technical and financial assistance spending and, 67; opinion of for Rhodesian government Wilson’s Cabinet management, 46 suggested by, 44; Wilson’s Cabinet Bruce, David, 179– 80 management assessed by, 46, Bundy, McGeorge, 172– 73, 175 228n255; Wilson’s obsession for Butler, David, 32 consensus with Conservatives noted Butler, R. A., 17–18, 162, 192 by, 69 Central African Federation (CAF): Cabinet (British): Conservative, 18– 19; Anglo- American consultation on, Labour, 25, 27–28, 30, 36, 38– 39, 157– 61, 185; Australia requested 46– 47, 60, 81, 98, 131, 181, 205 not to assist white migration from, Cabinet (Rhodesian), 1, 17– 19, 31, 38, 126– 27; British military planning 131, 162 and, 54–55, 57–58; collapse of, 15– Cabinet Office, 45, 166 16; formation of, 14– 15; Labour Caccia, Harold, 157–58 Party views on, 13, 20– 23; military Callaghan, James, 22, 53– 54, 67, assets handed over to Southern 237n115, 283n10 Rhodesia, 18, 62, 89, 191– 92; Canada: aid and technical Old Commonwealth trade and, assistance policies of, 120– 135– 36 25; Commonwealth Prime Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 78, Ministers’ Meetings and, 90ff.; 176 Commonwealth Secretariat Central Intelligence Organisation and, 95, 110– 11; contingency (CIO), 60 planning of and response to UDI, Chidzero, Bernard, 123 14, 116– 17, 139, 146– 49, 154, Chiefs of Staff (British), 54, 62– 63, 81, 206; deterrence and, 116, 132– 204 39; diplomatic representation Chiefs of Staff (Rhodesian), 55, 59– 60 in Salisbury, 116– 17, 139– 46, China, 7, 86, 130, 150, 166, 183, 153– 54; economic sanctions and, 196–99 118, 135, 147– 48, 183– 84, 195ff.; Cleveland, Harlan, 159, 191 force against Rhodesia opposed by, Cleveland, Harrison, 130– 31 68, 99, 132, 205; foreign policy Cold War, 2, 4, 8, 10, 71, 121, 161, characteristics, 121– 22, 254n40; 192, 196, 202 interests in Rhodesian question, Colonial Office (CO), 101, 179, 184, 117ff.; political initiatives of, 186, 187

pal-watts-book.indb 304 10/29/12 9:49 AM Index 305 Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Cunningham, George, 23– 24, 58 Meetings, 83– 114 Curragh “mutiny”, 66, 236n103 Commonwealth Relations Office Cyprus, 36, 67, 70, 75, 101, 186 (CRO): Bottomley- Gardiner mission and, 29; Canadians irritate, Dean, Patrick, 168, 175, 189, 191, 192, 148; Commonwealth consultative 271n79 committee proposal and, 97–98; Declaration on the Granting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Independence to Colonial Meeting (July 1964) and, 92; Countries and Peoples, 186 Commonwealth Secretariat and, Defence and Oversea Policy Committee 111; five principles and, 31; (DOPC): Anglo- American Foreign Office bureaucratic conflict relations and, 168; Bottomley with, 14, 45– 46, 48– 51; Old informs about developments in Commonwealth consultations with, Rhodesia policy and negotiations, 90, 147– 48, 262n192; Rhodesia 25, 28, 32, 35; Commonwealth chief responsibility of, 45; United consultative committee proposal States consultations with, 157ff.; rejected by, 97– 98; contingency weakness of, 206 planning and, 47, 50, 77, 148, Commonwealth Secretariat, 6, 85, 86, 199, 206, 229n268; five principles 94– 95, 109– 12 and, 97; military intelligence and, Communism: Britain and, 87, 89, 183– 60; Reedman affair discussed by, 85, 193, 196– 98, 202; Rhodesia 263n209; Wilson bypasses, 46 and, 61, 70, 75, 84, 88, 138, 144, Defence Planning Staff (DPS), 55– 58, 154; United States and, 158, 161, 62, 65 166, 172, 174, 178, 184– 85, 196– Department for Economic Affairs, 46, 97, 202 67 compellence (coercive diplomacy), 54, deterrence, 54, 71– 81, 132– 39 71– 81 Devlin Royal Commission, 15 Confederation of British Industry Dominican Republic, 176, 178 (CBI), 43, 206 Party, 16, 17 Congo, 56, 118, 157, 160, 165, 166, Donnelly, Desmond, 68 169, 186, 196, 198, 229n275 Douglas- Home, Alec: becomes Prime Conservative Party, 18– 19, 26, 36, 39, Minister, 18; bipartisan policy of, 69, 86, 87, 115, 203– 5 203; Communist threat in Africa contingency planning: British and, 196; Commonwealth Prime government and, 14, 45–52, Ministers’ Meeting (July 1964) 206– 7; Old Commonwealth and, and, 84, 90– 95, 109; disenchanted 116– 17, 146– 54; United