SCRIPT – SPEECH SQN LDR ASHCROFT SLIDE 2 - INTRODUCTION While recent conflicts have demonstrated tactical excellence, military analysts such as Stringer and Ritchie have criticised the lack of scholarly input into this area of study that does not fully explain how AP will succeed at the operational level. It has become more pronounced since campaigning in Operation Telic (2003), where there has been a disruption from senior leaders on air centric strategies adopted since the end of the Cold War. I believe the issue is one of Command Leadership (or Generalship), more specifically airpower being used to its full exploitation at all levels of war. The corollary to this is that command ethos is somehow pushed down the line, and not explored as an organisation. Historiography provides a rich heroic narrative of successful Air Generals in the past; Trenchard, Douhet, Mitchell to name a few. The narrative certainly reflects the ‘big man theory’ and personalises the theorists by championing the warrior elite of the pilot culture. The cultural limitations Post Second World War suggests a lack of Air Generalship because there have been fewer people to inform and influence success. Instead, it would appear the void has been partly filled by extensive leadership studies and doctrine pamphlets without a firm grasp behind the nature of what it means. One of the key issues is that middle management of the air forces who can shape and influence strategic thinking and opinion, has been limited to literature that does not fully codify or interpret command leadership. It offers scholars little insight into the cultural relationship with its airman and how war is waged. The nature of warfare today needs to consider how command leadership has evolved in the new setting, particularly when and how to employ lethal force. I want to explore if there has indeed been a dénouement of Air Generalship since WW2. And, if so what can be done to prepare the RAF for contingent operations. SLIDE 3 – CIRCUMSTANCE OF WAR Clausewitz astutely discerned that war and its inherent complexity is inexorably changing. War is less distinct and slightly foreshortened than the traditional means of inter-state warfare, blurring compression lines between all three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. Events in Syria, and the intra-state conflict in Ukraine shows conflict has moved on from the ‘AfPak’ wars of the Obama Administration. Limited war and counter insurgency (COIN) now dominate the political agenda, where there is an increasing requirement to balance overseas presence with power projection aspirations in meeting national military objectives. The fictional world in Singer’s World War 3 novel ‘Ghost Fleet’ is a prescient view in how decisive strategic effect with tactical level actions using striking power of technology to find and locate critical targets in the littoral battle space is critical. There is a fundamental need to train and select Air Commanders to think for themselves in these future air and space environments, and to command their airman appropriately. SLIDE 4 – COMMAND LEADERSHIP There have been many attempts to interpret Generalship or Command leadership, understand scope of the term, and develop a baseline, past and present of what constitutes acceptable ‘Air Generalship’. The most compelling definition comes from Fuller, the last notable author to refer to it as ‘Generalship’. He argued it is made up of the physical, intellectual and moral, which can be synthesised into two generalisations: personal leadership and professional capacity.
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My best interpretation is the Officers Trinity HERE. It represents the need for commanders to have vision to deal with complex issues, conceptual and abstract thought and the need to think above the tactical concerns of a unit commander. Only a few commanders will emerge who are outstanding on all 3 levels. The RAF recognises leadership as an intellectual activity to strengthen service ethos but has done very little in developing strategy above leadership style. Stringer confirmed this in 2014 arguing that ‘Air Generals’ (those who lead the RAF on operations), had presented a unique set of demands of commanding air operations that required an improved education and training focus for those destined to lead. Without it, Stringer asserts Air Generals would be destined to think like line mangers rather than airpower strategists. What training on operational design that does exist at military staff college plays a huge emphasis on campaign planning; criticised as linear in process and divorced from the strategic realities of the situation. There is also no provision for a specific ‘Generals course’ in the RAF to promote this knowledge and prepare air senior officers for their future Air General careers. Instead, this would be overcome from personal and professional experience. To get around the problem air forces promote their pilots in the hope that by accident it will help prepare them for the highest airpower appointments. Command leadership in the RAF can be summed in three veins: strategic leadership providing Grand - Strategic direction (Chief or Air Staff), C2 at the operational and tactical level (Air Officer Commanding) delivering grand strategic intent, and senior leadership teams. Fundamental to Generalship is C2 - the kernel of their activity. Command is an act of will, based on considerations outside the system it is commanding. Like a radiator, control is the ability to adjust, which means knowing what is actually happening and having some means of affecting it. Whilst both are separate entities, deciding what to do affects the act of command. In command, the aim for Air Commanders is to balance tactical joint air C2 in the Joint Operating Area (JOA). Execution of such activities would be decentralised through air command control systems (C2S). The challenge to this principle is how closely the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) wishes to manage its strategic efficiency at the expense of flexible campaign planning. Redefining how the RAF applies operational art in its strategic thinking within a JFACC appointment could arrest the problem. This would involve the application of JFACC’s strategy into an operational design integrating key activities at all levels of war. Like an artist creating a painting, the commander confronts the challenge by developing a campaign that is easily understood. Concept and practice of command leadership is therefore at the heart of the matter. Scholars such as Mahoney suggest lack of Generalship is attributable to low organisational confidence. The RAF as an organisation may not be helping. Stringer and Ritchie assert that since the Second World War the RAF has eschewed the need to develop strategic theory, which stems from its cultural beginnings as an independent air force from Trenchard himself. Post 1917 a counter culture existed where the public-school system (like the Army) filtered down permeating the organisation and encouraging maverick behaviour and high jinks. High confidence was seen through to the Second World War but following the Cold War it is suggested that organisational confidence has dipped during more frequent jointery in conflicts post 1990s. WHY IS THIS? The issue seems to be the Cold War itself yet to apply lessons from the past - such as Kosovo in the 1990s. Even the Coningham Keyes project (post Operation Telic) failed to resolve C2 issues in airpower as it prepared the RAF for fighting existential threats following
