105th CONGRESS Printed for the use of the 1st Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

REPORT ON THE MARCH 5, 1995 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN ESTONIA AND THE STATUS OF NON-CITIZENS: Tallinn and Northeast Estonia

MAY 1995

A Report Prepared by the Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION (OSCE)

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki process, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. Since then, its membership has expanded to 55, reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. (The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, has been suspended since 1992, leaving the number of countries fully participating at 54.) As of January 1, 1995, the formal name of the Helsinki process was changed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The OSCE is engaged in standard setting in fields including military security, economic and envi- ronmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian concerns. In addition, it undertakes a variety of preventive diplomacy initiatives designed to prevent, manage and resolve conflict within and among the participating States.

The OSCE has its main office in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of permanent represen- tatives are held. In addition, specialized seminars and meetings are convened in various locations and periodic consultations among Senior Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or Government are held.

ABOUT THE COMMISSION (CSCE)

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), also known as the Helsinki Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to monitor and encourage compliance with the agreements of the OSCE.

The Commission consists of nine members from the U.S. House of Representatives, nine members from the U.S. Senate, and one member each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. The positions of Chair and Co-Chair are shared by the House and Senate and rotate every two years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff assists the Commissioners in their work.

To fulfill its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates information on Helsinki-related topics both to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening hearings, issuing reports reflecting the views of the Commission and/or its staff, and providing information about the activities of the Helsinki process and events in OSCE participating States.

At the same time, the Commission contributes its views to the general formulation of U.S. policy on the OSCE and takes part in its execution, including through Member and staff participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings as well as on certain OSCE bodies. Members of the Commission have regular contact with parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of non-governmental orga- nizations, and private individuals from OSCE participating States.

ii SUMMARY

ELECTION Reports of International Observers: The election on March 5, 1995, for Estonia’s national parlia- ment, the Riigikogu, were conducted normally, without any serious violations of the election law or inter- national standards. A seventeen-member delegation of the Organization on Security and Cooper- ation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCEPA) concluded that the election was “free and fair.” The OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) reported that “[the election was] carried out in accordance with the principles contained in the electoral law and there are no major matters which the representatives wish to highlight.” ODIHR has submitted several suggestions to the Riigikogu and the National Electoral Committee for improving technical aspects of the process.

Commission Staff Observations: Polling stations were “well laid out and organized,” as reported by ODIHR, but at least one polling station visited by Commission staff member (Rakvere no. 3) was locked until the voting began at 9:00 a.m., precluding any scrutiny by observers of the ballot box sealing, or storage of ballots cast by persons who voted, as permitted by law, up to three days before election day. This was most likely not due to chicanery on the part of election officials, but to the fact that they were not expecting foreign observers, most of whom arrived unannounced. There was no local observer present.

At nine polling stations in the rural northeast (off the beaten Kohtla-Jarve/Sillimae/Narva track, where much of the population is ethnic Estonian or Estonian-speaking Russians who have lived in Estonia since the Tsarist era), election procedures were carried on normally, albeit with a certain degree of inconsistency regarding the identification of voters. At some polling stations, voters claiming to be citizens but without Estonian passports could be confirmed by telephone with the local citizenship office. Other officials said “no passport, no vote.” In at least one small rural village, the chairman of the precinct election commission assured the Commission observer that identification was not necessary, since “we know everyone.”

Political party structures are noticeably undeveloped in the northeast, and in none of the polling stations were any local observers encountered. Discussions at the National Electoral Commission in Tallinn and with local precinct officials revealed some disagreement about the procedure for admitting local ob- servers, around 700 of whom had registered with the National Electoral Commission prior to the election. In any case, the lack of local observers probably indicated general confidence by the citizenry that the government was capable of holding an orderly and honest election without the need for monitors. Checks with other international observers indicated that the only local observers noted were in Tallinn, and pre- cious few of these.

Election Results A little over 545,000 voters, or 68.9 percent of those eligible, took part in the election. None of the 16 electoral blocs and parties in contention achieved a majority in the 101-seat Riigikogu. An alliance of the Coalition Party and Rural Union, led by former Prime Minister Tiit Vahi, outdistanced its nearest rival, the Reform Party, headed by National Bank chairman Sim Kallas, by a margin of 41 to 19 seats. Coming in third, with 16 seats, was the Center Party, headed by former perestroika era Prime Minister Edvard Savisaar. Six seats went to non-Estonian (i.e., ethnic Russian or Russophone) candidates running under the Estonia Is Our Home ticket. Several of the most nationalist-oriented incumbents did not retain their seats.

