Does public recognition matter? An assessment of awards granted to firms

VERÔNICA DE FÁTIMA SANTANA Universidade de São Paulo RAQUEL WILLE SARQUIS Universidade de São Paulo

Abstract

The purpose of this research is to evaluate whether the public recognition of firms’ quality via the Troféu Transparência, awarded by Anefac-Fipecafi-Serasa, and the Melhor Empresa do Ano Award given by the Melhores & Maiores yearbook from Exame magazine, generates value to stockholders. Thus, we employed an event study analysis in order to gauge whether the winner firms present positive cumulative abnormal returns around the awards announcement dates. Based on The Signaling Theory, high-quality firms will differentiate themselves from low-quality firms sending signals to market, that will be used by potential investors in investments decisions. In , there are two certifications of firms’ quality widely known and valued by the market: Troféu Transparência, that is granted to those firms with the highest level of transparency in their financial statements; and Melhor Empresa do Ano, that is a certification for those firms with the best financial performance, being a stamp of investments with higher future profitability. We proposed that winner firms from both awards will send positive signals to the market, and potential investors will positively value it. In both awards, the winner firms are announced to the market only in an awards’ ceremony. Therefore, we performed an event study focusing the analysis around the ceremony awards’ dates, calculating abnormal returns for the winner firms in a window of 20 days before and after the date of the events. Analyzing the winners of the last five editions (2012–2016), our results indicate, on average, the Melhor Empresa do Ano winners accumulate more than 10% of abnormal returns 5 days after the ceremony and the Troféu Transparência winners accumulate 20% of abnormal returns 20 days after the announcement. Our findings indicate these firms indeed present positive cumulative abnormal returns around the awards’ ceremony, suggesting that this kind of public recognition generates value to stockholders.

Keywords: Firms’ Awards, Troféu Transparência, Melhor Empresa do Ano Award, Value to stockholders.

1 www.congressousp.fipecafi.org

1 Introduction

This research aims to evaluate whether the public recognition of publicly-held firms’ quality via the Troféu Transparência, awarded by Anefac-Fipecafi-Serasa Experian, and the Melhor Empresa do Ano Award given by the Melhores & Maiores yearbook from Exame magazine, generates value to stockholders. Specifically, the purpose of this study is to analyze whether those firms that won the Troféu Transparência Award or that received the Melhor Empresa do Ano Award in the last five editions, observed a positive market reaction, through the evaluation of positive abnormal returns generated around the announcement date of these awards. Based on the Signaling Theory, proposed by Spence (1973), in an environment with information asymmetry and adverse selection problem, high quality firms tend to produce signals to market, aiming to signalize potential investors that they may be better investment opportunities. Therefore, the market will value these signals and will use it to differentiate these high quality firms from others (low quality firms), helping investors to make better investment decisions, increasing the efficiency of capital allocation (Spence, 1973; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Dalmácio, 2009; Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; Scott, 2015). During an investment decision making, potential investors will search for signals that certificate the firm’s quality, given that this kind of certification may help them to identify better investment opportunities. In Brazil, there are two awards widely accepted by the capital market that public recognize those firms with higher quality: (i) the Troféu Transparência, awarded by Anefac-Fipecafi-Serasa; and (ii) the Melhor Empresa do Ano Award given by the Melhores & Maiores yearbook from Exame magazine. Specifically, the Troféu Transparência Award is a certification granted to those firms with the highest level of transparency in their financial statements (Anefac, 2017). The Melhor Empresa do Ano is awarded to the best firm of the year in Brazilian capital market. Thus, this second award also evaluate firms’ quality, but focusing on firms’ financial performance during the last year (Exame, 2017). In this context, both awards are considered by the market as important certifications of firms’ quality in Brazil. While the first one (Troféu Transparência) guarantees that the winner firm disclosed financial statements with the highest level of transparency, the second one (Melhor Empresa do Ano) is a certification for those firms with the best financial performance, being considered as a stamp of investments with higher future profitability. In both cases, winner firms will send a signal to the market on their quality and investors will positively value it. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: the public recognition of publicly-held firms’ quality via Troféu Transparência and Melhor Empresa do Ano awards result in a positive market reaction around the announcement date, creating value for the stockholders of the winner firms. To evaluate this hypothesis, we use an event study analysis to assess whether those firms that won the Troféu Transparência or the Melhor Empresa do Ano award in the last five editions (2012–2016) observed positive abnormal returns around the announcement dates of these awards. In both awards, the announcement of winning firms occurs in an award’ ceremony. Thus, we considered the day of the ceremony as the date of the event. The ceremony of the Melhores & Maiores yearbook from Exame magazine usually occurs between the end of June and the beginning of July of each year, and is attended by executives from several firms and professionals from Brazilian capital market, and also by the Ministry of Finance. In this ceremony, several awards are given to firms; however, the main award is the Melhor Empresa do Ano. This award is announced to capital market only in the award’ ceremony. Specifically for the Troféu Transparência award, the announcement of winner firms also occurs only in the award’ ceremony. Nevertheless, the judgment committee chooses a set 2 www.congressousp.fipecafi.org