2 the Cold War. NATO and the air force had been designed to fight the Red Army as it swarmed over the plains of Europe. Everyone knew what to do in their Single Service (Ss) bubble and when it needed to be done. There was a broad acceptance of Ss capabilities and a high degree of organisational confidence: the Navy focused on deterrence with Trident, the RAF on strategic bombing in its airpower roles, and the Army on land manoeuvre. The rigid nature of airpower delivery during the Cold War was simple but understood despite question marks over its integration into a joint operational design. When the Warsaw pact collapsed NATO had to prepare for something else of which no one could specify. Traditional methods of C2 had to be replaced and it was done with mission command and joint operations. SLIDE 5 – ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE Command today covers those aspects of leadership with setting and giving direction predicated on delivering mission command. General Bagwell successfully introduced it into the Army during the mid-80s in response to the flexible response strategies against the Soviets. He also introduced the Higher Command Staff College for its best and brightest officers across all 3 services. However, it would seem mission command has not fully addressed the intellectual chasm with current airpower practice. Redressing the balance requires a review of airpower critical thinking, and much more could be done in the RAFs relationship in gaining the conceptual edge over its sister services. RAF culture is not so different to its sister services as they recruit primarily from the same social levels. There is a clear continuity of leadership influencing ethics post First World War. For example, RAF drill and ceremonial is based on straightforward leadership principles that are the same to the Army and Navy. Similarly, the projection of personality was deemed important to both services; it reflects underlying stereotypes that shape our character and ethos. Barnett suggested this spontaneous emergence of force derived from the basic will power of personality. Admiral Fisher used it to great effect when introducing widespread social justice and efficiency into the Navy at the turn of the century. Similarly, Air Marshal Park and Dowding fashioned a powerful and formidable partnership to help win the Battle of Britain. But here is where the similarities end. Ross Mahoney believes the cause is cultural immersion at initial officer training and how it flows down from senior leadership. Maao saw airforce pilots as glamorous elites, distorted as caricatures in films rather than real warriors: such as the character ‘Lord Flash Hart’ from the Blackadder goes forth series. Laurence in his CBS coverage of Vietnam even saw them as a ‘wild bunch that mixed mischief with ego- centric behaviour in leading men’. By codifying its image around flying the RAF developed a unique identify of its own that reflects this culture. Air Marshal (AM) Curtis once said that pilots are more equal than others, and the preference for pilots in senior command positions solidified post Second World War. Therefore, a distinctive pilot culture has developed with a pervasive expectation of pilot elitism considered essential to maintaining ethos and fighting power.1 Unlike regimental loyalty in the Army, RAF pilots did not identify with the corporate values of the air force on station (based around squadron core values), or a ship in the Navy. This conundrum has never been solved and remains open to debate. What it has done though is influenced the technocratic-minded thinking in the RAF today by drawing on the more bourgeoisie elements of society of well-educated and specialist individuals from grammar schools that are broad minded in outlook. The new RAF, with its increasing dependence on technology (and
1 Flying hours were even logged as part of officers’ annual reports.
3 educated personnel from the middle classes), quickly found that a more relaxed way of working between officers and airman was required instead of the rigid hierarchical system evident in the other services. Furthermore, it could be argued that education and technical mindedness enabled RAF officers to think strategically about the global security environment. Both generalisations of pilot culture and relaxed command structures came about because of the perception that air force and naval officers are more comfortable with concepts than definitions (than the Army) due to the importance of strategic culture. SLIDE 6 – LEVELS OF DOCTRINE Barnett attempts to understand this difference by explaining it in hypothetic constructs: strategic, operational and tactical. In the Army it is defined by distance at intercontinental, theatre or the battlefield. For air force strategist’s levels of warfare are expressed in the intensity of conflict. Therefore, strategic is nuclear, operational and tactical are often merged with progressively lesser levels of non-nuclear conflict differentiated by scale. For navy strategist’s levels of warfare are defined by objectives where distance was of no object. Whether inspired by Jomini, Hart, Clausewitz or Machiavelli, strategic thinking has dominated the doctrine and military pamphlets of air forces thereby influencing how Generals think. To many the connection between the two is not obvious but an important one to understanding the psyche of Air Generalship. Strachan on the other hand refuted the requirement for strategic culture in the military and believed that to understand current practice, command leaders needed strategic theory. He saw command leadership in a power projection narrative played out in the ‘real politik’ of the international order. The independent minded nature of air force spirit was dominated by the ‘offensive’ dialectic without thought to its culture and its spectrum of use. Essential to this concept is the role of purpose, which Freedman saw as being largely unrecognised in most theories of power today. Instead, the plethora of autobiographical accounts from former Generals such as Jackson and Richards has skewed the interpretation of airpower application through the lens of Herrick based experiences. It meant that purpose would feature heavily over the battlefield, but potentially not in the way the air force wants to see it being used than is the case. Strategic culture on the other hand is the production of intended effects (where as leadership lies in the dimensions of intent). The psychological dimension of culture only serves to provide a basis of understanding in the relationship of power to leadership. Strachan argues strategic culture was embedded within the post Second World War cultural legacy of a divided Germany, which caused the emerging security dilemma to conflate the perspective of Generalship. Unfortunately, the historian’s narrow focus on the historical use of strategic bombing and its development has misdirected the utility and doctrinal commitment to working with the other services. The AP1300, for example, looked at integrated bombing rather than strategic bombing, in which it highlighted that airpower could deliver a potent weapon in an offensive role as part of a joint force working together. SLIDE 7 – LIDDELL HART (INFLUENCE OF STRATEGIC THEORY) Therefore, the challenge of this paper has been to link the past with the present, and to provide a tangible understanding to the nature of strategic culture and strategy that informs the analysis. Part of the problem is the way theorists such as Liddell Hart have interpreted strategy in the past and neglected the role of Air Generalship in effect and intent. He argued that direct attacks (involving airpower) would never work on an opponent; instead he advocated a more land based indirect approach of surprise and decisive effort. This does