States with African Commonwealth at and, 162– 70 the UN, 128; G. Mennen Williams Coote, Wendell, 166, 168, 181 and, 157– 58; negotiations with Cousins, Frank, 46 , 18– 19; negotiations Crisis, 9, 199– 202, 282n105 with Ian Smith, 20; receives Crossman, Richard: Cabinet dismayed suggestion of aid for Rhodesia, 44; by Wilson’s trip to Salisbury United Nations and, 186– 87, 189; (Oct. 1965) according to, 36– 37; United States activism on Rhodesia Wilson’s Cabinet management rebuffed by, 159; Wilson’s initial assessed by, 46, 228n259; Wilson handling of Ian Smith commented preoccupied with UDI according on, 26– 27 to, 204; Wilson’s Vietnam initiative Du Bois, W. E. B., 2 assessed by, 98 Dupont, Clifford, 41

pal-watts-book.indb 305 10/29/12 9:49 AM 306 Index Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 economic sanctions: Australia and, 135, 54; Canada opposed to, 68, 99, 146, 149– 50, 183– 84, 195ff.; 132, 205; Commonwealth calls Britain and, 45, 47– 49, 52, 58, for use of, 28, 99– 101, 103, 108; 69, 76– 80, 84, 105, 148, 165–70, Commonwealth secretary- general 172– 74, 181– 82, 183– 84, 195ff.; in favor of, 110; Foreign Office Canada and, 118, 135, 147– 48, largely against, 49; Hugh Gaitskell 183– 84, 195ff.; New Zealand and, probably would have been willing 136, 146, 150– 53, 183– 84, 195ff.; to use, 22; Labour Party attitudes Rhodesia and, 2, 76– 77, 80, 96, regarding, 68, 71; New Zealand 135– 36, 139, 153, 181, 195ff.; opposed to, 132; problems involved United Nations and, 183– 84; in the use of, 53ff.; United Nations 195ff.; United States and, 58, 165– possibility of, 183ff.; United States 70, 172– 74, 178, 181– 82, 183– 84, and, 56, 68, 166, 176, 232n30; 195ff. Wilson rules out publicly, 38, 74– Eisenhower, Dwight D., 155, 184 76; Wilson willing to contemplate European Economic Community in certain circumstances, 58, 78– (EEC), 85– 87 79, 176, 200– 201 Foreign Office (FO): Commonwealth Fabian Colonial Bureau, 21 consultative committee proposal Fabian Society, 71, 204 and, 97– 98; Commonwealth Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Relations Office bureaucratic See Central African Federation conflict with, 14, 45– 46, 48– Field, Winston: African Commonwealth 51; international policy and, 80; disparaged by, 88; Alport’s Kaunda and, 96; Labour Party assessment of, 17; Australian suspects intentions of, 204, 283n7; diplomatic representation majority rule and, 80; United States in Salisbury invited by, 142; consultations with, 157ff., 185ff.; Commonwealth advice refused by, Vietnam peace initiative and, 98 116, 128– 29; Ian Smith’s opinion Foulon, Robert, 164 of, 18; independence for Rhodesia France, 76, 192, 194 demanded by, 17; negotiations with franchise (Rhodesian), 16, 209– 10 British government, 18– 19; ousted Fredericks, Wayne, 162– 63 by Ian Smith, 19, 124; United States alarmed by electoral victory Gaitskell, Hugh, 22 and subsequent ouster, 159–60, Gardiner, Gerald, 29– 30, 40, 47 162 Garner, Saville, 90, 94, 100– 101, 111, five (six) principles, 31, 33– 36, 41, 97 162– 63, 168, 171, 206–7 Fletcher, Peter, 59, 66 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Flower, Ken: British forces’ loyalty (GATT), 151 assessed by, 66; plot to oust Ghana: Australian sanctions satisfy, 150; Field reported by, 19; Rhodesian British government pressured by, forces’ loyalty assessed by, 60– 61; 89– 90; Canadian aid and, 123; Rhodesian Security Council decides Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ on a UDI, 74 Meeting (July 1964) and, 90– Foot, Hugh, 187– 88, 190, 192, 197, 92, 95; Commonwealth Prime 202, 206, 278n28, 278n33 Ministers’ Meeting (June 1965) and, force (against Rhodesia): Australia 100; Commonwealth Secretariat opposed to, 58, 68, 118, 132, 149, proposed by, 95; severs diplomatic 205; British cabinet subcommittee relations with Britain, 103; United dismisses as an option, 27– 28, 46, Nations and, 89– 90, 128, 187, 189,