of few finalist firms in three different categories, and these finalists are announced to the market before the award’ ceremony. Finalists firms are invited to the ceremony, that usually takes place between September and October and counts with the presence of executives from finalist’ firms, professionals from accounting and finance, representatives from Anefac, Fipecafi, Serasa-Experian and the regulation body of accounting profession in Brazil. Of the finalists, only one firm is the winner in each category. Only in the day of the ceremony the judgment committee will decide which firms will be the winner firms. Thus, though finalists are disclosed before the ceremony, the winner firm is announced to the market only in the award’ ceremony. Therefore, in both awards, we focused the analysis around the ceremony award dates, calculating abnormal returns for those firms in a window of 20 days before and after the date of the event, aiming to capture any anticipation or delay in market reaction. Analyzing the winners of the last five editions of the two awards, our results indicate that these selected firms indeed present positive cumulative abnormal returns around the awards’ ceremonies, suggesting that the public recognition of firms’ quality do matter for generating values to stockholders. On average, the Melhor Empresa do Ano winners accumulate more than 10% of abnormal returns 5 days after the award ceremony, while the Troféu Transparência winners accumulate 20% of abnormal returns 20 days after the award’s announcement. Our results have two important implications. First, our results bring relevant and practical evidences of the importance of both awards to the Brazilian capital market. Those firms that won the Troféu Transparência Award or that received the Melhor Empresa do Ano Award presented positive cumulative abnormal returns around the awards’ ceremonies, generating value for their stockholders. Therefore, these two certifications of firms’ quality indeed may be used by winner firms to send positive signals to market, given that these signals are positively valued by potential investors. Second, our study also contributes to the previous literature providing evidences of two awards that are widely known and valued by the market, specially by investors and professionals from the Brazilian capital market, but that are still not well explored by the accounting literature. Consequently, our results indicate winner firms from both awards may be used by the literature as proxies of firms’ quality (specifically, about transparency and performance evaluation).

2 Background and Hypothesis’ Development

The efficiency of capital allocation in economy is affected by the existence of adverse selection problem (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010; Scott, 2015). This problem, initially studied by Akerlof (1970), emerge from the information asymmetry between the firm and the provider of capital, given that the manager has more information about the profitability of the firm than outsider investors. In the presence of information asymmetry, the investors cannot properly evaluate the expected return from the investment and, consequently, they tend to overvalue bad firms and undervalue good investments, reducing capital allocation efficiency (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010; Scott, 2015). Given the existence of information asymmetry, capital markets have some mechanisms to minimize the problem of adverse selection. One of these mechanisms is the signaling that firms with higher quality send to market, aiming to communicate to potential investors that they might be a better investment opportunity (Scott, 2015). According to The Signaling Theory, initially proposed by Spence (1973), these signs that firms send to market will result in greater amount of available information to investors and, thus, reduce the information asymmetry (Dalmácio, 2009). This theory argues that high-quality firms will differentiate themselves from low-quality firms sending several signals that will be used by potential 3 www.congressousp.fipecafi.org

