With Every Living Creature That Is with You: Exploring Relational Ontology and Non-Human Animals

With Every Living Creature that is with You: Exploring Relational Ontology and Non-Human Animals

Allison Marie Covey

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Regis College and the Graduate Centre for Theological Studies of the Toronto School of Theology. In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Theology awarded by the University of St. Michael’s College.

With Every Living Creature that is with You: Exploring Relational Ontology and Non-Human Animals

Allison Marie Covey Doctor of Philosophy University of St. Michael’s College 2020 Abstract

Despite the progressive contributions of Laudato Si’, Catholic theology today often fails to differentiate between non-human animals, inanimate objects, and nature broadly defined. The only line drawn with consistency is that between humanity and the rest of Creation.

Anthropocentric instrumentalism has edged out a Trinitarian relational ontology of non-human

Creation rooted in both Scripture and Tradition. This dissertation argues that the anthropocentric instrumentalisation of non-human Creation is not a necessary nor authentic position of the

Christian faith. It proposes instead that Christianity’s failure to recognise Creation’s inherent goodness and theocentric telos has been the result of developments along the West’s passage into modernity. A restoration of Christianity’s pre-modern sense of theocentric relationality is both possible and desirable for countering modernity’s corruption of Creation theology and theological anthropology.

This dissertation formulates, from the existing tradition, a consistent and Trinitarian ontology of non-human animals that acknowledges them as beings existing for and in loving relationship with the common Creator. It argues that the telos of non-human animals is not service to humankind but fulfillment in relationship with the Trinity, with humanity, and with the whole of Creation. Non-human animals must be recognised as legitimate Others, participants in the cosmic liturgy, rather than objects to be used by humanity on its singular quest toward God.

They are intrinsically good, their goodness arising from their relationship with the Triune God on

Whom the ontological relationality of all of Creation is based and toward Whom it is ordered.

The inherent relationality of being renders impossible an authentic anthropology that fails to take into account the non-human members of Creation with which and through which humanity exists. Likewise, an ontology of non-human animals cannot be articulated without reference to relationality, as their existence is inextricable from the existence of all other beings, both earthly and divine.

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Table of Contents 0. INTRODUCTION 0.1 The Church Striving to Image God in a Trinitarian Key ...... 1 0.2 Supplanting Anthropocentric Instrumentalism ...... 3 0.3 Challenges to the Theological and Moral Standing of Other Animals ...... 6 0.4 Resources for the Development of a Trinitarian Relational Ontology ...... 7 0.5 The Argumentative Structure of This Project ...... 10 0.6 Conclusion ...... 14

I. CRITIQUING ANTHROPOCENTRIC INSTRUMENTALISM

1.1 Introduction ...... 16 1.1.1 What Is Anthropocentric Instrumentalism ...... 17 1.1.2 Anthropocentric Instrumentalism in Ritual and Doctrine ...... 18 1.2 The Picture Thus Far ...... 22 1.2.1 A Lacuna in Theology ...... 22 1.2.2 Magisterial Inroads ...... 24 1.3 The Historical Roots of Anthropocentric Instrumentalism ...... 29 1.3.1 Interpretations of Dominion ...... 30 1.3.2 The Rise of Metaphysical Dualism, Scientific Empiricism, and Human Exceptionalism ...... 37 1.3.3 Conflation of the Imago Dei and Biology ...... 46 1.4 Systematic Theology as Corrective ...... 51 1.4.1 Exegesis Alone as Insufficient Response ...... 54 1.4.2 Ethics Alone as Insufficient Motivation ...... 58 1.4.3 Correcting Eco-Theology’s Category Mistake ...... 60 1.5 Re-visioning the Imago Dei ...... 64 1.6 Conclusion ...... 72

II. THE GOODNESS OF CREATION IN HANS URS VON BALTHASAR 2.1 Introduction ...... 74 2.2 Who Is the Human ...... 76 2.2.1 Theological Personhood ...... 80 2.2.2 Freedom as Imago Dei ...... 87 2.3 What Is Creation ...... 92 2.3.1 Why Did God Create the World? Creation as Gift ...... 98 2.3.2 Beauty in Non-Human Creation: The Form of Nature as Divine Self-Expression ...... 104 2.4 Eschatological Hope for Non-Human Creation ...... 111 2.5 Conclusion ...... 116

III. THE RELATIONAL ONTOLOGY OF METROPOLITAN JOHN ZIZIOULAS

3.1 Introduction ...... 118 3.2 Relational Personhood ...... 121 3.2.1 Personhood in the Trinity ...... 121 3.2.2 Questions of Ontological Primary ...... 123 3.2.3 The Personhood of Created Beings ...... 132 3.3 Connecting to How God Is ...... 138 3.3.1 The Priesthood of Humanity ...... 141 3.3.2 The Telos of Non-Human Creation ...... 147 3.4 Conclusion ...... 152

IV. BEYOND ANTHROPOCENTRIC INSTRUMENTALISM: NON-HUMAN ANIMALS IN CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE

4.1 Introduction ...... 154 4.2 Andrew Linzey: Beginning the Conversation ...... 156 4.2.1 Theos-Rights and Theocentricity ...... 160 4.2.2 Reinterpreting the Incarnation in Liberation Theology ...... 164 4.2.3 Service as Human Uniqueness ...... 167 4.2.4 Creation's Absent Praise ...... 171 4.2.5 The Role of the Incarnation ...... 173 4.3 David Clough: Laying a Systematic Foundation ...... 174 4.3.1 Anthropocentrisms ...... 176 4.3.2 Creation & Creaturely Difference ...... 178 4.3.3 Creaturely Incarnation ...... 181 4.3.4 Eco-Theology's Dilemma ...... 183 4.3.5 The Doctrine of God ...... 185 4.4 Celia Deane-Drummond: Evolutionary Christology ...... 186 4.4.1 Imago Dei, Image-Bearing, and Graced Nature ...... 188 4.4.2 Cosmic Liturgy and Performance ...... 192 4.4.3 Evolved Relationality ...... 194 4.5 Conclusion ...... 196

V. LIVING IMAGO TRINITATIS: A RELATIONAL ETHIC FOR THE PRIESTS OF CREATION

5.1 Introduction ...... 200 5.2 Animals and Christian Moral Theology ...... 201 5.3 Recognising a Moral Question about Other Animals ...... 204 5.4 Identifying a Starting Point for Moral Theology ...... 209 5.4.1 Relationality as an Alternative Starting Point ...... 215 5.4.2 Trinitarian Theocentricity as Essential Corrective ...... 218 5.5 A Theocentric Relational Ethic in Practice ...... 222 5.5.1 Darwin the Ikea Monkey: Anthropocentrism as an Obstacle to Flourishing ...... 225

5.5.2 Industrialised Animal Agriculture: Mutual Goods and the Self-Sacrificial Priesthood ...... 233 5.5.3 Pet Carers in Crisis: Rejecting Zero-Sum Anthropocentrism, Living Relationality ...... 242 5.6 Conclusion ...... 250

VI. CONCLUSION ...... 254 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 258

Introduction 0.1 The Church Striving to Image God in a Trinitarian Key

The 2015 publication of Pope Francis’s long-awaited environmental encyclical Laudato

Si’ marked, for the Church, a moment of unprecedented contemplation of and concern for non- human Creation.1 Pope Francis’s authoritative acknowledgement and condemnation of humanity’s anthropocentric instrumentalisation of the goods of the planet at once affirmed the controversial assertion of historian Lynn White, Jr., that Christianity had contributed to the ecological crisis and rejected White’s assumption that this human-centered mode of relating to the non-human world was intrinsic to the Christian worldview.2 Laudato Si’ offered an important legitimization of Christian environmentalism, portraying ecological conservation as not only an accepted but indeed a critically necessary aspect of maintaining a preferential option for the poor and vulnerable, of meeting the demands of the Common Good, and of defending the dignity of Creation.3 Pope Francis’s recognition of the inherent and theocentric relationality of being (and the encyclical’s call for human humility as an appropriate response) signaled a new and hopeful direction in magisterial interpretation of theological anthropology. Despite this significant step forward, however, much work remains to be done, both by theologians and by the leadership of the Church, in dismantling the destructive discursive patterns created by

1 See Pope Francis, Laudato Si’, Encyclical letter on care for our common home, June 2015 (Washington: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2015). 2 See Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Science 155, no. 3767 (March 1967): 1203–1207. White’s thesis has, for the more than fifty years since its publication, been the subject of numerous responses, both supportive and critical. Notable academic responses include: Todd LeVasseur and Anna Peterson, eds., Religion and Ecological Crisis: The “Lynn White Thesis” at Fifty (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017); Bron Taylor, Gretel Van Wieren, and Bernard Daley Zaleha, “Lynn White Jr. and the Greening-of-Religion Hypothesis,” Conservation Biology 30, no. 5 (October 2016): 1000–1009; Lewis W. Moncrief, “The Cultural Basis for Our Environmental Crisis,” Science 170, no. 3957 (October 1970): 508–512. 3 Laudato Si’, 115, 156–158.

2 centuries of relatively unchecked Christian anthropocentrism and in constructing a theologically robust understanding of creaturely identity that recentres the Creator and takes seriously the

Creator’s relationship to fleshly beings other than humanity.

Although it is yet early, reception of Laudato Si’ has been mixed and, even where warm, ultimately superficial. Serious concerns have been raised over whether compassion for non- human Creation, particularly for other animals, might represent a misanthropic lack of concern for human suffering or even a denial of human dignity.4 Many still struggle with the notion that moral consideration of other species is, in a relational Creation, indivisible from concern for humanity itself and a significant aspect of what it means to have dominion over the earth.5 The

Catholic Church’s struggle with an anthropocentrism that insists on a hierarchical dualism of man and brute beast is ongoing; the theocentric relationality central to the encyclical has yet to be realized.

In Laudato Si’, Pope Francis writes that “all creatures are moving forward with us and through us toward a common point of arrival, which is God . . . Human beings, endowed with intelligence and love, and drawn by the fullness of Christ, are called to lead all creatures back to their Creator.”6 This theocentric vocation of humanity—which recognises other creatures not as objects and instruments but as co-journeyers toward God, who is the Father of all—is one that

4 See Peter Carruthers, The Animal Issue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Wesley J. Smith, A Rat Is a Pig Is a Dog Is a Boy: The Human Cost of the Animal Rights Movement (New York: Broadway Books, 2009); Wesley J. Smith, The War on Humans (Seattle: Discovery Institute Press, 2014); Lynn Vincentnathan, S. Georg Vincentnathan, and Nicholas Smith, “Catholics and Climate Change Skepticism,” Worldviews 20 (2016): 125–149. 5 See Pew Research Center, “Catholics Divided Over Global Warming: Partisan Differences Mirror Those Among General Public,” June 16, 2015; Nan Li et al., “Cross-pressuring Conservative Catholics? Effects of Pope Francis’ Encyclical on the U.S. Public Opinion on Climate Change,” Climactic Change 139, no. 3–4 (December 2016): 367– 380. 6 Francis, Laudato Si’, Encyclical letter on care for our common home, June 2015 (Washington: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2015), 83.

3 has been unclear for much of Church history and has only just, at present, begun to come into focus.7 Who are these Others who accompany humanity? How ought humanity to lead them?

Where are they being led? The Catholic tradition is rich with animal imagery and allegory— lambs, lions, doves, asses, camels, even dragons—but the ontology of non-human animals themselves remains largely unexamined, theologically. This work is an attempt to answer these questions from a Catholic perspective and, in the process, to answer also questions of the identity of the human being in relation to them—for, as Pope Francis writes, “There can be no ecology without an adequate anthropology.”8 It is a rejection of anthropocentric instrumentalism in favor of a relational ontology of Creation arising from a Catholic understanding of Trinity.

0.2 Supplanting Anthropocentric Instrumentalism

Despite the progressive contributions of Laudato Si’ and long-standing Scriptural precedent such as the Genesis description of the Noahic covenant, Catholic theology today often fails to differentiate between animal species and even between non-human animals, inanimate objects, and nature in general. The only distinct line drawn with any consistency is that between humanity and the rest of Creation. Anthropocentric instrumentalism has effectively edged out a

Trinitarian relational ontology of non-human Creation that finds its roots in both Scripture and

Tradition. An inconsistency in what material does exist, coupled with a lack of authoritative, ontological teaching on non-human animals, leaves the faithful with information too vague and underdeveloped to be truly instructive. This study will address these problems of consistency, authenticity, and relevance in the contemporary Catholic understanding of non-human animals.

The aim of this dissertation is to formulate, from the existing tradition, a consistent and

7 Ibid., 244. 8 Ibid., 118.

Trinitarian ontology of non-human animals that acknowledges them as beings who exist for and in loving relationship with the common Creator. This work argues that the telos of non-human animals, insofar as it can be known, is not simply to serve humankind but to come to their own fulfillment in relationship with the Trinity, with humanity, and with the whole of Creation. Non-human animals must be recognised as legitimate Others, participants in the cosmic liturgy, rather than mere objects to be used by humanity on its singular quest toward

God. They are intrinsically good, their goodness arising from their relationship with the Triune

God on Whom the ontological relationality of all of Creation is based and toward Whom it is ordered. Theirs is an inherent goodness that stems from their createdness, not their utility. This goodness differs from that of humanity but also from that of plants and inanimate objects, which is different still.

Like Pope Francis, this dissertation proceeds on the supposition that anthropocentric instrumentalisation of non-human Creation is not a necessary nor authentic position of the

Christian faith. It proposes instead that the dichotomous worldview of contemporary

Christianity that insists on a hierarchical division between humanity and other animals has been the result of several developments along the West’s passage into modernity. In particular, a sense of Creation’s inherent goodness and theocentric telos was lost with the embracing of a mechanistic empiricism and metaphysical dualism during the Scientific Revolution and with the

Enlightenment’s insistence that the human capacity for reason is that which not only sets humanity apart from but also installs it above the rest of the created order. A restoration of

Christianity’s pre-modern sense of theocentric relationality is, however, both possible and desirable for countering modernity’s corruption of both Creation theology and theological anthropology.

The relationality of being is supported by an understanding of the Trinity itself, the source and sustainer of all life. The human being's mere existence as a creature, the creation of a

Creator, places the human, from its origin, ontologically in relationship not only with a divine

Other, with absolute Being, but with all other creatures, beings, Others, who have also been formed by the same Creator. I will show that from the first passages of Genesis, this relationality is highlighted, reflected in Adam's naming of the other animals—one does not need a name for that to which one never refers. Made in the image of the Triune God, a God whose own interior reality has been revealed as a relationship of Others, the human being is called to live life on earth as it is in Heaven. That the human is, in particular, a fleshly creature unites the species not only to Christ in an embodied, tangible sense but also to its earthly co-inhabitants, the non- human animals who likewise find themselves formed from flesh, from the same material as humanity itself.9

A key claim of this work is that this inherent relationality of being renders impossible an authentic anthropology that fails to take into account the non-human members of Creation with which and through which humanity exists. Likewise, an ontology of non-human animals cannot be articulated without reference to their own relationality, as their existence is inextricably caught up with the existence of all other beings, both earthly and divine. It seems inevitable that in the development of such a relational ontology of non-human animals, the answer to the much- contested question of humanity's dominion will come into clearer focus. Despite the promise of

9 The Yahwist Creation account of Genesis 2 supports this biological reality when it describes both Adam and the non-human animals being fashioned, by God, from "the ground," suggesting a unity of substance. Eve, of course, is fashioned from Adam's rib rather than from the ground, rendering problematic any attempt to lean too heavily on this particular passage in order to build a case for the ontological unity of the animal kingdom. Contrary to historical characterisations of women, the Yahwist account could even be read to place a greater distance between women and the non-human animals than exists for men. Despite these crux interpreta, the unity of substance described bears noting.

6 this line of inquiry, few theologians have followed it, and questions surrounding the identity and telos of non-human animals remain as of yet controversial both in the pew and in the academy.

This dissertation aims to contribute to the nascent efforts of Christian theologians to both claim credibility for and advance the study of non-human animals within the field of systematic theology.

0.3 Challenges to the Theological and Moral Standing of Other Animals

There are significant challenges to the project of dismantling anthropocentric instrumentalism and replacing it with a relationality that takes seriously both the love of the

Trinity for other creatures and the resultant moral claims of those creatures on humanity itself.

The urgency of human suffering, particularly the ongoing challenges to the dignity of the poorest and most vulnerable, suggest to many that a kind of triage of moral concern is necessary. With limited resources at hand and an array of humanitarian crises to address, some consider it irresponsible, offensive, or even sinful to devote attention to the claims of other species, viewing compassion as a zero-sum game.10 Others assert that an instrumental approach to non-human animals is so ingrained in nearly every human society and within the increasingly globalized economy that any large-scale departure from the status quo would be, if not impossible, disastrous.11 The full realization of a relational ontology of being carries with it significant moral implications regarding human treatment of non-human animals. That the task of recognising and responding to the claims of animal Others upon humanity is a difficult one, one

10 Berkman, “From Theological Speciesism to a Theological Ethology,” 12. 11 Peter Carruthers, The Animal Issue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 160–166.

7 that asks much of the human species and little or nothing of other species, is not sufficient reason to avoid undertaking it.

Catholics who would advocate for non-human animals and, like Pope Francis, for the environment as a whole increasingly recognise that a preferential option for the poor and vulnerable cannot be realized without attention to the suffering of non-human Creation. In a relational cosmos, humanitarian concerns do not exist in a vacuum; they are bound up with the concerns of other creatures and with those of entire ecosystems. Quoting the Conference of

Dominican Bishops, Pope Francis writes that “peace, justice and the preservation of creation are three absolutely interconnected themes, which cannot be separated and treated individually without once again falling into reductionism.”12 The interests of non-human animals, as fellow fleshly, embodied members of that Creation, are bound up with the interests of humanity itself such that to deny one is to only partially and thus inadequately attend to the other.

0.4 Resources for the Development of a Trinitarian Relational Ontology

In order to develop the authoritative condemnation of anthropocentrism put forward by

Pope Francis in Laudato Si’ and to bring contemporary philosophical discourse on human relationships with other animals into conversation with Catholic theology, the dissertation chooses to give special attention to the work of Catholic theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar on the goodness of Creation and of Greek Orthodox theologian John Zizioulas on relational ontology. The work of these two theologians facilitates the expansion of a Trinitarian approach to questions of Creation’s telos and of humanity’s identity as Imago Dei. Balthasar and

12 Laudato Si’, 92.

Zizioulas have been chosen for their attentiveness to the significance of Christianity’s belief in a specifically Trinitarian God—particularly the implications that God’s Trinitarian form has on a theology of Creation. The work of both theologians brings together anthropology and cosmology with Trinitarian ontology, identifying for humanity a unique role within the cosmic liturgy without discounting the goodness of the rest of Creation or subordinating it to a merely instrumental goodness. Through Balthasar, this dissertation finds its connection to Catholic systematic theology, building upon his broader ontology of being and reverence for the beauty of

Creation. Through Zizioulas, Trinitarian theology is brought to bear on the present ecological crisis, a consideration that this work then extends to the question of non-human animals in particular.

In approaching the identity and telos of other animals through Christian systematic theology, the dissertation seeks to bypass some of the highly charged debates surrounding animal rights in the philosophical and activist discourses and to alleviate the concerns of Christians, principally Catholics, who worry that a reconsideration of human identity represents a grave rupture with tradition and a dilution or even denial of human dignity. The contention of this dissertation is that it is precisely the authentic and long-standing tradition of Christianity, particularly in its Catholic form, that has potential to speak constructively to the Church on the problem of anthropocentric instrumentalisation of other animals. Like Pope Francis, this work recognises that the inherent relationality of being in a Trinitarian key is not a new development in theology, nor is concern for other fleshly creatures a concept borrowed from allegedly secular philosophy, but that both of these notions arise naturally from God’s own self-revelation. Just as this dissertation engages with Eastern Orthodox thought in order to advance an argument situated within the Catholic context, one hopes that theologians working in other Christian denominations

9 will find herein resources to counter anthropocentric instrumentalisation of non-human animals where it is found within their own traditions.

The dissertation’s engagement with Balthasar and Zizioulas is grounded in a view of both as thinkers concerned with the retrieval and exposition of Christian wisdom on the identity, telos, and ultimate destination of both human and non-human Creation. Particularly in Balthasar’s consideration of Maximus the Confessor and Zizioulas’s consideration of the Cappadocian

Fathers, these theologians demonstrate a reverence for the foundational doctrines that constitute

Christian Tradition, particularly that of the Trinity, confident that their respective conclusions are not new inventions but faithful continuations or retrievals of what has been handed down. The nuanced work of each on Creation and God’s relationship to it provides fertile ground for thinking through questions now arising within what has been called “animal theology.”13 The dissertation engages with particular contributions of Balthasar and Zizioulas in order to synthesize its own relational mode of thinking about other animals and of humanity’s unique relationship to them. This work outlines the theological and ethical problems with an understanding of the Imago Dei that is grounded in anthropocentric instrumentalism and, through engagement with these and other thinkers, reimagines a cosmic liturgy in which humanity serves as Priest of Creation, recognising other fleshly creatures as religious subjects rather than objects.

How humanity understands God has an impact not only on its understanding of human identity and the call to image God but also on its understanding of and relationship with other

13 Though neither considers himself an animal advocate, and certainly Balthasar found no cause for concern in Christianity upholding a view of human exceptionalism that would place humanity above the other animals, their work is nonetheless useful for thinking through these contemporary questions. This project is primarily one of comparative analysis and critical synthesis. It does not aim to produce a Balthasarian or Zizioulan view of animal identity, and it acknowledges that neither thinker would recognise the conclusions of this work as his own original thought.

10 embodied beings. Zizioulas asserts that the doctrine of the Trinity has lost its practical application in the lives of the Christian faithful, but this work contends that a reclamation and reconsideration of Balthasar’s Imago Trinitatis offers a way forward, toward both a relational anthropology and ontology of other animals. A theocentric relational ontology not only helps to correct the “inadequate presentation of Christian anthropology” that Pope Francis laments as having contributed to the ecological crisis but offers a holistic solution to the problem of anthropocentric instrumentalisation of other animals as well.14

0.5 The Argumentative Structure of This Project

This dissertation presents its argument for a Trinitarian relational ontology of other animals, their inherent goodness, and their theocentric telos in five chapters. The first chapter outlines the central assumptions of anthropocentric instrumentalism, the theological position against which this work positions itself. It traces the roots of anthropocentric instrumentalism, arguing that it is not an intrinsic part of Catholic theology but a relative latecomer to Christian thought, bound up with the project of modernity realized in the Scientific Revolution and

Enlightenment. The chapter defends the claim that anthropocentric instrumentalism is not congruent with a faithful understanding of humanity’s dominion and is indicative of a misunderstanding of the Imago Dei. It concludes by arguing that the fields of Scriptural exegesis, Christian ethics, and eco-theology are insufficient to correct the theological problems of anthropocentric instrumentalism without the contributions of systematic theology.

Chapter 2 argues that anthropocentric instrumentalism is countered by a recognition of the inherent goodness of non-human Creation, a goodness that flows from a relationship with the

14 Laudato Si’, 116.

Creator, as well as by a theological anthropology that rejects individualism in favor of Trinitarian relationality. Non-human Creation is not merely material for human use but God’s own self- revelation and gift; all creatures are participants in a cosmic liturgy in which eschatological hope is not limited to a single species. Building upon the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar, the chapter makes the case for a contextualized theological anthropology that does not shy away from the embodiedness and embeddedness of the human being in Creation but instead recognises these characteristics as critical to an accurate understanding of human identity. Balthasar’s assertion that the Imago Dei is never private but communal—and relational—is made especially salient to the project of this dissertation where he considers the Imago Dei through a specifically

Trinitarian lens, arguing that humanity is called to be Imago Trinitatis. His response to the work of cultural theorist Denis de Rougement on the missionary nature of theological personhood and the destructive path of “anti-social Reason” provides a foothold for the vocational character of the Image developed in Chapter 3.15

Chapter 3 develops further the relational cosmology and anthropology of the previous chapter through engagement with the work of Metropolitan John Zizioulas. The chapter argues that Creation’s inherent goodness and relationality render an anthropocentric instrumentalist approach to other animals not only an ethical problem but, more than that, an existential one that distorts the telos of Creation, the reality of God, and the vocation of humanity as Priest of

Creation. Zizioulas’s rejection of an anti-relational individualism and an overemphasis on humanity’s cognitive capacities echo the work of Balthasar, allowing the dissertation to build upon and extend Balthasar’s Trinitarian and vocational view of the Imago Dei. Zizioulas’s lectures on the ecological crisis in particular serve as a useful pivot between Balthasar’s broader

15 Hans Urs von Balthasar, "On the Concept of Person," Communio 13 (Spring 1986): 25.

12 systematics of being and the focused animal theology of Zizioulas’s present-day contemporaries, outlined in the fourth chapter. Like Balthasar, Zizioulas argues that theological personhood can only be understood by reference to the unity and multiplicity of the Trinity. Of particular interest for this dissertation is the further step that Zizioulas takes in developing a Trinitarian relational ontology that links both divine and creaturely identity inextricably to relationality. Zizioulas’s characterization of the Imago Dei as a priesthood bestowed upon humanity is effective in countering not only history’s despotic understandings of dominion but also contemporary eco- theology’s models of stewardship, which lack the impetus necessary to move humanity beyond mere conservationism. A vocational model of the Imago Dei affirms the theocentric telos of non-human Creation, emphasizing its participation in the eschaton and the singular task of humanity to facilitate its recapitulation.

Chapter 4 situates the thesis question within contemporary discourse on non-human animals in Christian theology, arguing that a Trinitarian relational ontology that recognises the inherent goodness and theocentric telos of non-human animals, as presented in the previous chapters, resolves ongoing tensions and fills existent voids. The chapter puts the thesis in conversation with pioneering voices in Christian animal theology: Andrew Linzey, David

Clough, and Celia Deane-Drummond. With them, the chapter affirms that Christianity must preserve its insistence that the human species is set apart for a particular vocation within

Creation if moral theology is to argue that humanity has an obligation to facilitate the flourishing of non-human animals. However, where each of the theologians places strong emphasis on

Christ’s Incarnation to make a case for the goodness of other fleshly creatures and humanity’s connection to them, the chapter draws on the interventions of the previous chapters to argue that

13 it is the loving relationality of the Trinity that imbues this goodness and that provides humanity with the most complete image of that to which it ought to aspire as Priest of Creation.

The final chapter makes the case for Trinitarian relational ontology as an alternative starting point for moral decision making, considering the implications of the systematic theology of the previous chapters for Catholic moral theology through three contemporary case studies.

The chapter argues that Trinitarian theocentricity provides an essential corrective to theories of animal ethics that otherwise rely too heavily on the affections and partiality of humanity, presenting an inadequate challenge to anthropocentric instrumentalism. What ethical arguments that stem from even explicitly relational concepts such as love and care miss is that moral considerability hinges not on the capacities of the creature or its potential to be valued by another but on the reality of the love of the Trinity for all creaturely beings. The chapter will illustrate that anthropocentric instrumentalism is an impediment to the flourishing of humanity and other animals alike and that even self-costly care for God’s other animal creatures facilitates humanity’s achievement of its own telos.

This dissertation argues that the following moves will bring Catholics into greater alignment with their own telos and with the moral obligations that flow from it, facilitating the flourishing and eschatological hope of humans and other animals alike: 1. Identifying and challenging the anthropocentric instrumentalisation of other animals where it arises in Catholic thought and practice; 2. Recognising the inherent goodness of non-human Creation and the call of humanity to become Imago Trinitatis; 3. Embracing the vocation of humanity as Priest of an ontologically relational Creation teleologically ordered toward God; 4. Contributing the resources of Catholic systematic theology to ongoing philosophical and theological discourse on

14 the animal question; and 5. Using Trinitarian relational ontology as an alternative starting point for moral decision making.

0.6 Conclusion

Given the prevalence of non-human animals in sacred Scripture, music, and imagery, it is noteworthy that so little theological consideration has been dedicated to them as subjects in their own right. Recognition of humanity as one species among many, sharing the love of the Creator with other animal beings, carries with it moral and ethical implications that, if fully realised, would necessitate dramatic changes in human societies, particularly in developed nations where practices such as industrial animal agriculture are commonplace. Despite the disruptive potential of such changes, anthropocentric instrumentalisation of other animals, particularly where it is defended with appeals to the Christian faith, is contrary to the unique vocation of the human person as Priest of Creation and delays humanity’s coming into authentic personhood in Christ.

As Pope Francis warns, “A misguided anthropocentrism leads to a misguided lifestyle.”16 With the publication of Laudato Si’, the Church has taken preliminary steps to adding its own unique and formative voice to the discourse—still in relative infancy—that surrounds humanity and animality, but significant questions still remain.

The following chapters represent one attempt to begin to fill this epistemological gap, to think through and propose a theology of non-human animals that recognises them as distinct from other elements of non-human Creation—a diverse collection of species rather than a homogenous whole, the uniquenesses of each known and valued by their common Creator.

Simultaneously, this understanding of non-human animals is grounded in a relational ontology of

16 Laudato Si’, 122.

15 the Trinity that recognises all of Creation as existing in intrinsic relatedness both externally, with the Creator, and internally, with its own various elements. This relatedness does not diminish the uniqueness, the Otherness, of any species or individual member of Creation; instead, it is their very Otherness that makes possible the love between creatures. This love between the many

Others comprising the temporal world, modeled on the love of the Trinity through which all of earthly being has been formed, must become a priority of the Church. It is only in striving to live out the image of God in this Trinitarian key, to become the personal Imago Trinitatis, that humanity fulfills its priestly vocation of gathering the fractured, fragmented world and offering it up to its Creator. The Church must strive for this: as Balthasar writes, the "definitive shape" of the totality of Creation is participation in the divine life of love in the Trinity.17 With this in mind, the thesis turns now to the question of how this theocentric relationality of humanity and other animal species was supplanted by an anthropocentric instrumentalism that divorced God from God’s Creation and humanity from its evolutionary context.

17 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume V: The Last Act (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003), 101.

Chapter 1 Critiquing Anthropocentric Instrumentalism

1.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the concept of anthropocentric instrumentalism, a theological position that problematically distorts the Catholic understanding of theological anthropology and cosmology. I argue that an understanding of non-human Creation as teleologically ordered toward the advancement and ultimately the salvation of the human species shapes the way that proponents of this view interact with the world around them, particularly with other animal species, to their mutual detriment. The chapter draws upon select magisterial documents to illustrate the tension within Catholic liturgy and doctrine between anthropocentric instrumentalism and theocentric relational ontology, the view for which this dissertation advocates. It will show that anthropocentric instrumentalism is, rather than an inherent part of an authentically Catholic worldview, a relatively new concept within the lengthy history of the

Catholic intellectual tradition and one the Church has begun to question. Understanding what anthropocentric instrumentalism is, how it has come to influence Catholic theology, and where it appears within the tradition is critical for understanding the dissertation’s argument against it.

The chapter defends the claim that the misinterpretation of humanity’s role within Creation and of humanity’s relationship to other animals represents more than just an exegetical error: it is a failure on the part of humanity to come into authentic personhood as Priests of Creation. The chapter makes the case for the necessity of the Church’s embrace of a vocational understanding of the Imago Dei that preserves human uniqueness without making it reliant on specific cognitive or affective capabilities of the human being, such as reason or moral capacity. It argues that the

17 identity of the human being as Imago Dei must be re-understood in light of a Trinitarian relationality that binds all of Creation together rather than setting humanity apart and above.

This corrective must come not only through the contributions of Scriptural exegesis, Christian ethics, and eco-theology but through the work of a distinctively Trinitarian systematic theology that provides a firm foundation for other forms of theological inquiry.

1.1.1 What Is Anthropocentric Instrumentalism?

In this work, the term “anthropocentric instrumentalism” is used to refer to a particular and very prevalent view of the relationship between humanity and the rest of Creation— principally, for this project, between humans and other animals. Proponents of anthropocentric instrumentalism uphold a dichotomy of human and non-human animals unsupported by the contributions of scientific inquiry, particularly in the field of evolutionary biology, nor by careful

Scriptural exegesis, though appeals to both are often employed to support this division. Other animals, and indeed the whole of non-human Creation, are understood as instruments ordered wholly or primarily toward the goods of humanity. Creation is a stage upon which the drama of humanity’s salvation is played out, and other creatures are mere props or instruments intended by

God to assist humanity in achieving its solitary telos. Other animals, then, are not inherently good but derive their goodness from their utility to human beings. A cow is good because cows provide humanity with milk, meat, and leather. A dog is good because dogs provide humanity with companionship, entertainment, and a reminder of God’s loyalty. A mouse is good because mice act as test models for scientists researching human diseases.

The anthropocentric instrumentalist may recognise other animals as creatures of the common Creator while understanding the telos of these creatures to be fundamentally different

18 from humanity’s own. The suffering and death of other animals, while pitiable, is viewed as an unfortunate part of their fulfillment of the purpose for which they have been made. When a pig is slaughtered to become pork, the pig fulfills its telos, which is service to humankind. The anthropocentric instrumentalist may express concern for the treatment of the pig prior to slaughter, but, given the pig’s presumed telos, does not recognise in the pig’s captivity and slaughter itself a moral question, or at least not one to be taken seriously. Concern for other animals, then, where it exists, is primarily focused on achieving an acceptable balance between the efficient meeting of human objectives and the humane treatment of the animals instrumentalised in the process. An anthropocentric orientation in both the ontology and telos of these other animals is taken for granted, the validity of their instrumentalisation unquestioned— pigs are things to be eaten, cows are things to be worn, chickens are things to lay eggs, hamsters are things to provide amusement. It is thus possible for the anthropocentric instrumentalist both to speak of the goodness and createdness of other animals and to interact with them as objects.

1.1.2 Anthropocentric Instrumentalism in Ritual and Doctrine

The Church’s few rites recognising other animals illustrate well this tension between recognising other animals as beloved creatures of God and regarding them as mere instruments ordered toward the achievement of human goods. The Book of Blessings offers a rite for the blessing of animals, commonly used by parishes to mark the feast of St. Francis of Assisi.

Unlike St. Francis, however, the rite does not describe other fleshly creatures as brothers and sisters but as tools and symbols bestowed by God upon humanity. The introduction to the rite explains that “animals have a certain role to play in human existence by helping with work or

19 providing food and clothing.”18 While the Introductory Rites profess that “animals share in

Christ’s redemption of all of God’s creation,” and Isaiah’s vision of the Peaceable Kingdom is offered as an alternate reading, the Intercessions are entirely anthropocentric, praising God for other animals in their utility, both as physical objects and as spiritual symbols—Blessed are you,

O Lord, who created animals and gave us the ability to train them to help us in our work, who gave us food from animals to replenish our energies, who for the sake of our comfort give us domestic animals as companions, who show us a sign of your providence by caring for the birds of the air.19 Non-human animals, even in the very rite intended to bless them, are consistently described as instruments ordered toward the goods of human beings, who, in turn, are ordered toward God. Indeed, both options offered for the Prayers of Blessing do not directly bless the animals being presented but instead pray for God’s continued provision for human needs.20

The Catechism of the Catholic Church presents only a very short teaching on non-human animals, which has been placed under its treatment of the Ten Commandments. The subsection

“Respect for the Integrity of Creation,” under the larger heading “Respect for Persons and Their

Goods,” falls within the Catechism’s discussion of the seventh commandment.21 The placement and brevity of this consideration are indicative of the prevailing anthropocentric instrumentalist position on non-human animals in Catholic theology today. Where non-human Creation and

18 “Order for the Blessing of Animals,” in Book of Blessings (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Co., 1989), 942. 19 Isaiah 11:6-10 (NRSV); “Order for the Blessing of Animals,” 955. 20 The text of these blessings is as follows: “O God, the author and giver of every gift, animals also are part of the way you provide help for our needs and labors. We pray (through the intercession of Saint N.) that you will make available for our use the things we need to maintain a decent human life. We ask this through Christ our Lord” (“Order for the Blessing of Animals,” 957). “O God, you have done all things wisely; in your goodness you have made us in your image and given us care over other living things. Reach out with your right hand and grant that these animals may serve our needs and that your bounty in the resources of this life may move us to seek more confidently the goal of eternal life. We ask this through Christ our Lord” (“Order for the Blessing of Animals,” 958). 21 Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC), 2nd. ed. (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 2000), 2415– 2418.

20 animals in particular warrant respect and moral consideration, it is as the property of human persons and as instruments for the attainment of human goods. Even in this section allegedly dedicated to the integrity of Creation, what the Catechism presents is more a negotiation of humanity’s place at the head of Creation than a discussion of the ontology and integrity of

Creation itself.

The Catechism describes a “hierarchy of creatures” following the six days of Creation, making clear both that inanimate objects are creatures and that humanity is the pinnacle of God’s artistry, having been created last.22 Nevertheless, it affirms a relationality of being, willed by

God, in which every creature, animate and inanimate, exists “only in dependence on each other, to complete each other, in service of each other.”23 Simultaneously, however, it describes minerals, vegetables, and animals as “resources” over which humanity holds dominion.24

Theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether is skeptical of this ordering of Creation. She questions the dominion of humanity, specifically the anthropocentric images she finds in the Hebrew tradition, in light of Darwinian evolution. Considering the relatively recent arrival of homo sapiens in the world, she holds that “it is absurd to say that the God of earth’s creation gave humans dominion over this planet, much less over the cosmos,” unless one believes that the whole of evolution has been ordered toward the creation of one species “with its achievement of a cancerous growth that is threatening the biotic life of this whole planet.”25 Theologian John

Berkman echoes her misgivings, warning that an unwarranted concern for any species is a form of idolatry. This idolatrous fixation usually goes hand in hand with a lack of appropriate concern

22 CCC, 342. 23 CCC, 340. 24 CCC, 2456. 25 Rosemary Radford Ruether, "Men, Women, and Beasts," in Good News for Animals? Christian Approaches to Animal Well-Being, eds. Charles Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1993), 22.

21 for other species, which he views as a rejection of God’s Creation and a failure to give God due glory.26 These sins undergird a myriad of other sinful behaviours that are a part of embracing theological speciesism, a phenomenon Berkman describes as “a failure to see the variety of non- human animals the way God sees them; that is, failing to see them as creatures of God who manifest God’s goodness and give praise to God in their flourishing as creatures of diverse natures.”27

Despite the prevalence of anthropocentric instrumentalism in its texts and liturgies, the

Church seems hesitant to completely embrace the notion of non-human animals as instruments for human use. The Catechism cautions that humanity’s dominion must be tempered by a concern for the needs of one’s human neighbours and for human dignity, which is threatened in an unspecified way by the needless suffering and death of non-human animals.28 More significantly, it affirms that “[e]ach creature possesses its own particular goodness and perfection.”29 Despite these gestures toward a theocentric ontology of non-human animals, though, the Catechism contains only one paragraph in which they are truly treated as subjects rather than objects. Paragraph 2416 confirms that non-human animals, by their mere existence, bless God and give God glory and are owed by human beings a duty of kindness.30 What is missing is a Catholic understanding of how non-human animals participate in glorifying God— an understanding that does not reduce them to artefacts of human religious experience. The

Church acknowledges the integrity of non-human animals as valued beings in relationship with

26 John Berkman, “From Theological Speciesism to a Theological Ethology: Where Catholic Moral Theology Needs to Go,” Journal of Moral Theology 3, no. 2 (2014): 14. 27 Ibid. 28 CCC, 2415, 2418. 29 CCC, 339. 30 CCC, 2416.

God, glorifying God apart from their utility to humanity, and at the same time declares that, by their nature, non-human animals are ordered, like all non-human elements of Creation, toward the goods of humanity rather than to God.31 This inconsistency remains unresolved and largely unexamined by clergy and theologians alike. Within the Catechism, the significant tension upon which this dissertation draws is particularly visible.

1.2 The Picture Thus Far 1.2.1 A Lacuna in Theology

Many of the Church's greatest minds have weighed in on the ontological and teleological identity of the human being: anthropological inquiry is abundant in the tradition. Although scholarly and magisterial interest in the natural environment, apart from humanity, has intensified in the past fifty years with the rise of eco-theology as a discipline and the recent publication of Pope Francis’s long-awaited environmental encyclical Laudato Si’, a lacuna persists where non-human animals are concerned. Where the non-human animal has received theological attention, it has most often been by way of providing anthropological contrast, underscoring the human being's uniqueness or highlighting superiorities through comparison with the brute beast. Primatologist Frans de Waal laments that, “[h]aving escaped the Dark Ages in which animals were mere stimulus-response machines,” scholarly interest in animal cognition is growing in both popularity and acceptance while, despite this, “we are still facing the mindset that animal cognition can be only a poor substitute of what we humans have . . . Toward the end of a long career many a scholar cannot resist shining a light on human talents by listing all the things we are capable of and animals not.”32 De Waal’s disappointment resonates as soundly in

31 CCC, 2415. 32 Frans de Waal, Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2016), 157.

23 the humanities as it does in the sciences. “What a bizarre animal we are,” he says, “that the only question we can ask in relation to our place in nature is ‘Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the smartest of them all?’”33

Numerous theologians, both ancient and modern, have addressed the topic of non-human animals in their work, but so few have undertaken a sustained, systematic examination of these animals in their own right that the majority of sources cited in this dissertation are not examples of what could be called “animal theology” but are instead works of theological anthropology,

Creation theology, or secular philosophy, mined for elements of intersectional relevance.

Admittedly, the interdisciplinary field of “Animal Studies” is still in its infancy: it developed out of the ethical thought of the mid-1970s, and its borders and boundaries are still being defined today. Theology, then, is not the only discipline that has been slow to embrace the question of the animal—but, given the Church's teaching on the divine origin of all created beings, that so little theological attention has been directed, throughout the lengthy history of the tradition, toward those earthly creatures most substantially similar to human beings seems an especially conspicuous omission.

Much of the theological scholarship to date surrounding contemporary ecological and animal issues has centered on understandings of humanity's dominion, as granted by the Creator in Genesis. Eco-theologians and their detractors have, for several decades now, debated the proper understanding of this dominion, proposing various models outlining humanity's role in

Creation and its moral obligations to other species (or lack thereof). Although discourse on dominion is important in a consideration of Christian attitudes toward the natural world, a clearer

33 Ibid.

24 picture of that over which humanity is said to hold dominion would contribute significantly to any understanding of the concept. Volumes of eco-theology have been produced, and yet there exists a poverty of work on non-human animals as subjects in their own right. An apophatic theology of non-human animals has become the norm, highlighted by the very term "non-human animal"; one knows what non-human animals are because one knows what they are not—human.

It has been pointed out, perhaps most poignantly by philosopher Thomas Nagal in his exploration of theories of mind, that it is not possible for the human being to know what it is like to be a creature of another species, but to then claim that nothing can be known of them at all is giving up too easily.34 Whichever interpretation of Genesis 1:28 one accepts, it cannot be futile to explore and develop a theological ontology of non-human Creation, particularly of the non- human animals with whom humanity shares so much.

1.2.2 Magisterial Inroads

The 2015 publication of the papal encyclical Laudato Si’ marks for the Church the first magisterial document dedicated entirely to consideration of Creation and the present ecological crisis as a theological issue.35 Throughout the lengthy text, Pope Francis repeatedly condemns an anthropocentrism that would reduce non-human elements of Creation to instruments ordered toward the use of humanity. He cautions: “When human beings place themselves at the centre, they give absolute priority to immediate convenience and all else becomes relative.”36 Taking a divinely ordained anthropocentric instrumentalism as one’s starting point, it is indeed very difficult to accurately distinguish between humanity’s needs and its conveniences. If one accepts

34 Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?," The Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (October 1974): 435–450. 35 Francis, Laudato Si’, Encyclical letter on care for our common home, June 2015 (Washington: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2015), 65–67. 36 Ibid., 122.

25 that other animals have been created for human utility and live only to be of service to human beings, how narrowly ought one to interpret CCC#2418’s admonition against the needless suffering and death of other animals? Laudato Si’ attempts to reorient Catholic theology, making a theocentric turn, re-centering the Creator, and providing more clarity on questions of humanity’s needs, desires, and requisite sacrifices.

Pope Francis upholds the inherent goodness of non-human Creation, praising the German bishops for their rejection of anthropocentric instrumentalism in their 1980 letter “Zukunft Der

Schöpfung—Zukunft Der Menschheit.” “In our time,” he writes, “the Church does not simply state that other creatures are completely subordinated to the good of human beings, as if they have no worth in themselves and can be treated as we wish. The German bishops have taught that, where other creatures are concerned, ‘we can speak of the priority of being over that of being useful.’”37 This message, however, seems inconsistently conveyed even in the very letter Pope Francis praises. While the German bishops affirm that “Tiere sind Tiere und nicht bloß Nahrungsmittel, Ausbeutungsobjekt oder Ware,” they simultaneously hold that by contrast with persons (a term that one can reasonably assume they use as a synonym for “humans”),

“Pflanzen und Tiere kein unantastbares individuelles Lebensrecht.”38,39 What does it mean to insist that animals are not mere commodities—that they have a goodness and value unrelated to their human utility—and at the same time to place them in a category with plants, maintaining that they have no right to life except, perhaps, in the broad sense of a species’s right not to

37 Laudato Si’, 69. Here, Francis quotes Die Deutschen Bischöfe, “Zukunft Der Schöpfung—Zukunft Der Menschheit: Erklärung der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz zu Fragen der Umwelt und der Energieversorgung” (Fulda: der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz ,1980), II, 2. 38 Die Deutschen Bischöfe, “Zukunft Der Schöpfung—Zukunft Der Menschheit,” III, 1: “Animals are animals and not merely food, objects for exploitation or commodities . . . ” [translation mine]. 39 Ibid., III, 2: “Plants and animals have no inviolable, individual right to life” [translation mine].

26 become extinct? What does it mean to maintain that every creature has a purpose of its own and yet to allow the use, even the suffering and death, of these same creatures toward purely human ends?40 While it may be possible to argue that no inconsistency exists here, that whether a creature has a telos and whether the same creature has a right to life are separate questions, is the subordination of the ends of non-human animals to the ends of humanity not at least a frustration of the God-given purposes of non-human animals? A prioritization of being useful over being?

Pope Francis points to the Catechism’s affirmation that “each creature possesses its own particular goodness and perfection,” thus reflecting “in its own way a ray of God’s infinite wisdom and goodness.”41 This goodness does not arise from a utility to human beings but out of the creature’s very createdness and relationship to God. “The ultimate purpose of other creatures is not to be found in us,” Pope Francis warns.42 The German bishops concur, asking, “Aber sind sie nur dazu da, daß der Mensch sie braucht? Ist das, was wir nie brauchen werden, sinnlos?”43

Instead, all creatures find their meaning in the Incarnate Word. Each creature in its own right reflects and reveals the divine,44 blessing God and giving God glory, participating in God’s praise.45 Citing Aquinas, Pope Francis writes that multiplicity in Creation exists because an individual species is insufficient to reflect God’s infinite goodness.46 Recognising the participation of other species in the divine life of love ought to induce in humanity humility and a hesitation to continue practices and behaviours that deny the truth of this relationality.

40 Laudato Si’, 84. 41 Ibid., 69; citing CCC, 339. 42 Laudato Si’, 83. 43 Die Deutschen Bischöfe, “Zukunft Der Schöpfung—Zukunft Der Menschheit,” II, 2: “But are they only there for the human’s need? Is that which we will never need pointless?” [translation mine]. 44 Laudato Si’, 12, 69, 84–85, 221. 45 Ibid., 11, 72, 85, 87. 46 Ibid., 86.

While Laudato Si’ introduces, arguably for the first time, a magisterial condemnation of anthropocentric instrumentalism, it does not go far enough. In his consideration of the natural world, Pope Francis, like many eco-theologians, often flattens non-human Creation into a single entity, its constituent parts relational but nevertheless indistinguishable within the text. Absent is all but passing reference to other animals and humanity’s relationship to them as members of the same Kingdom, both spiritually and taxonomically.47 While Laudato Si’ condemns human tyranny over other animals and the treatment of them as instruments rather than creatures with an inherent goodness of their own, it cannot be said that with this encyclical, Pope Francis has called for an end to the unnecessary instrumentalisation of other animals by the faithful.

The problem lies, in part, with the fact that the category of the creature, invoked often in magisterial documents, is somewhat nebulous. Who or what counts as a creature? Who or what does not? Context suggests that “creature” should not be understood as referring to humanity alone, but this offers little more in the way of clarification on the boundaries of the category.

Surely a cat is a creature, but is a tree a creature? A mountain? An ocean? A virus? Is a creature anything that has been created by God or only those things with some agency? While much of what has been written on the creature, particularly in Laudato Si’, is useful in upholding the goodness and relationality of non-human animals, the haziness of the category allows a measure of deniability that obstructs an appreciation of the full impact of these affirmations. To speak of other animals directly, to name them as “animals” or, better, as individuals and species, helps to ground discourse in the realities of material, embodied life, with all of its variety and division. Instead, where Laudato Si’ does mention “animals” directly, it often follows this word

47 The Kingdom of God and kingdom Animalia.

28 with “and plants.”48 In only one paragraph of the lengthy encyclical does Pope Francis write of

“animals” without also writing of vegetation. Even in this paragraph, however, humanity’s relationship with inanimate Creation is invoked, leaving not a single paragraph in which other animals are treated as subjects unto themselves, belonging to a category apart from flowers and rocks.49

Despite these shortcomings, Laudato Si’ unquestionably presents a wealth of theology of potential use to theologians interested in both animal and environmental protection. Pope

Francis offers an understanding of human uniqueness rooted not so much in essential capacities of the human mind and body as in the relationality of being.50 He writes of the imperative to overcome individualism, to pursue human fulfillment by imaging a God who is Godself relational.51 Human beings are called to make their own a “trinitarian dynamism” by “going out from themselves to live in communion with God, with others and with all creatures.”52 While

Pope Francis maintains that humanity possesses a God-given dignity above that of the rest of

Creation, he rejects forcefully the notion that this dignity provides justification for anthropocentrism.53 Instead, he invokes Bonaventure and Francis of Assisi, viewing “universal reconciliation with every creature” as a path to the restoration of “original innocence.” 54 This image of humanity as relational—as properly contextualised within a material, embodied

Creation, connected through God to all living things and bearing a unique responsibility to lead

48 Laudato Si’, 11, 25, 33, 35, 130, 132–133, 145. 49 Ibid., 92. 50 While Francis does identify knowledge, reason, and intelligence as unique gifts of humanity, he also mentions other, more esoteric uniquenesses, such as responsibility, freedom, and the ability to interpret reality. Laudato Si’, 69, 81. 51 Ibid., 119, 208, 240. 52 Ibid., 240. 53 Ibid., 84. 54 Ibid., 119.

29 them to their Creator—reconciles with the concept of humanity as Priest of Creation explored in the work of theologians such as Eastern Orthodox Metropolitan John Zizioulas. In Laudato Si’,

Pope Francis, like Zizioulas, presents a picture of life in a “Trinitarian key,” with all creatures existing in relationships of interdependence and service to one another, a universal communion that reflects the inner life of the Creator.55 This relational ontology of being, ordered toward God and moving toward its telos in the Trinity, leaves no room for an anthropocentric instrumentalisation of other beings.56 It is Pope Francis’s vigorous condemnation of anthropocentrism in the document, despite its internal inconsistencies, that holds the greatest promise for the exposition of a theology that truly embraces all creatures. Having received this teaching, the Church must now move on to consider whether the way Christians live and interact with other animals reveals the truths set forth in this encyclical.