pal-watts-book.indb 306 10/29/12 9:49 AM Index 307 Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 191; white Rhodesian migration House of Commons (debates and suggested by, 127; Wilson’s visit to statements), 22, 27, 32, 67, 74, 90, (Oct. 1965), 38 91, 107, 128, 183, 200 Gibbs, Humphrey: attempts to Howman, Jack, 123– 24, 129– 30 persuade Winston Field to Hughes, Cledwyn, 33– 34, 42 remain in office, 19; political isolation of, 32; receives notice of indaba, 20, 24– 25, 40, 143, 164 India’s termination of diplomatic India: Commonwealth mission proposal representation, 96; refuses to order dismissed by, 132; Commonwealth Ian Smith’s arrest, 60; Rhodesian Prime Ministers’ Meeting (July government dismissed by, 1; state 1964) and, 90– 91; Commonwealth of emergency declared by, 2, Prime Ministers’ Meeting (June 225n200 1965) and, 101; Commonwealth Gilpatric, Roswell, 175 role of, 89; Commonwealth Glass, Lester, 141 Secretariat’s powers feared by, Gore- Booth, Paul, 48 110; democracy in, 89; diplomatic Greenhill, Denis, 205 representation in Salisbury Griffith, James, 21 terminated by, 96; United Nations Grimond, Jo, 68 and, 189 International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Harriman, Averell, 158, 165, 180, 197 Project, 8– 10, 200– 202 Hasluck, Paul, 118, 131 International History: changing Hawkins, Harold, 60 nature of, 7– 8; relationship with Haynes, Ulric, 172, 175– 76 International Relations (IR), 8–11 Healey, Denis: Britain’s overseas role and, 237n115; British military Japan, 76 intervention in Rhodesia and, Johns, G. B., 60 57, 60, 62, 65, 74, 79, 236n100; Johnson, Lyndon B.: inherits a Commonwealth policy and, 87; developing crisis in Rhodesia, defense procurement and, 67; 157; message to Ian Smith, 173; Wilson assessed by, 74 preoccupied by other US foreign Heath, Edward, 27, 36, 39, 69 policy problems, 178, 275n149; Hilaly, Agha, 101 Roswell Gilpatric’s appointment Hola camp atrocities, 70 as Rhodesia coordinator opposed Holyoake, Keith: Commonwealth by, 175, 273n121; US response mission to Rhodesia endorsed to the UDI authorized by, 174; by, 131; economic sanctions Wilson and, 77, 172– 73, 175, 177, and, 152– 53; objects to Old 274n142, 274n144; Zambian airlift Commonwealth acting in concert, authorized by, 176. See also United 137; relationship with Ian Smith, States 132; Rhodesian attendance at Johnson, U. Alexis, 175 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Johnston, J. B.: Bottomley- Gardiner Meeting (July 1964) and, 90– 91; mission assessed by, 29– 30; five sympathy for white Rhodesians, principles and, 31; Ian Smith 119– 20; Wilson’s deterrent efforts assessed by, 19– 20; Ian Smith supported by, 131, 133– 34, negotiations with, 30– 32, 35 136– 37 Joint Intelligence Committee (British), Home, Lord. See Douglas- Home, Alec 77, 233n50, 281n91 Home Office, 46 Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States), Hood, Samuel, 185 56, 65

pal-watts-book.indb 307 10/29/12 9:49 AM 308 Index Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 Kaiser, Philip, 168 Prime Ministers’ Meeting (Sept. Kapwepwe, Simon, 106– 8 1966) and, 108; Kaunda and, 107; Kariba Dam, 44, 56, 58, 166, 201 Wilson assessed by, 104, 108 Kaunda, Kenneth: British military Macleod, Iain, 55, 158, 160 presence in Zambia and, 57–58, 63; Macmillan, Harold: African policy Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ legacy of, 203; Douglas- Home Meeting (June 1965) and, 100; replaces as Prime Minister, 18, denies Zambia providing a base 128; Eisenhower and, 155; for African nationalists, 96; no Kennedy and, 155, 184; G. independence before majority rule Mennen Williams and, 158; Royal (NIBMAR) and, 107; participates in Commission appointed by, 15; conference on fortieth anniversary United Nations and, 186– 88; of UDI, 4; Wilson and, 59, 78, 96, “” speech, 158. 