<<

in far-flung “platoon houses” and suf- editor of the Journal fered heavy casualties. Farrell debunks and professor at the U.S. School a decades-old argument that pleas from of Advanced Studies, opens the President Hamid Karzai and Provincial book by discussing the modern (post– Governor Mohammed Daoud had World War II) proliferation of SOF and forced the British commanders to move claims that many countries “seek to gain off the original plan. He tells how the the status and capabilities” that come British commanders never even read the from possessing such specialized units. plan and decided on their own to get He then briefly describes the intent of into a fight in the hinterlands. the book—to fill the gap between “a vast Edward Butler, the British commander in body of literature that focuses on single Helmand at the time, dismissed the origi- cases of heroism, or at best, histories of nal plan as “pretty light on the military single units” during a select period. Line of Operation . . . drawn up by peo- To help fill the gap, Elite Warriors ple who did not properly understand the provides descriptive chapters on the SOF ’s skill sets and capabilities.” Years forces of 14 countries in the following later, of course, Butler’s successors fell order: Russia, Ukraine, France, Germany, back on defending central Helmand, just , Poland, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, as the original plan had advised. Farrell’s China, , Columbia, and case will surely draw great controversy. Algeria. The book claims a format com- What should we take from this? The monly used by the Center for Analysis United Kingdom was caught in the same of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), dilemma that the United States has faced Elite Warriors: Special the Russian think tank co-founded and again and again in and . Operations Forces from directed by Pukhov. CAST regularly For the outsider, intervening in an Around the World employs a team of highly capable research insurgency or a civil war is a learning analysts to provide summaries on a variety Edited by Ruslan Pukhov experience. The imperative to work with of topics—usually focused on Russia’s and Christopher Marsh the people demands knowledge of so- defense industry and national arms pro- East View Press, 2017 ciety, culture, politics, and history, in all curement program. Elite Warriors claims $79.95 263 pp. their complexity. Yet learning takes time. that each of the chapters provides a “brief ISBN: 978-1879944992 Outsiders face an unavoidable dilemma historical background to that country’s of making decisions with incomplete Reviewed by Bruce McClintock special operations forces, then quickly knowledge or making no decisions at all. moves to the present time, offering the Every decision stands a reasonable chance reader a very comprehensive overview of being a misstep. Friction is inevitable. pecial operations forces (SOF) of the many units that exist, the mis- What Farrell reminds us is that at any have existed in some form and sions which they are designed to address, decision point we should listen to the S played roles in warfare since the and examples of some of the missions knowledge that does exist and not dismiss advent of conventional military opera- they have conducted.” Marsh states, it because it complicates what we want tions. For example, in biblical times, “Encyclopedic in nature, it is filled with a to do. King David had a special forces platoon. wealth of information on the special op- With its broad scope and detail, World War II brought growth, greater erations forces of the countries included.” Unwinnable is akin to an official history recognition, and prestige for special Most chapters do include some form in the finest of British historical tradition. forces like the British , of historical discussion, a detailed organi- In fact, whenever the official history does Special Air Service, and the American zational listing for known units, and some come out, it will find itself in stiff compe- Office of Strategic Services. The last information on equipment used, as well tition with Farrell’s work. JFQ two decades have witnessed explosive as training and education. However, the growth in various forms of unconven- diversity of contributors creates inconsis- tional or SOF. tency in the format as well as the style of Dr. Carter Malkasian spent 2 years as a civilian In Elite Warriors, Ruslan Pukhov and the different chapters. If read cover-to- political officer in Helmand Province and is the author of War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Christopher Marsh aim to provide acces- cover, the inconsistency in the chapter Conflict on the Afghan Frontier (Oxford University sible, high-quality comparative research organization is readily apparent, as is the Press, 2016). on the elite SOF of 14 countries. They level of detail available for various coun- achieve some of their lofty objectives tries. The chapter on Iran, for example, and add value to the important field of provides good detail on the weapons literature on special operations. Marsh, used by Iranian SOF and provides basic

JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018 Book Reviews 113 information on recent operations in This gap has, arguably, reduced the with substantive footnotes of the sources military’s effectiveness in operations for the information. Other chapters like Iraq and Afghanistan because think include substantially less detail, often tanks and professional military educa- citing the lack of available information. tion have not replicated the academic The chapters are generally short with depth of understanding in local cultural the shortest being only eight pages and dynamics. Critics like author and co- containing no information on equipment editor Montgomery McFate, herself an or training. accomplished anthropologist, attorney, The strength of Elite Warriors is the and longtime professor at the Naval War variety of authors and their use of native- College, argue this is because military language sources, often from mass media culture is task-oriented, reductionist, and and generally current, as well as other problem-solving by nature as opposed authoritative material. The generous use to the more open-ended, expansive, of footnotes makes the book a worth- and puzzle-solving individual nature of while resource for those who want a academic inquiry that is necessary to guide to other useful material. The book, produce depth of qualitative knowledge however, fails to explain its rationale for of social complexity. This becomes a the relevance or importance of the 14 se- problem when the military is tasked, as lected countries. Readers will find value in it has been many times since 1989, with the China and Iran chapters but wonder operations other than war where under- where they might find information on standing the complexities of the local key allies including , South Korea, Social Science Goes to War: culture can mean the difference between Denmark, the Netherlands, and the The Human Terrain System success and failure, reduced casualties, United Kingdom. Furthermore, the in- in Iraq and Afghanistan and escalation. consistent format and level of detail may In the polarized literature surround- Edited by Montgomery McFate and frustrate some readers. Readers looking ing the U.S. Army’s controversial Human Janice H. Laurence for more specifics on U.S. forces should Terrain System (HTS), few publications Oxford University Press, 2015 examine Linda Robinson’s Masters of are likely to have the impact that this vol- $39.95 320 pp. Chaos (PublicAffairs, 2009) and the ume promises on the debate surrounding ISBN: 978-0190216726 more recent historical evaluation by Mark the inclusion of social science expertise Moyers titled Oppose Any Foe (Ingram, Reviewed by Brian R. Price within the American military/security 2017). Nevertheless, the material in Elite establishment. McFate introduces a Warriors is valuable and the book is an concept of the military-academic divide, ideal primer for someone without a back- he gap between academia and the noting how the HTS was often successful ground in special operations who wants military has existed at least since in bridging the sociocultural gap between to learn the basics about foreign military T the early 1960s, when Project not only the Afghan/Iraqi societies and elites and have a guide to other useful Camelot crystallized political opposi- expeditionary military units but also the sources. JFQ tion to the American military/security social scientists’ own academic world and apparatus by activist academicians. As that of the military. This out-of-the-box a result, the military/security com- perspective, McFate and co-editor Janice Brigadier General Bruce McClintock, USAF (Ret.), munity established its own think tanks, Laurence conclude, proved valuable is the Chief Executive Officer of Zenith Advisors Group, a full-spectrum startup and government designed to replicate social and hard in widening the perspective of military consulting . science capabilities, reducing the politi- teams in an effort to represent the local cal noise and fallout inherent in the population in the military decisionmaking engagement with a potentially hostile process. academic community. On the other McFate was the anthropologist who, side of the divide, many academics together with Colonel Steve Fondacaro, reacted with anger to social scientists USA, led HTS in its formative period. engaged in military activity, political McFate and Laurence gathered first- beliefs fusing with concerns of academic person data by social scientists who freedom and fanned with the flames of worked in Iraq and Afghanistan. They opposition to the in what offer the best summary to date of the they saw as colonialism and rampant program’s establishment and mission in militarization of American society. “Mind the Gap.” McFate’s contribution

114 Book Reviews JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018