1.3 The Historical Roots of Anthropocentric Instrumentalism

As Pope Francis indicates, the excessive anthropocentrism of modernity has deep historical roots: the rupture between humanity and the rest of Creation dates back to the original humans themselves. From the beginning, human beings have struggled to understand their place in the cosmos and to faithfully live out the dominion with which they have been entrusted.57 In his 1967 Science article "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," historian Lynn White, Jr., famously declared that, "[e]specially in its Western form, Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen."58 In the five decades since, the merits of White's

55 Ibid., 11, 42, 85, 86, 91, 92, 220, 246. 56 Ibid., 67, 68, 69, 75, 83, 117, 155. 57 Ibid., 66. 58 Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Science 155, no. 3767 (March 1967): 1205.

30 thesis have been hotly debated in theological and historical circles, and his short article has inspired numerous academic responses, both supportive and critical.59 The sustained interest of academics in his assertion that the teachings of Christianity have contributed disproportionately to the present ecological crisis suggests that, regardless of the accuracy and historicity of White's claims, many do regard the Church's teachings, particularly on the Imago Dei, as problematic and, if not actually responsible for, at least enabling of anthropocentric instrumentalism. Indeed,

Pope Francis acknowledges with regret a historical misunderstanding of the Imago Dei that has led to the notion that humanity is justified in “absolute domination over other creatures.”60 What follows is a brief overview of the development of philosophical and theological thought on the natural world and on non-human animals in particular, intended to place the thesis question within historical context and to demonstrate that anthropocentric instrumentalism has not always been, and need not be, the Church's dominant approach to God's Creation.

1.3.1 Interpretations of Dominion

White argues that the triumph of Christianity over paganism in the Middle Ages drove a detrimental shift in humanity’s attitude toward the world around it. “By destroying pagan animism, Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects,” he writes.61 Ignoring the diversity of both Jewish and Christian commentary and exegesis surrounding the Creation accounts of Genesis, White points in particular to these stories as the source of a uniquely Christian dualism of human and non-human Creation, fed by

59 White’s article remains one of the most cited in the history of Science. Notable academic responses include: Todd LeVasseur and Anna Peterson, eds., Religion and Ecological Crisis: The “Lynn White Thesis” at Fifty (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017); Bron Taylor, Gretel Van Wieren, and Bernard Daley Zaleha, “Lynn White Jr. and the Greening-of- Religion Hypothesis,” Conservation Biology 30, no. 5 (October 2016): 1000–1009; and Lewis W. Moncrief, “The Cultural Basis for Our Environmental Crisis,” Science 170, no. 3957 (October 1970): 508–512. 60 Laudato Si’, 65-67. 61 White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” 1205.

31 work dating back to Tertullian and Irenaeus on the Imago Dei.62 White contends that Christian theological anthropology, in contrast to the pagan systems it supplanted, "insisted that it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends."63 Pagan animism, on the other hand, protected the natural world, making it impossible to apathetically abuse and instrumentalise nature. If this decline of pagan animism coupled with reverence for the Creation stories of Genesis spurred an unfavourable pivot in humanity’s relationship with the non-human world, it is unclear from

White’s argument why this attitude first takes root, by his own account, as late as medieval

Christianity. White's thesis appears to disregard the millennium of Jewish history prior to the

Pentecost event—a history that involved much more explicitly the rejection of pagan nature worship, which was far more prevalent in those eras than in the Middle Ages. Blame for anthropocentric instrumentalism cannot be neatly offloaded onto Christianity's Jewish predecessors either, though. Jewish historian Jeremy Cohen, in his extensive study of the historical interpretation of Genesis 1:28, finds that the Jewish writers of the Hellenistic period portrayed "dominion as an administrative responsibility of management on behalf of a superior officer constru[ing] Gen. 1:28b as mandate or commandment as much as blessing."64

Humanity’s dominion was understood neither as permission to exploit the natural world nor as a generous inheritance devoid of obligation. The anthropocentric instrumentalism present in later

Christian readings of the text is absent.

A tradition exists in the Rabbinic Midrash that the non-human animals will pay homage to the image of God in humanity when humanity obeys the precepts of the Torah. Midrash

62 Ibid., 1206. 63 Ibid., 1205. 64 Jeremy Cohen, ‘‘Be Fertile and Increase, Fill the Earth and Master It’’: The Ancient and Medieval Career of a Biblical Text (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 72.

Tanhuma records God telling Adam, "If you are meritorious, I shall make you king over the creatures of the lower world just as I am king over the creatures of the upper world."65

Dominion, in this tradition, is the asset of the truly righteous: those who reject sin and are faithful to the commandments of the One who holds dominion, in turn, over them. This picture of humanity's dominion as both reserved for the righteous and analogous to God's own reign implies, in Christian terms, a connection to the restoration of the Kingdom—to the gradual reestablishment of original peace through obedience to the Creator rather than a consumptive, forceful conquering of the natural world. Biblical scholar and theologian Richard Bauckham, considering the analogy of dominion, stresses that humanity's dominion is within Creation rather than transcendent of it. "Treating humans as gods in relation to the world was probably the most fateful development in Christian attitudes to the non-human creation,” he writes. “Only with this development did interpretation of Gen. 1.28 take its place in the ideology of aggressive domination of nature that has characterized the modern West."66

Despite precursory undercurrents in early Christian Creation theology, intellectual historian Peter Harrison holds that anthropocentric instrumentalist understandings of humanity's dominion are relatively new in the history of the Church; Patristic and medieval treatments of the

Genesis text tend toward anthropocentric readings of a different kind. The early Church Fathers, viewing the human being as a microcosm of the cosmos, internalized the concept of dominion, reading dominion over the other animals in Genesis as a reference to humanity's need to tame its own impulses.67 Origen, considering these passages, writes, "By the fish, the text indicates the

65 Ibid., 101. 66 Richard Bauckman, “Modern Domination of Nature—Historical Origins and Biblical Critique,” in Environmental Stewardship, ed. R. J. Berry (New York: T&T Clark International, 2006), 33. 67 Peter Harrison, "Subduing the Earth: Genesis 1, Early Modern Science, and the Exploitation of Nature," The Journal of Religion 79, no. 1 (January 1999): 90.

33 desires which are secret and deep; for as the fish are in the depth, they are invisible and unseen.

God wills that man rule these. And by the birds the text indicates the reason which is in us which God wills man in his image rule, for reason, being lightweight, flies like the birds . . . "68

In his Homilies on Genesis, Origen preaches: "The saints and all who preserve the blessing of

God in themselves exercise dominion over these things guiding the total man by the will of the spirit. But on the other hand, the same things which are brought forth by the vices of the flesh and the pleasures of the body hold dominion over sinners."69 Harrison finds similar allegorical readings of dominion in Augustine, Jerome, John Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa, and Ambrose, among others.70 While allegorical readings do not necessarily preclude literal readings—indeed,

Augustine offers both in his Two Books on Genesis Against the Manichees—Harrison finds that

“[f]or the first fifteen hundred years of the Christian era there is little in the history of interpretation of Genesis to support White's major contentions. Patristic and medieval accounts of human dominion are not primarily concerned with the exploitation of the natural world.”71

Although a literal reading of the non-human animals referenced in the Creation stories was a later trend in Scriptural exegesis, the association of humanity's untamed desires with non- human animals is nevertheless problematically dualistic, setting humanity apart from the rest of the animal kingdom and painting non-human animals as unruly, unthinking, and in need of humanity’s discipline. This view of non-human animals did not apply to all species, however, through the Middle Ages. The Physiologus and later bestiaries presented non-human animals as

68 Origen and Ronald E. Heine, Homilies on Genesis and Exodus (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 69. 69 Ibid. 70 Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 90–91. 71 See Augustine, On Genesis: Two Books on Genesis: Against the Manichees and on the Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An Unfinished Book, trans. Roland J. Teske (Baltimore: Catholic University of America Press, 2001); Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 90.

34 emblems of virtue as well as vice, with some creatures serving as an inspiration for humanity and others as a warning. The natural world was understood by medieval Christians like Bernard of

Clairvaux, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, 72 and Aquinas73, as the self-communication of its

Creator, revealing to humanity moral and spiritual truths with every element. The more one could learn about the Creation, the more one could learn about the Creator. The translation of the works of Aristotle into Latin drove a less allegorical, more scientific approach to the natural world, and yet a literal concept of humanity's dominion remained absent.74 Instead, scholars strove for "intellectual mastery" of the kind it was believed Adam had had in the Garden when he named each of the animals. Collecting information about the non-human animals reunited, in the mind of humanity, the animal kingdom in perfect knowledge. 75

Bonaventure preached, in his Collationes in Hexaemeron, that “Adam in the state of innocence ‘possessed knowledge of created things and was raised through their representation to

God and to his praise, reverence and love.’”76 With the Fall, humanity and non-human Creation were set at odds, and Adam's once complete knowledge was lost. Bonaventure believed that it was through the re-accumulation of this lost knowledge that the intimacy of Creation would be restored and the creatures would make their way back to the Creator. Indeed, Cohen's study of the medieval interpretation of Genesis 1:28 concludes that physical domination of the natural

72 Specialist of medieval natural philosophy James A. Weisheipl writes of Albert the Great: “By his example, he devoted his tireless energies (even as bishop) to the pursuit of scientific truth in nature, and he insisted on the indispensability of scientific truth (and indeed of all philosophical truth) for sound theology, ‘the science of God's special revelation to man.’” James A. Weisheipl, “The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great,” in Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays 1980 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1980): 47. 73 Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.45.7; Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 91. For an overview of medieval patristic perspectives on divine self-revelation through Creation, see also G. Tanzella-Nitti, “The Two Books Prior to the Scientific Revolution,” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 57, no. 3 (September 2005): 235–248. 74 Harrison, “Subduing the Earth.” 92. 75 Ibid., 93. 76 Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaemeron 13 (Opera Omnia, v 390), in Peter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 62.

35 world was very much a minority understanding, inserted anachronistically into medieval history by modern scholars like White who sought to link the text to modern ecological crises without sufficient consideration for the interpretation of the Jewish and Christian traditions over time.

Cohen writes:

[M]odern scholars have retrojected contemporary concern with dominion over nature onto Scripture's call to "fill the earth and master it," assuming that here lies the source of Western ecological attitudes that have flourished, more than they have developed, since biblical antiquity . . . While the words of our text have remained fixed for millennia, its message has developed considerably; in antiquity and the Middle Ages this message touched only secondarily on conquering the natural order.77

While literal readings of the text were not unheard of, Origen's allegorical view was the prevailing interpretation, "so religious motivations for the material domination of nature are secondary to the pursuit of a spiritual domination of the will over the wild and wayward impulses of the body."78 Humanity's exploitation of the natural world, in the Middle Ages, was linked much more strongly to practical motivations—food, shelter, transportation—than it was to religious conviction.

It was not until the early modern period that a despotic understanding of dominion over the natural world began to gain ground.79 The Protestant Reformation ushered in a new approach to Scriptural hermeneutics and semiotics, one that did away with Catholic symbol, allegory, and sacramentality, insisting that words, not objects, function as signs. As environmental ethicist and eco-theologian Michael Northcott explains, “Protestants sought to remove any vestige of spiritual power in the natural world, as represented in medieval Catholicism in pilgrimages to sacred places, or in festivals around sacred wells or sites of divine activity. They sought to purge

77 Jeremy Cohen, ‘‘Be Fertile and Increase, Fill the Earth and Master It,” 314. 78 Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 96. 79 Michael S. Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 47.

36 the landscape of the sacred, and locate the site of God’s activity entirely in the individual self.”80

Coupled with an increased interest in mechanistic approaches to science and the corresponding decline of Aristotelian vitalism, Protestant literalism and redemptionist theology introduced a significant shift in the Christian understanding of Genesis.81 God-given dominion became part of the rhetoric of the Scientific Revolution, with both Protestants and Catholics embracing a new instrumentalist relationship with non-human Creation.82

White points in particular to the notion, popular until the eighteenth century, that the goal of science is "to think God's thoughts after him."83 Scientific inquiry, for several centuries, was explained by scientists in theological terms, motivated by the Western understanding of natural theology as a pursuit through which one could come to an understanding of the mind of the

Creator through dissection of the Creation. Bonaventure's goal of restoring unity through natural science was replaced by the belief of those such as Renaissance philosopher Francis Bacon that, through science, humanity could regain the control over the natural world that Adam once possessed.84 Such an attitude, paired with the Protestant work ethic, ushered in a new outlook on agriculture. Working the earth was no longer an inconvenience necessitated by the Fall but an intrinsic good, an imitation of the vocation of the first man.85 Protestant Reformer Martin

Luther’s theology of Creation “reduced the whole world of nature to a repository of goods for the service of man,” and fellow Reformer John Calvin’s soteriology inspired the view that through

80 Ibid., 53. 81 Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 96–98. 82 Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, 53. 83 White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” 1206. 84 “For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which he partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences.” Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning and Novum Organum (New York: Colonial Press, 1900), 470. 85 Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 100.

37 hard work and even the generation of wealth, the Christian could be assured of a place among the elect.86

Philosopher John Locke looked to the Creation stories of Genesis for his colonial perspective on property ownership. He reasoned that since it was God who had commanded humanity to subdue the earth, those who occupied land without improving it were in disobedience to the divine directive and deserved to have their lands confiscated.87 He writes, in his Second Treatise of Civil Government, that “God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth—i.e., improve it for the benefit of life and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour. He that, in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled, and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him.”88 Disdain for indigenous ways of life and the dispossession of native persons came as a natural result of this view that agriculture, construction, and industry are not only pleasing to God but commanded by God; the oppression of the natural world and the oppression of human minority groups became linked, as they would often be throughout history.89

1.3.2 The Rise of Metaphysical Dualism, Scientific Empiricism, and Human Exceptionalism

The fundamental shift from a theocentric to an anthropocentric instrumentalist perception of the natural world was ushered in with the advent of the modern scientific method in the

86 George Hendry, Theology of Nature (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 17; Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, 53–54. 87 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2004), 23–24. 88 Ibid., 20. 89 Peter Harrison, “‘Fill the Earth and Subdue It’: Biblical Warrants for Colonization in Seventeenth Century England," Journal of Religious History 29, no. 1 (February 2005): 23.

38 sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Dualisms of mind and body, human and animal further reduced humanity’s recognition of the goodness of non-human Creation, bolstered not only by anthropocentric readings of Genesis but now by the purportedly impartial evidence offered by scientific empiricism. While non-human Creation had once been viewed with a kind of superstitious awe, advances in science and technology chipped away at this reverence and replaced it with a sense of the world as mechanistic and inert, a collection of raw materials awaiting human manipulation.

Francis Bacon maintained that domination of the natural world by the rational male was the path to the redemption of nature. He writes, in Novum Organum, "Only let the human race recover that right over nature which belongs to it by divine bequest, and let power be given it: the exercise thereof will be governed by sound reason and true religion."90 Bacon identifies three "grades of ambition" in humanity: the ambition to extend one's power within one's own country, which Bacon finds "vulgar and degenerate"; the ambition to extend the power of one's country "and its dominion among men," which he finds more dignified but still covetous; and, finally, the ambition "to establish and extend the power and dominion of the human race itself over the universe, which he describes as "a more wholesome thing and a more noble than the other two."91 This cosmic dominion of humanity depended, according to Bacon, on the advancement of the arts and sciences. Bacon saw empiricism as an emancipation of human understanding,

whence there cannot but follow an improvement in man's estate and an enlargement of his power of nature. For man by the fall fell at the same time from his state of innocency and from his dominion over creation. Both of these losses however can even in this life be in some part repaired, the former by religion and faith, the latter

90 Francis Bacon, Francis Bacon: A Selection of His Works, ed. Sidney Warhaft (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1965), 374. 91 Ibid.

by arts and sciences. For creation was not by the curse made altogether and for ever a rebel, but in virtue of that charter "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread," it is now by various labours (not certainly by disputations or idle magical ceremonies, but by various labours) at length and in some measure subdued to the supplying of man with bread, that is, to the uses of human life.92

Bacon likened natural history—the foundation of natural philosophy, built on observation rather than on empirical evidence gathered through experimentation—to a kingdom built on the gossip of the streets rather than "letters and reports from ambassadors and trustworthy messengers." He is credited as the father of empiricism and the deliberate, methodical inductive reasoning of the modern scientific method. Experiments of the "mechanical arts" yielded, Bacon held, more reliable, more thorough results than deductive reasoning alone. He writes: "For even as in the business of life a man's disposition and the secret workings of his mind and affections are better discovered when he is in trouble than at other times; so likewise the secrets of nature reveal themselves more readily under the vexations of art than when they go their own way."93

This statement, from Bacon's Magna Insuratio, seems problematically to endorse scientific discovery through invasive, even torturous experimentation and procedures, and indeed Bacon's thought has been used, over time, to justify precisely such things. Human “labours” subdue the earth and render it useful for human life.

Despite the strength of his statements, Bacon's contribution to the anthropocentric instrumenalisation of nature is a question of some debate. Harrison concludes that, for Bacon,

"[i]t is because nature does not readily acquiesce in its own exploitation that force is called for."94 This position, Harrison holds, is not as anthropocentric as it may appear, as Bacon and his

92 Ibid., 392. 93 Francis Bacon, The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon, ed. John M. Robertson (Milton Park: Routledge, 2011), 289. 94 Harrison, "Subduing the Earth," 105.

40 fellows did not believe that the postlapsarian world was designed to cater to the needs of humanity; it was, instead, an unruly and hostile environment, opposed to human desires. It was humility, then, not arrogance, that motivated the early modern scientists—a will to restore rather than to dominate, much akin to that of contemporary environmentalists. As Harrison notes, “It might be said that in these early modern understandings of creation and fall are the resources for an ecologically sensitive theology. It is intriguing, then, that so many advocates of eco-theology have tended to regard traditional theology as the problem rather than the solution.”95

On the heels of Bacon, philosopher René Descartes's Discours de la Methode played a significant role in encouraging metaphysical dualism—separation of res cognitans from res extensa—and driving a wedge between humans and other animals with his notion of bête- machine. Cartesian thought “dominated intellectual life during the early modern period,” anthropocentrically reshaping the dominant worldview of the day with an impact that continues to reverberate into the present.96 Despite later rejections of it, Descartes’s work, particularly on the question of human reason, was so influential that, as philosopher John Cottingham writes,

“we cannot write the obituary of Cartesian rationalism in its entirety unless we are prepared to declare that the philosophical enterprise itself is defunct.”97 This emphasis on intellect and rationality, allegedly capacities exclusive to the human being, and their distinction from and superiority to embodied, material existence further eroded humanity’s sense of the inherent relationality of the cosmos and its own vocation within it.

95 Ibid., 108. 96 Tad M. Schmaltz, “Introduction,” in Receptions of Descartes: Cartesianism and Anti-Cartesianism in Early Modern Europe, ed. Tad M. Schmaltz (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), xii. 97 John Cottingham, Cartesian Reflections: Essays on Descartes’ Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 93.

The human being, Descartes believed, is animated by both a corporeal animal spirit and an incorporeal immortal soul, which interact through the pineal gland. The animal spirit and the immortal, rational soul exist in real distinction to one another: they are ontologically complete unto themselves and independent of one another. The mind can exist without the body, and the body can exist without the mind.98 It is this latter arrangement that, for Descartes, describes the non-human animal: body without mind, animal spirit without thinking soul. Without a mind, non-human animals are mere automata, indistinguishable from complex machines, completely ruled by instinct and thus unworthy of moral consideration. Descartes went as far as to speculate that, were a human to have the requisite materials at their disposal, they could create a machine indistinguishable from a non-human animal. He writes,

Here, I specially stopped to show that if there had been such machines, possessing the organs and outward form of a monkey or some other animal without reason, we should not have had any means of ascertaining that they were not of the same nature as those animals. On the other hand, if there were machines which bore a resemblance to our body and imitated our actions as far as it was morally possible to do so, we should always have two very certain tests by which to recognise that, for all that, they were not real men.99

98 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Replies, trans. Michael Moriarty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 55. 99 René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Mineola: Dover Publications, Inc., 2003), 38.

The tests Descartes identifies are language—specifically the ability "to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do"—and reason.100 These tests, in addition to serving as Descartes's own Voigt-Kampff, separating humans from convincingly bioengineered android replicants, are also, he holds, useful in distinguishing humanity from non-human animals.101

Despite his mechanistic view of non-human animals, Descartes allowed that they are capable of sensation as a result of their possession of sense organs similar to those of humanity.102 Both his disciples and his detractors, like priest and rationalist philosopher Nicolas

Malebranche and fellow rationalist philosopher Henry More, however, ascribed to Descartes the notion that non-human animals, in addition to being unable to think, are also unable to feel, unable to experience suffering and pain.103,104 This is perhaps not an entirely unfounded stretch,

100 Ibid. 101 In Philip K. Dick’s dystopian novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, the Voigt-Kampff test is administered by bounty hunters in order to distinguish between their targeted androids and human beings. In Dick’s dystopia, it is empathy rather than language or reason that is taken as the capacity essential to authentic humanity. See Philip K. Dick, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (New York: Del Rey Books, 1996). 102 Gary Hatfield, “Animals,” in A Companion to Descartes, eds. Janet Broughton and John Carriero (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 421. See also Emre Arda Erdenk, “Descartes’ Account of Feeling of Pain in Animals,” FLSF 15 (Spring 2013): 201–210. 103 Henry More, a contemporary of Descartes, wrote to him condemning “the internecine and cutthroat idea that you advance in the Method, which snatches life and sensibility away from all the animals . . . ” Henry More in Gary Steiner, “Descartes on the Moral Status of Animals,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 80, no. 3 (1998): 268. 104 Descartes’s disciple Nicolas Malebranche accepted the monstrous thesis (see footnote 106) favorably, as a result of his theodicy. Malebranche reasoned that non-human animals are incapable of sin and “if they were capable of feeling, this would mean that under an infinitely just and omnipotent God, an innocent creature would suffer pain, which is a penalty and a punishment for some sin.” He argued that “to hold that beasts feel, desire, and know, although their souls are corporeal, is to say what is inconceivable and what manifests a contradiction.” He credits Descartes’s De l’homme for “beginning” to offer a “sensible proof” of the insensate mechanism of other animal species but laments that “men will eternally confound and confuse these arguments . . . ” Nicolas Malebranche, The Search After Truth, trans. Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980), 323–324; Nicholas Jolley, “Sensation, Intentionality, and Animal Consciousness: Malebranche’s Theory of the Mind,” Ratio 8, no. 2 (September 1995): 139–140. See also William C. French, “Beast- Machines and the Technocratic Reduction of Life,” in Good News for Animals? Christian Approaches to Animal Well-Being, eds. Charles Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1993), 27.

43 given Descartes’s characterisation of them as bête-machines. This reading of Descartes was embraced to justify invasive practices such as vivisection, viewed as critical to scientific advancement, as well as to defend theological notions of human uniqueness.105,106 It appears that

Cartesian mechanism maintained its popularity in large part because it appealed to the prevalent image of the human being as superior, the master of Creation. Attempts to discuss humanity as embodied, as a part of the natural, animal world, were met with harsh criticism, a trend that continues to this day in both the humanities and the sciences.107

Harrison points out that, although a literal, oppressive sense of dominion was indeed evident in the seventeenth century with the upheaval of the Scientific Revolution and the influence of dualist thinkers such as Bacon and Descartes, it is still not as straightforwardly exploitative a doctrine as some, like White, have argued. While the stories of Genesis drove scientific advancement, dominion in this era was, without exception, linked to the Fall; human subduing of the earth was viewed as a restorative undertaking rather than a symptom of indifference. "Human artifice compensates for the defects of nature, and fittingly so, for these defects represent the consequences of human sin," explains Harrison.108 Humanity toiled on the earth not to leave its mark but to erase it. Harrison notes that the seventeenth century also saw the first opposition to anthropocentrism, with several prominent Christian scientists and clergy denying that the earth was created for the sole use of one species.109 The replacement of

105 French, 27. 106 Philosopher Kemp Smith famously decried Descartes’s position on animal sentience as “monstrous.” Subsequently, in the contemporary literature on Descartes and animals, this position has come to be referred to as “the monstrous thesis.” See Norman Kemp Smith, New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes (London: Macmillan, 1952), 136, 140; John Cottingham, Cartesian Reflections: Essays on Descartes’ Philosophy, 63; Gary Steiner, “Descartes on the Moral Status of Animals,” 269; Nicholas Jolley, “Sensation, Intentionality, and Animal Consciousness: Malebranche’s Theory of the Mind,” 136. 107 French, 28. 108 Harrison, "Subduing the Earth," 103–104. 109 Ibid., 104.

44 geocentrism by heliocentrism, a decline in Aristotelian physics, and an increase in empiricism and objectivity in the sciences—all hallmarks of the Scientific Revolution—helped to put the question of humanity's dominion into cosmic perspective, even as other aspects of philosophy worked to set humanity apart.

While Harrison is correct that the work of tracing the origins of anthropocentrism and assigning blame for its propagation is a far more complex matter than White has estimated, I argue that Harrison's view is overly charitable and his definition of anthropocentrism too narrow.

Is not the early modern belief in the necessity and even virtue of human aggression toward nature an anthropocentric position? Dualistic? Detrimental? While early modern Christians may not have believed that non-human Creation readily bent to their will, they did believe that it should—that this was the original and intended order of things, lost through human sin, and that through human effort and even vexatiousness, it could be restored once more. It is nonetheless anthropocentric to believe that the world should revolve around humanity, even if one acknowledges that, at present, it does not. This nostalgic, insecure anthropocentrism still involves a damaging false dualism of human and nature and denies a relational ontology of

Creation grounded in Trinitarian love.

Despite the significant influence of Cartesian dualism, Bauckham, like Harrison, views the question of Christian anthropocentrism in the pre-modern world as one more intricate than some scholars have acknowledged. Bauckham notes that, prior to the modern period, the dominant theological tradition, though anthropocentric, involved mitigating beliefs about the relationality of God and Creation and of the various creatures themselves. Humanity was largely rooted in a sense of its own creatureliness and an awareness that the cosmos is ultimately theocentric, existing for God's glory. All creatures were believed to worship God and to possess an inherent

45 goodness as God's own creations. Aggressive notions of humanity's God-given dominion as a mandate for expansion and exploitation arose, Bauckham claims, out of Greek philosophy as humanity began to lose a sense of Creation's value for God and of the common creatureliness in which it too shared.110

While White and his assenters may have been incorrect in ascribing a violent disregard for nature to Biblical exegesis in the early modern era and earlier, the question yet remains of how much the precise theology and intent of these historical Christians matters in light of the actual exploitation they achieved. Harrison argues that the early modern Christians cannot rightly be called anthropocentric because they viewed the earth as rebellious against the will of humanity.

But if a human being destroys the earth and its creatures in a misguided attempt to do God's will, is it not still destructive? If a human being destroys the earth and its creatures in a misguided attempt to restore an Edenic state of human dominion, is that not still anthropocentrism?

Harrison is correct, however, in noting that contemporary eco-theologians such as Thomas

Berry, Sally McFague, and Michael Fox too quickly discard early Christian theology, accepting

White's thesis with seemingly little critique.111 Harrison warns that while it is tempting to speculate on the connection between doctrines of human dominion, divine transcendence, and destructive approaches to the natural world, and while these links may appear to have "a prima facie plausibility," the evidence of history calls into question the simplicity of this correlation, suggesting that the reality is rather more nuanced and complex.112 Christianity is neither an

110 Richard Bauckham, “Modern Domination of Nature,” 33. 111 Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 108–109. 112 Ibid., 109.

46 innocent scapegoat nor an entirely culpable perpetrator in the spread of anthropocentric instrumentalism.

1.3.3 Conflation of the Imago Dei and Biology

Much of theological anthropology, throughout Church history, has been comparative: humans are considered in light of their difference from other animals and their similarity to God.

Other animals exist as foils against which humanity’s superiorities are highlighted or as allegorical symbols of the passions and virtues of the human heart. In order to support arguments for human superiority, theologians have often turned, like Descartes, to the input of the life sciences. That other animals allegedly lack certain cognitive, affective, and linguistic capacities possessed by humanity is taken as a significant confirmation that humanity bears

God’s image and other animals do not. This habit of mobilizing scientific inquiry for the specific purpose of discovering humanity’s physiological uniqueness and then attaching these traits to the Imago Dei ignores, however, the fullness of the data offered by evolutionary biologists and ethologists, which suggests that human uniqueness has been grossly overstated.

Theological anthropology that neglects the evolutionary context of the human species is deficient, both scientifically and theologically. It offers a one-dimensional and dualistic picture of human identity—one that makes the suggestion, sometimes inadvertently, sometimes not, that the bodily and environmental context of humanity are irrelevant to an understanding of who the human being is.

Philosopher of religion Joshua Moritz, examining the theological anthropology of several contemporary Western evangelical religious leaders, notes that biological understandings of the

Imago Dei are frequently used not only to justify instrumentalist approaches to the natural world

47 but also to support more extreme theologies such as young earth creationism. In these systems, humans are viewed as "absolutely distinct and discontinuous from animals," having a separate origin and an exclusive claim to the attention and love of their Creator.113 Such claims, although obviously attractive, become readily unsustainable as scholars delve deeper into the study of the bodies and minds of non-human animals. Scientific developments have, in the past fifty years, begun to dismantle many of humanity’s biological, cognitive, and moral claims to uniqueness.

Since Darwin, biologists, ethologists, and geneticists have consistently indicated that the animal kingdom cannot rightly be viewed as a clear dichotomy of man and brute beast but is, rather, a continuum on which all animals sit, some species closer than others. New studies are exploring the capacity of non-human animals for emotion, language, moral behaviour, and even religious experience, and yet an insistence on human superiority persists.

The inclination toward drawing biased comparisons between humanity and other animal species, what theologian Andrew Linzey calls "uniqueness spotting," is not exclusive to theology; it appears also in the life sciences themselves. Scientists too have long been interested in the question of what makes humanity unique, of what sets homo sapiens apart from other animals. Moritz refers to this conviction that humans are not merely one species among many as

"Homo singularis." This notion has inspired "various scientific attempts to identify the particular capacities that form the basis of the supposed ‘essential nature’ of humans and for many theologians the locus of distinctiveness that separates humans from the animals is explicitly connected to, or understood as the content of, the imago Dei."114 This conflation of Homo singularis and the Imago Dei is problematic, as it ties the image of God in humanity to

113 Joshua Moritz, “Evolution, the End of Human Uniqueness, and the Election of the Imago Dei,” Theology and Science 9, no. 3 (August 2011): 308. 114 Ibid., 310.

48 unverified scientific hypotheses rather than to God. A conclusion has been reached here despite the fact that the study of non-human animals is still in its relative infancy.

For many years, anthropologists spoke of "Man the Toolmaker," believing humanity to be the only species capable of fashioning and using tools. It was not until 1960 that primatologist Jane Goodall discovered that chimpanzees in Gomba, Tanzania were using blades of grass to fish termites from their mounds. Upon receiving word of this paradigm-shattering discovery, paleoanthropologist Louis Leakey exclaimed, "Now we must redefine tool, redefine

Man, or accept chimpanzees as humans."115 Discoveries, like Goodall's, that call into question earlier assumptions about the qualitative uniqueness of homo sapiens are still being made, rendering the staking of the Imago Dei to some scientifically observable characteristic of the human mind or body dangerously tenuous. Moritz describes such concepts as appealing to what he calls "an anthropocentrism of the gaps." "[I]n lieu of empirical evidence,” he writes, proponents “fill the empirical and epistemic gaps with an unwarranted faith in human uniqueness where science has not yet demonstrated a clear evolutionary gradualism or a clear discontinuity."116

Goodall was not the first to discredit a claim based on this anthropocentrism of the gaps, of course. Following the publication of The Origin of Species, “Darwin’s Bulldog”117 anatomist

Thomas Henry Huxley and fellow anatomist Sir Richard Owen, attending a meeting of the

British Association for the Advancement of Science, became embroiled in a heated debate on

115 “Toolmaking,” The Jane Goodall Institute UK, accessed July 28, 2017, http://www.janegoodall.org.uk/chimpanzees/chimpanzee-central/15-chimpanzees/chimpanzee-central/19- toolmaking. 116 Moritz, “Evolution, the End of Human Uniqueness, and the Election of the Imago Dei,” 312. 117 Charles G. Gross, “Hippocampus Minor and Man’s Place in Nature: A Case Study in the Social Construction of Neuroanatomy,” Hippocampus 3, no. 4 (October 1993): 407.

49 what has become known as the Great Hippocampus Question. Owen, eager to prove human uniqueness through an appeal to anatomy, made the claim that homo sapiens alone possess the hippocampus minor and that this brain structure endows humanity with unique capacities not found in other animals. Huxley and other sympathetic anatomists such as William Henry Flower forcefully dispatched this claim by dissecting the brains of several species of non-human primate.118

Despite the caution of history, scientists and theologians alike continue to search for the source of human uniqueness—the indisputable justification for human superiority—and they often link their quests, conflating Homo singularis and the Imago Dei. This tying of the Imago

Dei to biological characteristics of the human species is a game of “uniqueness spotting” that has been rigged from the outset. The very concept of taxonomic ranks is dependent upon the notion that all species are distinct from one another in significant, measurable ways. Several million species of life have been identified on one planet alone, with an indeterminable number more already lost to extinction and more yet to be discovered by humanity. Each of these species could be said to be unique, different enough from the others to warrant separate recognition by science. God's inquiry of Job in Job 39 provides Scriptural support for this scientific observation: God recalls several non-human animal species and their individual characteristics, each different, each known to and valued by their Creator. Approaching the Imago Dei horizontally, anthropocentrically, through the life sciences alone is a losing gambit, as every species can rightly be said to be unique, to possess a matchless collection of qualities and characteristics endowed by their Creator. That it is not flight or echolocation or a prehensile tail

118 For a detailed discussion of the debate between Huxley and Owen, its origins, and its impact on both politics and science, see Charles G. Gross, “Hippocampus Minor and Man’s Place in Nature: A Case Study in the Social Construction of Neuroanatomy,” Hippocampus 3, no. 4 (October 1993): 403–416.

50 that sets a species apart from all others as the image of God is not verifiable by scientific empiricism. Scientifically dependent approaches to identifying the Imago Dei trap theological anthropology in a circulus in probando, with theologians clinging to the conclusion while searching for the premises in an evolving pile of scientific literature.

The introduction of evolutionary theory further complicates the discussion by problematizing the very category of species itself for biologists, a problem theologians are now only beginning to recognise and wrestle with themselves. Neo-Darwinian theories of evolution reject entirely the traditional notion of qualitative essential traits demarcating species boundaries.

“A species essential trait must occur in all members of the species for the entire life of that species,” writes Moritz. “Moreover, if that trait is to be unique to that species, it cannot occur in any other species for the entire existence of life on this planet.”119 This is certainly a high standard to meet and an impossible one to prove definitively. What appear to be clear species distinctions at a particular point in time begin to blur and mesh once one views the species in historical context. The gradualism of evolution means that species boundaries are difficult if not impossible to identify; there are no objective speciation events wherein it is possible, for example, to identify the moment that homo sapiens broke away from homo heidelbergensis.120

119 Moritz, “Evolution, the End of Human Uniqueness, and the Election of the Imago Dei,” 315. 120 Indeed, evolutionary biologists are not certain that this was the origin of homo sapiens at all. Genetically modern human beings initially existed alongside several other species of hominid, some of whom paleoanthropologists believe used language, wore jewelry, created tools, cooked over a fire, hunted, and even built homes and boats. These non-human hominids were contemporaries of, not ancestors to, modern humans, complicating (perhaps even more so than modern non-human animals) cognition-based claims to human uniqueness. See João Zilhao et al., “Symbolic Use of Marine Shells and Mineral Pigments by Iberian Neandertals,” PNAS 107, no. 3 (January 2010 ): 1023–1028; Antonio Benítez-Burraco and Lluís Barcelό-Coblijn, “Paleogenomics, Hominin Interbreeding and Language Evolution,” Journal of Anthropological Sciences 91 (2013): 239; Robert G. Bednarik, “Seafaring in the Pleistocene,” Cambridge Archeological Journal 13, no. 1 (April 2003): 41–66.

Moritz likens the evolution of species to the gradations of colour in a rainbow: each is distinct when viewed separately, out of context, and yet each is impossible to separate from the others where they meet in transition when viewing the rainbow as a whole. Species, then, are best understood not as a collection of individuals sharing an essential trait, an "atemporal essence or a generic nature," but as a collection of individuals sharing a common lineage.121 Such non- essentialist understandings of species resolve the problem of marginal cases, such as human beings with severe cognitive impairments, and non-human animals who demonstrate capacities for allegedly unique human traits, such as the use of reason, the exercise of proto-morality, and linguistic communication. At the same time, however, the question arises of when in its evolutionary history humanity was bestowed with the Imago Dei. Was God's image present in modern humanity's ancestral hominids? In its non-ancestral hominids? What evidence is there to support the privileging of the present form? The answers, although academically compelling, are perhaps less important than what theology does in response to the problem itself.

1.4 Systematic Theology as Corrective

In the wake of Darwin, contemporary research continues to challenge much of what the life sciences once held to be true about non-human animals. The recent advent of the field of animal studies has added to this evolving conversation its own challenges to existing moral norms and philosophical assumptions. These areas of scholarly inquiry alone, however, lack the epistemological tools and ecclesiastical authority to thoroughly interpret for the faithful their own rapidly emerging findings and the deep implications they carry for an understanding not only of non-human animals but of humanity itself and its place in the cosmos. This question of

121 Moritz, “Evolution, the End of Human Uniqueness, and the Election of the Imago Dei,” 315.

52 the nature, purpose, and telos of non-human animals is significant to Catholic theology, as its answer holds the potential to advance the relationship between human beings and the rest of

Creation, bringing humanity closer to the Kingdom and to authentic personhood in Christ.

The fields of evolutionary biology and genetics have made great strides toward placing humanity back on the evolutionary spectrum of animalia, but without a consistent, developed theology of the non-human animal, there remains a disconnect between these scientific advancements and Catholic belief and practice. Those who would hold that anthropocentric instrumentalism is their birthright and the will of the Creator are permitted to continue their destructive exploitation of the natural world, while those who are not so convinced by this questionable anthropology are potentially led away from the Church by convincing challenges to biological, essentialist models of the Imago Dei, calling into question the truth of Catholic teaching. Whether or not Christianity has, historically speaking, been the sole or even the greatest cause of instrumentalist anthropocentrism, Catholic theologians and clergy have done little to dismantle the image of humanity as God-sanctioned master and dominator of Creation, particularly of non-human animals.

One might argue that the Church cannot be expected to bear responsibility for lay misreading and even abuse of Scripture. Dei Verbum, incipit of the Second Vatican Council’s

Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, however, holds that "authentically interpreting the word of God, whether written or handed on, has been entrusted exclusively to the living teaching office of the Church."122 Certainly, this role includes also the challenge and correction of

122 Second Vatican Council, Dei Verbum [Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation]. Vatican Website, November 18, 1965, accessed July 28, 2017, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat- ii_const_19651118_dei-verbum_en.html.

53 inauthentic interpretations, something the Church has historically done little of when it comes to the nature of humanity's dominion, particularly over the non-human animals. The Catechism and the rites of the Church itself reinforce the very notion that White's detractors have expended much energy denying: that all of the natural world, non-human animals specifically included, are mere "resources,” existing for the common good of a single species—humanity.123 If such a disordered ontology of non-human animals has arisen from an inauthentic reading of Scripture, a reading that has contributed in a significant way to a theological justification of anthropocentric instrumentalism, it is imperative that the Church, in its exclusive role as teacher and interpreter of Scripture, offer redirection to the faithful. This redirection, however, must not be limited to an alternative exegesis but must arise from the discipline of systematic theology, offering a corrective that reaches deep into Creation theology, theological anthropology, and Trinitarian ontology to address the constellation of theological errors that have allowed such a disordered view of Creation to thrive.

Only with the papacy of St. John Paul II has the Church begun to show a substantial interest in environmental protection, with a loose concept of ecological sin slowly developing.

While concern for the environment is gradually finding inroads into Catholic social teaching, the

Church remains largely silent on the ontological and teleological question of the non-human animal. Philosophers, lawmakers, and activists have offered a variety of responses, ranging from staunch defences of the instrumentalist status quo to vehement condemnations of speciesism that allow little room for the privileging of one species over another. Although White's landmark article contains many details in factual dispute, he is nevertheless correct in doubting that

123 CCC, 2415.

"disastrous ecologic backlash can be avoided simply by applying to our problems more science and more technology." A theological response is necessary.124

The input of the Church is needed in order to offer a balanced view of Creation that is faithful both to the Word of God and to the Tradition of the Church while at the same time reflecting scientific perspectives on the natural world. The necessity of such a contribution is made more urgent by the plight of non-human animals in an ever-more-globalised economy in which they are more often viewed as commodities than as creatures. If, as Laudato Si’ suggests, non-human animals are inherently good, inherently beautiful, apart from their utility to human beings, ordered toward a kind of cosmic communion both with humanity and with God, then human action that compromises their wellbeing poses both systematic and ethical problems. It is contrary to the restoration of original justice and impedes what Pope Benedict XVI, inspired by theologian C.H. Dodd, has called “an eschatology in process of realisation.”125

1.4.1 Exegesis Alone as Insufficient Response

Like White’s, several modern explorations of humanity's relationship with non-human

Creation centre on one pericope, one line of the Hebrew Scriptures, Genesis 1:28—“God blessed them, and God said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that

124 White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” 1206. 125 Benedict XVI, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan to the Transfiguration (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 188.

55 moves upon the earth.’”126 While there is certainly good reason for such intense interest, there are some often-overlooked shortcomings to a purely exegetical approach to the question of humanity's dominion. Too sharp a focus on literary analysis and textual criticism ignores the multiplicity of ways in which the text has been interpreted, misinterpreted, and used over time and across changing cultural landscapes. A single passage does not a theology make, but one might be tempted to think otherwise in reading much of the literature surrounding the concept of humanity's dominion.

White's thesis has been widely criticised through the years by theologians who point out that his reading of Genesis is amateur at best—that it fails to take into account, for example,

and the input of source criticism. They complain that the כבש and רדה alternative translations of text does not bear the interpretation that White and his supporters have assigned to it and dispute the authenticity of a tradition that would encourage plunder rather than stewardship.127 From the perspective of both Biblical scholarship and systematic theology, these detractors offer many valid critiques. The lively debate surrounding the meaning and implications of Genesis 1:28 itself demonstrates that perspective on this difficult passage is not homogenous, even within a single tradition. Harrison, considering White's work more than three decades later, accurately points out, however, that "the meaning of the text, as established by current methods of biblical

126 See Jeremy Cohen, ‘‘Be Fertile and Increase, Fill the Earth and Master It’’: The Ancient and Medieval Career of a Biblical Text (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Thomas F. Dailey, “Creation and Ecology: The ‘Dominion’ of Biblical Anthropology,” Irish Theological Quarterly 58, no. 1 (March 1992): 1–13; Chris U. Manus and Des Obioma, “Preaching the ‘Green Gospel’ in Our Context: A Re-Reading of Genesis 1:27-28 in the Nigerian Context,” HTS Teologiese Studies 72, no. 4 (July 2016): 1–6; Patrick McLaughlin, “A Meatless Dominion: Genesis 1 and the Ideal of Vegetarianism,” Biblical Theology Bulletin 47, no. 3 (2017): 144–154; Benjamin B. Phillips, “A Creature Among Creatures or Lord of Creation? The Vocation of Dominion in Christian Theology,” Journal of Markets & Morality 14, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 133–146. 127 See footnote 59.

56 criticism, is at best tangentially related to the issue of how the text might have informed attitudes toward nature and environmental practices."128

Another challenge arises, however, within the text itself, dividing even those with exegetical expertise. Biblical scholar and theologian Michael Welker notes a trend in Jewish and

Christian exegetical approaches to the Creation stories that he calls the “‘Yes-but’ see-saw.”

This hermeneutical technique involves a source-critical attempt to relativize the language of the

Priestly creation story, which includes Genesis 1:28, by an appeal to the older Yahwist creation story, which includes Genesis 2:15: “The Lord God took the man and put him in the garden of

and עבד in the P account are contrasted with כבש and רדה Eden to till it and keep it.” The verbs

,in the J account, with the exegete arguing that the latter serves as a corrective to the former שמר clarifying that humanity is meant to cultivate and preserve Creation rather than to dominate and subjugate it.129 Welker rejects this approach as "foolish and empty," arguing that the incline of the "Yes-but" see-saw could be easily reversed:

Then it would look like this: Yes, the older creation account says that human beings are ordained to tilling and preservation, but the younger—and thus further developed—creation account candidly admits that tilling and preservation are impossible without chopping and cutting and uprooting: that is, impossible without violent intervention.130

The see-saw's relativizing temptation becomes apparent when one considers the treatment of gender in the two Creation accounts. The P source appears to endorse "a non-patriarchal partnership tied to ecological brutality," while the J source appears to endorse "a conception that

128 Harrison, "Subduing the Earth," 89. 129 Michael Welker, Creation and Reality (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999), 62–63. 130 Michael Welker, “Creation and the Image of God: Their Understanding in Christian Tradition and the Biblical Grounds,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 34, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 445.

57 is ecologically prudent but tied to patriarchal structures of domination."131 Welker sees a developed theology of the Imago Dei as the key to stopping the motion of the see-saw, striking a balance between the seemingly conflicting texts of the Creation stories and approaching a systematic understanding of relationality in Creation.

Also examining the Creation stories of Genesis, moral theologian Scott Bader-Saye finds that, in the Priestly account, both times that humanity is said to have been made in God’s image, what follows directly is reference to humanity’s relationship to other animals. Genesis 1:26 reads, “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness; and let them have dominion . . . ”132 Again, in Genesis 1:27, the Imago Dei is mentioned, followed immediately, in

Genesis 1:28, by the instruction to “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth.”133 Bader-Saye observes that “Genesis 1 pictures us standing with one hand reaching up toward God and another hand reaching out toward the animal world.”134

He asks, “What if the real question is not whether animals are sufficiently like us to warrant moral consideration, but rather what kind of people must we be to embody the claim that our lives and dominions are images of God?”135 The love and unity of Creator and image, the grace flowing from Creator to all of Creation, carries with it heavy implications for humanity’s treatment of the non-human world.

131 Ibid. Compare the equitable origin of Eve in Genesis 1:27—“So God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them”—with the derivative origin of Eve in Genesis 2:22: “This one shall be called Woman, for out of Man this one was taken.” 132 Emphasis mine. 133 Emphasis mine. 134 Scott Bader-Saye, “Imaging God through Peace with Animals: an Election for Blessing,” Studies in Christian Ethics 14, no. 1 (August 2001): 2. 135 Ibid., 5.

Religionist George L. Frear, Jr., considering the many apparently conflicting messages about non-human animals throughout the body of Scripture, draws an adjacent conclusion:

The main moral stimulus of the Bible does not lie in the specifics of its various texts. This is particularly true when the Bible presents us not with a unified morality but with an approach that contains within it a strong tension . . . Its main stimulus lies in its proclamation when in individual or group worship, the Bible comes alive and moves us as whole beings with reason, will, and affection.136

Biblical criticism alone cannot lead the Church to this kind of affective, effective theology; a more comprehensive, systematic approach, firmly rooted in and brought to life by the liturgical worship of the Church, is necessary to reshape norms and to inform a Scriptural message that is lived out in embodied relationality rather than existing only as words on a page.

1.4.2 Ethics Alone as Insufficient Motivation

Where the animal question is raised, the Scriptural exegetes toiling over Genesis are joined by a growing number of moral theologians who recognise in the space surrounding the treatment of non-human animals an ethical question that demands a response. It is within the discipline of ethics that the majority of both modern secular and theological work on non-human animals is focused. From Peter Singer's 1975 landmark work Animal Liberation to Andrew

Linzey's 2009 book Why Animal Suffering Matters: Philosophy, Theology and Practical Ethics, the ethics of human-animal relations have been at the forefront of the conversation, if not the sole focus at times.137 Often, this moral discourse shapes itself around the concept of animal rights and corresponding human duties, leaning heavily on empirical data supporting parallels

136 George L. Frear, Jr., “Caring for Animals: Biblical Stimulus for Ethical Reflection” in Good News for Animals? Christian Approaches to Animal Well-Being, eds. Charles Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1993), 9. 137 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: The Definitive Classic of the Animal Movement (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2009); Andrew Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters: Philosophy, Theology and Practical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

59 between human and non-human minds and bodies in order to build a case in favour of compassion.138

These questions of how humanity ought to treat other animals and what kind of consideration human beings owe them, however, seem premature to theologian David Clough.139

Intending to write a monograph on animals in Christian ethics, Clough found the systematic theology of other animals so underdeveloped that he wrote instead an entire volume exploring their place in Creation and redemption in order to adequately lay the foundation for his work in moral theology.140 Likewise skeptical of the potential of ethics alone to adequately respond to the animal question, theologian Rosemary Radford Reuther asks, "Can the language of personal rights and the appeal to a common sentience carry us into a broad enough concern with what modern industrial society is doing to the non-human world?" 141 She expresses doubt that the philosophical and ethical approaches presently favored by animal rights activists will lead to success in protecting species other than those with whom human beings already experience a kinship, those who clearly demonstrate their sentience. Preservation of reptiles, fish, and insects, she suspects, will require a different approach. “This is not a criticism,” she writes, “so much as an indication that our relationship with the non-human world is so fragmented and disconnected that we need to use different ethical and motivational appeals in different contexts.”142 Reuther recalls various popular approaches to encouraging compassion for animals—appeals to their cognitive and affective capacities, appeals to the environmental degradation inherent in large- scale farming operations, appeals to the preservation of biodiversity through habitat protection—

138 A further critique of this tendency in animal rights theory is offered in Chapter 5. 139 David Clough, On Animals: Volume I, Systematic Theology (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013), x. 140 David Clough, On Animals: Volume II, Theological Ethics (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2018). 141 Radford Ruether, "Men, Women, and Beasts," 20. 142 Ibid.

60 and wonders whether there isn't "a more comprehensive principle that can deepen and connect them."143

Zizioulas echoes Radford Reuther’s concerns, lamenting that Western solutions to the ecological crisis, whether legislative, ecclesiastical, or academic, are so often based on ethics, on wishing that humanity would behave better. He writes:

Ethics, whether enforced or free, presupposes other, more deeply existential motivations in order to function. People do not give up their standards of living because such a thing is “rational” or “moral.” By appealing to human reason we do not necessarily make people better, while moral rules, especially after their dissociation from religious beliefs, prove to be more meaningless and unpleasant to modern man.144

A relational ontology of Creation, firmly grounded in Trinitarian theology, holds promise as just such a comprehensive, existential principle for Catholic Christians. Moral theology connecting this doctrine to practice is necessary, but it must be undergirded by a firmer systematic foundation than is currently available if it is to have the kind of impact that generates real change.

1.4.3 Correcting Eco-Theology’s Category Mistake

In developing theologies of Creation, however, one must avoid the temptation to reinforce the same simplistic dualism one seeks to challenge. Attempts to address the ecological crisis, in both secular and theological literature, commonly focus on “the environment” as a unified whole. In such treatments, a dichotomy is envisioned in which all things non-human,

143 Ibid., 21–22. 144 John Zizioulas, “Priest of Creation,” in Environmental Stewardship, ed. R. J. Berry (New York: T&T Clark International, 2006), 274.