104, 106– 7. See also Zambia Malaya, 67, 75, 88 Kennedy, John F., 155, 157, 187, 196 Malaysia, 56– 58, 67, 101, 193 Kenya: British atrocities in, 75; Malta, 39, 56, 91, 108, 227n239 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ March, Derrick, 48– 49 Meeting (July 1964) and, 91; Margai, Alfred, 100– 101 independence of turns spotlight on Martin, John, 187 Rhodesia at United Nations, 141; Martin, Paul: Britain and, 134– 35, 147– mutiny in armed forces, 67; no 48; Canadian policy on aid and independence before majority rule overseas development and, 122; (NIBMAR) and, 107; United States’ Canadian policy on Rhodesia and, opinion of before independence, 117; Oliver Bennett and, 124, 129 185. See also Kenyatta, Jomo McClelland, Roswell, 171 Kenyatta, Jomo, 96– 97 McIntosh, Alister, 152 Kerr, David, 68, 207 McIntyre, Laurence, 119 Kevin, J. C. G., 119, 144 McNamara, Robert, 170 King, Cecil, 48 Menzies, Robert: Australian response Kissinger, Henry, 178 to UDI announced by, 150; Knox, William, 42 Commonwealth consultative committee proposal and, Labour Party: aid for Rhodesia and, 45; 97; Commonwealth mission Central African Federation policy proposals and, 36, 129, 131– 32; of, 13, 20– 22; Commonwealth Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ policy of, 86– 87; pressure group Meetings and, 90ff., 248n118; influence on, 71; Foreign Office Commonwealth Secretariat and, intentions suspected by, 204, 95, 110– 11; five principles and, 97; 283n7; Rhodesia policy while Rhodesian government and, 131– in Opposition, 22– 24; Rhodesia 32; Ian Smith and, 28, 36, 132, policy requires more research at 134; supports Wilson’s deterrent constituency level, 207; Vietnam efforts, 131, 133ff., 258n109, preoccupies, 68 259n133; sympathy for white Land Apportionment Act, 30, 34– 35 Rhodesians, 118 Lapsley, J. H., 62 methodology, 7– 11. See also Le Quesne, Martin, 41, 49– 51 International History Lloyd, Selwyn, 36, 86 Ministry of Defence (officials in), 45, 54, 60, 62, 66, 79, 81 MacDonald, Malcolm: African leaders Ministry of Power, 46 assessed by, 98– 99; Commonwealth Mitchell, Derek, 98

pal-watts-book.indb 308 10/29/12 9:49 AM Index 309 Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 Monckton Commission, 15 by, 96; Ghana and, 92, 95; Lagos Monday Club, 69 conference and, 103–6; OAU Monson, Leslie, 107 and, 103; Rhodesia coalition Mountbatten, Louis, 55 government idea supported Movement for Colonial Freedom, 21, 71 by, 131; UDI reaction to, 48; , 57– 58, 79, 163 Wilson suggests participation in Mugabe, Robert, 3, 16 Commonwealth prime ministers’ Multilateral Force, 164 mission, 131; Wilson’s visit to, 38. Musonga, Paul, 188 See also Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa Mutasa, E. C., 24, Nkomo, Joshua: Arthur Bottomley insists on seeing while in detention, Nabrit Jr., James M., 194 25; funding to train guerillas National Archives (UK), 3, 46, 156, sought by, 163; parties formed by, 206 16; Rhodesia’s 1961 Constitution National Democratic Party, 16 repudiated by, 17; UN Special National Museum of Labour History, Committee petitioned by, 188; 207 Wilson rules out use of force to National Security Council (NSC), 159, influence, 38 171– 73, 175, 178 Nkrumah, Kwame: British policy Ncube, Welshman, 3 criticized by, 97; Commonwealth negotiation theory, 39–45 Prime Ministers’ Meeting (June Netherlands, 187 1965) and, 100; Commonwealth New Zealand: aid and technical Secretariat proposed by, 95; Lagos assistance policies of, 125– 27; meeting and, 106; Canadian policy given limited and, 101; OAU and, 103. See also encouragement by, 6, 120– 21, 138; Ghana Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ no independence before majority rule Meetings and, 90ff.; contingency (NIBMAR), 107– 8 planning of and response to UDI, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 14, 116– 17, 146, 149, 150–53, (NATO), 57, 68, 185, 196 206; deterrence and, 116, 132– : Anglo- American 39; diplomatic representation talks and, 158, 160; British military in Salisbury absent, 140, 145; planning and, 54– 56; Canadian economic sanctions and, 136, diplomatic representation in 141; 146, 150– 53, 183–84, 195ff.; Central African Federation and, force against Rhodesia opposed 14, 15, 21; Commonwealth Prime by, 68, 118, 138, 205; influence Ministers’ Meeting (July 1964) on Rhodesia perceived by United and, 91; Southern Rhodesia seeks States, 116; interests in Rhodesian concomitant independence with, question, 120; sympathy toward 17– 18, 160. See also Zambia white Rhodesians, 119– 20, 138, Nyandoro, George, 123 144, 153; trade with Central Nyasaland, 15. See also Malawi African Federation, 135– 36; United Nyerere, Julius: Commonwealth Prime Nations and, 7, 151– 52, 187–89; Ministers’ Meeting (June 1965) United States and, 156ff. See also and, 100, 102; Holyoake, Keith and, 101; Lagos meeting and, 106; Nigeria: Canadian aid and, 123; no independence before majority Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ rule (NIBMAR) and, 107, 130; Meeting (June 1965) and, 101; OAU and, 103; Winston Field and, constitutional conference suggested 129. See also Tanzania

