The Reinvention of Patronage Networks in Contemporary Yemen

SHIFTING LIGHT IN THE QAMARIYYA: THE REINVENTION OF PATRONAGE NETWORKS IN CONTEMPORARY YEMEN A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In Government By April Longley Alley, M.A. Washington, DC September 23, 2008 Copyright 2008 by April Longley Alley All Rights Reserved ii SHIFTING LIGHT IN THE QAMARIYYA: THE REINVENTION OF PATRONAGE NETWORKS IN CONTEMPORARY YEMEN April Longley Alley Thesis Advisors: Daniel Brumberg, Ph.D., Steven Heydemann, Ph.D., and Andrew Bennett, Ph.D. ABSTRACT Understanding the dynamics of regimes that combine the external trappings of democracy with the substance of authoritarian rule is a central puzzle facing comparative political scientists. Thus far, much of the literature addressing hybrid regimes has focused on the importance of elections, while neglecting variations in the underlying practice of autocracy. This dissertation moves beyond the focus on elections to explore processes of institutional change and renewal within a particular type of hybrid regime: those dominated by neopatrimonial politics. It asks: Under what conditions do elites in neopatrimonial regimes, who are embedded in networks of patronage, defect by building formal political institutions? And, what impact does their defection have on the existing mode of autocracy? To address these questions, the project inductively constructs a typological theory using comparative and within-case analysis of individual elites in the context of the Yemen. It argues that five variables combine to determine if included elites are likely to defect: 1) the degree of patronage inclusion 2) the type of patronage extended, 3) elite identity, 4) life-cycle position, and 5) an ease of defection index. The details of the typological theory do not travel beyond Yemen, yet the study provides analytical insights that inform the analysis of neopatrimonial regimes more broadly. First, it suggests that not all types of patronage are created equal. Scholars wishing to iii understand the micro-politics of elite bargaining must look beyond an inclusion/exclusion dichotomy to include distinctions in both the degree and type of patronage. Secondly, the project offers a cautionary tale for policymakers and researchers who view defection as a source of democratic change. Powerful elites may choose to defect, but they may do so as a bargaining tactic to reposition themselves in networks of patronage. In these cases, defection may serve to reinvent, rather than attenuate, the existing mode of autocracy. iv This dissertation is the product of a year and three months of fieldwork in the Republic of Yemen. During that time, countless Yemenis opened their hearts, minds, homes, offices, and gat chews to me as I sought to understand their political system. Without their generosity, this project would not have been possible. I am particularly grateful for the insight and assistance of Abdul Ghani al-Iryani, Dr. Saadaldeen Talib, and Dr. Muhammad al-Maitami. In addition to Yemeni friends, I would like to thank my family. To my grandparents who opened their home during the writing process, and to my parents for their steadfast support throughout a long academic journey. Finally, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my husband David, whose overwhelming love, patience, and support have been my foundation and inspiration. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I: Introduction…………………………………………………………………… 1 Chapter II: The Rules of the Game……………………………………………………... 51 Chapter III: Within-type Analysis: A Pool of Potential Defectors…………………… 101 Chapter IV: A Deviant, Yet Promising Case of Defection……………………………. 154 Chapter V: A Politically Prominent Case of Defection……………………………….. 189 Chapter VI: Conclusion……………………………………………………………….. 230 Appendix A……………………………………………………………………………. 249 Appendix B……………………………………………………………………………. 253 Appendix C……………………………………………………………………………. 255 Appendix D……………………………………………………………………………. 257 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………... 259 vi LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Placement of Cases in the Typological Space………………………………… 47 Table 2: Full Property Space for Public Sector Patronage……………………………... 48 Table 3: Full Property Space for Private Sector Patronage…………………………….. 49 Table 4: Full Property Space for Political Patronage…………………………………… 50 vii CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION Understanding the dynamics of regimes that combine the external trappings of democracy with the substance of authoritarian rule is a central puzzle facing comparative political scientists. Thus far, much of the literature analyzing “hybrid” regimes has focused on the importance of elections, because it is in these instances that contradictions and tensions are most acute.1 However, the focus on elections has sidelined questions dealing with the organization of power that animated earlier analysis of non-democratic regimes: i.e. – who rules, how do they rule, and why do they rule?2 While many contemporary non-democratic regimes combine the façade of democracy with the reality of authoritarianism, the underlying practice of autocracy varies, with potentially profound consequences for processes of institutional change and renewal. This dissertation attempts to move beyond the focus on elections to explore the internal dynamics of a particular type of hybrid regime: those dominated by neopatrimonial politics.3 Here, neopatrimonialism is defined as a mode of organizing public authority. More specifically, it is a political system “in which the customs and *A Qamariyya is a type of traditional window design found in the old city of Sana‘a. The window is composed of multi-colored geometric pieces of glass. Qamariyyas are similar to stained glass windows, but they only contain geometric patterns. 1 The term hybrid regime is used by Larry Diamond and others to describe regimes that maintain the external trappings of democracy, but lack the substance of meaningful competition and participation. See, Larry Diamond, “Elections without Democrats: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13:2 (April 2002): 21-35. 2 Richard Snyder, “Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism: The Spectrum of Nondemocratic Regimes,” in Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. Andreas Schedler (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 220. 3 I will use the term “hybrid regime” to refer to a combination of autocracy and democracy. The term neopatrimonialism is used in this study to specify a sub-type of hybrid regimes. 1 patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions.”4 In order to understand both the potential for change at critical junctures (such as elections), and more subtle processes of renewal and maintenance in neopatrimonial systems, it is necessary to disaggregate and analyze the informal patterns of politics, particularly patronage networks, that undergird and often trump formal institutional arrangements. The third wave of democracy brought with it a short-lived optimism that elite bargaining could produce democracy without democrats.5 In the transitions paradigm, elite defection cracked authoritarian regimes, opening the door for pact-making between regime soft-liners and moderates in the opposition and sometimes moving the process of liberalization beyond the original intent of elites.6 The limitations of this model are well known and empirical reality has shown that political change is a highly endogenous process, fraught with history and old institutions.7 4 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 62. 5 Ghassan Salame, ed., Democracy Without Democrats?: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World (London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001). 6 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), and Adam Przeworski, “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy,” in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspective, ed. Guillermo O’Donnell, Phillippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 7 For a critique of the transitions paradigm see: Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transitions Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13:1 (January 2002): 5-21. For a critique of the transitions paradigm in the context of several specific cases, see: Frances Hagopian, "After Regime Change: Authoritarian Legacies, Political Representation, and the Democratic Future of South America," World Politics 45:3 (April 1993): 464-500, Frances Hagopian, “Democracy by Undemocratic Means?” Elites, Political Pacts, and Regime Transition in Brazil, Comparative Political Studies, 23:2 (July 1990): 147-170, John Waterbury, “Democracy Without Democrats? The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East” in Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, ed. Ghassan Salame (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), 24-47, Daniel Brumberg, “Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies in the Arab World,” in Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, ed. Rex Brynen, Baghat Korany and Paul Nobles (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995), 229-59, and Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 82-89. 2 Neopatrimonial

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