4 not help the historian in codifying or making generalisations about how air force leaders have been influenced by other strategic cultural factors such as imperial, societal or been affected by strong economic military nations throughout the 20th Century. The author codifies RAF culture as: assumption of independence, and control of the air spirit. Independent thinking has shaped modern day thinking of air force Generals which inculcates self-reliance and adaptability stemming from its inception - current RAF Expeditionary Air Wings (EAW) symbolises this self-reliance. The assumption of RAF independence (1 April 1918) owes itself to the Smuts report, where the RAF sought to link the ethos and technology as a more efficacious means of fighting war. But the effect of the report took time to come to fruition. Only in 1931 was Leigh Mallory able to bridge the cultural gaps between the Army and Navy by calling for air superiority in the battle space and legitimised the use of airpower. Control of the air spirit is more difficult to define. Doctrinally it is offense related that incorporated technological assumptions, underpinning values and beliefs of the RAF. What makes it problematic is interpreting airpower as part of the 3rd dimension. It is characterised by the technological advantage over the adversary and based around the most efficient way of conducting war. This technology is organised into systems, large and varied requiring well-qualified individuals to service and fix the aircraft capable of working and thinking independently. Even Liddell Hart in his 1925 work, ‘Paris and use of war’, supported the efficient application of air doctrine to win war recognising the need for technologically minded people; an argument that is still going on with UAVs today. SLIDE 8 – EDUCATION & RELATIONSHIP WITH ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE Doctrine was understood through education. The socialisation through staff colleges allows the transfer of critical cultural values and protects and promote as a capability. During 1930- 31, Trenchard provided a practical framework to air force spirit to emphasise the human element and develop the conceptual component. Teaming up with Henderson and Sykes he pushed this cultural change because they were heavily involved in the detailed work of the Smuts report. They believed that the Squadron organisation should promote a regimental identity, but also adopt a corporate stance to ensure survival of the essential air force spirit. To do this military education nurtured officers to defend independence. Trenchard enunciated the importance of training and linked it to the pillars of development of personnel that occurred during the intellectual changes of the Cardwell and naval military reforms in the late 19th Century. Pivotal to our understanding of command leadership, therefore, is not just strategic theory, but strategic culture and its link to the development of Air Generalship. Most academics such as Maao and Mahoney concede that the basic assumptions regarding theory and culture are made up of many intangibles that form part of the ethos within an organisation. The ethos does not exist in strict isolation, but, is in a mutual interactive relationship with each other. SLIDE 10 – AIR COMMANDERS & CONCEPTUAL COMPONENT Key qualities identified were: Courage, Vision and Decisiveness. Firstly, courage requires both physical and moral which is shaped by good judgement and influenced by steely determination. Trenchard was imbued with this quality when he stoically defended the need for an independent air force during the inter war years. Fuller
5 attributes Trenchards vision of air mindedness as essential to the joint working environment, or the ability to operate independently from the other services. Equally, General Moseley also demonstrated the strength of character by making better use of airpower during Operation Anaconda in the first phase of the Afghanistan campaign in 2002. A firm believer in the independent use of airpower and joint operations, he achieved this by coordinating the disparate elements of airpower effectively. Secondly, the ’do this’ (or decisiveness) factor alludes to the degree of faith that his subordinates have in the commander’s knowledge. General Swarzkopf allowed General Chuck Horner during Gulf War 1 a large amount of mission command to plan the air campaign with little meddling by politicians. Conscious of the failings from Vietnam, he painfully remembered how American Generals had failed to develop a strategy for Vietnam, which in turn led to bad command leadership because Ss parochialism did not develop a unified and coherent recommendation to the president. It spawned a flawed pursuit of a conventional war to defeat the insurgency from the North. General Horner was determined not to make the same mistake. He did this successfully through media superiority and engagement which added more pressures proving another skill the General must master in shaping opinion of him and, how operations are tackled. It has added complexity to decision making and meant every action is open to scrutiny. Diplomacy as a facet of strategic leadership was added. General Eisenhower proved adept at this quality managing senior officer relationships during campaigning in North West Europe 1944-45. Similarly, General Horner had to develop effective political and military relationships to cohere the coalition relationship. This required him to be skilful and effective at relationship management, but also amenable to the public. Horner had ‘CNN factor’, media friendly, recognising the heroic narrative (such as good luck stories) around the conflict to improve morale. This resonates with many pre-war theorists who supported the propaganda value of fighter pilot aces. Finally, the introduction of war has brought challenges requiring vision. This encompasses the need for experience, knowledge and techniques to develop greater knowledge of ‘knowing’ the enemy. Douhet was expansive, if sometimes ethereal in his thoughts and aphorisms; drawing on his personal experiences and knowledge from WW1 to influence and shape European bombing theory during the 1930s. Despite both their perspicacity military leadership punished them for their visionary expression. This maverick style of constructive dissent is possibly missing in today’s leaders in challenging orthodoxy. Douhet and Mitchell possessed a similar passion of strategic bombing which was shaped around early air doctrine. This focused on striking the war making capabilities of industrialised nations in the air rather than the land domain which offered no guarantee of victory. Aircraft offered an alternative to the static nature of trench warfare by attacking the key vital centers of an enemy’s war making ability. It illuminated how early airpower theorists such as Douhet and Billy Mitchell influenced airpower doctrine during the locust years of the 1920s and recognised the airplanes potential to transform warfare. These early airmen expressed many of the core tenants of airpower that have become central to conceptual thinking today. While some scholars view Douhet more of a prophet and theorist, Mitchell developed a more precise and plausible theory of strategic bombing in his targeting policy. Similarly, General Michael Ryan expressed intellectualisation of war. Following Operation Deliberate Force in 1999, using lessons of intelligence, he nurtured the JFACCs, by bringing in retired generals with experience commanding air operations to mentor future JFACCs. Like Trenchard his air mindedness was expressed in the training
