8913Z the Cornerstone of Economic Nationalism

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8913Z the Cornerstone of Economic Nationalism The Cornerstone of Economic Nationalism: National Self‑image Robert Mikecz Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences ISSN 1674-0750 Volume 12 Number 4 Received: 25 January 2019 / Accepted: 25 July 2019 / Published online: 23 September 2019 © Fudan University 2019 Abstract The focus of this article is Estonia’s post-socialist economic transition and the reasons behind the liberal nature of the country’s economic policies. I argue that the self-image of a nation plays a significant role in shaping its economic policies. Objectives associated with economic nationalism can be achieved through various means that can include strategies of economic liberalism as well. Thus, the concepts of economic nationalism and economic liberalism are not a dichotomy. I examine the construction of the Estonian self- image through the discourses of radical individualism and industriousness, historical suffering, desire for freedom and return to Europe and sense of abandonment. By showing how these discourses interact with the liberal paradigm, I claim that Estonian policy-makers chose liberal economic policies because they perceived them to most effectively serve their objectives. When economic policies are examined in view of the national self-image and motivation of policy-makers, the incongruence between economic nationalism and liberal policies disappears. Keywords Economic nationalism · Liberalism · Post-socialist transition · Estonia · Baltic · Central and Eastern Europe 1 1. Introduction Economic nationalism is on the resurgence. Donald Trump, President of the United States recently declared that he is a ‘Tariff Man’ to whom national interests always come first. Brexit has dealt a blow to the liberal trend in global trade (The Economist 18.05.2019). Although Brexit has a strongly nationalist character, it is not a uniquely British phenomenon. Economic nationalism has gained strength in various European countries as well (Hopkin 2017). Even though both Donald Trump’s policies and Brexit lead to the rise of trade barriers, economic nationalism does not have to mean protectionism. Traditionally, economic nationalism has been associated with protectionism and mercantilism that contradict liberal policies with their emphasis on free trade and a passive, non-interventionist state (Baughn and Yaprak, 1996; Nakano, 2004; Abbas, 2017). However, Shulman (2000), Helleiner (2002), Pickel (2003), Nakano (2004) and Johnson and Barnes (2015), and Reznikova, Panchenko and Bulatova (2018) all provide evidence that liberal policies can be compatible with economic nationalism. The argument of this article is that the self-image of a nation is a crucial determinant of economic policy decisions. It defines the objectives as well as the strategies chosen. Depending on the objectives and the national self-image of policy makers strategies of economic nationalism can also include liberal policies. By using policy formulation in Estonia as a case, I show how Estonian national self-image has shaped economic policymaking in 2 post-socialist Estonia leading to policies manifesting features of both economic nationalism and economic liberalism. I analyse the construction of Estonian self-image through a set of discourses: radical individualism and industriousness, historical suffering, desire for freedom and return to Europe, and sense of abandonment. By demonstrating how these discourses interact with the liberal paradigm I argue that Estonian policy formulators decided to pursue liberal policies because they perceived them to best serve their objectives of regaining and maintaining their sovereignty, breaking away from the geopolitical, economic and cultural influence of Russia, and reorienting their economy towards Western Europe. To Estonian policy makers liberal policies were a tool to achieve their objectives of building a prosperous sovereign state. The structure of the article is as follows. First, the concept of economic nationalism and its manifestations are discussed. Then an examination of the Estonian economy will be provided followed with a detailed analysis of the discourses of the Estonian self-image and a discussion of how policy formulators actualised these discourses when legitimating their pursuit of the liberal economic policies. 2. Economic nationalism 2.1 Are economic nationalism and economic liberalism mutually exclusive? The drivers of globalisation – the advancement and diffusion of technology, the internationalisation of production, consumption, input and output markets, harmonisation of economic policies, and standardisation of laws and regulations across borders - all have a 3 significant impact on national policies and behaviours. The complexity of the world economy, the interdependence of national and regional economies through the extraordinary integration of the supply chain make it practically impossible to decouple a nation’s economy from the global economy. Private capital through its locational decisions (i.e. where to invest) can considerably restrict governments in their policy choices. International financial and economic organisations have contributed to the homogenisation of economic policies with their policy recommendations (Pryke 2012; Crane 1998). Hobsbawm (1992, 191) argues that “nationalism is historically less important” and claims the “decline of the old nation-state as an operational entity” in view of the “new supranational restructuring of the globe”. In other words, globalisation and the integration of national economies have been eroding the impact of nationalism. It is nations through their representatives at various national and international institutions that shape economic globalisation. In today’s interdependent world locational qualities – tax regimes, the state of the infrastructure, the economic, political and legal environment, spending on health care and education – are all largely determined by decisions made at national governmental level. “As states compete for global capital, we see intense efforts to play up the distinctiveness of local characteristics and competitive advantages” (True 2005, 202). Pryke (2012, 281) promotes the understanding of economic nationalism as a “set of practices designed to create, bolster and protect national economies in the context of world markets”. He distinguishes between “nationalist motivation of economic policy” and economic nationalism. Indeed, it would be political suicide for any politician not to dress up economic policies as in the ‘best interest of the nation’. As Hobsbawm (1992, 183) states, 4 “National economies… undermined by the transnational economy, coexist and intertwine with it”. To Baughn and Yaprak (1996), Capling (1997) and Berend (2000) economic nationalism is equivalent to protectionism as well as neomercantilism. Berend (2000, 317) defines it as “guaranteeing the command of native investors instead of foreign entrepreneurs, thwarting foreign competition in the domestic market by high protective tariffs and other isolationist measures…” In Hall’s (2005, 124) summation, economic nationalism mostly includes policies that liberal economists ‘disapprove’. Economic nationalism emphasises “the anarchic nature of international affairs” highlighting the central role of state-building and the “moral superiority of one’s own state over all other states” (Gilpin 2001, 14) contradicting liberal economic theory which underlines free trade and an economically passive, non- interventionist state. According to Helleiner (2005, 308), liberal economists have referred to economic nationalism to “describe policies they did not like”. This narrative of economic nationalism contradicts liberal policies – the promotion of free mobility of inputs and outputs, and non-discriminatory access to resource and output markets, which involve the dismantling of all forms of trade barriers. Liberal theorists do not dwell on the concept of nation or nationalism but focus on the role of the self-motivated individual and the betterment of free society through proactive rational individual effort unhampered by government intervention. 5 As multidimensionality of the nation is a common theme in the literature on national identity (Crane 1998), it is not unreasonable to expect a broad range of policies adopted by economic nationalists, including liberal ones. Numerous economic liberals in the 19th century were nationalists claiming that liberal economic policies were in the best interest of the nation (Helleiner 2002). Liberalism does not mean that the government should withdraw from all economic matters; as Hayek (1960, 194) argues, “it is the character rather than the volume of government activity that is important”. “The consistent liberal is not an anarchist” (Friedman 1962, 34) but intervention in economic affairs must be evaluated carefully on a case-by-case basis. Liberalism and economic nationalism do not constitute a dichotomy. There are numerous examples of economic policies bearing the hallmarks of both economic nationalism and liberalism. By examining the role of economic nationalism in the Japanese context of the ‘developmental state’ Hall (2005) argues that economic nationalism needs to be defined not in terms of policies but in terms of its goals and motivations. True (2005) analyses the interdependence between economic nationalism and globalisation in the case of the radical economic reforms that took place in New Zealand. She brings up the creation of Brand New Zealand, the successful marketing of the Chinese gooseberry as the kiwifruit of New Zealand around
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