CNS Global Incidents and Trafficking Database
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July 2019 CNS Global Incidents and Trafficking Database Tracking publicly reported incidents involving nuclear and other radioactive materials 2018 Annual Report Produced Independently for the Nuclear Threat Initiative by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies - 1 - Global Incidents and Trafficking Database Contents Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 3 I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 7 II. Materials and Data Overview .................................................................................................................... 9 III. Key Findings and Policy Implications ........................................................................................................ 12 1. Variable reporting transparency yields variable, low transparency, results ........................................12 2. Transportation creates greatest vulnerabilities ...................................................................................15 3. Human failure is a security risk ............................................................................................................ 18 4. Viable alternative technologies exist ................................................................................................... 20 IV. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 23 V. Appendix .................................................................................................................................................... 24 JULY 2019 │ CNS GLOBAL INCIDENTS AND TRAFFICKING DATABASE Acknowledgments The 2018 report was authored by Sam Meyer, Shea Cotton, Jakob Lengacher, and Jaewon Oh. The authors thank Jessica Varnum and George Moore for their peer review comments on an earlier draft of this report. - 2 - Global Incidents and Trafficking Database Executive Summary In 2018, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ (CNS) global, multi-language, review of open Three years have passed since the fourth and final source reports found a total of 156 incidents of nuclear Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), which marked or other radioactive materials outside of regulatory 4 the culmination of a multi-year global effort control, occurring in 23 countries. Since CNS began to strengthen security over nuclear and other tracking incidents in 2013, researchers have identified radioactive materials. The IAEA has rolled out new a total of 1,040 incidents in 58 countries. technical documents on how states can improve security over nuclear and other radioactive Incidents involving nuclear materials (especially materials,1 and member states are increasingly certain isotopes of uranium and plutonium) are of incorporating those recommendations into their special concern, because of the potential of such regulatory frameworks. In addition to creating materials to be used in an improvised nuclear device high-level awareness of the threats, the summit (IND). In 2018, there were four reported incidents process may have contributed to a reduction of involving nuclear materials, a decrease from the the most serious incidents involving nuclear and eight unique incidents recorded in 2017. One 2018 other radioactive materials. The 2018 edition of incident was particularly serious: the loss of 1 gram the database recorded only four incidents involving of weapons-grade plutonium from a university the most dangerous materials (IAEA Category 1 and laboratory in Idaho. While the incident did not 2), tied with 2016 for the fewest in the history of involve sufficient material for an IND, it illustrates the database. It is impossible to causally link this worrying gaps in the security of weapons-useable data point with the summit process—and other nuclear materials. dangerous incidents may have gone unreported— but the data provides some reason for optimism. Non-nuclear radioactive materials incidents also carry significant safety and security concerns, as Despite this progress, there are several indications discussed in greater detail throughout this report. that security over nuclear and other radioactive The IAEA categorizes radioactive materials 1-5, materials is dangerously declining in priority on where Category 1 poses the greatest danger to the international agenda. No international forum human health and Category 5 poses the least risk. has emerged to replicate the high-level attention The IAEA’s categorization system is based on the type paid to the issue by the NSS process, and further of radioactive material involved, its activity level, international cooperation in this realm appears and the relative danger posed by external (human) unlikely. The deteriorating diplomatic relationship exposure to the material. Higher IAEA categorization between the United States and Russia, the collapse also corresponds to materials of higher concern for of key decades-old arms control agreements, and misuse as radiological dispersal devices (RDDs). uncertainty about the future of transnational entities and trade agreements make the global Incidents involving the most dangerous materials, climate unfriendly to new nuclear security initiatives. Category 1 and 2, are relatively rare in the CNS Additionally, the United States has significantly database. In 2018, zero Category 1 incidents were decreased its nuclear security and nonproliferation reported, and only three Category 2 incidents were budgets,2 and International Atomic Energy Agency reported, which tied with 2016 for the fewest spending on nuclear security has decreased from Category 1 and 2 incidents reported. In total, from its post-NSS highs.3 And, this year’s report finds 2013 to 2018, four cases involved Category 1 sources, that the overall number of incidents worldwide and 35 involved Category 2 sources. Although these involving nuclear and other radioactive materials numbers are low, it is impossible to know whether outside of regulatory control remains consistent the relative scarcity of Category 1 and 2 cases is and concerning. artificially low because of incidents going unreported. - 3 - Global Incidents and Trafficking Database Category 3-5 materials are classified as presenting a far the most prolific public reporting state, does lower risk than Categories 1 and 2. However, these not publicly report all incidents. For example, in an materials can still pose significant safety and security incident uncovered in 2018, Department of Energy risks, and are cause for public concern. The majority (DOE) employees lost sealed plutonium and cesium of 2018 incidents involved Category 3-5 materials, sources while traveling. Since the sources involved accounting for approximately 77 percent of total were DOE rather than civilian in nature, they were not reported incidents. In 32 percent of cases, there was reported through Nuclear Regulatory Commission insufficient publicly reported information for CNS channels, and the incident was only uncovered researchers to categorize the material. publicly through investigative reporting.5 Canada, another country that publicly reports incidents, only With six years of accumulated data, consistent updates its database when a Category 4 or higher trends have emerged, which lend additional weight loss occurs. As a result, incidents involving Category 5 to the key findings and policy recommendations materials may be published months after they occur. outlined below. This problem is not limited to public reporting. The Key Finding 1: Voluntary reporting IAEA’s Incident and Tracking Database (ITDB) remains yields variable, low transparency confidential, and thus closed to outside researchers. However, it suffers from similar reporting results. inconsistencies.6 States voluntarily participate in its reporting system and set their own standards for As in past years, CNS found that there were broad what to disclose to the organization. Even if incidents differences in the numbers of incidents reported become publicly known, the IAEA may only record across countries, with the U.S. reporting the most them in the ITDB if they were also reported to the incidents. This says much more about the variations IAEA by the state in question. in reporting requirements across countries than it does about the actual number of incidents in each Policy Recommendation: Establish a common country. As shown in Fig. 1, the majority of incidents standard for incident reporting that requires recorded in the 2018 database occurred in the six reporting Category 1 & 2 losses; encourage public countries that have public reporting mechanisms. reporting of incidents involving military sources. Figure 1. Total Incidents, 2018 Past versions of this report have made this recommendation, but international progress has not been made on this front. At a minimum, the 37 IAEA should establish a mandatory standard for all member states to report incidents involving the most dangerous Category 1 and Category 2 losses to the IAEA’s ITDB. This would allow the Agency to identify problem areas and craft appropriate responses. 119 Better still would be to publicly disclose these incidents. A well-informed public can both assist with materials recovery and bring nongovernmental expert analysis to bear to improve security practices. Countries