investors to discriminate these two types of firms in terms of quality (Spence, 1973; Connelly et al., 2011; Scott, 2015). Therefore, when making investments decisions, the potential investors will search for and take into accounting signals that prove and certificate the quality of firms, given that these quality signs will help them to make more efficient investments. Thus, the Troféu Transparência, awarded by Anefac-Fipecafi-Serasa Experian, and the Melhor Empresa do Ano Award given by the Melhores & Maiores yearbook from Exame magazine, are two examples these certifications, that represent the public recognition of firms’ quality that is widely accepted and valued not only by potential investors, but also by all players of the capital market and society as a whole. The Troféu Transparência is an award created in 1997 by the partnership between three recognized institutions: Anefac, Fipecafi and Serasa Experian. This award aims to increase the corporate transparency in the capital market, through an incentive for firms to adopt transparency practices in disclosing their financial statements. In 20 years of history, the Troféu Transparência is an annual award given for those firms with the highest level of transparency in their financial statements, independently of the financial performance of these firms. To evaluate this level of transparency, the judgment is based on some criteria, such as: (i) the quality and transparency of the information provided in financial statements; (ii) clarity in management report and the consistency with the financial statements; (iii) compliance of accounting standards; (iv) audit report; (v) disclosure of voluntary information, for example, EBITDA and sustainability report; among others (Anefac, 2017). For the market, this award is considered as a stamp of the quality of financial information disclosed. According to Valor Econômico (2016), this is one of the most value stamps in the market, given that it public recognize those firms that exercise their social responsibility in disclosing their real performance, in a clear and objective way. Considering the importance of the level of transparency in financial statements to capital markets (Barth & Schipper, 2008; Barth, Konchitchki, & Landsman, 2013), this award may be considered a relevant sign, that potential investors will probably take into account in an investment decision. Therefore, it is expected that those firms that received the Troféu Transparência award, observed a positive market reaction around the announcement date, creating value for their stockholders. Similarly, the Melhor Empresa do Ano award given by the Melhores & Maiores yearbook from Exame magazine, is also considered a public certification of firms’ quality. However, different from Troféu Transparência, the Melhor Empresa do Ano award does not consider only the level of transparency in financial statement, but mainly the firms’ financial performance in last year. The Melhores & Maiores yearbook from Exame magazine analyzed more than 3.000 firms in last edition (2016) and provided several rakings, such as the 500 larger firms, 1.000 larger firms, by industry, geographic region, state, origin of capital and based on several indicators of financial performance. Beyond these rankings, the Melhores & Maiores yearbook also provide an award for the best firm in each of the 20 industries analyzed. This industry award is based on five indicators: (i) sales growth; (ii) current liquidity; (iii) return on equity; (iv) wealth created by employee; (v) market leadership. Firms can also receive addition points whether they are listed on Guia EXAME de Sustentabilidade. The best firm in each industry (total of 20 industries) are then submitted to an editorial and journalistic judgment to choose which firm will receive the Melhor Empresa do Ano award (Exame, 2017). Given these rigorous criteria applied to choose the winner, the Melhor Empresa do Ano award is considered by the market as an important certification of firms’ excellence and, specifically, of firms’ financial performance during the year. Consequently, potential investors will positive value this award, given that they may use this signal to classify winner 4 www.congressousp.fipecafi.org

firms as high profitability’ investments, differentiating them from other investments opportunities. Considering that both awards are public certifications of firms’ quality, and that these quality stamps may be useful for potential investors, we propose the following hypothesis: the public recognition of publicly-held firms’ quality via Troféu Transparência and Melhor Empresa do Ano awards result in a positive market reaction around the announcement date, creating value for the stockholders of the winner firms.

3 Data and Methods

Table 1 shows the winners of the Troféu Transparência awarded by Anefac-Fipecafi-Serasa for the last five years for each of the three categories: Revenues higher than R$ 5 bi, Revenues lower than R$ 5 bi and Privately-held firms, which was converted to represent the Energy Industry since 2016. With this change, in 2016 a privately-held company, Raízen Energia won the Award in the first category, while Brasil Energia, a publiclyheld company who had won the prize in the first two years in the second category, won the Award in the third category. Table 1: Anefac Winners Category Year Revenues > R$ 5 bi Revenues < R$ 5 bi Privately-held firms / Energy Industry JSL Furnas Centrais Elétricas 2012 BM&FBovespa Distribuidora 2013 Engie Brasil Energia Furnas Centrais Elétricas 2014 Engie Brasil Energia Furnas Centrais Elétricas 2015 Raízen Energia Guararapes Confecções Engie Brasil Energia 2016 Note: Up to 2015, the third category comprised privately-held firms. But in 2016, the third category became representative of the Energy Industry.