6 environment. Among a number of other key conceptual developments was the introduction of the Airborne Expeditionary Force (AEF), much like the RAF’s EAW concept that made deployments more predictable and creating a sense of stability. His creative intelligence meant that he could gauge an understanding of the larger aspects of war required for great Generalship. But, the taxonomy of qualities perhaps overlooks the relationship to the nuclear revolution and liberal democracy (civil-military relationship) ensnared into an existential struggle with the Soviet Union. In the Cold War civilian neo- realist strategists such as Schelling and Osgood had a huge impact on military thinking. The move towards the offensive and defensive nuclear dialectic fostered distinct limited war thinking in the 50s and 60s. It deprived battlefield victory in the traditional sense and turned war into a mechanistic process predicated on an Armageddon timetable of response that was deterministic in outcome. Civil – military complexities within a democratic environment, therefore, affect the practice of Generalship in the field. As General de Gaulle observed, ‘strategic success in war requires a consensus ..between politicians and the military’. Cohen and Press argue this ‘unequal dialogue’ means execution of Generalship difficult in an environment when dealing with an enemy that adapts in a rapidly uncertain campaign. Tension between the Army Staff and the White House emerged over strategy in Iraq in 2006 – 2007, and the political dismissal of General McChrystal by President Obama in 2011 demonstrate that, despite a veneer of consensus, civil–military relations always carry undercurrents of friction. Based on these factors has Air Generalship withered on the vine? Evans would agree. He views the principle of successful generalship (laid down by General Marshall in the Second World War) as having declined. The hallmarks of the Marshall system included controlling senior officer appointments; high professional standards; accountability for command decision- making; and relief of non-performers by the Army Staff. For the USAF it was a similar complaint caused by a lack of intellectual military excellence, to understand the theoretical basis and the intricacies of the strategic level of war. There have been exceptions such as General Ryan and Mosley but few others have emerged to reverse this current trend of thinking in the US forces. SLIDE 11 – THE AIRPOWER TRINITY TO UNDERSTAND if it has declined in the RAF, military analysts need to firstly translate the modern understanding of war into the old paradigm of doing business. The conceptualisation of this is represented here. It highlights the contested conundrum of the 3rd dimension and how airpower is measured and exploited to the maximum potential among a triumvirate of factors: theory, practice and technology (underscored by doctrine, art and science). Whilst technology may have been the driving force in the Cold War, its weakness was in providing deterrence capability at the expense of developing long-term strategic tenets and doctrine for a different type of military conflict. Today, commanders are alert to the effects of employing airpower, but limited in ability to collect, understand, and assess data to measure the psychological effects it seeks to achieve within this 3rd dimension. Many of the Army Commanding Officers (COs) deployed to Afghanistan during Operation Herrick referred to it as ‘on the job training’, admitting to needing an appreciation of the enemy that is involved in both military and foreign policy planning. Lack of appreciation (such as Operation Ellamy proved) has therefore meant Air Generals have struggled coming to terms in understanding new adversaries such as Gadhafi, a Milosevic, or counter insurgency (such as Daesh) leader.
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Beagle argues too much technology has severed the link between the tactical, operational and strategic levels blurred by recent Air-Land Herrick experiences. The heavy reliance military commanders have placed on expensive intelligence assets to mitigate risk, has allowed the notion of ‘operating’ on the ground to become confused with the operational level. The conduct of tactical level RAF operations has become an end in themselves or to no higher intent, design or banal purpose – memorably described by a Task Force Helmand Brigade Commander as ‘mowing the lawn’. To expand the zone of operational execution Generalship would have to develop operational art, arguably lost since the end of the Cold War. This should ideally consist of a C2 system (i.e. a stronger operational level than the current operations suggest) which is enabled by CAS (the tactical effect) to better aid the mission (the strategic effect). Why is this? McNamara asserts the RAF lost some of its integrated closeness to the Army during the 1990s in its drive to control airpower centrally at the theatre level. This may have started in Gulf War 1 when there was a decoupling of conceptual thinking away from the operational level from the influence of USAF. Colonel Warden developed Global Reach - Global Power theory, which represented a shift away from operational employment of airpower to a global/strategic focus containing operational and strategic air campaign elements during Gulf War 1. It was assessed that the Global Reach - Global Power concept driven by advances in technology had eliminated airpower traditional limitations allowing it to catch up to the promises of the airpower pioneers. However, this expectation has not been realised through lack of doctrinal developments. Consequently, Carter argued the kinetic use of airpower within this power narrative came at the expense of using airpower at the operational level within guiding doctrinal principles. This may be down to a lack of understanding (or execution) of operational art, or through a lack of theoretical strategic creativity. A plausible theory of the split is that Air Generals have been locked into the imbroglio of a heated and febrile inter-service rivalry that has been running since ‘options for change’ in the 1990s and, follow on Strategic Defence Reviews in 2010 (and 2015). Focus was not on strategic or tactical employment of available instruments, but, more on the fundamental technological power and use of a weapon in the procurement of big-ticket capability platforms such as aircraft carriers or F-35 jets in gaining an edge over the other Ss. Senior military leaders become subsumed in financial management to the detriment of their ability to imaginatively deploy airpower. The prioritisation of niche capabilities, is often cited as an, or even the answer to cash-strapped Defence departments. Stringer asserts at the operational level does not bridge the conceptual shortfalls or ensure that technology will provide the decisive edge. This dichotomy of centralised control with flexibility must be addressed with critical thinking to explore the means of airpower to its greatest exploitation (seen in coercion theory).
