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Greece Social Briefing: Greek Public Opinion in 2019 George N ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 14, No. 3 (GR) January 2019 Greece social briefing: Greek Public Opinion in 2019 George N. Tzogopoulos 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 Greek Public Opinion in 2019 The beginning of 2019 finds all opinion polls in Greece anticipate a victory of New Democracy in the next national election. But the inability of the main opposition party and its leader Kyriakos Mitsotsakis to inspire the society give the opportunity to SYRIZA and Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras to fight hard ahead of the national election. Many undecided voters could perhaps make their final decision in the next months comparing the performance of SYRIZA and New Democracy on several policy areas. The Prespes Agreement does not currently facilitate the attempt of Tsipras to change the political game but the issue might not be on the agenda a few months later. The role of public opinion in Greece will be critical during 2019. As the national election is looming, Greek citizens will decide about the next political landscape. Although both the European Parliament and regional elections will take place this year (May), attention is certainly being directed towards the national one. At the time of writing the main opposition New Democracy is having a clear lead in all opinion polls. For example, the European Parliament’s Public Opinion Monitoring Unit recently published a report showing that – in January – the conservative opposition, which is a member of the European People’s Party, saw its popularity average come in at a high of 39.2 percent, while SYRIZA, which is a member of the European United Left, trailed at 25 percent. As far as smaller parties are concerned, neo-Nazi Golden Dawn came third with 7 percent, the Movement for Change fourth with 6.8 percent and the Greek Communist Party (KKE) fifth with 6.4 percent. According to the same report, smaller parties such as the Popular Unity, the Union of Centrists and Independent Greeks are not expected to surpass the necessary 3 percent and enter Parliament. Additional firms anticipate relatively similar results (on the basis of their methodological criteria). A January survey organized by Opinion Poll exhibits New Democracy received 31.5 percent of the vote, while SYRIZA 16.5 percent. The survey put support for Golden Dawn at 4.3 percent, KKE at 4.1 percent and the Movement for Change at 3.8 percent. On the same wavelength, according to a February Metron Analysis poll for To Vima newspaper, 28.4 percent of respondents said they would vote for New Democracy, compared with 19.2 percent who would cast a vote for SYRIZA. The far right Golden Dawn party came third with 6.9 percent, the Movement for Change fourth with 5.4 percent, and KKE fifth with 4.7 percent. Last but not least, Interview firm presented another survey for Vergina TV at the beginning of 1 February which demonstrates a difference of 10.2 percentage points between SYRIZA (21.1 percent) and New Democracy (31.1 percent). The following percentages were 6.4 percent for Golden Dawn, 5.5 percent for KKE and 5.2 percent for the Movement for Change. The image of SYRIZA is currently being damaged by the Prespes Agreement, although this accord opens a new political chapter in relations between Greece and North Macedonia. The sensitivity of many Greeks about the name ‘Macedonia’ makes them skeptical concerning the initiative of SYRIZA to solve the issue by making some concessions. An opinion poll carried out by Pulse on behalf of SKAI TV demonstrates 62 percent of respondents believed the name deal was ‘probably bad’ or ‘definitely bad’. The afore-mentioned survey of Metron Analysis also finds 71 percent of respondents would only refer to the neighboring North Macedonia as Skopje, the name of its capital. Furthermore, the survey of Interview firm shows 22.3 percent of respondents believed New Democracy’s stance on the debate about the Prespes Agreement was good while 12.6 percent said this had been the case for SYRIZA. While the majority of firms predict a clear victory of New Democracy, some exceptions do exist. Vox Pop Analysis company did recently publish the results of its research in the weekly newspaper Documento (this newspaper is supporting SYRIZA). In this case, the difference between the two parties does not appear to as large as in other opinion polls. In particular, 27.5 percent of respondents opt for SYRIZA and 29.5 percent for New Democracy in the ‘intention to vote’ question. More importantly, this survey presents SYRIZA as gradually boosting its popularity (from 23.8 percent in July 2018 and 26 percent in September 2018 to 29.5 percent in January 2019). By