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Sadc and the Angolan War

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Sadc and the Angolan War SADC AND THE ANGOLAN WAR Jackie Cilliers 1 SADC AND THE ANGOLAN WAR War by Proxy – Angola during the Cold War Angolans gained their freedom with large parts of their territory occupied by two foreign armies (from South Africa and Zaire) and with external support fuelling a bitter internal conflict between the MPLA, FLNA and UNITA. Despite the continued flow of arms, mercenaries and funds to the armed opposition groups, most countries soon recognised the MPLA government. But international recognition, even if initially not from the US (or South Africa) did little to buttress the domestic legitimacy of an MPLA government which was as brutal in Luanda as it was eventually to act in those areas where UNITA found its support base. 1 In subsequent years support to the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and eventually to the African National Congress (ANC) would ensure that South Africa remained deeply engaged in Angola, eventually occupying a buffer zone south of the Cunene River in Southern Angola. Apartheid South Africa took over where the Americans temporarily left off after the Clarke Amendment. The massive South African support to UNITA, abetted by the French secret service, a collection of US Arab clients and others, turned UNITA into a formidable fighting machine. In 1985, as Soviet and Cuban support of an increasingly overt Marxist MPLA became evident, the US Senate would repeal the Clark Amendment. South African and overt US support of UNITA increased - in tandem with the determination of the Frontline States and their allies within the Non-Aligned Movement to fight back. In parallel with negotiations on the independence for Namibia – a struggle intimately linked to developments in Angola - fighting between Cuban/FAA and South African forces in southern Angola intensified during the late eighties. While the SADF stockpiled equipment for UNITA in the Southeast, the Americans started providing an alternative stock of equipment in Zaire should negotiations for the independence of Namibia succeed and UNITA loose its southern support base.2 UNITA operations along the Zairian border soon increased. The Angolan Peace Process On 22 December 1989, the New York Accords were signed between South Africa, Cuba and Angola. Namibia was to become independent and while the Cubans and the ANC were to leave Angola, South Africa was to end its support of UNITA – although that from the US would soon increase. The United Nations was to oversee events. Having secured the independence of Namibia, pressure towards an internal settlement in Angola and a reduction in tensions in the sub-continent increased. Talks between the MPLA and UNITA were held under Portuguese auspices and following intense US pressure Dos Santos and Savimbi met for the first time in Gbadolite on 22 June 1989 in the presence of 18 African heads of state. The publicity aside, the subsequent cease fire quickly collapsed. Amidst fierce fighting six rounds of peace talks took place been April 1990 and May 1991 when they resulted in the signature of the Bicesse Accords in Portugal and a respite to the war. Portugal had also hosted the negotiations with observers from the United States and the Soviet Union – an arrangement to become known as the observing Troika. The Troika sought to marshal the resources and influence of the former colonial power Portugal and the respective superpower patrons of the MPLA and UNITA, but in the 2 process often supplanting the United Nations who would eventually have to accept responsible for implementing the peace agreement. Bicesse provided for a ceasefire, the disarming and demobilising of the armed forces of the MPLA and UNITA, the formation of a new national army with an equal number of soldiers from UNITA and the FAA, and for multi-party elections monitored by the UN. The MPLA would remain the legal government, responsibility for running the country while preparations for elections were made. The Angolan People’s Assembly subsequently twice amended the Constitution (during March 1991 and again in September 1992) and passed a series of laws to allow for a nominal multi-party system. Bicesse represented a triumph for American diplomacy. It provided UNITA with an opportunity to gain power through the ballot box – an outcome widely expected by the US and Savimbi alike. A small UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM ll) was deployed in a monitoring role under the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Angola, Margaret Anstee. In March 1992 the missions mandate was enlarged to include the observation and monitoring of the elections negotiated under the Bicesse Accords but remained woefully inadequately funded and staffed for the task. US support for UNITA through Zaire continued, however, and it would take six months for the US to recognise the elected government – by