Coercion (or compellence) in the 1990s was geared around 2 key phases of war fighting: the emergence of integrated operations with diplomacy (Operation Deliberate Force), and coercion (Operation Allied Freedom). It is like deterrence in that it focuses on influencing the adversary’s decision calculus. Essentially this is concerned with affecting political and military outcomes through indirect military measures – ceasefire, withdrawal of forces or surrender, by states that retain the capacity to carry on in battle. At the conventional level, air and naval forces would be used, while tactical air and ground forces would be shaping events on the battlefield. Coercion can be broken down into 3 key areas: The Schelling Model looking not at destroying the enemy but to shape his thinking into defeat; destroying
8 economic infrastructure; the Douhet model, which is the infliction of high costs to shatter civilian morale and cause citizens to pressure government to stop land denial, and the Interdiction model. This focuses on military vulnerability by attacking rear area targets of importance and is more than likely to achieve coercive effect than the other two models. However, all must not be treated in isolation. Boyd and Pape both view these areas as a lost paradigm to airpower, arguing that Air Generals need to exploit all three models to full effect. But opinion is divided. The consensus amongst coercion theorists is that coercion is no recipe for success and that it is ‘harder than deterrence’. Jakobsen blames the theorists for lack of success, arguing coercive theory provides a poor understanding of prosecuting coercive war. However, this view does not consider the impact of limited war thinking and the pervasive use of technology in recent conflicts. Moreover, while Generals may have a grasp of coercive war strategies they may not have the opportunity to demonstrate great Generalship. Scholars need now to reassess how airpower is employed and why technology has been leaned on in recent campaigns. This is reflected in the number of precision bombs dropped (35%) in Kosovo compared with Gulf War One (8%). Similarly, CAS support was 75% in Operation Telic. This is a rising trend that has continued in current operations. During Operation Inherent Resolve 79% of targets destroyed were dynamic relying on fast air. Evidence show a heavy emphasis on dynamic targeting rather than fixed targeting, and that the RAF is being stove piped into fully supporting narrow CAS functions of dynamic targets. However, while the ability to generate mass and flexibility is crucial there is view by Stringer that it has led to a flat lining of UK capability and a deviation from traditional airpower doctrine. The Air-Land relationship is an indelible part to command relationships, but not necessarily driving the right environment for the development of Generalship qualities. This is complicated by the need to ensure the conflict remains limited and accept that restrictions on the military will be politically essential; and that technologically advanced forces will have to be deployed (increasingly relied upon) at quick readiness at the decisive place. SLIDE 12 – V BOMBER FORCE Air Vice Marshall (AVM) Torpey commented that the RAF has ‘forgotten all that was good’ from the Cold War, in terms of organisational confidence, while lessons have not been learnt from the Balkans of the 1990s regarding interoperability and coercive strategies. It is from this baseline of perceived ill preparedness today that comparisons can be drawn. V Bomber Force The use of V Bombers has parallels with the Second World War bombing offensive, where the requirement for control of the air was universally recognised. During the late 50s and early 60s the strategic element of the RAF was assigned to NATO in the nuclear role as the V-Bomber force. A key issue, however, was C2 of the nuclear weapons themselves that veered between reliability and safety of the weapon and its system. The C2 of nuclear arsenals by Strategic Air Command (SAC) returned to checklists and Ss rivalry with fighter command. SAC in USAF surfaced as the dominant services to control and introduce labyrinthine safety procedures on nuclear weapons. Paradoxically, the thirst for safety and need for implementing checklists centralised the decision-making process that potentially stymied freedom of thinking for commanders – thereby increasing accidents. At its inception Air Chief Marshal (ACM), Slessor oversaw the transition to the thermonuclear age based on his 1952 Global Strategy paper. Undeniably a great influence on RAF
9 doctrine through his phrase ‘the Great Deterrent’, his unpopular decision did however create a revival of relations with the US that assisted in creating a joint nuclear policy following President Eisenhower and the ‘New Look’ approach. This was a great success in reducing the scale and cost of war towards limited wars and getting away from ‘Balance forces’ so that they could afford to maintain without breaking themselves. According to Professor Howard, neither Brodie or Liddell Hart or any other strategic thinker was in a position to translate their ideas directly into policy as Slessor during the vital years 1950-52. The British Empire required the active application of airpower all over the world. But here lay the problem. By the late 1950s, the absence of a clear targeting policy and the stockpiling of weapons had created a C2 problem with Bomber Command. The Army, Navy and RAF had done little to coordinate their efforts, which meant duplication of plans including with NATO. At stake was whether command structure be centralised or decentralised, city busting, or counter force? There was little uptake by Air Generals in Bomber Command in dealing with this conundrum that applied very little thought to the way coercive strategy would be used. Saundby referred to the use of ballistic missiles as adding a new dimension to warfare. However, evidence from Pape would suggest otherwise. In meeting the Douhet model of Pape’s coercive strategy showed it was strategic in nature, but it did very little to assist the land forces. Like the prevalence of CAS culture today, use of the V force did not utilise the full range of how airpower should be employed by Generals and was narrowly focused on capability (the power narrative) over influence methods. As an instrument of policy, self- deterrence, may have avoided war but the logic inconsistency of his live and let live approach was never resolved or answered if nuclear war was to break out. His