Air and Missile Defense: Defining the Future

Vishal Giare and Gregory A. Miller

ABSTRACT Since the development of the proximity fuze in 1942, the Johns Hopkins University Applied Phys- ics Laboratory (APL) has been leading the nation in the development of air and missile defense capabilities to defend our military forces, our allies, and the nation. Throughout these 78 years APL has strived to solve many of the most critical challenges in air and missile defense and in doing so has made critical contributions to the nation. As we look toward APL’s centennial in 2042, global threats to our nation’s military, allies, and homeland are evolving at a pace that will significantly challenge today’s air and missile defenses. This article describes the grand challenges in future air and missile defense and how APL, by anticipating these future warfighting environments and leveraging technology innovations, is working to revolutionize air and missile defense to ensure our nation’s preeminence in the 21st century.

BACKGROUND APL has made critical contributions to our nation’s scanning, tracking, and closed-loop guidance needed to air and missile defenses since it was founded in 1942 for defend against simultaneous aircraft and missile raids and the express purpose of developing the proximity fuze was the precursor to the Aegis AN/SPY-1 radar; and the for use during the war. These contributions to counter- Cooperative Engagement Capability,4 which was the first ing air and missile threats have spanned the spectrum networked air defense capability for the Navy, enabling of advanced sensor, weapon, and command and control a ship to engage aircraft and missiles using another ship’s (C2) technologies and have resulted in the development netted radar data. APL thought leadership and technical of four of the innovations that have helped define the contributions to the Aegis and Ship Self-Defense System Laboratory over its history. These air and missile defense combat systems, the Standard Missile family, the Evolved defining innovations include the proximity fuze,1 which Sea Sparrow Missile, the Air and Missile Defense Radar, dramatically increased the effectiveness of anti-aircraft surface electronic warfare systems, Naval Integrated Fire artillery during World War II; surface-to-air missiles,2 Control, our nation’s Ballistic Missile Defense System which resulted in the Navy’s first operational missile and its sea-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense element, defense system and was the foundation of the current and numerous other programs have achieved essential Standard Missile program; Advanced Multi-Function air and missile defense capabilities for the Lab’s Navy and Array Radar,3 which provides near-instantaneous Missile Defense Agency sponsors.

Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Volume 35, Number 4 (2021), www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest 505 V. Giare and G. A. Miller FUTURE AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ensure safe and free access to them. In space, the United States has developed capabilities over many decades that GRAND CHALLENGES are vital to the US economy and are heavily leveraged As we look toward the future, and the centennial of in most aspects of our national defense. In response, the Laboratory, global threats to our nation’s military, adversaries have matured technologies and operational allies, and homeland are evolving at a pace that will capabilities to threaten space systems, imperiling US significantly challenge today’s air and missile defenses. warfighting capabilities and turning space into a con- Anticipating future warfighting environments and lever- tested domain. aging technology innovations will prepare us to revo- Near-space has also emerged as a contested domain lutionize air and missile defense to ensure our nation’s with the emergence of hypersonic strike weapons. The preeminence in the 21st century. domain of near-space (defined as the region between altitudes of 20 and 100 km) favors vehicles designed at the Highly Contested Anti-Access/Area-Denial Environments intersection of conventional aeronautical and aerospace With the reemergence of a strategic, great-power systems. Achieving dominance of this domain is of keen competition, certain nations seek to challenge US mili- interest to adversaries since it is weakly defended with tary advantage and restrict our freedom of operation conventional anti-air warfare systems operating below across the globe. Strategic competitors are making sig- and ballistic missile defense systems operating above this nificant investment in advancing regional anti-access/ domain. area-denial (A2/AD) warfighting capabilities to con- test US ability to deter adversary aggression. They AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE STRATEGIC VECTORS have developed networked, multidomain battle forces with integrated theater-scale intelligence, surveillance, AND INNOVATION reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR&T), aimed at apply- Keeping pace with and ultimately leaping ahead of ing overwhelming force with large-scale weapon salvos. our adversaries will require significant advancement The capability exists for significant application of non- and innovation that may fundamentally redefine our kinetic and cyber weapons, augmented with the use of approach to air and missile defense. A framework for con- artificial intelligence to control these weapons. In this templating the game-changing capabilities necessary to highly dynamic environment, the potential for a rapidly accomplish this goal across the set of anticipated future escalating collision of highly networked and lethal forces grand challenges is depicted in Figure 1. The strategic operating across an entire theater must be considered. vectors span the breadth of envisioned capabilities and Both offensive and defensive operations could occur provide direction toward potential defining innovations. simultaneously, with all domains heavily contested. They include ubiquitous ISR&T; novel kinetic weapons; asymmetric nonkinetic defeat; transformational C2; and Defending the Homeland cognitive communications and networking. On the home front, the United States has historically Ubiquitous ISR&T benefited from peaceful partners on the northern and ISR&T senses the battlespace to establish and main- southern borders and enjoyed the sanctuary afforded by tain an understanding of the operational environment two oceans buffering the nation from adversaries. The and provide targeting data of sufficient reliability and development of long-range ballistic missiles carrying accuracy to consummate engagements across the spec- nuclear warheads was a defining characteristic of the trum of air and missile threats. Future ISR&T systems Cold War. With no suitable defenses, the United States must operate in the context of great-power conflict, and the Soviet Union relied on the doctrine of mutually limiting the effectiveness of systems developed for more assured destruction (MAD) to provide strategic stability. permissive environments. Challenges include contin- Today, proliferation of long-range ballistic missile tech- ual targeting of all potential threats, including missiles nology into the hands of rogue nations has renewed the (cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic), unmanned vehicles, urgency for homeland ballistic missile defense. Further, ISR platforms, and threat delivery platforms. Continual the reemergence of long-range conventional cruise mis- targeting of all potential threats improves the track qual- siles as well as the advent of widely available autono- ity of potential targets by incorporating observations mous systems reveal alarming attack vectors from the when available or needed and reduces target uncertain- air. Ensuring robust air and missile defense of the home- ties, including threat identification. Additionally, global land will be a paramount national priority. custody encompasses the timely, continual tracking of potential threats at scale with timeliness to meet engage- Dominating the Space and Near-Space Domains ment orders without the need to fall back and retask sen- New global environments are emerging in the space sors. This must be achieved to defend the homeland and and near-space domains, with the attendant need to protect expeditionary forces during regional conflict.

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Grand Combat operations in Defending the Dominating space and challenges A2/AD environments homeland near-space domains Strategic vectors

Ubiquitous ISR&T Multidomain, multifunction sensors, distributed fusing, resilience

Novel kinetic weapons Multimission, scalable intelligence, enhanced kill mechanisms, miniaturization

Asymmetric nonkinetic defeat Directed energy, electronic attack, large-scale autonomy, cyber

Transformational C2 Distributed, learns and adapts, resilience, optimized human/machine intelligence

Cognitive comms and networking Multidomain, resilient, heterogeneous, aware, dynamically reactive

Figure 1. Future air and missile defense capability framework. This framework contemplates the game-changing capabilities necessary to keep pace with and ultimately leap ahead of our adversaries across the set of anticipated future grand challenges. The strategic vectors span the breadth of envisioned capabilities and provide direction toward potential defining innovations.

Overcoming these challenges will require autono- scale (large numbers of targets), and enabling a human mously composable, multidomain ISR&T (Figure 2) that on the loop to manage much more complex systems. This intelligently fuses all available data to enable flexible, effec- envisioned ISR&T capability requires fusing data agnostic tive kill webs in highly contested environments, resulting of sensor source; battle management, command, control, in the ability to establish and maintain custody of many and communication to move data between operational potential targets and providing cohesive targeting solu- areas; and the algorithms to discover, fuse, and task sen- tions across warfighting domains. Autonomous compos- sors. Achieving this vision will provide multiple viable ability may leverage autonomy and artificial intelligence/ targeting options to the warfighter while confusing adver- machine learning (AI/ML) to concurrently develop mul- sary ISR&T. The technology employed to achieve ISR&T tiple viable kill chains, thus realizing kill webs. AI/ML is capabilities should apply to multiple warfighting domains not a singular solution, but rather it enables key attributes and should have multilevel security enabling interoper- of ISR&T solutions, including timeliness, operating at ability across domains and handover among modalities.