61 animate and inanimate, are placed in a single category and human beings in another.145 While there is, undeniably, an interconnectedness to the natural world, such an indiscriminately holistic approach fails to take into account the dignity and alterity of individual elements of Creation, of individual species, and sets humanity artificially outside of its environment and creaturely context. Humans know intuitively that there is a significant ontological and moral difference between an animal and a plant, a plant and a rock. Biology reflects these differences, breaking

Creation down taxonomically, drawing distinctions between life forms at even the highest rank of classification. Precedent for the recognition of the heterogeneous multiplicity of Creation is not limited, however, to the sciences; the Bible itself divides Creation into multiple groups, not infrequently recognising individual non-human species. Theology too must reflect this scientific and Biblical distinction, resisting the tendency to take for granted that eco-theologies and expressions of environmental concern encompass and speak adequately to the theological question of the non-human animal. The input of both biology and Scripture affirm without ambiguity that it is a category mistake to pair non-human animals with inanimate elements of

Creation rather than to pair them with human beings.

The structure of the Creation accounts of Genesis acknowledges an essential difference between inanimate creation, vegetation, and non-human animals. God's incremental act of creation denies the homogeneity that certain eco-theological approaches impose upon the natural world, with creation of the animal kingdom alone divided into stages and spread across the fifth

145 For example, eco-theologian Thomas Berry’s pioneering work of eco-spirituality, The Dream of the Earth, mentions non-human animals only 19 times, and his The Great Work: Our Way into the Future does so only 18 times. In the majority of these instances, non-human animals are mentioned only in passing, among lists of natural features such as mountains, rivers, and plants. Liberation theologian Leonardo Boff’s acclaimed foray into eco- theology, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, mentions non-human animals only eight times, under much the same circumstances as Berry’s work. See Thomas Berry, The Dream of the Earth (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1990); Thomas Berry, The Great Work: Our Way into the Future (New York: Bell Tower, 1999); Leonardo Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor (Ossining: Orbis Books, 1997).

62 and sixth day. God’s bestowal of dominion further supports a distinction between non-human animals and other elements of Creation. Genesis 1:28 grants Adam and Eve dominion "over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth." The passage, while setting humanity apart from other animals, nevertheless, in its composition, contains an acknowledgement of the diversity of the animal kingdom. Vegetation is treated separately, with "every plant yielding seed that is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree with seed in its fruit" going to humanity as sustenance in Gen 1:29 and "every green plant" to the non-human animals; this is, again, an acknowledgement of diversity, even within kingdom Plantae. The Yahwist creation account of Genesis 2 likewise distinguishes between non-human animals and other non-human elements of Creation, mandating that Adam till and keep the Garden prior even to the creation of the other animals, who are presented to Adam as potential helpers and partners rather than resources for his use. Such distinctions are not unique to the Creation accounts, though. Throughout the whole of Scripture, the animal kingdom itself is regularly divided into four categories: aquatic animals, land animals, aerial animals, and human animals.146 Distinctions are also made with regularity between wild animals and domestic animals and between clean animals and unclean animals.

After the Flood, in Genesis 9:8-10, God enters into a covenant with Noah's family "and with every living creature that is with you, the birds, the domestic animals, and every animal of the earth with you, as many as came out of the ark." Biblical scholar Richard Whitekettle writes that "[a]s instrumentalities, animals function as objects in the affairs of others. As interested parties, however, animals are subjects, having lives and interests of their own, and their existence

146 For a detailed account of the taxonomy of animals in the Old Testament, see Richard Whitekettle, "Freedom from Fear and Bloodshed: Hosea 2.20 (Eng. 18) and the End of Human/Animal Conflict," Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 37, no. 2 (2012): 219–236.

63 has its own integrity."147 In Hosea 2, again a covenant is created, with non-human animals acting as subjects rather than objects. Considering both of these covenants with non-human animals and the story of Noah's Ark as a whole, Whitekettle concludes that Genesis 9 and Hosea

2 are both part of a narrative tradition that "thought of animals as subjects in the world, and as interested parties in a covenant."148 Non-human animals are depicted standing alongside humanity, such that the entire animal kingdom experiences the same destruction as well as the same salvation. The same dignity and subjectivity is not afforded to plants, bodies of water, geological formations, or other inanimate features of God's Creation.

An examination of the text reveals that the Bible itself does not support a homogenous dichotomy of human and not-human or even of human animal and non-human animal. Instead, a bond is recognised between all fleshly creatures of God. Frear finds evidence of this kinship of the animal kingdom in the Creation accounts of Genesis but also in less explicit passages that make reference to “flesh,” such as Isaiah 40:5, 1 Peter 1:24, and John 1:14. He writes: “Even where we might think that the biblical author is only referring to humans, as when the prophet of the exile proclaims that ‘all flesh’ will see the glory of the Lord or when the Johannine prologue states that ‘Word became flesh,’ can we be sure that animals are not included at least in the margins of the author's consciousness?” It is apparent to Frear that these Scriptural authors intended to call to mind “the fragile living tissue we share with animals.”149

Frear's observation may be worrisome to theologians concerned about an overly egalitarian approach to speciation within Christian theology. It could be argued that, if all

147 Whitekettle, “Freedom from Fear and Bloodshed,” 229–230. 148 Ibid., 230. 149 Frear, “Caring for Animals: Biblical Stimulus for Ethical Reflection,” 5.

64 elements of Creation are created and valued by God, and non-human animals are included alongside humanity in God's covenants and are participants even in the Incarnation, then theology, at least, must treat the whole of the animal kingdom, of the fleshy world, in the same way: equally. To say that all that God has created is inherently good, and inherently related and relational, does not, however, necessitate the conclusion that all creatures are identical in their goodness or that humanity must regard them all as one cohesive whole. Despite the kinship of the flesh, of creaturely existence, it remains clear that God distinguishes between humanity and non-human animals, between non-human animals and vegetation, and between vegetation and inanimate Creation with varying degrees of nuance within these broad categories. Theology too must recognise a distinction between eco-theologies and animal theologies, continuing to explore the many points at which they overlap and intersect while acknowledging them as distinct research areas, each with its own developing questions, sources, and methods. To do eco- theology is not necessarily to do animal theology and, indeed, in some cases, may be to work at cross-purposes with animal theology.150

1.5 Re-visioning the Imago Dei

Despite their differences, animal and eco-theologians alike recognise in anthropocentric instrumentalism a disordered anthropology that contributes in a very material sense to the degradation of both the natural world and humanity’s relationship with its Creator. Within the

Church, this anthropocentrism has been bolstered by understandings of humanity’s identity and vocation that ignore its creaturely context, overstate its capacities, and reduce teleology to the salvific drama of a single species. It may appear to some, then, that White is correct—that

150 More on the fraught relationship between eco- and animal theology can be found in the dissertation's treatment of the work of theologian Andrew Linzey in Chapter 4.

65 theological claims to human uniqueness are indefensible, and that the Imago Dei is an outdated concept from an outdated religion, bound to eventually disappear, itself an ironic victim of evolution. Unwilling to abandon the concept entirely, however, some theologians, in an attempt to reconcile theological anthropology, modern cognitive ethology, and evolutionary biology, have proposed instead an extension of the Imago Dei to other species and even to nature as an undifferentiated whole.151 They hold that, given the reality of the species problem in biology, such paradigm-shattering reconsiderations are necessary if the Church is to take both theology and science seriously. Such a desire to reshape the theology of the Imago Dei, though understandable, seems unnecessarily drastic, the result of the acceptance of a false dilemma: either humanity is discontinuously distinct from or humanity is essentially the same as all other animals. By contrast, Pope Francis recognises that there are the resources within the Church to combat the excessive anthropocentrism of modernity and to replace it instead with an ontology of Creation’s relationality that gives rise to an ethic of care. It is specifically because of the unique dignity of the human being, he writes, that humanity is “called to respect creation” and its other creatures, recognising in them a particular goodness arising not from their human utility but from their createdness, from their relationship to the Creator.152

Theologian Wentzel van Huyssteen, advocating for a less esoteric, more embodied understanding of human uniqueness, writes that "if scientific contributions to understanding the issue of human uniquenesses are taken seriously, the theological notion of the imago Dei is

151 Theologian David S. Cunningham has argued that all of Creation bears, to different degrees, the Imago Dei. Theologian Oliver Putz has argued for the extension of the Imago Dei to all “moral species,” particularly apes. See David S. Cunningham, “The Way of All Flesh: Rethinking the Imago Dei” in Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals, eds. Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough (London: SCM Press, 2009), 100–117; Oliver Putz, “Moral Apes, Human Uniqueness, and the Image of God,” Zygon 44, no. 3 (September 2009): 613–624. 152 Laudato Si’, 69.

66 powerfully revisioned as emerging from nature itself."153 Little "revisioning" seems necessary, however, given Christianity's existent, lengthy history of searching for the key to the Imago Dei in scientific laboratories rather than theological libraries and liturgical settings. Despite his insistence on an understanding of human uniqueness that is more firmly grounded in and cognizant of humanity's own embodied animality and the findings of modern science, van

Huyssteen admits that "[t]he sympathetic scientist would . . . want to acknowledge that there is more to embodied human personhood than science alone could explain."154 Theologian James C.

Peterson, considering the implications of paleoanthropology for religious concepts of human uniqueness, finds scientific evidence of humanity's rapidly evolving intellectual capabilities that could, arguably, endow the species with a unique capacity for significant encounter with God, yet he arrives at the conclusion that the faithful must nevertheless reject essentialist, capacity- based conceptualisations of the Imago Dei. Drawing upon the theological anthropology of both

Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Peterson writes, challenging van Huyssteen, that "to bear

God's image is more than having sufficient intellectual capacity. It requires actually meeting

God (relationship) and reflecting God's presence (ethics)."155 The Catholic Church, with its rich understanding of priesthood and liturgy, stands poised to rescue the Imago Dei from both distortion and extinction and restore the Scriptural nuances of its meaning. It is not necessary, and indeed inauthentic and injurious, to approach a theology of human uniqueness through the sciences alone. Entering the laboratory intent on discovering what makes humanity different from and therefore superior to the other animals is to begin with the conclusion, leaving little

153 Wentzel van Huyssteen, Alone in the World? Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2006), 322. 154 Wentzel van Huyssteen, "Emergence and Human Uniqueness: Limiting or Delimiting Evolutionary Explanation?," Zygon 41, no. 3 (2006): 662. 155 James C. Peterson, "Homo Sapiens as Homo Dei: Paleoanthropology, Human Uniqueness and the Image of God," Toronto Journal of Theology 27, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 21.

67 room for modification of hypotheses. It is not the biology of the human being that the Imago Dei points to but the relationality it enjoys, the unique vocation entrusted to it.

Striving likewise toward an understanding of the Imago Dei that is not reliant upon the biological or neurological qualities of the human animal, other scholars, such as Moritz, exegete

J. Richard Middleton, and Hebrew Bible scholar Nathan MacDonald, have pointed to the ancient

Near Eastern pagan tradition of referring to kings as the image of the particular god who had allegedly chosen them.156 Kings of this era acted as both political and religious leaders, monarchs as well as priests. Just as this concept of election was expanded in Judaism from the individual elected king to the collective nation of Israel, so too can it be expanded to humanity as a priestly species, ministering to other creatures—a species set apart but not above. To support this expansion, Moritz points to parallels in the language and structure of Genesis 1, in which

Adam and Eve are given dominion over Creation, and the language and structure of Genesis 17, in which Abraham and Sarah are elected by God to give rise to a nation of priests, ministering to other nations. With the aforementioned historical models of election in mind, Moritz concludes that God has elected Adam and Eve and, through them, all of humanity to be a species of priests, made in God’s own image and ministering to other species, bearing the image of their divine elector to the other creatures.157 Similarly, Bader-Saye finds attractive systematician Kendall

Soulen’s observation that, in the Scriptures, God’s blessings are inextricably connected to

“relations of difference and mutual dependence among God’s creatures.”158 Throughout

156 Moritz, “Evolution, the End of Human Uniqueness, and the Election of the Imago Dei,” 328; Nathan MacDonald, "The Imago Dei and Election: Reading Genesis 1:26-28 and Old Testament Scholarship with Karl Barth," International Journal of Systematic Theology 10, no.3 (June 2008): 304; J. Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2005), 119. 157 Moritz, “Evolution, the End of Human Uniqueness, and the Election of the Imago Dei,” 324. 158 Bader-Saye, “Imaging God through Peace with Animals,” 6.

68 salvation history, God has set aside particular peoples to be mediators of these blessings: humanity in Genesis, Israel in Numbers, Christ in the Gospels, and the Church in Acts. God’s work, Soulen suggests, presupposes an “economy of mutual blessing between those who are different . . . The Lord’s blessing is available only through the blessing of an other.”159

In his commentary on Maximus the Confessor, theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar notes the linking of ecclesial and sacramental worship with the created world and Maximus’s view of the whole as a cosmic liturgy, a theme shared by and expounded upon by John Zizioulas in his own understanding of the human being as Priest of Creation. Creation, as a vehicle of the divine, is sacramental, relational, beautiful. Balthasar’s and Zizioulas’s liturgical visions of cosmic relationality flesh out Soulen’s economy of mutual blessing, with humanity ordained to a special vocation of priestly service. Such vocational understandings of the Imago Dei draw upon the inherent relationality of being, both vertically and horizontally, rather than upon the uniqueness of human physiology, avoiding both the contradiction of scientific knowledge and the staking of the Imago Dei inextricably to it. Anthropocentric instrumentalisation, then, expressed in theologies of the Imago Dei that emphasise human exceptionalism and superiority rather than

Trinitarian relationality, becomes a disregarding of the unique priestly vocation of the human person and an impediment to reception of the blessings intended for God’s creatures.

A vocational interpretation of the Imago Dei finds support both in Scripture and in many of the authoritative documents of the Church, particularly those dealing with Catholic social teaching. Theologian James E. Helmer, examining the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, observes that human rights are “directed towards the flourishing or fulfillment of

159 R. Kendall Soulen, The God of Israel and Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1996), 116– 117.

69 individuals-in-community” and arise from the inherent dignity of the human being as a creature made in the image of God.160 The Compendium goes on to offer a fourfold understanding of the

Imago Dei that is at once substantive, functional, ontological, and vocational. He finds that the

International Theological Commission’s document “Communion and Stewardship: Human

Persons Created in the Image of God”161 likewise offers a multifaceted understanding of the

Imago Dei that is substantive, ontological, relational, theological, and functional. Excising the cognitive and affective aspects of both understandings, the remaining characterisations of the

Imago Dei in these documents can be collapsed into the image of humanity as Priest of Creation.

“Communion and Stewardship,” in particular, lays out a concept of the Imago Dei that involves a specifically Trinitarian relational ontology wrapped up in a Christological teleology.162 Helmer’s study of these documents leads him to conclude that the International Theological Commission

“locates moral standing in moral personality rather than in moral agency and argues that ‘the imago Dei consists in [the human person’s] fundamental orientation to God, which is the basis of human dignity and of the inalienable rights of the human person.’”163 If non-human animals, as likewise created beings, are also fundamentally oriented to God rather than to the temporal and teleological goods of humanity, then it is possible to consider that they too possess an inherent dignity that arises relationally and bestows a certain right to moral consideration. It is proper, then, that humanity, as Priest of Creation, existing in a cosmos that is always already relational, contemplate its relationship with other animals.

160 James E. Helmer, “Speaking Theologically of Animal Rights,” Journal of Moral Theology 3, no. 2 (2014): 114. 161 International Theological Commission, Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons Created in the Image of God, Vatican Website, 2004, sec. 22, accessed May 7, 2017, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20040723_commun ion-stewardship_en.html. 162 Ibid., 115. 163 Communion and Stewardship, 22 in Helmer, “Speaking Theologically of Animal Rights,” 117.

By a rather less exegetical, less scientific route, Zizioulas arrives at this same notion of humanity’s cosmic priesthood, approaching humanity's vocation as relational, an analogy of the ordained priesthood with corresponding liturgical actions and responsibilities. While he identifies the Imago Dei as the creative quality of God, reflected in humanity, rather than as humanity's election itself, the implications of humanity's vocation as priest to the rest of Creation remains in essence the same, and the troubles inherent in a biological understanding of the Imago

Dei are avoided. A relational, vocational restructuring of the doctrine allows it to be salvaged, perhaps even restored to its original intended meaning, thereby preserving human uniqueness without diminishing the goodness of other species. The relational, vocational priesthood of humanity envisions Creation as a community in which species play different roles but do not necessarily form a hierarchy in which some have inherently greater claims than others to their common home, to flourishing, or to the Creator.

Drawing on the serpent’s deceitful words in Genesis 3—“you will be like God”—Bader-

Saye, however, identifies reason for caution. He marks a distinction between imaging God and being like God: “[t]he former is our highest calling, while the latter is our deepest rebellion.”164

Bader-Saye sees displayed in theological discourse regarding the Imago Dei this same ancient temptation not only to image but to become God, ordering all of Creation toward one species.

Understanding the image as election does not alleviate this temptation and may, in fact, intensify it, Bader-Saye warns.165 For him, humanity walks, always, a tightrope between claiming too much and claiming too little for itself, with a complete denial of the Imago Dei representing as great a pitfall as does employing it to justify an overreaching domination.166 Zizioulas’s

164 Bader-Saye, “Imaging God through Peace with Animals,” 7. 165 Ibid., 6. 166 Ibid., 7.

71 liturgical understanding of humanity as Priest of Creation overcomes these objections, its transformative anaphora transcending linear time, encompassing all stages of Creation and uniting them to the sacrifice of the Cross. Christ’s sacrifice, despite its occurrence at a particular moment in earth’s history, in a particular place in the cosmos, is not limited by space or time, applying to all those who lived before and after the Incarnation itself.

A distinction must be made here for clarity’s sake. To understand the Imago Dei as vocational rather than biological does not invalidate questions about how the various physical and mental capabilities of the human animal might contribute to humanity’s living out of this vocation. What it does do, however, is avoid making these capacities themselves the source and reason for the image of God in humanity. It simultaneously elevates humanity to a role of leadership and humbles it to a role of service. If humanity is Priest of Creation and the non- human animals its parishioners, it follows that anthropocentric instrumentalism is not permissible, as later chapters of this dissertation will argue. Non-human animals do not exist for humanity’s use; rather, they exist alongside humanity as fellow creatures of a common Creator.

Linzey suggests that “it should be that humans given lordship or God-like power should serve creation. To reiterate: The inner logic of Christ's lordship is the sacrifice of the higher for the lower; not the reverse. If the humility of God is costly and essential, why should ours be less so?”167 Humanity is called to live as though it truly believes in a generous and loving God who has created the cosmos and everything in it and saw that it was good.

Just as the vocation of Israel is fulfilled when the Gentiles finally join the People of God, so too will the vocation of humanity be fulfilled rather than diminished when the non-human

167 Andrew Linzey, “The Servant Species: Humanity as Priesthood,” Between the Species 6, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 115.

72 members of Creation come into the Kingdom. By embracing the Otherness and recognising the inherent goodness of the non-human animal, humanity is drawn into relationship with the rest of the animal kingdom and with the common Creator without diminishing nor equating the particular dignity of the human being. If human uniqueness is vocational rather than rooted in rational capacity, then to fail to live out this vocation or, worse, to reject it entirely is to fail to live authentically as a human being—an ontological and soteriological danger to which the

Church must respond. By contrast, in striving to understand non-human animals and respecting the Otherness of the non-human animal in relationship, all of Creation draws closer to the

Kingdom.

1.6 Conclusion

This chapter has presented and challenged the assumptions underlying anthropocentric instrumentalism as a theological perspective. It has demonstrated the tension between anthropocentric instrumentalism and relationality within contemporary Catholic liturgy and doctrine and called for greater clarity and consistency on questions of theological anthropology and cosmology. The chapter has identified the historical events and influences by which anthropocentric instrumentalism made its way into Catholic theology and pointed out resources within the Catholic tradition, particularly Pope Francis’s Laudato Si’, that might serve to dismantle it. I have argued that the work of challenging a theology centered on the goods of humanity, and recovering a recognition of the inherent goodness of other animal species and their theocentric telos, is a necessary step toward a faithful, vocational living out of humanity’s dominion. To resist this work—to insist on anthropocentricity in lieu of theocentricity—not only impedes the flourishing of other animal creatures but delays humanity’s attainment of its own telos.

The chapter that follows argues that all of Creation, to include non-human animals, is inherently good, and that this goodness flows not from a utility to humanity but from a relationship with the Triune God, who is the source and sustainer of all things. Through engagement with the work of theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar, the chapter articulates a theological anthropology rooted in creaturely relationality and ordered toward God. Humanity is called to image God but, more specifically, to image the loving relationality of the Persons of the

Trinity, a vocational calling that connects it to the rest of the cosmos. The chapter rejects the conflation of personhood with individuality, situating the human being within its proper creaturely context and calling for the recognition of non-human Creation as beautiful, as good, as relational.

Chapter 2 The Goodness of Creation in Hans Urs von Balthasar

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter argued that a recognition of the inherent goodness of non-human

Creation and a theocentric understanding of humanity’s place within it are critical to the project of challenging the anthropocentric instrumentalisation of other animals. The work of Hans Urs von Balthasar, although it predates the rise of both eco- and animal theology, is a rich starting point for thinking through these questions in a Trinitarian context. Balthasar's exploration of the identity of the human being, his theological anthropology, leads always to an understanding of humanity not solely as Imago Dei but specifically as Imago Trinitatis. The human being exists not as a separate, individual entity but always already in dialogue with the Creator and, though the Creator, with the Creation.

This chapter contends that theological personhood is inherently relational, known only through contemplation of the Trinity and participation in the reciprocal love of Creator and creature. Human dignity, then, is not anthropocentric but theocentric, arising not from the intellectual capacity of the human species but from its relationship with its Creator. The loving relationality of the triune God is central; it is ever-present in Balthasar's ontology of the Trinity and also in his consideration of the cosmos, which, for him, is a reflection, however blurred, however incomplete, of the reality of Trinitarian life. This dissertation argues that a creaturely relationality draws humanity ever outward, toward relationship with the rest of Creation and with its Creator. Balthasar's emphasis on the inherent relatedness of Being, reflected back in the being of the world, God's own creation and gift, lays the foundation for the dissertation’s treatment of the increasingly developed relational ontology of theologians such as Metropolitan

John Zizioulas.168 Without this understanding of the inherent relationality of creaturely being, a relationality that images the interior relationality of the Trinity, the vocational view of humanity’s theological identity advanced by Zizioulas in the following chapter and the moral obligations generated by this vocation, outlined in the final chapter, are unintelligible.

Balthasar's consideration of the loving relatedness of the Persons of the Trinity and their connection to that which they have created demands careful, deliberately theological reconsideration of the philosophical concept of personhood, especially as it is applied to the human being. This chapter asks: What is a person? Who is the human? And what does it mean to be made in the image of an expressly triune God? Balthasar's answers to these questions help to lay the foundation for a theology of Creation that goes beyond classic anthropocentric instrumentalist formulations and is open instead to the goodness inherent in non-human Creation.

Balthasar's treatment of theological anthropology and the transcendentals casts humanity and indeed the beauty of all of Creation as unique expressions, self-communications, of the triune

Creator; both the unity and the multiplicity of the cosmos and of each species take on new significance in light of this relationship with the source and summit of all life.

Although Balthasar himself finds no reason to dispense with anthropocentrism entirely, his treatment of humanity places the human within a broader cosmology and recognises that human life is anchored in the created world—a world that is, ultimately, oriented toward God.

He writes, "The fact that I find myself within the realm of a world and in the boundless community of other existent beings is astonishing beyond measure and cannot be exhaustively

168 See Chapter 3 for an in-depth discussion of the relational ontology of Zizioulas.

76 explained by any cause which derives from within the world."169 The way the Creator is centered throughout Balthasar’s work on Creation is of particular value to this dissertation in synthesising a hermeneutic by which the beauty of all of Creation and, more specifically, of the non-human animal is exposed and embraced, without devaluing humanity or denying its unique vocation within Creation. This chapter proceeds by arguing first for a relational, vocational understanding of theological anthropology centred on the loving relationality of the Trinity. It moves then to more closely consider Balthasar’s cosmology, arguing that his appreciation of the inherent goodness and beauty of non-human Creation and God’s relationship to it is beneficial in understanding the identity of non-human animals as subjects ordered toward God rather than objects ordered toward humanity.

2.2 Who Is the Human?

Balthasar describes humanity as the epitome of the cosmos, "neither plant nor animal nor anything apart from himself."170 Certainly humanity has viewed itself, throughout the course of history, as "Summe und Inbild des Kosmos," at times imaging itself as wholly other, as in

Balthasar's depiction, and at times acknowledging its place on the spectrum of created things.171

Balthasar too fluctuates between recognising humanity within its creaturely and evolutionary context and wanting to set it apart, to articulate its uniqueness within the cosmos and the course of history. Humanity, for him, is both a microcosm of Creation and transcendent of it, with the stages of evolution traced within the human body as it develops in the womb. "All the realms

169 Hans Urs von Balthsar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, Volume VII: Theology: The New Covenant (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 615. 170 Hans Urs von Balthasar, A Theological Anthropology (London: Sheed and Ward, 1967), 44. 171 “The sum and perfect image of the cosmos.” Hans Urs von Balthasar, Das Ganze im Fragment: Aspekte der Geschichtstheologie (Cincinnati: Benziger, 1963), 63.

77 and genera of living things converge in him; no animal species is alien to him.”172 Balthasar's understanding of humanity at once appeals to biology to hold up the human being as a convergence of all creaturely existence and ignores biological taxonomies that place humanity firmly within the kingdom Animalia, separated from other species by a difference of degree, not of kind. His position, while unashamedly anthropocentric, does not create a complete dualism of human and animal, human and nature. Despite these fluctuations in his thought, Balthasar rightly characterizes as blasphemous an anthropocentric instrumentalism that celebrates the natural world only for its utility to humanity.173 The nature of humanity, Balthasar holds, is instead oriented toward being in general, such that in contemplating humanity itself, one finds oneself being drawn deeper into relationship with Creation rather than detaching from it.174

In non-human animals, humanity recognises its own traits—strength, cunning, wisdom, loyalty, industriousness—as evidenced by the popularity of medieval bestiaries, which extolled the virtues of non-human animals as examples to humanity. Despite these commonalities, real or perceived, Balthasar sees humanity alone as capable of overcoming and sublimating primal passions common to all animals. He also holds that humanity is uniquely able to offer to nature, through humanity’s spirit, the dignity that humanity has been afforded. "The directing of his gaze inward does not detach man’s mind from the ground of nature,” he writes, “but enables him

172 Balthasar, A Theological Anthropology, 43. 173 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, Volume I: Seeing the Form (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982), 444. Although Balthasar's work predates the advent of eco-theology and certainly of animal theology as a distinct research interest, his theological aesthetics, particularly beauty, have been employed convincingly by contemporary systematicians concerned with animal and environmental theology. See Celia Deane-Drummond, Christ and Evolution: Wonder and Wisdom (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009); David Moss, "Hans Urs von Balthasar: Beginning with Beauty,” in Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical and Theological Perspectives, eds. David G. Horrell et al. (London: T&T Clark International, 2010), 196–210; Anthony C. Sciglitano, “Hans Urs von Balthasar & Deep Ecology: Towards a Doxological Ecology,” in Confronting the Climate Crisis: Catholic Theological Perspectives, ed. Jame Schaefer (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2011), 277–299. 174 Balthasar, A Theological Anthropology, 44.

78 to make his roots in it stronger, profounder, more intimate."175 Humanity can, he argues,

“transfer the infinities of spiritual dimensions to the dark maternal forces of nature thus giving back to them, through his spirit, the dignity that nature accorded him.”176 Although human uniqueness and superiority are taken for granted by Balthasar, the fate of the species is, nevertheless, inextricably linked to that of the non-human cosmos. Balthasar specifically rejects

"acosmistic" theories of the perfectibility of humanity, which posit that humanity can only be perfected apart from the being of the world, apart from humanity's own corporeality and embeddedness in Creation.177 Such notions he describes as "treason against the world."178

Humanity's embodiment, its participation in a cosmos that includes a myriad of non-human creatures and objects, is not a hindrance or a temporal prison of the soul, nor is it merely the means to an exclusively human eschatological end; it is indeed the intentional design of the

Creator, who loves all that has been created. The human being cannot help but exist, as do the

Persons of the Trinity, in loving relatedness to both the Otherness of God and the otherness of its fellow creatures.

Balthasar acknowledges humanity as limited being in a limited world, although human reason, he says, “is open to the unlimited, to all of being.” Humanity demonstrates an understanding of its own finitude in its contemplation of existential questions: “I am but I could not-be.”179 In Christ, the finite, relative freedom of humanity is confronted by the absolute freedom of God. Ultimately, Balthasar says, the human must be a search for God, a question

175 Ibid. 176 Ibid. 177 Ibid., 45. 178 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume II: Dramatis Personae: Man in God, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 343. 179 Hans Urs von Balthasar, “A Résumé of My Thought,” Communio 15 (Winter 1988): 468.

79 posed to the Creator. The human exists not as an individual but only in dialogue with the other—with God and with one’s neighbour.180

In the modern world, Balthasar identifies impediments to the recognition of this relationality. Human beings lead increasingly fragmented, compartmentalised lives, struggling to keep separate the realms of the professional and the personal, the personal and the political, the political and the religious. It is not only the relationship between humanity and its Creator that is strained by the demands of modern living but also the relationship between humanity and non-human Creation. Balthasar notes with regret that the dawning of the technological age has inserted additional distance into the relationship between humanity and the rest of Creation, a concern shared by Pope Francis.181 Pope Francis laments, in Laudato Si’, that “[h]uman beings and material objects no longer extend a friendly hand to one another; the relationship has become confrontational.”182 He notes that “[r]eal relationships with others, with all the challenges they entail, now tend to be replaced by a type of internet communication which enables us to choose or eliminate relationships at whim, thus giving rise to a new type of contrived emotion which has more to do with devices and displays than with other people and with nature.”183 Technological innovations, despite their many benefits, add a layer of separation that further divides human beings from the land they work, from the creatures they interact with, and from one another. The integration of human life, the restoration of the relationships of original peace present in the

180 Hans Urs von Balthasar, My Work: In Retrospect (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 114. 181 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Explorations in Theology, Volume I: The Word Made Flesh (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 82. 182 Francis, Laudato Si’, Encyclical letter on care for our common home, June 2015 (Washington: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2015), 106. 183 Ibid., 47.

Garden, is possible only through relationship with Absolute Being, which is the origin and the telos of all life.184

2.2.1 Theological Personhood

The concept of the person is of special concern in the discourse surrounding non-human animals, as it is so commonly used, philosophically and legally, as the basis for moral consideration. The person alone has rights, has interests, has agency—but what or who is a person? Acknowledging that the word has a complex "multiplicity of meanings" that resist synthesis, Balthasar endeavors to discern within it the unique theological meaning that bestows upon the word "its special dignity in history."185 He traces the modern Christian understanding of personhood back to Greek and Roman antiquity, to the Etruscan word phersu. Revelers at festivals honouring the goddess Persephone wore masks, known as phersu, although this term was also used to denote the masked revelers themselves. The term persona, on the stage, likewise took on a multitude of meanings, referring to the role, the actor, the character being portrayed, the essential elements of the personality, or even simply a particular individual.186

From these origins in theatre, Balthasar notes that Aquinas sees a connection of person with a particular dignity first arising where person was used to denote the depiction of famous men, men of dignity.187 Before the time of Christ, the understanding of persona began to develop more specialised meaning in literature, law, and philosophy, as well, with Latin favouring a definition of persona as not merely a role but a spiritual subject. This practice was eventually adopted by the Church, and person came to indicate "a spiritual subject (hypostasis) that is

184 Balthasar, A Theological Anthropology, 46. 185 Hans Urs von Balthasar, "On the Concept of Person," Communio 13 (Spring 1986): 18. 186 Ibid., 20. 187 Ibid., 23. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1a.29.3.2ad.

81 distinguished through a characteristic lying in order of dignity."188 Balthasar traces the adoption of persona in this subjective and spiritual sense back to Chalcedon and the Church's articulation of the hypostatic union.

Contemplation of the Trinity makes evident the necessity of such a nuanced understanding of personhood for Christian systematic theology. Balthasar warns especially against definitions of personhood that reduce “person” to a synonym for “individual,” a conflation that becomes problematic in the consideration of Trinitarian ontology. Instead, he maintains that there cannot be a person who exists only within and by themselves.189 He views the Chalcedonian Definition as evidence that the divine person of the Son, as one person with two natures, “can, as such, exist only in a (trinitarian) relation, for otherwise we would end up with a doctrine of three gods.”190 The being of the Son, then, is inherently, ontologically relational, a notion incompatible with the individualistic formulation of personhood advanced by

Boethius in the Middle Ages. Balthasar takes issue also with Augustine's placing of "the image of the Trinity in created man completely in the single individual—certainly from a fear of polytheism—in that he wanted to see this image only in the individual's spiritual faculties

(memory, knowledge, and will)."191 By contrast, he notes that Bonaventure and Duns Scotus distinguished, in their work, between individuum and person, identifying the difference as an

"exalted dignity" in the latter.192 Aquinas, after Boethius, attaches this dignity to independence and a nature with the capacity for reason, concluding that "every individual of a nature endowed

188 Balthasar, "On the Concept of Person," 21. 189 Ibid., 24. 190 Ibid., 21–22. 191 Ibid., 22. 192 Ibid., 23.

82 with reason is called person."193 With regard to God, however, Balthasar notes that Aquinas applies personhood "solely on the basis of the idea of dignity."194 If God is three Persons whose interdependence does not negate their personhood, whose cognitive capacities do not comprise the litmus test, it stands to reason that the exalted dignity that affords God’s creatures their own personhood might also be independent of their capacities for reason and individuality. It is God, after all, Who exalts this dignity in the first place, transforming an individual into a person.

Without the illumination of theological insight, philosophical concepts of “person” and

“individual” can collapse into one, yet Balthasar acknowledges that in order for Christology and

Trinitarian theology to bestow new meaning, the secular, philosophical concept of personhood must already exist. He warns, however, that just as theology can give shape to philosophy, philosophy can likewise influence theology.195 Balthasar laments the erosion of the concept of personhood in the Modern Age at the hands of secular philosophers such as Descartes, Hegel,

Kant, and Spinoza. "[E]ven though it was demanded that the other person was respected, the absoluteness of the person was anchored simply in his ethical freedom,” Balthasar writes.

“Thus, there was nothing preserved of a fundamental interrelatedness of persons—as a meaningfully understood Imago Trinitatis would have demanded."196 It is, ironically, philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach's atheistic materialism that Balthasar credits with restoring the inherent relationality of personhood within philosophy. It was Feuerbach who rediscovered "the elementary fact that there simply cannot be a single person, existing within himself, but that existence as a person comes about only in the relationship between the I and Thou."197 This

193 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1a.29.3.2ad. 194 Balthasar, "On the Concept of Person," 23. 195 Ibid., 19. 196 Ibid., 24. 197 Ibid.

83 relational ontology of the person provides theology with the insight that the human is "the personal imago Trinitatis."198 It is not until later, however, that Balthasar identifies "a true image of the Trinity" appearing in modern personalism through the work of theologians Emmanuel

Mounier, Gabriel Marcel, and, especially, cultural theorist Denis de Rougemont. Rougemont notes a period of "anti-social Reason" in which the individual rejects the tribe and profanes what it holds sacred as a preliminary stage to the emergence of the person. This stage, however, leads to anarchy and the degradation of society if individuals do not eventually move past it.

Rougemont identifies a “vocation” that binds the human being to their neighbour and gives rise to the Church. It is only within this relationship, Rougemont says, that the person exists. He writes, "Person, act, vocation become for me virtually synonymous. The act is concrete obedience to a transcendent vocation: the vocation brings forth the person in the individuum.

Hence this new definition: the individuum is the natural man; the person is the new creature, as

Paul understands it."199

Balthasar finds helpful the nonreciprocal notion expressed by Jacques Maritain, among others, that “the individual exists for the society, but the society exists for the person”—a notion that does not treat “individual” and “person” as synonyms.200 As evidence of the special dignity distinguishing the person, Balthasar looks to the non-human animals, creatures one readily recognises as individuals but not as persons. Although referring to a human being as an

“individual” does not deny this dignity, Balthasar uses the word to refer to “the identity of

198 Ibid. 199 Balthasar, "On the Concept of Person," 25. 200 Here, Balthasar takes for granted that non-human animals are not persons; however, elsewhere in his Theo- Drama, he makes footnoted mention of St. Mechthild von Hackeborn and her visions that led her to the conclusion that non-human animals are, beyond question, viewed as "persons" before the Lord. Whether Balthasar agreed with this vision is unclear from the text. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume V: The Last Act (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003), 421.

84 human nature,” whereas the word “person” is reserved for consideration of “the uniqueness, the incomparability and therefore irreplaceability of the individual.”201 The human being, he writes,

"stands in the tension between the individual and the person—a tension, as one sees very easily, that cannot be resolved, for no one can be a person except on the basis of individuality. Yet the word individuality, which means the quality of not being broken into parts, always includes an element of singularity that, at least potentially, contains something of personality."202 Balthasar's definition of “individuality” leans more toward synonymy with wholeness, unbrokenness, and integrity than the more common notion of “individual” as single, distinct, or separate, although the latter may be incorporated, for him, in the former. This particular understanding of individuality is easier to resolve with relational ontologies of personhood. I argue that if an individual is an individual not by virtue of being separate from others but by virtue of one's not being fragmented and broken within oneself, there exists a lesser tension in the concept of relationship with the Trinity as the fulfillment of personhood and the Trinity itself as its perfect model.

The critical difference between the individual and the person is viewed clearly only through the lens of theology, specifically a theology of relationality, informed by consideration of the triune character of divine love. From this perspective, individual and person cannot be synonyms but become almost antonyms; the individual is enveloped and preserved within personhood but necessarily opened to the relationality, the loving exchange, and the communal participation of existence within the life of divine love. All human beings, Balthasar holds, are called to be not just Imago Dei but, more specifically, Imago Trinitatis, beings in relation—a feat

201 Balthasar, "On the Concept of Person," 18. 202 Ibid., 19.

85 made possible by the Incarnation, which makes accessible to Creation the mystery of the

Trinity.203 In agreement with Pope Benedict XVI, Balthasar notes that the person of the Father generating the person of the Son becomes the model and mystery of theological personhood.

Pope Benedict XVI explains the act of generating another complete person is not added to the complete person of the Father "but the person is the deed of generating, of giving itself, of streaming itself forth. The person is identical with this act of self-donation.”204 Personhood can be said to be, ontologically speaking, inherently relational.

Balthasar expresses admiration for the Buddhist concept of the "tiny I" that gives way to the "selfless self" as one nears enlightenment, a notion that parallels the concept of the birth of the person from the ashes of the individual.205 It is futile to cling to a separatist independence, resisting a move toward the Trinitarian nature of pure love, the fulfillment of theological personhood. Christ's life is not the life of an individual but is, rather, the perfect expression of relational personhood. In the Incarnation, Christ does not give up His divinity, even temporarily.

“As man, [Christ] is not a modified God, and, as God, he is no altered man,” Balthasar writes.

“He is fullness in person: God and man, and both in a perfect, immutable manner.”206 Christ incarnate is not limited in His humanity as a result of His divinity but is indeed the authentic, perfect human being. He invites humanity into the relationship He shares with the Father and the

Spirit, bringing about "the perfect unity between unabridged eternal life and unimpaired human life" in a way that unites the two while being authentically receptive to the values of both.207

203 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume IV: The Action (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 105. 204 Joseph Ratzinger, “Retrieving the Tradition: Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology,” Communio 17 (Fall 1990): 444. 205 Balthasar, “On the Concept of Person,” 26. 206 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 513. 207 Ibid., 514.

Christ in the Trinity then provides an image of the perfection of the person, the selfless self, existing in loving relationship, uniting both Heaven and earth. The Divine Commission, for

Balthasar, is the eternal processio of the Son and the Spirit in economic form; the "core reality of the person" and participation in Christ's saving mission.208

Throughout his consideration of personhood, Balthasar freely and almost without comment uses “person” to describe the Trinity as well as an exalted, fulfilled state of humanity in particular. Despite the attempts of philosophers to connect personhood to attributes presumed to be the exclusive purview of the human species, such as the capacity for reason, Balthasar makes little effort to justify his exclusive assignment of personhood to just one species of creature among many. In a brief divergence, troubling for modern sensibilities and yet intriguing for the consideration of non-human personhood, Balthasar considers that the incomparability constitutive of personhood may not be afforded to all human beings individually. In some

“primitive cultures,” he suggests, “personal character” might be shared only communally, necessitating that the individual become part of a tribe in order to share in it.209 This notion, problematic though it may be in racial and cultural terms for the inherent dignity of the human being, resists the popular conflation of “person” with “human” and begins to hint at the notion of other theologians, like Zizioulas, that personhood is only fulfilled in relation to the Other, without whom one is not only "lost" but cannot exist at all.210 If not all humans are persons, are all persons humans? Certainly, the answer to this question is "no" as the Father and the Spirit cannot be said to be human—but what of the creatures Balthasar describes as subhuman?

208 Balthasar, “On the Concept of Person,” 25. 209 Ibid., 19. 210 Ibid., 19.

Although he himself does not explore this question and was no opponent of the sanctity of human uniqueness, Balthasar’s thought is nevertheless helpful in thinking through this question.

2.2.2 Freedom as Imago Dei

Balthasar declines initially to give a concise definition of the Imago Dei, holding that the human being can only be understood and defined through reference to Christ. The Imago Dei, then, is a concept that is Christological rather than anthropological, concerning the discovery by humanity of God's own definition of humanity, in Christ.211 Balthasar maintains that the only way to come to an understanding of the identity of humanity is through consideration of the One in Whose image it has been made. Humanity resists this explicitly theological, explicitly

Christian solution, turning instead to an array of other philosophies, none of which can offer an authentic answer to the question of who humanity is.212 Christ's form transcends the Imago Dei as "the concealed epiphany of the thing itself in the medium of the relationship between God and creature."213 It is Christ's taking on flesh and walking among His creatures that makes visible the invisible, makes tangible the intangible. "The appearance and sight of the “form” offers us, in a very personal way, an overwhelming perception of the mystery which constitutes the human condition,” writes Balthasar. “This is the mystery of how the reciprocal act of love expresses at its deepest level what it is to be human."214

Theologian Dominic Robinson, through his reading of Balthasar, concludes that the most important truth about humanity as the Imago Dei is not the reality of the Fall but the enduring

211 Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume II: Dramatis Personae: Man in God, 343. 212 Balthasar, “A Résumé of My Thought,” 5. 213 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, Volume I: Seeing the Form, 480. 214 Dominic Robinson, Understanding the “Imago Dei”: The Thought of Barth, von Balthasar and Moltmann (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 85.

88 love of the Creator for the creature. Christ, in the Incarnation, assumes the form of the creature who has been made in His image and, in doing so, purifies it. It is this relationship that is transformative and draws humanity into Trinitarian communion, all the while respecting and retaining both the other otherness of the creature and the Otherness of the Creator.215 The otherness of humanity, then, is not disgraceful but is an image of God, even though it is not

God.216 Theologian Celia Deane-Drummond writes that "the human and the divine in Christ are united such that there is nothing human that is not the utterance and expression of the divine and nothing divine that is not revealed and communicated to us in human terms."217

The analogy of proportionality factors heavily into Balthasar's understanding of the

Imago Dei. Humanity's goodness and freedom are proportional, though imperfectly, to God's own. God, as infinite Being, is infinitely good, experiencing infinite freedom, whereas humanity, as finite being, is only finitely good, with finite freedom. It is this finite freedom that is, for Balthasar, influenced by Tertullian, the image of God in humanity. Balthasar does not discard entirely, however, classic interpretations of the Imago Dei that would link the image to human rationality, parenthetically noting that finite freedom is only possible in a being with a rational nature. Balthasar is not satisfied, however, to center his construction of the Imago Dei on the cognitive capacities of the human animal alone, pointing instead to the characteristics of the Creator. It is Christ as the "truer and more dependable man" in whose image and likeness humanity has been created and around Whom the concept must revolve.218

215 Ibid., 84. 216 Balthasar, “A Résumé of My Thought,” 3. 217 Celia Deane-Drummond, Christ and Evolution: Wonder and Wisdom (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), 138. 218 Balthasar, Theo-Drama II, 327.

Balthasar finds compelling the Patristic distinction between the image and the likeness.

He shows admiration for the teaching of Tertullian and Irenaeus that humanity has retained the image of God but lost God's likeness in the Fall. Balthasar's angle differs from that of Greek

Fathers, however, in that he places the stress not on the loss of likeness but on the work of the

Saviour Who moves humanity toward its Creator.219 It is in moving toward God, a movement made possible by the finite freedom of humanity as creatures made in God's image, that the human being, through grace, realises as well the likeness of God. By contrast, in the free choice to move away from God, the human loses this likeness.220 Balthasar praises Origen's ability to recognise the unity also in image and likeness without succumbing to the Platonic temptation to dissolve the two into one.221 It is through the Incarnation, then, and the movement of the Spirit that humanity is, by divine grace, ultimately restored as both the image and likeness of its

Creator and enters into the life of the Trinity.

Robinson identifies a tension in modern understandings of the Imago Dei between two poles he calls the “ascendant” and the “descendant.” The former describes the action of humanity, journeying toward God. The latter describes the theocentric grounding of the concept, the focus on God's action in the life of humanity. Robinson notes the influence of theologian

Karl Barth on Balthasar’s understanding of the Imago Dei, with Barth shifting the doctrine away from anthropocentric articulations toward Christocentrism and influencing Balthasar to go even further in constructing his own contemporary treatment.222 In response to concerns that

Balthasar has simply imposed a Catholic shape on Barth's Reformed system, Robinson holds that

219 Robinson, Understanding the “Imago Dei,” 89. 220 Balthasar, Theo-Drama II, 327. 221 Ibid., 329–330. 222 Robinson, Understanding the “Imago Dei,” 116.

Balthasar's Imago Dei is actually a synthesis of the thought of a number of theologians, and the relational and teleological themes in their work resonated more with Balthasar than they did with

Barth.223 Robinson writes: "It is a movement which refocuses Lutheran Christocentrism on

Christ's presence in human life and searches for a new Christocentric theological aesthetic expressing human identity in terms of relationship."224

In Balthasar’s formulation, anthropocentric constructions of the Imago Dei, centered on cognitive or affective capabilities of the human species, are discarded in favour of an understanding oriented toward God. Humanity "is not the primal word, but a response; he is not a speaker, but an expression governed by the laws of beauty, laws which man cannot impose on himself."225 The human being is not a soul contained in a body, willingly or unwillingly, but a totality of body and soul—its embodiment, its form, an integral part of its being. As such, humanity must make itself into "God's mirror and seek to attain to that transcendence and radiance that must be found in the world's substance if it is indeed God's image and likeness."226

Humanity is both a proportional image of God already and questing toward the likeness of God through engagement with Christ, who draws the human into relationship with Himself but also with the whole of Creation and with the other Persons of the Trinity. The Imago Dei "cannot possibly be considered a private matter. Rather it is a communal one."227

Balthasar asserts that God's presence shows itself in concrete human fellowship: "It is the dawning of the divine love in what is not God and what is opposed to God, the dawning of

223 Ibid., 126. 224 Ibid., 127. 225 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord I, 22. 226 Ibid. 227 Robinson, Understanding the “Imago Dei,” 88.

91 eternal life (as 'resurrection') in utter death: not the dawning of the divine 'I' in the non-divine

'Thou', but the dawning of the divine I-Thou-We in the worldly, creaturely, I-Thou-We of human fellowship."228 It is the relationality of being, then, that makes manifest the glory of God—but must this fellowship remain limited to human society? The notion of non-human Creation also participating in some way in the manifestation of God's presence and the eschatological hope it reveals does not seem incongruous with Balthasar's thought. He holds that the original creation includes "the hominisation of nature and the evolution of mankind," largely through the efforts of humanity who, from the beginning, has been endowed with, as Sirach states, strength like

God's own. "A reflected radiance of the divine glory lies on this sovereignty of the man," writes

Balthasar.229

Balthasar sees in Ephesians 4 an expression of the "miracle of God's glory": "There is one body and one Spirit, just as you were called to the one hope of your calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all and through all and in all."230 It is the restitution of God's grace—through the Eucharist—offered up in the Church's love—through faithful humanity—that achieves the goal intended for all of Creation from the beginning: God's glory. Balthasar writes that "the man who believes and loves has substantially become 'the glorification of the glory of the grace' of God."231 Such a unitive, transformational effort is led by humanity in the Church, on behalf of Creation, as a result of humanity's having been made in

God's image. This special role of humanity in Balthasar’s work hints at Zizioulas's more

228 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord VII, 432. 229 Ibid., 518. 230 Eph 4:4-6 (NRSV). 231 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord VII, 431.

92 developed notion of humanity as Priest of Creation, which is to be discussed in the following chapter.

2.3 What Is Creation?

It can be assumed by the mere existence of the world as a creation of God that God must will its being and wish to communicate God's own love, reflected in this creation.232 Deane-

Drummond notes that while Balthasar tends to view non-human Creation as the stage upon which the drama of salvation is played out, the influence of Ignatius, Maximus the Confessor, and poet Gerard Manley Hopkins keep him from limiting the non-human world to this role alone.

Balthasar characterises the question of why the world exists as a "fundamental puzzle," comfortable with a degree of apophaticism in his theological cosmology. 233 That Balthasar sees the existence of Creation as a mystery implies a rejection of a simplistic anthropocentric instrumentalism and the possibility that the telos of non-human Creation is known in its fullness only to the Creator. Balthasar's retrieval of patristic theology leads him to a sacramental view of

Creation, one in which God is revealed in all things and therefore all things are wondrous: all things are of value that far exceeds their simple utility to humanity.234

Balthasar, through critical engagement with, especially, Maximus the Confessor, considers the identity of Creation, its purpose and its dignity. I argue that Balthasar’s cosmology, although it predates contemporary theological interest in synthesising a deliberately eco- or animal theology like Deane-Drummond's, nevertheless provides a useful foundation for establishing the inherent goodness of the created world beyond mere service to humanity. His

232 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 99. 233 Deane-Drummond, Christ and Evolution, 133. 234 Ibid., 150.

93 work on Creation, albeit not extensive, suggests that Balthasar rejected a purely instrumentalist approach to the created world, preferring instead an appreciation of the cosmos grounded in its divine origin rather than its worldly functionality.235 "For the 'world' is not only this external, temporal world: its being has its foundation in God, and is oriented toward eternity,” he writes.

“It comes from God and goes to God, and, even when it distances itself from him, it is not outside God."236 Although humanity remains, for Balthasar, the unquestionable summit of

Creation, he recognises within non-human creatures a “life principle” that I argue demands a move beyond instrumentalising to an understanding of non-human Creation as divine in origin and beautiful in relationship, participating in the revelation of the mystery of Being. Humanity alone is the Imago Dei, but non-human Creation is nonetheless graced as creation and reflection of the divine Creator.

Within the natural world, Balthasar recognises a greater law at work, and he writes that the human person is "acting best of all when he allows this great law to operate unobstructed through him."237 This law is present not only in humanity but in “everything ordered by the law of nature” which reveals the Being of the world.238 For Balthasar, the splendor of Creation is a form of divine revelation. It is only through the sin of humanity, through the Fall that deafened humanity to the “immediate interior voice” of God in Creation, that the “locutio interna had to become a locutio externa.”239 Nevertheless, God’s words were expressed in the speech of

Creation, which is predisposed toward the reception of God's self-revelation. Finite Creation imperfectly echoes the infinite Creator Who simultaneously sums up and surpasses Creation,

235 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord I, 444. 236 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 100. 237 Balthasar. The Glory of the Lord I, 445. 238 Ibid. 239 Ibid., 449.