pal-watts-book.indb 309 10/29/12 9:49 AM 310 Index Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 Obisesan, Alhaji, 153 Anglo- American consultation on, Obote, Milton: Commonwealth Prime 165, 191, 197; Australia keen to Ministers’ Meeting (June 1965) and, distance itself from at UN, 150; 100; Commonwealth Secretariat Australian ambassador in South proposed by, 95; no independence Africa sympathetic towards, 119; before majority rule (NIBMAR) and, British government concludes 107. See also Uganda sanctions would be undermined by, O’Connor, D. S. S., 54 77; further research needed on, 208; Old Commonwealth. See Australia; G. Mennen Williams fears Rhodesia Canada; New Zealand being pushed into closer association Operation Fume, 56 with, 160; Kaunda views as a threat Operation Mattock, 54, 56– 57 to peace in southern Africa, 100; Organization of African Unity Rhodesian “accredited diplomatic (OAU): British government gives representative” sent to, 34, 261n167, insufficient consideration to, 263n209; Rhodesians counting on 48; Canadians recognize need support from to cope with sanctions, to forestall criticism from, 130; 80; Rhodesians seen as part of a further research needed on, 208; barrier against spread of Communism indignation at UDI, 2; Kaunda in Africa, 138, 144; US assessment of feels humiliated in the eyes of, 107; likely support for Rhodesia, 65; UN resolution calls for members to resolutions opposed by, 194; Wilson break of diplomatic relations with proposes consultative committee Britain, 103; Wilson anxious about involving, 97– 98. See also Angola; calls for use of force, 201 Mozambique Ormsby- Gore, David, 192 Powell, Enoch, 86 Owen, David, 4, 203 Poynton, Hilton, 186, 190 Putterill, Rodney, 60, 66 Paget, Reginald, 68 Pakistan: Commonwealth Prime Queen Elizabeth II: Commonwealth Ministers’ Meeting (July 1964) role and, 113; Ian Smith affirms and, 91; Commonwealth Prime “unswerving loyalty” of the Ministers’ Meeting (June 1965) and, Rhodesian people to, 1; Rhodesian 101; Commonwealth role of, 89 armed forces owed allegiance to, Palley, Ahrn, 32 60– 62 Pearson, Lester: Commonwealth mission proposal and, 129; Commonwealth Rahman, Abdul, 101 Prime Ministers’ Meetings and, 84, Ramphal, Shridath, 111 90ff.; economic sanctions and, 135, Ramsay, Michael, 71 195; five principles and, 97; likely Reedman, Harry, 34, 261n167, 263n209 attitude to Harrison Cleveland’s representation (diplomatic), 6, 139– 46, constitutional proposals, 131; Ian 153– 54 Smith and, 132, 134; supports Rhodesia Lobby, 69, 71 Wilson’s deterrent efforts, 136–38; Rhodesian Front: British military sympathy for African nationalists, intervention feared by, 74; 117; UN peacekeeping mission Communism and, 75, 84, 87– 88; opposed by, 195 Dominion Party merges with, Pestell, John, 59 16; electoral victory (1965), 32, Portugal: African colonies complicate 96, 102; five principles and, 41; logistics of British military Ian Smith and, 32, 42, 225n200; intervention in Rhodesia, 57– 58; Labour government and, 26, 31, 40,

pal-watts-book.indb 310 10/29/12 9:49 AM Index 311 Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 203; majority rule and, 80; Robert Singapore, 106, 113 Menzies sees Rhodesian politics in Singapore Declaration, 112 similar terms to 118; Rhodesian Sithole, Ndabaningi: Bottomley insists armed forces and, 59– 61; transfer of on seeing while in detention, 25; Central African Federation military Nkomo criticized by, 16; Welensky assets and, 18; discusses transition to African defeated by, 17; United Nations majority rule with, 164; Wilson and, 189; United States and, 159– rules out use of force to influence 60, 164, 170– 71, 191; Winston attitude of, 38 Field and, 18– 19, 162 Skybolt, 156, 177, 179, 181 Rhodesian Institute of Directors, 77 Slade, H. G., 59– 60 (RLI), 60–64, Smith, Arnold: Australian and British 233n57, 234nn59– 60 