An Assessment of Awards Granted to Firms VERÔNICA
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Does public recognition matter? An assessment of awards granted to firms VERÔNICA DE FÁTIMA SANTANA Universidade de São Paulo RAQUEL WILLE SARQUIS Universidade de São Paulo Abstract The purpose of this research is to evaluate whether the public recognition of firms’ quality via the Troféu Transparência, awarded by Anefac-Fipecafi-Serasa, and the Melhor Empresa do Ano Award given by the Melhores & Maiores yearbook from Exame magazine, generates value to stockholders. Thus, we employed an event study analysis in order to gauge whether the winner firms present positive cumulative abnormal returns around the awards announcement dates. Based on The Signaling Theory, high-quality firms will differentiate themselves from low-quality firms sending signals to market, that will be used by potential investors in investments decisions. In Brazil, there are two certifications of firms’ quality widely known and valued by the market: Troféu Transparência, that is granted to those firms with the highest level of transparency in their financial statements; and Melhor Empresa do Ano, that is a certification for those firms with the best financial performance, being a stamp of investments with higher future profitability. We proposed that winner firms from both awards will send positive signals to the market, and potential investors will positively value it. In both awards, the winner firms are announced to the market only in an awards’ ceremony. Therefore, we performed an event study focusing the analysis around the ceremony awards’ dates, calculating abnormal returns for the winner firms in a window of 20 days before and after the date of the events. Analyzing the winners of the last five editions (2012–2016), our results indicate, on average, the Melhor Empresa do Ano winners accumulate more than 10% of abnormal returns 5 days after the ceremony and the Troféu Transparência winners accumulate 20% of abnormal returns 20 days after the announcement. Our findings indicate these firms indeed present positive cumulative abnormal returns around the awards’ ceremony, suggesting that this kind of public recognition generates value to stockholders. Keywords: Firms’ Awards, Troféu Transparência, Melhor Empresa do Ano Award, Value to stockholders. 1 www.congressousp.fipecafi.org 1 Introduction This research aims to evaluate whether the public recognition of publicly-held firms’ quality via the Troféu Transparência, awarded by Anefac-Fipecafi-Serasa Experian, and the Melhor Empresa do Ano Award given by the Melhores & Maiores yearbook from Exame magazine, generates value to stockholders. Specifically, the purpose of this study is to analyze whether those firms that won the Troféu Transparência Award or that received the Melhor Empresa do Ano Award in the last five editions, observed a positive market reaction, through the evaluation of positive abnormal returns generated around the announcement date of these awards. Based on the Signaling Theory, proposed by Spence (1973), in an environment with information asymmetry and adverse selection problem, high quality firms tend to produce signals to market, aiming to signalize potential investors that they may be better investment opportunities. Therefore, the market will value these signals and will use it to differentiate these high quality firms from others (low quality firms), helping investors to make better investment decisions, increasing the efficiency of capital allocation (Spence, 1973; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Dalmácio, 2009; Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; Scott, 2015). During an investment decision making, potential investors will search for signals that certificate the firm’s quality, given that this kind of certification may help them to identify better investment opportunities. In Brazil, there are two awards widely accepted by the capital market that public recognize those firms with higher quality: (i) the Troféu Transparência, awarded by Anefac-Fipecafi-Serasa; and (ii) the Melhor Empresa do Ano Award given by the Melhores & Maiores yearbook from Exame magazine. Specifically, the Troféu Transparência Award is a certification granted to those firms with the highest level of transparency in their financial statements (Anefac, 2017). The Melhor Empresa do Ano is awarded to the best firm of the year in Brazilian capital market. Thus, this second award also evaluate firms’ quality, but focusing on firms’ financial performance during the last year (Exame, 2017). In this context, both awards are considered by the market as important certifications of firms’ quality in Brazil. While the first one (Troféu Transparência) guarantees that the winner firm disclosed financial statements with the highest level of transparency, the second one (Melhor Empresa do Ano) is a certification for those firms with the best financial performance, being considered as a stamp of investments with higher future profitability. In both cases, winner firms will send a signal to the market on their quality and investors will positively value it. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: the public recognition of publicly-held firms’ quality via Troféu Transparência and Melhor Empresa do Ano awards result in a positive market reaction around the announcement date, creating value for the stockholders of the winner firms. To evaluate this hypothesis, we use an event study analysis to assess whether those firms that won the Troféu Transparência or the Melhor Empresa do Ano award in the last five editions (2012–2016) observed positive abnormal returns around the announcement dates of these awards. In both awards, the announcement of winning firms occurs in an award’ ceremony. Thus, we considered the day of the ceremony as the date of the event. The ceremony of the Melhores & Maiores yearbook from Exame magazine usually occurs between the end of June and the beginning of July of each year, and is attended by executives from several firms and professionals from Brazilian capital market, and also by the Ministry of Finance. In this ceremony, several awards are given to firms; however, the main award is the Melhor Empresa do Ano. This award is announced to capital market only in the award’ ceremony. Specifically for the Troféu Transparência award, the announcement of winner firms also occurs only in the award’ ceremony. Nevertheless, the judgment committee chooses a set 2 www.congressousp.fipecafi.org of few finalist firms in three different categories, and these finalists are announced to the market before the award’ ceremony. Finalists firms are invited to the ceremony, that usually takes place between September and October and counts with the presence of executives from finalist’ firms, professionals from accounting and finance, representatives from Anefac, Fipecafi, Serasa-Experian and the regulation body of accounting profession in Brazil. Of the finalists, only one firm is the winner in each category. Only in the day of the ceremony the judgment committee will decide which firms will be the winner firms. Thus, even though finalists are disclosed before the ceremony, the winner firm is announced to the market only in the award’ ceremony. Therefore, in both awards, we focused the analysis around the ceremony award dates, calculating abnormal returns for those firms in a window of 20 days before and after the date of the event, aiming to capture any anticipation or delay in market reaction. Analyzing the winners of the last five editions of the two awards, our results indicate that these selected firms indeed present positive cumulative abnormal returns around the awards’ ceremonies, suggesting that the public recognition of firms’ quality do matter for generating values to stockholders. On average, the Melhor Empresa do Ano winners accumulate more than 10% of abnormal returns 5 days after the award ceremony, while the Troféu Transparência winners accumulate 20% of abnormal returns 20 days after the award’s announcement. Our results have two important implications. First, our results bring relevant and practical evidences of the importance of both awards to the Brazilian capital market. Those firms that won the Troféu Transparência Award or that received the Melhor Empresa do Ano Award presented positive cumulative abnormal returns around the awards’ ceremonies, generating value for their stockholders. Therefore, these two certifications of firms’ quality indeed may be used by winner firms to send positive signals to market, given that these signals are positively valued by potential investors. Second, our study also contributes to the previous literature providing evidences of two awards that are widely known and valued by the market, specially by investors and professionals from the Brazilian capital market, but that are still not well explored by the accounting literature. Consequently, our results indicate winner firms from both awards may be used by the literature as proxies of firms’ quality (specifically, about transparency and performance evaluation). 2 Background and Hypothesis’ Development The efficiency of capital allocation in economy is affected by the existence of adverse selection problem (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010; Scott, 2015). This problem, initially studied by Akerlof (1970), emerge from the information asymmetry between the firm and the provider of capital, given that the manager has more information about the profitability of the firm than outsider investors. In the presence of information asymmetry, the investors cannot properly evaluate the expected return