94 particularly in the form of Christ. Through the Incarnation, the Son once again pronounces the goodness of Creation. In becoming flesh and making "his contribution to the world's work," the

Son proves to the Father that the affirmations of Genesis 1 still hold true: that Creation is still good, still of value.240

Balthasar describes the unfolding of the world as "the reflection of the eternal self- realization of the Divine Being," forever pointing beyond itself to its source.241 Creation is the self-expression of God in a unique mode, encompassing, paradoxically, both unity and individuality: "For the multiplicity of beings in space and time points in every respect to the unity which is presupposed in and over them—in so far as each of these is one and yet all of them form natural kinds in groups of beings of ever greater universality." This paradox is, for

Balthasar, "the fundamental existential experience of everything that lives," and it is itself a reflection of the Triune Creator, three distinct Persons in one unified Being.242 Balthasar finds this same thread in Maximus's In De Divinis nominibus, in which the latter writes of the syntheses of the whole from its parts as "the direct way to God": "Multiplicity in species: horse, cow, human being, intellectual being; unity of genus: all are living creatures. Multiplicity in the product: creatures; unity in the source: God is the cause of all." The differences between species exist only within this unity, over which God emerges as "the highest synthesis," the One in

Whom all difference arises and all difference is dissolved.243 If, however, these creatures, these species, are in contact with one another only through the uniting power of God, to Whom each has its own access, then "creatures, as such, can only be open to each other through their

240 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord VII, 519. 241 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 100. 242 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord I, 448. 243 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003), 68.

95 transcendental identity in the unity of God. This is a negative identity, in that all of them have their origin in nothing and have as their one common quality the fact that none of them is God.

But it is also a positive identity, in that the one Creator keeps them in being, one might say, through his relationship to them."244

Evolutionary biology has demonstrated that many species share much more in common than merely their createdness, but Balthasar's reading of Maximus is nonetheless useful in identifying the lowest common denominator by which the relationality of the cosmos and the value of all creatures, even those furthest from humanity cognitively and genetically, can be established. If the diversity of species is a reflection of the multiple Persons of the Trinity, the notion of an evolutionary hierarchy ordered toward service of one particular species, humanity, becomes problematic. Likewise, the intended unity of Creation, a reflection of the unity of the

Godhead, carries with it strong implications for the relationship between humanity and its non- human fellows. If everything in the world is a "particular image of God" that points to the

Creator, what does it mean to unnecessarily harm or destroy any individual creature, any unrepeatable image of the divine, denying it unity?245

Critiquing Pseudo-Dionysius, Balthasar, after Maximus the Confessor, rejects the

Philonean notion—variations of which are still popular today—of a hierarchy of creatures standing on a ladder stretching up to God, with the seraphim directly before the Beatific Vision and the lowliest of the non-human animals and inanimate objects occupying the bottom rungs, furthest from their Creator. This "golden chain of being," Balthasar objects, risks the loss of the very thing that it attempts to achieve: "It risks postponing once again the unity of a

244 Ibid. 245 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 101.

96 transcendence beyond all Being and an immanence within all Being, in order to make room for a struggle between Being and Nothingness (or matter), light and darkness."246 Balthasar credits

Maximus for discarding hierarchical notions of creatureliness, which, in turn, find unfavourable reflection also in ecclesial structure and liturgical practice, in favour of constructing an analogous relationality between God and the world. No longer must creatures struggle to peer past one another, to catch disproportionate glimpses of their common Creator; they are able to meet God on earth. Balthasar admits that Maximus was, nevertheless, a product of his time and training, and some of his ideas are thus outdated—but Balthasar praises Maximus's insistence on preserving the autonomy of the cosmos in the approach to immanence and transcendence. He writes, "It is not ‘heavenly liturgy,’ as it is for Pseudo-Dionysius, or ‘cosmic gnosticism,’ as it is for Erigena; theology, for Maximus, is Cosmic Liturgy."247

In agreement with former Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams, Deane-Drummond notes that Balthasar's sacramental approach to Creation, informed by Maximus, displays "not so much ‘hints of transcendence,’ but show[s] the divine through creation being itself in a way that includes creation in its unfinished state, in its pain, suffering, and death."248 Such a view is critical, she finds, for reconciling the scientific view of a still-evolving world with the theological view of a world created by a divine Other. Balthasar acknowledges the evolutionary nature of

Creation, pointing to the divine commission of Genesis 1:28: "Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it . . . " Considering the four verbs in this passage—be, multiply, fill, and subdue—he writes that "one cannot be surprised that they show the world and humanity to be

246 Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 84. 247 Ibid., 85. 248 Deane-Drummond, Christ and Evolution, 150–151.

97 essentially in a condition of evolution."249 Such an acknowledgement and awareness adds a dynamism to his theology of Creation that makes the movements, the transformations, and the evolutions of the creature not merely a result of the Fall, as Origen believed, but "an ontological expression of created existence."250 Maximus's approach to Creation hinges on the paradoxical interrelatedness of the multiplicity of being and a mutual reciprocity between Heaven and Earth, between intellect and sense, "so that even passivity is not to be viewed as an imperfection, because it is a way of imitating God even while being radically different."251 It is a theology that meets Creation where it is and carries it forward, affirming the evolutionary order of the world in such a way that cooperation rather than competition is emphasized. While expressing appreciation for this relational, communally oriented theology of the cosmos, Deane-Drummond cautions against a romanticisation of the harmony of Creation that would conflict with or even moralise against the competitive realities of Darwinian evolution.252

Citing Aquinas, Balthasar considers that the procession of creatures finds an analogy in the procession of the Persons of the Trinity:

[J]ust as we trace the procession of the creatures, representing the perfection of the divine nature in an imperfect manner, back to the perfect prototype, the Son—who is the principle, prototype and ground of creatures' quasi-natural procession from God—this same procession of creatures, since it results from the generosity of the divine will, must be traced back to a principle that, as it were, provides the foundation for this whole, freely given communication. This is nothing other than love . . . 253

Balthasar's analogy of being attempts to resolve tensions between the immanent and economic

Trinity, between a Creator remote from Creation and a Creator present in Creation. It is the

249 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord VII, 518. 250 Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 141. 251 Deane-Drummond, Christ and Evolution, 151. 252 Ibid., 152. 253 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 63.

98 incarnate Christ on the cross Who provides the pivot, Who makes present the Creator to the

Creation without succumbing to pantheism. If the love of the Trinity is the model upon which all of earthly being has been formed, it follows that love between the creatures, between the various others making up the temporal world, should be a priority of Christians—and limited not to a single species. The "definitive shape" of the totality of Creation is participation in the divine life of love in the Trinity.254 In agreement with Irenaeus, Balthasar writes that becoming, in God, is a "confirmation of his own Being." The world is to become what God is, the world's becoming, a temporal and imperfect copy of the becoming of God. 255 The creation of humanity is patterned after the Father's begetting of the Son, the call to live among the other creatures, a reflection of the relational life of the Trinity itself. 256

2.3.1 Why Did God Create the World? Creation as Gift

Balthasar considers what the work of creation and redemption means to God, whether

God could be said to gain anything from Creation, and whether God could be said to lose anything if all are not saved. He quickly rejects the suggestion that God is only fulfilled through

God's involvement with Creation, as well as the theory that the goodness of God radiates in such a way that the communication of this goodness is necessary. Likewise, Balthasar dismisses the notion that God undertook Creation as a means to secure God's own glorification or to allow others to share in God's blessedness. All of these concepts limit God's freedom and diminish the

"divine character of the act of creation."257 Instead, Balthasar insists, the gloria Dei, the "final goal of Creation," can only be understood through a Trinitarian rather than an anthropological

254 Ibid., 101. 255 Ibid., 512. 256 Ibid. 257 Ibid., 507.

99 lens. God, as infinite, has no need of Creation but chose to create, because God is love and “love supposes the one, the other, and their unity.”258 The gloria Dei is grounded in the "gratuitous character" of the divine processions of the immanent Trinity, "for without this gratuitous character it would be unthinkable that these processions ‘proceed’ in love." God's glory follows also from the creature's being "drawn into the reciprocal acts of love within the Godhead, so that the collaboration of each Divine Person in the work of creation is intended to magnify the ‘glory’ of the Others." Creation, therefore, is not superfluous but connected to the "fundamental gratuitousness of the divine life of the Trinity," and Creation's participation becomes a gift exchanged between the divine Persons.259 The glory of God by and through Creation is internal rather than merely external. Creation, then, exists as an internal gift both to and from the Trinity.

The creature, in their relationship with God, participates in the indissolubility of

Trinitarian love. Balthasar explains: "Just as the divine Persons do not confront one another in autonomous beings but, in God's one concrete nature, are forever one divine Being, so too, in

Christ, the covenant between God and creature as a covenant of free partners is forever surpassed and indissolubly established, in anticipation, upon the hypostatic union."260 The union of Father,

Son, and Holy Spirit, and the union of the divine and human natures of the Son, both "give to free love an ontological and substantial form; and they make this substance, to its very foundation, something permeated and shaped by love."261 Balthasar points to the Eucharist as the most salient manifestation of this reality: Christ offers Himself to Creation as the Father's gift, and that gift, in turn, is offered back to the Father by His creatures.

258 Balthasar, “A Résumé of My Thought,” 3. 259 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 507. 260 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord I, 480 261 Ibid., 480.

100

While the enrichment of the world by Christ's work is evident, Balthasar also allows that the work of salvation "actually does ‘enrich’ God in a particular respect, without adding anything that is lacking to his eternal life."262 In saving Creation, the Son glorifies the Father, and the

Father is appreciative. Unlike the Prodigal Son, Christ returns to His Father with more than He had when he departed. Balthasar writes, "[T]he fact that the Trinity is more perfected in love after the Incarnation than before, has its meaning and its foundation in God himself, who is not a rigid unity but a unity that comes together ever anew in love, an eternal intensification in eternal rest."263 Balthasar defends against the charge that such an idea implies a changing, imperfect

God by positing that the dynamic richness of God's love allows for eternal change without alteration or decrease. He warns that one ought not to be surprised that economic events occur in the life of the Trinity, such as the new joy arising from the return of the Son to the Father following the Incarnation. Through the Incarnation, "it is as if a new movement, a new current, is brought into the divine love, so that our love may be drawn into it. It is as if an incision is made in the divine love to make room in it for the creature's love."264 This creaturely love is not limited to the love of humanity for God; it includes as well the praise of the non-human animals, described in the Psalms and in Job, which also glorifies the Creator.265

Balthasar asks, "What does God gain from the world? An additional gift, given to the

Son by the Father, but equally a gift made by the Son to the Father and by the Spirit to both."266

He calls Creation a "gift" because it is through the particular actions of each of the Persons of the

Trinity that Creation comes to participate in the life of the divine. In turn, Creation itself

262 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 514. 263 Ibid. 264 Ibid., 515. 265 Ibid., 420. 266 Ibid., 521

101 presents that which God has given, including the gift of creation itself, and returns them to God as its own gift.267 A gift that is not treasured does not elicit in the recipient genuine gratitude, nor does it engender a deepening or perfecting of the love between giver and receiver. If

Creation, to include both humanity and non-human animals, participates in the perfection of the internal love of the Trinity by being given, as gift, from each divine Person to the others, of what great value must it be to God?

Balthasar grapples with the question of what, if anything, God loses if any of God's creatures are lost to eternal damnation. Is God with God's Creation something greater than God alone? To say that God loses nothing because God is the totality of Being leaves theology at risk of embracing the Eastern māyā doctrine, which holds that the world is merely an illusion. To say that God does lose something because Creation possesses a being of its own implies that God is not the fullness of Being and that the world is of some necessity to God.268 Balthasar concludes that such a quantitative dichotomy fails to take into account the freedom of God, which is, both internally and in the decision to create, purely gratuitous, necessarily excluding any external necessity or motivation. "The infinite possibilities of divine freedom all lie within the trinitarian distinctions and are thus free possibilities within the eternal life of love in God that has always been realised," notes Balthasar.269 God acts in infinite freedom in all things, including the

Incarnation and the Crucifixion. God is not obliged to create, nor to save what has been created.

The Fall did not necessitate an alternative approach to Creation, forcing God to act on behalf of the world, but the sending forth of the Son was a possibility existing freely within God for eternity. Balthasar continues: "The divine Father gives the Son absolute, independent existence

267 Ibid. 268 Ibid., 508. 269 Ibid.

102 as God, and in doing so he makes the ‘idea’ of creation—up to and including the Cross— realisable; at the same time, however, this ‘idea’ has already been overtaken and surpassed by the divine life and as such is incorporated into the absolute gratuitousness of trinitarian freedom and vitality."270 That which has been realised economically originates from the freedom of the immanent Trinity, wherein it has always been a part of God's plan.

Through Christ's saving work, the Cross has allowed love to emerge from judgement— for life to emerge from death, for the internal relationality of the Trinity to become different without becoming quantitatively greater.271 Balthasar describes the entirety of Creation as having the dominant form of the Cross. From the word of Creation, all has been arranged by the

Father to point toward the sending forth and crucifixion of the Son. The possibility of a finite, imperfect world has been, according to Balthasar, a part of the conversation of the Trinity for all of eternity.272 In order to draw this world into the freedom of the divine, the Incarnation and the

Cross were anticipated—the Incarnation to bring the world into the Son's divine relationships, and the Cross to pave the way for humanity to freely overcome its resistance and be brought into

God. The embedding of the world in the love between the Son and the Spirit allows the Father to view Creation as something not merely external.273 Creation is Christocentric rather than anthropocentric, with every detail arranged from the outset as a premonition of the Cross and the suffering of the world united with the suffering of Christ and thus joined to the love of the

Trinity.274

270 Ibid., 509. 271 Ibid., 516. 272 Ibid., 509. 273 Ibid., 510. 274 Ibid., 100.

103

The Fall has always been anticipated by God, as has the sacrifice of the Son, which, from the beginning, has been offering to the Father. The Incarnation does not represent an interruption in the divine conversation, nor a change in God. The Cross overcomes sin "and roots the world deeper in God than sin could alienate it from him."275 The Son's decision to save the world is eternal, even though His actions take place within history. The celebration of the

Eucharist reminds the world that the saving work of Christ is not a past historical act but instead one that transcends time. Christ’s work mediates for Creation the realities of the divine life of the Trinity, manifesting the infinite love of God to a finite, imperfectly loving world.276

Balthasar writes that "[t]he New Testament no longer entertains the idea of a self-unfolding horizontal theo-drama; there is only a vertical theo-drama in which every moment of time, insofar as it has christological significance, is directly related to the exalted Lord, who has taken the entire content of history—life, death and resurrection—with him into the supra-temporal realm."277 In an evolutionary Creation in which humanity's existence spans only a small fraction of linear time, it goes beyond anthropocentrism to pure egoism to presume that billions of years have passed and entire species have evolved, lived, and become extinct with no theological significance of their own, no relation whatsoever to the Creator. Balthasar's vertical theo-drama, the transcending of anthropocentric time in a move toward Trinitarian time, holds within it great implications for the meaning and telos of non-human Creation.

Creation was and, throughout its evolution, has continued to be predisposed to receive the

Word. The creature has, says Balthasar, naturally within it, a sense of the Creator:

Man's spiritual speech presupposes the speech of nature, and the speech of revelation presupposes for its part the speech of God's creation, in fact, this analogy of being,

275 Ibid., 510. 276 Ibid., 511. 277 Ibid., 48.

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and in consequence, a natural knowledge of God, or expressed in religious terms a natural, concrete sense of the creature for the being from which it proceeds, a cognitio per contactum (Thomas) which persists through each individual essence and the whole historical cause of peoples and cultures.278

Although Balthasar sees the moment at which humanity developed advanced linguistic skills as the moment it became possible for God to reveal Godself through human speech, humanity's rootedness in Creation and the significance of both the communication and evolution of non-human animals is still of importance to Balthasar's understanding of natural theology.

Balthasar describes what he calls a "creaturely relationality," made visible in "natural faith," a term that he admits is controversial and often misused. With it, he refers to humanity's interior

“natural knowledge of God” and its own "absolute dependency" upon the divine, even if humanity only understands that it is dependent but is unable to recognise or articulate that which it is dependent upon.279 This creaturely relationality draws the human being outside of itself and toward the other.

2.3.2 Beauty in Non-Human Creation: The Form of Nature as Divine Self-Expression

Considering Maximus's Quaestiones ad Thalassium, Balthasar writes that the first law of the world is "engraved in nature—not simply in the human soul, but in the whole cosmos and in every one of its parts." One is able to acquire a vision of God, "of his righteousness, wisdom, and goodness," through contemplating the natural world, the "body" of Creation.280 In his discussion of Maximus’s synthesis of the three sets of laws, Balthasar notes that Maximus differs from Origen and Augustine in viewing the natural law and scriptural law “as a tension between

278 Balthasar, Explorations in Theology I, 84. 279 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord I, 450–451. 280 Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 291.

105 two poles of equal value that mutually complement each other.”281 Revelation in nature is not subordinated to revelation in history as both nature and Scripture are grounded in Christ and find their fulfillment in the third law, which is the law of grace. Maximus warns, however, that the contemplation of both nature and Scripture must, ultimately, lead the contemplative to praise of the Creator, lest they be led astray by the extremes of pantheism or dualism. Discernment in the

Spirit is necessary, through careful consideration of both nature and Scripture and the use of one's own reason. Balthasar writes that one "who can lift the spirit out of Scripture, meaning out of creation, and reason out of his own consciousness and then bind them inseparably with each other: such a person has found God!"282

Balthasar describes the experience of Adam and Eve in the Garden as a "creaturely phase" in which God reveals Godself not through words or even through the Incarnate Word but through the splendour of God's Creation, through the beauty of the natural world, which reflects and reveals its Creator. "It is as creature that man first comes to know the ever-greater and, thus, ever-more-hidden God as his Lord," he writes.283 Citing Aquinas, Balthasar notes that the voice of God addressing Adam in the Garden was not a sensory, auditory voice but "God's presence through grace in the voices of nature and of the heart."284 The natural world cast as God's chosen form of self-communication with humanity, the sum and pinnacle of that same Creation, carries with it significant implications for the relationship between humanity and the non-human world:

"[T]he natural inspiration coming from the Being of the world is the locus and the vessel of

God's inspiration by grace."285 It is only through the Fall, through the alienation of humanity

281 Ibid., 291–292. 282 Ibid., 297. 283 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord I, 449. 284 Ibid., 452. 285 Ibid.

106 from the rest of the cosmos, that humanity is deafened to the locutio interna, "the immediate, interior voice of things and of God in them." 286 An externalisation of God's self-revelation was necessary, first in the law and prophecy of Judaism and, ultimately, in the person of Christ, the locutio externa. Although the Fall impaired the ability of humanity to hear the voice of God through the channel of the natural world, the natural world’s original purpose as a primary mode of divine self-communication commands a particular enduring respect and reverence from humanity. Human beings, although no longer able to hear the voices of nature clearly, must recognise nevertheless that God continues to speak through it.

Theologian David Moss sees that Balthasar's entire treatment of modern theology and

Biblical hermeneutics "remained riveted to the ailments afflicting our sense and experience of nature, the natural or creation . . . in light of the supernatural." It is this admission of humanity's distance, humanity's deafness, that prevents Balthasar's view from being easily dismissed as outdated and anthropocentric.287 Balthasar resacralizes non-human Creation, focusing on its beauty, on the wonder one experiences in the open perception of it, allowing God to work through it rather than humanity to work with it. Moss describes Balthasar's theology of creation as "essentially theophanic," although he admits that Balthasar's definition of theophany would be particular to his own thought. The world, for Balthasar, is “a ‘body’ of God, who represents and expresses himself in this body, on the basis of the principle not of pantheistic but hypostatic union.”288 Recognition of the origin and telos of the cosmos depends on seeing the form of

Creation in the image of Christological love. Moss explains: "The key to reading the

286 Ibid. 287 David Moss, "Hans Urs von Balthasar: Beginning with Beauty,” in Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical and Theological Perspectives, eds. David G. Horrell et al. (London: T&T Clark International, 2010), 198. 288 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord I, 679.

107 cosmos . . . lies in no pantheistic (or even panentheistic) narrative, but, according to Balthasar, in the manner through which Christ, through an obedience to the fate of creaturely being in his death and burial, thereby shepherded creation up from nothingness in his rising from 'the lower parts of the earth' (Eph. 4.9)."289 Moss concludes that Balthasar's cosmology calls not for the deification of nature, the repurposing of the Gaia mythology to fit Christian sensibilities, but "a renewal of a 'cultural' wonderment (thaumazein) at the theophanic quality of beings through which the light of the divine Love itself shines."290

Deane-Drummond notes that, in Balthasar’s work, "revelation in Christ does not come simply alongside creation, as if in competition with it, but rather appears within it, showing

Christ's uniqueness through his ordinariness."291 Creation's beauty does not merely point to God; its form is the apparition of the mystery of the divine, revealing and, at the same time, veiling and protecting it.292 Beauty is not above or behind Creation but within; the world itself, all created beings, possess a revelatory character that shines forth in natural theology. Balthasar sees Scriptural evidence of this quite clearly in the Wisdom literature, which contemplates this quality of Creation, and yet he laments the absence of a bridge between the meaning of Creation and the meaning of the Creator—the inevitable giving way of cataphatic natural theology to apophatic theology, God's seeming hiddenness from humanity.293 Balthasar describes a wisdom

"objectively at work in the cosmos no less than in history," a wisdom that is "the presence of the creating and graciously providential God in all worldly form," personally indwelling and redeeming the world. The form of the world is God's own concealed self-revelation, of which

289 Moss, "Hans Urs von Balthasar: Beginning with Beauty,” 199. 290 Ibid., 200. 291 Deane-Drummond, Christ and Evolution, 138. 292 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord I, 151. 293 Ibid., 448.

108 faith has a "living awareness," a consciousness placed already within the hearts and mouths of humanity by the Creator.294

Balthasar rejects German idealism, resisting its conflation of creation and revelation, the reduction of the world to a manifestation of the divine Being and, at the same time, the dualism on the opposite end of the spectrum that would separate entirely the revelation of the Word from the natural revelation of the created world. Even a recognition of the divine radiating from within the form of the creature can, however, if one is not careful, lead to a dualism "of ostensive sign and signified interior light." Such a dualism is resolved with the introduction of the category of the beautiful: "The beautiful is above all a form, and the light does not fall on this form from above and from outside, rather it breaks forth from the form's interior." 295 Form not only points to the mystery within; it is the manifestation of this mystery and, paradoxically, its veiling. Balthasar writes, "The content (Gehalt) does not lie behind the form (Gestalt), but within it. Whoever is not capable of seeing and 'reading' the form will, by the same token, fail to perceive the content. Whoever is not illuminated by the form will see no light in the content either."296 If the divine is made manifest in the form of the created world, then those who fail to appreciate, who fail to see the form of beauty in even seemingly superfluous creatures within the world, also fail to recognise the form of the Trinity within them.

In a passage that provides, perhaps, Balthasar's most explicit articulation of the inherent goodness of the non-human world, he writes:

In a flower, a certain interior reality opens its eye and reveals something beyond and more profound than a form which delights us by its proportion and colour. In the rhythm of the form of plants, from seed to full growth, from bud to fruit—there is

294 Ibid., 454. 295 Ibid., 151. 296 Ibid.

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manifested an essence, and to reduce this essence to mere instrumentalist principles would be blasphemous. And in the totality of things, as they ascend and maintain their equilibrium, there is revealed a mystery of Being which it would be even more blasphemous and blind to interpret by reducing it to a neutral "existence."297

To view Creation apart from its theological, relational context, to see it only for its utility to humanity, aesthetic or otherwise, is to fail to recognise God, Who is revealed within it. This error, however grave, is not uncommon. Platonic dualism reduced symbol to mere allegory, reducing form to a secondary derivation in a misguided attempt to preserve the dignity of the spirit. Aristotle's aesthetics avoided Plato's dualistic pitfalls, embracing the form of humanity and the world, but neglected to offer hope for wholeness beyond earthly life. The embodied eschatology of Christianity, the promise of a New Earth and a glorified flesh, is, Balthasar holds, the only way around the errors of classic aesthetics.298

Balthasar laments that both the natural sciences and modern religion have shied away from the discussion of beauty, discounting it as a superficial, amateur, imprecise pursuit.

Beauty, he argues, has such an indissoluble bond with both truth and goodness that one who shows contempt for the contemplation of beauty "can no longer pray and soon will no longer be able to love."299 The transcendentals are interdependent, such that, without beauty, the world loses confidence in itself, Aquinas's sure light of Being is dimmed, and "[t]he witness born by

Being becomes untrustworthy for the person who can no longer read the language of beauty."300

Balthasar notes that, etymologically, the words used to convey beauty also imply form.

Formosus¸ Latin for "beautiful," is derived from formus, meaning "form" or "shape" in both

Latin and Greek. Speciosus, another Latin term for “beautiful” or “attractive,” is derived from

297 Ibid., 444. 298 Ibid., 21. 299 Ibid., 18. 300 Ibid., 19.

110 species, meaning “likeness” or “appearance.” It is the splendor, the divine radiance from within, he posits, that transforms formus into formosus, species into speciosus. "The necessary, internal and living relationship between expressive form and the self-expressing life-principle is the presupposition for the understanding of natural beauty," he writes.301 It is this relationality of

Creator and creature that makes accessible the mystery of God's self-revelation. Drawing out this etymological exploration beyond Balthasar's treatment, the division of creatures into

"species" implies that their differences are fundamentally aesthetic—that they are made distinct by their particular form, and their particular beauty radiates from within.

Deane-Drummond notes that Balthasar does not draw a sharp distinction between the beauty of the Cross and the beauty of Creation. This refusal to delineate boundaries is most evident, she finds, in his consideration of the analogous experience of contemplating the beauty of a flower and accepting the form of Jesus. Just as the flower "can be seen for what it is only when it is perceived and 'received' as the appearance of a certain depth of life, so, too, Jesus' form can be seen for what it is only when it is grasped and accepted as the appearance of a divine depth transcending all worldly nature."302 Deane-Drummond suggests that the possibility of such an interpretation of Christ as the form of beauty, including all the ugliness of His suffering and death on the Cross, can be extended to "include appreciation of not just creaturely suffering more generally, but also our standards of aesthetics as applied to the non-human world."303 A theological consideration of form and beauty transcends superficial, subjective evaluations of

301 Ibid., 444. 302 Ibid., 154. 303 Deane-Drummond, Christ and Evolution, 141–142.

111 appearance and demands that one see the value and the beauty in all creatures, including those considered unattractive, bothersome, or frightening.

2.4 Eschatological Hope for Non-Human Creation

In his Theo-Drama, Balthasar writes:

If God's idea of the world is to bring heaven and earth together in Jesus Christ in the fullness of time, so that "we may be holy and blameless before him" . . . it follows that this incorporation of all created beings into the Begotten is, in trinitarian terms, the most intimate manner of union with God. For it implies that the creaturely "other-than-God" is plunged into the uncreated "Other-in-God" while maintaining that fundamental "distance" which alone makes love possible.304

Balthasar puts this relationality in terms of God and the creature rather than the more limited, specific God and the human being; it is the world that he describes as Imago Trinitatis. While he often uses the human being to represent all of the world and, without question, holds the species above all others, Balthasar nevertheless peppers his writing on relationship with the divine, particularly in the eschaton, with references to the "creature," "the world," and the "earth." I see here room to develop from his work an eschatological hope for non-human Creation unrelated to instrumental ends. Indeed, he holds that only through Christ do all things and all human beings

"acquire their full meaning."305

"Hope must never be individualistic: it must always be social," Balthasar writes.306

Eschatological hope, in Balthasar’s work, is inherently relational. In the eschaton, all beings will be animated by the Son's breath as He claims His victory. "The word ‘all’ here does not mean only all men but also all the things that were created for man, and hence also for the Son,” argues

304 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 105. 305 Ibid., 106. 306 Ibid., 176.

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Balthasar. “The entire creation bears the sign of the Son; all things strain toward him and all things are held together by him in his kingdom . . . "307 The mission of the Son is to bring all of

Creation, not just humanity, into the life of the Trinity: "Every act of obedience that distinguished the Son during his mission is now translated by the Father into that eternal form of subjection that will now enfold all the world's beings."308 Balthasar rejects individualistic interpretations of future glory, speaking instead of relationships and participation in a new community made possible by the work of Christians to create conditions in which all are able to have hope. "God's will to save embraces the whole of humanity (1 Tim 2:4) and the cosmos," he writes.309

Amidst brief discussion of theologian Anton Vögtle's future of the cosmos and Teilhard de Chardin's cosmological Christ, Balthasar notes that "the promises of salvation at the end of the world cannot be divorced from the doctrine of creation, since man and his environment are reciprocally interdependent."310 He points to Paul's many mentions of the universal change that is to come over all of creation as a result of Christ's bodily resurrection and the eager anticipation with which both human and non-human Creation await it, specifying that κτίσις, the creation, in

Romans 8:19 is traditionally rendered by commentators as "the whole visible creation outside man, including everything both living and nonliving." The coming of the Messiah, then, carries with it, in words Balthasar borrows from Teilhard, the "implications for the extra-human creation

(the universe, the world of plants and animals) suggested by apocalyptic and rabbinic theology."311 Balthasar's exegesis of Romans 8 notes within the passage Paul's deliberate

307 Ibid., 520. 308 Ibid., 521. 309 Ibid., 417. 310 Ibid., 419. 311 Ibid., 420.

113 emphasis on the universality of eschatological expectation (πᾶσα κτίσις—"whole creation”) and the solidarity (repeated use of συν prefix—“together”) of Creation in the agony of its anticipation.

Against the backdrop of Scripture and both the Jewish and Christian theological traditions, the medieval image of the eschaton seems out of place to Balthasar, "a chimera."312

Aquinas speculated that the entry into the resurrected world would be limited to human beings, and inert elements of Creation, plants, and non-human animals would disappear from existence, inherently incapable of beholding the Beatific Vision. Balthasar writes that "this cruel verdict contradicts the Old Testament sense of the solidarity between the living, subhuman cosmos and the world of men (Ps 8; Ps 104; Gen 1, and so on), the prophetic and Jewish ideas of divine salvation in images of peace among the animals (Is 11:6-9; 65:25) . . . "313 Balthasar recalls the

Noahic covenant, in which God covenants not only with humanity but specifically with the whole of the animal kingdom, and the covenant referenced in Hosea 2, also entered into with the non-human animals. As evidence of the long history of the notion of salvation for non-human animals, he points as well to the pseudepigraphical Slavonic text of Enoch, which contains the idea that, on the Last Day, the souls of the animals will hold humanity accountable for what has been done to them.314 Balthasar accepts that it is only through humanity's sin that the peace

312 Ibid. 313 Ibid. 314 Ibid., 421. "The Lord will not judge a single soul of beast for man's sake, but adjudges the souls of men to their beasts in this world; for men have a special place. And as every soul of man is according to number, similarly beasts will not perish, nor all souls of beasts which the Lord created, till the great judgement, and they will accuse man, if he feed them ill." (2 Enoch 58:1-6) The text goes on to warn against the needless killing of beasts, apart from ritual sacrifice and sustenance. "Whoever defiles the soul of beast, defiles his own soul . . . whoever kills beast without wound, kills his own soul and defiles his own flesh. And he who does any beast any injury whatsoever, in secret, it is evil practice, and he defiles his own soul." (2 Enoch 59:1-5) This apocryphal text not only provides a picture of non-human animals in the Final Judgement but also speaks to a spiritual interdependence of species.

114 among the animal kingdom has been disrupted. Quoting theologian Joseph Bernhart, he asks whether it should come as any surprise "that a human being who is faithful and obedient to the

Creator of all beings should find animals obedient to his own commands and wishes? We forfeit dominion over the creation because we ourselves no longer take our service of the Creator seriously."315

Balthasar finds several further examples of eschatological inclusivity for non-human animals within Scripture, theology, hagiology, and classical philosophy:

[O]ne can refer (with Wolfram von den Steinen) to the role of animals in the biblical heaven—the lamb, the dove, the living creatures with animal faces before the throne of God—and to their indispensable employment in Christian art. The Book of Revelation is particularly telling here: not only does it draw the historical "prehistory" of the Christian community into its world of imagery—going so far as to equate the two—it also provides the basis on which man's cosmic prehistory can attain salvation together with him in God's world, which will ultimately achieve wholeness: God's creation, in all its multiplicity, is one.316

Quoting Protestant ecclesiastical historian Hans von Campenhausen, Balthasar notes that "every period in world history is equally immediate to God."317 This time-transcending immediacy and universal will to save means, for him, that whatever is positive in the world's evolutionary history will be afforded a place in eternal life. He maintains that it is "futile to assume that history will go into eternity only in the form it will have in its final (and possibly most grim) stage. Whatever positive elements the world has known, at any of its stages of development, will be worthy to participate in God's eternally new event."318 If the agony of Christ crucified spans all of time, from its origin to its end, then His redemptive act reaches back to the epochs before the evolution of humankind, unnecessarily extending His suffering if humanity alone stands to

315 Ibid. 316 Ibid., 422. 317 Ibid., 418. 318 Ibid.

115 benefit from it.319 Given the relatively recent appearance of homo sapiens on the earth,

Balthasar's vision of the eschaton and Christ's transcendent sacrifice necessarily encompasses a myriad of non-human creatures who were, in Genesis, declared "good" by their Creator, long before the appearance of Adam and Eve. As Balthasar asks, "How could God forget his

'evolutionary' creation when he plans to make ready for it a definitive place in his triune love!"320

Balthasar's eschatology is explicitly cosmic, paralleling his Christology. Future hope is not the exclusive purview of humankind but is the telos of all of God's diverse Creation through the cosmic Christ. The goal of all temporal becoming is eternal life. 321 While Balthasar holds that the ways in which humanity and non-human Creation will enter into eternal life are not the same, he nevertheless hints that the latter will "possess the infinite determination of the trinitarian process of love" in some manner.322 Otherness, multiplicity, in God does not present an obstacle to God's infinity but instead facilitates it. Likewise, when the world is caught up into the divine life of the Trinity, it does not lose its own identity, its distance from God, its

Otherness. The distinction between God and the world, and between the particular creatures who comprise the world, is not lost—the world is not dissolved into the divine, but it is its very

Otherness that enables the eternal exchange of love.323 Balthasar writes that, "Christian hope, theological hope, goes beyond this world, but it does not pass it by: rather it takes the world with

319 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, Volume IV: The Realm of Metaphysics in Antiquity (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989), 337. 320 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord VII, 518. 321 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 512. 322 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Explorations in Theology, Volume IV: Spirit and Institution (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), 438. 323 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 101.

116 it on its way to God, who has graciously prepared a dwelling in himself for us and for the world."324

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the human being is best understood by rejection of classic individualistic formulations in favor of a relational, theocentric view. Participation in the reciprocal love of the Creator for the Creation is at the center of a properly framed theological anthropology, grounding personhood in the inherent relationality of creaturely existence. I have argued that Balthasar’s assertion that the human being is called to image not just God but specifically the relationality of the Trinity provides a useful lens through which to consider humanity’s relationship with the non-human world, particularly with other animals.

Anthropocentric instrumentalism becomes a problem not only as a result of the vocational role of humanity but because Creation itself possesses an inherent goodness as a result of this same

Trinitarian relationality. Balthasar’s appreciation for the inherent beauty of Creation, through which God reveals Godself, makes impossible a diminishing of the non-human world to raw materials ordered toward the service of human whims.

In the following chapter, the creaturely relationality of Balthasarian thought, grounded in an understanding of humanity as Imago Trinitatis, is carried further through engagement with

Zizioulas’s ecologically informed systematics. The inherent goodness of non-human Creation and the theocentric orientation of its telos are connected explicitly, in Zizioulas, to humanity’s obligations toward the natural world. The intrinsically relational nature of theological

324 Ibid., 176.

117 anthropology, articulated by Balthasar, is echoed in Zizioulas’s notion of humanity as Priest of

Creation: a species set apart for a unique role within Creation, dependent not upon its physical or intellectual capacities but upon its relationship with and imitation of the Trinity. Balthasar’s eschatological hope for Creation is realized in this priestly vision of Zizioulas’s, which, I argue, necessitates a rejection of an anthropocentric instrumentalist view of other animals and creates in humanity instead a special obligation toward them.

Chapter 3 The Relational Ontology of Metropolitan John Zizioulas

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter argued for the inherent goodness of non-human Creation and its theocentric telos, drawing upon the vision of humanity as Imago Trintatis present in the work of

Hans Urs von Balthasar, in order to challenge the assumptions of anthropocentric instrumentalism. The dissertation now proceeds to the work of Eastern Orthodox Metropolitan

John Zizioulas in order to carry this Trinitarian understanding of Creation and of humanity’s role within it further, toward a theological anthropology and a theological ontology of other animal species that recognises them as religious subjects rather than objects. The work of Zizioulas, particularly his lectures on eco-theology, fill in what is absent from Balthasar’s theology, which fluctuates at times between Christological and Trinitarian accounts of Creation and between an emphasis on humanity as set apart from and an insistence on humanity as embedded within creaturely context. Zizioulas’s vision of humanity as Priest of Creation, living in ontological relationship with God and with non-human Creation, powerfully counters anthropocentric instrumentalism. His vocational view of human uniqueness, inseparable at the same time from the inherent relationality of being, is necessary in order to effectively counter anthropocentric instrumentalism and establish the moral and eschatological obligations that flow from the special vocation of humanity.

Zizioulas, following the tradition of the Cappadocian Fathers, maintains that being is relational. To be is to be in relation. The three Persons of the Trinity are in relationship together, the Trinity is in relationship with Creation, and the various elements of Creation are in

118

119 relationship with one another. The present human understanding of this last relationship, however, poses a problem that affects also the relationship of Creation and Creator.

Anthropocentric instrumentalism has influenced the way in which humanity relates to non- human Creation, with far-reaching effects. Although one can trace the strain in this relationship back to the Enlightenment and the Scientific Revolution, as I have done in Chapter 1, Zizioulas looks even further back, back to the Garden, to arrive at the root of the disorder. From the Fall, humanity and nature have been at odds. “I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your offspring and hers,” God tells the serpent. “[C]ursed is the ground because of you,” Adam is told.325

This ancient conflict has perhaps never been so clear as it is at present, in the midst of the ecological crisis. Zizioulas calls it “the number one problem facing the worldwide human community . . . If we follow the present course of events, the prediction of the apocalyptic end of life on our planet at least is not a matter of prophecy but of sheer inevitability.”326 As human beings and human corporations pursue their own interests, using Creation as a mere resource, the cosmos suffers. This suffering is especially evident in the plight of non-human animals. From industrialised animal agriculture in America and the Canadian seal hunt to the habitat destruction through deforestation in Indonesia and the poaching of endangered species across Africa, non- human animals are born, live, and die as mere commodities for human consumption. Although the Church has begun to speak out on environmental degradation, spurring a growing Christian interest in the green movement and a recognition of ecological sin, this anthropocentric use and abuse of non-human animals has gone largely unremarked upon by theologians. Failure to

325 Gen 3:15-17 (NRSV). 326 John D. Zizioulas, “Priest of Creation,” in Environmental Stewardship, ed. R. J. Berry (New York: T&T Clark International, 2006), 273.

120 constructively contribute to solving destructive problems affecting all of Creation places the

Church, according to Zizioulas, at risk of becoming irrelevant and losing its own claim to the

Truth.327

Zizioulas’s relational ontology is useful in developing a theological understanding of the intrinsic goodness of non-human animals and the relationships by which they exist as valued

Others. His notion of humanity as Priest of Creation makes clear that the anthropocentric instrumentalisation of non-human animals is contrary to humanity’s unique vocation and presents an obstacle to authentic personhood in Christ. By contrast, to embrace the Otherness of the non-human animal, allowing it to be and to be other, draws both the human and the non- human animal into right relationship with one another and with their common Creator, without diminishing nor equating the particular dignity of either. Although such relationships, with the environment and with non-human animals, are normally relegated to the realm of ethics,

Zizioulas is skeptical of the ability of ethics alone to create real change. He maintains that people do not give up their standards of living for the sake of morality or even reason without deeper existential motivations.328 Reasoned argument is not enough to compel the kind of change necessary to combat the anthropocentrism degrading Creation; a systematic, liturgical approach is needed to restore the relationship between humanity and the rest of the cosmos.

The underpinning of Zizioulas’s systematic treatment of relationship is ontology.

Relationship is not just something one does but something one is. This synthesis of relation and being, relational ontology, has far-reaching influence in the thought of Zizioulas. A relational

327 Ibid., 273. 328 Ibid., 274. See further discussion of the limitations of reasoned argument for the motivation of ethical behavior in Chapter 4.

121 ontology of the Trinity is the foundation upon which his anthropology, cosmology, and eschatology are built. Theological personhood cannot be understood without reference to the unity of the three persons of the Trinity, cosmology cannot be understood without reference to the ontology of personhood, and eschatology cannot be considered at all before that which is to be redeemed has been established. The Trinity is the model upon which Zizioulas’s entire ontology of Creation is based, and it is within the history of Trinitarian theology that Zizioulas identifies the first seeds of this relational ontology. Even more so than Balthasar, who often speaks of Creation Christologically, Zizioulas stresses the dogma of the Trinity not simply as a theoretical proposition to be accepted but as a means of "relating one's existence to this faith."

He sees evidence of this reality in the Trinitarian formula of Christian baptism, unchanged since

Gospel times, by which the Elect enter "into a certain way of being which is that of the

Trinitarian God."329 The multiplicity and unity of God that underpins even Balthasar’s

Christological moments is made more explicitly central in the thought of Zizioulas. It is specifically the understanding of God as Trinity, informed by the patristic tradition of the

Cappadocian Fathers and of Athanasius, that shapes Zizioulas’s understanding of all other being.

3.2 Relational Personhood

3.2.1 Personhood in the Trinity

Zizioulas writes that "[o]ntology, as discourse about what exists, claims the right to give a metaphysically absolute character to being, in other words, to the fact of existence in contrast to non-existence."330 Whether it is possible to speak of God as being is a matter of some

329 John D. Zizioulas, The One and the Many: Studies on God, Man, the Church, and the World Today (Alhambra: Sebastian Press, 2010), 3. 330 Ibid., 27.

122 disagreement; Trinitarian ontology occurs when one decides, as Zizioulas has, that it is. Patristic theology viewed the tetragrammaton as itself an ontological statement, "I am who am"—an understanding reflected in the Eucharistic Anaphoras of the Fathers' liturgies. The Cappadocian

Fathers identify the three Persons of the Trinity as "modes of existence." "The fact that they are called modes of existence proves that it is not only permissible but imperative to speak of the persons of the Holy Trinity in ontological categories, which means categories indicative of God as being," Zizioulas writes.331 Rather than existing at odds with ontology, theology gives ontology its proper context and shines a revelatory light onto philosophical discourse.

How one speaks of the being of God—how one approaches whatever limited understanding of the ontology of the Trinity is available to humanity—has been the subject of great debate over the course of Church history. The ontology of the Trinity remains today a matter of great significance, especially to interfaith dialogue, Zizioulas believes, particularly with fellow monotheistic faiths. Christians must know what it means to claim that God is one and yet to simultaneously affirm the Trinity. "[I]s the unity of God a matter of unity understood in the objectifiable arithmetical sense, or is it a matter of unity understood in the form of a relational oneness?" he asks.332 The question of God's oneness has, historically, been answered in two ways: that of the Greek Fathers in the East and that of St. Augustine in the West. God is either one as a result of God’s ontological Fatherhood, or God is one because the three Persons of the

Trinity share one ousia. How this question is answered has wide-reaching existential implications for humanity and, indeed, for all of the created world. It affects how one understands not only the Trinity but all of Creation, revelation, and salvation as well.

331 Ibid., 29. 332 Ibid., 7.

123

3.2.2 Questions of Ontological Primacy

From the second century, the Trinity was described, as Tertullian puts it in his Against

Praxeas, as “una substantia, tres personae.”333 Although Zizioulas takes no issue with either the notion of monotheism or of the Trinity, the order in which these two doctrines are expressed is problematic for him. Substance, ousia, is given primacy over personhood. He objects to this view, as it makes the Trinity logically secondary, ontologically speaking, when "what is shared is prior to what shares in it."334 The rise of Arianism and the necessity of a response from the

Church acted as the historical catalyst for a significant revision of the theology of the logos and, thus, a significant development in relational ontology. The primacy of substance was called into question as theologians took quite different routes in their response to Christological heresy.

Augustine sought to bring clarity to the question of whether the three Persons of the Trinity could be properly said to be substances or accidents in the classic sense of Aristotle’s natural philosophy. In his De trinitate, Augustine echoes Plotinus and Porphyry in maintaining that the

Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are neither substance nor accident but instead are to be understood as relations subsisting in the divine substance. Despite the promise of relationality in

Augustine’s Trinitarian theology, ousia retains ontological primacy over relation, schesis, in keeping with the classical Greek tradition.335

Likewise responding to Arius, Athanasius chooses instead to draw upon the Eucharistic theology of Ignatius and Irenaeus, as opposed to the Alexandrian catechetical tradition.336 This

333 John D. Zizioulas, “Relational Ontology: Insights from Patristic Thought,” in The Trinity and an Entangled World: Relationality in Physical Science and Theology, ed. John Polkinghorne (Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2010), 147. 334 Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 10. 335 Zizioulas, “Relational Ontology,” 148. 336 John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), 83.

124 theology includes an ontology of communion, which Athanasius develops in order to draw a distinction between the substance and will of God. This is necessary in order to assert that the being of the Son and the being of Creation are different. While the being of Creation belongs to the will of God, the being of the uncreated Son belongs to the substance of God. Athanasius’s linking of the being of the Son to the substance of God is, for Zizioulas, ontologically significant, as it implies that substance has a relational character. In Contra Arianos, Athanasius asks, “Has

God ever existed without His own (Son)?” He goes on to express that “the perfectness and fullness of the Father’s substance is depleted” without the relationship between Father and Son:

“If the Son was not there before He was born, there would be no truth in God.”337 This bold statement represents a drastic departure from Platonic ontology, which treats substance and relationship as wholly separate. Athanasius does not, however, reject the notion of divine substance altogether but identifies it with the Father, a title that is inherently relational. Zizioulas asks then, “If God’s being is by nature relational, and if it can be signified by the word

‘substance,’ can we not then conclude almost inevitably that, given the ultimate character of

God’s being for all ontology, substance, inasmuch as it signifies the ultimate character of being, can be conceived only as communion?”338

This reading of Athanasius has great influence on Zizioulas’s interpretation of the

Cappadocian Fathers. Whereas other scholars have interpreted the Cappadocians as advocating for a Trinitarian theology in which hypostasis is understood as “primary substance” and ousia as

“second substance,” Zizioulas finds this division ontologically problematic, as hypostasis and ousia were, for Athanasius, the same thing.339 The problem becomes clear in the consideration

337 Ibid., 84–85. 338 Ibid., 84. 339 John D. Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness. (New York: T&T Clark International, 2006), 158.

125 of the Otherness of the Son within the Trinity. Athanasius’s division of substance and will, when applied to Creation, is useful in establishing the absolute freedom of God. If Creation does not come forth from the divine substance of God but instead from the will of God, then Creation is wholly other and God is not reliant upon it. Such a division is important also for Maximus the

Confessor in responding to the neo-Platonists, who held that the world is an expression of the thoughts of God and has existed within God's mind always. Maximus counters that Creation is instead a product of the will of God, drawing a distinction between this will and its realisation.

A thought, he holds, is realised in simply being thought, whereas a will may or may not ever come to realisation. Without this distinction, it is possible to say that Creation itself is eternal, ever present in the mind of God, such that its existence is a necessity rather than freely willed.340

This same division of substance, thought, and will, however, is not as useful in explaining the internal Otherness of the Trinity. If the Son is of the same substance as the Father and His basis is not, as with Creation, in the Father’s will, then how is the Son to be understood as other?

Zizioulas looks to the Cappadocians for the answer.

With the Cappadocians, ousia and hypostasis, previously treated essentially as synonyms by Athanasius, are distanced from one another. Hypostasis, which had been understood as the concrete individuality of a thing, becomes associated instead with prosopon, person. Prosopon, unlike ousia, is understood relationally, and thus this new association introduces relationality into ontology and ontology into relationality. To be and to be in relation become identical, and identity takes on ontological significance only in relationship.341 For the Cappadocians, though, a distinction still exists between person and relation. Zizioulas notes that “[r]elation for them is

340 John D. Zizioulas, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics (London: T&T Clark, 2008), 88. 341 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 88

126 constitutive of personhood but person is not the relation itself; it is a concrete hypostasis, an entity that is relational but at the same time ontologically integral.”342 Personhood, therefore, is raised by the Cappadocians to the highest ontological status, in contrast to the thought of prior theologians, who had reserved that status for ousia. This meant that “[t]hreeness is just as primary as oneness; diversity is constitutive of unity. The many are neither caused by the One nor subsist as relations within the One. The De Deo uno cannot be treated before De Deo trino.”343

Following the Cappadocians, Zizioulas’s theology of relationship is inextricable from his theology of personhood: “There is in reality no such thing as nature ‘in the nude,’ i.e., as substance or logos without a tropos, a modifying relationality. And this is exactly what we find in personhood.”344 The question of what something is and the question of how it exists cannot be separated, yet ousia is only accessible at the level of personhood, of relating. God is known not in God’s essence, which is unknowable to humanity; rather, relationship with God occurs with the hypostases, the Persons of the Trinity. Humanity knows and communes with God as Father,

Son, and Holy Spirit, coming to know God only through the Persons of the Trinity and not through Their common essence, which is incomprehensible. Humanity can know, then, that God exists and how God exists but not what God is. Theologian and Orthodox saint Gregory Palamas notes that God did not say "I am the essence" but "I am the being."345 Zizioulas embraces total apophaticism regarding the essence of God, asserting that there is not anything that theology can say about it, only about the experience of the personal existence of God. "We cannot pray either

342 Zizioulas, “Relational Ontology,” 154. 343 Ibid., 148. 344Ibid. 345 Gregory Palamas, Triads, III, 2.12, in Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 29.

127 to the divine essence or to the divine energies," he writes.346 God engages with humanity not as essence but as Persons. The Cappadocians do not apply this principle only to the being of God but also to all created beings. Gregory Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa both express that “even the nature of created beings is beyond comprehension,” making it impossible not only to answer

Nagel's famous question, "What is it like to be a bat?" but also to give any sort of definitive answer to the question, "What is a bat?"347 Relationship for the Cappadocians, and thus for

Zizioulas, is not essence to essence but person to person.

Despite the Cappadocian contribution, ousia continues to be afforded priority over hypostasis in the West, an approach condemned as nonsensical by Zizioulas. Salvation and revelation have an ontological character that goes unrecognised if ontology is limited to discussion solely of essence rather than “how God is.” Given the inability of creatures to participate in the essence of God, salvation relies upon the personal existence of God, the relationship of the Son to Creation and of the Son to the Father and Holy Spirit. Without this personal dimension to ontology and soteriology, Zizioulas warns, adoption through Baptism must take on a purely metaphorical or ethical meaning.348 He points to theologian Karl Rahner's critique of the Augustinian tradition, which prioritizes the substance of God over the Person of the Father. Rahner advocates instead for a return to the Greek patristic tradition, which he believes, as Zizioulas does, was more faithful to the Biblical narrative—a view that has gained traction in modern Orthodox scholarship.349 Zizioulas takes issue with Augustine's description of the Persons of the Trinity as memory, knowledge, and love, as these terms relate more to

346 Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 30. 347 Zizioulas, “Priest of Creation,” 149. 348 Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 36. 349 Karl Rahner, The Trinity (London: Burns & Oates, 2001), 17–18.

