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From Weapons of the Weak to War by Different Means Developments of Hybrid Warfare Cav. Capt. (NLD-A, OF-2) John G.L.J. Jacobs September 2017 (original) December 2019 (revision) [INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] From Weapons of the Weak to War by Different Means Developments of Hybrid Warfare Cav. Capt John G.L.J. Jacobs S4477774 Radboud University, Nijmegen, NLD Master in Human Geography with a specialization in Conflict, Territories and Identities Supervisor: Dr R. Malejacq Research Internship at the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA), Breda, NLD Internship Supervisor: Prof Dr Ir G.E. Frerks Nijmegen, 14 September 2017 (original) Nijmegen, 02 December 2019 (revision) [INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] i Acknowledgements When writing about asymmetrical warfare, T.E. Lawrence remarked that it was like eating soup with a knife, messy and slow. This master thesis is the outcome of the Human Geography Master from Radboud University Nijmegen, and its specialization in Conflicts, Territories and Identities. It is a product of an academic development combining Radboud University’s master in Human Geography and three independent standing academic interactions with the Netherlands Defence Academy (Breda/Den Helder) and three summer schools at Utrecht University, King’s College London and University of Cyprus respectively. Combined, they represent five years of studying and arguing about conflict and war. It goes without saying that this product is not achieved independently, and to the extent that the writing of this thesis was not like eating soup with a knife, I am thankful to many, and wish to highlight a few, and thank for their contributions over the past years. First and foremost, this is Dr Luuk Slooter for his supervision. In particular for his strict bordering of the thesis proposal and making sure I do not overstrain the scope of the research (a habit I seem not to get rid of easily), additionally I would like to thank him for his course work during the summer school at Utrecht University in 2014. Secondly, I would like to thank Prof Dr Ir Georg Frerks, who took me under his wing at the Netherlands Defence Academy for my research internship. We also go back to the same summer school in 2014, and I would also like to thank him for his guidance and the meetings in Breda we conducted during my bachelor thesis where he served as a second reader. During my stay at the NLDA, I was able to also contribute to the teachings of the military students, for this, I am also thankful to Mr Alexander Bon, Prof Dr Theo Brinkel, and Ms Sabine Mengelberg who also proved invaluable in their discussions during my months in Breda. Thanks also then to the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) and its chapters on both sides of the Atlantic. As president of their youth department, I had the opportunity to visit a variety of seminars and conferences, allowing me to speak with some of the authors I am citing in this work. Furthermore, thanks to Dr Romain Malejacq, for whom I started working in May 2016 as a research assistant. Aside from his great insight into Afghanistan and the way non-state actors operate, working for Dr Malejacq greatly enhanced my academic writing and research methods and lead to habits I used in the writing of this thesis. Finally, I wish to thank my parents and close friends for their support in the past months, Wouter, Lennaert, Mark, Elwin – thank you for the discussions we had on the topic, as well as for the R&R that was needed at times. Mom, Dad, thank you for the support in my academic development. I owe you much. ii [INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] iii Summary In 2006 Retired Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman added the term Hybrid Warfare to the literature and debate of international security studies. Originally to describe the perceived new tactics Hamas used against Israel. The term returned to the field of international security studies in 2014 when Russia invaded Ukraine and has ever since dominated the field of security studies. Hybrid Warfare has become a container term used to describe various ways of asymmetric and unconventional warfare. This has led to the term being blurred and stalling the (academic) debate on what Hybrid Warfare is and what it is not. It made these questions nearly impossible to answer and raises the question, if these other forms of warfare are not Hybrid Warfare, what are they then? Hybrid Warfare is the subject of this thesis. It examines the development of Hybrid Warfare, both as a term in the literature as well as the operational aspect of Hybrid Warfare and its various monikers on the tactical and strategic level. The term has subsequently been used to describe warfare employed by four different actors: non-state actors, who traditionally have been associated with Hybrid Warfare (also before Hoffman used the term), as the weaker party using asymmetric means. However, also, as I came to conclude falsely, to describe the tactics employed by state actors. The invasion of Ukraine and subsequently annexation of Crimea brought it in the limelight, but Hybrid Warfare is not employed by the Russians – they prefer the term non-linear warfare, which focusses on (mass) deception. Similarly, Chinese do not use Hybrid Warfare – but build forward on the conceptual unrestricted warfare, with a focus on the use and abuse of law, or lawfare. Finally, I examined the western counter parts, who are not at all a stranger of asymmetric warfare. While this also is not Hybrid Warfare, it focusses largely on political warfare and counter-insurgency. Each of these includes hybrid elements, in the sense that hybrid means a combination of multiple assets, but it strays away from the Hoffman definition. To understand how both the use of the term and the actually implemented warfare has developed is the central theme in this research. The fact that the terms differ that much, and are incorrectly used interchangeably, shaped the main question of this research: What has been the development of Hybrid Warfare over the past century? The development of what is now called Hybrid Warfare is important for this research. I base the research on a historical process tracing starting at the inception of what Lind referred to as the 4th generation warfare. In my research I argue that for each of the four identified actors’ various independent factors influenced the development of warfare, and at the same time, these factors also influenced one another. Hybrid Warfare, as we know it today, is the product of specific historical events that influenced military thinking and practice. In order to detect these events, I spoke with several experts and study literature, news articles, and reports about the development of warfare and related concepts, using process tracing to identify and explain the events and their influence on thinking and praxis. I see that there is a shift to asymmetric warfare starting at the end of World War II. The start of this trend is the writings of Mao – while this is not to say that his preferred mode of warfare is iv new, he, in fact, denies this, his decision to write his views down had been extremely influential. After the cold war, and the U.S. obliteration of Iraq in the Gulf war using airpower was a game- changer. The U.S. preference for airpower in itself the result of its experience in Vietnam. For many adversaries of the U.S. the shock and awe approach triggered a renewed focus on asymmetric warfare and the various tactics that laymen eventually grouped under Hybrid Warfare. I argue in my thesis that not all these forms should be named Hybrid Warfare, and suggest to use the terms coined by the ones who came up with their respective variations of asymmetrical warfare — calling things by their name: Hybrid Warfare by non-state actors, unrestricted warfare by the Chinese, non-linear warfare by the Russians, and counter- insurgency / political warfare by the west. v Table of Contents Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... ii Summary ................................................................................................................................... iv List of Acronyms ........................................................................................................................ ix Figures and Boxes ..................................................................................................................... xi 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 Part I ........................................................................................................................................... 4 2. The Method of Studying Developments in Hybrid Warfare .................................................. 4 2.1 Research question ............................................................................................................ 4 2.2 Methodology .................................................................................................................... 4 2.2.1 Systematic examination through Process-Tracing .................................................... 5 2.2.2 Explaining Outcome Process Tracing in this research ............................................... 8 2.3 Data collection .................................................................................................................. 9 2.4 Scope of this research ...................................................................................................

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