which time war had resumed. Against general expectations and with UNITA still controlling some 20% of the country, President Dos Santos, the MPLA candidate, won the subsequent presidential elections in September 1992 and, by the narrowest of margins, failed to achieve an absolute majority and avoid the legal requirement for a second round. The MPLA also won the legislative competition, receiving 54% of the vote, against UNITA’s 34%. UNITA had lost in all provinces except Benguela, Huambo, Bié and Kuando Kubango. Even before the results were announced Savimbi retreated to Huambo while government sponsored militias killed most of UNITA’s senior members who had risked being in Luanda at the time of the elections. Within a month the ‘Third War’ had started, lasting until November 1994. During this ‘War for the Cities’ first UNITA and then the MPLA appeared to gain the upper hand in a conflict that saw the destruction of a number of Angola’s larger provincial cities and a level of suffering not previously experienced in the country. During the first three months UNITA pushed the government out of nearly two thirds of the country – an achievement that could hardly have been possible without prior planning and logistical preparations. Not for the first time Zairian army units fought alongside UNITA inside Angola. During January 1993 UNITA pushed into the remainder of the diamond area in the Northeast, took the important oil town of Soyo and seized the strategic airport of Cuito Cuanavale. Huambo was placed under siege for 55 days before it fell to UNITA on 7 March. Thousands died and not for the first time UNITA seemed on the verge of victory. Inconclusive talks in Addis Ababa and Abidjan made little progress. The only change was diplomatic recognition of the MPLA government by the Clinton administration which subsequently also lifted the arms embargo against Angola. With more than a thousand Angolans dying each day, the UN imposed sanctions to forbid the sale of weapons or fuel to UNITA. The number of persons in need of emergency relief almost doubled over the course of 1993 and 1994. The economy had collapsed, agricultural activities ceased, commercial ties broke down, social services stopped and families were separated. 3 By the autumn of 1993 the military tide was turning and in November the following year Savimbi had to retreat from Haumbo. UNITA would retain control of a large portion of the diamond areas, however, which, by mid 1996 was worth an estimated US $1 million a day “ flown out to Zaire from the airports under UNITA control such as Andulo, Bailundo and Negage, despite the UN presence in those places.”3 The subsequent Lusaka Protocol was signed in Zambia during November 1994 following three years of shuttle diplomacy by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Alioune Blondin Bye. The Protocol was signed at a time when UNITA was under extreme military pressure and sought to build upon rather than replace the Bicesse Accords. Prior to the formal signing of the Protocol the government undertook one ‘final push’ to capture Huambo. It was not surprising that Savimbi refused to personally sign the agreement, leaving it to a subordinate. Dos Santos had no choice but to do the same – an ominous start to the peace process. The Lusaka Protocol provided for a cease-fire, a new national army, and four ministries, seven vice- ministries various provincial governors and ambassadors for UNITA. Savimbi himself was to have a ‘special status’ to be defined later. The 70 UNITA parliamentary deputies who won seats in the 1992 elections but never took them up, would return to Luanda to do so as part of a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN). The Protocol also provided for extensive reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA and provided for amnesty “ for the illegal acts committed by anyone in the context of the current conflict.” A detailed process was spelled out by which UNITA was to demilitarise and return those territories under its control to the government. A Joint Commission, consisting of the UN, the Angolan government and UNITA, with the United States, Portugal and Russia (originally the Soviet Union) as observers oversaw the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. But the Troika had proven to be a weak institution and apart from confusing the oversight role of the United Nations undermined the peace process when two of its members sold military equipment to the Angolan government while the third was widely suspected of covertly funding UNITA. Compared to the previous UN mission, UNAVEM lll was large, costing some US $1,5 billion over four years and had as many as 7 000 troops in Angola. Despite the commitment by the international community the peace process started to unravel literally from the start. Not only was it delayed in deployment, but the UN systematically also refused to acknowledge breaches of the Accord by both parties.
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