Figure 2. Envisioned kill webs enabled by ubiquitous ISR&T. Composable networks of space-based sensors (satellites), manned and unmanned surface and airborne sensors, and ground sensors are envisioned to enable adaptable targeting across air, surface, and ground threats.

Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Volume 35, Number 4 (2021), www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest 507 V. Giare and G. A. Miller Novel Kinetic Interceptors the limited arsenals of kinetic weapons that our forward- The ability to kinetically defeat adversary threats deployed platforms can carry. Additionally, each of has been an air defense cornerstone and will be critical the grand challenges presents different threats. For for success across all three grand challenges. In highly combat operations in A2/AD environments, the asym- contested A2/AD environments, adversaries have metry results from our ships and other assets being in access to an overwhelming inventory of weapons, so close proximity to adversary territory from which large forward-stationed combatants will be required to defend numbers of aircraft, missiles, and other threats can be themselves and our allies against massive attacks. So launched. For defending the homeland, threats include that the nation can be successful in this arena, APL intercontinental ballistic missile raids as well as mis- will strive to develop capabilities employing large-scale siles and unmanned aerial vehicles launched from off- autonomous, potentially heterogeneous kinetic weapons shore manned and unmanned platforms threatening a to overcome inventory disadvantages. In space and near- diverse range of targets. Finally, for space and near-space space environments, we aim to lead development of new domains, defended assets include our systems in orbit multimission interceptors capable of overcoming stress- and terrestrial assets that can be attacked from space ing physical environments and ensuring US dominance and near-space. For each of these environments, we must in these domains. To support the defense of the home- develop new, nontraditional, cost-effective approaches land, we aim to develop new interceptor technology to to defeating the asymmetric threats encountered. allow deployment of cost-effective systems to defend the There are a number of technology areas through US population over our more than 3,000,000 square which new defeat mechanisms may be realized. These miles of territory, even against weapons from mobile or include high-energy laser and high-power microwave, covert launchers. advanced distributed electronic attack, cyber and elec- To achieve these advances in interceptor and autono- tronic warfare techniques, and volume defeat (creating mous system capabilities, we envision technology inno- a lethal volume filled with “effects” that would damage/ vations across multiple fronts. Interceptors with the defeat threats flying through that volume). These tech- ability to negate more than one threat, or a volume of nologies may yield several potential defining innova- threats, may be developed, offsetting raid size asym- tions. We could deny or degrade adversary targeting metry. Weapons capable of operating in and defending of our assets and forces by action against their sensors near-space and space could be built, overcoming access and networks in ways that are not readily detectable issues. Persistent propulsion along with cooperative, self- or attributable. We could create overwhelming confu- organizing swarms of defensive munitions capable of sion for threat missiles or unmanned vehicle swarms intra-salvo communication are envisioned to optimize via combinations of cyber and electronic warfare driven performance as the threat environment evolves mid- by advancement in AI/ML. Further, we could deliver flight. Highly advanced seekers capable of containing cyber payloads that disable incoming weapons and/or wide uncertainties while still achieving high precision targeting sensors, resulting in system malfunction or during terminal homing might be designed, improving deception. Additionally, evolution in directed-energy mission flexibility, accuracy, and robustness. Kill mech- weapons could enable disabling effects at tactically anisms that significantly increase overall effectiveness significant ranges. Finally, with advances in electronic could be developed, providing a capability for defense warfare and decoy techniques, we could divert incoming and offense. Finally, intelligent multimission intercep- threats to a small kill zone, amplifying the effectiveness tors capable of mission selection/reassignment through- of defeat mechanisms. out the engagement battlespace could become the norm, allowing robust homeland defense and defense against Transformational C2 saturation raids. C2 systems provide the means though which military operations are planned, directed, and coordinated Asymmetric Nonkinetic Defeat in pursuit of a mission. To be successful in the air and Defeating asymmetric air and missile threats, includ- missile defense missions encompassed within the three ing overwhelming raid sizes and large-cost asymmetries grand challenges, we must develop a distributed C2 between the adversary threat and our weapons, is a cen- capability that enables our forces to overcome adver- tral issue in each of the grand challenges. An example saries by making decisions and coordinating actions of the former is large raids of aircraft, cruise missiles, more accurately and on a shorter timeframe than they small boats, or unmanned platforms in highly contested can. In highly contested A2/AD environments, we environments. For the latter, an example is relying must optimize and schedule the use of kinetic weapon multi-million-dollar interceptors to defeat multi- ons, electronic warfare (EW), directed energy, ISR&T, thousand-dollar unmanned aerial vehicles. In addition physical and electromagnetic spectrum maneuver, and to cost, this situation also stresses inventory because of unmanned operations to overcome our opponent’s

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software optimization will enable the speed and resilience required for AI enhancements and robust cyber defenses for these distributed systems.