1 Forty-eight members elected to the Riigikogu had served in the previous body, while 23 had been members of the Supreme Council of the Estonian SSR. Eleven women were elected.

Besides the usual level of popular dissatisfaction caused by the transition from economic statism to the free market, voters had become disenchanted with what they perceived as an unseemly “every man for himself, devil take the hindmost” capitalism regnant in ruling circles. By June 1994, The New York Times reported presciently that “Estonia Savors Economic Success, But the Reformers May Be in Trouble.” Various scandals and allegations of scandal concerning foreign arms deals and privatization hurt the ruling Fatherland coalition, causing it to split up before the election.

Immediately after the election, speculation focused on a parliamentary coalition of the Coalition Party and Rural Union, and the Reform Party, but this move foundered on the latter’s opposition to farm subsi- dies. Ultimately, the Coalition Party and Rural Union agreed to a coalition with the Center Party, with Vahi as Prime Minister.

While the election results indicate the desire of many voters to slow the pace of free market reform and for more government concern for persons who suffer economically from the reforms, most observers consider it unlikely that Estonia will make a major turn away from the economic policies that have made the country the most prosperous of the former de facto Soviet republics.

STATUS OF NON-CITIZENS Residence Permits: Since initiated in 1994, the registration process whereby non-citizens in Estonia apply for residence permits has been marked by “delays and confusion” and “carelessness and omissions by the pertinent authorities.”1

In any event, as of March 1995, approximately 200,000 to 250,000 non-citizens remain without legal residence permits and have until July 12, 1995, the date when the old Soviet passports become invalid, to regularize their status in Estonia.2 Without residence permits, these non-citizens — mostly ethnic Russians who moved into Estonia during the incorporation into the Soviet Union — may be subject to “an order to exit Estonia.”

The Estonian “Law on Aliens” prescribes for non-citizens the requirements for acquiring residence permits, work permits, and aliens’ passports. When the law was passed in the summer of 1993, many non- citizens saw the law as discriminatory and there followed a spate of unrest and threats of violence, espe- cially in the heavily ethnic-Russian northeast. With suggestions from the OSCE and the Council of Europe, the Riigikogu amended the bill to theoretically provide a more secure status for persons who had arrived before July 1990, at which time the Estonian SSR passed its first post-1940 immigration law.3 With these amendments, the situation settled down somewhat.

1Country Reports on Human Rights Practice, 1994. U.S. Department of State; Estonian delegation to the OSCE Permanent Committee, May 12, 1995. 2.For an review of the ethnic Russian presence in Estonia, see the “Russians in Estonia” chapter of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe publication “Minority Rights, Problems, Parameters, and Patterns in CSCE Context, 1991. 3.For a detailed description of the events surrounding passage of the Aliens Law, see the Commission report “Human Rights and Democratization in Estonia,” September 1993.

2 In a subsequent decision, the Estonian government interpreted the Law on Aliens to mean that the majority of non-citizens were only eligible for temporary three-year residence status instead of immediate permanent residence, as had been recommended by the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minori- ties. Estonian authorities claimed that this policy conformed to that of other European states;4 the other reason for extending such limited status, it was frankly admitted, was to prevent non-citizens from using permanent residence status to bring in relatives from Russia.

At the moment, applicants for residence permit applications are being told by Estonian officials that the issuing process may take up to a year. This increases anxiety among applicants that some officials might be looking for excuses to reject applications. On the other hand, the bureaucratic difficulties involved in a computer-poor country such as Estonia need to be taken into account.

There are reports that applicants for residence permits are being told by some local officials that “you will need a passport in which to put the residence stamp” when it is issued. If this requirement is true, and unless the Estonian government reverses present policy and issues aliens’ passports en masse to its non- citizens (see below), it could cause problems when the residence permits are issued. Many applicants are unlikely to meet the requirements for Estonian citizenship in the near future, nor will they hold foreign citizenship. Russian law does permit former Soviet citizens to apply for Russian citizenship until the year 2001, but many non-Estonian residents in Estonia have no particular desire to become Russian citizens. International law proscribes compulsory naturalization.5

Estonian spokespersons note correctly that the United Nations has called upon Member States to reduce statelessness, and have used this argument to justify Estonia’s preference that non-citizens acquire some kind of passport/citizenship. Under international law, stateless persons do not enjoy diplomatic protection, and generally, statelessness is a status to be avoided. The point of U.N. documentation on the subject, however, is that states should make it easier for stateless persons to acquire the citizenship of the state in which they reside, rather than induce non-citizens to accept a foreign citizenship.6