Table 2 shows the finalists for the Troféu Transparência award for each year for each category. The first thing that calls attention is how repetitive is the list, except for the last year, where several companies were excluded due to their involvement in corruption investigations. For example, Vale and are finalists for all five years. BM&FBovespa won the award in 2013 and was a finalist for the three following years, while Engie Brasil Energia was a finalist in 2013 and a winner in the following three years, first in the category of Revenues lower than R$5 bi and then in the Energy Industry category. Finally, table 3 shows the winners of the Melhor Empresa do Ano Award, where one can see is not uncommon for the winner to be also present in the Troféu Transparência list, as is the case for , Marcopolo and Telefônica Brasil. To analyze whether the awards concessions generate values for stockholders, we proceed to an event-study analysis (Campbell, Lo, & MacKinlay, 1997), where we evaluate whether the winner firms present cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the awards’ announcement dates. If so, this is evidence that the public recognition given by the awards sign the firms’ quality to the market, generating value for their stockholders. With this method, we cannot analyze all firms presented in tables 1 and 2, since they include privately-held firms, for which no prices’ quotations are available to calculate returns. Therefore, we only use the firms from the two first categories up to 2015 and selected only the publicly-held companies in 2016, so that the 2016 winner Raízen Energia is excluded for the analysis. Further, the 2013 and 2014 finalist Taesa is also excluded since its data is not available at Yahoo Finance.

5 www.congressousp.fipecafi.org

Table 2: Anefac Finalists Category Year Revenues > R$ 5 bi Revenues < R$ 5 bi Privately-held firms / Energy Industry Braskem BM&FBovespa Eletrosul Centrais Elétricas Cemig Copasa Embasa CSN Refap Embraer Samarco Gerdau -- -- 2012 Natura -- -- Petrobras -- -- Sabesp -- -- Vale -- -- AES Eletropaulo AES Tietê Embasa Braskem Engie Brasil Energia Energisa Cemig Furnas Centrais Elétricas Embraer JSL Samarco Grupo Pão de Açucar -- -- 2013 Petrobras -- -- Sabesp -- -- Usiminas -- -- Vale -- -- AES Eletropaulo Bandeirantes Energia Aché Cemig BM&FBovespa Embasa CSN Celpe GRU Airport Embraer Guararapes Confecções -- Gerdau Hypermarcas -- 2014 Petrobras Localiza -- Sabesp Mahle -- Usiminas Marcopolo -- Vale Taesa -- AES Eletropaulo Bandeirantes Energia Eletrosul Centrais Elétricas Ambev BM&Fbovsespa Embasa CSN Copasa -- Gerdau Grendene -- 2015 Sabesp Guararapes Confecções -- Usiminas Mahle -- Vale Taesa -- Ambev Biosev AES Tietê Cielo BM&FBovespa Distribuição CSN Cia Hering Duke Energy, Geração Paranapanema Embraer EDP Energias do Brasil Fleury -- 2016 Raia Drogasil Grendene -- Raízen Energia JSL -- Sabesp Mahle -- Telefônica Brasil -- Vale -- -- Note: Up to 2015, the third category comprised privately-held firms. But in 2016, the third category became representative of the Energy Industry. 6 www.congressousp.fipecafi.org

Table 3: Melhores & Maiores Winners Firm Year TOTVS 2012 Embraer 2013 Marcopolo 2014 WEG 2015 Telefônica Brasil 2016