fears about his position as Rhodesian Reserve Bank, 77 Commonwealth secretary- general, Rhodesian Security Council, 74 110– 11; Canadian assistant Rogers, Philip, 101, 112 undersecretary for external Rogers, William, 175 affairs, 117, 147; favors Chapter (RAF): capabilities for VII resolution, 282n100; no potential operations against Rhodesia, independence before majority rule 57, 62– 63; relationship with Royal (NIBMAR) and, 107; writings on Rhodesian Air Force, 59–60; images of the Commonwealth, 85. Wilson rules out action by, 74– 75 See also Commonwealth Secretariat Royal Commission, 38– 39, 137, 194 Smith, Ian: belief that international Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF): reaction to UDI would be brief, attitudes of its senior officers, 59– 2; Bottomley- Gardiner mission 60; capabilities of, 62 and, 29– 30, 221n127; British aid Ruanda- Urundi, 189 insufficient to modify belief in Rusk, Dean: consultation with British utility of a UDI, 43– 44; British politicians and officials, 159, 162, assessments of, 19, 30, 32, 41– 42; 165, 167, 169– 70, 172–73, 192; British public and, 69– 70; Canada estimates force needed to invade alarmed by posturing of, 147; Rhodesia, 56; little interest in Commonwealth and, 36, 88– 91, African issues, 178; US response to 95– 96, 102, 116, 131– 32, 134, UDI established by, 174 136– 37, 139; Communism and, 89, 281n92; economic sanctions Salisbury, Lord, 69 and, 76– 77, 135; Field and, 18– 19, Sandys, Duncan: becomes 162; five principles and, 31, 33– 36; Commonwealth secretary, 18, 128; Holyoake and, 119– 20, 132, 134, Commonwealth involvement in 136; Menzies and, 94, 99, 132, Rhodesian problem advocated by, 134, 136; Mutasa letter and, 24; 128– 29; Ghanaian protest received negotiations with Bottomley and by, 90; Hugh Foot alarmed by Wilson, 25ff.; negotiations with policy of, 190; negotiations with Douglas- Home and Sandys, 20, Ian Smith, 20, 24– 25; negotiations 24, 217n45; Pearson and, 134, with Winston Field, 18– 19, 128– 136– 37; proclamation of the UDI, 29; Sangster, Donald, 101 1; reaction to Labour government’s Sharpeville massacre, 70, 186 warning statement (Oct. 1964), Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 101 26– 27, 40, 133; refuses to Sierra Leone, 95, 100, 131 apologize for deaths of thirty Silundika, George, 163 thousand Zimbabweans, 3;

pal-watts-book.indb 311 10/29/12 9:49 AM 312 Index Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 Smith, Ian (continued): responsible Southern Rhodesia. See armed forces; for Mugabe’s rule, 3; Rhodesian institutions of government; political armed forces and, 59– 61, 232n43; parties; politicians; relations Rhodesian Front and, 32, 42, with individual countries and 221n131, 225n200, 226n223; organizations Royal Commission and, 38– 39; Soviet Union, 7, 71, 193, 196– 98 South Africa and, 65; status quo and, Special Air Service (Rhodesian), 63 42– 43, 226n229; United States and, Special Commonwealth African 162, 171– 73, 272n97, 272n101; Assistance Plan (SCAAP), 123, 126 visits London for funeral of Winston Stevenson, Adlai, 55, 160 Churchill, 28– 29, 41, 76, 133, Stewart, Michael: bureaucratic conflict 256n74; visits London for talks with Arthur Bottomley, 49– 50; with Wilson 35– 36, 74, 226n227; consultations with Dean Rusk and Wilson’s visit to Salisbury and, 37– George Ball, 169– 70, 271n85; 38, 224n192; Zambia and, 96, 176 military intervention considered too Smyth, Ian Douglas, 141– 42 risky by, 53, 62, 230n1; sent to UN South Africa: Anglo-American after UDI, 195; Wilson advises Soviet consultation on, 165, 191, 197– intervention unlikely, 198, 281n91 99; Australia and, 119, 150; British Suez, 11, 70, 75, 121, 156, 177, 179, arms sales to, 113, 199; British 181, 184– 85 military intervention in Rhodesia complicated by, 57–58, 64–65; Tanganyika, 89, 128– 29. See also Central African Federation formed Nyerere, Julius; Tanzania in response to influence of, 15, 21; Tanzania: Canadian aid and, 123; changing attitudes contribute to end Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ of white minority rule in Rhodesia, Meeting (June 1965) and, 100, 102; 2; Commonwealth withdrawal, 50, accuses of harboring 85, 92, 