At the same time, reliable sources report that “irreconciliables” in the ethnic Russian community have been trying to dissuade non-citizens from applying for temporary residence permits. Commission staff member was not able to confirm this personally in 1995, but based on staff member’s previous contacts

4.See, inter alia, former Prime Minister Mart Laar quoted by Baltic News Service, Tallinn, 27 April 1994. 5.Contemporary International Law: A Concise Introduction, Werner Levi, 1991, pg. 141. The position of the United States government is that, “as a general rule, no person should have the a foreign nationality forced upon him after birth without his consent, express or implied.” Quoted from a reply by the United States government to Preparatory Committee for the Hague Conference of 1930, P. Weis, Nationality and Statelessness, 1956, pg. 110. 6.Officially, the Estonian government does not recognize its post-1940 arrivals or persons born in Estonia during the Soviet period as “stateless.” Some Estonian officials have tried to claim that even former Soviet citizens who have not formally naturalized as Russian citizens are de facto Russian citizens. For an exposition of this position, see “We Need an Aliens Law” by Academician Endel Lippmaa, in Postimees July 5, 1993, reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), August 2, 1993. The OSCE has stated that “...the term ‘stateless’ is applicable to residents of Estonia who are not considered as nationals by any state, in other words to most of the non-citizens currently living in Estonia” (Mission Political Report #25, August 1993). The Norwegian Human Rights Institute report of March 11, 1992 asserts that: “Unless [former Soviet citizens] make use of the option to become Russian citizens, they are stateless...” For a detailed discussion of conferment and withdrawal of nationality (citizenship), see P. Weis, Nationality and Stateless- ness, 1956. 3 with elements of the Russian community still nostalgic for the Soviet Union, the reports are creditable.7 Moreover, many ethnic Russians themselves will admit to the Soviet-conditioned tendency to put off making decisions, such as giving up the familiar Soviet passport, until circumstance make it absolutely necessary.

Aliens’ Passports: The amended Law on Aliens retained a stipulation that aliens’ passports for foreign travel would not be issued to aliens who could obtain passports, i.e., citizenship, from another country. As noted, this stipulation excludes almost any former citizen of the Soviet Union living in Estonia until the year 2001. As late as August 1994, the Estonian Foreign Ministry stated that aliens’ passports would only be issued to “refugees” who could not receive them from their “homelands.”8 Instead of aliens’ passports, the Estonian government has been issuing foreign travel documents good for one departure and one reentry. At first, these travel documents were valid for six months, and then extended to two years to accomodate entry requirements of other governments. It can take up to three weeks to acquire these documents after application, and they do not permit the holder to reenter and depart Estonia without going through the entire application procedure anew.9

New Citizenship Law. Just before the 1995 elections, the Riigikogu passed, and President Meri signed, a new law on citizenship to supplant the pre-war citizenship law (with updates and amendments since 1992), which extends the residency requirements for citizenship applicants from three years to six. Theoretically, the provisions of the new law do not affect pre-July 1991 residents, but critics claim that the language requirements written into the new law are more stringent than those which had previously applied, and will, consequently, make naturalization more difficult for anyone who has not yet taken the language exam.

These policies have prompted representatives of the non-Estonian community to charge that Esto- nian officials are purposely constructing a bureaucratic mechanism designed to force ethnic Russians to accept Russian citizenship or be denied residence papers.10

7.In its statement to the Vienna OSCE Permanent Committee (op. cit. 1), the Estonian delegation stated that “...a number of Russian (radical) circles have appealed to foreigners not to return the application forms and thus disobey the Estonian laws.” 8.Some confusion surrounding the “homeland” of post-1940 ethnic Russians in Estonia may be occasioned by the erroneous assumption that the international community recognized Estonia as “occupied” under the provisions of Geneva Convention (IV) of 1949, which, inter alia, prohibits the transfer of civilian populations into occupied territories. The United States non-recognition policy was based on the “Stimson Doctrine,” in response to the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931. The Soviet Union acceded to Geneva Convention (IV) on May 10, 1954. In February 1993, the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe passed amendments to the European Covenant on Human Rights retroactively recognizing the Baltic States as “occupied”. 9.There is no specific requirement under international law that persons without national passports, i.e, stateless persons, receive aliens passports for unhindered travel abroad. However, the OSCE has on several occasions recom- mended that Estonia take steps to facilitate foreign travel for non-citizens. 10.Foreign Ministry spokespersons regularly declare the opportunities for non-citizens to “choose Estonian, Russian, or other citizenship,” but rarely mention the option of permanent legal residence. Note also the OSCE Parlia- ment Assembly Report on the Parliamentary Election in Estonia, March 5, 1995 which states, “At the same time non- citizens should decide which citizenship they wish to choose” (author’s emphasis).