The Troféu Transparência is usually awarded in the end of September, except for 2016, where the prize was awarded in the end of October. Specifically, the dates for the last five years are: 09/20/2012, 09/23/2013, 09/25/2014, 09/24/2015 and 10/20/2016. The Melhor Empresa do Ano Award is usually announced in the end of June/ beginning of July, except for 2014, when the Award was announced earlier due to the World Cup in Brazil. Specifically, the dates for the last five years are: 07/04/2012, 07/01/2013, 06/16/2014, 07/01/2015 and 06/29/2016. To calculate and plot the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the awards’ announcement dates, we proceed to the following steps. First, we collect the close daily stock prices adjusted for dividends and splits, available at Yahoo Finance, for the firms cited in tables 1, 2 and 3. Second, we calculate daily log-returns and define the estimation window, where we estimate the parameters of the model for calculating the abnormal returns, and the event window. For the Troféu Transparência awards, we define the first six months of each year as the estimation windows, since the announcements are only in the end of September and October, while for the Melhor Empresa do Ano we define only the first four months of the years, since the award is announced in June/July. We define the event windows as 20 days before and after the awards’ announcement dates. Third, to calculate the abnormal returns, we use the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model (Fama & French, 1992, 1996; Carhart, 1997): ˆˆ ritˆ i  b i r mt  sˆˆ i smb t  h i hml t  w i wml t  it , (1) where rmt is the daily log-return of the market index over a risk-free rate, smbt is the daily log- return of a portfolio short on stocks of large firms and long on stocks of small firms (small minus big), hmlt is the daily log-return of a portfolio short on growth stocks (low book-to- market (BTM) index) and long on value stocks (high BTM) (high minus low), and wmlt is the daily log-returns of a portfolio short on losers stocks (stocks with lower short-term returns) and long on winner stocks (stocks with higher short-term returns). Doing so, we extract the returns associated with the market risk and with the size, BTM and momentum effects. Therefore, we estimate equation (1) for each stock i in each year using data from the estimation windows, and then use the parameters ˆ , bˆ , sˆ , hˆ and wˆ to calculate the daily abnormal returns for each stock i, arit for the event windows at each year: ˆˆ arit r it ˆ i  b i r mt  sˆˆ i smb t  h i hml t  w i wml t . (2) The data for the four risk factors were are calculated and made available by the Brazilian Center for Research in Financial Economics of the University of São Paulo (NEFIN).

4 Results

Figures 1 and 2 show the CAR plots for the firms who won the Troféu Transparência awarded by Anefac-Fipecafi-Serasa and the Melhor Empresa do Ano Award given by the Melhores & Maiores (M&M) yearbook from Exame magazine for the years of 2012 to 2016. 7 www.congressousp.fipecafi.org

The shaded areas show the confidence intervals calculated via bootstrap (Davison, Hinkley, & Schechtman, 1986).

Figura 1: Anefac Winners

Figura 2: M&M Winners Figure 1 shows the CAR for the winner firms in comparison with the firms who were finalists but were not awarded. Therefore, the upper line is the cumulative of the mean for the abnormal returns of Usiminas and JSL in 2012, Gerdau and BM&FBovespa in 2013, Braskem and Engie Brasil Energia in 2014, Cemig and Engie Brasil Energia in 2015 and Guararapes Confecções and Engie Brasil Energia in 2016. Similarly, the lower line is the cumulative mean of the abnormal returns of the publicly-held firms listed in table 2. Figure 2, on its turn, shows the cumulative mean of abnormal returns for TOTVS/2012, Embraer/2013, Marcopolo/2014, WEG/2015 and Telefônica Brasil/2016. From figure 1, one can see that the winner firms have significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns from more than 15 days before the award is announced, and that returns continue positive rising to 20% for more than 20 days after the awards’ ceremony. Comparatively, the finalist firms do not present persistent positive returns, since the CAR is always around zero. This result indicates a strong expectation around the award, since the winner firms present positive abnormal returns already a month before the award is announced. The winners of the Melhor Empresa do Ano Award also present positive abnormal returns. However, they are less persistent and of a lower magnitude: the CAR only become

8 www.congressousp.fipecafi.org

significant around 10 days before the award is announced, rising to a maximum of 10% around 5 days after the ceremony, and 20 days later they are coming back to around zero.