use of the V force in pre-emptive strikes were keeping damage to acceptable proportions at least so they thought until thermonuclear weapons were developed by the Soviets. In comparison, Operation Deliberate Force that provided strengths and diplomacy in exploiting airpower. This operation was the epitome of minimum force that succeeded in winning hearts and minds with minimum use of violence. It is in assessing this relationship between targeting and desired political effect that lies at the heart of coercive strategy. SLIDE 13 – CASE STUDY IN THE BALKANS Coercion in the Balkans (NATO power) Operation Deliberate Force was the NATO campaign against Bosnian Serb forces in 1995. The RAF contributed 9.3% to the total sorties - a significant contribution to the Serb leadership’s decision to enter negotiations at Dayton. The warring factions were forced, through the forceful use of airpower, to accept the UN brokered framework agreement. This was the first use of offensive airpower in Europe since 1945 and the first instance in which Billy Mitchell’s industrial web theory was applied in what Sullivan referred to as the ‘critical component theory’ A key lesson from this conflict is that it can defeat or lower an adversary’s confidence by preventing it from achieving its military objectives and change the enemy decision making. Such a ‘denial’ strategy focus means it reduces the chances of an adversary’s unwanted behaviour. The historical record offers strong support for Pape’s thesis that neutralising an adversary’s ability to achieve its desired ends through force is critical to coercion, and that such denial is a key contribution that airpower can make to coercion. Successful denial, Sullivan argued required defeating the enemy’s particular strategy, not just simply stopping its conventional military forces force on the plains of Europe. The key lesson is to evaluate individual coercive instruments and their effectiveness in each crisis, including strategic
10 goals set by the adversary and whether those goals are vulnerable to military force. It is this area of airpower which Air Generalship must apply C2. Despite its limited impact on Milosevic in 1999, AP was pivotal in the campaign and was able to leverage the local balance of forces in Bosnia and Kosovo in favour of NATO. Such a strategy, however, requires the existence of a viable indigenous or allied force that the coercing power can support. Strikes on C2 facilities also proved effective despite assertions by military analysts that the operation was viewed as a cheap and easy military solution. Grant described it as “a drive-by shooting with cruise missiles”. But this accusation perhaps undersells the success of the campaign. The use of airpower, coordinated to exploit third-party threats serves to impose immediate damage on an adversary and deny it from resisting using threats. The most publicised advantage of airpower is that it can improve domestic support by lowering the likelihood of casualties and concerns about civilian suffering through its ability to conduct precision operations. In sum, policymakers and Generals must consider not only what they seek to accomplish through coercion, but also what they seek to prevent. As the Balkan contest proves, airpower prosecuted effectively can preclude an adversary from doing what they want. To achieve this Air Generals must recognise the need to balance ground and air forces’ together including the different types of aircraft used. At the same time it must also maintain its independent status that is coordinated with the other services. SLIDE 14 – PREPARING FUTURE AIR COMMANDERS A comparison to the other services elicits little else to prepare future Air Commanders. The RAF is now at a size that its commitment to Operation Shader may currently rule out a wider role - for example providing air superiority to ground forces concurrently in another campaign. While a popular view, relying on the allure of the niche brought on by the constraints above may be a misleading one, which rests largely on an analysis of supporting Washington’s intent. The Libyan campaign showed that the UK Government was provided with policy and military options that included a range of air and maritime Intelligence Assets, Strike and C2 capability which afforded the UK a level of Influence from the Grand Strategic to the tactical. Having gone from these opportunities, Stringer believes that configuring war fighting to value added niche capabilities represents a gamble to how Commanders can execute operations in the future. It would also limit UK influence with the US when it matters most at the Grand Strategic level. How do Air commanders conceptualise problem of operational design? Firstly, setting the conditions in operations, circumstances and influences must consider an air minded culture so that Air Generals can agree on an air-centered language. In articulating the threat airhman have tended to believe that a generic, metaphor-based strategy will work repeatedly, and thus challenge Winston Churchill's observation that ‘airpower is the most difficult of all forms of military force to measure, or even to express in precise terms’. However, the average air force officer still lacks a pure vocabulary or lexicon in which to analyse airpower theory, including confusing theory with doctrine. This may be down to the long-standing dependence of air force officers on Army terminology and advocates of land-based power. The term ‘interdiction’, for example, illustrates the point. Interdiction is ‘an action to destroy, disrupt, divert or delay the enemy’s surface potential against friendly forces, or otherwise achieve its objectives. Unfortunately, this definition