4 International Response: The OSCE, the European Union, and the Council of Europe, along with prominent international human rights organizations, have followed closely the issue of integration of non- Estonians into Estonia. A fact-finding Mission of the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights visited Estonia in December 1992, and a permanent OSCE Mission was established in Estonia in February 1993 to monitor the situation and assist in developing dialogue between ethnic communities. The OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, has consulted on several occa- sions with Estonian officials and members of the non-Estonian ethnic community.

Unfortunately, when Estonia regained its statehood in 1991, most of the attention was focused on the demand by post-1940 arrivals and their descendants for automatic, “zero-variant” citizenship. The inter- national community has recognized Estonia’s right to reestablish its statehood and, as a sovereign nation, establish its own citizenship criteria. This focus on citizenship has obscured the real issue: clarifying the legal status, as closely as possible under international law and precedent, of persons ineligible for citizenship residing in Estonia following the demise of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the Russian government has engaged in overheated, and occasionally threatening, rhetoric from Moscow about “ethnic cleansing” and “massive human rights violations” against Russians in Estonia. Ironically, the Russian government has on at least one occasion closed its borders to ethnic Russians from Estonia not holding Russian passports, a policy that increases pressure on non-citizens to apply for Russian citizenship.11 Despite the allegations of “massive human rights violations,” Russians in Estonia have not emigrated in great numbers to Russia (to the undoubted disappointment of some Esto- nians), as they have from other former republics.12 Many are attempting to learn Estonian.13

INTERVIEWS

AMBASSADOR RICHARD SAMUEL, HEAD OF MISSION OSCE MISSION IN ESTONIA, MARCH 3, 1995 Ambassador Samuel, who previously headed the OSCE Mission in Moldova, had been in place for about a week. The Mission had been criticized by the Estonian government, not without reason in one particular case, for injudicious reporting, and for allegedly being more sympathetic to Russian complaints than to the broader problems Estonia faces as a result of the forced incorporation into the Soviet Union.

Samuel saw as a priority the opening up of good communication channels between the Mission and the new Estonian government following the elections. He said it was his impression that interethnic relations had improved since the pullout of Russian troops in late 1994; the Mission would continue to monitor relations between the communities, and specifically the residence permit situation for non-citizens as the registration deadline approached. He also noted that, given the change in circumstances in Estonia since

11.”Russia Shuts Border to Its Former Sons...for Reasons of a Technical Nature,” Izvestiya, February 14, 1995. 12.According to a poll released in Moscow, 92 percent of the Russians in Estonia intend to stay in the republic regardless of Estonian government policy toward them, Russian Information Agency, April 12, 1995 (cited in FBIS-SOV- 95-086), May 4, 1995). 13.See “Russians in Estonia Struggle to Learn Difficult Language,” Catherine Torrington, Christian Science Monitor, July 7, 1994. While the article quotes an Estonian diplomat stating that 40,000 people have passed the language exam since 1991, critics charge that the majority of those who passed are ethnic Ingrians, whose Fenno-Ugric dialect is close to Estonian. 5 the mission’s establishment in 1993, it might be appropriate for OSCE to consider changing the mandate, should the Mission be extended. Samuel said that the Mission has received complaints from non-citizens that they cannot travel abroad freely due to non-recognition by some countries of the travel documents provided by the Estonian government to non-citizens, but added that “there’s not a great deal we can do about it.”

MART PIISKOP, HEAD OF THE CONSULAR DEPARTMENT MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MARCH 6, 1995 Mart Piiskop said that there are 50,000 new citizens of Estonia since independence was re-estab- lished in 1991. Of these, 8,000 have passed the Estonian language exam for citizenship; the others were naturalized via other procedures. In the same time period, approximately 60,000 persons living in Estonia have chosen to acquire Russian citizenship.14

A little over 100,000 non-citizens had applied for temporary residence permits, at the same time applying for permanent residence, as permitted by law. The remaining 250,000-300,000 non-citizens, said Piiskop, have not filed for their residence permits because they fear that if they give up their old Soviet passports, they will be without any legal protection. Another reason, Piiskop posited, was that non-citizens might have been hoping for more sympathetic treatment by the new Riigikogu after the elections.15