contrast, New Democracy percentages remain stable (from 28.4 percent in July 2018 and 29.5 percent in September 2018 to 29.5 percent in January 2019). It is interesting that Vox Pop Analysis predicts a tight electoral battle despite the interpretation of the Prespes accord by the majority of Greek citizens which it also depicts as negative. The poll finds 64 percent of respondents thought the deal would not serve Greece’s national interest. Can SYRIZA change the game? The immediate question that is raised is whether SYRIZA will be able to change the game in the next months or the lead of New Democracy will prove irreversible. Although unexpected political developments can happen, a closer look at the details of the results of surveys can offer useful insights about current trends. For the purpose of this analysis, two surveys producing different results, namely the one of Metron Analysis (difference between SYRIZA and New Democracy is measured to be 9.2 percent) and that of Vox Pop Analysis (difference between 2 SYRIZA and New Democracy is measured to be 2 percent) can be compared. In both cases the percentage of undecided voters remains high though. It is 11.4 percent in the survey of Metron Analysis and 13.9 percent in that of Vox Pop Analysis. The behavior of undecided voters could judge the result of the national election. A proportional distribution of the votes of undecided voters in line with results offered in the ‘intention to vote’ question could be risky. The lead of New Democracy in opinion polls does not mean Greek citizens are deeply satisfied with its performance and that of the leader of the party Kyriakos Mitsotakis. The Metron Analysis survey which finds that more Greeks prefer Mitsotakis (30 percent) than Tsipras (19 percent) to be the new prime minister does also focus on the former’s problematic record. 60 percent of respondents disagree with his handling of politics. For its part, the Vox Pop Analysis poll demonstrates more Greeks prefer Tsipras (29.2 percent) than Mitsotakis (28.4 percent). Generally speaking, both polls reflect the reserved stance of several respondents to applaud the leader of the main opposition party while Premier Tsipras naturally sees his profile damaged after four years in power. In the next months ahead of the national election Tsipras is expected in invest in polarization in order to send a clear message to disenchanted supporters of SYRIZA to vote for the party again. It cannot be now anticipated how this effort will impact on undecided voters, especially those identifying themselves as belonging to the political center. According to the Metron Analysis poll, many voters, who have not yet decided which party they will support in the national election, supported several parties in 2015 (SYRIZA: 13 percent, New Democracy: 6 percent, Democratic Alliance: 4 percent, KKE: 3 percent, To Potami: 2 percent etc. or abstained). No doubt, most Greeks are not happy with current economic conditions (41 percent are pessimistic according to Metron Analysis). But if they decide to vote, they will have to make a comparison between the political parties. They will have to examine which party better serves their personal interests as well as the national ones. Within this context, the Vox Pop Analysis firmed asks citizens how the valued SYRIZA and New Democracy on specific areas of policy. New Democracy is having the lead in questions regarding better security (34,7 percent as opposed to SYRIZA’s 24.3 percent), perspectives for growth (35 percent as opposed to SYRIZA’s 26.9 percent) and the reduction of unemployment (30.3 percent as opposed to SYRIZA’s 29.5 percent). But SYRIZA is also preserving the lead in other areas. These include the fight against corruption (29.3 percent in comparison to New Democracy’s 19.4 percent), fair taxation (26.8 percent in comparison to New Democracy’s 25.6 percent), social policy (30.8 percent in comparison to New Democracy’s 23.4 percent) and labor conditions (30 percent in comparison to New 3 Democracy’s 19.8 percent). Obviously, balanced answers as the ones discussed above might arguably challenge New Democracy’s superiority in view of the next national election. Conclusion Polling firms measuring and analyzing the attitude of the Greek public opinion miserably failed in the past. But the results of their research remains the only available tool to discuss the potential electoral behavior of citizens. The lead of New Democracy is unquestionable but – at the same time – the main opposition party and its leader Kyriakos Mitsotakis can hardly inspire the society, particularly undecided voters. This gives SYRIZA and Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras the opportunity to fight hard in the pre-election period.
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