151; further research needed Malawian rebels, 101; Lagos on, 208; G. Mennen Williams fears meeting and, 106; Mozambique’s Rhodesia being pushed into closer guerilla forces and, 163; mutiny in association with, 160; Kaunda views armed forces, 67; OAU and, 103; as a threat to peace in southern Africa, Ian Smith disparages, 89, 132; UN 100; Rhodesians counting on support inflammatory statement by, 194; from to cope with sanctions, 80; Zambian contingency planning and, Rhodesian diplomatic representation 166– 67. See also Nyerere, Julius; in, 34; Rhodesian financial assistance Tanganyika from, 43; Rhodesians seen as part of a Territorial Force (Rhodesian), 55, barrier against spread of Communism 61– 63 in Africa, 138, 144; sanctions and, Thomson, George, 197 7, 77, 118, 147, 150–52, 165, Thorpe, Jeremy, 68– 69 183, 195–96, 198–99, 202, 206; Todd, Garfield, 44–45, 125, 188 UN resolutions opposed by, 194; Trading With the Enemy Act (United US assessment of likely support for States), 170 Rhodesia, 65, 268n46; US considers Treasury, 45 Rhodesia of secondary importance Tree, Marietta P., 170, 193 compared to, 157; Wilson proposes Trend, Burke: British contingency consultative committee involving, 97– planning recognized as deficient 98; Wilson tries to keep off cabinet by, 35; British position “morally agenda, 46. See also Verwoerd, impregnable” according to, 29; Hendrick Commonwealth Secretariat and,

pal-watts-book.indb 312 10/29/12 9:49 AM Index 313 Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 95; Crossman suggests “decisive and, 184, 196; Britain and, 27, influence” in Wilson’s to visit 45, 48, 68, 138, 155ff., 183ff., Salisbury, 37; Wilson advised to 206; bureaucratic politics, 174– side with CRO in disagreement 75, 268n42, 269n60, 270n67; with Foreign Office, 49 Central African Federation and, 157– 61, 185; changing attitudes Uganda: Canadian aid and, 123; conditioned white minority rule Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ in Rhodesia, 2, 178; Communism Meeting (June 1965) and, 100; and, 158, 161, 166, 172, 174, 178, Commonwealth Secretariat 184– 85, 196– 97, 202; economic proposed by, 95; mutiny in armed sanctions and, 58, 165– 70, 172– forces, 67. See also Obote, Milton 74, 178, 181– 82, 183– 84, 195ff.; United Federal Party (Rhodesia Party), force and, 56, 68, 166, 176, 16, 17 232n30; interests in Rhodesian United Nations (UN): Australia and, question, 157, 160– 61, 166, 119, 133, 136, 149, 187– 89, 174; New Zealand and, 156ff.; 194– 95; Britain and, 7, 14, 27, Portuguese and South African 28, 36, 48– 49, 53, 62, 65, 70, support for Rhodesia assessed by, 77– 79, 86, 103, 129, 137, 159– 65, 268n46; response to UDI, 60, 163, 167, 170, 180, 183ff., 174; Rhodesia perceived to be 205– 7; Canada and, 7, 122, 141, most susceptible to influence of 188– 89, 195, 202; Central African Australia and New Zealand, 116; Federation and, 191– 92; economic Rhodesian Front and, 159– 60, sanctions and, 77– 79, 183– 84; 164, 170– 71, 191; Ian Smith and, 195ff.; force and, 183ff.; Ghana 162, 171– 73, 272n97, 272n101; and, 89– 90, 128, 187, 189, 191; United Nations and, 7, 70, 157, and, India and, 159– 60, 163, 167, 170, 174, 180, 189; 186– 88; New Zealand and, 183ff., 202; Vietnam and, 174, 7, 151– 52, 187– 89; OAU and, 176, 178; Zambia and, 48, 58, 78, 103; Portugal and, 194; South 156, 161, 165– 70, 175– 76, 181, Africa and, 194; Tanzania and, 273n132. See also US politicians 194; UN Charter, 108, 147, 170, and officials (e.g., Ball, George; 186– 88, 195, 206, 229n273, Bundy, McGeorge; Harriman, 277n17; UN Conference on Trade Averell; Haynes, Ulric; Johnson, and Development (UNCTAD), Lyndon B.; Komer, Robert; Rusk, 122, 126, 255n43; UN Fourth Dean; Williams, G. Mennen); Committee, 187– 88, 191, 194– US government and military 95; UN General Assembly, 7, 23, institutions (e.g., CIA; Joint Chiefs 62,103, 122, 184, 186– 90, 193– of Staff; NSC) 95, 281n91; UN Security Council, 7, 62, 79, 89, 96, 109, 122, 147, Verwoerd, Hendrick, 64, 190 150, 151, 170, 184, 187, 191, Victoria Falls Conference, 15, 18, 191 193, 195, 197, 199, 281n91; UN Vienna Convention, 145 Special Committee, 27, 119, 186, Vietnam: Labour Party and, 68, 207; 188, 192– 93; United States and, 7, Rhodesia linked with in Anglo- 70, 157, 159– 60, 163, 167, 170, American relations, 156, 182; US 174, 180, 183ff., 202 preoccupied by at time of UDI, United States (US): aid and technical 174, 176, 178; Wilson and, 46, assistance policies of, 124, 163, 98, 102, 137, 204; Zambian airlift 269n51; Bermuda Conference affected by US involvement in, 169