128 psychology than to scripturally grounded ontology, rendering them an inappropriate characterization.350

Zizioulas's understanding of personhood as relation, hypostasis as prosopon as schesis, deviates also from the classic Aristotelian formulation. Aristotle’s ontology takes as its starting point the individual thing: one cannot relate until one is. Aristotelian metaphysics holds that the substance of the individual being is primary. Secondary are the ontological categories, such as relating, that can be applied to more than one being.351 Gregory Palamas, responding to the controversy between the East and the West regarding cause in the Trinity, writes, "[T]he One who is does not come from the substance, but it is the substance that comes from the One who is."352 To identify the being of God exclusively with the essence of God is, according to Gregory

Palamas, an error. In agreement with the Greek Fathers and with Rahner, Zizioulas maintains that “the final assertion of ontology in God has to be attached not to the unique ousia of God but to the Father, that is, to a hypostasis or person,” to "how God is."353 This idea, not without controversy, sets his theology of personhood well outside the realm of philosophical personalism as previously understood.

For Zizioulas, the primacy of ousia poses significant existential problems. Is being a result of ousia or of personhood? To answer that ousia is the origin of being opens one up to the error of Eunomianism, which denied the divinity of the Son, equating ousia with the Father and making the Father alone agenetos. The Cappadocian Fathers countered this heresy by positing that the person of the Father, not the Father’s ousia, is the cause of the Son, a position affirmed

350 Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 3–4. 351 Pamela Michelle Hood, Aristotle on the Category of Relation (Lanham: University Press of America, 2004), 5–6. 352 Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 14. 353 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 88.

129 by the First Council of Constantinople’s alteration of the creed articulated by the First Council of

Nicaea.354 This primacy of person over substance avoids ontological monism and allows the relational subordination of the Son to the Father, present in the Orthodox doctrine of the monarchy of the Father, by making the Father the cause of the Son and the Spirit without slipping into subordinationist heresy by denying the co-equality of the Son in substance. This solution is intended not to degrade the Son but to protect His divinity by precluding identification of the ousia of God with the Father to the exclusion of the other two Persons.

This Cappadocian understanding of cause within the Godhead demonstrates that being is not static but dynamic. For Zizioulas, relations are causal at the level of personhood, as evident in the Persons of the Trinity. The Father, as the “principle without principle,” is the first origin of the persons of the Son and the Spirit, with the two emerging as hypostases from the movement of relationality. This represents a deviation from Greek philosophy, which held that the particular is derivative, not causative.355 The question of cause is important to Trinitarian theology, as the answer carries with it weighty existential implications for the rest of Creation as well. Zizioulas argues that if there is no causation in the being of God—if God exists simply because God exists, because of an "ousianic tautology"—then God's existence is necessitated by

God's ousia, and God becomes a "necessary being."356 If God's existence is necessary, then God does not have freedom, and God's Creation, by extension, is likewise bound by givens. If, however, God's existence is caused by the free Person of the Father, then there is hope for

354 The First Council of Constantinople in 381 excised a portion of the creed formulated at the First Council of Nicaea fifty-six years earlier which described the Son as “the only-begotten; that is, of the essence of the Father” (γεννηζέντα εκ του πατρος μονογενη, τουτέστιν εκ της ουσίας του πατρός) [Emphasis mine]. See Thomas G. Weinandy, “The Doctrinal Significance of the Councils of Nicaea, Ephesus, and Chalcedon,” in The Oxford Handbook of Christology, ed. Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 553. 355 Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness, 104. 356 Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 12.

130 creaturely liberation from necessity, from "given realities"—hope of taking on God's way of being in theosis. "‘Theosis’ is meaningless apart from the liberation of man from the priority of substance over against the person," writes Zizioulas.357 Cause, additionally, “gives to being a quality of love and to love an ontological character: to be is to exist for the other, not for the self, and to love is not to ‘feel’ something about the other, but to let the other be and be other.”358 To say that God is love is to say that God is relational: “The Father’s love for His world is the Son

Himself, nothing less. And the purpose of this love is the ‘eternal being and well being’ of the world. If this does not constitute an ontology of the person, then terms have lost their precise meaning.”359

Although the Palamite or Hesychast controversy over the nature of God was a matter of great importance to systematic theology in the mid-14th century, Zizioulas doubts whether the priority of substance over person has retained its importance in modern Western theology.

Instead of reviving the question, he proposes that ecumenical energies be expended instead on the development of a theological understanding of personhood in light of Trinitarian theology, an understanding that would counter the individualistic Boethian understanding to which Balthasar also objects and solicit input from the fields of secular psychology and sociology. Zizioulas urges that "[i]f we are to make the doctrine of the Trinity relevant again, we must open the frontiers of theology to other concerns. We must actually begin from the point where these nontheological concerns emerge in our time."360 He views the ontology of the Trinity, of

Trinitarian personhood, as a matter of great significance—not only to systematic theologians but

357 Ibid. 358 Zizioulas, “Relational Ontology,” 150. 359 Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 36. Here, Zizioulas references Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua. 360 Ibid., 14.

131 to all the faithful, as well as to those with whom the Church enters into ecumenical and interfaith dialogue. Poor Trinitarian theology, theology that fails to adequately articulate the reality of the

Trinitarian existence, puts the dogma of the Trinity at risk of irrelevance. Both Rahner and

Zizioulas lament that the Trinity is already without effect on the liturgical and devotional life of

Christians in both the East and the West. To the lay Christian, Zizioulas observes, it makes little to no difference to Whom a prayer is addressed.361 Similarly, Rahner writes that “despite their orthodox confession of Trinity, Christians are, in their practical life, almost mere “monotheists.”

We must be willing to admit that, should the doctrine of the Trinity be dropped as false, the major part of religious literature could well remain virtually unchanged.”362

The Persons of the Trinity are considered secondary characteristics of God, with God's unity maintaining ontological primacy. "This lack of suspicion that in the difference of the

Persons there is a clear distinctiveness not to be overshadowed by the unity of the Godhead, is characteristic of the irrelevance of Trinitarian theology for the Church's liturgy," writes

Zizioulas.363 He regrets that, for many Christians, spirituality involves a personal relationship with Jesus Christ bordering on monism or, to the other extreme, an absorption of one's soul into the love of the divine, erasing one's distinctiveness, eliminating one's Otherness in relation to

God. By contrast, authentic personhood, personhood modeled on the relationality of the Trinity, values and indeed generates Otherness.364 As for Balthasar, both the unity and the multiplicity of the Godhead shape the reality of Creation and the identity of the human being, who is called to be Imago Trinitatis.

361 Ibid., 5. 362 Rahner, The Trinity, 10–11. 363 Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 6. 364 Ibid.

132

3.2.3 The Personhood of Created Beings

Zizioulas sees a Trinitarian understanding of personhood as a critical existential question, and one on which very little work has been done. He notes the inadequate attempts of both religious and atheistic humanism and secular sociology to define the person and calls for a theological response that would connect theology to humanity's existential needs.365 Without the doctrine of the Trinity, he maintains, this is not possible—and faith is empty of its significance for our existence. Although sociological models of personhood rely on individualism and psychology, defining person as the subject of self-consciousness, identified with particular social roles, Zizioulas sees an opening for theology in the fact that other disciplines have concerned themselves with the concept and recognised it as one of some importance to society.

Zizioulas’s joining of theological anthropology to the systematics of the Trinity is not without controversy. Theologians, like Zizioulas, who attempt to make this connection have been met with accusations of philosophical personalism and existentialism by those preferring theological apophaticism.366 Opponents maintain that the formulation of an ontology of personhood in reference to God's being is not only impossible but is to be actively discouraged.

Zizioulas counters their many published objections by arguing that dogmas, such as that of the

Trinity, are unconvincing and irrelevant to the faithful if not connected with the essence of human life.367 Adoption of a theological understanding of personhood that places prosopon

365 Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 6. 366 Theologian Karen Kilby has been an outspoken opponent of the Trinitarian theology of both Zizioulas and Rahner. See Karen Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the Trinity,” New Blackfriars 81, no. 957 (November 2000): 432–445; Karen Kilby, “Is an Apophatic Trinitarianism Possible?,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 12, no. 1 (January 2010): 65–77. Zizioulas mentions also critiques by Biblical scholar Savvas Agouridis and systematician I. Panagopoulos, both printed in Synaxis. Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 17. 367 Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 17.

133 before ousia signifies humanity's aspiration for the freedom exercised by God and lends meaning and relevance to the dogma of the Trinity for Christians in the pews and on the altar. An existential link between the lives of the faithful and Christian dogma must be established and interpreted; otherwise, theology is not relevant but merely descriptive. Basing the ontology of the person on the ontology of the Trinity safeguards the "communal character of existence" on ontological, eschatological, sacramental, and ecclesiological rather than merely moral grounds.368 The early 20th century saw philosophers such as Nikolai Berdyaev, Gabriel Marcel, and Martin Buber, who recognised the ontological difficulties of giving primacy to ousia, instead attempt to place the concept of communion or community between ousia and prosopon, as a third addition to the debate. For them, community takes ontological priority over personhood; the person is "conceived of within communion or as a result of it, person being subordinated to the generality of communion."369 Zizioulas distinguishes his own concept of personhood from this one. Communion is not an intermediary step but constitutive of personhood itself.

Zizioulas connects divine relationality to the relationality of the world through his concept of personhood. "If ‘the persons of the Trinity cannot provide the basis’ for the concept of the human person, then there is no alternative to accepting humanistic personalism (which we all find so irritating), or else rejecting the notion of person entirely,” he writes. “There is no other way out.”370 The ontology of the created being, however, is distinct from that of God. One created being is independent ontologically from another in a way that the Persons of the Trinity are not. Nevertheless, Creation’s relational way of being resembles the reality of the divine

368 Ibid., 38. 369 Ibid., 21. 370 Ibid., 33. Here, Zizioulas is responding to John Panagopoulos, “Οντολογία ή θεολογία τού προσώπου,” περιοδικό Σύναξη 13 (1985): 63–77.

134 personhood. Zizioulas holds that this too can be traced back through the tradition to Greek patristic thought, especially that of the Cappadocians. The roots of philosophical personalism, on the other hand, date back to the work of Augustine, developed more fully by Boethius,

Descartes, Aquinas, and, in more recent times, philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, Nikolai

Alexandrovich Berdyaev, and Edgar S. Brightman. Augustine's De Trinitate points to the existence of a soul and its analogy to the Trinity. Finding of particular relevance humanity's use of reason and possession of self-consciousness, Augustine describes the persons of the Trinity as

"the mind, and the knowledge by which it knows itself, and the love by which it loves itself and its knowledge."371 In his own attempt to articulate the uniqueness of humanity as a species set apart within the natural world, Boethius proposed that “person” be defined as “rationalis naturae individua substantia.” 372 Likewise highlighting the human capacity for reason and consciousness, Brightman defined personhood as "a complex unity of consciousness which identifies itself with its past self in memory, determines itself by its freedom, is purpose and value seeking, private yet communicating, and potentially rational."373 Zizioulas finds in each of the many incarnations of philosophical personalism the common thread of consciousness that, according to Brightman, all of existence participates in.374 By contrast, for the Fathers, “person” cannot be defined as the subject of consciousness or psychological experiences, as evidenced by their insistence that the three Persons of the Trinity share only one consciousness. Zizioulas notes that the essential elements of the person within philosophical personalism are not, for the

Fathers, hypostatic-personal properties but are connected to the essence of God in that they are

371 Augustine, On the Trinity, Books 8–15, ed. Gareth B. Matthews, trans. Stephen McKenna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 171. 372 "The individual substance of the rational nature." Boethius, De persona et duabus naturis, ch. 3. 373 Edgar S. Brightman, “Personalism (Including Personal Idealism),” in A History of Philosophical Systems, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), 352. 374 Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 21.

135 common to all three Persons: "Person and essence are not in conflict, as in the personalism of existentialism, and for this reason freedom is a positive and affirmative stance; in other words, it is identified with love." 375 Each divine Person, therefore, expresses its identity by coexisting with the others in love, sharing a common essence, rather than by opposing this essence, attempting to set oneself apart from it. Zizioulas maintains that “person” cannot be conceived of without essence, and the essence of God cannot be conceived of "in a naked state" without the person.376

Zizioulas rejects individualistic notions of personhood popularized by Boethius and still common in Western thought today, as evidenced by the importance of individuality and standing out from the crowd. The more a being distinguishes itself from other beings, the more its own identity is recognised and valued. This is applied, too, to non-human animals. There are many stories similar to that of Yvonne, the dairy cow who escaped slaughter in the summer of 2011 and was cheered on by people around the world as she evaded capture in Germany. Mayor Franz

Märkl of Zangberg, the Bavarian city to which Yvonne fled, remarked, “It's unbelievable how famous she's become—for sure nobody would dare shoot her now."377 Even those who support meat and dairy consumption rooted for Yvonne because she had set herself apart as an individual in a species normally given consideration only as a unified whole. The dominant view insists that cows are not irreplaceable individuals; they are a uniform species, one exactly like the next, all instinct and evolution, unlike human beings.

375 Ibid., 22. 376 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 41. 377 Bill Chappell, “Yvonne, a Cow Wrapped in a Mystery Inside a Forest,” NPR, August 15, 2011, accessed July 26, 2017, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2011/08/15/139648411/yvonne-a-cow-wrapped-in-a-mystery- inside-a-forest.

136

Individualistic concepts of personhood have historically been used not to relate but to reject, from within the human species and in human relationships to non-human Others.

Asserting personhood through emphasis on individualism, on setting oneself apart from the other, is especially prevalent in classic theological and philosophical attempts to define the

Imago Dei, to get at the heart of human uniqueness by highlighting differences between humans and other animals. Such an approach has, for Zizioulas, far-reaching social and theological risks.

“The fact that the fear of the other is pathologically inherent in our existence results in the fear not only of the other but of all otherness,” he writes. Even when humans are accepting of others,

Zizioulas says, “we accept them on condition that they are somehow like ourselves.”378 It is no surprise, then, that, when the Otherness of non-human animals comes into play, it is easier to advocate for compassion toward chimpanzees than toward chickens, easier to assign personhood to an anthropomorphic extraterrestrial than to a dolphin.

“Person” has been wrongly taken not only as a synonym for “human being” but as a pseudo-taxonomic and legalistic label used to set apart the particular kinds of human beings deemed most desirable for participation within society—Caucasian human beings, male human beings, neurotypical human beings, able-bodied human beings. Those who don’t qualify as persons, who are considered sub-human, don’t qualify for full inclusion in the community.

Although the humanity and personhood of women, people of colour, and those with disabilities is now widely recognised, at least under North American law, this individualistic, anthropocentric concept of personhood continues to prevent those such as the unborn and non- human animals from being recognised as possessing an inherent goodness and thus having legitimate claims to certain consideration and care. Personhood marks inclusion, and Otherness

378 Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness, 2.

137 marks exclusion. Zizioulas’s relational ontology, however, links the two eternally in love, making each dependent on the other for its very existence. Personal relation presupposes union with the other in “valued difference.”379 The “unbreakable koinonia” existing between the three persons of the Trinity means “that otherness is not a threat to unity but a sine qua non condition of it.”380 Communion generates Otherness.

“Person,” argues Zizioulas, for the human being as for the Trinity, is an inherently relational category, a fact upon which Christ’s saving work relies. "A person is a unique entity which cannot be conceived of without relation to other entities, not only other humans but to nature as a whole,” he writes.381 In each of us is the totality of human nature. Were this not so,

Adam’s sin and Christ’s death and resurrection could not properly be said to have resonated throughout all of humanity. Zizioulas critiques Western philosophy’s concept of the person as a combination of rational individuality and psychological experience and consciousness. Being a person, he says, can be distinguished from being an individual or a personality "in that the person can not be conceived in itself as a static entity, but only as it relates to."382 Instead, he proposes, in agreement with Rahner, that personhood is made up of ekstasis and hypostasis rather than ousia, a definition that applies not just to the human person but to the persons of the Trinity.383

Before philosopher Martin Heidegger popularised the term ekstasis, the Greek Fathers, such as

Maximus the Confessor and Pseduo-Dionysius, used it in this same sense, giving the idea a pedigree apart from that of secular philosophy, which Zizioulas finds problematic. Personhood,

379 Patricia A. Fox, God as Communion: John Zizioulas, Elizabeth Johnson, and the Retrieval of the Symbol of the Triune God (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 2001), 43. 380 Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness, 5. 381 Fox, God as Communion, 57. 382 John D. Zizioulas, “Human Capacity and Human Incapacity: A Theological Exploration of Personhood,” Scottish Journal of Theology 28, no. 5 (October 1975): 407–408. 383 Ibid., 408.

138 by this definition, implies the openness, the ekstasis, of being, "a movement towards communion which leads to a transcendence of the boundaries of the 'self' and thus to freedom."384 Zizioulas’s personhood is a concept that can stand up against rapidly developing scientific and technological advances that have already begun to identify qualities such as reason and self-consciousness not only in non-human animals but in artificial intelligences as well. It is one of inclusion and love rather than social standing and segregation: "A person is an identity formed through a relationship."385

3.3 Connecting to How God Is

Zizioulas’s theological anthropology is rooted in this Trinitarian understanding of personhood, of being, as relational. God's self-revelation is person to person, the person of

Christ to the people of the world, rather than essence to essence or energy to energy. Zizioulas views the distinction between the essence of God and the energies of God, a topic of some popularity in modern Orthodox theology, as something of a soteriological dead end, preferring instead to focus on personhood as the key to the Greek notion of theosis or deification. Essence, he argues, is not the way by which humanity will be deified, as God's essence is unknowable and the gap between Creation and the uncreated being of God is insurmountable.386 Likewise,

Zizioulas finds the path to theosis via the energies problematic, as the energies are mediated by the Persons of the Trinity rather than by the essence of God. These energies, as they saturate

Creation, can lead to a type of paganistic focus on the created world if they are viewed as the key to creaturely deification.387 Personhood, Zizioulas insists, is a central question to Christian

384 Ibid. 385 Zizioulas, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics, 111. 386 Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 31. 387 Ibid., 32.

139 soteriology, a question necessarily neglected in discussion of energies and essences, because salvation ultimately comes from the second Person of the Trinity, in the person of Christ

Himself, and its goal is a personal communion with God. He writes, "The nature and energies are offered to us ‘in person’ and have the aim of creating a personal relationship between the

Persons of the Trinity and our own persons."388

The ontological character of revelation is made clear in the fact that salvation refers not to deliverance from temporal struggles, from moral and social evils, but to transformation in

Christ, to the raising of the dead back to new life. As God alone is immortal, it is participation in the death and Resurrection of Christ that connects Creation to "how God is," to immortality through the Person of the Son. If all of Creation is subject to the corruption of sin and death and, through the actions of humanity as Priest of Creation, is joined to God's immortal nature and made new, then non-human animals too participate in immortality, participate in the Cross, become "how God is." Humanity exists not only in relationship with the Triune God but in relationship with the rest of God’s Creation as well—a relationship meant, by divine design, to go beyond anthropocentric instrumentalism to theocentric, liturgical communion. In Genesis, humanity is given dominion over the earth and all of the creatures within. During the

Enlightenment, this dominion came to be understood as proprietary. Philosophers René

Descartes and Francis Bacon saw humanity as “masters and possessors of nature” and saw nature as the “slave” of humanity, a view that gained widespread popularity with the rise of capitalism.389 Because this view arose from an interpretation of Scripture and went without challenge from the Church for so long, Christianity bears, in Zizioulas’s eyes, much of the

388 Ibid. 389 John D. Zizioulas, The Eucharistic Communion and the World (New York: T&T Clark International, 2011), 133.

140 responsibility for the present ecological crisis.390 It follows, then, that the specific plight of the non-human animals within Creation can also be traced back to exegetical abuses and poor formulations of theological anthropology. Such problematic notions of humanity’s dominion have since been largely replaced by the notion of stewardship, although this too is quickly falling out of favour, especially among animal theologians.391 The concept of human stewardship of

Creation, though useful in encouraging benevolence over domination, does not adequately represent humanity’s true vocation, according to Zizioulas. Stewardship, he laments, implies a managerial, conservationist approach to nature.392 It is about humanity relating to non-human

Creation by what humanity does, not by what humanity is.393

There is no question for Zizioulas but that humanity holds a special place among God’s creatures; however, he rejects definitions of the Imago Dei that point to the specific capabilities of the human being. Biology, he holds, connects humanity to the rest of the animal kingdom rather than setting it apart. Humans are animals—animals with “higher qualities” than other species, but animals who share a great deal in common with them as well, both cognitively and genetically.394 Zizioulas acknowledges that non-human animals are now known to share intelligence and consciousness, attributes long thought to be the exclusive crown of humankind.

Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution was a breakthrough that Zizioulas credits with helping to

390 Ibid., 154. 391 For two examples of the rejection of the stewardship model among animal scholars, see Diane Perpich, “Scarce Resources: Levinas, Animals, and the Environment,” in Facing Nature: Levinas and Environmental Thought, eds. William Edelglass, James Hatley, and Christian Diehm (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2012): 67–94; and Matthew T. Riley, “A Spiritual Democracy of All God’s Creatures: Ecotheology and the Animals of Lynn White Jr., in Divinanimality: Animal Theory, Creaturely Theology, ed. Stephen D. Moore (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014): 241–260. 392 Ibid., 134. 393 Ibid., 139. 394 Ibid., 135.

141 put humanity back into its proper creaturely context.395 Darwin, in demonstrating not only that there is a biological continuity between humans and non-human animals but also that intelligence and emotion can legitimately be found in non-human animals, established that the difference between human animal and non-human animal is one of degree, not of kind.

Developments in the sciences, particularly the field of cognitive ethology, continue to demonstrate that the cognitive and affective capacities once thought to be exclusive to humanity can, in fact, be found in many species of non-human animal. At times, these cognitive capacities of non-human animals even exceed those of human beings, particularly children and the cognitively disabled, creating marginal cases that complicate neuroscientifically dependent definitions of the Imago Dei. For these reasons, rationality has been abandoned by many philosophers as the dividing line between humanity and non-human animals, but remnants of it remain in theological definitions of the Imago Dei.396 Such antiquated theories, says Zizioulas, isolate humanity from Creation, attempting, often unsuccessfully, to set the human above and apart rather than bringing the human into relationship.397

3.3.1 The Priesthood of Humanity

Although the Fathers that he so greatly admires did themselves point to rationality, logos, as the expression of the Imago Dei within humanity, Zizioulas maintains that their understanding of rationality is not comparable to modern definitions of rationality as cognitive capacity or intelligence. He argues that the term, as the Fathers use it, refers instead “to the capacity of the human being to collect what is diversified and even fragmented in this world and make a unified,

395 Ibid. 396 See Chapter 4 for further discussion of rationality and human uniqueness in theology. 397 John D. Zizioulas, The Eucharistic Communion and the World, 135.

142 harmonious world (cosmos) out of that.”398 The uniqueness of humanity, therefore, lies in its capacity to unite the world, to itself and to God. Following Maximus the Confessor, Zizioulas views the human being as “a microcosm of the whole universe.” He writes, “Because the human being has this organic link with creation and at the same time the drive to unite creation and to be free from the laws of nature, he can act as ‘the priest of creation.’”399 In this way, embracing and acknowledging the genetic and cognitive similarities of human and non-human animal does not, for Zizioulas, present any sort of threat to or denial of the human uniqueness described in

Scripture. “The fact that the human being is also an animal, far from being an insult to the human race, constitutes the sine qua non for his glorious mission in creation,” he maintains.400

The Imago Dei is not intended, after all, to be anthropocentric but theocentric, an exclusive reflection, in humanity, of some unique quality of God, not of humanity itself.

Zizioulas identifies this quality as the yearning in humanity for absolute freedom, the ability to create ex nihilo as God does rather than being limited to the materials given. While non-human animals are capable of, perhaps even superior at, environmental adaptation, Zizioulas notes that they do not strive to go beyond their existing boundaries to create a new world for themselves.401 In this unique tendency of humanity is seen the evidence that human personhood is only satisfied in becoming Imago Dei, in exercising the freedom and creativity that is characteristic only of God. Gregory of Nyssa called this freedom of humanity to be master of itself, to create without being restricted by the materials provided, autexousion.402 Hand in hand with this concept, however, goes tragedy, because humanity, as created being, cannot achieve

398 Ibid., 137. 399 Ibid. 400 Zizioulas, “Priest of Creation,” 286. 401 Fox, God as Communion, 62. 402 Zizioulas, The Eucharistic Communion and the World, 168.

143 absolute freedom, despite this God-given yearning.403 All that humanity has to work with has been provided already by God. The Cappadocian Fathers often distinguished between the image of God and the likeness of God, some taking the view that humanity was in the "image" immediately after Creation, while still in the Garden, sinless and newly created. By contrast, humanity will be in the "likeness" of God during the eschaton, when it enjoys communion with the uncreated and is finally free as God is. At present, humanity exists by necessity, at the will of the Creator, and is therefore not free. "But the 'image' means that we may have our existence,” Zizioulas explains, “not because we are obliged to by the way things are but because we are able to receive it for ourselves willingly and freely."404

It is through humanity’s relationship with Creation, through humanity’s priesthood, that this yearning finds fulfillment. In its priestly role, humanity transforms thinghood into personhood by opening up Creation to transcendent relatedness.405 This transformation is vital because, although God willed the world to exist, the world does not possess on its own the means to sustain its own existence indefinitely; it is not immortal. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo affirms that Creation is not eternal; it has a beginning, and, like all things with a beginning, it also has an end. Creation, without humanity, possesses no means to ensure its own survival.

The universe and all creatures in it are finite, created things, sustained only by their relation to

403 Ibid. 404 Zizioulas, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics, 95. 405 Zizioulas, “Priest of Creation,” 274.

144 the infinite, eternal Creator.406 It is important that this Creator-Creation bond be severable; otherwise it would be possible to say that Creation itself is immortal, is a god, but godhood cannot be extended to that which has a beginning, that which was created by someone else.407

To endow the world with immortality would have meant elevating it to godhood, negating the need for relationship with the Creator. The world's existence is not free or necessary; it exists only at the will of God. The Church rejects the Greek notion that, if the world did not exist, something else would need to exist in its place. "The necessity of existence is a function of the actual event of existence and of the fact that something exists at this moment,” writes Zizioulas.

“But it is not necessary that anything exists at all."408

Despite this bleak ontological picture, God values what God has created and provides an escape from corruption, death, and the inevitable return to the nothingness from whence Creation

406 Zizioulas's teaching on the ontological essentiality of the Creator-Creature bond for the creature poses a challenge to the predominant Catholic understanding of Hell as eternal separation from God. Such a complete separation, for Zizioulas and his fellow Orthodox theologians, would necessarily mean the succumbing of the creature to the nothingness of nonexistence from whence it came. The possibility even of fallen angels and Satan himself is eliminated in a state of complete ontological separation from God. Orthodox eschatology allows for two possible alternatives to such an understanding of Hell, alternatives not entirely incongruous with Catholic teaching. The first involves viewing Hell as a just and retributive punishment for sin, a punishment meted out by God and thus involving an ongoing connection between the sufferer in Hell and the sufferer's Creator that, although unimaginably painful, is still existentially sustaining. The second involves viewing Hell as containing the hope of apokatastasis, eternal salvation. Although this is a controversial minority view in the Orthodox Church, its proponents maintain that it appears in the writing of Patristics such as Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor and is explored, although not positively affirmed, in the theology of modern Catholic theologians such as Hans Urs von Balthasar and Karl Rahner. In order for Zizioulas's teaching on the crucial nature of the creature's bond with the Creator to resonate with Western eschatology, Hell cannot be viewed as a final, ontological separation of the soul from God. For more on the debate regarding apokatastasis within both Orthodox and Catholic theology, see Ilaria Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2013); Brian E. Daley, “Apokatastasis and ‘Honorable Silence’ in the Eschatology of St Maximus the Confessor,” in Maximus Confessor: actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2-5 septembre, 1980, eds. Feliz Heinzer and Christoph Schönborn (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1982), 309–339; Hans Urs von Balthasar, Dare We Hope that All Men Be Saved? with a Short Discourse on Hell (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988); and Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations: Volume XIV, Ecclesiology, Questions in the Church, and the Church in the World (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1976). 407 Zizioulas, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics, 93. 408 Ibid., 92.

145 came, through communion with God's own Self facilitated by the priesthood of humanity. God chose humanity for this essential role in the salvation of God's Creation, Zizioulas explains, because the body of a human being is made up of "all material elements," representing a link between humanity and the entire created, material world—a link that does not exist for incorporeal angels.409 “Man is the only creature who both includes the material world and also exceeds it,” he writes.410 It is not, however, merely the materiality of the human body that sets the species apart but also the human longing to create ex nihilo. These two factors must be considered alongside the Incarnation; otherwise, having dismissed the cognitive and affective capacities of the human species as criterion, it could be said that any portion of material Creation might fill this role solely because of its corporeality. In order to maintain the life-sustaining bond between Creation and Creator, the affirmation of a creature with free will is also necessary.

The freedom of human beings combines with their "material hypostasis" to make humanity the species uniquely suited to give this affirmation on behalf of Creation. Zizioulas argues, "It is the vocation of free beings to allow creation to survive. All creation hands on their exercise of freedom on its behalf."411

Scripture is clear that God not only acknowledges the goodness of what God has created but that God wills Creation to be united with God so that all might enjoy eternal life. Zizioulas argues that “God has ordained nature to be elevated to the ultimate status of personhood in

Christ.”412 Zizioulas sees this desire to unite God and Creation as the very reason God created humanity. From the beginning, the vocation of humanity has been that of a priest, lifting up

409 Ibid., 89. 410 Ibid., 90. 411 Ibid., 93–94. 412 Fox, God as Communion, 66.

146

Creation to unity with the Creator. The order of Creation itself, for Zizioulas, points to this unique role of humanity in the work of salvation. Human beings were created last, in order to unite the world to its Creator, but humanity refused to answer this calling. Instead, human beings decided to make gods of themselves, believing this to be the key to attaining independent immortality for the mortal world. Adam and Eve exercised their free will by refusing to fulfill the purpose for which they were created and, in doing so, damned the world to corruption and death.413 This gift of free will was intended instead by God to draw the world into being “how

God is,” independent and freely acting according to the will. God respected the refusal of the first humans but did not abandon the world to the consequences of their “No.”

I argue that it is not the will of God that Creation should pass back into the nothingness it was called forth from but that it should be united to God, through humanity, and thus enjoy eternal life through this relationship. Non-human Creation is dependent upon humanity for this anaphora, and its fate is inextricably linked to humanity’s, an assertion that Zizioulas ties to the eschatological expectation of Creation in Romans 8:19.414 Humanity is called not simply to conserve what exists, as implied by the stewardship model, but to develop it, as the wheat and grapes are developed into bread and wine before being offered to God in the Eucharist. This development is not intended to serve the needs of humanity but to serve the need of Creation to fulfill its own purpose for its own sake.415 Paul, in his letter to the Romans, provides an affirmation of the dependence of non-human creation on the priesthood of humanity. Every creature, all of the inanimate world, has an existential investment in the reconciliation of humanity with God. The free will of humanity affords it the ability to work either on behalf of

413 Zizioulas, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics, 90. 414 Ibid., 32. 415 Ibid., 140.

147

Creation or against it. As the course of history will attest, humanity is capable of using the material world and the creatures within it in ways that are productive and beneficial to Creation or, perhaps more commonly in the modern era, in ways that are destructive and intended for the service of humanity alone. The priesthood of humanity depends on two factors for Zizioulas: on the ability of humanity, as both free and corporeal, to consent to communion with God and also on the authority bestowed upon humanity by God to make use, in a theocentric, non- instrumenalizing way, of the created world.416 It is humanity's dominion that both renders humanity responsible for Creation and allows humanity to transform it, offering it up to God.

3.3.2 The Telos of Non-Human Creation

In response to Greek monism, which threatened God's transcendence and freedom, the early Church Fathers articulated the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in order to make clear that God existed prior to Creation and exists regardless of it.417 It is through the relationship of love between the Father and the Son that Creation came to be, that God the Creator spoke the world into existence with the Word. In the Garden, Adam and Eve were not to dominate and use the rest of Creation instrumentally but to live out their vocation as its priests, uniting the rest of

Creation, through a relationship of love, to its Creator. In fact, it could be said that humanity’s role, its means of coming to fulfillment and true freedom, is to be used by Creation, becoming the catalyst by which it undergoes anakephalaiosis, recapitulation.418 The sin of Adam and Eve, then, according to Zizioulas, was anthropocentrism. Original sin involved humanity’s attempt to make itself the ultimate point of reference for Creation, despite the fact that “from him and

416 Ibid., 95. 417 Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 9. 418 Fox, God as Communion, 58.

148 through him and to him are all things.”419 Adam and Eve—finite, created beings—tried to replace God, the infinite and uncreated being, cutting Creation off from its only source of eternal life and, as a result, subjecting the world to death and decay, the natural consequence of its finite nature.420 In making themselves God, they refused their role of priest. The root of the present ecological crisis, therefore, is original sin, anthropocentrism in a cosmos designed to be theocentric.421 Not willing that Creation should perish, Christ became incarnate in order to become a new priest of Creation, to pick up the role rejected by Adam and Eve and restore the relationship between Creation and God.

Through Christ's saving work, the priesthood was restored to humanity in the Church, which, through the sacraments, brings Creation into relationship with God once more. Being like God “means the actualization of the ontology of the person,” an ontology that is eschatological. Although the full realisation of personhood in Christ belongs to the future, humanity is offered a foretaste of this through the Church. Through the sacramental life of the

Church, especially the celebration of the Eucharist, the human being is placed “in an existential, ontological relationship with God, with other people, and with the material world.”422 The purpose, then, of the sacraments is to bring humanity into relationship, to offer the faithful a glimpse of “how God is,” of the Economy of the Trinity. Zizioulas sees the Church, imaging the

Trinity, as "a set of relationships making up a mode of being." As personhood is inherently relational, the human being cannot realise personhood outside the Church. "The Church must be conceived as the place where man can get a taste of his eschatological destiny, which is

419 Rom 11:36 (New Revised Standard Version). 420 Zizioulas, The Eucharistic Communion and the World, 138. 421 Ibid. 422 Zizioulas, The One and the Many, 37.

149 communion in God's very life."423 In Baptism, humanity gives up its desire to be God for

Creation and acknowledges the true Creator of all. In the Eucharist, Creation is recapitulated and referred back to its Creator.424 It is in acting not as God but as priest that humanity comes to fulfillment and enjoys absolute freedom by being the catalyst through which the rest of Creation is set free. The vocation of the human is to become a priest of Creation, consecrating the world to Christ, modeling the self-giving service of Jesus rather than exercising the absolute dominion of an earthly ruler.

Given that being is inherently relational, humanity’s relationship to nature and thus to other animals is not merely functional but ontological. For Zizioulas, this is another reason to reject the stewardship model. “In the case of stewardship our attitude to nature is determined by ethics and morality: if we destroy nature we disobey and transgress a certain law, we become immoral and unethical,” he writes. “In the case of priesthood, in destroying nature we simply cease to be, the consequences of ecological sin are not moral but existential.”425 Non-human animals, therefore, not only have an intrinsic goodness that stems from their being creations of

God that must be respected by humanity out of reverence for their common Creator but also take on an important existential value for humanity directly. By their existence, they are other, assisting humanity in approaching authentic personhood through relation. Zizioulas’s cosmology describes Creation as Christ’s body, the bearer of life.426 It is a communion of entities in relationship with one another and with their common Creator. Zizioulas acknowledges that non-human Creation is capable of taking on personal dimension in relating to

423 Ibid., 15. 424 Zizioulas, The Eucharistic Communion and the World, 138–139. 425 Ibid., 139. 426 Fox, God as Communion, 65.

150 humanity, and he allows that it too may be destined for personhood in Christ.427 This personal and theocentric telos of Creation raises numerous questions and carries with it strong ethical implications for the proper relationship between humanity and non-human animals, outlined in the final chapter. While it cannot be said, then, that a rat is a pig is a dog is a boy, it may be possible to say that they all share a similar destiny and that it is exactly their differences, their

Otherness, that makes possible the realisation of their personhood in Christ.428

Despite his clear reverence for the inherent goodness of non-human Creation, Zizioulas’s consideration of it, like that of Pope Francis and numerous other eco-theologians, does not escape a flattening of Creation that, though inadvertently, upholds the very dualism he seeks to challenge. Zizioulas’s relational ontology greatly values diversity and uniqueness—his personal approach makes “every being unique and irreplaceable”—and yet, throughout his work, he has divided Creation into a false ontological dichotomy of human and non-human.429 The Catechism of the Catholic Church likewise fails to make meaningful distinctions between plants, non- human animals, and inanimate features of Creation, although one might wonder if Zizioulas does so by oversight, whereas the Catechism clearly does so by design. Despite this shortcoming,

Zizioulas’s ontology of Creation nevertheless offers a direct challenge to the teaching of

CCC#2415: “The seventh commandment enjoins respect for the integrity of creation. Animals, like plants and inanimate beings, are by nature destined for the common good of past, present, and future humanity.”430 Recognising non-human animals as valued Others, undiminished in

427 Ibid., 64. 428 Animal activist Ingrid Newkirk, president of the organization People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), infamously declared that “a rat is a pig is a dog is a boy.” Though the original time and place of this quote is debated, Newkirk has embraced it as her own and uses it in her publications on PETA’s website. The quote also appears in the work of numerous skeptics of animal rights. It is held up as both an argument for animal equality by Newkirk and an artifact demonstrating the moral absurdity of such egalitarianism by her detractors. 429 Fox, God as Communion, 64. 430 Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC), 2nd. ed. (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 2000), 2415.

151 their uniqueness even as they are in relationship, means that they are not simply a part of the landscape, an undifferentiated part of “ecology,” “nature,” “the environment,” or even

“Creation.” They are relational beings, ordered toward union with their Creator, with humanity, and with the rest of the cosmos. This status asks the Church to abandon the false binary of human and non-human and to celebrate the diversity and multiplicity of God’s Creation.

If non-human animals are not ordered toward the service of humanity but, rather, humanity is ordered toward the recapitulation and anaphora of non-human Creation, then humanity’s relationship with them takes on a new moral complexity. As priests of Creation, it is humanity’s vocation to lift the non-human animals up to Christ, to encourage them toward their ultimate fulfillment in Him. To do them unnecessary harm is, as the Catechism says, “contrary to human dignity”—a denial of humanity’s own personhood and a refusal to love the other, a refusal to simply be.431 This existential denial is an offense to the dignity not only of Creation but also of its Creator. An anthropocentric interpretation of dominion and a conservationist interpretation of stewardship are necessarily replaced by an understanding of unity in loving relationality modelled on that of the three Persons of the Trinity. As a result, cruelty to non- human animals becomes more than a property issue, more than an ecological issue: it becomes an ontological, existential issue. To recognise, in theory and in practice, the valued Otherness of the non-human animal has not only practical, ethical implications but eschatological ones as well. Were such a relational view of non-human animals to become not only official doctrine but operational, normative doctrine, the Church would take a step toward restoring right relationship between humanity and Creation, humanity and the Creator. This, in turn, would be a step toward original justice, a state in which all live in loving relationship. “The underlying

431 CCC, 2418.

152 assumption is that there exists interdependence between man and nature, and that the human being is not fulfilled until it becomes anakephalaiosis,” Zizioulas affirms. “Thus, man and nature do not stand in opposition to each other, in antagonism, but in positive relatedness.”432

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that Zizioulas’s relational ontology of being, centered on the reality of Trinitarian Being, makes an important contribution to Christian theological inquiry into theological anthropology and the ontology of other animals alike. Building upon the inherent goodness of Creation and the relational nature of theological personhood outlined in the previous chapter, I have argued with Zizioulas for a vocational understanding of the Imago Dei that uncouples it from human capacities. Envisioning humanity as Priest of Creation provides an effective counter to the despotic view of humanity’s dominion, covered in Chapter 1, and challenges anthropocentric instrumentalism. I have argued that to misunderstand the Imago Dei, taking an instrumentalist approach to Creation and, specifically, to other animals, presents an existential problem for humanity, whose existence and telos are bound up with theirs.

The following chapter considers contemporary attempts within philosophy and theology to take seriously the inherent relationality of Creation, with particular attention to the relationship between human beings and other animals. I ask how the dominant voices in these discourses advocate for other animals and where they make both promising contributions and potential errors in their efforts. I argue that the theocentric telos of Creation and humanity’s priestly role within it, presented in this work thus far, make a valuable contribution to the evolving conversation surrounding the ontology and ethics of non-human animals. Where animal

432 Zizioulas, “Priest of Creation,” 274.

153 philosophers and theologians leave lacunae in their work, where that work risks inadequately dismantling anthropocentric instrumentalism, I argue that the adoption of a theocentric relational ontology that recognises humanity as Creation’s Priests rather than its rulers or even its stewards can serve as a useful corrective, productively advancing the conversation.

Chapter 4 Beyond Anthropocentric Instrumentalism: Non-Human Animals in Contemporary Theological Discourse 4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter argued that being is relational, the proper understanding of both theological anthropology and Creation theology finding its roots in the relationality of the

Trinity. This relationality of being renders anthropocentric instrumentalism more than a moral problem but an existential one, misrepresenting the telos not only of other animals but of humanity itself, called to act as Priest of Creation. Recognition of human uniqueness as vocational, carrying with it a responsibility to God and to other creatures, effectively rejects despotic constructions of human dominion and hierarchical views of Creation that set humanity apart from and above its creaturely context. This chapter carries a Trinitarian relational ontology of other animals forward, situating it within contemporary discourse in Christian animal theology.

Systematician Celia Deane-Drummond is one of very few Catholic voices in the present theological dialogue on other animals. However, neither she nor any other systematician has, to my knowledge, produced a book-length academic manuscript advancing a Catholic systematic theology of non-human animals. 433 This makes it necessary—both within theological discussions and within this chapter itself—to engage with the work of Protestant theologians as well. Despite their denominational differences, the theologians of this chapter—Andrew Linzey,

433 Though noteworthy contributions to a Catholic theology of non-human animals, both writer Deborah Jones’ The School of Compassion: A Roman Catholic Theology of Animals and ethicist Christopher Steck’s forthcoming All God's Animals: A Catholic Theological Framework for Animal Ethics take the approach of moral theology more so than systematic theology to make their respective cases for Catholic concern for animals. See Deborah Jones, The School of Compassion: A Roman Catholic Theology of Animals (Herefordshire: Gracewing Publishing, 2009); Christopher Steck, All God's Animals: A Catholic Theological Framework for Animal Ethics (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2019).

154

155

David Clough, and Celia Deane-Drummond—each wrestle with how to authentically construct a systematic and moral theology of non-human animals from within Christian traditions that have, for centuries, overlooked a theology of God’s other creatures. With very little by way of theological tradition to bring directly to bear on this question, today’s animal theologians find themselves in a new and rapidly expanding dialogical landscape. Linzey and Clough admit that, in this largely uncharted territory, their job is often to act as scouts as much as cartographers, sketching out new provinces and pitfalls for the explorers who come after them.434 Their work is foundational and by no means exhaustive; it is an effort to simply raise the question and be taken seriously so that others may likewise and later be taken seriously in their attempts to answer.

As they work to carve out the boundaries of animal theology, Linzey, Clough, and

Deane-Drummond find it necessary to revisit the meaning of the Imago Dei as the source of human uniqueness, the scope and applicability of Christ's saving work, and the particularity of

His Incarnation. Preserving an understanding of these foundational doctrines that is both loyal to the deposit of faith and encourages progress for non-human animals requires a reconstruction of them that strips away anthropocentric glosses added over time. Human uniqueness takes on relational and, particularly in the work of Deane-Drummond and Linzey, liturgical meaning; soteriological vision is expanded, and the caro of incarnatus is given greater force. Their work emphasises and expounds upon the ontological relationality of God's created beings, a relationality that is and must be recognised first as theocentric.

Engaging with the work of these three pioneering animal theologians, the chapter argues that a preservation of the concept of human uniqueness within Christian theology is necessary in order to create a moral obligation on the part of humanity to other animal creatures. With them it

434 David Clough, On Animals: Volume I, Systematic Theology (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013), x.

156 affirms that the source of this uniqueness has been misunderstood, overstated, and is in need of a revision which restores a vocational understanding of the Imago Dei. That said, where Linzey and Clough draw heavily on the theology of the Incarnation to make their respective cases for human concern for other animals, this chapter instead contends that the Trinitarian relationality of the previous chapters is a more useful model of how humanity, as Priest of Creation, ought to relate to other species. The image of the Trinity is an image of what Balthasar calls fundamental interrelatedness—and of Others existing always already in perfect communion, as Zizioulas describes. Loving relationality is central to the doctrine of God and central as well to a theology of Creation that rejects anthropocentrism. This emphasis on Trinitarian relationality informs the priestly vocation of humanity—a vocation that is necessarily relational, involving not only other human beings but all elements of Creation and God Godself—in a way unavailable in exclusively Christocentric models.

4.2 Andrew Linzey: Beginning the Conversation

Anglican theologian Andrew Linzey has the distinction of being among the first theologians to work to address the poverty of animal theology within the Christian tradition.

Dubbed the “modern-day father of the Christian animal advocacy movement,” Linzey’s work is an attempt to initiate the theological conversation on animal ethics.435 He begins the work of justifying a Christian concern for non-human animals and, in doing so, attends, though somewhat sparsely, to the need for a foundation of systematic theology to inform moral theology. This

435 Ben Devries, “Andrew Linzey and C.S. Lewis’s Theology of Animals,” Journal of Animal Ethics vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 25.

157 dissertation notes this remaining lacunae and presents itself as one effort to begin to fill it, from the Catholic perspective.

Despite his incomplete systematics, Linzey helpfully distinguishes animal theology from other areas of scholarship, particularly from eco-theology and liberation theology. Though he finds potential in both, Linzey recognises at the same time significant limitations in their ability to adequately address the plight of non-human animals. Because he has been for so much of his career working to merely make space for animals in theological discourse, cobbling together a subfield that was not yet recognised when he began, Linzey’s work is quite broad, more of a sketch than a portrait. There is an urgency to it, however, fueled by his awareness of the ongoing plight of non-human animals, particularly those who are farmed, hunted, and used as biomedical research subjects. Sensitive to this pressing need to reach all of the Church, Linzey seems at times undecided about whether he is speaking to a popular or an academic audience, publishing more for the former than the latter. Subsequent scholarship must nuance and develop Linzey's offerings, continuing to expand this field of animal theology he has delineated, both in terms of content and audience, a task to which this dissertation is a contribution.

While animal rights theorists Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and their interlocutors debate the ethical treatment of animals in the philosophical sphere, the Church remains relatively silent, offering little challenge to the anthropocentric instrumentalisation of other animals despite the potential foundation for such a resistance present in the Church’s own historical tradition.

Linzey's work is an ongoing effort to fill that theological gap, providing both an ethical framework for human interaction with non-human animals and, to some extent, the systematic and Scriptural underpinnings for such a moral theology. Linzey's 1994 book Animal Theology is a pioneering effort to take seriously non-human animals as theological subjects in their own right

158 and to challenge what he identifies as a harmful anthropocentrism present in a variety of theological works and movements.436 Despite his strong advocacy for animals, Linzey works to distinguish animal theology from the radically egalitarian philosophies of animal rights theorists like Singer, insisting instead that Christian teachings on human uniqueness and the Imago Dei need not be at odds with notions of goodness in other animals.

Linzey's work takes as its starting point the view that non-human animals have an irreducible goodness apart from their utility to human beings. Their goodness is theocentric; because they exist for the glory of God, their lives have meaning and worth.437 Like Balthasar and Zizioulas, Linzey reasons that this non-instrumental goodness of non-human animals is implied in their divine origin and ontological distinction from God. All of Creation is dependent on God for its existence and exists only in a relationship of grace with God, therefore it is only by God's continued approval that Creation persists.438 This ontological relationality leaves all of

Creation inherently open to the Creator even as its fallen nature denies the relationship. Lest

Linzey's advocacy for the rights of animals be taken as egalitarianism, a flattening of the animal kingdom, or a denial of human uniqueness, he maintains that "[t]he Biblical principle that all life has value is not to hold that all being has the same value or to hold that there are not morally relevant distinctions between one kind of being and another."439 Valuing all life and equating all life are meaningfully different positions.

Linzey justifies his differentiation between species and, in particular, his own prioritization of concern for non-human animals over plants and inanimate Creation by appealing

436 Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995). 437 Ibid., 95. 438 Ibid., 96. 439 Ibid., 23.s

159 to God's own treatment of the animal kingdom in Scripture. From the order of Creation in

Genesis 1, to the Psalms, to the parables of Christ, 'man and beast' are paired together, set apart from other elements of Creation. Such a distinction, he notes, is present also in the hagiological tradition of the Church through the teaching of figures such as St. Francis and St. Basil the Great who recognised a picture of divine generosity and the inherent goodness of living beings as creatures of God.440 Linzey critiques Zizioulas as "[n]eglectful of the precise issues raised by the contemporary debate about animals," beginning with the need to attend to these issues separately from those of eco-theology.441 This critique, he easily levels against multiple theologians writing on eco-theology and Creation theology including Jürgen Moltmann, Pierre Tielhard de Chardin,

Paul Santmire, A.D. Galloway, and the World Council of Churches.442 Despite his skepticism of eco-theology, Linzey nevertheless gives voice to his hope that future scholars will pick up relevant threads in the thought of eco and Creation theologians in order to make explicit their implications for non-human animals. This dissertation takes up Linzey’s challenge through the eco-theology of Zizioulas. While Zizioulas has neglected to distinguish between the goods of

Creation generally and the goods of animal creatures in particular, his work is nevertheless of significant value in establishing the goodness of non-human Creation and advocating for the kind of reform of theological anthropology that Linzey calls for.

440 Ibid., 36. 441 Ibid., 201. 442 See Linzey's "Guide to the Literature," an appendix of Animal Theology, for his brief evaluation of these and several other thinkers. See also Chapter 4 of his Creatures of the Same God entitled "The Conflict Between Ecotheology and Animal Theology" for a more detailed exploration of why Linzey believes the specific plight of non-human animals so rarely enters into eco-theological consideration. Andrew Linzey, Creatures of the Same God (New York: Lantern Books, 2009).

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4.2.1 Theos-Rights and Theocentricity

Despite his high opinion of Creation's goodness, Linzey remains skeptical of an 'Equality

Paradigm' for governing the human-non-human animal relationship. Representative of his departure from utilitarian animal rights theory, Linzey takes issue with the egalitarian view proposed by Singer. Singer states openly that his vision of non-human animal equality does not necessarily involve the equal treatment of non-human animals.443 For Linzey, this is not a paradigm of equality at all, especially as Singer's equal consideration of interests, Linzey notes,

“is to be interpreted considerately only in the case of (adult?) humans.”444 Linzey further argues that egalitarian approaches to animal rights do not go far enough in establishing and articulating humanity's obligation to non-human animals. Instead, they tend to focus on the limits of what humanity may do to other animal creatures, advocating for a minimization of suffering without regard for the rest of the relationship that exists or ought to exist between the species. Taking up the case of animal experimentation, Linzey demonstrates that Singer's preference utilitarianism obliges the sacrificing of other animals for the goods of humanity. Linzey introduces instead his

Generosity Paradigm which holds that humanity does not have the right to promote its own interests over those of other species. Applied to animal experimentation, Linzey’s Generosity

Paradigm holds instead that humanity must, out of generosity, cease experimentation on other animal species, bearing whatever consequences may ensue. Admittedly, adherence to the

443 Peter Singer, “All Animals Are Equal,” Philosophic Exchange 1, no. 5 (Summer 1974): 104. 444 Linzey, Animal Theology, 39. Linzey is careful to distinguish himself from secular animal rights theorists, particularly Peter Singer and Tom Regan, insisting that he is not simply dressing up their philosophy in Christian vestments. The publication of Linzey’s own book, Animal Rights: A Christian Perspective, indeed predates the definitive works of both Singer and Regan. In fact, Linzey appears to resent the tendency of many reviewers to presume congruence between the three based solely on their use of the term "animal rights" and not on a careful comparison of their respective theories thereof. See Andrew Linzey, "The Divine Worth of Other Creatures: A Response to Reviews of Animal Theology," Review and Expositor 102 (Winter 2005): 120; Andrew Linzey, Animal Rights: A Christian Perspective (London: SCM Press, 1976).