Piiskop was emphatic that there is no distinction in terms of rights and privileges between temporary and permanent residence status (actually, temporary residents must have work permits, permanent resi- dents do not), and stated that no one was being refused a residency application on the basis of their being able, under Russian law, to apply for Russian citizenship. Asked about the status of the approximately 4,000 former Russian Army officers who, under the agreement with Moscow, are supposed to register with the Estonian government for repatriation, Piiskop said that only about 1,000 have registered. The remaining, numbering roughly 3,000, are “underground.” (On the same subject, an election official in Rakvere commented, “the shoulder boards have gone home; the people who wore them are still around.”)

LARISSA YAKOVLEVA, DIRECTOR, AND LEENA BLUM, ONSULTANT HUMAN RIGHTS INFORMATION CENTER, MARCH 6, 1995 The Human Rights Information Center was established in Tallinn in September 1994, with the sup- port of Danish NGOs, members of the Representative Assembly of Estonia (a group of non-citizen politi- cal activists representing the interests of non-citizens), and the Tallinn city government. Yakovleva and Blum are ethnically non-Estonian. They speak Estonian and hold Estonian citizenship.

While confirming that Estonian laws are “reasonably decent” taken by themselves, Yakovleva main- tained that various normative acts and interpretations of legislation on immigration, language, aliens, etc., produce a “packet” of intentional discrimination against non-Estonians, and an effort to limit the number of

14.According to the OMRI Daily Report of May 5, 1995, this number now stands at 71,000. 15.This anticipation of a more sympathetic political atmosphere may not have been misplaced. The portfolio of the Citizenship and Migration Department, which handles the non-citizen registration process, has been delegated to the Center Party, which is generally considered more sympathetic to the concerns of the post-1940 non-citizen popula- tion than the parties that made up the previous governing coalition.

6 Estonian citizens and induce them to take Russian citizenship. There has been no open, public discussion on pending legislation or concern as to the economic or social impact on individuals. Yakovleva reported that persons who applied for aliens’ passports were being told by Estonian officials to apply instead for Russian citizenship.

Blum pointed to a stack of complaints received by the Center from petitioners who charged that they had been granted Estonian citizenship, but whose documents were allegedly delayed in order to keep down the number of non-Estonian voters. This complaint was also noted in the ODIHR submission to the Riigikogu and National Electoral Commission.

ALEKSEI SEMYONOV AND HANON BARABANER, CO-CHAIRMEN RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT, MARCH 6, 1995 Since the re-establishment of independence, Semyonov and Barabaner have persistently criticized the Estonian government’s policies on naturalization, and interethnic relations in general.

According to Barabaner, even if Estonian officials worked assiduously from now until the July 12th deadline, they would be unable to do the necessary paperwork to complete the process for all non- citizens. In the town of Sillimae (about 96 percent Russian), they saw particular problems and increased tension if authorities attempted to penalize non-citizens without residence papers after July 12th.

Semyonov and Barabaner strongly criticized the new law on citizenship, the Estonian language re- quirements of which they consider more difficult than those previously applied.16 They also challenged Mart Piiskop’s assertion that temporary residence permits provide the holder with the same rights and privileges as those with permanent residence permits, referring to the requirement that, unlike permanent residents, temporary residence permit holders must have work permits. (see above).

Semyonov and Barabaner asserted that Tallinn wants non-citizens to accept Russian citizenship rather than grant them permanent residence status because a clause in the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty between Estonia and Soviet Russia provides that persons opting for Russian citizenship “shall leave Estonian terri- tory within one year of such option.” They claim that if the Russian Federation were to recognize the treaty, as Estonia has been seeking, Tallinn might demand the repatriation of all Russian citizens back to Russia.

When this “repatriation” issue was raised with the Estonian Embassy in Washington, D.C., the Em- bassy in Washington responded that Tallinn considers the treaty ratified and seeks Russian government recognition of the treaty, not re-ratifications.