pal-watts-book.indb 313 10/29/12 9:49 AM 314 Index Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 Walker, Patrick Gordon, 21, 86– 87, 203– 4; economic sanctions and, 164– 65, 180, 199, 205, 237n115, 45, 47, 51, 76–78, 105– 6, 176, 238n140 182; force and, 27– 28, 38, 58– Walker, Victor Lee, 61 59, 63, 74–76, 78–79, 80– 81, Wall, Patrick, 69 105, 176, 193, 200– 201, 205, Walston, Henry, 24 240n177, 240n182, 241n212; Wankie colliery, 56, 166 Holyoake and, 131, 133ff.; House Welensky, Roy: Bottomley- Gardiner of Commons statements, 32, 67, visit assessed by, 221n123; British 96, 107, 183, 200– 201; Ian Smith government and 158, 162, 190, and, 24ff., 74, 88– 89, 113, 131ff., 230n6; Communist threat in 198, 226n227; Johnson and, 77, Africa according to, 196; Edgar 172–73, 175, 177, 274nn141– 42, Whitehead and, 164; Winston Field 274n144; Kaunda and, 59, 78, and, 129 96, 104, 106– 7; MacDonald’s “White Redoubt,” 138, 159 assessment of, 104, 108; majority Whitehead, Edgar: British government rule and, 13, 21, 22, 24, 35, and, 159, 191; Ian Smith and, 41, 51, 109, 113, 203; Menzies 20; moderate politics of, 17, 191; and, 102, 131, 133ff., 258n109, Rhodesian Legislative Assembly 259n133; Nyerere and, 100, warned by, 27; UN Fourth 102–3; Pearson and, 99– 100, Committee and, 191; Welensky 104, 108, 133ff., 195; Opposition and, 164 years, 21– 24; Rhodesia policy and Whitelaw, William, 69 negotiations dominated by, 5, Wigg, George, 57, 62– 64 21 35, 45–47, 204– 5, 228n259; Williams, Eric, 95 Royal Commission proposed by, Williams, G. Mennen (“Soapy”): 38– 39; United Nations and, 103, Alfred Bentley and, 171; Britain 183, 193, 195, 197– 98; United and, 157– 58, 171, 174, 266n15; States and, 164, 170ff.; Vietnam bureaucratic politics and, 175; and, 46, 98, 102, 137, 204; visits Central African Federation and, Salisbury, 36– 38, 70, 138, 173, 158– 59; fears Rhodesia being 194, 220n94, 224n190, 224n192 pushed into closer association with Wright, Oliver: Commonwealth Prime South Africa and Portugal, 159– Ministers’ Meeting (Sept. 1966) 60; policy recommendations in recalled by, 108; continuity UN, 189, 194 in Britain’s Rhodesia policy Williams, Marcia, 70, 205 acknowledged by, 203– 4; decision Willoughby, John, 66 to rule out use of force explained Wilson, Harold: Abubakar Tafawa by, 75; moratorium on Rhodesian Balewa and, 103– 4, 138; independence issue suggested by, bureaucratic politics and, 49– 50; 43; Rhodesia a “second order” Cabinet management, 5, 27– problem according to, 178; 28, 46– 47, 98, 181, 228n255; supremacy of domestic issues over Commonwealth policy of, 6, foreign affairs acknowledged by, 85, 87, 206; Commonwealth 81; Vietnam peace initiative details consultative committee proposal, worked out by, 98; Wilson’s visit to 97– 98; Commonwealth Prime Rhodesia assessed by, 37 Ministers’ Meetings and, 33, 84, Wyatt, Woodrow, 68 95ff.; Communism and, 87, 89, 183, 193, 197– 98; Conservatives Yates, Sidney R., 192 and, 26– 27, 36, 39, 69, 75, Yew, Lee Kuan, 106

pal-watts-book.indb 314 10/29/12 9:49 AM Index 315 Copyrighted material – ISBN 9781403979070 Zambia: Anglo-American consultation 28, 49, 58, 76, 96, 98, 105–6, 118, and cooperation on problems of, 139, 147, 165ff., 201, 247n91, 48, 58, 78, 156, 161, 165–70, 272n97; further research needed 175–76, 181, 273n132; Bottomley on, 208; harboring of guerilla forces attends independence celebrations in, 96, 234n60; Soviet Union and, in, 25; British military forces in, 198. See also Kaunda, Kenneth 57– 58, 62–63, 78; Commonwealth Zimbabwe African National Union mission opposed by, 132; concept (ZANU), 16, 126, 165 of crisis and, 9, 200–202, 282n112; Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union economic effects of the UDI on, (ZAPU), 16, 159, 165

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