11 overlooks the potential of waging an interdiction campaign with airpower, and wrongly presupposes the goal of war is to destroy the enemy army, and that air operations are ‘mere prologues to this necessary act’. Geography as critical - in particular location of C2. The United States Africa Command based at Stuttgart, Germany is far from the regional stability operations it conducts in Africa. Dislocation does allow the Combined Air Operations Centre to shift from one area to another swiftly for air force purposes (Operation Herrick to Shader), but this may not suit the land campaign effort or key leadership engagement. This dislocation is referred to as ‘logic of circumstance’ meaning senior leadership are isolated from reality; like the chateaux generals of the First World War, characterised by detachment, moderation and power of analysis. Lord Mountbatten understood this clearly by moving the CINC post HQ from the Middle East to the Far East in 1944 thereby creating an effective and efficient command structure between General Slim and Air Marshal (AM) Park to deliver Air Supply operations to 14th Army. This meant he had leadership presence and influence where it mattered. SLIDE 15 – C2 @ 83 EAG Similarly, not having influence in key appointments (like Mountbatten did) in the CAOC, Al Udeid has relegated the role of the RAF’s EAG concept to FGen and deployment. It is responsible for most UK air operations in the Operations Kipion and Shader JOA. Whilst it is situated appropriately at Al Udeid it is only blistered onto the CAOC where the AOC serves as a contingent commander towards the Combined Joint Force Air Component Commander (CJFACC); and largely remains situated in a ‘voyeuristic’ leadership role providing penny packets of airpower on request by the JFACC. Instead, AOCs in the RAF should be in a position to develop theatre campaign plans and insert key appointments. SLIDE 16 – LESSONS CONT’D Use of the phrase ‘independent’ has turned into a pejorative expression. In terms of providing a forward presence and emphasising the projection of power the RAF has not developed its strategic bombing concepts beyond supporting the land campaign. Like the French air force of the early 20s, Vennasson argues that the issue is down to the hegemony of the Army, (larger budgets and influence) and the centralisation of its decision-making in the predominant role of security policy. Extrapolate this thinking to today, the centralised institutional filter from Air-Land dominance of Ss rivalry has arguably shaped Air Generalship goals towards tactical operations seen in current ops. Finally, Carter and Sullivan cite history as important for Air Commanders to study and deal with current issues of possible doctrinal decline. In the 1930s, the drift towards an offensive ideology neglected the experimental testing and detailed planning within a coercive strategy. Its failure to develop operational plans led to a mismatch in projected employment concepts and actual capabilities of its independent bomber fleet which came to light against Germany in 1937. ACM Slessor’s flawed pursuit of the offense in the 1950s also led to unexpected operational and potentially strategic consequences also seen in the failed bombing raids against Berlin in January-March 1944. That being said, what would develop the strategic bombing concepts necessary to bridge the conceptual gap in making this a workable framework for Air Generals? The ‘thinking to win’ strategy introduced by AVM Stringer in 2014 sets out to bridge the gap. The idea has all the right intent but requires significant momentum at the station level so that it is not viewed as rhetoric. Rather than a refresh this is cultural change and has widened the scope to the broader aspects of leadership at all levels, to develop its strategic thinking to
12 airman. It is not a road map to success, but an attempt to enthuse and encourage debate in the conceptual component. The philosophy recognised other limitations such as a tendency for airman to be risk averse, stifling creativity and not taking bold decisions (stymieing maverick tendencies we see in traditional Generals), discouraging boldness, and innovation that would be career limiting. The challenge is how to allow this all to happen. This does of course mean that the intellectual component is any less than in the Army and Navy; rather just some subtle changes to make the system better. There is a much healthier respect for achievements of the RAF due to the commitments to jointery and support to the land campaign in Operation Telic and Herrick. But more can be done. Command can be distinguished as an intellectual activity. The RAF’s problem appears to be a need to understand the status of its CC, define where it needs it to be in the future and then plot a course to get there, and not be seen as Continuous Improvement. SLIDE 17 – COMMAND LEADERSHIP MODEL So, my view is that Critical thinking is important. How do we learn? Bungay and Evans take an ahistorical view of how lessons can be learned from the past in developing the talent for senior command. Von Moltke first recognised that military education would steer the concept of bounded initiative in the right direction to develop both individuals and organisations for future appointments. Failure to innovate boils down to poor knowledge in the art of war, and this is because it is entrenched in a tactics-based approach. Unfortunately, the method for providing the all-round education required to instil, support, and sustain the desired leader behaviours has yet to be determined. The following C2 methods could be employed in commanding personnel and managing politicians. Firstly, every good relationship the government must have trust in its generals, irrespective of its control to enable them to command. Many senior officers view mission command as key to empower airman on operations. If there is trust in the General then there is more confidence they have with his abilities. In addressing trust Bungay proposes two dimensions. The first is moral, having confidence in supporting an effective briefing process. The second is practical by trusting an individual through mission command to deal with ‘unknown unknowns’ by identifying linkages and commonalities with their previous experience and knowledge of historical precedents. SLIDE 18 – BRIGADIER LANE It is then up to the commander to create a context in which trust can be fostered that relies on consultation. In 2002 Brigadier Roger Lane (leader of 3 commando brigade) was removed from command following a lack of boss centered leadership he displayed during Operation Jacana. Lack of trust between himself and the US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, led to media disagreements contradicting of when the war in Afghanistan would end. Mr Rumsfeld then publicly disagreed with him. Scrutiny of commanders has become an indelible part to political life. Trust is key to provide a framework. Bungay’s unified approach helps institutionalise the process across the 3 services. It enables the organisation to become much more agile to emerging challenges and potentially reduces the power asymmetry between single services rivalry. By focusing on this area of trust will improve their ability to conduct unplanned battles more astutely and to grasp their interpretation of reality on more informed decision-making.