Cognitive Communications and Networking Communications and networking provide the underly- ing interconnectivity between ISR&T, weapons, C2 systems, and platforms. Cognition, resilience, security, and high-capacity communications will be essential Figure 3. Autonomous netted persistent decoy concept. Employment of distributed enablers for military operations manned and unmanned air defense assets will require transformational C2 capabilities that in highly contested environments learn, adapt, and optimize human and machine intelligence to counter projected air and in the air, space, and near-space missile threats. domains as well as in defense of the homeland. Future capabilities are envisioned to seamlessly “home field advantage” in inventory and other areas. integrate our distributed systems and platforms with Figure 3 illustrates an APL-conceived autonomous net- heterogeneous communications leveraging all available worked persistent decoy concept employing distributed assets. Communication networks must be flexible to take EW techniques to counter anti-ship missiles. In space advantage of new and evolving technologies, while pre- and near-space, we need to make engagement and fire- serving operability with existing systems and capabilities. control decisions despite profound uncertainty in threat To enhance warfighting capabilities, better quality of ser- trajectories and countermeasures, and with the full tac- vice and higher data rates (potentially 100 times higher) tical and strategic consequences that our actions will will be needed, as will new algorithms and technologies, have on adversary response. In defending the homeland, including AI, in situ learning, and real-time data fusion. we face many possible avenues of attack and must opti- New communications systems should be cognitive and mize allocation of our limited surveillance and defense adaptive, sensing the spectrum and reacting to natural resources to maximize our defense. and adversarial environments to provide the best avail- To overcome these challenges, we envision trans- able quality of service. formational C2 systems that learn, adapt, and optimize These novel communications capabilities will draw human and machine intelligence to achieve force-level, on and extend state-of-the-art technologies in commu- superhuman decision-making to outmaneuver our nications networks, particularly 5G and beyond, such adversaries. These distributed systems will be composed as massive multiple-input, multiple-output and modern of a combination of manned and unmanned systems modulation techniques, full-spectrum usage, and beam- in a structured framework compatible with service C2 forming and directionality, to fully utilize diversity in architectures and operable with a mix of legacy and space, time, and frequency. Anticipated technologi- modernized capabilities. Leveraging academic research cal breakthroughs include advances in high-efficiency, and commercial technologies in autonomous systems, high-diversity waveforms with diverse media and links, optimization, learned behavior, and game theory, we advanced antenna designs, innovative multiplexing envision predictive capabilities to evaluate multimission techniques, and broad-spectrum utilization methods. courses of action, optimized and coordinated across the Additionally, the capability will achieve flexibility to theater and resilient to adversary deception and com- trade between network capacity and redundancy, as well munications denial. The application of artificial intel- as resiliency and multilayered encryption with emphasis ligence to advanced C2 perception, reasoning, planning, on the physical layer to achieve security. We envision decision-making, and adaptive learning, combined with innovations in encryption techniques, mission-specific advancing human and machine teaming, will enhance algorithms to optimize network capacity, techniques to shared awareness and context between humans and reduce vulnerability, and smart communication usage machines to achieve trust in autonomy and order-of- that adapts to warfighter mission needs. Further, these magnitude improvement in decision-making. Finally, capabilities will support heterogeneous traffic (video, C2, technology evolution of state-of-the-art computing and text, tactical data) and links (radio frequency, optical,