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Generosity Paradigm would be quite costly for humanity but to hold that humanity's interests must always come first is, for Linzey, idolatrous, the raising of the human being to an unwarranted God-like status.445

Despite his objections to them, Linzey encourages Christians to take seriously the egalitarian claims of animal advocates like Singer and to formulate a considered response. It is not enough to merely respond that humanity has special moral relevance in the Christian tradition without a careful examination of why this may be and what constitutes the basis of humanity's unique status in Creation. A Christian defense of humanity’s role in the cosmos, he argues, must be centered on God and on God's relationship with Creation, not on humanity’s intellectual capacities.446 Linzey holds that humanity's special value derives from God in God's generosity and obliges humanity to likewise show generosity as prescribed in the teachings of

Christ. The Christian faith, Linzey notes, is built on a paradigm of the higher performing costly service for the lower, as evidenced both in Christ's treatment of the particular marginalised persons of His day and in His salvific sacrifice as God, dying for humanity. Service and lordship are inseparable. It is precisely humanity's 'higher' status in Creation that creates in humanity a moral duty to the non-human animals, not any kind of equality between them. "Our special value in creation consists in being of special value to others," Linzey writes.447 Linzey speaks of the moral priority of the weak, a concept familiar in Catholic social teaching as a 'preferential option for the poor and vulnerable.' Humanity's uniqueness does not arise from the capacity for reason or language but from a special capacity for service born out of humanity’s lordship, granted through the generosity of God. Both humanity’s capacity for service and its lordship are

445 Linzey, Animal Theology, 40. 446 Ibid., 30. 447 Ibid., 33.

162 analogous to the service and lordship of Christ Himself. In view of the Creator's generosity,

Linzey argues that non-human Creation has a “right to generosity,” a right to be treated generously by humanity.448 To treat Creation as merely a means to human ends is an indication that humanity has lost sight of the generosity of God.449

Inspired by the work of theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Linzey finds it helpful to speak of the “rights” of God in Creation, noting the controversy surrounding the use of rights language in doing moral theology. He sidesteps the argument that rights language does not belong in theology at all by choosing instead to focus on the opposition of Christians who would use rights language without reservation to speak of human rights while simultaneously denying that it can usefully be applied to non-human animals.450 Linzey does not advocate for an espousal of rights language over the language of reverence, respect, or responsibility but introduces his concept of theos-rights as a compliment to these ideas.451 He argues that the concept of rights effectively emphasises the theocentricity of Creation and returns humanity to a position of humility, recognising that it has no rights over God nor over that which God has created. He writes that,

"Such language—whatever its limitations or deficiencies—serves to convey to us that the claims of animals are God-based claims of justice."452

Humanity respects God's own rights by practicing reverence toward that which God has made. As creations of the Creator Who alone has an absolute claim to rights, non-human animals are, by extension, the holders of theos-rights. Theos-rights arise out of the theocentric

448 Ibid., 42. 449 Ibid., 58. 450 Ibid., 26. 451 Ibid., 3. 452 Ibid., 27.

163 orientation of Creation; Creation exists for God and God is for Creation. This is not to say that

God exists to serve Creation, but that God cares for and loves that which God has created, endowing it with and respecting within it certain rights. Citing poet Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr.,

Linzey argues that if creatures have no rights that their Creator is bound to respect, there can be no moral relations between the two. He understands this to mean not that God is obliged to respect some external right of God's Creation but that God ,Who is by nature love, loves

Creation and thus "what is genuinely given and purposed by that love must acquire some right in relation to the Creator."453 The theos-rights of Creation arise from God's own valuing of

Creation. Linzey states his central thesis quite succinctly: "If God is for them, we cannot be against them."454

Despite Linzey's heavy use of rights language, he admits that talk of rights and even equality point only to the minimum obligation humanity owes others and thus fall short of fully articulating the moral claims made by them. Linzey offers the example of parenthood. A parent who merely respects a child's right to be fed, to be educated to some basic extent, to avoid being beaten, and to receive medical care when necessary is, despite this accommodation, nevertheless a poor and perhaps even a negligent parent.455 Concepts of human rights cannot encompass all that is required of a good parent just as concepts of animal rights cannot encompass all that is required of humanity in response to Creation. Even with such caveats in place, Linzey's commitment to the language of rights seems half-hearted. He seldom uses it without concession to those who would oppose it and appears to favour the language of rights and corresponding moral duties more because it will be familiar and provocative to his readers than because he

453 Ibid., 24. 454 Ibid., 25. 455 Ibid., 42.

164 endorses it as the most accurate or effective way to speak of the relationship between Creation and Creator. His unusual and potentially controversial use of rights language puts the nascent discourse around animal theology at risk of dialogical deflection, the pros and cons of rights theory debated while concern for non-human animals is pushed to the side. Surely, the clarity of

Linzey's concepts is not reliant on this particular expression.

4.2.2 Reinterpreting the Incarnation in Liberation Theology

Linzey also finds useful the language of liberation theology, speaking of a "psychological bondage" enslaving human and non-human animals alike.456 Humanity holds the key to freeing all species from this oppression by its own commitment to end the systemic exploitation of non- human animals pervasive especially in Western society. While Linzey sees potential in liberation theology to lay the foundation for the liberation of Creation, he argues that, in its present form, it instead ties Christianity more firmly to instrumental anthropocentrism.457 He makes a series of recommendations, however, for the salvaging of liberation theology as an inclusive moral scaffold.

Linzey first suggests a renewed Johannine doctrine of Christ as Logos, the Word of God through Whom all things came into being. John's Prologue offers a reminder of the common origin of all creatures, drawing attention to their samenesses rather than their differences. This commonality is affirmed by the Incarnation, understood as God taking on materiality, taking on fleshly embodiment, rather than exclusively taking on humanity. In Incarnational theology,

Linzey sees the foundation for a "high doctrine of matter." The flesh shared by all of the animal

456 Ibid., 88. 457 Ibid., 62.

165 kingdom "is the pivot of God's redeeming purposes," an appropriate medium for God's own self- revelation.458 He gives great significance to the ousia of the Incarnation as God's “Yes” to all of

Creation. Such an understanding does not preclude the particular human significance of the

Incarnation but rejects the dichotomous notion that a “Yes” to humanity must be a “No” to all other creatures. 459 Linzey finds the understanding of systematician Paul Tillich especially compelling on this point. Tillich writes that "[m]an cannot claim that the infinite has entered the finite to overcome its existential estrangement in mankind alone."460 It seems unthinkable to

Linzey that if God has created, loves, and sustains the entire cosmos, any part of it would be eventually discarded. Instead, God's saving power manifested in one part of Creation implies its operation in all parts of Creation. With eco-theologian Brian Horne, Linzey affirms that "[t]he

Jesus who is crucified is also the Logos of God: through him all things come into being, in him all things are ‘summed up,’ and by him all things are sanctified by the presence of the Spirit. In taking man to himself, he takes all nature to himself."461

Indeed, all creatures are included in Linzey's understanding of Christ as new covenant with an emphasis on the Noahic covenant's inclusion of all animals. He argues that if it was the will of God to include both human and non-human animals as parties to the same covenant, humanity cannot, as liberation theology suggests, have only duties concerning them but it must also have duties to them. 462 Humanity's love of the non-human world ought to imitate Christ's own, humanity becoming, in the words of Athanasius, 'Saviour of the Universe.’ Linzey admits that liberation theology does acknowledge the cosmic character of the reconciliation of Christ in

458 Ibid., 97-98. 459 Ibid., 69. 460 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume Two (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 96. 461 Brian Horne, A World to Gain: Incarnation and the Hope of Renewal (London: Longman and Todd, 1983), 55. 462 Linzey, Animal Theology, 69.

166 the work of Leonardo Boff but fails, Linzey argues, to recognise its moral implications.463 This is, for Linzey, a significant failing as it is truly Christ who is the moral exemplar for humanity, modeling katabasis toward the poor and vulnerable. Christ’s is, Linzey writes, "power expressed in powerlessness and strength expressed in compassion," an example which Linzey cannot justify limiting only to moral dealings amongst human beings.464 He argues that liberation theology ought to be eschatological, reflecting the eschatological actions of Christ. Because the ultimate oppression facing Creation is the bondage to decay and the futility that plagues it as a result of both its createdness and its fallenness, the ultimate liberation is salvation.

Like Irenaeus, Linzey places responsibility for the Fall solely with humanity, a species unique in its concupiscence. It is this flaw of the human being that creates in humanity a moral duty toward other animals who are themselves innocent, bearing no culpability for sinfulness, personally or communally. The Fall of humanity imposes suffering and death onto the other, wholly innocent members of Creation thus humanity must make restitution not only to God but to the non-human animals for the injustice of burdening them with the consequences of humanity’s sin. Linzey describes fallen nature as parasitical, a cycle of death, decay, and predation that fuels the natural world as it exists presently. He laments that eco-theologians have embraced this “ecological parasitism” as God's will, placing themselves at odds with his own liberation theology of Creation.465 This divergence originates from differing evaluations of

Creation's fallen state and their impact on the perceived reliability of natural law, understood as a guideline of conduct arising from 'the way things are.’ Linzey objects to the modern trend of sacralising nature and denying or diminishing its fallenness as a way of counteracting

463 Ibid., 70. 464 Ibid., 71. 465 Ibid., 76.

167 generations of environmental degradation and abuse. Such a reinterpretation of the theological tradition is, he argues, unnecessary to promote greater ecological concern and may instead hinder an understanding of Christ's redemptive action in Creation and of humanity's own participation therein.466

This dissertation affirms Linzey’s assertion that theological concern for non-human animals does not require an abandonment of existing Christian doctrine in favour of a kind of animism that would render Creation sacred apart from its theocentric orientation. Linzey’s strong emphasis on human culpability for the effects of the Fall, however, is unnecessary to establish human moral responsibility for the rest of Creation. In the Creation stories of Genesis,

God reveals that humanity has been made in God’s own image prior to the disobedience of

Adam and Eve. An understanding of the Imago Dei as vocational, the divine selection of humanity as Priests of Creation, is sufficient to establish the special moral responsibility of humanity to other animal species. Even within the Garden, Adam and Eve are set apart for a particular role. While the difficulty and urgency of living out this role are both exponentially increased with the effects of the Fall, this dissertation argues that it is humanity’s call to image the loving relationality of the Trinity as Creation’s Priests, not humanity’s sinfulness, that necessitates its care for Creation.

4.2.3 Service as Human Uniqueness

Linzey laments the "extensive uniqueness-searching anthropology" present in

Christianity, fueled by the concept of the Imago Dei. He finds theological efforts at uniqueness

466 Ibid., 84-85.

168 spotting suspect because many of the capacities to which humanity has staked exclusive claim have since been spotted in other species. After zoologist and ethologist Desmond Morris, Linzey questions whether humanity is driven not so much by theological curiosity as by insecurity.

"Can the same God who nourishes and sustains the entire created universe really only be interested in one species?," he asks.467 Linzey blames the Christian tradition of 'difference- spotting' for the minimalization of the moral standing of non-human animals and a low opinion of animality in general.468 He rejects the false dilemma put forward by both proponents and opponents of animal rights that either humanity is entirely distinct from other animals and thus owes nothing to them or humanity is essentially the same as non-human animals, without notable uniquenesses. Linzey holds instead that good animal rights theory rests precisely on the fact of humanity's uniqueness and moral superiority. 469 Specifically, humanity has the unique capacity to image the suffering servanthood of God in its relation to the whole of Creation through the practice of its self-sacrificial priesthood. The sinlessness of non-human animals and their vulnerability in the face of humanity render them childlike, deserving of care rather than exploitation. To abuse a non-human animal is morally outrageous for Linzey, an egregious misuse of the dominion with which humanity alone has been entrusted. He writes that, "[t]he groaning and travailing of fellow creatures requires a species capable of co-operating with God in the healing and liberating of creation."470 Its ability to become a species of suffering servants is what sets humanity apart from other species.471

467 Linzey, Creatures of the Same God, 83. 468 Linzey, Animal Theology, 47. 469 Ibid., 45. 470 Ibid. 471 Ibid., 57.

169

The human being is 'the World's High Priest,' a concept Linzey points to in the writing of others as far back as seventeenth century Protestant Archbishop Robert Leighton. This priesthood of humanity, like the ordained priesthood, involves the dual functions of representation and anaphora which Linzey identifies as sacrifice.472 If God is present throughout all of God's Creation and not only in humanity, then humanity’s priesthood needs also to reach all of Creation. The human being, as priest, is the icon of Christ, offering up the sacrifice for all of Creation but this role is not cause for what Linzey calls “theological self-congratulation.”473

He suggests instead that the intense focus of the Judeo-Christian tradition on humanity over other species may signify that humanity, rather than being the greatest and most valued species, is the species in greatest need of liberation from sin.474 If this is so, it is unsurprising that the majority of theological work has been focused on this one species. The cosmic priesthood Linzey envisions is a suffering one, heavy with responsibility rooted in culpability. Specifically, for

Linzey, following systematician Thomas F. Torrance, the World's High Priest is responsible for the redemption of nature and the restoration of original peace. It is the actions of humanity that cause the greatest destruction of the natural world and humanity must embrace a new life of self- sacrificial servanthood so that the eschatological future of Creation can be assured. "In short: the representative function of priesthood is the presentation and actualization of God's suffering service in the world," he writes.475 Linzey identifies a sensitivity to suffering as the hallmark of humanity's priesthood and the healing of this suffering, as humanity's charism.476 This role is not a passive or merely contemplative one nor one focused only on 'thou shalt nots.' Linzey argues

472 Ibid., 54. 473 Ibid. 474 Ibid., 73. 475 Ibid., 54. 476 Ibid., 56.

170 that "we need positive vision of how we can take upon ourselves the suffering of the world and transform it by the power of the Holy Spirit."477

Linzey finds insufficient the priesthood of humanity proposed by Archbishop Leighton and by Zizioulas. Leighton's emphasis on the priest's offering thanksgiving and Zizioulas's description of the priest offering the world back to its Creator strike Linzey as inadequate to describe the primary role of the World's High Priest. Linzey's priesthood, modeled on Christ's own, is necessarily sacrificial, involving what Linzey deems 'self-costly love' and carries with it the imperative to release the world from the bondage of decay described by Paul.478 It is unclear why Linzey has taken Zizioulas's priesthood of humanity as a development of Leighton's, focused not on sacrifice and reconciliation but on the offering of thanks on behalf of a non- human world incapable of praising the creator in its own way. It is also unclear why Linzey, himself an ordained priest in the Anglican tradition, would take humanity's priestly offering of thanksgiving as an indication, in Leighton and Zizioulas, that non-human animals cannot praise

God independently of their cosmic priest. Certainly, he would not suggest that the human laity have no way of communing with God outside of the Mass.

This dissertation argues that Zizioulas, contrary to Linzey's evaluation, proposes something far more similar to Linzey's own concept of humanity’s priesthood than Linzey gives him credit for. Zizioulas's notion of referring the world back to its Creator—of recapitulation and anaphora—is not merely an act of thanksgiving and praise but an act of reconciliation and redemption, just as in Linzey's formulation. Both theologians place a degree of eschatological responsibility for Creation on humanity's shoulders. While Zizioulas explicitly ties the very

477 Ibid., 58. 478 Ibid., 55.

171 survival of the cosmos to humanity's acceptance of God's intended vocation for it, Linzey describes humanity as “co-workers” and “co-participants” with God in God's work of redemption.479 Linzey is not as clear as Zizioulas regarding the degree to which this redemption is dependent on humanity's consent and performance but Linzey does describe humanity as

"essential in order to liberate animals" and the rest of Creation, as agents of the Spirit of God in

Christ, the true liberator. It is this view of humanity's vocation that leads Linzey to admit to the charge of ‘humanocentrism’ but to argue that, rather than being simply a humanist like every other, his theology is one of "suffering servant humanism," a constructive and defensible form of anthropocentrism. 480

4.2.4 Creation's Absent Praise

Linzey's contribution is unique among the few extant animal theologians in that his approach, like Zizioulas’s, takes on a liturgical character. More than a mere practical matter, the transcendental quality of Christian worship in the liturgical traditions serves to bring together the worship of the faithful with more abstract thought on metaphysical and ethical issues. It offers also a richer understanding of the vocation of the human person in relationship with the rest of

Creation. While Zizioulas envisions the participation of Creation in a cosmic liturgy, he urges theologians to make clear the link between systematics and the lived experience of the faithful lest doctrines like that of the Trinity be regarded as irrelevant. Linzey, though sidestepping the

Trinity, nonetheless raises questions regarding the role of animals in the Church’s every day worship. If God values all that God has created, fleshly creatures taking on special significance

479 Ibid., 57. 480 Ibid., 72.

172 in the Incarnation, why does such a poverty exist within Christian ritual and liturgy where non- human animals are concerned?

Recalling the loss of his family dog Barney, Linzey remarks that just as Barney led a life of suffering and neglect prior to being adopted from the animal shelter, Barney also experienced neglect in his death.481 When a human being dies, the liturgies of the Church—the prayers, the

Masses offered, the rosaries—provide a prescription for human action that many find comforting in a time of pain and loss that is often disruptive and overwhelming. The question of "What do we do now?" is answered in these rituals which are as much about the healing of the bereaved as they are about the remembrance and repose of the deceased. Standing over Barney's grave however, Linzey finds himself without any prescribed, liturgical response.482 The death of a non-human animal, even a beloved family pet, is a non-event in the sacramental and liturgical life of the Church. There is no official rite to guide the bereaved, no way to recognise the relationships that existed or to validate the loss apart from improvised, individual action. He laments that a “tradition that has countenanced the blessing of cars and houses has never even registered a pastoral need in relation to the death of companion animals." What struck Linzey in this moment of vulnerability was the invisibility of non-human animals in the liturgical life of the Church. "Christians currently worship God as though the world of animals does not exist,"

Linzey observes. 483 Where is Creation's praise in the praise of the Church when even the annual animal blessing is often conducted outdoors, so that non-human animals do not make a mess of the sanctuary (and of theology)?

481 Linzey, Creatures of the Same God, 83. 482 Ibid. 483 Ibid.

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4.2.5 The Role of the Incarnation

Linzey's concern is not merely with ending anthropocentric instrumentalisation of other animals but in bringing to the Church a liturgy and theology inclusive of all of God's Creation.484

Linzey calls Christians to take seriously animal embodiment, recognising incarnational relevance in all fleshly species. Christ took on flesh, bestowing special value on all who likewise bear flesh. This connection of non-human animal goodness to the Incarnation rather than to capacity or utility is a useful departure from the thought of the theologians Linzey defines himself against.

In his emphasis on fleshly embodiment, however, Linzey’s systematic theology relies almost exclusively on a low Christology to the exclusion of any mention of the Trinity.485 The word

“Trinity,” in the theological sense, appears only once in all of Animal Theology and then only to reference Jesus as “the second Person of the Trinity.” In his exclusive focus on God as Christ,

Linzey misses the way in which imaging God as Trinity necessitates the kind of loving relationship between humanity and non-human Creation that his work seeks to promote.

Despite his high doctrine of matter, Linzey retains a strong sense of the disorder of

Creation. Predation and parasitism do not fit into his understanding of the eschaton and must be resisted. Humanity is called to exercise its trans-natural moral imperative, acting against its imperfect nature toward the restoration of original peace for all creatures.486 Humanity's embracing of its role as the World's High Priest restores to it its own dignity, jeopardized when humanity shirks its obligations and abuses the power entrusted to it by God. It is precisely humanity's superiority in both cognitive and moral arenas that equips human beings to cooperate

484 Linzey is the author of fourteen liturgies for animal care, an effort to fill in holes he has found in the Christian liturgical tradition which finds itself inadequately prepared to respond to both sorrowful and joyous occasions involving other animals. Andrew Linzey, Animal Rites: Liturgies of Animal Care (London: SCM Press, 1999). 485 Linzey, Animal Theology, 97. 486 Ibid., 87.

174 in Christ's redemptive work, bringing healing to a wounded world. With Linzey, this dissertation contends that Creation's theocentric goodness and humanity's role in the cosmos can be acknowledged without major revision to Church teaching on sinfulness, theological anthropology, or eschatology.

4.3 David Clough: Laying a Systematic Foundation

Theologian and Christian ethicist David Clough, embarking on his own theological exploration of animal ethics after Linzey, comes to the conclusion that "the doctrinal foundations for such a project were radically underdetermined.” He writes that, “[i]f we are not sure where other animals belong in God's work of creation, reconciliation and redemption…we can make little headway with a plausible account of what our responsibilities might be in relation to them."487 Systematics, Clough argues, is prior to ethics and the systematic theology of non- human animals is woefully absent from the extant literature. He admits that his book On

Animals: Volume I, Systematic Theology occupies a middle ground between the persistence of this lacuna and future theological innovation but not uncomfortably so. Clough hopes that his work will serve as a springboard for other thinkers who will continue his mission. As the first text of its kind, Clough spends much of his time pointing out areas for future development, theological gaps that act as potholes in the road to a comprehensive ethic of relationship with non-human animals. Clough does not set out to endorse a maximally useful method of doing theology—process theology over liberation theology, for example—but seeks to identify and begin to address the most pressing theological issues surrounding God's other fleshly creatures.

This task, for Clough as for Linzey, need not involve radical reconceptualisations of God or

487 David Clough, On Animals: Volume I, Systematic Theology (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013), x.

175 drastic revisions to existing theology. This dissertation affirms the conclusion of both theologians that Christians need not give up their God or their Scripture in order to articulate a theology that affords greater consideration to non-human animals.

Although Clough is, in a sense, responding to those who would seek to protect the boundary between the human and non-human animal, he is, in a greater sense, responding to silence—the silence of theologians who are and have been for centuries uninterested in the question of the animal. He writes as much to show that non-human animals belong in Christian theology as to show where non-human animals belong in Christian theology.488 While Jewish and Christian theologians as well as secular philosophers through the ages do often make mention of non-human animals, Clough notes that other species serve largely as placeholders or metaphors that allow these thinkers to talk instead about humanity's own creatureliness. They use artificially homogeneous constructions of 'The Animal,' Clough notes, in order "to prop up constructions of the human, and are usually not discussing 'animals' even when they appear to be doing so."489 Despite Charles Darwin's insistence on humanity's own animality and the contemporary acceptance of Darwin’s work by large portions of the Church, Clough finds that

"[t]heological constructions of the human and 'animal' remain resolutely pre-Darwinian, let alone pre-Derridian."490 Theology's reluctance to give sustained attention to the systematic and ethical implications of Darwinian evolution burdens it with not only an antiquated understanding of non-human animals but an incoherent theological anthropology as well.

488 Ibid., 173. 489 David Clough, "Angels, Beasts, Machines, and Men: Configuring the Human and Non-human in Judeo-Christian Tradition," in Eating and Believing: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Vegetarianism and Theology, eds. Rachel Muers and David Grummett (London: T&T Clark, 2008), 68. 490 Ibid., 69.

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4.3.1 Anthropocentrisms

Before attempting to dismantle the anthropocentric arguments against concern for non- human animals, Clough finds it necessary to first define and, in some cases, dismiss for his purposes varying understandings of the term 'anthropocentrism'. Like Linzey, Clough is not convinced that all forms of anthropocentrism are to be (or even can be) avoided.

Epistemological anthropocentrism involves, he suggests, the relatively innocuous observation that humanity's knowledge of God's purposes is restricted to God's interaction with humanity itself. An awareness of this limitation of humanity, rather than being a detriment, can serve to keep humanity humble, reminding it to be, as Clough puts it, "appropriately cautious before presuming too much knowledge of God's relationship to other creatures."491 Epistemological anthropocentrism does not preclude the human being from seeking theological answers about its own relationality to other creatures but keeps in perspective humanity's inability to know the will of God for them. Should other creatures possess the reflective capacities of the human being, it is conceivable that they too would experience the limitation of an analogous epistemological species-centrism.

Perspectival anthropocentrism, Clough holds, is another unfortunate inevitability arising from human limitations. The human being, even the human serving as an animal theologian, can never not view the world qua a human being.492 By virtue of this fact, all of human theology will be, to an inescapable degree, anthropocentric in the perspectival sense of the word. To mire discourse in consideration of this reality is, however, in Clough's view "both platitudinous and

491 Clough, On Animals: Volume I, Systematic Theology, xvii-xviii. 492 Ibid., xvii.

177 irrelevant to the teleological, metaethical or ethical questions."493 That humanity can only view the world through human eyes does not preclude it from attempting to resist those latter forms of anthropocentrism just as the inevitability of perspectival egocentrism does not limit the individual human being to consideration only of their own interests. Too often, however, humanity conflates its own worldview with that of God, to disastrous result. Human beings must be aware of their own perspectival anthropocentrism not only so that it can be resisted but also so that the humanness, the creatureliness of human perspective is humbly remembered.

Contrary to perspectival and epistemological anthropocentrism, metaethical anthropocentrism serves not to humble the human being but to elevate it to blasphemous heights.

This view holds that humanity is the source of all moral value in the cosmos. Such a position, though it has crept into Christian thought on occasion via utilitarianism, is, Clough warns, "the philosophy of atheistic humanism."494 It dethrones and denies God as the only source of moral goodness and sets humanity above all other beings. Relatedly problematic is ethical anthropocentrism, which holds that human interests are the predominant and perhaps even the only interests deserving of ethical consideration. Against those who would argue that the term

‘anthropocentrism’ does not adequately describe the objectionable position, Clough responds by defending its use for the purpose of discussing, in theological circles, the teleological view he is interested in countering. Given the absence of an accepted concept of telos in atheistic or secular discourse, Clough allows that terms such as 'human chauvinism' or 'speciesism' may better serve those debates, debates which are, by virtue of their atheological quality, unconcerned with the questions of epistemological and teleological anthropocentrism. Anthropocentrism, he argues,

493 Ibid., xviii. 494 Ibid.

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"is an appropriate concern only in a theological context, where it represents . . . an inappropriately narrow interpretation of God's purposes in Creation." 495

Clough responds to theologians such as Christopher Southgate and Orthodox Patriarch

Bartholomew who have shown an interest in distinguishing an inclusive teleological anthropocentrism—one in which humanity is central to God's soteriological mission in Creation without precluding the participation of other creatures entirely—from exclusive teleological anthropocentrism—one that does not allow for non-human Creation to play any role in God's work of creation and redemption apart from its utility to humanity. Proponents of distinction have labelled the latter "anthropomonism."496 Clough rejects the assertion that Christianity is inherently anthropocentric in any but the inescapable perspectival and epistemological senses.

With him, this dissertation argues instead that the faith is not meant to be weakly or strongly, inclusively or exclusively anthropocentric but theocentric. If a case is to be made for any sort of anthropocentric teleology, it can only be said that humanity is instrumentally central in that it serves as a means to the end of an escape from bondage for the rest of the cosmos. This theme of humanity as vocationally useful in the context of a Creation ultimately centred on God also resonates strongly in Zizioulas's and Linzey’s concepts of humanity as Priest of Creation.497

4.3.2 Creation & Creaturely Difference

Of special concern to Clough is the temptation to slip into atheistic methods of solving the anthropocentrism problem, methods which tend to strip humanity of any claim to non- arbitrary uniquenesses in an attempt to slot humanity back into its proper evolutionary context.

495 Ibid., xviii-xix. 496 Ibid., xix. 497 Ibid., xx.

179

The human being’s similarity to other animals does not, in Clough’s theology, necessitate the taking on of this sort of vulnerability the way that Singer's atheist utilitarianism does. It is possible for human beings to be unique, set apart vocationally, without their being superior or even unique in their uniqueness. Instead, Clough approaches human uniqueness relationally and

Christocentrically. Humanity is unique in its singular vocation of imaging God to the created world.498 It does this to the extent that it participates in the true image of God Who is Christ

Jesus. Clough argues, against those who would say that such a vocational understanding of the

Imago Dei is anthropocentric, that each species has its own unique vocation.499 It is true that

Homo sapiens is unlike any other species—different even from its closest living genetic relatives, the chimpanzee and bonobo—but the same can also be said of ants and dogs and dolphins. The mere existence of difference—biological, neurological, or vocational—is not enough to justify the kind of generalised superiority to which humanity has consistently laid claim, a claim the importance of which Clough admits he does not fully understand.500 Why is maintaining the boundary between human and non-human so crucial in the thought of both

Christian and Jewish theologians? What is really at stake if this line becomes blurred? Clough warns against fetishizing the Imago Dei, becoming too caught up in questions of who the concept ought to incorporate and how it ought to be defined theologically. Non-human animals need not be the Imago Dei to image God, he insists. Scripture is rife with examples of the godliness of other creatures such as the mother hen who gathers her brood under her wings in Matthew 23 and the lamb who goes silently to the slaughter in Isaiah 53.501

498 Ibid., 101. 499 David Clough, “On Thinking Theologically About Animals: A Response,” Zygon 49, no. 3 (September 2014): 765- 766. 500 Clough, "Angels, Beasts, Machines, and Men,” 61. 501 Clough, On Animals: Volume I, Systematic Theology, 39.

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Like the thinkers of Chapter 1, Clough reads the first chapter of Genesis as a text about humanity's unique role in the divine-creaturely economy but not a text that establishes any sort of animal hierarchy. Attempts to rank species by their importance to the Creator relative to one another are, like efforts to rank personal importance to God, an unproductive and ill-advised venture. Theologians, he advises, ought not try to create "creaturely league table rankings."502

This is not to deny that species difference is not deserving of moral attention, only that this attention need not become hierarchical. It is conceivable and not contradictory to Clough's thesis that human beings have responsibilities to some species that it does not have to others. For example, domesticated companion animals may be owed veterinary care, food, and shelter whereas free-living animals are not but this difference in humanity's duty of care does not imply that companion animals are in some way superior to other species, as if humanity's moral obligation toward them were the locus of their value.

To the common objection that too great a valuing of non-human Creation diminishes the theological identity of the human species, Clough is conciliatory. Borrowing a metaphor from medieval Jewish thinker Moses Maimonides, Clough points out that one's discovery that the ruler who safeguards one's house at night also safeguards the houses of others does not require one to give up one's belief that the ruler is the guardian of one's house, only the belief that this is the final end of the ruler.503 He writes that "[t]o affirm that God watches over me, my co- religionists, or my species, is not inconsistent with believing that these purposes are not the sum of God's purposes in the creation and redemption of the universe."504 As Balthasar has argued,

502 David Clough, “Theology Beyond Humanity: David Clough’s On Animals: Volume I, Systematic Theology: A Response,” Lecture, American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting, Baltimore, MD, November 23, 2013. 503 Clough, On Animals: Volume I, Systematic Theology, 24. 504 Clough, "Angels, Beasts, Machines, and Men," 68.

181 the telos of Creation is not to serve solely as a stage upon which the theo-drama of human salvation is played out. Humanity's interests are not the sum of God's purpose in creation and redemption. These assertions in no way diminish the goodness of the human being.

Teleological anthropocentrism must be abandoned for the good of theological anthropology and

Creation theology alike. God's graciousness to humanity must instead be celebrated within the context of God's bestowal of being on all of God's creatures.505

Clough finds in the eschatology of theologians John Hildrop and John Wesley room for his hope in the redemption of all creatures. This hope stretches back further, he admits, to the work of Irenaeus on anakephalaiosis or recapitulation in which the world is gathered up by

Christ and restored to a state of original peace, a theme present also in the work of Zizioulas.506

Clough finds in the work of Hildrop and Wesley that the scope of Christ's redemption encompasses more than just the human species, rendering exclusivist, anthropocentric visions of redemption incomplete. What God creates, God has reason to redeem. Although humanity must admit to a necessary human ignorance of the details of the eschaton, Scriptural images of redemption include a vision of peace between all creatures including an end to cycles of predation. Such visions give credence to Clough's assertion that, at present, the whole of

Creation suffers the effects of sin and awaits transformation together.

4.3.3 Creaturely Incarnation

While he is quite comfortable with placing humanity back into creaturely context along the animal spectrum, Clough rejects the notion of an similar divine-creaturely continuum.

505 Clough, On Animals: Volume I, Systematic Theology, 173. 506 Ibid., 149.

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Human personhood is merely analogous to divine personhood; there is a difference of kind rather than of degree. Although he challenges a divide between human and non-human animal, Clough strongly upholds a divide between creature and Creator.507 Likewise, non-human animals have a place in Creation distinct from their environment but distinct also from their Creator. It is only in Christ that this gap is bridged, not in the sense of defeating a duality of the spiritual and the material but in the sense of overcoming a duality of the creaturely and the divine.

Clough, in agreement with Linzey, holds that Christ's incarnation is best understood as

God becoming creature rather than God becoming human. Clough warns that “the doctrine of the incarnation need not and should not be interpreted in such a way as to establish a discontinuity between human beings and other creatures.”508 Just as Christ’s becoming incarnate as a male, Clough argues, does not privilege males over females, Christ’s incarnation as a human being ought not privilege human beings over other species.509 Clough's easy disregard of Christ's maleness points, however, to Clough’s own Presbyterian roots. Christ's gender is not of no consequence to the Catholic and Orthodox traditions among other, increasingly scattered

Protestant and evangelical traditions. That Christ became incarnate as a male is a detail that has shaped the boundaries of the ordained priesthood for centuries and informed Christian understandings of sex and gender.510 This detail, while significant in the discourse around sacramental theology and the theology of the body, is not, however, considered essential and

507 Ibid., 26. 508 David Clough, “All God’s Creatures: Reading Genesis on Human and Nonhuman Animals,” in Stephen C. Barton and David Wilkinson, eds., Reading Genesis After Darwin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 156. 509 Clough, On Animals: Volume I, Systematic Theology, 174. 510 See Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Women Priests? A Marian Church in a Fatherless and Motherless Culture,” Communio 22, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 164-170; Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Thoughts on the Priesthood of Women,” Communio 23, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 701-709; Robert A. Pesarchick, The Trinitarian Foundation of Human Sexuality as Revealed by Christ According to Hans Urs Von Balthasar: The Revelatory Significance of the Male Christ and the Male Ministerial Priesthood (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 2000).

183 privilege-endowing in discussions of salvation. Christ's maleness does not imply that females do not benefit from His saving work. Likewise, Christ's humanity need not imply that only human beings have a place in salvation though it does point to a special role for humanity. This role,

Linzey and Zizioulas argue, creates the kind of responsibility in humanity necessary to motivate care for Creation. Where Clough's incarnational theology loses some of its application for the

Catholic tradition is in too quickly albeit selectively dismissing the particularity of the

Incarnation. It is not necessary to disregard Christ's sex and species as little more than coincidence or arbitrary necessity in order to clear a path to salvation for women and non-human animals.

4.3.4 Eco-Theology's Dilemma

Like Linzey, Clough recognises a distinction and occasional conflict between animal and environmental theology and ethics. The eco-theologian, Clough finds, advocates for recognition and moral consideration of ecosystems as cohesive units. The animal theologian, by contrast, is content to consider non-human animals as subjects in their own right, not denying their embeddedness in the relationality of their environment but not denying their distinctiveness as beings either.511 These differing views often find convergence—what is good for the ecosystem as a whole may be good for the non-human animals within it—but conflicting interests do arise that place the eco and animal theologian on opposite sides of the same debate. At times, nature appears willing to sacrifice the individual for the sake of the whole, leaving animal ethicists to juggle concern for the individual creature and concern for the ecosystem or species generally. Is it, for example, permissible to capture and hold in captivity some members of an endangered

511 Clough, On Animals: Volume I, Systematic Theology, xxi.

184 species for the purpose of increasing their population through managed breeding programs? Is it morally significant that the captive individuals are likely to die before a successful reintroduction of their species to the wild is realised? For the animal theologian, regarding other animals as individual beings as well as members of a species, such moral dilemmas take on a complexity that does not vex the eco-theologian focused on the health and wellbeing of the ecosystem or the avoidance of extinction.

Clough finds eco-theology's tendency to consider the whole to the detriment of its parts an undesirable alternative to anthropocentrism's narrow focus on a singular species to the exclusion of the relational reality in which it exists. Clough's theology suggests instead that the life and death of each particular creature matters individually.512 Failure to consider the particularity of non-human animals, he writes, "would be to judge that, unlike human beings, animals have significance only as part of the ecosystems to which they belong, rather than being worthy of attention as individuals, communities and species."513 The question of privileging the whole over its parts is no easier resolved then in the case of non-human animals than it is in the case of human beings. Clough’s work suggests the need for a bridge between an eco-theology that can only conceptualise the value of the whole and a kind of care-centred ethics that tends to privilege the individual. Each creature, whether known to humanity or not, is an unrepeatable creation of God and, as such, is deserving of appropriate moral consideration, no matter how this complicates the work of ethicists.

512 Ibid., 144. 513 Ibid., xxi.

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4.3.5 The Doctrine of God

Absent from On Animals: Volume I, Systematic Theology is sustained consideration of the doctrine of God. Clough’s work, like Linzey’s, is distinctly Christocentric, with almost no reference to the Trinitarian reality of which Christ is one part. Clough’s focus is on the development of a theology of Creation and the eschaton more so than on consideration of how these might be informed by the Trinitarian relationality of the Creator. Working out of a

Christian tradition without a sacramentally ordained priesthood, Clough also does not engage with concepts of humanity's priesthood or with sacramental understandings of call and vocation.

This dissertation furthers the discussion with the addition of both considerations—the significance of the Trinity for an understanding of non-human animals and humanity’s role as

Priests of Creation, vocationally called to responsibility for other animals.

Clough is clear that he is not attempting to record a systematic theology in the comprehensive sense of the term but to explore and open doors within selected loci. Despite his modestly stated aims, Clough builds upon the foundation laid by Linzey and contributes the much more deliberate, thorough systematics lacking in Linzey’s work. Clough writes in a more rigorous academic idiom, writing for and engaging with other contemporary theologians, situating himself as a dominant voice in the growing conversation around other animals within

Christian theology. Together with its companion volume on animals in Christian ethics, On

Animals represents the largest sustained look at non-human animals in Christian academic theology to date.514 Dialogue is not possible on any topic if there is not some work, some theory,

514 David Clough, On Animals: Volume II, Theological Ethics (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2018).

186 some assertion inviting a response. Perhaps the most important contribution of On Animals to the field of systematic theology is simply that it exists.

4.4 Celia Deane-Drummond: Evolutionary Christology

Like Clough, Catholic theologian Celia Deane-Drummond writes in response to a lacuna in theological discourse. Trained as both a plant physiologist and a systematician, she finds a

Christological perspective lacking in contemporary dialogue on religion and evolution. These discussions tend to speak of God in a more general sense, inclusive of other theistic faiths but, in doing so, miss the unique contribution of the Incarnation for uniting the creaturely and the divine. Likewise, Christian theological discussion on the contemporary vision of Christ tends to ignore the question of evolution.515 Evolutionary biology, Deane-Drummond finds, has implications not only for the Incarnation but for theories of atonement, for eschatology, and, of course, for a theology of Creation. She rejects the dichotomous image favoured by theologian F.

LeRon Shults of Christology and science as two lovers in dialogue. Scientific perspective on evolutionary biology is too diverse to be viewed as a cohesive whole, she warns. Scientists dialogue amongst themselves as much as they dialogue with theologians. Instead, Deane-

Drummond prefers to see the discourse between Christology and evolutionary biology as "a mutual seeking after wonder and wisdom in both, as a shared task that unites and respects difference, seeking to influence instead of bringing union, rather than promoting any special preference for the other . . ."516

515 Celia Deane-Drummond, “Christ and Evolution: A Drama of Wisdom?,” Zygon 47, no3. (September 2012): 525. 516 Celia Deane-Drummond, Christ and Evolution: Wonder and Wisdom (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), xiii.

187

Christian embracing of evolutionary theory does not necessarily engender a denial of traditional concepts of sin and redemption but instead imbues both evolution and theology with a more complete sense of reality. Deane-Drummond is strongly critical of evolutionary psychology, seeing it as a stopgap filling a Christology-shaped hole. She writes that "it is an idolatry taking the shape of an anti-Christology inasmuch as it shows up the need for an adequate soteriology and eschatology."517 Evolutionary psychology, used to explain away immoral behaviour in human beings as simply evolved tendencies, as once legitimate survival tactics that have lost their application, strikes Deane-Drummond as both scientifically and theologically irresponsible. It is an attempt to scapegoat humanity's genetic ancestors and an atheistic endorsement of sinfulness which, she argues, "offers a specific account of humanity in biologized essentialist terms, a secularised theory of atonement, and a secularized eschatology," pointing to the need for a Christology that takes evolution seriously.518

Among skeptics of the animal question, Deane-Drummond notes a convergence of concern over the denigration of human culture by animal rights and anti-speciesist thought and concern over the denigration of human ontological and moral status by evolutionary theory.519

In response to the challenge of evolutionary theory to essentialist formulations of the Imago Dei grounded in human physical and mental capacities and in an effort to recognise the goodness of non-human animals, some animal theologians have preferred to either expand the divine image to non-human Creation or to stop talking about the Imago Dei altogether.520 Deane-Drummond does not accept the validity of any of these concerns, rejecting the notion that the affirmation of

517 Ibid., xv. 518 Ibid., 60. 519 Celia Deane-Drummond, “God's Image and Likeness in Humans and Other Animals: Performative Soul-Making and Graced Nature,” Zygon 47, no. 4 (December 2012): 935. 520 See footnote 151.

188 non-human animals and of evolution requires either a denial of human difference or a diminishing of human dignity. On the contrary, Deane-Drummond, like Linzey and Zizioulas, sees arising from humanity's unique relationship with the Creator a special responsibility toward non-human Creation. She argues that non-human animals "need to be treated with respect by humans who have a particular vocation to share in the fullest relational sense of what it means to be in the image of God, imago Trinitatis."521

4.4.1 Imago Dei, Image-Bearing, and Graced Nature

Deane-Drummond takes the discourse on human uniqueness further into the theological realm, considering the problems posed by modern ethological and paleoanthropological data to capacity-based understandings of the Imago Dei. She describes her view of human nature and the Imago Dei in humanity as a combination of capacity-based and relational approaches.

Deane-Drummond maintains the theological importance of humanity's natural capacities while cautioning that capacity alone is insufficient to define either human nature or the Imago Dei. As an alternative, she speaks of “graced nature,” emphasising the transformation of nature by God's grace rather than God's adding grace onto otherwise base nature.522 The recognition and affirmation of humanity's creatureliness is, for Deane-Drummond, important in staving off the temptations of Cartesian dualism that have historically been a part of such discourse.523

Deane-Drummond criticizes Linzey's unnuanced dismissal of Aquinas as a Cartesian but notes that he is not alone in this unflattering characterisation of the Thomistic attitude toward

521 Celia Deane-Drummond, “Are Animals Moral? Taking Soundings through Vice, Virtue, Conscience and the Imago Dei,” in Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals, eds. Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough (London: SCM Press, 2009), 210. 522 Deane-Drummond, “God's Image and Likeness in Humans and Other Animals,” 946. 523 Ibid., 936.

189 non-human animals.524 The perspectives of both Descartes and Aquinas have, she finds, been too easily discounted, some scholars failing to take into account the distinctions between the two and the subtleties of their respective thought.525 Aquinas, unlike Descartes, draws an analogy between human thought and the instinct of non-human animals, allowing that they too have a

God-given wisdom and are subject to divine reason. What sets humans apart in the work of

Aquinas is not rationality itself but the capacity for abstract deliberation.526 In particular, it is the capacity for abstract deliberation about eternal things and the “highest good” that is roughly analogous to and reflective of the wisdom of God. For Aquinas, it is not merely the intellectual capacity of human beings that sets them apart as Imago Dei but the specific capacity for

“revealed knowledge.”527 Given that the angels also have a rational mind and such a capacity for revealed knowledge, Aquinas affirms them too as bearers of the Imago Dei. He rejects the possibility that the fleshly embodiment of humanity allows it to more perfectly bear the Image, realising the implications such a view would have for non-human animals, implications drawn out by Linzey and Clough. Non-human animals, Aquinas allows, bear a trace of God's image but only those creatures with sufficient intellect bear it truly. Aquinas is thus content to concede the most true reflection of God to the angels, lest non-human animals be elevated too high.528 His emphasis on the essentiality of the mind and accompanying anxiety about embodiment suggest to Deane-Drummond that "those areas of human life, such as spiritual, bodily, or imaginative ways of knowing, are only ever capable of bearing a "trace" of the image."529

524 Deane-Drummond, “Are Animals Moral?,” 198. 525 See Chapter 1 for further discussion of Descartes’ thought and its (mis)interpretation by those who followed him. 526 Deane-Drummond, “Are Animals Moral?,” 199. 527 Deane-Drummond, “God's Image and Likeness in Humans and Other Animals,” 936. 528 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1a.93.3. 529 Deane-Drummond, “God's Image and Likeness in Humans and Other Animals,” 937.

190

Deane-Drummond is herself resistant to the idea of non-human animals sharing in the

Imago Dei, despite an earlier entertaining of the possibility, preferring instead to see them as sharing in God's likeness.530 Her evolving thought on the question is indicative of its newness in the academic study of Christian systematic theology and of Dean-Drummond's own role as a pioneer in this area. As the traditional distinctions between human and animal used by the

Fathers to formulate their own understandings of the Imago Dei are challenged and broken down by developments in ethology, evolutionary biology, and paleoanthropology, those few theologians working in animal theology find themselves caught between the need to address these challenges and the reality that the rate of scientific inquiry easily outpaces that of theological revision.531 Capacity-based formulations of the Imago Dei, like similarly grounded understandings of sin, moral capacity, self-awareness, and religious experience, are unlikely to survive long without the need for reconsideration. The anthropocentric essentialism they rely on reveals not whether non-human animals possess the capacity for any of these things but only whether they are currently known to possess this capacity in a sense identical to humanity's own, a far less interesting and useful question.

Paleoanthropology and evolutionary theory present, for Deane-Drummond, challenges to traditional, capacity-based concepts of the Imago Dei as well as to Plato's ontological

530 Compare the evolution of her position from the publication of Creaturely Theology to the publication of Christ and Evolution: Wonder and Wisdom. 531 See Michael S. Northcott, “Do Dolphins Carry the Cross? Biological Moral Realism and Theological Ethics,” New Blackfriars 84, no. 994 (December 2003): 540-553; and Celia Deane-Drummond, The Ethics of Nature (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004). There is an evolution of the discourse on animal sinfulness between Northcott’s piece and Deane-Drummond's response in The Ethics of Nature and later, in her Christ and Evolution: Wonder and Wisdom. A change in Deane-Drummond's theological position—from disputing any strong sense of the moral culpability of non-human animals to considering the possibility of their moral culpability within their own non- human worlds as analogous to humanity's own—was inspired by the input of emerging scientific data on non- human animal behaviour, particularly the work of ethologists Frans de Waal and Marc Bekoff. Celia Deane- Drummond, Christ and Evolution: Wonder and Wisdom, 162.

191 discontinuity between human and animal. Drawing upon the work of contemporary theorists of developmental science and evolution such as Justin Barrett and David Sloan Wilson, Deane-

Drummond asks to what extent religion is an evolved capacity and what implications this has for the doctrine of the Imago Dei. If image-bearing is linked to higher cognitive function and the expression of religious belief, then some recent developments in paleoanthropology suggest that

Neanderthals would have been appropriate candidates for the Imago Dei. At the same time, paleoanthropologist Ian Tattersall's research suggests that advanced reasoning and symbol formation was not expressed in Homo sapiens for some time after the evolution of the species, disqualifying generations of humans from capacity-based image-bearing.532 Deane-Drummond is reluctant to dismiss the importance of natural capacity in theological discussions but finds it insufficient on its own to define either human nature or the Imago Dei. Neither can the image be defined solely by reference to a personal relationship with Christ as such an approach would likewise exclude many generations of human beings, alive prior to the Incarnation. Instead,

Deane-Drummond proposes that Christ is "the exemplar of what true image-bearing may look like in the human community."533 Humanity's imaging of the divine is necessarily imperfect while Christ's is ideal. Aquinas described the Imago Dei in humanity as not unlike the image of a king, stamped onto a coin; the image is of a different nature than the imaged. By contrast, the divine image in Christ is that of the king's image in his own son, an image of the same nature.534

Deane-Drummond rejects eco-theologian Thomas Berry's providential concept of image- bearing, in which Homo sapiens becomes Homo divinis through special divine intervention in the

532 Deane-Drummond, “God's Image and Likeness in Humans and Other Animals,” 942. 533 Ibid., 946. 534 Deane-Drummond, “Are Animals Moral,” 208.

192 course of evolutionary history.535 The grace of God is not, she insists, added on to human nature but transformative of it. Deane-Drummond is unsatisfied with the notion that the human person can be understood as a biological concept with an evaluative extra added on, setting it apart from other species whose existence is adequately covered by evolutionary biology alone. Deane-

Drummond’s concept of graced nature expresses her non-dualistic understanding of the working of divine grace in human life and in evolutionary history. Humanity's transformation, by grace, sets it apart from other species not in order to grant humanity superiority over the other animals but to equip humanity for the fulfillment of its priestly role among them. Deane-Drummond writes that "image-bearing is consequent on a gift of higher-reasoning and religious powers that have evolved in human beings, but these capacities are present as a means to express an active relationship with God according to the pattern of humble service set forth in Christ."536

Humanity is transformed in order to facilitate the transformation of all of Creation, not to dominate it.

4.4.2 Cosmic Liturgy and Performance

Considering Aquinas on graced nature and its relationship to the Imago Dei, Deane-

Drummond concludes that image-bearing is about more than rationality or cognitive capacity.

Aquinas held that God's image in humanity was operative in three stages, that is to a differing degree from human to human. The first stage involves what Aquinas describes as a “natural aptitude for understanding and loving God, an aptitude which consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men."537 The second stage is found only in the just and involves a

535 Deane-Drummond, “God's Image and Likeness in Humans and Other Animals,” 941. 536 Ibid., 945.” 537 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1a.93.4.

193 movement of the intellect and will, though imperfect, in conformity to God's grace. The third stage is rarer still, found only in the blessed, and consists of the perfect love of God. Aquinas writes that "this is the image by likeness of glory."538 Deane-Drummond finds in these stages reason to preserve some discussion of human capacity as part of the Imago Dei but holds that the primary orientation of the Image is theocentric, the perfection of the human ability to know and love God.539 In Aquinas's theology, Deane-Drummond sees what she calls “performative elements.” His is an understanding that is not purely ontological but includes also humanity's active imitation of God. She recognises that this performative element “coheres with the idea of human image-bearing reﬂecting a speciﬁc priestly ministry,” supporting the picture of humanity as Priest of Creation proposed and developed in the work of Linzey and Zizioulas.540

Deane-Drummond finds Zizioulas's view of the Fall useful for understanding humanity's vocation in light of evolutionary biology. Rather than death entering the world through the Fall in the literal sense that Linzey’s Creation theology stresses, Zizioulas views the Fall as a failure on the part of humanity to reach its own potential and to overcome the mortality already present in the world. Deane-Drummond praises the Eastern integration of theory with practice, particularly in its liturgies which tend, more so than those of the West, to maintain a sense of

Creation's participation in salvation history, what Zizioulas calls “cosmological propheticism.”