Figura 3: Anefac Winners for each Year When we analyze each year separately, the results are noisier. Figure 3 shows the analysis for each year, where we can see that the years of 2012, 2014 and 2015 have a similar pattern as when we consider the whole period, that is, winner firms present consistently positive abnormal returns. However, the 2013 plot shows that Gerdau and BM&FBovespa present falling returns the days following the awards, who rise again from 5 days later; and the 2016 plot shows no significant increasing CAR for the winner firms, while a sharp increase is seen in the first days, and two sharp falls are seen a few days before the award announcement and also after 15 days. The magnitudes are also strikingly different throughout the years. In 2012 and 2015, the CAR rise to almost 45%, while in 2013 and 2014 the highest point is 15% and in 2016 it is less than 6%. These different results for the separate analysis are likely due to specific factor affecting each firm, since only two firms are classified as winners each year. For instance, the award is given in September/October, around the date firms are finishing and presenting their third- quarter financial statements. Returns may be, therefore, concurrently reacting with earnings forecasts and announcements. However, further analysis considering the case of each winner firms is necessary to better understand the behavior shown in figure 3.

9 www.congressousp.fipecafi.org

Similarly, figure 4 shows the plots for the cumulative abnormal returns for the winner firm of each year of the Melhor Empresa do Ano. In these plots, the confidence intervals equal the CAR because only one firm is available per year. The three first years show similar patterns to figure 2, but the latter two seem more sharply affected by specific events. Once again, a further investigation is necessary to understand such behaviors.

Figura 4: M&M Winner for each Year

5 Concluding Remarks

This research sought to investigate whether the public recognition of firms’ quality via the Troféu Transparência, awarded by Anefac-Fipecafi-Serasa, and the Melhor Empresa do Ano Award given by the Melhores & Maiores (M&M) yearbook from Exame magazine, generates value to stockholders. To do so, we employed an event studies analysis in order to gauge whether the winner firms present positive cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the awards announcement dates. Using the winner firms of the last five years we found evidences consistent with the hypothesis that the public recognition of firms’ quality generates value to stockholders, since around 15/20 days before the awards’ announcement, the winner firms start to accumulate positive returns, which continues up to 20 day after the announcements. Nevertheless, when the analysis is conducted separately for each year, different patterns arise, probably due to specific events that affected the winners around the dates, like earnings announcements, for 10 www.congressousp.fipecafi.org

example. Therefore, a specific analysis for each firm is necessary to better understand their stock prices’ behavior around the awards announcements.

References

Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for “lemons”: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 488–500. Anefac. (2017, January). Regulamento do Troféu Transparência 2016. Retrieved from https://www.anefac.com.br/TrofeuTransparencia internas.aspx?ID=2 Barth, M. E., Konchitchki, Y., & Landsman, W. R. (2013). Cost of capital and earnings transparency. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 55(2), 206–224. Barth, M. E. & Schipper, K. (2008). Financial reporting transparency. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 23(2), 173–190. Beyer, A., Cohen, D. A., Lys, T. Z., & Walther, B. R. (2010). The financial reporting environment: review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2), 296–343. Campbell, J. Y., Lo, A. W., & MacKinlay, A. C. (1997). The econometrics of financial markets. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Carhart, M. M. (1997). On persistence in mutual fund performance. The Journal of Finance, 52, 57–82. Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011). Signaling theory: a review and assessment. Journal of Management, 37(1), 39–67. Dalmácio, F. Z. (2009). Mecanismos de governança e acurácia das previsões dos analistas do mercado brasileiro: uma análise sob a perspectiva da teoria da sinalização (Doctoral dissertation, Universidade de São Paulo). Davison, A., Hinkley, D. V., & Schechtman, E. (1986). Efficient bootstrap simulation. Biometrika, 73(3), 555–566. Exame. (2017, January). A metodologia de Melhores e Maiores. Retrieved from http: //mm.exame.abril.com.br/metodologia/ Fama, E. & French, K. (1992). The cross section of expected returns. The Journal of Finance, 47, 427–465. Fama, E. & French, K. (1996). Multifactor explanations of asset pricing anomalies. The Journal of Finance, 51(1), 55–84. Healy, P. M. & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: a review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31(1), 405–440. Scott, W. R. (2015). Financial accounting theory (7th ed.). Nova Jersey: Prentice Hall. Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355– 374. Valor Econômico. (2016, outubro). Anefac premia 25 companhias campeãs. Retrieved from http://www.valor.com.br/empresas/4751221/anefac-premia-25-companhias

11 www.congressousp.fipecafi.org