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SPECIAL REPORT 1200 17Th Street NW, Suite 200 • Washington, DC 20036-3011 • Vox 202.457.1700 • Fax 202.429.6063 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org SPECIAL REPORT 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200 • Washington, DC 20036-3011 • vox 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPORT John Prendergast This Special Report results from John Prendergast’s trip to Angola and neighboring countries during September 1999. He met with Angola’s Deadly War representatives of the Angolan government, Angolan civil society, the diplomatic community, and international nongovernmental organizations. This is the fourth in a series of Special Reports on Dealing with Savimbi’s African conflicts authored or coauthored by Pren- dergast since he left the National Security Council staff. This report was written before he joined the Hell on Earth State Department as a special advisor to Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Susan Rice. Previous reports focused on the Horn of Africa, the DRC, and Rwanda and Burundi. Briefly… The views expressed in this report do not • The rebel organization National Union for the Total Independence of Angola necessarily reflect those of the United States (UNITA) has plunged Angola back into a recurring nightmare of war and human Institute of Peace, which does not advocate rights depredations. Dissatisfied with any scenario in which he is not Angola’s specific policies. president, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi has chosen war over peace, for the second time this decade. October 12, 1999 • Two hundred people are dying every day. With many more people in need of assis- tance than in Kosovo, and higher mortality rates than in East Timor, Angola is the CONTENTS world’s deadliest war. 2 Introduction • Fabulous natural resource wealth provides blank checks for the continued prose- 3 Renewed Warfare Erupts cution of the war by UNITA and the government. 5 Finding the Path to Peace • Because Angola provides 7 percent of U.S. daily imports of oil, a figure that could 7 Promoting Transparency and double in the next five years, the United States has a direct national security inter- Good Government est in the stability of the country. 7 Advocating for Human Rights • Given the obstacles to immediately resuming negotiations to end the war, a peace strategy must be supported, which could include promoting quiet cross- 8 Building Peace Through line contacts, aggressively enforcing sanctions against UNITA, and engaging with Economic Development the government on good governance, human rights, and institution building. 8 Enhancing Security 9 The Way Ahead 2 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE Introduction The United States Institute of Peace is an Despite a $1.5 billion peacekeeping operation and the tremendous potential a peace- independent, nonpartisan federal institution time economy could unlock, Angola has descended back into Africa’s most deadly war created by Congress to promote research, for the fourth time in the last four decades. The rebel UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi has education, and training on the prevention, decided for the second time this decade that war is a better option than peace, choos- management, and resolution of international ing to plunge the country back into war in 1992 after losing national elections and in conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute 1998 after abandoning—after four years of uneasy peace—an internationally brokered meets its congressional mandate through an peace plan to which he had agreed. Savimbi again has decided that if he himself can- array of programs, including research grants, not govern the country, he will continue to endeavor to make the country ungovernable. fellowships, professional training programs, Better armed than ever, the Angolan government and UNITA rebels engage in conferences and workshops, library services, scorched-earth offensives, destructive sieges, and other tactics that primarily rebound publications, and other educational activities. on civilians. More vulnerable than ever, Angola’s civilian population continues to pay an The Institute's Board of Directors is appointed increasingly heavy price. by the President of the United States and The international community and the Angolan government face a bitter conundrum, confirmed by the Senate. no less difficult than that faced in Sierra Leone with its revolution by amputation. After Savimbi and UNITA walked away from two peace agreements this decade, should he continue to be viewed as a credible negotiating partner? Or should the war option be played out in full, with the military defeat of UNITA—as elusive as that goal surely is— BOARD OF DIRECTORS becoming the sole path to future stability? Or is there a middle option, perhaps hard to envisage now, in which other elements of UNITA beneath Savimbi are engaged diplo- Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Schlesinger Professor of matically in order to lay the foundation for a future peace agreement beyond Savimbi’s Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service, capacity to destroy? Georgetown University • Max M. Kampelman, Esq. Before attempting to answer these questions, it is important to explore the current (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and context. Angola is a country of extreme contraditions. It is one of the fifteen poorest Jacobson, Washington, D.C. • Dennis L. Bark, countries in the world, despite fabulous mineral riches. Billions of dollars worth of dia- Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, monds and oil are exported each year, while the war causes 200 people to die every Revolution and Peace, Stanford University • day from hunger and ill health. The latest series of signature bonuses (standard prac- Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, tice throughout the world), paid to the government by oil companies for the right to University of Notre Dame • Seymour Martin explore one of the largest untapped reserves in the world, provide nearly $1 billion in Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason new resources, much of which will be utilized to finance the war effort. Over the last University • W. Scott Thompson, Director, International decade, UNITA has sold over $4 billion worth of diamonds, despite United Nations Development Studies, Fletcher School of Law (UN) Security Council sanctions. This wealth has helped purchase one of the most and Diplomacy, Tufts University • Allen Weinstein, highly militarized countries on earth, peppered with 10 million landmines and up to President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C. • 100,000 amputees. Angola stands alone at the top of UNICEF’s Child Risk Measure, Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Israel which examines the risk of death, malnutrition, abuse, and development failure for Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C. children worldwide. MEMBERS EX OFFICIO: The future development of the country is being mortgaged in exchange for weapons Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State • and for foreign currency, which often finds its way into private bank accounts. This “war Daniel H. Simpson, Vice President, National Defense of dispossession,” according to the Grupo Angolano de Reflexao para a Paz (GARP, a civil University • Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary society peace advocacy organization), “makes everybody vulnerable in the face of the of Defense for Policy • Richard H. Solomon, power of the gun.” The war in Angola has raged for nearly forty years, whereas the aver- President, U.S. Institute of Peace (nonvoting) age Angolan is only seventeen years old. Thus, over 80 percent of the population has never experienced an Angola at peace. The war has produced twice the number of people in need of assistance as there are in Kosovo. Two million Angolans have fled their homes and suffer from a lack of basic amenities, while up to 3 million remain inaccessible to humanitarian agencies. Economic dislocation continues to increase, as inflation and a free-falling Angolan kwanza con- tinue to eat away at purchasing power and domestic investment. The UN Food and Agri- cultural Organization says that Angola is in the worst shape of the sixteen countries receiving emergency food assistance worldwide. Angola’s Deadly War: Dealing with Savimbi’s Hell on Earth — United States Institute of Peace Special Report — October 12, 1999 3 The conflict in Angola sends sonic waves throughout the region, dramatically affect- ing neighboring countries and forcing governments to choose allegiances. Angolan war- ring parties have changed or shaken governments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Congo-Brazzaville, Namibia, and Zambia. For example, the Angolan gov- Over the last five years, UNITA ernment intervened decisively in both the DRC and Congo-Brazzaville wars in 1997 in was able to rearm and support of the eventual victors, in both cases overthrowing governments deemed too supportive of UNITA. For its part, UNITA recently diverted some ammunition to sepa- resupply—during ratists in Namibia’s Caprivi Strip as punishment for the Namibian government’s alliance implementation of the with the Angolan government. This led to a series of military confrontations. The result- ing crackdown by authorities led to charges against the Namibian army and police for 1994 Lusaka Protocol peace human rights violations. UNITA’s low-cost, low-risk strategy sends the message to gov- agreement and despite ernments throughout the region that if they cozy up to the Angolan government, there international sanctions— will be consequences. Over the last five years, UNITA was able to rearm and resupply—during implementa- because of a robust network tion of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol peace agreement and despite international
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