In Orthodoxy, Deane-Drummond finds "an awareness that the problems of the environment, including the present ones, are not something that can be discussed remotely but impinge on one's own lifestyle and practices."'541 Deane-Drummond parts ways with Zizioulas, however, as

538 Ibid. 539 Deane-Drummond, “God's Image and Likeness in Humans and Other Animals,” 943. 540 Ibid., 946. 541 Celia Deane-Drummond, Eco-Theology (Toronto: Novalis, 2008), 67.

194 she considers his concept of the priesthood of humanity. In agreement with Linzey and some of

Zizioulas’s own Orthodox contemporaries, she holds that to view humanity as the link between

God and Creation problematically denies the ability of non-human Creation to independently offer praise or to enjoy a direct relationship with the Creator. She prefers instead theologian

Elizabeth Theokritoff's more equitable image of non-human Creation as con-celebrants in the cosmic liturgy.542 If all elements of Creation are priest, however, the priesthood of humanity loses any special significance and the cosmic Church loses its laypeople, creating a flat cosmic ecclesiology in which the horizontal dimension of ontological relationality is diminished in favour of several parallel, vertical relationships. If all creatures are priests, humanity loses its responsibility to minister to them in a way greater than the responsibility of the other creatures to minister to humanity. As Zizioulas, Linzey, and Clough assert, it is precisely humanity’s unique role within Creation that creates in it a special responsibility to be of service to other creatures.

4.4.3 Evolved Relationality

Deane-Drummond advocates for an unromanticised view of humanity and non-human animals, one that takes seriously the contributions of both science and theology as magisteria that do indeed overlap.543 In them, she recognises an epistemological complementarity; science offers theology deeper looks at the created world and theology offers science additional pieces of the animal puzzle that remain forever out of its reach, though to understand the relationship as a simple exchange misses the diversity of both scientific and theological perceptions. From this perspective, Deane-Drummond offers an alternative view of the Imago Dei, preserving human

542 Ibid., 60. 543 Deane-Drummond’s thought represents a departure from that of evolutionary biologist and historian of science Stephen Jay Gould who holds that science and religion are “non-overlapping magisteria” (NOMA). See Stephen Jay Gould, Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life (New York: Ballentine Books, 1999).

195 uniqueness even as she affirms humanity's ontological continuity with other animals. Her understanding of image bearing is both relational and capacity-based. It is only in Christ that

Creation finds a true exemplar of God's image, but humanity strives toward greater perfection as it carries out the performative elements of the role of image bearer, actively imitating God in the transformation of all of Creation. Likewise, humanity's own nature is truly transformed by God's grace.

Deane-Drummond positions herself in opposition to those who would create dualisms of human and animal, graced and base nature, rejecting the notion that God has intervened in evolutionary history to bestow grace upon humanity alone. Instead, she holds that the capacity for humanity's relationship with God has itself evolved, both biologically and socially. The

Incarnation is not an interruption of the evolutionary process but occurs within it, uniting the creaturely and the divine, bringing the cosmos into Christological focus. In her work, Deane-

Drummond seeks also to unite the disciplines of science and religion in a mutual seeking of wonder and wisdom, illuminated by the light of Christ. She emphasises the samenesses and differences between species, acknowledging the unknowability of other animals but optimistic that scientific inquiry offers a way toward a more complete knowing that enables humanity to better assist other species to flourish according to their kinds.

Deane-Drummond’s work is situated at the busy intersection of science and religion but seeks also to bridge the gap between animal and eco-theology, a gap Linzey would prefer to enlarge. For Deane-Drummond, it is just as critical to a correct understanding of non-human animals that they are considered within their ecological context as that humanity is replaced within its evolutionary context. This emphasis on ecology in her work highlights the horizontal relationality of humanity and other animal beings in addition to the vertical relationality of

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Creation and Creator without losing sight of the distinctiveness of each species that comprises the whole. Deane-Drummond is unique in that she is one of very few animal theologians to engage at length with the concept of the Trinity, recognising in God’s Trinitarian Being a relationality with consequence for Created being. Her work on the doctrine of God through critical engagement with the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar is covered in Chapter 2 of this project.

4.5 Conclusion

Linzey, Clough, and Deane-Drummond each wrestle with the question of who or what non-human animals are and what humanity's response to them ought to be. Each arrives at the conclusion that the goodness of the non-human animal is not limited to its human utility but is instead intrinsic, arising from relationship with God. Anthropocentrism, particularly anthropocentric instrumentalism, is condemned as untenable, an antiquated position assailed on both scientific and theological fronts. The challenge of evolutionary biology in the work of

Deane-Drummond in particular renders suspect classic uniqueness-spotting efforts reliant on capacity-based essentialism. Egalitarianism too is rejected as unrealistic, an ideal not even its own proponents are willing to fully espouse. Implicit then in the animal question is the problem of humanity's own identity. Who is the human being and how does it differ from other species?

What is at stake in delineating this difference and what rights and responsibilities might it bestow? Despite their focus on non-human animals, Linzey, Clough, and Deane-Drummond, like this dissertation, find they must spend time also on these anthropological questions. Human and animal identity are inextricable from one another because humanity is animal, at once the same as and different from all fleshly creatures. There is an ontological relationality inherent in animal existence.

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Animal theology today works to overcome the dualism of intellect and embodiment, recognising the shared experience of fleshly existence as one key to encouraging the recognition of non-human animals in ontology and ethics. Animal theologians push against the boundaries of present academic discourse, making space for other species, for other modes of knowing, for other ways of being. Despite these efforts, participants in the nascent discourse around animal theology are ever conscious of their own limitations, of the inevitability of, as Clough puts it, their own perspectival anthropocentrism.

Philosopher Cora Diamond warns also of the danger of deflection, that temptation, especially prevalent among academics, to divert discourse to discourse itself.544 The animal question asks philosophers and theologians alike to confront the difficult reality of human interaction with non-human animals; it shoulders them out of those places where they have become comfortable and illuminates before them the inadequacy of present dialogical boundaries to encompass all that wants to be said. Such evolution of thought is especially visible in the work of Deane-Drummond who unabashedly amends and develops her theology in light of emerging ethological data. A relatively new area for inquiry, considering non-human animals in theology and philosophy demands humility, in one's willingness to revisit and revise one's own work as new information comes to light but also in one's willingness to see oneself and one's species as something in need of re-envisioning.

The enormity of the paradigm shift each of these thinkers advocates for is not lost on them. In most cases, they have spent a significant portion of their careers advancing unpopular ideas about non-human animals and about humanity, testing the boundaries of their disciplines

544 Cora Diamond, “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy,” in Philosophy & Animal Life, ed. Stanley Cavell et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 59.

198 and the tolerance of their colleagues. This pursuit is driven both by concern for non-human animals and for humanity itself. At stake in the question of the animal is the identity of the human being and, by extension, the identity of the Church, even of the incarnate Christ Himself.

In the work of this chapter’s theologians, Christ takes on more than humanity, He takes on animal flesh and dwells among His creation, entering into embodied experience and affirming the goodness of the creature. Linzey, Clough, and Deane-Drummond, though arriving at varying conclusions about the particular meaning of the Imago Dei, concepts of sin and fallenness, and humanity's role in salvation history, invariably conclude that the foundation for an inclusive and relational understanding of Creation is present within the Christian tradition already. Turning to the great theologians of their respective traditions, they each find that it is not necessary to entirely discard notions of human uniqueness in order to carve out a place for other animals in

Christian theology. While Deane-Drummond understands human uniqueness as a distinctive combination of social and biological capacity transformed by divine grace, Linzey describes it as a priestly capacity for self-costly service, and Clough speaks of a unique facility for image- bearing, each has rejected simplistic notions of reason or language as the source of the Imago

Dei, theocentrically redirecting the concept without jeopardizing a narrative of human exceptionalism or diminishing the dignity of other creatures.

Each of the theologians writes in their own way about the shared Creator who values all that has been made and, particularly in Linzey and Clough, of the fleshly embodiment shared by animal beings with the Creator in Christ. The common thread between Linzey, Clough, and

Deane-Drummond’s articulations of the moral status of non-human animals is relationality. This relationality is ontological, grounded in and ordered toward the common Creator. A potential exists, pointed to especially in the theologians's vision of an inclusive eschaton, for this

199 relationality to far transcend mere instrumental interaction in which non-human animals are valued as tools for human flourishing. God completes the circuit of relationality, God's own relationship with each species creating a relationship between species and suggesting an ethic for their interaction. This relationality between creatures is modeled on God’s own Trinitarian reality.

The following chapter considers the implications of the dissertation’s Trinitarian relational ontology for Christian ethics. It illustrates through three case studies that the goods and flourishing of human beings and other animals are often realized mutually in a relational

Creation. The chapter advocates for the use of a Trinitarian relational ontology as an alternative starting point for moral decision-making that avoids the reinscription of anthropocentrism to which contemporary animal rights theory and care ethics remain vulnerable. The ethical implications of the relational, vocational understanding of humanity as Priest of Creation, outlined in the previous chapter, are drawn out in order to establish moral concern for other animals as a theologically necessary means to realization of the human telos.

Chapter 5 Living Imago Trinitatis: A Relational Ethic for the Priests of Creation 5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter argued that the contemporary theological discourse around the identity of non-human animals and humanity’s relationship to them, while promising, misses the importance of Trinitarian relationality for countering anthropocentric instrumentalism. Without a tether to the relationality of divine Being, the goodness of other animal creatures risks remaining anthropocentric and instrumentalist. Though Christological solutions are important in encouraging theological appreciation of animality and embodiment and thus of those creatures with whom humanity shares its fleshly existence, it is the loving relationality of God as Trinity that provides the most complete image of that which humanity is called to image as Creation’s priest. A relational, vocational understanding of human beings as Priests of Creation is especially significant in moving beyond a mere acknowledgment of the goods and flourishing of other animal species to a recognition of humanity’s special moral responsibility to them. As

Pope Francis writes, “Human beings cannot be expected to feel responsibility for the world unless, at the same time, their unique capacities of knowledge, will, freedom and responsibility are recognised and valued.”545 The movement from systematics to ethics in this final chapter is critical in establishing a more-than-academic relevance to the argument of this dissertation, encouraging humanity toward priestly responsibility for other animal species.

545 Francis, Laudato Si’, Encyclical letter on care for our common home, June 2015 (Washington: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2015), 118.

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Building on this line of argument, this chapter highlights shortcomings in contemporary animal rights philosophy and moral theory, arguing that a Trinitarian relational ontology—that acknowledges the inherent goodness of other animals and articulates clearly humanity’s responsibility toward them, rejecting anthropocentric instrumentalism—serves as a corrective for ethical approaches that remain, despite concern for animals, ultimately centered on human interests. Understanding humanity as Priest of Creation, existing in loving relationship with other animals through God’s love for the whole of Creation, mitigates the risk of anthropocentrism inherent in other ethical approaches without negating humanity’s special duty to facilitate the flourishing of other species. This chapter will demonstrate, through three contemporary case studies, that while humanity’s vocation as Priest of Creation requires a degree of self-sacrifice, in an inherently relational cosmos, humanity and other animal species can realize mutual goods. Human flourishing, both earthly and eschatological, is bound up with the flourishing of other animal creatures.

5.2 Animals and Christian Moral Theology

Catholic social teaching calls the faithful to a preferential option for the poor and vulnerable, to respect for the life and dignity of the human person, and to responsible care for

God's Creation. In theory if not yet in practice, the dominant themes of Catholic social teaching recognise the inherent relationality of being, not only relationships among humans but the relationships human beings live out, in faith, with all of God's Creation. Does how Christians treat other animals bear witness to their faith in a loving God? What does humanity’s relationship with other animals say about the One Christians seek to emulate? In his 2009 encyclical letter Caritas in Veritate, Pope Benedict XVI speaks of a "covenant" between the environment and humanity, the linking of the Catholic’s duties to her fellow human beings with

202 her duties to the non-human world.546 Pope Francis goes further with this message of the relationality of being in his 2015 encyclical Laudato Si’, reinforcing the notion that failing to care for Creation is failing to care for humanity.547 This is true not only on the broad ecological scale of these encyclicals but also on the level of individual, interspecies relationships.

Despite these promising magisterial gestures toward an ethic of relationality, the Church has not offered a sufficient challenge to anthropocentric instrumentalism, allowing the instrumental (ab)use of other animals and a misunderstanding of human superiority to prosper.

Where right relationship between humans and other animals is concerned, Catholics have been left largely without spiritual guidance, this ethical lacuna created, at least in part, by a systematic lacuna. It matters what the Church teaches about the ontology and teleology of non-human animals as these teachings inform, shape, and motivate the way Christians behave toward them.

Lex orandi, lex credendi, lex vivendi. Having, in previous chapters, argued for the importance of a systematic theology of non-human animals and proposed a relational ontology that supports a view of them as creatures of the common Creator—creatures imbued with an inherent rather than an instrumental goodness—the project now draws out the implications of these ideas for moral theology.

The moral status of non-human animals is often debated in terms of moral agency and corresponding moral duties. Competing models of animal ethics frequently begin by establishing the moral status of non-human animals either by demonstrating, typically through

546 Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, Encyclical letter on integral human development in charity and truth, Vatican Web site, June 29, 2009, accessed August 21, 2017, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict- xvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate.html, 50, 69. 547 Francis, Laudato Si’, Encyclical letter on care for our common home, June 2015 (Washington: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2015).

203 the citation of ethological data, the ways in which non-human animals meet classic, essentialist, capacity-based standards for moral agency or by challenging the various capacities associated with agency, reshaping the definition in more inclusive ways. Theories of animal ethics that choose not to begin with such a methodical justification for moral concern, like Stephen R.L.

Clark’s in The Moral Status of Animals, have been criticised as lacking in intellectual rigour by those who insist on this more traditional, analytic treatment.548 Is the deliberate establishment of non-human animals as moral agents the only or necessary starting point for a theology of concern for animals? Can an ethic grounded horizontally, in the actions and abilities of the agent or patient, elevate Christian moral theology to a place of compassion for other animals? Is it even appropriate or useful given the vastly diverse capacities of different animal species? A

‘no’ to any or all of these questions need not rule out the Church’s moral consideration of non- human animals. This chapter argues for the potential of Trinitarian relational ontology as an alternative starting point for Christian moral decision making about animals, an alternative not intended to supplant traditional forms of moral discourse but to add a critical lens that can help to bring the animal question into sharper focus.

Helmer, in considering theologian Andrew Linzey’s contribution to a Christian moral theology of non-human animals, identifies several key questions prompted by Linzey’s work.

This chapter will take up a few of them—“Why do non-human animals matter and why should we care about them? What is their moral status? . . . Can a theological perspective provide distinctive insights in considering these questions?”549 Simply exploring these questions, however, is insufficient without attention to how the answers might apply to concrete ethical

548 See Onora O’Neill, review of The Moral Status of Animals, by Stephen R.L. Clark. The Journal of Philosophy 76, no. 7 (1980): 442-446. 549 James E. Helmer, “Speaking Theologically of Animal Rights,” Journal of Moral Theology 3, no. 2 (2014): 110.

204 problems involving non-human animals. Theologian John Berkman views the responsibility of the moral theologian working on the animal question as one that includes as a priority understanding and communicating God’s story about non-human animals. This story, as he sees it, is one of “providential love and concern,” for both species generally and the individuals who comprise them. 550 In its telling, theology must be willing to move beyond the realm of the theoretical, the general, to particular application. In an effort to make this move, the chapter concludes by delving into casuistry, taking up three modern case studies and examining them through the lens of a relational ontology of non-human animals, asking how such a theology might offer direction to humanity as Priest of Creation.

5.3 Recognising a Moral Question about Other Animals

One’s focus determines from the outset what is seen and what is overlooked. “I have found it required a different intention of the eye to see different plants, even when they were closely allied…,” writes Thoreau of the reeds and rushes around him at Walden Pond. Likewise, although humanity and other animals are closely allied, a “different intention of the eye” is necessary in order to recognise other animals, there in humanity’s midst.551 Reflecting on

Thoreau’s observation, philosopher Brian Klug laments “a kind of tunnel vision in science” which prevents the investigator from seeing a moral question about animals.552 This tunnel vision is not limited, however, to the sciences. Theology too has had a difficult time seeing a

550 John Berkman, “From Theological Speciesism to a Theological Ethology: Where Catholic Moral Theology Needs to Go,” Journal of Moral Theology 3, no. 2 (2014): 14. 551 Henry David Thoreau, “Autumnal Tints,” The Atlantic, October 1862, accessed July 25, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1862/10/autumnal-tints/308702. 552 Brian Klug, “Can We See a Moral Question About Animals?,” in Animals on the Agenda: Questions About Animals for Theology and Ethics, eds. Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 206.

205 moral question and indeed seeing animals at all. Frequently, moral theologians are content to address ‘Creation,’ ‘nature,’ ‘the environment,’ even the entire cosmos as an undifferentiated whole, spending little or no time pondering what special consideration other fleshly beings might warrant. In describing this oversight, Klug uses the analogy of impaired vision, a particularly effective one as it avoids ascribing malice or even conscious choice. The argument is not that those who fail to recognise animals do so out of callousness but out of habit or ignorance, unaware even that they have overlooked anything. As Klug puts it, they answer the moral question without ever truly having asked it because they have approached the question in the first place with the presumption that it does not matter.553

Theologians John Berkman and Celia Deane-Drummond, however, are less willing to interpret this oversight so benignly. They note that while moral concern for the environment and ecological issues began to emerge in Catholic ethics at approximately the same time that the field of environmental ethics was establishing itself in its own right generally, Catholic moral concern for non-human animals is already forty years behind the treatment of such topics in secular moral philosophy.554 Whereas some discussion of cruelty to other animals could be found in moral manuals prior to Vatican II, the topic has all but disappeared from Catholic moral theology since.

It is difficult to find even defenses of anthropocentrism in contemporary moral theological literature let alone any direct treatment of non-human animals. They have been so marginalised as to have fallen off the page, not included in the scope of concerns appropriate to Catholic moral

553 Ibid., 209. 554 John Berkman and Celia Deane-Drummond, “Introduction: Catholic Moral Theology and the Moral Status of Non-Human Animals,” Journal of Moral Theology 3, no. 2 (2014): 3.

206 theology and indeed considered utterly inappropriate objects of moral concern at times.555 To substantiate this claim, Berkman points to the complete absence of non-human animals in a variety of modern introductory textbooks, edited volumes, and magisterial documents on

Catholic moral theology, including those covering environmental ethics.556 Catholic moral theology has, he writes, embraced a kind of “moral nihilism” or indifference with regard to other animal species. Animal ethics is not only a small and sparsely populated corner of moral theology but a very isolated one, lacking integration into the field as a whole.557 Berkman posits that the Church is, with regard to the subject of non-human animals, in a state of epistemological crisis as outlined by philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre.558 Progress in Catholic theology has come to a halt in this area, the old manualist treatments having been discarded with only patchy and internally contradictory teachings to replace them.

Berkman notes that the possibility of expanding moral concern and even theological personhood to non-human species is not a topic entirely closed for discussion among moral theologians but where it has been explored, it is typically within the context of exotheology.559

Why is it more comfortable to speculate on the personhood and moral status of strange, extraterrestrial life forms than of the animal creatures with whom humanity is already familiar?

Two reasons seem likely, that these imagined aliens are just that for the moment—imagined— and that they are imagined with all of those essential qualities already associated with human

555 Ibid., 2-3. Berkman and Deane-Drummond offer examples from their own careers and that of theologian Elizabeth Farians of the ridicule and academic censure that have awaited theologians willing to take seriously non- human animals as subjects of Catholic theological inquiry. Though they note that the tide has begun to turn in recent years, an interest in other animals growing amongst Catholic moral theologians, the work of dismantling anthropocentrism within the Church and the Academy is far from complete. 556 Berkman, “From Theological Speciesism to a Theological Ethology,” 15. 557 Ibid., 16. 558 Ibid., 26-27. See also Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 361-362. 559 Berkman, “From Theological Speciesism to a Theological Ethology,” 19.

207 personhood and moral status, particularly the use of reason manifested in linguistic capacity. It is not difficult to envisage, in the modern age, the extension of moral concern to beings who can advocate for themselves, especially if these beings exist only in the mind’s eye, making no actual moral claim and demanding no immediate or even proximately foreseeable action.

Considering why it is that the Church has failed not only to answer but largely to recognise at all a moral question about animals, Berkman and Deane-Drummond agree that there is something more threatening about the question of the animal, something Catholic theologians are specifically resisting that does not appear in exo- or even in eco-theology. They suggest that this resistance arises in response to the realisation that animal ethics demands “more immediate and radical change,” seemingly taking away from concern for humanity as it focuses on concern for other species.560 Unlike anthropomorphic extra-terrestrials, non-human animals surround humanity daily. To take seriously their moral claims would be to reorganise innumerable aspects of human culture, a prospect resisted with the insistence that some essential difference in kind exists between humans and other animals, a difference that indisputably justifies and even necessitates their instrumentalisation at human hands. As zoologist and ethologist Desmond

Morris writes in his iconic ethological work The Naked Ape, “Our climb to the top has been a get-rich-quick story, and, like all nouveaux riches, we are very sensitive about our background.”561

The notion that human moral concern is a limited resource is one that has plagued moral theology since Biblical times. Theologian Scott Bader-Saye observes that where non-human

560 Berkman and Deane-Drummond, “Introduction: Catholic Moral Theology and the Moral Status of Non-Human Animals,” 4. 561 Desmond Morris, The Naked Ape: A Zoologist’s Study of the Human Animal (Reading: Vintage Books, 1967), 163.

208 animals are concerned, the Imago Dei, like the category of ‘neighbour,’ has often been used to define and tighten the boundaries of moral consideration and release agents from their duties.562

Like the lawyer of Luke 10, moral theologians today continue to overlook the imperative to love and become mired in legalistic questions of who precisely is entitled to that love, as if it must be cautiously rationed lest it run out.563 Berkman labels proponents of such positions “zero-sum defenders” of “speciesism”—Richard D. Ryder’s notion of the undue moral privileging of one species, usually humanity, over another.564 Zero-sum defences set up a false dilemma between animal and humanitarian concern. They take as their starting point the faulty presumption that compassion is a scarce resource such that any concern shown to non-human animals is necessarily concern diverted from the poor and vulnerable of humanity. This stance denies the intersectional nature of human, non-human animal, and ecological interests, the zero-sum speciesist neglecting the multitude of ways in which human concern for other species, particularly for non-human animals, is of benefit to humanity itself.

A cessation of intensive animal agriculture, for example, contributes to a cleaner environment, leads to a decrease in consumption of unhealthful animal food products, lessens the presence of antibiotics in human bodies slowing the development of antibiotic resistant superbugs, and reduces the exploitation of undocumented migrant labour.565 This is to say

562 Scott Bader-Saye, “Imaging God through Peace with Animals: an Election for Blessing,” Studies in Christian Ethics 14, no. 1 (August 2001): 5. 563 Lk 10:25-37 (NRSV). 564 Berkman, “From Theological Speciesism to a Theological Ethology,” 12. See also Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes towards Speciesism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1989). 565 A variety of claims are made here for which evidence is broad and varied. For a general overview of several of these issues, see Colin Spedding, “Sustainable Agriculture,” The International Journal of Human Rights 2, no. 2 (June 1998):29-39. For discussion in greater depth of antibiotic resistance see Emanuel Goldman, “Antibiotic Abuse in Animal Agriculture: Exacerbating Drug Resistance in Human Pathogens,” Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal 10, no. 1 (February 2004): 121-134. For discussion in greater depth of the exploitation of migrant and undocumented labour in animal agriculture, see Lance A. Compa, Blood, Sweat and Fear: Workers’ Rights in U.S. Meat and Poultry Plants (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2005).

209 nothing of the intellectual shift that would occur alongside such actions, shaping societal values and impacting attitudes toward other oppressed and marginalised groups. Zero-sum defenders of speciesism, like radically egalitarian animal rights proponents, miss the nuances of the animal question. Reacting against secular animal rights philosophers like utilitarian Peter Singer, they cling to the doctrine of human exceptionalism, overlooking the possibility that there is any middle ground between egalitarianism and speciesism in which an appropriate Catholic moral concern for animals might reside.

5.4 Identifying a Starting Point for Moral Theology

Has moral thinking, both theological and philosophical, chosen the most productive starting point for inquiry in choosing to begin with questions of capacity and status flowing from it? Although deconstruction of the categories of moral agent, patient, subject, and object are useful in illuminating the spaces in Catholic moral theology where non-human animals can enter and demand consideration, the notion that working within this existing analytic framework is the only way to justify moral consideration for other species of animal is itself a thing to be deconstructed. While the superiority of human beings as a species has classically been defended by appeals to human reason, moral capacity, and language, these defences arise first from a prior claim to a superior relationship with the Creator. That human beings were set apart by God is the claim for which reason, morality, and language are merely supports, offered as evidence of the truth of the claim or justifications for God’s choice. It is the relationship of human beings to

God that has served as the lens through which other animals are viewed, without much consideration for whether the lens itself may be warped.

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Philosophers Cora Diamond and Stephen Mulhall hold in their responses to fellow philosopher Onora O’Neill that reasoned argument is but one way of approaching the animal question and a way that is invested with a particular politics of anthropocentric dualism.566 This is not to deny the value of such an approach but to caution that it must be undertaken with an awareness of its history and partiality and the ways in which these may affect the conclusions this method produces. Like Diamond, Mulhall finds the accepted boundaries of moral philosophy constricting and self-serving. It is no surprise to him that the kind of attention afforded non-human animals by such a system returns information and scholarship that serves only to confirm its own anthropocentric presuppositions. Like Klug, Mulhall warns that "human observation of non-human animal life runs a very grave risk of producing only the results that those observers can imagine getting."567 He identifies a circularity in O'Neill's critique of Clark, a self-serving definition of conviction and persuasion which ties conviction exclusively to rationality and persuasion, to a kind of emotional manipulation which forgoes the use of argument, bypassing the faculties of reason.568 Accepting such an understanding of both terms, one is forced to agree that true conviction must, as O'Neill holds, proceed beyond assertion to argument.

O'Neill complains that Clark has insufficiently established the basis for the moral status of non-human animals, having leapt into morality without due attention to the grounding of metaphysics. Her bias toward a particular performance of reasoned argument is visible in her

566 See Onora O’Neill, review of The Moral Status of Animals, by Stephen Clark, The Journal of Philosophy LXXVII, no. 7 (July 1980): 440-446; and Cora Diamond, “Anything but Argument?,” Philosophical Investigations 5, no. 1 (January 1982): 23-41. 567 Stephen Mulhall, The Wounded Animal: J.M. Coetzee & the Difficulty of Reality in Literature and Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 43. 568 Ibid., 5.

211 uncritical acceptance of the common notion that the moral status of non-human animals must be founded on capacity, on some objectively demonstrable quality or essential attribute of the creatures themselves. More specifically, that moral status must be determined by comparing these capacities to their expression in humanity, a species whose moral standing is beyond question. If a human being's moral status is determined by the species's use of reason, for example, then a non-human animal whose rational capacities approximate humanity's own can be reasoned to have a comparable moral claim whereas one whose capacities fall short of humanity's mark does not warrant the same standing. O'Neill, searching for such an anthropocentric, reasoned, metaphysical formula in Clark's exploration of the question is left understandably albeit unjustifiably disappointed. Just as it rejects the false divide of human and animal, Clark's work also rejects a dichotomy of mind and body, intellect and emotion. O'Neill's insistence on defending these walls, between humans and other animals and between reason and felt experience, illustrates, for Mulhall, "the fateful vulnerability of humans to paranoid fantasies about their own animality, and hence their relation to other animals."569

Ethological data showing that other animal species have interests and engage in purposeful behaviour in pursuit of the fulfillment of those interests is abundant. The question for theological ethics then is not whether non-human animals display (to the satisfaction of the human evaluator) reason, linguistic capacity, suffering, or even purpose-driven activity but whether these capacities are truly essential for moral consideration and how humanity ought to respond. Even an insistence, contra evidence, that non-human animals are lacking in the prerequisites of traditional moral agency, including rational capacity, is not in itself sufficient to conclude that they ought to be excluded from moral consideration entirely. Despite rationalism’s

569 Ibid., 7.

212 long pedigree through key figures in Catholic theology such as Thomas Aquinas, Berkman notes that a justification for the subordination of so-called irrational animals is rarely offered or defended at any length.570 That irrational creatures are ordered toward rational creatures is taken as a given, a conclusion so obvious that it does not need explanation or defence.571 Animal theologians, however, turn a critical eye to this claim, not content to take its conclusion for granted in a scientific age that continually casts doubt on the validity of these categories. Does moral superiority follow from rational capacity and can humans truly be said to have an exclusive claim on it? Increasingly, ethological data is demonstrating that the answer, to the latter at least, is no.

Helmer makes the case that Catholic moral theology, for all of its discussion of moral agency and its requisite capacities does not, in practice, put much weight on these concepts in determining who is entitled to moral consideration. Through his study of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace’s Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church and the International

Theological Commission’s document, “Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons Created in the Image of God,” Helmer concludes that although a range of elements are offered up in these documents as ineliminable contributors to the moral status of human beings, in practice moral considerability “is regarded as co-extensive with species membership.”572 He notes that Catholic social thought uses a minimalist definition of personhood which eliminates the condition of

570 Berkman, “From Theological Speciesism to a Theological Ethology,” 20. 571 Ethicist Kendy Hess finds that throughout much of philosophical history, until the advent of Utilitarianism, the assumption that only human beings matter morally has been accepted without challenge. “Without bothering to articulate the claim, [philosophers] have consistently assumed that both moral agents and moral subjects are human—that only human beings could owe or be owed moral consideration…To this day, the unacknowledged assumptions built into our basic theories of morality ensure that only human beings fit comfortably within those theories (and not even all human beings, at that).” Kendy Hess, “De-humanizing Morality” in Beastly Morality: Animals as Ethical Agents, ed. Jonathan K. Crane (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015): 31. 572 Helmer, “Speaking Theologically of Animal Rights,” 116.

213 moral agency and allows for the extension of full moral standing to those who lack it.573 He points to the Church’s consistent ethic of life, particularly its defence of the unborn, the dependent elderly, and the medically incapacitated to demonstrate that species membership alone, linked to the dignity of the human person as a created being, as a creature, appears to be the true baseline for moral consideration of human beings. What Helmer has noted suggests that the Church, consciously or unconsciously, has accepted MacIntyre’s vision of the human being as dependent rational animal—incapacity, disability, and dependence recognised not as defects or exceptions but as experiences natural and common to human existence. Why then are questions of rationality, linguistic capacity, and moral agency thrown up as roadblocks in the path of moral consideration for other creaturely beings?

Helmer finds it important to distinguish between moral agency and moral patiency, a concept common to treatments of animal ethics in secular philosophy. He offers this definition of moral patiency, diverging somewhat from the understanding of animal rights philosophers such as deontologist Tom Regan: “…to be a moral patient is to possess moral status or standing, to be morally considerable and an object of moral respect and concern, and thus, to be the beneficiary of various duties and obligations on the part of moral agents.”574 It is not necessary under this concept of moral patiency that a being possess the capacities of a moral agent, if agency is to be defined by capacity at all, in order that they be entitled to moral consideration.

Taking into account the existing work of Catholic moral theology, particularly its understanding of moral personality with regard to its treatment of marginal cases, Helmer concludes that the ascription of moral rights need not be limited to those demonstrating the capacities of a moral

573 Ibid., 117. 574 Ibid., 111.

214 agent but is extended more consistently, within the Catholic tradition, along the basis of moral patiency and moral subjectivity. A focus on subjectivity rather than exclusive focus on agency, frees the assignment of moral standing from the capacities associated with exercising moral agency. From here, Helmer advocates for the extension of moral rights normally reserved for human beings to non-human animals, not all rights and not to all animals but those that are appropriate according to the particularities of each species. This extension by analogy is made possible by the intrinsic goodness of non-human animals as creations of God and by their status as creatures who have the potential to flourish and who bear essential moral interests.575

To put it another way, theological consideration of non-human animals in Helmer’s work is, as it has been throughout history, relational even while purporting to be scientific or metaphysical. Moral standing, in a variety of moral theories, is understood relationally, describing the position of one in relation to the other. Rights arising from moral status in choice theory describe the power of the bearer of rights to control the actions of another. In benefit theory, the perspective is reversed but no less relational, rights being that which another owes to the rights bearer. Moral theology itself is necessarily a means of organising and understanding the relationality inherent in the ontology of being. Where theological ethics are concerned, the moral considerability of human beings arises first from their status as beings created and sustained in love by the Creator, a status shared also by other animal species. Capacity enters in only secondarily, as a means to determine what a creature’s flourishing might look like, a creature already worthy of moral consideration flowing from its relationship with the Triune

575 Ibid., 113.

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God. Humanity’s special moral obligation toward other animals arises from both this mutual creaturely status and the particular vocation of human beings as Priests of Creation.

5.4.1 Relationality as an Alternative Starting Point

Philosopher Anca Gheaus proposes a normative approach to relationships with non- human animals that is grounded not in the establishment of moral agency and reasoned arguments for moral consideration but in the importance of meeting needs.576 While animal rights philosophers like Singer and Regan stress an ethic that takes as its foundation various qualities of the non-human animal itself—sentience, pain perception, interests—Gheaus is not so willing to discount the role of love in considering these questions. Like Diamond, she pushes back on the suggestion that affect and relationality have no place in philosophical discourse.

Particularly in the realm of theological ethics, a consideration of love seems entirely appropriate.

A relational approach to non-human animals allows for a more nuanced animal ethic, one that more closely parallels the relational ethic applied to human interrelationships. A relational approach frames the question of animal ethics in the positive—how ought we to relate?—rather than the negative—what ought we to avoid?

While models based on essential capacity may be effective at establishing moral rights and duties, they are not helpful in explaining certain licit preferences. Why, for example, does a parent have a greater moral duty to their own child than to a stranger’s of the same age and

576 Anca Gheaus, “The Role of Love in Animal Ethics,” Hypatia 27, no. 3 (Summer 2012): 583.

216 capacities?577 A moral theology that takes into account relationality enables the recognition of a greater moral obligation to one’s own child but also to one’s own pet cat vis-a-vis a free-living colony of feral cats. This is not to imply that there is no moral obligation to animals with whom one has no direct relationship of care, only that the relationship itself is morally relevant and produces different obligations. Whereas one might be obliged to provide food, shelter, and veterinary care to their own cat, these same expectations cannot reasonably apply to every cat.

The modern animal rights movement, by contrast, offers little distinction between species and individual members thereof.578 ‘Liberation’ as a goal is unqualified and often undefined. What represents liberation, what represents a good for one species or even an individual creature, however, is not a good for another. To set one’s indoor cat ‘free’ outside is to condemn her to a life of hardship and, quite probably, to an imminent and painful death. It is a refusal to honour the relationship that exists between companion animal and caretaker and, as such, could be understood even as sinful in its negligence and cruelty. By contrast, to choose not to capture and domesticate a healthy feral cat who frequents one’s neighbourhood, instead watching from a distance to see that she has what she needs to flourish, is not negligence or cruelty but care. A different relationship exists between human neighbour and feral cat, one that requires a different ethical response in order to foster the cat’s flourishing. Animal rights philosophy offers little by

577 And for that matter, why does a parent not have less of a moral duty to an intellectually disabled child than to their neurotypical sibling? Singer has found his brand of utilitarianism unable to formulate convincing reasons for even keeping the profoundly disabled alive. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 154-190; Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, Should the Baby Live?: The Problem of Handicapped Infants (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 1985). 578 Indeed, a common approach to promoting the liberation of farmed animals involves attempting to collapse distinctions between those species kept as livestock and those kept as human companions through appeals to common capacities. This strategy compares, for example, the capabilities of a dog with the capabilities of a pig, suggesting that if a pig is equally or more intelligent, loyal, or playful than a dog, it is hypocritical for humans to treat one as food and the other as friend. The ‘Why Love One but Eat the Other’ ad campaign targeting Toronto’s public transit system is one example of such a tactic in use by vegan advocacy groups. iVegan, “iVegan Toronto Subway Ad Campaign,” Indiegogo, accessed July 25, 2017, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/ivegan-toronto- subway-ad-campaign-ivegan-ca#/.

217 way of a framework with which to navigate these disparate cases, to understand compassion for animals as something that can and must take different shapes in response to different situations and species.

Theologian Grace Kao, responding to fellow theologian Daniel K. Miller’s skepticism of

“the animal rights position,” warns against denying animal rights philosophers a contextual ethic altogether. Regan, she points out, does offer several reasons for preferring the human over the dog in the classic lifeboat scenario and for intervening to stop the slaughter of livestock by humans but not to stop predation by other free-living animals.579 While this is true of Regan’s philosophy, his reasons for stopping the slaughterhouse worker but not the wolf are grounded in his concept of rights. The wolf, he argues, is incapable of violating the rights of the sheep in his predation and so there exists no duty on the part of the human witness to intervene. A relational understanding of animal ethics, however, parses the situation in terms of relationality. If the sheep is one’s companion animal or one’s charge as a shepherd, then certainly one does have a duty to defend her against the wolf, regardless of whether the wolf is morally culpable for what he is doing. It is one’s relationship with the sheep that creates one’s duty toward her. Likewise, in the slaughterhouse scenario, it is humanity’s history of domesticating sheep into dependence, humanity’s relationship with sheep, that ought stay the hand of the person with the bolt gun.

Despite alternate characterisations, relationality then is the essential foundation for moral decision making. This observation alone, however, does not eliminate the possibility of variance in ethical theories nor does it necessarily solve the problem of anthropocentrism. It remains entirely possible to embrace a relational ethic and arrive, nevertheless, at something

579 Grace Y. Kao, “Creaturely Solidarity: Rethinking Human-Nonhuman Relations,” Journal of Religious Ethics 42, no. 4 (December 2014): 753.

218 approximating the status quo, to find oneself with a theory lacking the kind of sturdiness and scope necessary to pull all or at least the majority of other animals out of the margins and put them securely onto the page. While secular attempts at a relational ethic of non-human animals represent progress in moral philosophy, without a theocentric turn, they risk overvaluing subjective human sentiment thus limiting the breadth of their application.

5.4.2 Trinitarian Theocentricity as Essential Corrective

Gheaus notes that even those thinkers who espouse an ethic of care approach to animal ethics, such as feminist theorists Carol J. Adams and Josephine Donovan, stop short of articulating exactly why it is that human sympathy and empathy for non-human animals is morally relevant.580 Gheaus suggests that “[t]he full ethical significance of animals derives from people’s and animal’s need for love.”581 Her solution then to the question of why non-human animals are morally relevant is reciprocal love between human beings and other animals, particularly domestic animals, a solution which results in a system of relational ethics with limited applicability. The vast majority of non-human animal species do not interact in reciprocally loving relationships with humans and some, like tigers, rhinoceroses, and frogs, do not even form social groups with members of their own species. Among those other animals who sometimes do give and receive love with humans, there are many cases in which the circumstances that have led to the relationship—captivity, animal agriculture, the exotic pet trade—are problematic and arguably unloving. Other species, such as bedbugs and head lice, have an antagonistic relationship with humanity, preying upon and irritating the human individuals with whom they are in relationship.

580 Gheaus, “The Role of Love in Animal Ethics,” 583-584. 581 Ibid., 586.

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Gheaus appears, albeit unwittingly, to be merely reframing the ethical outlook of the majority, of people with no special interest in animal ethics. It is not unusual for humans to care about the wellbeing of their own domestic animals and to extend that moral concern to other members of the same species. Westerners are often outraged, for example, to learn of dogs being bred for human consumption in parts of Asia while feeling quite comfortable consuming pigs, cows, and chickens themselves.582 It seems obvious from Western pet culture that loving relationships between humans and other animals exist and are already considered morally significant. A much broader understanding of love and relationality is necessary, however, to extrapolate from this an ethic that does more than just reinforce the status quo. Gheaus’s emphasis on reciprocity leads to an ethic of care narrower even than the average pet owner’s understanding of the care owed to pets such as fish, arachnids, and some reptiles who may show no signs of affection or even awareness of their human caretakers. Is a timid or aloof cat worthy of less moral consideration than an affectionate lap cat? Certainly, a human’s affective response to each is different but the duty of care owed, once that pet has been adopted into a household, remains the same despite the pet’s unwillingness or inability to engage in reciprocal love.

Zizioulas warns that love bears an ontological character; it is not something one feels about or toward the other but the very existence of one for the other.583

While a focus on relationality and care ethics in secular thought is useful in pushing against the existing boundaries of moral philosophy, there is a temptation with these theories to

582 See Shaojie Huang, “China’s Dog Meat Festival Is Again at Hand, and Opponents Are Lining Up,” The New York Times, June 9, 2016, accessed July 25, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/10/world/asia/china-yulin-dog- meat-festival.html. 583 John D. Zizioulas, “Relational Ontology: Insights from Patristic Thought,” in The Trinity and an Entangled World: Relationality in Physical Science and Theology, ed. John Polkinghorne (Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010), 150.

220 fall into the trap of overemphasising the particular over the general. While particularity is relevant and useful in navigating relationships with the other animals with whom one interacts regularly, these models fail to establish convincingly a reason one should extend this ethic of care to animals one will never meet. The argument from mutual love can be salvaged, however, with a theocentric turn. All creatures can give and receive love when considered in relation to their Creator. All creatures exist, are sustained, only by the will of their Trinitarian Creator Who is relational, Who is Love. In order to escape anthropocentricity and to increase applicability, relational arguments need to be understood through reference to Trinitarian relationality. These horizontal, creature to creature relationships are not compelling enough to create a moral duty until they are grounded in the relationship one has to other animals as fellow creatures of the common Creator and viewed through the lens of one’s human vocation as a Priest of Creation.

While animal rights philosophy offers a valid critique, that an ethic based on the sentiment of human beings is unjustifiably anthropocentric and can lead only to the kind of arbitrary species preferences already witnessed today—adorable dogs and affectionate cats receiving greater protection than slimy fish and scary snakes—to discount love altogether is a likewise unproductive manoeuver. Catholic moral theology must take into account love, in particular the love of God and the relationality of God’s Trinitarian being that serves as a model for all Christian living. Deane-Drummond, after Balthasar, writes that “Christ the form of beauty challenges humanity to appreciate not just those forms of creation that seem most appealing to us, but also those creatures that seem to us in aesthetic terms to be repellent or even repugnant.”584 Balthasar’s theological aesthetics are helpful in leading humanity to reconsider the methods by which it has assigned value to its fellow creatures, both human and non-human.

584 Celia Deane-Drummond, Christ and Evolution: Wonder and Wisdom (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009): 143.

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Appearance is often cited as a reason for preferring to keep one species as a companion and another species as a food source, for supporting campaigns to protect one population but not another.585 A theocentric, relational perspective challenges Christians to consider not just

Gheaus’s “shared need for mutual love” that binds some humans and other animals together but the unlimited, all-encompassing love for which all of Creation has an ontological, existential need, the mutual love of its Creator which imbues all species with beauty.586

Philosopher Raimond Gaita and Gheaus agree that the moral identity of the human being is in part comprised of their “capacity for partiality” and their existing as potential objects of love for others. “We have obligations to those whom we do not and could not love, but that does not mean that we would find it even intelligible that we should have those obligations if we did not also find it intelligible that someone could love them…”587 A theocentric, relational approach to animal ethics takes this understanding further, offering it greater stability. It is not merely the human being’s potential as an object of love that invests them with moral value but their being an actual object of God’s love. Non-human animals are morally considerable not because humans love them or because they are species-adjacent to an individual animal one keeps as a pet but because God loves them and this relationship imbues them with inherent goodness. Pope

Francis, in Laudato Si’, writes that “[e]ven the fleeting life of the least of beings is the object of

585 Ecologists and activists alike often note the disproportionate concern of the public for “charismatic megafauna” such as elephants, tigers, and polar bears. For two studies on this disparity of concern and the efforts of ecologists to tap into affection for charismatic megafauna as a means to protecting biodiversity and less charismatic species, see Alexandra Shah and E.C.M. Parsons, “Lower Public Concern for Biodiversity than for Wilderness, Natural Places, Charismatic Megafauna and/or Habitats,” Applied Environmental Education & Communication 18, no. 1 (2019): 79-90; Marsya C. Sibarani et al., “Measuring the Surrogacy Potential of Charismatic Megafauna Species Across Taxonomic, Phylogenetic and Functional Diversity on a Megadiverse Island,” The Journal of Applied Ecology 56, no. 5 (2019): 1220-1231. 586 Gheaus, “The Role of Love in Animal Ethics,” 584. 587 Raimond Gaita, A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice (London: Routledge, 2002), xxii.

222 his love, and in its few seconds of existence, God enfolds it with his affection.”588 Theocentric relationality removes the speculative element of Gaita and Gheaus’s ethic of love and avoids the problem of the solitary or threatening creature that it may be difficult to imagine as the object of human affection. God does love all of God’s creatures. Echoing Balthasar, Linzey writes,

From our human perspective, some animals may appear terrible or frightening or demonically possessed or all of these things, but from God’s point of view every creature is a blessed creature or it is no creature at all. What so many saints force us to wrestle with is the idea that we must view creation from God’s own perspective and not our own. The worth of every creature does not lie in whether it is beautiful (to us) or whether it serves or sustains our life and happiness. Only if we can save ourselves from an exaggerated anthropocentricity can we begin to construct an adequate theology of animals. Only God, and not man, is the measure of all things.589

5.5 A Theocentric Relational Ethic in Practice

A specifically theological perspective on compassion for animals may appear an indulgently academic thing, a theology of little practical use to the general public and, when grounded in a systematics of the Trinity, perhaps inaccessible even to the majority of the faithful.

It is here that the work of moral theology, particularly in casuistry, helps to bridge that gap between the theoretical and the practical. A further gap is bridged between the Church and the secular world or rather, the closeness of these things that exist already in inextricable relationality with one another is made clearer. Theology is not done in a vacuum; a normative

Catholic ethic of compassion for animals necessarily exists in a world that is not solely the

Church. A robust Catholic animal theology stands in contrast to the dominant, post-

Enlightenment anthropocentrism of the West. Here, the Church’s contribution has a significant

588 Laudato Si’, 77. 589 Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 67.

223 potential to effect change given its long history of engagement with and influence in Western scientific and sociopolitical structures.

Theological awareness and even recognition of other animal species, however, is not enough though to move humanity beyond an unfounded anthropocentrism. Of the three defenders of speciesism identified by Berkman, his “abstract concern defenders” are perhaps the most effective in hindering of the progress of animal theology. 590 While zero-sum and rationalist defenders can be engaged actively, the abstract concern defender’s defence takes the form of inactivity. Unlike the others, engaging these defenders leads not to a robust discussion but to a solid wall of affirmation. Agreement is reached quickly that animals are creatures of

God, that they possess some inherent dignity as a result of this status, and that humanity has some moral responsibility to them, but here the discussion fizzles out, all platitude and no action.

They shy away from casuistry that would condemn even the most destructive methods of industrialised farming, non-compulsory cosmetic testing on animals, or trophy hunting. Among these abstract concern defenders can be placed those eco-theologians who sidestep the animal question entirely, advocating only for an undifferentiated, flattened Creation that excludes in its radical inclusivity the particular goods of Creation’s diverse constitutive species.

Abstract concern defenders concede the intrinsic goodness of non-human animals and acknowledge, at least liminally, that this ought to have implications for human relations with them but fail to bring these abstractions into practice. Their defence of speciesism manifests in their actions or rather, their lack of action, more so than in their words. They are content to leave non-human animals in the margins, unmotivated to engage the animal question in any serious

590 Berkman, “From Theological Speciesism to a Theological Ethology,” 12.

224 sense, dialogically or practically. Pope Francis laments this kind of abstract concern as a response to the ecological crisis. “[T]he most one can expect,” he writes, “is superficial rhetoric, sporadic acts of philanthropy and perfunctory expressions of concern for the environment, whereas any genuine attempt by groups within society to introduce change is viewed as a nuisance based on romantic illusions or an obstacle to be circumvented.”591 The priesthood of humanity and the respect owed to non-human animals though cannot be left in the realm of abstractions and platitudes. As Zizioulas warns, theological concepts without a clear connection to the life of the Church and the people who comprise it quickly lose their relevance as does the

Church itself when it fails to concretely respond to that which threatens Creation.592 What then does it mean to speak of ministering to non-human animals, recognising their inherent goodness and allowing human relationships with them to become theocentric rather than anthropocentric?

How might the Church move beyond destructive abstract concern speciesism into something more fruitful and eventually normative? Magisterial teachings must outline the theological principles that govern a relational ontology of non-human animals but Church leadership must also be willing to speak to specific practices and situations as they arise in the world. Having considered the foundations for consideration of non-human animals in moral theology, the chapter now turns to three contemporary scenarios of interspecies relationship to demonstrate the way in which a Trinitarian relational ontology that strives toward a non-speciesist ethic shapes a theological response.

591 Laudato Si’, 54. 592 John D. Zizioulas, “Priest of Creation,” in Environmental Stewardship, ed. R.J. Berry (New York: T&T Clark International, 2006), 273; John D. Zizioulas, The One and the Many: Studies on God, Man, the Church, and the World Today (Alhambra: Sebastian Press, 2012), 5-6.

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5.5.1 Darwin the Ikea Monkey: Anthropocentrism as an Obstacle to Flourishing

The common practice of flattening non-human Creation or even just the animal kingdom into one uniform group of Others must be avoided if a Catholic moral theology of non-human animals is to have real intellectual and practical benefit. As Helmer begins to suggest, an extension of moral considerability to non-human animals must start with an understanding of the particularities of each species. It is not appropriate to extend to all species the same moral consideration but determining what may be appropriate for dogs versus dolphins requires a knowledge of the goods of both dogs and dolphins. While some degree of generalising and taxonomic grouping is certainly possible and advantageous to the work of theologians, it must be understood that the moral goods of non-human animals are not uniform. What it means for a monkey to flourish is different from what it means for a dolphin to flourish is different from what it means for a snail to flourish and these differences are not irrelevant theologically. The inherent goodness of non-human animals as created beings in relationship with their Creator is the foundation for their moral consideration by humanity but it is only the foundation; closer study of each species is necessary in order to determine what this consideration ought to look like in application. To allow for a flattening of the diversity of God’s Creation, to disregard the particularly of each species, makes difficult a justification of moral consideration for non-human animals that differs significantly from the moral consideration shown plants or inanimate elements of Creation. They too are created by God and they too have some goodness inherent to their connection to the common Creator. Without regard to species difference, to the uniqueness of each kind of creature and their role in Creation, ultimately unknowable though that may be to human theologians, the case for non-human animals is vulnerable to a reductio ad absurdum that

226 its detractors are all too willing to make.593 Moral status and consideration are not universal but are held by different species and different individuals differently. Such differences, however, need not be interpreted hierarchically.

Like MacIntyre and Deane-Drummond, Berkman views as a moral good that which enables a species to flourish and a harm, that which impedes this flourishing in the species’s specific mode.594 The fulfillment of humanity’s priestly role in Creation then involves avoiding that which would impede this flourishing in other species and, where possible, actively facilitating it. While ethological information about particular species is relevant to a theological ethic because it enables an understanding of what it means for each species to flourish according to its own kind, ethology alone is not enough to establish a duty on the part of humanity to facilitate or at least not to interfere with this flourishing. Berkman’s proposed solution is the creation of a new field of theological ethology.595 The theological ethologist works to break out of the anthropocentric mold of both theology and ethology and pursues an understanding of a particular non-human animal species as it is and for its own sake.