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acoustic) that are interchangeable and will seamlessly defense technology development focused on potential connect multiple domains. Key enablers in this area are defining innovations. We envision key strategic vectors additional non-radio-frequency-based links (such as free- that can align us toward realizing game-changing space optical links), quality-of-service-driven network defensive capabilities across the range of future grand management, real-time data fusion algorithms to merge challenges. Leveraging the deep technical insight we heterogeneous traffic, and novel scheduling and routing gain through advancing today’s state-of-the-art defense techniques. Finally, innovations will include cognitive systems in the face of current challenges, we focus our capabilities to recognize and mitigate disruptions (physi- technology development and innovation in areas that cal, cyber, or environmental), optimize throughput, and move us along these strategic vectors toward defining achieve superior resilience by applying sensing, inter- the future of our nation’s air and missile defense. pretation, and reasoning algorithms for data validation. Important advancements will include resilient AI-based ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: The ideas captured in this article spectrum sensing and network resource optimization, resulted from internal APL workshops and study groups cognitive sensing, interpretation and reasoning algo- conducted in 2019–2020 to identify specific charac- rithms for data validation, intrusion detection, intruder teristics of emerging grand challenges and potential confusion, vulnerability assessment, and intelligent directions for future capability development. We grate- cyber protection. fully acknowledge the efforts of the APL Air and Missile Defense Sector staff members who generated these ideas and directions. CONCLUSION As we strive to fulfill APL’s centennial vision and REFERENCES ensure our nation’s preeminence in the 21st century, 1R. D. Semmel, “Defining innovations,”Johns Hopkins APL Tech. Dig., we foresee a future of intense technological competi- vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 107–108, 2018, https://www.jhuapl.edu/Content/ techdigest/pdf/V34-N02/34-02-Semmel.pdf. tion pitting emerging adversary offensive capabilities 2D. B. Hudson, “Alvin R. Eaton (1920–2011),”Johns Hopkins APL Tech. against the defensive system advancements needed to Dig., vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 83–86, 2012, https://www.jhuapl.edu/Content/ counter them. Meeting the challenges posed by these techdigest/pdf/V31-N01/31-01-Memoriam_Eaton.pdf. 3C. Phillips, “Aegis: Advanced Multi-Function Array Radar,” Johns rapidly advancing threats will require the development Hopkins APL Tech. Dig., vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 246–249, 1981, https://www. and application of defenses far more distributed, flexible, jhuapl.edu/Content/techdigest/pdf/V02-N04/02-04-Phillips_Radar. and intelligent than those of today. We are anticipat- pdf. 4Anonymous, “The Cooperative Engagement Capability,” Johns Hop- ing tomorrow’s warfighting landscape to ensure that we kins APL Tech. Dig., vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 377–396, 1995, https://www. remain at the forefront of cutting-edge air and missile jhuapl.edu/Content/techdigest/pdf/V16-N04/16-04-APLteam.pdf.

Vishal Giare, Air and Missile Defense Gregory A. Miller, Air and Missile Sector, Johns Hopkins University Applied Defense Sector, Johns Hopkins University Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD Vishal Giare is APL’s air and missile defense Gregory A. Miller is APL’s air and missile mission area executive. He has a BS in phys- defense deputy mission area executive. He ics from the University of Tennessee, an MS has a BS in electrical engineering from in physics from the University of Michigan, the University of Maryland, College Park and an MS in electrical engineering from and an MS in electrical engineering from the University of Michigan. He leads and sets direction for staff Johns Hopkins University. He has decades of experience in researching and developing advanced ballistic missile defense engineering management for the development of integrated (BMD) and air defense systems to provide integrated air and warfare systems, target detection tracking and identification missile defense (IAMD) for the nation, its deployed forces, and systems, sensor networking systems, tactical data link commu- its allies. He oversees a portfolio including Aegis, Standard Mis- nications systems, surface combat systems, and the operations sile, Cooperative Engagement Capability, and Missile Defense and interactions of US Navy combat systems. This experi- Agency programs. Vishal has more than two decades of expe- ence includes vision and goal setting; fiscal, technical, and rience in the systems engineering, modeling and simulation, programmatic management for product development, testing, test and evaluation, and operational system analysis of complex evaluation, and demonstration; and worldwide delivery, instal- IAMD weapon systems, serving as a trusted agent and technical lation, and operational support. His email address is gregory. advisor to senior US Navy and Missile Defense Agency lead- [email protected]. ers. In 2016, he was appointed by the National Academy of Sci- ences, Engineering and Medicine, to serve on the Naval Studies Board Committee on Defending Forward-Deployed US Navy Platforms from Potential Enemy Missile and Rocket Attacks. His email address is [email protected].

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