A Lost Chance for Peace: the Bicesse Accords in Angola
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Conflict&Security A Lost Chance for Peace The Bicesse Accords in Angola Virginia Page Fortna In 1991, the combatants in Angola’s longstanding civil Virginia Page Fortna is Assistant war signed a peace agreement. But the country was soon Professor of Political back at war in a conflict that would grind on for another Science at Columbia University. She is cur- decade. Three particular problems in the peace process rently a Visiting Schol- led to the failure of Angola’s first “best chance for ar at the American 1 Academy of Arts and p e a c e . ” First, the peacekeeping mission was extre m e l y Sciences. limited, partly because the international community hoped to keep peace as cheaply as possible. Second, issues of “spoiler” management were handled poorly due to the assumption that União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UN I TA) would win the elections and that the Movimento Popular de Libertacão de Angola (MPLA) would not be able to contest the win by forc e . T h i rd, elections were held before demobilization, era d i- cating any incentive that the electoral loser, Jonas Savim- bi, had to end the war, thereby squandering the interna- tional community’s only effective leverage. This combi- nation of mistakes proved disastrous for Angola and added substantial difficulty to subsequent attempts to achieve peace. Eleven years later, the international com- munity and the Angolan parties should reflect upon the failed peace of the past in order to take advantage of Sav- imbi’s death and further the peace process today. Winter/Spring 2003 [7 3 ] A LOST CHANCE FOR PEAC E Background. Co n t e m p o ra r y An g o l a T he Peace Agreement . Th re e has never known stable peace; civil war tenets comprised the Bicesse Accords: a erupted on the heels of the war of liber- ce a s e - f i r e supervised jointly by the two ation from the Portuguese. What started Angolan parties; the demobilization of as a three-way fight among rival national- MPLA and UNI T A forces in order to ist groups ended as a war between the cr eate an integrated national army; and governing MPLA, led since 1979 by Pres - multi-party elections. A Joint Pol i t i c a l - ident José Eduardo dos Santos, and Military Commission (CCPM) was UNI T A, led by Jonas Savimbi. The con- established to oversee the peace process. flict was primarily a struggle for control It consisted of rep r esentatives from the of the state and the country’s rich oil, MPLA and UNI T A, with the UN and the diamond, and mineral res o u r ces, rat h e r “Troika”—Portugal, the United States, than an ethnic or identity conflict.2 Th e and the Soviet Union—participating as conflict was expressed in Cold War ideo- observers. Unlike the arrangements in logical terms: the MPLA espoused social- many other peacekeeping cases, imple- ism, and was backed by both the Soviet mentation of the Accords was primari- Union and Cuba, while UNI T A took an ly the responsibility of the belligerents. anti-communist line, winning support The UN peacekeeping observation mis- from the United States and South sion, UNAVEM II, was mandated only Af r i c a . 3 In 1988, as Cold War tensions to monitor the progress of the Angolan waned, Cuba and South Africa agreed to process. Although the UN was eventu- wi t h d r aw troops and cease military activ- ally called on to play a more substantial ity in Angola. Within a few years, the role, it was severely limited by having to stalemate on the battlefield, U.S. and work through the unwieldy CCPM. Soviet pres s u r e, and Portuguese media- The Bicesse agreement was a tall tion induced dos Santos and Savimbi to order on a very tight timetable, allow- sign the Accordos de Paz para Angola, ing only 16 months between the signing often called the Bicesse Accords . 4 of the Accords and elections. In that When the Accords were signed in May time the country, whose infrastructure 1991, Angola was not viewed as a partic- was in shambles, had to demobilize ularly difficult peacekeeping case. This 150,000 troops, form a new army, overly optimistic assessment was a res u l t extend government authority to the of the previous success of the United o n e - t h i rd of the country held by Nations during Cuba’s withdrawal from UNITA, and implement voter registra- Angola, external support for peace by tion and polling. Furthermore, major the superpowers whose rivalry had dri- components of the agreement had not ven the war, and the non-ethnic, non- been fully resolved. A telling section of secessionist character of the war. As the Accords entitled “Concepts for Angola was rich in natural res o u r ces, it Issues Still Pending between the Gov- was hoped that they would pay for much ernment and UN I TA” enumera t e d of the peace implementation. However, demobilization logistics, specifics of this initial underestimation of the situa- creating a neutral police force, and tion coupled with the failure of Angola’s details about who would setup the first real chance for peace, made subse- army. Quarrels over these details, espe- quent attempts much more difficult. cially the creation of the police force, [7 4] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs F O R T NA Conflict&Security quickly undermined trust and cooper- ther the United States nor the Soviet ation within the CCPM.5 Me a n w h i l e , Union viewed Angola as a high priori- technical difficulties, resulting from ty. The primary work of maintaining woefully inadequate time and res o u rc e s , peace fell to the UN, even though it provided excuses for deliberate non- had played a minimal role in the nego- compliance by both parties. tiations. Both the peace accords and The Bicesse Agreement was a tall orde r on a very tight timetable. The president was to be elected by a the UN Security Council gave majority of the people, while the Nation- UNAVEM II a restricted mandate: al Assembly was to be elected through a strictly to observe the work of the system of proportional rep re s e n t a t i o n . CCPM, not to keep peace dire c t l y . The Accords established a National Elec- Because the belligerents had protested to r al Commission consisting of UNI T A against extensive outside involvement, and MPLA rep r esentatives to oversee the UNAVEM’s mandate was overly limited. elections. UNAVEM was later asked to The MPLA was particularly touchy about help monitor these elections. so v e r eignty issues and presumably feared In retrospect, many have argued that a a pro-UNI T A bias on the part of the major flaw of the Bicesse Accords was the U.S.-dominated international commu- “w i n n e r - t a k e-all” presidential contest, as nity. UN I TA, on the other hand, opposed to a power-sharing arran g e - seemed to want to avoid a strong pres - me n t . 6 Both sides, however, saw the elec- ence that would enforce the demobiliza- tions as a chance to win at the ballot box tion provisions of the agreement. The what they could not win on the battle- international community, feeling the field: legitimate power to rule Angola st r ain that new missions would impose, alone. Neither party desired to share was all too happy with preserving peace as power, and the United States, believing inexpensively as possible.8 its proxy would win, did not push for it. The res o u r ces provided for imple- Only when it appeared that UNI T A menting the Bicesse Accords were might lose did outside mediators begin to in c r edibly limited given Angola’s vast size pr ess for power-sharing arran g e m e n t s . 7 and the inaccessibility of most of the country. The initial 18-month allocation Implementing Bicesse. External for UNAVEM II was $132.3 million for a involvement prolonged the war for country of 12 million people.9 The mis- years, but when it came time to imple- sion consisted of 350 military observers, ment the peace, Angolans were left 126 police observers, an electoral divi- largely to their own devices. While sion of 400 poll monitors, and a civilian there was support in principle from the staff of 242.10 Co m p a r e this with 4,650 Troika, its role on the ground was lim- troops, 1,500 police monitors, an elec- ited. Portugal was less active in imple- to r al team of 900, and the $368.5 mil- mentation than in mediation, and nei- lion spent in about 1 year in Namibia, a Winter/Spring 2003 [7 5] A LOST CHANCE FOR PEAC E country with 1/8 the population of Estimates indicate that the MPLA kept Angola. This lack of spending ref l e c t e d 10,000 troops mobilized, while the reluctance of those paying the bill UNITA kept 30,000.12 Two days before rather than a genuine or realistic assess- the elections, 65 percent of MPLA’s ment of what Angola needed. troops had demobilized, but only 26 Implementation was behind schedule p e rcent of UN I TA’s had.