SUMMARY Rejuvenating Communism the Communist Youth

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SUMMARY Rejuvenating Communism the Communist Youth SUMMARY Rejuvenating Communism The Communist Youth League as a Political Promotion Channel in Post-Mao China Jérôme Doyon Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2017 © 2017 Jérôme Doyon All rights reserved ABSTRACT Rejuvenating Communism : The Communist Youth League as a Political Promotion Channel in Post- Mao China Jérôme Doyon How does the Chinese Party-State renew its political elite and maintain its cohesion in the post-Mao era? This is a key question to understand the evolution of China’s political system and still the explanations one can find in the literature are far from satisfactory. Overall, the literature on transformation of the Chinese political elite focuses on the broad outcomes, the fact that since the 1980s officials tend to be younger and more educated, but it falls short in unveiling the mechanisms at play. It gives a limited answer to the elite renewal issue as it leaves politics aside. By focusing on educational levels and technical skills it forgets about the importance of political commitment. I approach these questions through a unique account of the role played by the Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) in terms of cadres’ recruitment and promotion since the 1980s. Using biographical data and a snowball sample of 92 interviewees I reconstructed the trajectories of CYL cadres. Beyond my focus on the central organization of the CYL in Beijing, I compared the situation of the CYL in the capital cities of two very different provinces and in four universities. Through this mixed methods approach, I could assess the evolution of the CYL as a path to power in post-Mao China. My main findings are as follows: First, due to post-Cultural Revolution politics and the need for leaders at the time to recruit loyal young cadres, a “sponsored mobility” system was developed to renew the Party- State’s elite. College students are recruited and trained through the Party’s youth organizations. They are put then on a unique promotion path, which includes specific opportunities and trainings, and which leads them to leadership position in the Party-State. This contrasts with what happened in the Soviet case in particular. Under Khrushchev (1953-1964), the Soviet elite was renewed through the cooptation of professionals with technical skills rather than by recruiting young cadres who spent their whole career in the Party-State. Second, through the various steps of the sponsored mobility process, the young recruits develop a specific social role as future officials and transform their social circles. As a result, they cultivate a political commitment to their career in the Party-State and to the survival of the regime. Third, the decentralized nature of the Party-State and its youth organizations make it difficult for the young recruits to establish cohesive groups which could organize against the Party-State itself Contents Notes on Translation, Capitalization and Mandarin ....................................................... iii Acknowledgement ............................................................................................................... iv Summary ............................................................................................................................... 1 A - Elite cohesion and renewal in communist regimes ...................................................... 1 1) The transformation of communist systems ................................................................ 2 2) The Chinese case ........................................................................................................ 7 B - Literature review: beyond formal and informal politics............................................. 11 1) Formal politics in post-Mao China .......................................................................... 11 a) The limited institutionalization of the Party under Mao ................................................................. 11 b) The invention of Weberian bureaucrats in post-Mao China ........................................................... 13 c) The Party’s control over its cadres .................................................................................................. 16 d) Elite dualism and sponsored mobility ............................................................................................. 20 e) Beyond the organizational emperor................................................................................................ 24 2) Informal politics in post-Mao China ........................................................................ 26 a) Family ties in post-Mao China ........................................................................................................ 26 b) Factionalism in the Chinese polity .................................................................................................. 29 c) The limits of the formal and informal dichotomy ........................................................................... 31 C - An interactionist approach towards political mobility ............................................... 35 1) Loyalty, commitment and career.............................................................................. 35 2) The non-material incentives for political commitment beyond ideology ................ 38 3) Vocation and commitment to political roles ............................................................ 42 4) The social dimension of commitment ...................................................................... 44 a) Personal ties and group dynamics ................................................................................................... 44 b) Institutionalized group dynamics in contemporary China .............................................................. 47 5) Commitment and youth organizations: a multi-level analysis ................................. 50 D - The Chinese Communist Youth League in comparative perspective ........................ 52 1) Youth organizations and elite renewal ..................................................................... 52 2) The Communist Youth League in post-Mao China ................................................. 55 a) The League as the Party’s core youth organization ........................................................................ 55 b) The Party’s reserve force ................................................................................................................ 58 c) The Communist Youth League on campus ..................................................................................... 62 E - Research Question and Hypotheses ............................................................................ 64 F - Research Design ......................................................................................................... 67 1) Research methods .................................................................................................... 67 a) Career data ....................................................................................................................................... 67 b) Interviews ........................................................................................................................................ 69 c) Primary written sources ................................................................................................................... 73 2) Fieldwork sites ......................................................................................................... 74 i G - Outline of the dissertation .......................................................................................... 78 H - Main arguments .......................................................................................................... 80 1) Sponsored mobility and the reward of commitment ................................................ 80 a) The political origins of an age-based cadre management system ................................................... 80 b) Commitment and career building .................................................................................................... 81 c) The political elite plays by different rules ....................................................................................... 83 2) It all starts on campus ............................................................................................... 85 3) The Party-State’s segmentary features ..................................................................... 86 I - My approach and its limits .......................................................................................... 89 1) Comparisons across time and space ......................................................................... 89 2) A State-centered approach ....................................................................................... 90 ii Notes on Translation, Capitalization and Mandarin Unless specified, and besides the names of State’s laws and administrations, all translations from French and Chinese to English are the author’s. Besides common rules regarding proper nouns, locales and titles, the names of specific institutions and positions are capitalized. Capitalization occurs only when referring to a single specific institution (for example: Peking University Student Union, by opposition to universities’ student unions) or position (for example: Central Party Committee
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