It is here that the theological understanding of human beings as Priests of Creation, living in an inherently relational cosmos alongside other valued creations of an inherently relational

593 Vegetarian and vegan animal advocates are so familiar with such reductions that the strategy of appealing to the welfare of plants as a way of advancing an argument from futility against compassion for animals has been nicknamed the “Cry of the Carrots” argument. See Arrogant Worms. Carrot Juice is Murder. Arrogant Worms B00RF34KV0, 1994, CD; Tool. Disgustipated. Sony Legacy B000000993, 1993, CD. For an example of the Cry of the Carrots argument in action, see Ashley Feinberg, “Nice Try, Vegans: Plants Can Actually Hear Themselves Being Eaten,” Gizmodo, https://gizmodo.com/nice-try-vegans-plants-can-actually-hear-themselves-b-1599749162. July 3, 2014. 594 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), 24. See also Celia Deane- Drummond, “Are Animals Moral? Taking Soundings through Vice, Virtue, Conscience and Imago Dei,” in Creaturely Theology, eds. Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough (London: SCM Press, 2009), 204; and John Berkman, “From Theological Speciesism to a Theological Ethology: Where Catholic Moral Theology Needs to Go,” Journal of Moral Theology 3, no. 2 (2014): 14. 595 Berkman, “From Theological Speciesism to a Theological Ethology,” 12.

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God, can provide a link between systematics and ethics. This view of human identity makes explicit a responsibility toward God, toward God’s Creation and, combined with a relational ontology of non-human animals, toward them in particular. If a species’s natural good is that which allows it to flourish according to its kind and the task of humanity is to act as Priest of

Creation, seeking precisely this good for each species, then humanity must first know what these goods are. God’s chastisement of Job from the whirlwind seems to point to the kind of ethological ignorance Berkman identifies as a problem.596 “Do you know when the mountain goats give birth? Do you observe the calving of the deer?”597 If humanity could answer in the affirmative, would this not bring all of Creation some small bit closer to God? Opportunities to incorporate ethological insight and moral theology present themselves with regularity. The chapter turns now to one such instance, both recent and local, in which the contributions of secular law and its underlying philosophies proved insufficient to speak to the fullness of the case at hand.

On December 9th, 2012, Darwin, a juvenile Japanese macaque, became worldwide news after he was discovered wandering the parking lot of Toronto’s Ikea store wearing a tiny shearling coat. Toronto Animal Services officials seized the monkey, a prohibited pet under

Toronto’s municipal Bylaw 349, sparking a two year legal battle involving Toronto Animal

Services, Story Book Farm Primate Sanctuary, now housing Darwin, and Yasmin Nakhuda, the woman who had initially purchased him as a pet and from whose vehicle he had made his escape. Although the question central to the legal proceedings was one of property law—who owns the monkey?—the questions raised in the public discourse surrounding the case and in the

596 Ibid. 597 Job 39:1 (NRSV)

228 courtroom itself were much broader. While Justice Vallee of the Ontario Superior Court of

Justice found in her decision that the court ultimately lacked the jurisdiction to decide what was in Darwin’s best interests as a living creature, only who had the better legal claim to him as “a piece of property,” both Nakhuda and the defendant, Story Book Farm Primate Sanctuary, made their cases with a strong emphasis on the goods of Darwin himself.598

Both parties, particularly in their contact with the media, appealed to Darwin’s best interests, to his flourishing. The day following his well-publicised escape, Darwin was transferred from Toronto Animal Services to Story Book Farm Primate Sanctuary. The sanctuary describes Darwin upon intake as “very insecure” and so imprinted on human beings that he was not able to be immediately housed with other resident members of his species.599

During the trial, sanctuary president and owner Sherri Delaney testified that Darwin arrived with underdeveloped muscles and a thinned coat as a result of having been continuously leashed and dressed in clothing.600 Darwin was not, in the sanctuary’s estimation, thriving according to the specific Japanese macaque kind. Nakhuda’s treatment of him constituted a harm that could never be fully remedied as Darwin’s separation from his natural mother and subsequent domestication had rendered him incapable of survival in his native habitat. Nakhuda disputed the sanctuary’s claims, describing herself as Darwin’s mother and Darwin, as her son, arguing that his flourishing could only be achieved by returning Darwin to life as an equal member of her human family. Nakhuda viewed Darwin’s life at the sanctuary, a life designed to resemble as

598 Nakhuda v. Story Book Farm Primate Sanctuary, [2013] ONSC 5761 (Can.). 599 “Macaques,” Story Book Farm Primate Sanctuary, accessed July 25, 2017, http://www.storybookmonkeys.org/monkeys.htm#Macaques. 600 Laura Kane, “Darwin the Ikea Monkey: Animal Control Officers Testify,” The Toronto Star, June 10, 2013, accessed July 25, 2017, https://www.thestar.com/news/crime/2013/06/10/darwin_the_ikea_monkey_animal_control_officers_testify.ht ml; Nakhuda v. Story Book Farm Primate Sanctuary [2013] ONSC 5761 at para. 19.

229 closely as possible the life of a free-living Japanese macaque, as demeaning, a perspective indicative of her own anthropocentric bias.601 Nakhuda’s behaviour suggests that she believed anthropomorphism to be a kind of promotion for Darwin, the provision of human goods necessarily the provision of superior goods. Story Book Farm Primate Sanctuary countered that

Darwin, as a Japanese macaque, belonged with other members of his own species. What was demeaning to him was exactly this anthropomorphism. To treat Darwin as a human infant—to dress him and diaper train him and confine him inside a human dwelling—constituted an impediment to his flourishing according to his kind.

While the tide of public opinion was on the side of Story Book Farm, a not insignificant contingent of voices sympathised with Nakhuda. Journalist Christie Blatchford of the National

Post published a story on the case whose title, “If IKEA Monkey Court Case was about Love,

His Owner Would Win Hands Down,” could be considered an apt summation of this position.602

Nakhuda’s supporters focused on the pain and anguish suffered by Nakhuda as a result of the separation from her beloved (allegedly at least) pet and, to a lesser degree, on Darwin’s own suffering. Both parties agreed that Darwin had imprinted on Nakhuda and had taken some time to adapt to life as a monkey at Story Book Farm. There was no dispute as to whether there was an attachment, only whether this attachment was in Darwin’s own best interest, whether his life with Nakhuda was allowing him to achieve his own goods and to flourish, not as a human infant but as a juvenile Japanese macaque, a question Gheaus’s secular relational ethic, centered as it is on human love, fails to adequately consider. Cases like Darwin’s illustrate the reality that human

601 “Monkey Should Choose His Fate, Human ‘Mother’ Says,” CTV News Toronto, December 11, 2012, accessed May 31, 2017, http://toronto.ctvnews.ca/monkey-should-choose-his-fate-human-mother-says-1.1074567. 602 Christie Blatchford, “If Ikea Monkey Court Case Was About Love His Owner Would Win, Hands Down,” National Post, May 30, 2013, accessed May 7, 2017, http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/05/30/christie-blatchford-if-ikea- monkey-court-case-was-about-love-his-owner-would-win-hands-down.

230 affection for other animals sometimes manifests as a harm, making God’s love a much firmer theoretical ground. Although Vallee found that Nakhuda “was prepared to embellish the facts to improve her legal position” and that she had done precisely this with regard to many of the circumstances of her acquisition of and life with Darwin, the authenticity of Nakhuda’s feelings toward him has little relevance to the question of whether Darwin’s residing with her was an impediment to his own flourishing.603 The centering of Nakhuda’s experience by her proponents demonstrates well the danger of failing to recognise and address anthropocentrism even within a relational ethic. A theocentric turn brings Darwin back into the picture, asking what his goods are and how Nakhuda and the authorities of the City of Toronto, as members of a priestly species, can best support them, open always to the possibility that what enables Darwin’s flourishing may require sacrifice on the part of Nakhuda.

In order to answer these questions about what constitutes flourishing for a Japanese macaque, an understanding of the life of the species is necessary and it was to the input of ethology that supporters of the sanctuary turned to make their case.604 As MacIntyre warns, there is no common list of natural characteristics that a creature must possess in order to be said to be flourishing.605 To be hand fed, clothed, diapered, cuddled, and prevented from running free outdoors are goods proper to a human infant but what constitutes goods for one species is not necessarily what constitutes goods for another species, even one genetically very similar.

Nakhuda’s anthropocentric assumptions about the superiority of human society prevented her from recognising that many human goods represented for Darwin, as a monkey, harms; they

603 Nakhuda v. Story Book Farm Primate Sanctuary, 38. 604 Mallory Mos, “Ikea Monkey: Domestic Darwin or Wild Japanese Macaque?” The Jane Goodall Institute of Canada, December 17, 2012, accessed May 7, 2017, http://janegoodallcanadablog.org/2012/12/17/ikea-monkey- domestic-darwin-or-wild-rhesus-macaque. 605 Macintyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 78.

231 impeded his flourishing in the specific Japanese macaque mode. It is here that Berkman’s vision of a theological ethology arising out of moral theology is useful in determining both what it is for a macaque to flourish according to its kind and what ought to be done about macaques living in situations that impede their successful flourishing. Quotidian encounter or experience with other animals, though valuable in motivating moral concern for some species, is mediated inescapably through what theologian David Clough describes as perspectival anthropocentrism.

While ethological study is itself a form of personal encounter, particularly when performed in an immersive fashion like that of primatologist Jane Goodall or ethologist Marc Bekoff, it is a focused encounter aware of its perspectival biases. Ethological study is an encounter that takes as its starting point a desire to understand the other species qua the other species.

Nakhuda’s encounter, by contrast, was an encounter ordered toward her own enjoyment and a desire to understand Darwin as a pet, as an amusement, as a human being. Her evaluation of his goods and flourishing was skewed by an unacknowledged anthropocentrism. This is not to discount the value of lived experience and encounter in human concern for animals but to qualify that value, to caution that a certain astuteness is required in order to recognise the ways in which these encounters may be biased by the focus of the experiencer’s own gaze. Allowing the Other to be and to be Other involves understanding as best as is possible what it means to be the Other.

How do the interests of the Other differ from one’s own interests? How does the flourishing of the Other differ from one’s own flourishing? Nakhuda's error, if one believes her to be at all sincere, lies in projecting the goods and flourishing of her own species onto a member of a similar albeit significantly different species. She failed to understand and to respect that what it means to succeed as a Japanese macaque is different from and in some ways even contrary to

232 what it means to succeed as a human being. While the need for security, society, love, and shelter are common to both species, the specific form they take for each is not the same.

Throughout her decision, Justice Vallee demonstrated a consistent difficulty in discussing

Darwin as a piece of property without personality or interests.606 She and each of the parties to the case before her were aware, although the structure of the legal system constricted its expression, that monkeys indeed have goods and that these goods ought to be considered by human beings. The objectification of other animals imposed by civil law is artificial and butts up against a kind of conflicted intuition in humanity—the intuition that other animals are something more than objects in conflict with the assertion that they exist primarily or even exclusively for human use. As Vallee hinted in her decision, Darwin’s own nature and goods as a monkey ought to trump Nakhuda’s interest in possessing him. A relational ethic centred on God as source and sustainer of the goodness of all created beings offers firm ground for Darwin’s claim and the vocational notion of humanity as Priest of Creation creates Nakhuda’s obligation to recognise it.

The story of The Ikea Monkey instantly captured the attention of the Toronto public, quickly spreading across the globe with abundant coverage in both social and traditional media.

If the Church is to form the faith and morals of the faithful, it cannot sit silently, without a response to cases like this one. This is not to suggest that the Pope ought to have commented on an escaped exotic pet but that the existence of a robust and relational animal theology would offer the faithful a way of interpreting and making moral decisions about such cases as they arise

606 Vallee acknowledges up front the callousness of the legal question before her but nevertheless is careful never to use Darwin’s name in the decision, referring to him only as “the monkey.” She does however, consistently choose to use male pronouns to refer to Darwin. The decision to acknowledge Darwin’s gender even while omitting his name represents a small acquiescence to his status as more than an object. Each of the cases Vallee cites for legal precedent instead refer to the escaped animals in question as “it.” Nakhuda v. Story Book Farm Primate Sanctuary, 4.

233 in the personal or public spheres. Pets are an integral part of everyday life for a significant portion of the world’s population. The Church can offer so much more for these animals and their carers than an annual blessing liturgy in the parish parking lot. If humanity is to fulfill its role as Priest of Creation—to flourish according to its own priestly kind—it must be equipped with an understanding of that vocation, an understanding that it has a vocation at all. The

Church must move beyond abstract concern for other creatures to an active effort to put the relationality of creaturely being into proper theocentric perspective.

In the East, katharsis helps to bring about theosis, humanity arriving at divinization by way of ascetic practices. As Priests of Creation, humanity strives for likeness and unity with

God along a path of discipline and self-sacrifice. The synergeia of Priest and Creator elevates and transforms non-human Creation not into the image of humanity—as Nakhuda strove to do with Darwin—as humanity is a flawed and imperfect species that can never please God, but into something that images and reflects the divine. Just as the mission of the pastor is not to make use of his parishioners to achieve his own ends or even to transform each of them into a priest, but to support them in the vocation to which God has called them, the mission of humanity as

Priest of Creation is not to transform non-human animals, through training or edict or wishful thinking, into human beings but to support them in being what God has created them, wild and wonderful, to be. The goal of priestly work is never anthropomorphism but theosis.

5.5.2 Industrialised Animal Agriculture: Mutual Goods and the Self-Sacrificial Priesthood

Cases like Darwin’s, while affectively complex and steeped in a history of anthropocentrism, demand relatively little of human beings. It is not particularly difficult, socially or financially, to avoid involvement in the exotic pet trade. While it is a minority of

234 consumers who find themselves tempted by the acquisition of a wild animal, all humans make choices about the flourishing of other species multiple times each day when they sit down to eat.

This chapter now turns to the case of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations—commonly known in agriculture as CAFOs or colloquially (and pejoratively) as “factory farms”—as an illustration of both Creation’s inherent relationality and the self-sacrifice required of its priests.

The question of whether Christians ought to support industrialised farming, to eat commercial animal products at all, is one of some complexity. It is a question that reaches beyond issues of farmed animal welfare far into the core of Catholic social teaching, concerning itself with the rights and dignity of workers, a preferential option for the poor and vulnerable, the call to community and participation, and care for Creation more broadly.

Canada and America today rely almost exclusively on industrialised animal agriculture, more than 99% of farmed animals in the United States being raised and slaughtered in CAFOs.607

By contrast, prior to 1950, family farms produced the majority of eggs, dairy, and meat consumed by these countries, using farming methods similar to those in use for the previous century.608 Innovations in antibiotics and refrigeration, however, enabled farmers to grow livestock more quickly and distribute their products more widely to consumers with an increased capacity to store them.609 By 1980, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations were an industry standard, the number of small farms in America falling by 90%.610 Today, broiler hens eat half the feed they did in 1950 yet reach the ideal slaughtering weight of 2kg in only one third of the

607 Calculation by animal advocacy group Farm Forward based on the United States Department of Agriculture’s 2002 Census of Agriculture. Aaron Gross, “Why Farm Forward Matters,” Farm Forward, December 1, 2014, accessed July 25, 2017, https://farmforward.com/2014/12/01/why-farm-forward-matters. 608 Erik Marcus, Meat Market: Animals, Ethics and Money (Ithaca: Brio Press, 2005), 7. 609 The Worldwatch Institute, 2008 State of the World: Innovations for a Sustainable Economy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 62. 610 Marcus, Meat Market: Animals, Ethics and Money, 9.

235 time.611 Cows once lived up to five years before being ready for slaughter. Today, with the use of hormones, antibiotics, and a diet of corn and soy feed, these same calves will gain more than

500kg in only fourteen months.612 While the number of animals raised for slaughter rises, the number of distinct farming operations falls as new technology allows fewer individuals to raise a greater number of livestock thus generating a larger profit. How does humanity’s ability to manipulate livestock growth patterns for its own profit testify to its vocation as Priest of Creation and to Christian faith in a relational God Who has formed each of these creatures by hand?

While increased access to cheaper food faster may appear on its face to represent a benefit for humanity, the goods of the newly industrialised system of animal agriculture are easily outweighed by its harms, both immediate and long-term. In a Creation relational from its ontological foundation, many goods and harms are experienced in common; humanity’s flourishing inextricably linked to the flourishing of the species around it. What appears at first to be a good for humanity cannot be anthropocentrically assumed to represent a good for Creation or even for the whole of the human species. Where goods for some represent harms for others, humanity, as Priest of Creation, is called to exercise self-costly love, sacrificing that which might make life more pleasurable or convenient for that which better serves the common goods of

Creation.

In 2003, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops published a statement, “For I

Was Hungry and You Gave Me Food: Catholic Reflections on Food, Farmers, and

Farmworkers,” wherein the bishops expressed several concerns with the present direction of agribusiness in America. They wrote that “Catholic teaching about the stewardship of creation

611 The Worldwatch Institute, 2008 State of the World, 62. 612 Danielle Nierenberg, “Happier Meals: Rethinking the Global Meat Industry,” Worldwatch Paper 171 (September 2005): 23.

236 leads us to question certain farming practices, such as the operation of massive confined animal feeding operations. We believe that these operations should be carefully regulated and monitored so that environmental risks are minimized and animals are treated as creatures of God.”613 More than a decade later, CAFOs continue to exist as an industry norm in North America with few changes to the environmental and animal welfare issues that first aroused the concern of the

USCCB. The reflection of the bishops, like so many theological reflections on humanity’s relationship with other animals, has failed thus far to reach beyond the realm of abstract concern.

The bishops offered no actual speculation on whether and how it might be possible for the non- human animals housed in CAFOs to be “treated as creatures of God” while simultaneously being raised for human profit and consumption. Who ought to be doing the recommended monitoring and regulating of the CAFOs? What ought they to be monitoring for and regulating against?

How ought the faithful to respond to CAFOs that do not measure up? The reluctance to offer an analysis of any depth or specificity or to follow up with action results in a statement that has no real application. Despite an expression of abstract concern, functionally CAFOs have not been condemned and have, in essence, been condoned as a practice that is, at present, worrying but that, with regulation and monitoring, has the potential to be harmonious with a Catholic understanding of humanity’s priesthood.

The Church, with its experience and resources, is in a position to move beyond abstract concern over CAFOs. Bishops must be willing to take the risk of not just expressing vague misgivings but actually urging those who are able to to exercise a self-sacrificial priesthood by

613 William P. Fay, “For I Was Hungry and You Gave Me Food: Catholic Reflections on Food, Farmers, and Farmworkers,” United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, November 2003, accessed July 25, 2017, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/agriculture-nutrition-rural-issues/for-i-was- hungry.cfm.

237 eschewing animal products produced by CAFOs and working toward affordable and sustainable access to quality food for all. The social and practical impact of a major move away from anthropocentric instrumentalism toward a relational, pastoral approach to other animals would be considerable, both in terms of benefits and of costs. It is fitting then that Linzey views such a move as a true show of faith. His vision of veganism as a self-sacrificial act of theological witness to an eschatology in process of realisation may even seem suspect in light of Jesus’s own scripturally documented consumption of animal flesh. Linzey counters this objection by denying that it is Jesus’s first century Palestinian lifestyle that Christians are called to imitate. Christ is not, he posits, a static moral exemplar but an eschatological figure. The Church’s anticipation of the Parousia is an anticipation of a Christ transformed once more, coming again in an unprecedented glory which implies, for Linzey, that “there are dimensions of christhood not manifest in the historical Jesus and not yet fully grasped by the disciples.”614 Christ, as He appeared during His Incarnation, was limited by the constraints of the material world and the realities of the time and place in which He chose to become incarnate. The Incarnation signals the beginning of the transformation to be completed in the eschaton, not the completion of it.

What Linzey offers is “[n]ot that all things were transformed by Jesus, nor that all of his life in every aspect was so transforming, nor that every part has even yet been transformed, but that to follow Jesus is to affirm, and seek to actualize, the fundamental possibility of world transformation.”615 To live out humanity’s vocation as Priest of Creation involves participating in and facilitating this transformation, lifting the rest of Creation up to God in the hope that all will be drawn into more perfect relationality through the cosmic liturgy. The choice to resist humanity’s parasitical inclinations by ending, as far as possible, the pursuit of one’s individual

614 Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology, 86. 615 Ibid., 87.

238 goods at the expense of the flourishing of non-human animals and those human beings involved in the exploitative industry of animal agriculture is, for Linzey, one such affirmation.

CAFOs, on the surface, present a lifeboat scenario in which human interests and the interests of other animal species are at irreconcilable odds. Humans have an interest in avoiding hunger, in preserving their social bonds through the upholding of common cultural culinary traditions, and in financial stability, both through the dignity of work and through access to inexpensive necessities like food. Cattle, pigs, chickens, and turkeys have an interest in avoiding pain, in being free to pursue their own flourishing according to their kind, and in living until natural death. One must, it seems, make a heroic, Christlike sacrifice for the good of the other and humanity has been content to let this be the other side.616 Anthropocentric instrumentalism gives an automatic and uncritical preference to the interests of humanity over the interests of all other species, human culinary preferences trumping even another species’s interest in being alive. Humanity, however, understood as Priest of Creation, has as its vocation a self-costly love of Creation. The application of such a priestly paradigm produces another result entirely, a result that condemns CAFOs as indefensible and that troubles the use of non-human animals as commodities in human commerce more generally. Rather than placing human interests above those of all other species, the Imago Dei, understood relationally and vocationally, requires a

616 The slaughter of other animals for human consumption is often conceptualised and described in near-Messianic terms, livestock ‘giving up their lives for us’ as if they have freely chosen to become dinner. Social psychologist Melanie Joy observes that “an animal may be viewed as ‘sacrificed’ for human consumption, a perspective that imbues the act with spiritual meaning and implies some choice on the part of the prey.” Feminist theorist Carol Adams notes that “[t]he only volition apparently granted nonhumans is the desire to die for humans.” Melanie Joy, Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows: An Introduction to Carnism (San Francisco: Conari Press, 2010), 20; Carol Adams, ““A Very Rare and Difficult Thing”: Ecofeminism, Attention to Animal Suffering and the Disappearance of the Subject,” in A Communion of Subjects, edited by Paul Waldau and Kimberley Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 598.

239 careful weighing of the competing interests with a preferential option for the poor and vulnerable.

The reality of speciesism is such that while zero-sum scenarios are often invoked in defense of the anthropocentric status quo—If we stop farming animals, the economy will collapse! If we stop eating animals, we’ll all die of malnutrition!—they are rarely if ever truly encountered.617 The question of CAFOs is not who wins, humans or cattle, but is far more complex. Creation, organised relationally from its ontological foundations, does not allow for species to exist in a vacuum. To end the practice of using CAFOs in animal agriculture, while it is likely to drive up the price of North American animal products, disrupting human social practices and impacting human employment, does not mean tossing the human over the side of the lifeboat. It is a choice not entirely self-sacrificial on the part of humanity but a self-costly love carries no implication of altruism. To advocate for farmed animal welfare is also to advocate for the welfare of the poor and vulnerable of humanity, the goods of both linked in a relational Creation. CAFOs and slaughterhouses are unpleasant places, thousands of loud, malodourous animal bodies overflowing from barns and feedlots, producing waste, passing germs. As a result, they are disproportionately placed in low-income areas with lesser political

617 Philosopher Peter Carruthers points out that the livelihood of many human beings depends on the instrumental use of non-human animals and argues against any action that would threaten human goods. Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 160, 166.

240 influence, Nibyism keeping them out of more influential and affluent neighbourhoods.618,619

There, they impact the physical health of residents and drive down property values. Pollution from CAFOs has been linked to respiratory distress in the surrounding community as well as to anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of declining quality of life and economic uncertainty.620 Social health also declines as residents are forced to abandon outdoor activities due to the persistent foul odours emitted from the CAFOs and meat processing plants.

Traditionally, the manure of farmed animals has been used as a crop fertilizer and was thus returned to the soil innocuously. CAFOs, however, house so great a number of animals that using their manure in this way is no longer feasible. Chemical fertilizers are favoured instead for crops and animal manure is simply disposed of in manmade lagoons. Excrement regularly runs off into waterways, spreading pathogens that cause disease and leading to a buildup of nitrates at levels toxic to human beings.621 These problems present serious obstacles to the flourishing of those residing near CAFOs—to their ability to participate in society, to nurture their families, and to grow in community.

618 ‘Nimbyism’ has come to popularly refer to the acknowledgement that while institutions like homeless shelters, wind turbines, freeways, and slaughterhouses represent goods for humanity and are necessary for the continued functioning of society, they ought to be located somewhere else, ‘not in my backyard.’ 619 A 1987 study by the United Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice determined that communities made up predominately of racial minorities were more likely to be the sites of facilities generating hazardous waste, such as CAFOs. The Commission wrote that “[t]he possibility that these patterns resulted by chance is virtually impossible, strongly suggesting that some underlying factor or factors, which are related to race, played a role in the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities.” A follow-up report, prepared twenty years later, affirmed these findings and named them explicitly as “environmental racism.” It specifies that “[c]orporate hog farms are some of the most egregious perpetrators of environmental racism.” United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites (New York: United Church of Christ, 1978), xv; Robert D. Bullard et al., Toxic Wastes and Race at Twenty 1987-2007 (Cleveland: United Church of Christ, 2007), 118. 620 Ryan Gunderson, “Meat and Inequality: Environmental Health Consequences of Livestock Agribusiness,” Environmental Justice 5, no. 1 (February 2012): 56. 621 Ibid., 55; Robert D. Bullard et al, “Toxic Wastes and Race at Twenty 1987-2007,” 118.

241

It is not a problem of anthropocentrism that humanity too would benefit from that which benefits other animals unless humanity’s own benefit is the sole motivating factor. It is natural that relational beings, oriented toward a common Creator and sharing one Creation, would realise some commonalities in their flourishing. The relational reality of earthly, fleshy existence prevents any true compartmentalisation of species and their goods. To suggest that an end to CAFOs would be a boon to humanity, however, would be overly simplistic. There is still much sacrifice involved in such a move, sacrifice that would fall disproportionately to those who can least afford it. Linzey’s enthusiastic advocating for a vegan alternative comes from a position of relative privilege as a white male academic writing during an unfettered period of history in a first world country. In many ways, the kind of self-sacrificial concern for non- human animals Linzey advocates is possible primarily for those who find themselves enjoying a similarly advantaged lifestyle. Those living in major metropolitan centres in the West need to sacrifice much less to untangle themselves as far as possible from the systems of animal oppression Linzey speaks out against. Access to alternative food, clothing, and other necessities is simpler, even socially rewarded in some areas. This is not to suggest that what he urges is not worth pursuing, only that the solution must, like the problem itself, be complex, avoiding the temptation to merely reverse the zero-sum equation, privileging other animals over humanity.622

Self-sacrifice on the part of the economically advantaged for the benefit of the disadvantaged, both human and otherwise, is likewise an oversimplified picture of the solution.

622 The Voluntary Human Extinction Movement proposes that humanity reverse this equation by consciously and deliberately rendering itself extinct, either through mass suicide or the voluntary refusal to reproduce. The VHEM shares some overlap with both the environmental and animal rights movements. See Tarik Kochi and Noam Ordan, “An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity,” borderlands 7, no. 3 (2008): 1-21; “About the Movement,” The Voluntary Human Extinction Movement, accessed August 1, 2019, http://www.vhemt.org/aboutvhemt.htm.

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As Pope Francis warns in Laudato Si’, the degradation of the environment, of the common home of all creatures, is a danger to the rich and to the poor alike.623 Although Pope Francis neglects to mention it in his treatment of the ecological crisis, industrialised animal agriculture has been called “a leading cause of everything”—climate change, deforestation, ocean ecosystem collapse, obesity, water pollution, and antibiotic resistance to name but a few.624 While the poor and vulnerable of humanity and the farmed animals themselves stand to benefit most immediately from a shift away from CAFOs, this shift is nevertheless one with the potential to facilitate the flourishing of all of God’s relational Creation.

5.5.3 Pet Carers in Crisis: Rejecting Zero-Sum Anthropocentrism, Living Relationality

Dependence on other animals need not always be exploitative as in the above two case studies. The relational nature of the Trinity, reflected in Creation, means that humanity can never exist in a vacuum. Relationship with animal Others is innate to creaturely existence and, in many cases, can be positively formative, drawing humanity and other animals into right relationship with one another and with the common Creator. Gheaus writes that “[p]eople often need animals in order to lead good lives because they can meet some of our important needs: for affection, friendship, companionship, and trust.”625 Put another way, humans often need to be in relationship with other animals in order to flourish according to their kind. Relationship with specific animals with whom one shares a bond of genuine love—rather than anthropocentric

623 Laudato Si’, 24. 624 Christopher Hyner, “A Leading Cause of Everything: One Industry That Is Destroying Our Planet and Our Ability to Thrive on It,” Georgetown Environmental Law Review, October 23, 2015, accessed July 25, 2017, https://gelr.org/2015/10/23/a-leading-cause-of-everything-one-industry-that-is-destroying-our-planet-and-our- ability-to-thrive-on-it-georgetown-environmental-law-review. 625 Gheaus, “The Role of Love in Animal Ethics,” 587.

243 fixation like Nakhuda’s or exploitative dependence as in industrial animal agriculture—is particularly significant both morally and psychologically. Caring for a companion animal is potentially a mutual good. Likewise, separation of a human carer and their companion animal, especially forcibly and unwillingly, potentially presents an obstacle to the flourishing of each.

This obstacle may be expressly acute for the non-human companion if they have been entirely reliant on the human carer for food and shelter in addition to the fulfillment of emotional and social needs. Insofar as the attachment is not harmful to the non-human animal, as in Darwin’s case above, there exist both secular and theological reasons for prioritizing a preservation of the bond. In this final case study, the chapter looks at companion animals in crisis situations as a further challenge to zero-sum anthropocentrism and to the Church’s understanding of lived relationality.

Gheaus points to a tradition of humans regarding other animals as “valuable companions and friends whose emotional attachment warrants certain ethical standards.”626 While human attachment to companion animals is not what imbues them with goodness or renders them morally considerable from a theological perspective, it is not irrelevant to ethical questions about them either. The significance of these attachments, an inevitable part of relational living, is brought into relief especially in times of crisis. Studies of evacuation behaviour in disaster situations have repeatedly identified an unwillingness to abandon pets as a significant factor in human noncompliance with evacuation orders and unauthorised re-entry into disaster areas.627

With more than half of American households including at least one companion animal and more than half of those regarding these companions as members of the family, the risks are significant

626 Ibid., 585. 627 For a recent example, see Jungbu Kim and Seong Soo Oh, “Confidence, Knowledge, and Compliance with Emergency Evacuation,” Journal of Risk Research 18, no. 1 (2015): 111-126.

244 when families are not permitted to evacuate intact.628 Loose companion animals, left behind when they are not permitted to evacuate, pose a documented threat to relief workers and service animals in disaster zones as the behaviour of these formerly gentle pets becomes more aggressive and unpredictable due to fear, pain, and starvation. Left to roam and scavenge, they become vectors for zoonotic disease such as West Nile, rabies, and toxoplasmosis, impeding repopulation of the area.629 Zero-sum anthropocentrism puts both human and other animal life in jeopardy during and after disaster situations and yet it this kind of thinking is prevalent within relief organisations. The tension between humanitarian concern and concern for other animals is resolved first by recognising that the tension itself is largely a fiction. Even in actual lifeboats, the necessity of lifeboat ethics is rare. Companion animals are carried to safety with and by their human companions, not instead of them.

Hurricane Katrina was the first American disaster in which companion animal loss and recovery was widely documented. Intense journalistic focus inspired a wealth of inquiry from researchers and relief organisations alike, offering valuable insight into the impact of companion animal loss in a traumatic evacuation scenario.630 Subsequent studies in psychology and the social sciences show consistently that, regardless of how it occurs, the loss of a companion animal can result in significant stressors including anxiety and depression, particularly for persons with limited social support. In situations where the loss is connected to an additional traumatic event such as abuse, disaster, or war, the impact of the loss becomes more acute.631

628 American Veterinary Medical Association, U.S. Pet Ownership & Demographics Sourcebook (Schaumburg: American Veterinary Medical Association, 2012). 629 Lisa Baker and Loretta Cormier, Disasters and Vulnerable Populations: Evidence-Based Practice for the Helping Professions (New York: Springer Publishing Company, LLC, 2015), 178. 630 For a review of the relevant sociological literature, see Lisa K. Zottarelli, ”Broken Bond: An Exploration of Human Factors Associated with Companion Animal Loss During Hurricane Katrina,” Sociological Forum 25, no. 1 (March 2010): 110-122. 631 Ibid., 112.

245

Predictably, those most at risk for companion animal loss during a crisis are those who already experience the greatest social vulnerability—persons with low income, ethnic minorities, the elderly, and female-headed households.632 Emergency response literature post-Katrina, however, treats pet owners in general as an already vulnerable population. The relationship between human and companion animal is strong enough in many persons that they consistently defy evacuation orders or re-enter disaster zones to avoid separation. A study by the Fritz Institute found that among those affected by Katrina, in households that had the means to evacuate but chose not to, 44% cited an unwillingness to leave their companion animals behind as a primary motivating factor. Only reluctance to abandon one's home was cited more often.633 Similar studies have found that up to 30% of unauthorised re-entry into disaster zones, including zones affected by toxic chemical spills and environmental contaminants hazardous to human life, and up to 80% of re-entry generally is motivated by the desire to retrieve a companion animal left behind.634

It is possible to view the actions of these pet carers as irresponsible, a wanton disregard for their own human lives and a violation of the Catechism’s warning against showing non- human animals “the affection due only to persons.”635 In 2 Samuel 12, however, the prophet

Nathan tells King David the story of a poor man who raised a ewe lamb alongside his children, sharing his meagre food and drink with her and considering her “like a daughter” before she is taken and slaughtered by his rich neighbour.636 David is outraged by the story, calling for the

632 Ibid., 113. 633 Hurricane Katrina: Perceptions of the Affected (San Francisco: Fritz Institute, 2006), 4. 634 Sebastian E. Heath, Susan K. Voeks, and Larry T. Glickman, “A Study of Pet Rescue in Two Disasters,” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 18, no. 3 (November 2000): 362. 635 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd. ed. (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 2000), 2418. 636 2 Sam 12:3 (NRSV)

246 rich man’s death, the very reaction Nathan foresaw and intended. The Scriptural account does not condemn the poor man for squandering his family’s limited resources on a pet but instead holds up the relationship as an example of loving companionship which rightly ignites compassion and remorse in David. What constitutes a theologically inappropriate amount of affection or expense directed toward a non-human animal then remains unclear. Nathan’s example suggests that it is legitimate to view the self-sacrificing inclinations of vulnerable pet carers as proper to their vocation as Priests of Creation, an outward example of the inward reality of a Trinitarian relational ontology that binds all creatures together in a shared experience of bodily life and eschatological expectation.

Recognising that the protection of such interspecies relationships supports the goods and flourishing of all, provisions for the evacuation of companion animals were written into both

Louisiana state and federal law through the bi-partisan Pets Evacuation and Transportation

Standards Act or PETS following Katrina. Public outcry in response to numerous well publicised stories of traumatic separation coming out of the hurricane played a significant role in influencing legislation. The most memorable of these was the story of Snowball, a little white dog, evacuated to the Superdome by his young carer only to be ripped from the boy's arms by a police officer who, following orders, refused to allow Snowball to board a relief bus to Houston with his human family. Video broadcast around the world showed the boy desperately calling his dog's name over and over until vomiting in extreme distress at their forcible separation.

Snowball’s story was cited in the Congressional Record for PETS, its affective power having moved lawmakers to compassionate action.637

637 Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Acts of 2006, HR 3858, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 152, pt. 14: 18782.

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Despite measures such as PETS, many relief agencies and workers continue to discount the importance of companion animal evacuation, viewing it as a nuisance and obstacle to assisting human beings.638 These zero-sum defenders of anthropocentrism discount the relationship of attachment and interdependence present in human-companion animal bonds, dismissing it as oversentimental, particularly in adults. Investigations in psychology, however, have shown interspecies bonds to have a positive impact on human health and happiness across a variety ages and backgrounds.639 Particularly for the most vulnerable of humanity, companion animals can serve as healthy attachment figures, providing a secure base and safe haven in times of stress.640 Traumatic disruption of this bond can impact, as with Snowball’s young human companion, mental and physical health and have a detrimental effect on the human’s functioning in subsequent relationships, both with humans and other animals.641 Recognising the complex reality of the human/companion animal bond, it becomes less difficult to understand the lengths those caring for a companion animal will go to in order to keep the attachment relationship intact

638 Russell McCulley, “Saving Pets from Another Katrina,” Time, June 6, 2007, accessed July 26, 2017, http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1629962,00.html. 639 For a review of the literature on the physical and psychological benefits to humanity of living with a companion animal, see Emily K. Crawford, Nancy L. Worsham, and Elizabeth R. Swinehart, “Benefits Derived from Companion Animals, and the Use of the Term “Attachment,”” Anthrozoös 19, no. 2 (2006): 98-112. 640 Feminist theories of attachment have departed from psychologist John Bowlby’s narrow focus on motherhood, instead understanding attachment theory as ultimately a theory about love and relationship manifested in caregiving. This broadening of the definition of attachment has opened the door to research investigating attachment between human adults, between humans and Christ, and most recently, humans and their companion animals. While this work is still developing, it is generally agreed amongst attachment theorists that, although it is not possible to measure some aspects of attachment to non-human animals using the laboratory procedures traditionally favoured by attachment theorists, some clear congruencies with developmental psychologist Mary Ainsworth’s four characteristics of attachment do exist. For examples of this line of research in the fields of psychology and social work, see Lawrence A. Kurdek, “Pet Dogs as Attachment Figures,” Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 25, no. 2 (2008): 247-266; Pat Sable, “The Pet Connection: An Attachment Perspective,” Clinical Social Work Journal 41 (2013): 93-99; Sigal Zilcha-Mano, Mario Mikulincer, and Philip R. Shaver, “An Attachment Perspective on Human-Pet Relationships: Conceptualization and Assessment of Pet Attachment Orientations,” Journal of Research in Personality 45 (2011): 345-357. 641 Baker and Cormier, Disasters and Vulnerable Populations, 182; Melissa Hunt, Hind Al-Awadi, and Megan Johnson, “Psychological Sequelae of Pet Loss Following Hurricane Katrina,” Anthrozoös 21, no. 2 (2008): 117.

248 and the importance of assisting them in doing so where this bond serves the flourishing of both parties.

Catholic social teaching already makes clear the responsibility of the human being to human Others, responsibilities inextricable in a relational existence from humanity’s pastoral, priestly duties to Creation at large. A preferential option for the poor and vulnerable then must include a responsibility also to the companion animals counted by so many as valued family members and themselves dependent on human provision. By acquiring an animal companion, one takes on a serious obligation, agreeing to shelter and feed the animal, ideally for the duration of the animal’s life. In assisting vulnerable carers in providing for their companions, the Church enables them to keep their commitments, an act that honours the dignity of both. A refusal to assist the animal companions of the most vulnerable has demonstrable potential to increase their vulnerability, leading them to remain in dangerous situations or to take risks that endanger themselves and others. By contrast, maintaining proximity to a companion animal can help mitigate, for the attached carer, the stressors of a crisis situation and assist in hastening recovery.642

Maintaining the carer-companion bond not only avoids the unnecessary anguish of additional loss but helps to provide comfort, familiarity, and companionship both during the crisis and in the subsequent healing stages. It facilitates the flourishing of and avoids further harms to carer and companion animal alike. When the poor and vulnerable are forced to choose

642 Judith M. Seigel, “Stressful Life Events and the Use of Physician Services Among the Elderly: The Mitigating Role of Pet Ownership,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58, no. 6 (June 1990): 1084-1085; Nancy A.Pachana, Bronwyn M. Massavelli, and Sofia Robleda-Gomez, “A Developmental Psychological Perspective on the Human-Animal Bond,” in The Psychology of the Human-Animal Bond: A Resources for Clinicians and Researchers, eds. Christopher Blazina, Guler Boyra, and David Shen-Miller (New York: Springer Publishing Company, 2011), 151- 165.

249 between receiving social assistance and keeping their family intact, aid providers inadvertently increase their poverty and vulnerability, robbing the vulnerable either of assistance or of a secure relationship upon which they have come to rely for comfort and support, possibly with far- reaching effect. Acceptance of zero-sum anthropocentrism in crisis relief represents an obstacle to the flourishing of vulnerable human beings as much as it represents a harm to their animal companions.

After-action reviews of recent North American natural disasters have consistently named faith-based organisations among the first and most heavily relied upon emergency responders. A survey of those affected by Katrina showed that over a quarter of those who received aid within the first 48 hrs received it from church groups. These church groups provided only slightly less assistance than police and secular groups and significantly more assistance than the Federal

Emergency Management Agency and the American military during this crucial response period.643 Given the Church's role as a first responder, it follows that the Church cannot leave decisions about companion animals up to other agencies; it must decide for itself how best to respond with compassion and efficiency, bearing in mind the inherent goodness of other animals and humanity’s priestly role in relation to them. A responsibility to non-human animals, particularly those directly dependent on human care, arises from their common creatureliness and the teleological vocation of humanity. Recognition of the value of interspecies relationships of mutual love affirms the goodness of non-human Creation and the relational nature of theological ontology. Rather than a sentimental side project then, making accommodations for the companion animals of those in crisis is a legitimate strategy for ensuring the flourishing of

643 Fritz Institute, Hurricane Katrina: Perceptions of the Affected, 5.

250 affected persons, personnel involved with recovery efforts in the affected area, and the companion animals themselves.

Animal carers affected by natural disasters are not the only ones who stand to benefit from a rejection of zero-sum anthropocentrism and a more comprehensive approach to rendering assistance. Many of the same goods and harms described above also apply to carers fleeing war or intimate partner violence, or facing long term hospitalization, entry into an assisted living facility, or incarceration. Additionally, many street-involved persons live with companion animals and report prioritizing the pet's physiological needs above their own when resources do not exist to meet both.644 Human responsibility toward non-human Creation and to one another arises out of Creation’s relationship to the common Creator who is, as Trinity, inherently relational. Although Noah could have built a boat to house his human family in a matter of weeks, he laboured for many extra years to create an ark large enough to deliver human and non- human animals alike to safety. In the Church’s own response to floods, winds, fire, and other crises, it must remember humanity’s priestly responsibility to God’s other creatures. The needs of human beings and of other animals, particularly those who have evolved alongside humanity as companions, are inextricably intertwined in a Creation that is inherently relational.

5.6 Conclusion

Tom Regan’s Case for Animal Rights has been critiqued for its reliance on the concept of intrinsic value.645 For secular philosophy, this concept is ungrounded, nebulous, too esoteric.

Where does this value come from? Value to whom? Creatures with no obvious utility to human

644 Leslie Irvine, My Dog Always Eats First: Homeless People and Their Animals (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2015), 2. 645 Helmer, “Speaking Theologically of Animal Rights,” 127.

251 beings may nevertheless have value to one another or to their environment, as participants in an inherently relational ecosystem, but it is difficult to convincingly appeal to this sort of horizontal, local value in order to compel human consideration of non-human interests when conflict arises.

An ethic grounded in a Trinitarian relational ontology evades the necessity for moral proscriptions and a comprehensive rights theory, providing a lens through which moral decisions can be evaluated. The imitation of the love between the three Persons of the Trinity, living as

Imago Trinitatis, shapes the interaction between humanity and other animals. An ontological ordering toward a personal, relational God anchors the idea of intrinsic value or inherent goodness, answering the questions of Regan’s detractors, restoring logic to the concept of value, and offering a stronger impetus for human recognition of and response to it.

The moral considerability of non-human animals arises from God Godself to Whom humanity is already, uncontestedly (in theological circles) subject. If, as Balthasar writes, special difference is willed by God as a reflection of the diversity of the Trinity but also dissolves in God, leaving only unity reflective of the oneness of the Trinity, then the Christian working to bring about Heaven on earth ought consider also their interaction with the world external to their own species.646 The analogous relationship of Heaven and earth begins to unravel when one views the non-human world as inferior, servile, the means to an exclusively human end. Concepts of the Imago Dei that highlight human uniqueness through an emphasis on animal alterity and subordination impede recognition of the telos of non-human Creation and of humanity itself as Priest of Creation. Other animals become instruments in the salvation history of a single species. As Bader-Saye writes, “[t]heir stories are completely subsumed within the

646 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003), 68.

252 human story, and thus they have no story of their own by which relation to God can be expressed.”647

What Gheaus describes as the “neediness” of both humans and other animals can be understood alternatively as the common condition of fleshly embodiment. She acknowledges that “just like animals, we are born, age, and die; we are not self-sufficient; and we are vulnerable to illness, old age, and disabilities…we all share the need to move, flee from danger, look for food, and enjoy our bodies.”648 What Gheaus is pointing to is life in the body, a life that is inherently relational and that is lived in pursuit of that which will allow the creature to flourish toward its telos. In its priestly role, humanity is entrusted with a moral responsibility to humble itself in service to its fellow creatures. The fulfillment of this vocation requires that the human species be willing to sublimate its own desires to the needs of others where appropriate. It means facilitating the flourishing of other bodies, without regard to their human utility and even at the expense of it. It means investing intellectually and spiritually in learning about the other creatures who share this embodied life and using this wisdom to dismantle anthropocentric assumptions. It means moving beyond abstract concern to consider real world moral questions and craft achievable solutions that take into account the reality of a relational Creation in which human life intersects and overlaps with the lives of other animals.

Helmer notes that the Catholic theological tradition already recognises the inherent goodness of non-human animals as creatures created by God, it already acknowledges that some species of non-human animal are conscious and capable of suffering, it already acknowledges that other animals have interests relevant to their own flourishing, and that human beings have at

647 Bader-Saye, “Imaging God through Peace with Animals: an Election for Blessing,” 3. 648 Gheaus, “The Role of Love in Animal Ethics,” 593.

253 least some duties toward them arising from their dignity as created beings. If this is all true,

Helmer argues, “then the a priori blanket exclusion of non-human animals from consideration as potential moral rights bearers on the basis of species membership can only appear arbitrary.”649

The development of a Catholic theology of non-human animals then involves not so much the alteration or transformation of existing doctrine but the filling of a lacuna, the populating of a space left empty by centuries of preoccupation with humanity. This dissertation encourages

Catholic moral theology beyond abstract concern to a functional recognition of and advocacy for animal Others.

649 Helmer, “Speaking Theologically of Animal Rights,” 123.

Conclusion

In 1967, historian Lynn White, Jr. wrote that “especially in its Western form, Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen.”1 “We shall continue to have a worsening ecologic crisis,” he warned, “until we reject the Christian axiom that nature has no reason for existence save to serve man.”2 White concludes his now famous polemic by calling for recognition of St. Francis of Assisi, a man he describes as a left-wing heretic, as patron saint of ecologists.3 Yet half a century later, the first pope to bear the name Francis published the

Catholic Church’s first comprehensive statement on care for Creation, declaring that “clearly, the

Bible has no place for a tyrannical anthropocentrism unconcerned for other creatures.”4

This dissertation has argued that anthropocentric instrumentalism must indeed be rejected. And with Pope Francis, it has rejected White’s assumption that the axiom is inherently

Christian. It is not heresy to recognise what God repeatedly saw throughout the first Creation story of Genesis—“it is good.” Catholic theology attests to the goodness of Creation, to each, unrepeatable creature fashioned by the common Creator. Anthropocentric views of humanity’s dominion that instrumentalise other creatures, relative latecomers to Christian thought, obscure theological cosmology, distort the telos of non-human Creation, and misunderstand the Imago

Dei, to the mutual detriment ofs humanity and other animals. The goodness of non-human animals arises not from their utility to humanity but from the ontological relationality of being.

All animals exist in loving relationship with the Triune God who is Godself relational. It is this

1 Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Science 155, no. 3767 (March 1967): 1203. 2 Ibid., 1207. 3 Ibid. 1206-1207. 4 Laudato Si’, 68.

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255 love of God for the Creation that imbues humanity and other animals alike with goodness. The telos of non-human animals is not service to humanity but fulfillment in the relationality of the

Trinity.

The problem of anthropocentric instrumentalism within Catholicism cannot, however, be resolved by a flattening of Creation that denies differences between species and equates the goodness of human beings, other animals, plants, and inanimate objects. The dissertation has argued, to the contrary, that recognition of the particular dignity of the human person is essential to articulating an authentic theological anthropology that recognises and facilitates the flourishing of animal Others. The work of theologians Hans Urs von Balthasar and John

Zizioulas facilitates a richer understanding of the goodness of the theocentric, ontologically relational cosmos and of humanity’s role within it. Building on their foundational work, the dissertation has argued that the Imago Dei is not to be understood as a private honour, setting humanity above rest of the cosmos, but as a relational vocation better understood as Imago

Trinitatis. God has bestowed upon humanity a priesthood, calling the human being to unite the world to the love of the Trinity. This vocation—not cognitive capacity or individuality—is what makes the human being unique among God’s creations. It is a uniqueness that calls the human being to service rather than to domination.

Scholars in the modest but growing field of Christian animal theology are moving toward agreement that preservation of human uniqueness is necessary in order to argue that humanity has a special obligation to other animals, an obligation that animals do not have to humanity nor to each other. Animal theologians further agree that traditional views of this uniqueness that tie it to specific capacities of the human organism—reason, language, moral agency—cannot stand up against mounting evidence that these capacities may not be, in fact, unique to the human

256 species. A vocational understanding that recognises humanity instead as Priest of Creation frees human uniqueness from the threat of competition and situates it firmly and theocentrically within the relationality of the cosmic liturgy. Where pioneers of animal theology Andrew Linzey and

David Clough take Christ’s Incarnation as central to establishing both the particular goodness of other creatures—through their mutual fleshly embodiment—and the moral obligations of humanity with regard to them, the dissertation has argued instead for the critical necessity of

Trinitarian relational ontology. The communion of Others represented within the Trinity itself and imaged when humanity becomes Imago Trinitatis points to a relationality that is, as

Zizioulas argues, prior to substance.

This Trinitarian relational ontology cannot remain a matter for scholarly reflection alone but must translate into meaningful instruction for the faithful. The dissertation has considered three contemporary case studies, arguing that a theocentric approach to Catholic ethics that both recognises humanity as Priest of Creation and acknowledges the relationality of Creation serves as a beneficial corrective to existing theories of animal ethics. Ethical arguments from relational concepts such as care or love that fail to take a theocentric turn risk remaining anthropocentric, overemphasising the sentiments of human beings and understating the inherent goodness of other animals. It is the love of the Triune God, not the partiality of humanity, that imbues non-human animals with goodness, making them morally considerable. It is, in turn, God’s bestowal of a cosmic priesthood upon humanity that obliges human beings to take seriously the goods of other animals and to facilitate their flourishing, a flourishing that is, in a relational Creation, inextricably caught up with humanity’s own. As Pope Francis writes:

The human person grows more, matures more and is sanctified more to the extent that he or she enters into relationships, going out from themselves to live in communion with God, with others and with all creatures. In this way, they make their own that trinitarian dynamism which God imprinted in them when they were created.

257

Everything is interconnected, and this invites us to develop a spirituality of that global solidarity which flows from the mystery of the Trinity.5

5 Ladauto Si’, 240.

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