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Long Georgetown 0076M 14672 LEGITIMACY AND THE MARITIME BORDER: CHINA'S LEGITIMATION STRATEGY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in Conflict Resolution By Drake M. Long, B.A. Washington, DC April 22, 2020 Copyright 2020 by Drake M. Long All Rights Reserved ii LEGITIMACY AND THE MARITIME BORDER: CHINA'S LEGITIMATION STRATEGY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA Drake M. Long, B.A. Thesis Advisor: Matthew Kroenig, Ph.D ABSTRACT Legitimacy, in constructivist international relations theory, is an asymmetric concept that can restrain or embolden rising powers. Sticking to foreign policy that is seen as illegitimate in the eyes of established norms will invite ‘hedging’ behavior and potentially the ire of the enforcers who maintain the current order, whereas acting with legitimacy eases the concern of established powers by convincing them a rising power does not plan to alter the world or regional order. However, legitimacy requires justifications for actions abroad as well as arguments tailored for a domestic audience at home. In the South China Sea, China has employed legal warfare alongside provocative military maneuvers and paramilitary activity within disputed waters. China has expansive claims with little basis in international law that threaten the security and territorial integrity of other states in Southeast Asia. However, rather than make it clear it plans on replacing the regional order governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China employs a host of legal scholars, institutions, and actors to continually refine arguments couched in international law that legitimize its actions. These arguments are prolific, both within and outside China, and are communicated clearly at international fora and to the international community. iii The research and writing of this thesis is dedicated to family and friends who encouraged me, committee members and faculty members of the program that taught me, and the numerous coworkers and mentors who trained me. Many thanks, Drake Long iv TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 NATIONAL REJUVENATION ..........................................................................................3 CHINA’S LEGITIMACY STRUGGLE............................................................................12 DOMESTIC SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY ....................................................................15 THE SOUTH CHINA SEA IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY ....................................24 LEGAL ARGUMENTS ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ................................................28 DISPUTING UNCLOS AND THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION .........31 DELEGITIMIZING UNCLOS ..........................................................................................36 CO-OPTING INTERNATIONAL FORA .........................................................................41 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................44 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................................................................................................47 v INTRODUCTION Foreign policy requires legitimacy. Ian Hurd defines ‘legitimacy’ in international relations as the normative belief that a rule or institute must be obeyed.1 It is an asymmetric concept to an actor’s actual capacity or military power, because to look illegitimate could invite the ire of ‘enforcers’ in the international system, to act illegitimate feels wrong or dangerous to the actor themselves, and acting legitimately is assumed to be in a state’s best interest. In these manners, legitimacy shapes actor behavior. It runs extremely counter to the treatment of material power as the sole basis for decision-making in the international system. To legitimize its foreign policy, an actor is strategic, and must be social, interacting with other actors and the system around them. An actor’s legitimacy imparts meaning to what political action they take, which makes that action easier or harder for other actors to accept. Legitimacy is inherently contested, as domestic elites use legitimacy against one another for political power, and a state actor employs legitimacy even in disputes. Finally, legitimacy is a matter of rhetoric, and the power of rhetoric has always come through contentious dialogue with other actors that will sharpen and strengthen the original actor’s argument.2 1 Hurd, Ian. “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics.” International Organization 53, no.2 (April 1, 1999): 379–408. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081899550913. 2 Goddard, Stacie E., and Ronald R. Krebs. “Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy.” Security Studies 24, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 5–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2014.1001198. 1 Without legitimacy, an actor will be seen as irrational at best or be demonized at worst, complicating its ability to accomplish any foreign policy goals in the face of stiff resistance from other actors. The purpose of this paper is to treat modern China’s strategy in the South China Sea under the lens of legitimacy: whether China cares about legitimizing its actions in the South China Sea, how China could be legitimizing its South China Sea strategy, and what the effectiveness of this legitimation strategy is. The South China Sea represents the convergence of scholarship on borderlands and constructivism; it is simultaneously resource-poor, uninhabited, and far-flung from the centers of power of any country. Yet a policy of weakness in the South China Sea is treated as a threat to the territorial integrity of claimant states, most especially China, and the history of the South China Sea as well as its strategic importance has been almost wholly fabricated from nothing by actors competing to have their wide-ranging claims over its waters and features look more credible. For China, foreign policy goals in the South China Sea are twofold: (1) the South China Sea is key to China’s ability to become a maritime great power, and (2) it will help fulfill China’s grand strategy, of achieving ‘National Rejuvenation.’3 These are closely interrelated, as China argues maritime great power status is a precondition to ‘National Rejuvenation,’ but the South China Sea features in both of them for wholly different, non-related reasons. Fundamentally, maritime great power status requires legitimizing aggressive or revanchist actions to China’s neighbors, whereas ‘National Rejuvenation’ is 3 Numerous official documents state this. For example, see “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” from the State Council Information Office, April 2013. 2 contingent on legitimizing China’s actions to itself – the population of Chinese citizens and elites within China’s borders. As research shows, China is legitimizing its actions in the South China Sea through numerous legal warfare tactics: advancing legal arguments that appeal to the international law community, advancing legal arguments to discredit the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea using the language of anti-colonialism, and co-opting international fora. All of these tactics coincide with and benefit China’s effort to change facts on the ground through human habitation and resource exploration. These construct ever-higher stakes to justify an aggressive posture in the South China Sea to China’s neighbors and for China’s domestic audience. First, some key parts of China’s grand strategy have to be explained. NATIONAL REJUVENATION China is simultaneously a rising power and geographically situated on the site of a former hegemonic empire whose traditions it lays claim to. Reconciling these two identities has been an ongoing project for the People’s Republic of China’s new leadership, as General-Secretary Xi Jinping articulates in his vision for National Rejuvenation. This is the clearest blueprint for China’s grand strategy currently available. Xi Jinping laid out the concept of National Rejuvenation in his October 18, 2017 speech at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China: National rejuvenation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people since modern times began. At its founding, the Communist Party of China made realizing Communism its highest ideal and its ultimate goal, and shouldered the 3 historic mission of national rejuvenation. In pursuing this goal, the Party has united the Chinese people and led them through arduous struggles to epic accomplishments… Our Party was deeply aware that, to achieve national rejuvenation, it was critical to topple the three mountains of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat- capitalism that were oppressing the Chinese people, and realize China’s independence, the people’s liberation, national reunification, and social stability. Our Party united the people and led them in embarking on the right revolutionary path, using rural areas to encircle the cities and seizing state power with military force… Maintaining lasting prosperity and stability in Hong Kong and Macao and achieving China’s full reunification are essential to realizing national rejuvenation. We must ensure both the central government’s overall jurisdiction over the Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions and a high degree of autonomy in the two regions. We should ensure that the principle of “one country, two systems”
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