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Sull refers to this framework as agile absorption, balancing absorption and agility in dealing with world turbulence. He argued that the success of command leadership relies on continuous interactions as a recipe for success. Represented in the OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act) it perhaps does not consider the many intangibles and factors that affect waging a coercive war. Graphically illustrated with events that unfolded in the Cuban Missile crisis, many of Kennedy’s advisors believed the Soviets understood only power and respected only force. Because he knew Khrushchev personally, Kennedy was aware that Khrushchev despised war. So it is about understanding our adversary that plays a key part in analysis. Therefore, President Kennedy considered Khrushchev’s personal intentions more important than the organisation. However, Kennedy lacked trust in his team’s decision making and avoided anchoring on a single interpretation of a situation against the soviet existential threat, and the obvious conclusion that missiles signaled an escalation of hostilities. By discussing alternative actions and interpretations Kennedy made it safe to discuss the soft options of blockade and diplomatic negotiation avoided escalation. Air Generals need to make use of these concepts. One option is Red Teaming used to stimulate different points of view for leaders to solve problems. The USMC regularly challenges the command climate through Red teaming at the sub unit level when General Ramos introduced it in 2012. The second area is decision making. Experiences in Kosovo showed that the subtleties of the battlespace were understood and considered without resorting to predictable responses. Circumstances can oscillate between chaotic and non-chaotic states quickly affecting how leadership is practiced with subordinates. Because of this, complex issues are often ignored in favour of providing the obvious solution like President Roosevelt was expected to do against the Soviets when the missiles were being deployed on Cuba. The leader should firstly consider complexity in his thinking rather than a straightforward approach and allow for diversity. For repeatable situations, previous experience offers no reliable anticipation of uncontrollable or unforeseen events. Overwhelmed by complexity in the current contingency paradigm autocratic leadership is perhaps not compatible to complex adaptive systems. Appropriate analysis is needed to reduce the uncertainty and improve our intuition to a problem. Air Generals may need to advocate a more intellectual and intuitive response to advance our knowledge of ‘knowing’ the problem. Raising this level of knowledge may allow a better understanding of different Ss cultures in competitive joint environments. Air Generalship courses should be developed pan –service wide, and formalised selection process of pilots who move into 3* or higher joint appointments. General Breedlove outgoing Commander, SHAPE, is a good example of a well-balanced career structure touching on all the main assignments. His experience ranged from appointments in strategic defense policy in government to joint defense appointments in the UN. Attendance at a squadron commander’s course and enrolling on a double master’s programme serves the officer cadre well in the USAF. Air Generals also need to be put into key JFACC C2 positions. SLIDE 19 CONCLUSION Kinetic targeting delivered by Operation Shader do not demonstrate an operational level of success evident in the Second World War, during the Cold War, or the coercive strategies employed in Kosovo. Success of CAS has certainly improved response times and enabled the armed forces to operate on the ground in difficult and challenging environments. Unfortunately, the mind-set has remained geared towards a supporting role of joint missions.
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Has Air Generalship declined? To an extent that there has been a theoretical decay driven from a post Operation Herrick and Telic mind set. Airpower has been shoe horned into niche capabilities supporting the land campaign and, driven by the costly needs of defence. Admittedly, the macro environment is different to the 1930s, but the principles of independent airpower remain the same: control of the air, and air spirit. That is not to say that Generalship does not have a place in these niche capabilities, but perhaps is selling itself short being stove piped into the tactical domain or other niche areas such as cyber space. The RAF should incorporate air centric strategies and challenge the assumptions that it will become a land supported campaign. Most operational campaigns since the Second World the RAF has supported the land component of the United States (Iraq and Afghanistan) and become channelled into operating a CAS and interdiction capability. This has created a false sense of achievement at the tactical level (theatre), and absent at the operational level where the kernel of intellectual development should sit in the imaginative use of airpower. Tackling the 3rd dimension and leading the air force at the theatre level in its campaign planning is imperative. The period post Operation Herrick can be described as a watershed of Generalship following the ‘clattering of bits’ that defined the execution of Op Ellamy. Key to bridge this gap is practice through training/selection and career management. To grow future Air Generals the RAF needs to increase training on EAW Air Combat Service Support Units (ACSSU) with logistics and communications’ (not just flying planes) so that it brings coherence to exercises, including practising the JFACC role on a more frequent basis in key C2 roles. Incorporating this learning into the Senior Officer Study Programme (SOSP) and ‘red teaming’ may bring dividends delivering improved scenario-based training which give real situations and measuring staff’s ability to predict the outcomes. Recent examples could be used as the exemplar - such as General MacCrystal. In 2009 he redefined counter insurgency in Afghanistan to a hearts and minds approach (campaign of perception) against the Taliban. Notwithstanding the difficulties of stabilisation timetables, it may also inform strategic airpower thinking in this conceptual area that incorporates the soft areas of COIN as a critical enabler for a permissive operating environment. Intellectual debate must discuss how air force credibility can sustain domestic support or coalition unity, without eliminating political constraints. Air strikes can be seen as a low-risk, low cost measure by politicians. Successful coercion is far harder when casualties start mounting or when air strikes fail to break the will of the adversary. Changes to address the conceptual gap will require more than just trenchant views on Ss identity. All services need to join the debate that does not favour its own Ss. Senior Air Commanders need to understand airpower in its totality as an enabler and not lose the fight at the operational level.
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