16.Whether the language requirements under the new citizenship law are more stringent than previous require- ments is unclear. Unlike the old law, the new law requires knowledge of the “rights section” of the constitution and the Law on Citizenship. In a letter to the OSCE High Commissioner of December 23, 1994, Estonian Foreign Minister Juri Luik stated that “the current requirements have been included in the draft law without amendment.” In all likelihood, much will still depend on local examiners. At least two observers from the United States, including the author, have observed language exams being given, and have noted a generally lenient approach of examiners. 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Election:Based upon Helsinki Commission observation of this year’s parliamentary elections, the 1992 parliamentary election and presidential election, and even the Soviet-era March 199117 referendum on sovereignty, Estonia appears fully capable of conducting its elections in a manner consistent with inter- national practice and OSCE provisions. The only recommendation would be to strengthen procedures on preparation of voter eligibility lists, ballot security, and standardization of local observer accreditation. New citizens should receive their documentation by a reasonable time prior to election, lest they be denied the opportunity to vote.

In any event, it is time to take Estonia off the International Election Observers Grand Tour, unless to bring in observers from less democratic nations to demonstrate how the process can work.

Status of Non-citizens: The Commission recommends that OSCE, European Union, Council of Europe, and other concerned governments and international organizations:

1) monitor the issuance of residence permits to non-citizens, encouraging the latter to register and the Estonian government to conscientiously carry out the process without delay or pressure to acquire foreign citizenship; 2) reject Moscow’s rhetoric about “massive human rights violations” in Estonia as not corresponding to reality, and counterproductive; 3) urge the Estonian government to issue valid internationally-recognized travel documents to its non- citizens, as previously suggested by the OSCE, so that non-citizens may “leave and return to any country, including their own,”18 without unnecessary delay. Finally, in order to counter fears — or manufactured rumors — in the non-citizen community about the alleged repatriation implications of the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty, the Estonian government should publicly state that a policy of forced repatriation would not follow Russian recognition of the treaty.

POPULARITY OF PARTIES OR ELECTORAL UNIONS RUNNING FOR THE MARCH 1995 NATIONAL ELECTIONS PARTIES OR ELECTORALUNIONS 25January 27 February ** 1. Coalition Party And Rural Union* 28% 30% 2. Estonian Reform Party-Liberal 9% 15% 3. Estonian Centre Party 12% 13% 4. Moderates* 14% 7% 5. Pro Patria and ENIP Union* 6% 6% 6. Right Wingers 6% 6% 7. Others 22% 17% 8. No Answer 3% 6% * Electoral unions ** National survey of 2181 voters: 45% males 55% female.

17.For a report of observations of the 1991 referendum on sovereignty, see Commission publication “Presiden- tial Elections and Independence Referendum in The Baltic States, the Soviet Union and Successor States,” August 1992; also “Russians in Estonia: Problems and Prospects,” September 1992. 18.Art. 13, para. 2 of the U.N. Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948. 8 THE POPULARITY OF INDIVIDUALS FOR THE POST OF PRIME MINISTER (Who would you like to see as Prime Minister?) NAME PARTY/UNION JANUARY FEBRUARY Andres Tarand Moderates 33% n.a. Siim Kallas Reform Party/Liberals 12% U”lo Nugis Right Wingers 12% Edgar Savisaar Centre Part 10% Tiit Va”hi Coalition Party 9% Ju”ri Estam Better Estonia/Estonian Citizen 4% Mart Laar Pro Patria & ENIP 4% Jaanus Raidal Future’s Estonia Party 3% Ju”ri Toomepuu Better Estonia/Estonian Citizen 3% Vaino Va”ljas Justice 2% Kalle Kulbok 1% NAME PARTY/UNION JANUARY FEBRUARY NON-CITIZEN RESPONSE Edgar Savisaar 36% Andres Tarand 15%

FINAL COUNT AT 6:37 P.M., 9 MARCH: VOTES % LIST NAME MANDATES 174248 32.226 Coalition Party And Rural Union KMU” 41 87531 16.1885 Estonian Reform Party-Liberals RE 19 76634 14.1731 Estonian Centre Party K 16 42493 7.8589 Pro Patria And ENIP Union I&ERSP 8 32381 5.9889 Moderates M 6 31763 5.8744 Our Home Is Estonia! MKOE 6 27053 5.0033 Right Wingers W 5 19529 3.6118 Better Estonia / Estonian Citizen PE/EK 0 13907 2.5720 The Future’s Estonia Party TEE 0 12248 2.2652 Justice O~ 0 8146 1.5066 Estonian Farmer’s Party ETRE 0 4377 0.8095 Fourth power R 0 3477 0.6431 Estonian National League ERKL 0 3239 0.5990 Forest Party ME 0 1913 0.3538 Estonian Blue Party ESE 0 316 0.0584 Estonian Democratic Union EDL 0 1444 0.2671 others 0 540699 100.0000 101

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